October 2007 O Volume 1 O Issue 5

PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL Policy Insight

Shaping the Policy Priorities for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

early 80 percent of all violent conflicts from Policy Insight examines one of the most pressing 1989 to 2002 can be categorized as internal issues in post-conflict reconstruction: how to pri- N 1 conflicts or civil . Most occurred in oritize and sequence political, social, and economic underdeveloped countries plagued by widespread policies to enable post-conflict countries to sustain insecurity, bad governance, illiteracy, poor health, peace and reduce the reoccurrence of violence. and the absence of basic infrastructure in transpor- Anga R. Timilsina, Ph.D. Doctoral Fellow tation and communications. Peace, once obtained Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Pardee RAND Graduate in these places, has proved difficult to sustain. Challenges and Opportunities School (September 2001–June 2007) Thirty-one percent of conflicts resume within 10 Peacekeeping operations that combine military, years of the initial ceasefire. African conflicts are political, and development roles may be more even more prone to reignite: Half of African peace effective than traditional peacekeeping operations. restorations last less than a decade.2 However, today’s multilateral, multisectoral, multi- In response, the United Nations (UN), the leveled, and multistaged interventions have created , and other international players new challenges in the governance and coordination revamped their approaches in the 1990s, expand- of the overlapping organizations involved in post- ing peace-building activities and adding “multi- conflict reconstruction. James Dobbins Director dimensional,” military-based peace enforcement Despite these challenges, there are some real RAND International Security and Defense to their traditional focus on humanitarian relief, opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of Policy Center infrastructure restoration, and political rehabilita- post-conflict reconstruction programs, and the tion.3 But the policy challenges are immense. This international community has demonstrated its willingness to engage in such efforts. Since 1989, Figure 1. Countries Emerging from and Experiencing the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of these Large-Scale Violence (1989–2004) missions have steadily risen. In the 40-year period from 1948 to 1988, the UN led 15 peacekeep- ing operations around the world; in the 10-year span from 1989 to 1999, however, that number jumped to 31.4 The United States, North Atlantic The Pardee RAND Graduate Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European School is a recognized leader in doctoral education Union (EU) have adapted to the new environment in policy analysis. Using a multidisciplinary approach, by increasing their responsibilities for peace and students and faculty examine security. Since 1989, on average, a new U.S.-led a wide range of policy issues, 5 including health, education, intervention has been launched every other year. Corruption in Post- energy, public safety, and national SOURCE: Adapted from Large, D., ed., NATO has actively participated in the Balkans and international security. Reconstruction, Baabda, Lebanon: Lebanese Transparency Graduates pursue careers in Association, 2003. and ; the EU has played a vital role universities, think tanks, public service, government, and the 1 Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict 1989–2002,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2003, pp. 593–607. private sector. PRGS currently enrolls approximately 90 students, 2 Betty Bigombe, Paul Collier, and Nicholas Sambanis, “Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace,” Journal of African Economies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, drawn from more than 20 pp. 323–348. countries around the world. 3 The traditional model of peacekeeping operations focuses heavily on military tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones between hostile parties. These operations are usually carried out by UN peacekeepers who may or may not be armed and who are widely known as “blue helmets” or “blue berets.” Multidimensional peacekeeping operations involve a range of activities including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, , humani- tarian assistance, reconstruction, and public information. 4 United States Institute of Peace, “Peacekeeping in Africa,” Special Report 66, February 13, 2001. As of September 25, 2007: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr66.html 5 James Dobbins, “NATO’s Role in Nation-Building,” NATO Review, Summer 2005. As of September 25, 2007: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art1.html Table 1. An Analytical Framework for Policy Prioritization Policies Consensus (or Near-Consensus) Context-Specific Factors Prerequisites Reforming security Security is a top priority in all Nature of peace agreement, A comprehensive reform plan; sector post-conflict environments and quality of existing security national ownership of reform institutions Downsizing military Resources, over time, shift to Existence of security threats Effective compensation and social sectors assistance packages Implementing land Transparency and accountability Extent to which land is a A competent and efficient legal reform are mandatory source of volatility system to handle land disputes Reconstructing Building civil service capacity What the preexisting situation An integrated package and a and reforming civil should start in the early phase and was like multiyear strategy for reform service continue Conducting elections Free, fair, and inclusive elections Whether elections are included Existence of important pre- are required in peace accord electoral conditions Implementing large- Planning should be a focus from Nature of devastation caused Improvement in security and scale development the very beginning; projects with by the conflict, and the exist- governance projects potential to secure or strengthen ing security environment peace should be implemented early Prioritizing macro- Controlling hyperinflation, solving The macroeconomic problems Sufficient budgetary support, economic policies exchange rate crises, and mobi- and prudent analysis of destabi- lizing revenues are immediate lizing effects of reform priorities

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the focused and in what order should they be made? Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Does the simultaneous introduction of political, Kingdom has played an important role in restoring economic, and security initiatives generate better peace and rebuilding Sierra Leone. results than sequencing these initiatives? Based on Maintaining and sustaining security is critical to RAND’s broader research on nation-building, we global and regional stability. Failed states can pro- conclude that how policies are prioritized and vide safe havens for a diverse array of transnational sequenced in the post-conflict reconstruction envi- threats, including epidemic diseases, terrorist net- ronment must be nonlinear, context dependent, works, global organized crime, and narcotics traf- and specific to the needs and requirements of fickers. Post-conflict reconstruction can no longer each country. Nevertheless, there are lessons from be viewed solely as “charity work” because it affects many cases of reconstruction that will help guide national and global security. policymakers in designing and implementing post- Most importantly, the cumulative effect of all conflict interventions. nation-building activities has been measurably beneficial. Several studies show that peacekeeping Lesson 1: Comprehensive security has proved to be the most cost-effective instru- sector reform is critical for establish- ment when compared with the costs of continued ing and sustaining peace. conflict and the toll in lives and economic devasta- Security and development are interdependent; i.e., tion such conflict entails. Although it is difficult to development fosters security and security fosters revitalize a failed state, the cost of doing nothing is development. But in the early stages of reconstruc- often higher.6 tion, security must be achieved first with the rec- ognition that if higher-order objectives are not met, Lessons Learned on Policy lower-order achievements will ultimately prove Prioritization and Sequencing transitory. Without a sustained improvement in the While there is general agreement about the cost- security situation, other reconstruction efforts, such effectiveness of international engagement in post- as relief efforts, political reforms, democratization, conflict countries, debates continue over the ques- economic reform, and reconstruction, are likely to tion of prioritization: Where should investments be fail. The resurgence of violence in East Timor in May 2006 (nearly seven years after the end of the conflict) is a strong case for making security a top 6 See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War,” Challenge Paper, Copenhagen, Denmark: priority whether a conflict resolution is a negotiated Copenhagen Consensus Center, March 26, 2004. As of September 25, 2007: http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_ settlement (e.g., Cambodia and Mozambique), a 2 230404.pdf forced settlement (e.g., Afghanistan and ), or the result of a successful independence movement concomitant reductions in staff and budgets for (e.g., East Timor, Kosovo). the military and civil service. These organizations Building a new police force or demobilizing often work at cross-purposes partly because differ- rebel forces is not enough. Security is likely to be ent organizations have different mandates; how- sustained only if reform of all major components of ever, the effectiveness of the overall reconstruction the security sector (military, police, and judicial and process can be significantly improved if there is penal sectors) is undertaken and an active civil soci- greater coordination among major stakeholders ety emerges with a capacity to oversee and monitor on drafting the mandates of peacekeeping opera- reform. For example, in a country where there is no tions; conducting needs assessments; developing competent and efficient judicial sector to ensure fair the framework for reconstruction; and developing trials and hold police forces accountable for their baselines, targets, and benchmarks to measure Elections should not actions, a newly trained police force is vulnerable to the success of peace-building efforts in the short, be viewed as an corruption, bribery, and . medium, and long terms. exit strategy because they do not consti- Lesson 2: Building inclusive demo- Lesson 4: Generate visible short- tute the arrival of cratic institutions is a prerequisite term results to convey hope and , which for sustaining peace. optimism to a war-torn society. includes a range of Elections should not be viewed as an exit strat- The restoration of essential infrastructure and ser- other components egy because they do not constitute the arrival of vices (e.g., roads, ports, airports, communications, such as civil society. democracy, which includes a range of other compo- energy supply, and education and health services) nents such as civil society. Thus, the international could significantly help normalize circumstances. community should not fixate on holding quick Large-scale infrastructure and long-term develop- elections but rather consider elections as a means ment programs should generally be implemented to build and promote inclusive, transparent, and only after sufficient security is achieved, vital gov- democratic institutions. The major focus should be ernance institutions and capacities are put in place, on creating electoral conditions sufficient to sup- and the economy is stabilized (although planning port an inclusive democracy, such as writing a new for such reform and some of the components of constitution and laws to guarantee political space these policies could be an early priority). for minority and marginalized groups; designing mechanisms for holding elected officials account- Lesson 5: Pay attention to vital pre- able; and promoting and developing a free press requisites before launching any and a strong civil society. ambitious reform programs. Sweeping civil service reform and rapid military Lesson 3: Ensure greater coordina- downsizing can be counterproductive if effective tion between economic and political compensation and assistance packages are not in reconstruction. place. And while interim arrangements to address There is insufficient coordination among the inter- land disputes during the immediate post-conflict national financial institutions (IFIs), UN agencies, period are essential for the settlement of return- and bilateral donors on various reconstruction ing refugees and internationally displaced persons, efforts. For example, UN missions are usually without appropriate laws and mechanisms, sweep- authorized to maintain peace and stability and ing land reform in the early phase of reconstruction are often mandated to demobilize rebel forces may hinder the effectiveness of other reconstruc- and reintegrate them into the state military. This tion efforts. In addition, some sectors or industries, results in an initial need for larger military budgets if privatized or liberalized early, may contribute and more government positions. On the other to economic revitalization; but without a greater hand, the IFI’s missions in post-conflict coun- political consensus for reform, sharp reductions in tries focus on reducing government deficits with tariffs, liberalization of interest rates, elimination of 3 subsidies, and sweeping privatization may destabilize coordinate effectively with each other. However, the situation politically by forcing people out of in some cases, the opinions of and decisions made work and disrupting entrenched economic actors. by the taxpayers of donor countries directly and In sum, doing policy “the right way” is as important indirectly influence the reconstruction process as formulating the right policy. of post-conflict countries (e.g., the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq). In other cases, international Peer Reviewers Lesson 6: Context matters but we geopolitics and political sensitivities can play an Seth Jones can make some generalizations. important role in deciding the length of interna- Political Scientist, It is important to bear in mind that the prioritization tional military intervention. For example, unlike in RAND Corporation and sequencing of policies should not be perceived the cases of Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, U.S. Francis Fukuyama Bernard L. Schwartz as a “blueprint” for rebuilding all war-torn societies. policymakers were aware of the consequences of a Professor of International The specific circumstances of each post-conflict longer military involvement, and thus preferred a Political Economy Director, International country must be carefully analyzed and the rationale “quick and short” intervention during the last two Development Program behind every conflict should be properly understood U.S. interventions in Haiti. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International for the sequencing of policies to work. However, It is doubtful that the aforementioned constraints Studies, Johns Hopkins generalization can help policymakers understand will diminish anytime soon, and thus it might be University under what circumstances a policy works best and worthwhile to consider what options the interna- how priorities should be set. Table 1 (see page 2) tional community has in a world where resources offers a framework that generalizes policy prioritiza- and political will are likely to remain constrained. tion and sequencing by summarizing the areas of consensus and near-consensus, identifying context- specific issues, and outlining the prerequisites needed Further Reading to implement the policy. Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, Santa Limitation: Policies Versus Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-557-SRF, 2007. Underlying Political Problems As of September 25, 2007: The failure to respond adequately and in a timely http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557/ manner to underlying political difficulties may even- Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew tually result in the failure of policies, no matter how Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga good the policies might be. For example, a political Timilsina, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, deadlock (e.g., Haiti from 1997 to 2003) resulting MG-304-RC, 2005. As of September 25, 2007: from political struggles can quickly thrust a country http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG304/ back into conflict. A crucial question is what to do if Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. the government or the major political parties no lon- Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and ger remain committed to their original agreements Anga Timilsina, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From and instead become an obstacle to progress. Germany to Iraq, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, Politics in donor countries also have an impact MR-1753-RC, 2003. As of September 25, 2007: on the reconstruction of war-torn countries. An http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/ ideal approach is to develop a reconstruction strat- Timilsina, Anga R., Getting the Policies Right: The egy in which donors provide generous financial Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries, dissertation, Santa Monica, Calif.: Pardee support from the very beginning of the process and RAND Graduate School, RGSD-222, 2007. As of stay involved for at least ten years, do not lay unrea- September 25, 2007: sonable mandates on the countries involved, and http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD222/ http://www.prgs.edu/ RAND publications are available at www.rand.org

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © RAND 2007

CP-521 (10/07)