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Free Will and Compatibilism Free Will and Compatibilism An analysis of Jürgen Habermas’ position in the free will debate. Paul Klaassen Student ID: S891472 Supervisor: prof. dr. R.H.A. Corbey Second reader: dr. B.W. van de Ven Master thesis Philosophy February 18, 2014 Tilburg University But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science… —David Hume Abstract. In this thesis I will discuss Jürgen Habermas’ position in the free will debate as presented in his article ‘The Language Game of Responsible Agency’. Focusing on his rejection of compatibilism between free will and determinism, my main argument is that non-compatibilist solutions, that is to say positions that do not present us with a definition of free will which is compatible with determinism, will necessarily fall within three categories: dualism, (greedy) reductionism, and obscurantism, none of them acceptable to Habermas. My core argument is that Habermas insufficiently demarcates the various questions relevant to the issue. The first question, whether there exists an irreconcilability between the moral and the scientific language game; and the second question, whether mind is ultimately part of natural reality. These are not equivalent questions, it nevertheless sometimes seems that Habermas treats them that way. Doing this enables him to pursue a weak form of dualism. In my view he notably uses the first question as an intuition pump in order to argue for a negative answer to the second question. I will argue that this does not follow. A language game that utilizes an intentional overlay will per definition not be reducible to a mechanical description of the same ‘object’. You will always be left with some sort of intentional ‘residue’. This, however, does not imply that our ability to project such an intentional overlay (the intentional stance) cannot be mechanically or scientifically explained. Habermas, on the other hand, means exactly that: that science cannot explain the phenomenon of free will. Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Situating the debate ............................................................................................................................... 3 1.2 Outline ................................................................................................................................................... 4 Chapter 2: The free will problem .................................................................................................................... 5 2.1 The space of reasons .............................................................................................................................. 6 2.2 Compatibilism ....................................................................................................................................... 8 2.3 Incompatibilism ..................................................................................................................................... 9 2.4 Dualism, greedy reductionism and obscurantism ................................................................................ 10 Chapter 3: Habermas ..................................................................................................................................... 12 3.1 Theory of knowledge ........................................................................................................................... 12 3.2 Irreducibility and interdependence of participant and observer perspective ....................................... 13 3.3 The limited scope of science ............................................................................................................... 15 3.4 A natural history approach .................................................................................................................. 16 Chapter 4: Habermas contra compatibilism .................................................................................................. 18 4.1 Switching between perspectives .......................................................................................................... 18 4.2 Reasons are not bodily states ............................................................................................................... 20 4.3 Context ................................................................................................................................................ 21 4.4 Evitability ............................................................................................................................................ 22 Chapter 5: Differentiating the issue ............................................................................................................... 24 5.1 Subjective (reflexive) free will and moral free will ............................................................................. 25 5.2 Mind as part of nature ......................................................................................................................... 26 5.3 Responsible agency as a language game ............................................................................................. 27 5.4 Different descriptions of the same system at different levels .............................................................. 29 5.5 Habermas’ intuition pump ................................................................................................................... 30 Chapter 6: Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 33 List of references ........................................................................................................................................... 35 Chapter 1: Introduction In this thesis I will discuss Jürgen Habermas’ position in the free will debate as presented in his article ‘The Language Game of Responsible Agency’1. Habermas was prompted to write this article by what he considers the resurgent scientism dominating the public debate. One of the things driving this scientism is the progress being made in neuroscientific research. This progress presumably leads to the replacement of the standard moral language game with a more scientific one. Moral concepts such as guilt, reasoning and punishment are to be replaced by such utilitarian notions as optimization, efficiency and conditioning. Presumable this new language game is more functional and better equipped for its purpose of social regulation. Subsequently, this replacement would lead to increases in the health and wealth of society, it may also lead to more solidarity and an overall more just society. Habermas is skeptical. His opposition to these kinds of scientistic trends constitutes a recurring theme in his philosophy. This is characterized by his turning against societal processes and philosophical ideas which produce or warrant an increase in systemization, or lead to a growth in technocracy. It is easy to make this issue into one of black and white, where either you accept the neuroscientific paradigm, including the subsequent change in our self-understanding, or you reject it, and adopt a dualistic stance on mind and brain. It is in this regard that Habermas’ integrative approach cannot be overvalued. He is opposed to neuroscientific claims that call for a replacement of our moral language game, but at the same time he also expresses an unbending devotion towards solidifying the status of free will. His valuation of free will is not compatible with the deterministic causality of science. Additionally, he also admits that dualist positions are no longer plausible in today’s world. This constitutes the central theme of Habermas’ article and also of this thesis: how can we understand ourselves as both natural beings operating along the strict causal laws of science, and at the same time as free beings possessing moral responsibility? Habermas’ offers one such solution. In actual fact however, an entire range of positions can be held on this issue, ranging from the extremes of hard-line dualism, to positions of greedy reductionism.2 I believe it is these latter positions of greedy reductionism, that derive their intuitive appeal from the successes of modern science, and that try to do away with our everyday concepts and intuitions, that drive people toward convoluted dualist systems which have no basis in reality. These greedy reductionist positions in effect lower the plausibility of common sense scientific explanations. Habermas’ position can be characterized as one such place where people turn because they are disillusioned with what they believe to be the scientific worldview. Among other things, Habermas’ article provides us with a refutation of several compatibilist positions. Compatibilism encompasses positions in which freedom and determinism are ultimately not opposed to each other by redefining the ideas concerned in a more reconciliatory manner. My goal in the present thesis is to elaborate on Habermas’ position in the compatibilist debate and, conversely, use this debate as a starting point to give a more in- depth assessment of the solution forwarded by Habermas. I will argue that non-compatibilist solutions, which do not result in a definition of free will compatible with determinism, will fall into one
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