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Home , Imam Ali Shrine, Risalah (fiqh), Shia clergy, The Twelve Imams

MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XVIII, NO. 1, SPRING 2011

AL-: ITS RESURGENCE AS A RELIGIOUS AND UNIVERSITY CENTER Augustus Richard Norton

Dr. Norton is a professor of international relations and anthropology at Boston University.1

l-Najaf, 100 miles south of al-Kufah in the seventh century. Accord- , is a storied city in ing to legend, ordered that his body be the history of Shia . It placed on his camel and that he be buried Ais the final resting place of where the camel knelt. Shia scholars Ali Ibn Abu Talib, revered particularly by dismiss the legend and cite revered sources Shia as the commander of the to establish that Ali instructed his faithful, the son-in-law and companion son Imam Hassan that he be buried near of the Prophet , and the first the resting place of revered prophets, and of the regarded by the Shia as the that he was buried by his sons Hassan and legitimate successors to the Prophet. Ali is Hussein close to the burial site of the bibli- beloved by Shia Muslims for his wisdom, cal prophet . The spot is in al-Najaf, his leadership, his immaculate morals and about five miles south of the city of al- his membership in the household of the Kufah. The shrine and that mark Prophet (ahl al-bayt). In Shia eyes, he is the burial site have long been important second only to the Prophet in importance. destinations for Shia Muslims. In contrast, Sunni Muslims2 view Ali as the Indeed, there has been a shrine on the site fourth and last of the rightly guided suc- for more than 1,000 years. cessors (or “caliphs”), who were chosen to Visitors — shoeless, of course — often lead the Muslim community in the years kiss the immense wooden doors as they following Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E. enter the shrine. The chamber containing The progeny of Ali and , the the mausoleum is alive with light from daughter of the Prophet, constitute the the glistening ceiling of crystal tiles. The imamate, the chain of infallible successors mausoleum containing Ali’s remains is concluding with the twelfth imam, who dis- massive. Intricate gold arches and silver appeared into in the ninth cen- grillwork protect the mausoleum. The tury. It is believed that the will one interior is bathed in a soft green hue, the day reappear and fill the earth with justice color of Islam, particularly associated with in the days preceding the day of judgment. the ahl al-bayt. Visitors utter prayers and Imam Ali was grievously wounded supplications as they press their right hands by an assassin in the Great Mosque of to the glass behind the grillwork. In recent © 2011, The Author Journal Compilation © 2011, Policy Council

132 NORTON: AL-NAJAF: ITS RESURGENCE AS A RELIGIOUS AND UNIVERSITY CENTER

years, daily visitors often number 75,000, peared into occultation in 970 C.E. and on important anniversaries as many Historically, most of the visitors to the as 3 million pilgrims may come to the Iraqi shrine cities have been from outside shrine. Important dates include the country, particularly and India; this 21, when Ali died; 10, when his form of pious tourism has been an impor- son Imam Hussein was martyred; and Dhu tant source of income for these cities. Even al-Hijja 18, when, according to Shia belief, in the late nineteenth century, there were the Prophet affirmed Ali as his successor, as many as 100,000 visitations by Iranians thereby establishing the basis for the imam- and Indians, many traveling by foot on dif- ate, a core aspect of Shiism. Annually, ficult journeys lasting many months.4 about 14 million people visit the city. Al-Najaf is not only an important Although all Muslims aspire to per- destination for the living. The vast Wadi form the pilgrimage (al-) to at al-Salam cemetery adjacent to the city is least once during their lives, visits to other the preferred burial site for Shia Muslims. hallowed sites are also a common feature The traffic converging on the city includes of popular religion for many Muslims. the corpses of pious, and tens of thousands Among Shia, visits to sites revered for of funerals are conducted annually. association to any of While the shrines of al-Najaf and are esteemed as devout acts. Al-Najaf is are unrivaled in Shiism, distant a primary destination for Shia, as is the shrines have transfixed the imaginations city of Karbala, about 50 miles to the of many Iraqi Shias as well. In his classic north. Karbala was the location of the epic account The Marsh Arabs, Wilfred Thesi- battle where Ali’s son Hussein, the third ger recounts that the Shia marsh dwellers imam and the most famous Shia martyr, of southern yearned to visit far-away fell in battle on the tenth day of Muhar- Mashad in Khurasan.5 In those days, half ram (Ashura) more than 1,300 years ago. a century ago, this was an arduous journey. Imam Hussein’s remains and those of his Pilgrims made the trip to visit the tomb of half brother, the esteemed warrior Abbas, the eighth imam, Ali al-Ridha, earning the are believed to be interned in Karbala, honorific title zaair (visitor) by doing so. where the honoring them attract Al-Najaf continued to be uniquely impor- a flood of visitors annually. After the fall tant, and Thesiger emphasizes that people of the Baathist regime in 2003, hundreds hoped to be buried in Wadi al-Salam cem- of thousands of celebrants walked from al- etery in al-Najaf.6 Najaf and other cities, towns and villages Al-Najaf may be best known for being to Karbala to mark the fortieth anniversary the resting place of Imam Ali and the site ( al-arbaeen) of Ashura, resuming of a grand cemetery, but the city is also a custom that was seldom permitted under revered as a center of religious scholarship, the former regime.3 home to one of the oldest educational in- Other popular Iraqi visitation sites in- stitutions in the world. The first religious clude Kadhimayn, where the tombs of the school () in al-Najaf was founded seventh and ninth imams are found, and in about 1057 C.E., nearly 150 years , site of the tombs of the tenth and before the death of Averroes, the renowned eleventh imams, as well as the location of polymath of Andalusian Spain. The found- the cellar where the twelfth imam disap- er was Abu Jafar Muhammad bin

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Hassan al-Tusi (d. 1068 C.E.), a Persian setting alive with debate and contention.9 who may have been inspired by the model The city has the feel of a university town, of a Sunni madrasa in Baghdad.7 Known with students arguing about first principles, in as al-Tusi, he is considered one academic cliques, pecking orders among of the outstanding intellectual figures of faculty and jealously guarded prerogatives Shiism. His madrasa was established about among the four grand who pre- 20 years before the University of Bologna, side over the seminary (hawzah ilmiyah). Europe’s oldest university. Among the Is- While the core beliefs of Islam, not lamic institutions of higher learning in the least the unity of () and the Arab world, al-Najaf is the fourth oldest. It prophethood of Muhammad and life was pre- after death, ceded by the It is no exaggeration to say that for many may not be University of challenged, Zitounah in Shia Muslims their understanding of piety is Tunis (eighth and practice derives from the classrooms renowned for century), the of al-Najaf. its embrace of University of the imamate Qarawiyyin and its con- in Fes, Morocco (ninth century), and al- ception of divine justice, which is under- Azhar in Cairo (tenth century). stood through the application of reasoned If the present-day Shia seminary in al- intelligence. Legal questions are resolved Najaf, usually referred to as the hawzah, through application of , or indepen- rests on venerable foundations, the impor- dent judgment, for learned religious schol- tance of the city as an educational center ars are supposed to exercise their intellect has fluctuated over the centuries. Prior to to determine the answers to questions that the establishment of Shiism in Persia by lie beyond the seminal principles of faith. the Safavids, Jabal Amil (in present-day Through ijtihad, Shiism reveals an inclina- southern ), Bahrain and Hilla (in tion for innovative thinking that is often southern Iraq) were centers of Shia schol- absent from Sunni scholarship, which is arship. With the collapse of the Safavid averse to innovative religious thinking. state in 1722, the center of gravity for Shia As Seyyid Hossein Nasr notes, there is a religious education shifted from Isfahan to greater affinity for the intellectual Karbala. Al-Najaf did not rise to promi- in Shia theology than in mainstream Sunni nence until the middle of the eighteenth theology.10 century.8 Qum began to challenge al-Na- The typical individual Shia lacks the jaf for preeminence by the late nineteenth training to conduct ijtihad, and therefore century, and the rivalry between the two chooses a senior religious scholar as his cities continues. or her authoritative guide (marji ) in It is no exaggeration to say that for matters of religion. Thus, the layman prac- many Shia Muslims their understanding of tices taqlid, or imitation of his or her marji. piety and practice derives from the class- This is considered to be a completely rooms of al-Najaf, which is not to say that independent choice; I know Shia families such knowledge is uniform or uncontested. in Lebanon where the husband is a muqal- Even a short stay reveals an educational lid (or follower) of one , while

134 NORTON: AL-NAJAF: ITS RESURGENCE AS A RELIGIOUS AND UNIVERSITY CENTER

the wife follows a different marji, and the Khamenei is favored.14 Among Lebanese teenage children may follow yet another. Shia, Ayatollah Fadlallah also enjoyed a One of the most revered senior cler- following rivaling Sistani’s, particularly ics today is Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in among educated youth and middle-class al-Najaf, but many others are followed, professionals, who appreciated his em- including Qum-based Muhammad Sadegh brace of modern and technology Ruhani, Iranian leader , al- as well as his compelling logic.15 In Iraq, Najaf-based Bashir al-Najafi, and, until his anecdotal evidence indicates Sistani is by death in July 2010, Lebanon’s Muhammad far the most popular marji. Hussein Fadlallah. A number of factors Sistani’s importance and power were influence an individual’s choice of a marji, not well understood in Washington prior including ethnicity, nationality, education to the 2003 invasion. Proponents of the and age, as well as social and political war often tended to exaggerate the secular developments. Each marji has written a inclinations of the Shia. They knew little risalah, or about Shia compendium Sistani issued a fatwa calling for a general religious of rulings on institutions a range of election and a referendum on a new and, in my practical is- Iraqi constitution, thereby thwarting experience, sues. Precise Washington’s plans to stage-manage deprecated data on the politics through U.S.-created provincial scholars number of who argued people who assemblies. otherwise. follow the For instance, respective grand ayatollahs is obviously former Bush Pentagon official Douglas not available, but the relative popular- Feith, a longtime advocate of toppling ity of a grand ayatollah may certainly be , blames Arab rulers and discerned. For instance, Faleh A. Jabar U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials estimated that Sistani and Ruhani each for ignoring and understating Sistani’s attracted about 40 percent of all Shias in importance. Feith evades admitting that 1992.11 Since the mid-1990s, Ruhani, who he dismissed contrary reports, not to men- questioned the process of choosing a suc- tion scholars’ assessments, as did many cessor to Khomeini, has been suppressed of his high-level colleagues.16 Sistani by the regime in Iran and was long under demonstrated his influence following the house arrest. His following may have U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. declined. Sistani may be the most popu- With the exception of a visit to London for lar marji in Iran today. One measure of medical care, the grand ayatollah remained popularity is the volume of religious tithes in al-Najaf, including during a series of that muqallids donate,12 and Sistani seems violent episodes. His offices (and those of to collect more than any Iran-based marji.13 Grand Ayatollah Mohammad al-Fayyad) My own impression is that Sistani enjoys were besieged in April 2003 by partisans the support of many Shia in Lebanon, of the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, but although among those Lebanese Shia who Sistani’s followers rallied to his defense.17 see Iran as a model state, Iranian leader Ali U.S. officials, not least J. Paul Bremer,

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tended to underestimate Sistani, at least government and coalition forces. The until June 26, 2003. On that day, Sistani fighting, which included battles between issued a fatwa calling for a general elec- guard forces loyal to Sistani and al-Sadr’s tion and a referendum on a new Iraqi con- forces, was eventually ended by a peace stitution, thereby thwarting Washington’s agreement facilitated by Ayatollah Sistani, plans to stage-manage politics through who once again demonstrated his unparal- U.S.-created provincial assemblies. leled authority. Although the neighboring For several years following the inva- buildings suffered considerable damage, sion, al-Najaf witnessed much bloodshed. the mosque itself was only superficially On April 10, 2003, Abdul Majid marred by stray bullets and shrapnel. al-Khoei, who had recently returned from The subsequent period has not been exile in London and had been cooperating free of carnage; in August 2006, a suicide with the United States, was brutally mur- bomber wearing an explosive harness dered by henchmen of Muqtada al-Sadr blew himself up near the shrine, killing 40 near the shrine of Imam Ali. Abdul Majid people and injuring more than 50 others. was the son of Sistani’s mentor, the Grand Periodic violence still threatens the shrine Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, cities and surrounding areas: in October who died in 1992. Another former grand 2010, a motorcade that included the top UN ayatollah’s son was assassinated on August official hit a roadside bomb just outside of 29, 2003, when a exploded next al-Najaf; and the following month, Iranian to the shrine of Imam Ali, killing al-Sayyid pilgrims were the targets of bombs near Muhammad Baqir al- along with the Shrine of Ali, as well as in Karbala. about 100 people. Al-Hakim headed the In January 2011, 75 pilgrims performing Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolu- the ziyarat al-arbaeen were killed in two tion in Iraq (SCIRI), which was also then separate incidents. Despite the sporadic cooperating with the United States. The incidents of terror violence, al-Najaf has culprit was believed to be Abu Musab been reasonably peaceful, particularly in al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), the al-Qaeda ally comparison with other Iraqi cities. who directed many of the most sensational According to the number of govern- episodes of anti-Shia violence in Iraq, ment-issued ration cards, the population including the infamous attack on Samarra’s is about 1,200,000 people, and al-Najaf al-Askari mosque in February 2006. appears to be thriving. Local businessmen In April 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr’s and entrepreneurs are enjoying an upsurge Jaysh al-Mahdi seized the shrine of Imam of pious tourism. The city has 80 hotels Ali but withdrew a few weeks later, after either in operation or under construction, taking heavy casualties from U.S. forces. and the flow of visitors from all corners Also in April, Grand Ayatollah Najafi’s of the Shia world has resumed. Plans are offices were attacked by gunfire. Then, underway to improve the infrastructure of in May, mortar fire hit the shrine, causing the city and renovate the shrine in order to damage to the gates leading to the tomb of make al-Najaf second only to Mecca and Imam Ali. On August 5, 2004, the Jaysh as a destination for Muslims. al-Mahdi again seized the shrine and used During a visit to the city in 2009, I had it as a military base for launching attacks the opportunity to meet at the shrine with against the Iraqi police, the provincial the chief engineer to review the ambitious

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plans for renovation. He referred to the Islamic jurisprudence, philosophy, history damages suffered during the era of Saddam or knowledge of the .19 Some of Hussein (“God’s curses upon him,” my in- the schools typically attract students from terlocutor added in Arabic). He then spoke a specific region, such as the Madrasat enthusiastically about the design of an es- al-Irawani, which serves Turkish students, planade to accommodate tens of thousands while others attract a more eclectic student of visitors. The plans, then in a ninth body. The oldest school is the Madrasat revision, were developed by two architec- al-Sadr, built about 1824.20 tural design teams, one based in Tehran at In the Iraqi context, the hawzah is the Shaheed Beheshti University, the other also a shortcut reference to the four grand in London. UNESCO is helping to fund ayatollahs who constitute the marjiiyya, the the renova- clerics whose tion. Some Our interlocutors often emphasized judgments are early-stage usually taken work will be that their role was to persuade people to to be defini- showcased by follow the best course of action, to provide tive by many 2012, when guidance, not to exercise power or govern. Shia. They the city has are Grand been desig- Ayatollah Ali nated an “Islamic Cultural Capital” by the al-Sistani, certainly the best known and the Organization of Islamic Cultural Ministers. first among equals; Grand Ayatollah Mo- A few days are hardly adequate to gain hammad Said al-Hakim; Grand Ayatollah more than a glimpse of al-Najaf, but I was Bashir Hussein al-Najafi; and Grand Aya- grateful to have the opportunity to visit in tollah Mohammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, who October 2009 as one of four Americans succinctly described the role of the marjii- invited by Iraqi officials.18 The senior reli- yya as offering guidance (ishraf) for citi- gious authorities in al-Najaf assented to the zens and state, observing (riqaba) respon- visit, and I gather that Grand Ayatollah Ali sible officials and unifying the population Sistani lent his personal approval. It was (tuwahhid).21 During our visit to al-Najaf, fascinating to see famous religious sites we were not able to meet with Sistani, but that non-Muslims rarely have the opportu- we did meet with each of the other grand nity to visit. The trip, organized wholly by ayatollahs for extended and freewheeling , was intended to allow a few Ameri- discussions. These scholars, each with cans to gain knowledge of the hawzah al- more than half a century of accumulated ilmiyah seminary, or “enclave of knowl- wisdom, sit at the pinnacle of Shia scholar- edge,” the Shia educational establishment ship. The youngest, al-Najafi, is in his late for which al-Najaf is renowned. In other sixties. Expounding on questions asked by settings, the word “hawzah” can refer to an their followers is part of their daily routine; individual religious school, but in al-Najaf they are accustomed to debate and well its meaning approximates the idea of a uni- practiced in serious argument. At times, I versity (as it does in Qum). In fact, there was reminded of the academic rigors of the are more than two dozen distinct schools, seminar room at the University of Chicago. each typically under the sponsorship of a Throughout the discussions in al- senior cleric respected for his command of Najaf, our interlocutors often emphasized

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that their role was to persuade people to fought periodically over the course of three follow the best course of action, to pro- centuries. The last Ottoman-Persian war vide guidance, not to exercise power or ended only in 1823. While Persian-Turkish govern. Either explicitly or tacitly, they disputes fomented Sunni-Shia tensions, contrasted Iraq to Iran, where official doc- there were also periods of disorder when trine involves the “rule of the jurisconsult” Karbala and al-Najaf thwarted Persian and (wilayat al-faqih, Arabic; vilayat-e faqih, Ottoman might.22 The Ottoman govern- Persian). Disapproval of this doctrine pre- ment insisted that its subjects contribute vails in al-Najaf, and it is well known that annual forced labor (amaliyya mukallafa), a number of venerable Iranian ayatollahs which was much resented and evaded, have challenged its validity. During the including among the Shia. Indeed, the October visit, a hawzah faculty member impetus for some of the Sunni tribes’ suggested that scholarship in Qum has suf- conversion to Shiism in recent centuries fered from being in the ideological grip of was to elude Ottoman exactions. By thus the regime rather than independent of state aligning themselves with Persia, they pro- power, like al-Najaf. Grand Ayatollah al- vided a context for discriminatory policies Hakim argued that the strength of the marji throughout the that pres- was to persuade, “to tell the politicians the age the current vilification of Shia by Arab best course of action,” and that “our advice leaders in the twenty-first century. to the secular politicians (almaniyin) is to Britain’s creation of the kingdom of be truthful.” Grand Ayatollah al-Fayyad Iraq in 1920 provoked the Iraqi Revolt, emphasized the role of marji in providing which the clerics of al-Najaf encouraged guidance and direction in the law and illu- as a , although Sunnis also partici- minating the path of Islam (sabil al-Islam). pated. The rebellion was defeated, and If the grand ayatollahs of the hawzah a Sunni monarchy was installed in 1921. keep politics at arms length, other senior King Faysal, the Hashemite prince sup- Iraqi clerics have not shared this reticence. ported by Britain, distrusted the Shia and For instance, Ayatollah Muhammad Bahr ruled Iraq to the advantage of the Sunni al-Uloum springs from a family well- minority. Al-Najaf was progressively known for its commitment to reform and marginalized. The British authorities, not education. After spending many years in least the indomitable Gertrude Bell, were exile as an opponent of Saddam Hussein, intent on breaking the power of the Shia he returned after the dictator was toppled. clerics. Bell alluded to them as “alien He was a member of the Governing Coun- popes” (most of the senior mujtahids were cil established in the summer of 2003 by Persian, not Arab) who obstructed govern- U.S. proconsul J. Paul Bremer, although he ment authority and the implementation “froze” his participation in August 2003, to of its secular agenda. As for al-Najaf and protest the failure of U.S. troops to protect Karbala, the cities were described by Bell Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, as permeated by a “baneful atmosphere.”23 who was killed by a car bomb in al-Najaf. In 1918, there were about 6,000 The fortunes of al-Najaf and the other students in al-Najaf, many of them non- Mesopotamian shrine cities have often Iraqis.24 The number declined for decades been hostage to geopolitics. Rival empires thereafter.

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Government-encouraged secular By contrast, the 1960s and 1970s are education reduced the incentives to seek a sometimes described as a “golden age” for religious education in the shrine cities. To the al-Najaf hawzah, particularly because meet the demand for a more relevant edu- of the leadership of Grand Ayatollah cation, the Muntada al-Nashr (Forum for Muhsin al-Hakim (died 1970). The com- Dissemination) was created by Ayatollah munity of scholars and students grew to Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar in 1935. The over 3,000. 29 new institute offered a modern curriculum Meanwhile, in neighboring Iran, the and an updated religious one.25 The Mun- “Islamic Revolution” toppled the shah in tada did enjoy some success; two widely 1979, and the fear of contagion became an revered figures studied there: Muhammad obsession of the Baathist regime, as well Baqir al-Sadr (executed in 1980), who was as of prominent Western officials. The instrumental in creating the Hizb al-, Iraqi government responded with yet more and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (died in intimidation, repression, arrests and kill- July 2010), the highly influential Lebanese ings. Non-Iraqi students fled, leaving the cleric.26 The Muntada, however, was closed people of al-Najaf to endure waves of piti- in 1958 and less tyranny. replaced by “It was a great mistake of the United By the late the state- States not to overthrow Saddam in 1991.” 1970s, only recognized [Al-Hakim] knew that Saddam would 600 students Kulliyat al- and scholars , which take revenge on the Shia and that a “great were found in lasted until hurricane” would afflict the community. al-Najaf.30 1991, when it In Sep- too was shut down by the Baathist regime. tember 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, imagining Over the course of the twentieth cen- a quick victory as the revolutionary regime tury, the numbers of students in al-Najaf struggled to consolidate power. Instead, declined, in some periods quite drastically. the war lasted eight years. By 1985, the Several factors drove the decline, in addi- number of mujtahids, students and func- tion to the pragmatic interests of students tionaries in al-Najaf had shrunk to 150, seeking work after graduation. After according to Nakash.31 After teetering World War II, secular ideologies were close to defeat, Iraq emerged as the vic- ascendant: variants of Arab nationalism tor in 1988 and within two years invaded — including Baathism and communism Kuwait to precipitate another . — enjoyed remarkable success in mobiliz- When the Iraqi army was driven out of ing Shia across the Arab world, especially Kuwait in 1991, many observers, includ- in Iraq and Lebanon. The secular regime ing U.S. president George H. W. Bush, in Baghdad certainly did little to promote expected Saddam Hussein to fall from Shia religious institutions. The clerics were power. When Bush called upon the Iraqis convinced that the secular state was the en- to rise up against Saddam, the 1991 inti- emy, and this perspective was not merely fadah was already underway in southern paranoia, as Arjomand notes aptly.27 By Iraq, but the core element of the regime’s 1957, there were only 1,954 students, power, including the , including 326 Iraqis.28 were largely intact. The rebellion would

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be brutally crushed while the United States could not publish. “We felt the support, the and other powers watched. Iraqi Shia hidden hand, of God,” he recalls. remember this period as “the betrayal” (al- Ayatollah al-Hakim speaks softly in a khiyanah). This betrayal hardly registered funereal cadence. He is riveting because in U.S. neoconservative circles prior to the his listeners cannot help but imagine all 2003 invasion, despite its deep imprint on that he has seen and felt. More than 60 the psyches of Iraqi Shia. members of his extended family died at State repression grew after the 1991 the hands of the former regime, often in intifada,32 as was often noted in the con- revenge for external opposition activities. versations that our group was able to have He remembers one night in 1983 when 70 with the members of the hawzah, especial- family members were detained. People ly with Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said were held without charges; sometimes al-Hakim, who reflected poignantly on charges were only announced when they this period. We met with al-Hakim in his were released or killed. When he or other simply furnished majlis. Like the facilities family members refused to cooperate with of his cohorts, it is found on a non-descript the president or his deputies, perhaps street, marked only by a metal barrier and simply declining to attend a state-organized few guards. Al-Hakim entered the room conference, retaliatory arrests would follow. slowly, carrying the burdens of his years. After listening to Ayatollah al-Hakim’s He was in jail during the 1990-91 war poignant narrative, I alluded to the truth and recalls one day hearing gunfire just commissions in South Africa and asked outside his cell block. Initially puzzled, him under what circumstances those re- after a few moments he understood that sponsible for the cruelties that he described his guards were celebrating that the regime might confess their crimes and enjoy some and those who served it would survive. level of forgiveness. His response left no He declared, “It was a great mistake of the room in this life for repentance or Truth United States not to overthrow Saddam in Commissions: “Allah is going to avenge 1991.” He knew that Saddam would take these sacrifices. The punishment of those revenge on the Shia and that a “great hur- who repent before Allah may be lessened ricane” would afflict the community. in the afterlife. But, in this life you cannot He recalls that in al-Najaf the “collect- avoid paying for your sins.” ed scholars…were less than in this room,” Al-Hakim then turned to the core which is to say, fewer than a dozen. Most responsibility of the al-Najaf hawzah: to significant scholars were jailed or killed. interpret God’s law. He notes that the in- Starting in the 1980s, the former regime stitution has continued for 1,400 years, and had a scheme to demolish the hawzah. the rules have been preserved. “We are not Al-Najaf had been deeply infiltrated by working to simply add to the heritage of agents of various Iraqi security elements,33 knowledge,” he insists, “but to be sure that and there were no students from outside some people are not judged poorly on the of Iraq. All of the students were asked to Day of Judgment. Like medicine, we are work harder and to research and study with trying to save people. If you decide to say sincere devotion to God. He insists that the something else than I have said, you will regime’s repression did not stop the schol- see the consequences [i.e., on the Day of ars from doing their research, although they Judgment].”

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Like many of the scholars in al-Najaf, Sunnis) are easy to understand compared al-Hakim emphasized that the depth of sci- to Shiism because Shiism continues its entific research carried out in the hawzah scientific exploration. “It is as simple was unique, as was its setting in al-Najaf, a as reading a newspaper to understand city linked to the Imam Ali, the command- the other sects since their laws stopped er of the faithful and the person who is evolving 1,000 years ago. We spend more second in importance only to the Prophet. time reviewing Shia scholars than review- He observed that, until the eighth ing other sects.” He did acknowledge Islamic century (fourteenth century C.E.), that some scholars () write from a the scholars were able to teach one another comparative perspective, but he alluded to morals and jurisprudence (fiqh), because this field with the enthusiasm of a classics those were simpler times. He pointed professor for pulp fiction. to the need today for specialization, due Al-Hakim left no doubt that he is fol- to the multiplicity of views that need to lowing events outside Iraq, including those be weighed and evaluated as “scientific in Afghanistan. He reminded us that there complications” proliferate. He used the are many Shia in Afghanistan (the Hazara), parallel of a heart specialist to illustrate the arguing that if the United States deserts the specialized knowledge that mujtahids must country, it will be a repeat of 1997, when now master. the (rabidly anti-Shia) Taliban came to Al-Hakim noted that he had no time to power in Kabul. His dour observation was study other Islamic sects. His responsibil- that the West was losing credibility. ity is to be sure that he doing what he can If al-Hakim was somber, Grand to save his people. Those who follow him Ayatollah al-Najafi was lively and witty depend on his scholarship to direct them by contrast. His majlis is a short walk to the right path. He recalls that Allah from the , not far from the instructs Muslims: “Don’t follow what you heavily guarded home of Ayatollah Sistani. do not know” (probably referring to Quran About a dozen South Asian students were 17:36). His priority is to serve his people meeting with him when our small group in order to save them: “I preserve the law,” arrived, but he welcomed us within min- he declared. To emphasize his responsibili- utes. Al-Najafi was born in colonial India, ty for avoiding error, he recalled his grand- but his family moved to Pakistan at the father, Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim. time of partition. He arrived in al-Najaf He recounted that one night his grandfather nearly 50 years ago. In contrast to Ayatol- was about to go to bed but returned to his lah al-Hakim, al-Najafi enjoyed a Socratic desk to correct an error in a document he style of engagement, jousting over ideas. was writing; he would not have been able Since his visitors were from the United to fall asleep knowing that, if uncorrected, States, he wanted to talk about terrorism. the document would mislead a believer. Dubious about how the label “terrorist” Other branches of knowledge may not have is used in Western debates, he was also heavy consequences if there is an error, but intent to note that people who use violence al-Hakim bears the weighty responsibility against civilians are not true Muslims and of saving people’s souls. do not speak for Islam — nor will violence Earlier in the discussion, he noted affect the principles of religious scholars: that the other Muslim sects (namely, the “Someone who devotes himself to the

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hawzah is not swayed by guns.” His com- al-Najafi then resumed, perhaps wanting ments about the double standards inherent to share his unusual visitors. He distin- in U.S. rhetoric about terrorism would be guished between two types of reasoning. familiar to anyone who has ever discussed The first involves the immutable laws the subject with an open mind. found in the Quran, , and Ayatollah al-Najafi was asked about the words of Ali and the other imams. The the rivalry between al-Najaf and Qum. He second, which preoccupies scholars such as began by commenting on the great efforts al-Najafi, is categorization: understanding required for scholars to become learned how to think about questions that do not and master their fields. He took the rivalry have clear a priori answers, such as wheth- between the two hawzahs as a given, er artificial insemination is permissible. emphasizing that competition strengthens Over the course of the discussion, al- the spirit and dignity of the person; com- Najafi made several allusions to the poor petition is essential for progress. Asked and underprivileged. What does he tell about the number of students in al-Najaf as someone living in horrible circumstances? compared to Qum, he replied predictably He answered that his responsibility is to that it is quality that counts, not numbers. create a true personality, a wise person Citing the Imam Jaafar al-Sadiq, the (insan), to separate lions from wolves, as sixth imam, al-Najafi stated that material- he put it. ism is bad and that people should instead In contrast to Ayatollah al-Najafi, worship God. Asked whether artificial Ayatollah Fayyad seemed a bit perplexed insemination was permitted in Shia Islam, by our meeting, as though — understand- he replied that men may not overcome all ably — he was not quite sure who we problems in life, and that people may not were. Ayatollah Fayyad is much respected get all they seek. After a graphic discus- for his erudition, and it is said that he took sion of the difficulties some couples face in on Muqtada al-Sadr as a student earlier in conceiving a child, he ultimately rejected the decade. He entertained a few ques- the technique as impermissible (as did tions, but he was intent on having us Ayatollah al-Fayyad). Some people are understand that Islam is a complete set of luckier than others, he humorously added: laws that does not require changes. Like Some women have an American passport his colleagues, he stressed that his role was in their wombs, while others have Paki- to provide guidance and direction (irshad stani ones; that is just the way it is. Smil- wa tawjeeh) for Muslims to find the path ing, he remarked that he would like to have of Islam (sabil al-Islam) and to follow its been born a descendent of the prophet (a laws. As with many of the scholars we sayyid), but he was not. Returning to the encountered in al-Najaf, he wished to point question of artificial insemination, he was out that Islam does not promote terrorism. especially concerned with the question of who the father would be from the stand- CONCLUSIONS point of Islamic law; the legal ramifica- The hawzah bears a resemblance to a tions troubled him. university, especially in the sense that there Midway through the visit, a senior is a centralized leadership with important mujtahid, Sheikh Shams al-Din arrived, but limited prerogatives, beneath which is and we all stood to greet him. Ayatollah a collection of independent colleges with

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their own traditions, intellectual orienta- In the past, the majority of students in tions and criteria for admitting students. al-Najaf were non-Arabs, especially Ira- Despite the respect accorded to the grand nian or Indian. That is not the case today. ayatollahs, the decorum is informal but In 2009, there were about 5,000 students, hardly disorganized.34 Even in the course all but 500 Iraqis,36 including 20 Afghans, of a short visit, the diversity of thought 30 Saudis, 10 Bahrainis, 30 Indians, 200 was obvious, as was the competitive spirit. Iranians and 30 Lebanese. There were no The younger teachers, each the protégé Egyptian, Tajik or Yemeni students, not- of a leading mujtahid, were serious and withstanding accusations in recent years of thoughtful — an impressive group. Shia proselytism in those countries. Most of the students arrive after com- For at least a quarter century preceding pleting a secondary education (85 percent the 2003 invasion, foreign students were have completed the baccalaureate, we under heavy scrutiny in Iraqi shrine cities, were told), and, of course, today’s cohort and most chose to leave rather than risk of students is well-versed in the internet running afoul of the Baathist security ap- and other elements of the electronic media. paratus. Arab Shia students, who otherwise There are three major phases of a hawzah would have preferred the cultural affinity education:35 of an Arab city, often chose to study in Qum instead. In some southern Lebanese 1) The preliminary phase (al-muqadimat), villages with longstanding links to al-Najaf, which typically lasts four years or the insecurity of Iraq, coupled with attrac- longer. This instruction is carried out in tive facilities and stipends in Iran, persuad- small classes usually taught by scholars ed students to forgo Iraq. If the security who have progressed to the third level. situation in Iraq continues to improve, it is likely that the proportion of non-Iraqi Arab 2) The secondary phase (sutuh), which students will grow dramatically. often comprises six or seven years of While the al-Najaf hawzah is often study. described as being committed to a “quiet- 3) The graduation phase (bahth al-kharij ist” tradition, this is somewhat inaccurate. or dars al-kharij), which usually entails No doubt, there is widespread rejection of mentoring by a marji. clerical rule, particularly Iran’s model of the rule of the jurisconsult. Nonetheless, The goal is to be certified (to receive the senior figures in the al-Najaf hawzah an ijaza) as competent to perform ijtihad, provide guidance to lay politicians, and to become a mujtahid. In 2009, students they certainly expect to be consulted. at higher levels received a monthly stipend Although the grand ayatollahs live in very of about $250. Since the money is distrib- modest settings, they are not hermits; they uted, in part, on the basis of need, students seem well informed about what is going with families are likely to be paid more. on inside and outside of Iraq. They are Major foundations, such as the Muham- also keen to preserve their independence mad Baqr al-Hakim Foundation, also and have been alert to the threat of Iranian dispense a significant number of resources meddling in the shrine cities and in Iraq in al-Najaf. more generally.

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The hawzah, though venerable, is not may be appealing. One leaves the revital- anachronistic. If the certitude of faith pre- ized al-Najaf with the impression that it is vails, it is leavened by intellectual curios- confident of its place in modern Shiism. ity and an openness to serious debate that

1 The author would like to thank Dr. Ibrahim Bahr Alolom, Dr. Zuhair Humadi and Professor Dale F. Eickel- man for their expert comments and invaluable suggestions on the draft manuscript. Obviously, any errors or defects are the responsibility of the author. 2 The Sunnis are usually thought to account for nearly 90 percent of all the 1.2 billion plus Muslims in the world, but this is debatable. Shia scholars argue that all of the Shia sects combined account for about one fifth of all Muslims. The largest Shia sect is the ithna ashariyyah (or “”), the focus of this article, who easily account for ten percent of the total popluation. The Twelvers constitute the majority in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain and the plurality in Lebanon; and significant Shia communities are found in India, Kuwait, Pakistan, and . 3 The arbaeen marches were seldom permitted by the Baathist regime, and when they were organized, as in 1977, they met violent repression. 4 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq (Princeton University Press, 2003); and Juan R.I. Cole and Momem Moojan, “Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala,” in Past and Present (1986), pp. 112-43. Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, translated by Saeed Hussein Nasr (State University of New York Press). 5 Many of the Iraqi tribes only converted to Shiism in the nineteenth century. As a result, Shiism was far less densely institutionalized outside the shrine cities than in neighboring Iran. The late Hanna Batatu noted that, in Iraqi rural areas in 1947, there was only one religious institution per 37,000 people. In some rural areas, there were no institutions at all. See Hanna Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Daw’ah al-Islamiya and al-Mujahalin,” in Shi’ism and Social Protest (Yale University Press, 1986). 6 Wilfred Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs (E.P. Dutton & Co, 1964). 7 Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (Simon and Schuster, 1985). 8 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, op. cit., pp. 163-64. 9 The city has also been an important literary center. The renowned poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri (1899-1997) was a native son, as was the novelist Jafar al-Khalili (1914-84). 10 Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, translated by S. H. Nasr (State University of New York Press), pp. 11-12. 11 Faleh Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq (Saqi, 2003), p. 83. 12 As Mohsen Milani notes in an October 2010 private message, contributions are an inexact measure of popularity, since figures with a popular following among the lower classes may bring in less money but enjoy much more widespread and intense support. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was an example. In defiance of the Baathist regime, Ayatollah al-Sadr delivered Friday sermons to large crowds. He was build- ing a strong base of enthusiastic followers among the Shia underclass in Iraq during the 1990s, until he was assassinated along with two of his adult sons in 1999. No doubt, al-Sadr was killed to deny the restive Shia a popular leader. 13 Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 311. 14 The German sociologist Theodor Hanf reports that, in a 2009 public-opinion survey in Lebanon,19 percent of the Shia polled viewed Iran as the model state, and of that group nearly 60 percent named Khamenei as their religious guide. His analysis of the data, tentatively titled “Opinion Survey, Lebanon: 2009,” will be published in 2011. 15 Fadlallah’s legacy includes an impressive array of institutions, which his sons Ali and Jafar now superin-

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tend. It remains unclear whether either of the sons will be able eventually to fill their father’s shoes. 16 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper, 2008), p. 201. 17 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq (Scribner, 2008), pp. 130-31. 18 The others were Gary Sick, Dale F. Eickelman and Glen Howard. Sick’s reflections on the visit may be found at http://garysick.tumblr.com/post/247478146/will-iran-dominate-iraq-gary-sick-in-the-daily-beast . 19 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, op. cit., p. 254; and Jamali Fadil, “The Theological Colleges of Najaf,” Muslim World, Vol. 50, 1960, p. 15. 20 Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shi’is of Iraq,” op. cit. p. 242. 21 Haider Hamoudi, an Iraqi-American law professor from Northwestern University, accompanied our group to al-Najaf; he is the source of al-Fayyad’s description of the marjiiyya. Hamoudi’s memoir of Iraq, Howling in Mesopotamia, offers a warm and informative personal account of life in post-Bathist Iraq. 22 Juan R.I. Cole and Momem Moojan, “Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala,” op.cit. 23 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied (Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 68-69. 24 Hanna Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Daw’ah al-Islamiya and al-Mujahalin,” op. cit. 25 Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shi’is of Iraq,” op. cit., p. 265. 26 Sabrina Mervin, “The Clerics of Jabal ‘Amil and the Reform of Religious Teaching in Najaf since the Beginning of the 20th Century,” in R. Brunner and W. Edne, eds., The Shia in Modern Times: Reli- gious Culture & Political Culture (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), p. 83; Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 244. 27 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 86. 28 Jamali Fadil, “The Theological Colleges of Najaf,” op. cit. 29 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, op. cit. 30 Ibid. 31 Yitzhak Nakash, op. cit. p. 259. 32 The UN special raporteur for human rights in Iraq calculated that, in 1991, there were only 800 Shia in all of Iraq, as compared to 8,000 in 1971. See Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada, op. cit., pp. 51-2. 33 A younger scholar recalled that one of the ayatollahs would ask his students to remove and unfold their turbans, knowing that spies would be more likely to have difficulty refolding it properly. 34 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Epilogue: Competing Conceptions of Religious Education,” in R.W. Hefner and M.Q. Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam, op. cit., p. 243. 35 See Chibli Mallat, “The Renewal of Islamic law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi’i Interna- tional” (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 39-42 for a concise description of the phases. 36 This data, and the breakdown that follows, was provided by faculty members of the hawzah, at a meeting at the Institute of Heritage in al-Najaf, October 20, 2009.

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