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The Pathway to Regionalism: a Historical Sociological Analysis of ASEAN Economic Community*

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The Pathway to Regionalism:

A Historical Sociological Analysis of ASEAN
Economic Community*

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

Graduate Student, MSc Politics with Research Methods,
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield
Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Western Bank, Sheffield,
England S10 2TU

[email protected]

**This Paper is prepared for the International Studies Association
(ISA) Asia-Pacific Conference, City Univesity of Hong Kong, 25-27 June 2016. Please do not cite without explicit permission from the author**

* The author acknowledges financial support from the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP). The author is also grateful to Dr Simon Rushton for constructive comments over this draft.

Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

“The most important revolutionary force at work in the Third World today is

not communism or socialism but capitalism…”

Richard Robison

Introduction

The beginning of 2016 has marked a new phase for the regional integration

project in Southeast Asia: the coming of ‘ASEAN Community’ era. By this

date, all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has agreed to transform the region into a more complex form of cooperation under one regional community. The development dates back to the aftermath 1998-1999 financial crisis, when ten ASEAN member states have agreed to give more power for its regional organisation. Since the 2nd ASEAN Summit in Bali, 2003, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish ASEAN Community by 2015, which comprises three pillar of cooperation, including political security, economic, and social cultural. The ASEAN Summit in 2015 has extended this area of cooperation into a deeper multi-sectoral basis until 2025.

The development of latest political and economic integration in Southeast Asia has embraced a debate on the nature of regional integration: what makes the regionalism project in Southeast Asia possible? Early regionalism theorists basically argue that it is economic cooperation that enables the

growing ‘resurgence’ of regionalism in world politics (Haas, 1958; see Hurrell,

1995; Hettne, 2005). The economic cooperation is arguably possible due to growing interdependency in world politics, particularly after the 1970s (Nye, 1970). This argument has been further developed by liberal-institutionalist approach, who believes on the institutionalisation of cooperation beyond state boundaries (Aris, 2009). On the other side of this debate was the critical

theory, who contends that the ‘regional turn’ was in fact enabled by the

changing discourse of capitalism in the region, which put the state at the sidelines of emerging regulatory capitalist regime in the region (see Jayasuriya, 2009; Jayasuriya and Hameiri, 2011).

This paper aims to offer both theoretical and analytical critique of those perspectives in order to explain the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia. In so doing, it would be important to further understand the origin of capitalism in Southeast Asia before moving forward to analyse regionalism in Southeast Asia. Capitalist regional project, however, is not new for the region. Recent studies has demonstrated that Dutch and British regional project in Southeast Asia has been established during their mercantilist expansion in Southeast

Asia, and contribute to the formation of ‘modern’ political economy(see

Lawson and Buzan, 2015; Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). However, even though their rules are formative to the capitalist system at that age, there has been also the role of local ruler who maintain feudal economy at the region in the capitalist system (van Klaveren, 1953). Their strong role was evident, for example, in maintaining culturrstelsel in Dutch Indies or performing local rule

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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

through British indirect rule in Malaya (see Frankema and Buelens, 2013; van

Klaveren, 1953; Hamid, 2007). These ‘local’ origins also contributes to the

formation of capitalism in the region. With the decolonisation in 1950s, which

leads to the formation of ‘developmental states’ in the 1960s, these historical trajectories characterise the unique characteristics of ‘ersatz capitalism,

which put strong state control alongside the capitalist economic development (Kunio, 1987).

How could we explain the rise of such that phenomenon? The ‘colonial’ origin

of capitalism in Southeast Asia, which takes its root in the mercantilist political economy during the colonial era and its relations with local ruler the region, has led this paper to consider the framework of uneven and combined development –as developed by Trotsky (1930), and elaborated by Rosenberg (2009, 2010)— to comprehend the origin of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. Drawing upon such framework, which is based on a broader Historical Sociological perspective, this paper argues that the construction of regionalism is neither driven by economic interdependence in

the global economy nor the emergence of neoliberal form of ‘global governance’, but constructed historically ‘from within’ the social contestation

in the region. Instead of tracing the origin of regionalism from the existing global order, as Hurrell (2007) suggest, this paper argues that it is the transformation of capitalism in the region, which is characterised by an uneven and combined nature of historical development in the region, that enables the ASEAN Economic Community. This paper will build that argument on the longue duree analysis of capitalism in Southeast Asia until the formation of ASEAN Economic Community.

To do so, this paper will be divided into four parts. The first part will discuss the theoretical approach to understand the origin of regionalism in Southeast

Asia. More specifically, this research will outline the framework of ‘Uneven

and Combined Development’ (UCD), as developed by Trotsky (1930) and several proponents of Historical Sociology in International Relations as the main theoretical approach (see Rosenberg, 2009; 2010; Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). The second part will trace the historical trajectory of regionalism during the colonial era, which is arguably formative to capitalism in the region. This part will also trace the uneven and combined historical development that enables colonial mercantilist project and set birth to

‘Southeast Asia’ as a region. The third part will elaborate the rise of ‘third world nationalism’ and

‘developmental state’ as post-colonial project in the region, which was slowly emerged in Southeast Asia after the World War. The moment of decolonisation was enabled by several factors, including the rise of nationalism, Japanese expansion, and the post-war crisis that gave momentum for declaration of independence in some countries. The fourth part will understand the formation of capital-based regionalism in ASEAN, which was began by the establishment of ASEAN, and moved forward to its transformation into a more complex form of regionalism under SEAN

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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

Community. This paper argues that the transformation is related to the changing discourse of capitalism in both domestic and global level. This part will bring about the framework of uneven and combined development to capture the recent trajectory of regional integration in Southeast Asia.

Theorising Southeast Asian Regionalism: The Framework of Uneven and Combined Development

Contending Perspectives on Southeast Asian Regionalism

There have been many attempts to theorise the recent regionalism in

Southeast Asia from a wide range of perspectives, from ‘realism’ to ‘critical theory’ (see, for example, Narine 2002; Acharya and Stubbs, 2006; Kim,

2011; Quayle, 2013; Plummer, 1997; Gerard, 2014; Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2005; Jayasuriya, 2004; 2008; Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2009; Jones, 2011). This theoretical development enabled by some developments in the integration project in the region, which is arguably important in locating Southeast Asia in the changing context of world politics. Acharya and Stubbs (2006) argues that the rising theoretisation in Southeast Asian relations reflects the changing discourse of international politics that turns to ‘non-

Western’ world, particularly after the financial crisis and growing crisis in

world politics. This bourgeoning literature has built up two competing views about integration and regionalism in Southeast Asia. The first view sees

regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia as merely ‘state-led’

project. This view is shared by realist, constructivist, and to some extent

‘English-School’ approach that posits ‘state’ as the main actor in Southeast

Asian relations. Realists, of course, believes that state is the only actor in Southeast Asian relations and is quite skeptical with the regional integration project, having emphasise security and stability as the centre of international relations of the region (Emmers, 2012). Constructivist, even though more

‘critical’, in terms of placing the importance of ‘structure’ over the agential

status of the state, also believes that the state is remain central in the region (Haacke, 2003; Easton and Stubbs, 2006; also Acharya, 2003). This

standpoint has also been acknowledged by the ‘English School’, who believes on the hierarchical nature of regional politics rather than ‘anarchy’

(see Narine, 2006; Quayle, 2013). The second view, on the contrary, argues that regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia are also involving some non-state actors. Liberal-institutionalist and Critical Theory develops this anti-statist theoretical approach, albeit with different theoretical standpoint. On the one hand liberalinstitutionalist argues that Southeast Asian regionalism has been marked by the growing interdependence in the world politics, that enables the non-state actor to be involved at the regional processes (see Nye and Keohane, 1971; Hurrell, 1995). More specifically, in Southeast Asia, liberal-institutionalist

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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

approach believes that the financial crisis in 1997-1998 has led the

Southeast Asian countries to acknowledge the ‘region’ as the most important

factor in delivering state policies, particularly in trade and development (Kim, 2011; Hettne, 2005).

On the other hand, critical theorist --particularly those linked with ‘Murdoch

School’ of Asian studies-- argues that it is the liberal governmentality project, rather than interdependence in world politics, that gives birth to Southeast Asian regional integration. This approach sees regionalism as merely an

extension of state regulatory model to the ‘region’ in order to enlarge market

base for growing capitalist class in the region (Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2011). Nevertheless, this regulatory project has also enabled the rising advocacy of civil society and social movement in the region, which is organised under

some banners such as ASEAN People’s Forum or ASEAN People’s

Assembly (see Chandra, 2009; Gerard, 2014).

This competing perspectives, to some extent, reflects the ‘state debate’ in

International Relations theory, which has emerged since early theoretical debate in the discipline (see Hobson, 2000). According to Hobson (2000), the state debate in International Relations theory has been marked by

several ‘agential state power’, such as domestic, international, ‘statist’, and ‘internationalist’ (see Hobson, 2000).The ‘state debate’ in Southeast Asian

regionalism theory has reflected the degree to which state has agential

power, which is ‘high’ (represented by realist), ‘moderate’ (represented by constructivist and ‘English School’) and low (represented by liberalinstitutionalist and critical theory). However, as Hobson suggested, this ‘state debate’ has also neglected the social source of ‘state power’, which is

constructed historically within the state boundaries (see Hobson, 2000: 226). This lacuna in regionalism theories, particularly those emerged to explain Southeat Asian regionalism. has made International Relations theory unable to catch-up broader trends in international politics before the state was institutionally established in IR (for example, before the 19th century) and thus failed to understand the dynamics of states in post-colonial societies (Hobson, 2000; see also Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). To resolve such this problem, this paper attempts to re-conceptualise Southeast Asian

regionalism through the framework of ‘uneven and combined development’.

Double Reading Trotsky: The Framework of Uneven and Combined Development

It is therefore important to move beyond the ‘state debate’ to understand

regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia. This paper aims to

offer the framework of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ to investigate

the social origin of regionalism in Southeat Asia. This framework was originally proposed by Leon Trotsky in his lengthy book, The History of Russian Revolution (1930) and recently elaborated by several International Relations theorist, most notably Justin Rosenberg (2009, 2010) and

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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu (2015). Trotsky originally proposed the uneven and combined development as a law that govern the historical development of human society. Taking the case of Russian revolution, Trotsky argues that the revolution has in fact contained pecularities because its origin lies not in the domestic level, but in the

intersection between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ level (Trotsky, 1930). Trotsky argues that Russian revolution has been enabled by ‘the privilege of

backwardness’ of Russian society, which aims to loop forward to catch-up the industrial development in Western European states (that is, England and

Germany). This ‘historical backwardness’, according to Trotsky, marks the

uneven characteristic of international society during that period. However, this historical backwardness has also created a privilege for Russian society to catch the industrialisation through inter-societal relations, for example trade and modernisation, which was started during the the Tsarism of Peter

(1870). The Western Europe, suggest Trostky, serves as ‘the whip of

external necessity that enable the progress of historical development and

marks another feature of historical development, namely ‘the combined’

characteristic of historical development. Trotsky then argues that the Russian revolution was enabled by this uneven and combined characteristic, which

enabled the crisis in Russia’s bourgeois society in the 1910s and led to the

Bolshevik revolution in 1917 (Trotsky, 1930; cf. Anievas and Nisancioglu,

2015).This ‘uneven and combined development was later proposed as law that govern human society and made possible the idea of ‘permanent revolution’, since it is not possible for only having a revolution in only one

country (Trotsky, 1930; see also Lowy, 1981).

Trotsky’s framework of uneven and combined development has been

criticised, primarily because of two reasons. First, in its original form, it contains a very clear Eurocentric tendency (see also Hobson, 2011; Bhambra, 2011; Shilliam, 2009). By putting the framework of uneven and

combined development as a ‘law’, he tends to generalise all historical development into a single model of ‘progress’, that he believes should follow

to capitalist development in Western Europe and then socialist revolution in Russia (Trotsky, 1930). By doing so, Trotsky has failed to understand the historical development in non-European world, which at that time has undergone the process of colonialism (Hobson, 2011). Second, with this

Trotsky’s framework of uneven and combined development has also

entrapped to the danger of stagism, which is also central in the capitalist idea

of ‘stage of development’ (Bhambra, 2011; see also Rostow, 1959). It

therefore reproduces not only a Eurocentric narrative of historical

development, but will also mislead social theorist to a very ‘statist’

perspective of social science.

This ‘eurocentric’ trap has, however, been also a problem for Marxist theories

(see Said, 1978; Mollaer, 2015). In order to getting rid of this spectre, Rosenberg (2009, 2010), Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015), Anievas (2014),

Matin (2013), and Allinson (2016) re-elaborated this ‘law’ into a theoretical

6

Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

framework to understand not only Russian revolution, but also the entire

characteristic of ‘the international’. Drawing upon Trotsky’s concept of

uneven and combined development, Rosenberg (2006) argues that the

framework of ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ development should not only understood in terms of Russian revolution, but also the characteristics of ‘the international’ itself. Rosenberg proposes a view that the ‘uneven’ character of

the international marked the multiple form of societies, which is originally drawn from their interactions with the nature (Rosenberg, 2006; see also Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015).

Therefore, rather than arguing that all societies need to undergo a ‘stage of development’ in order to loop into capitalist society, one should understand

the very social nature of society based on their mode of production. The idea

of ‘multiplicity of society’ has, however, characterised with the combined

character of historical development, which is enabled by the inter-societal relations in the international world (Rosenberg, 2006). It leads to the

possibility to acknowledge ‘pre-modern’/’pre-Westphalian globalisation, which is in fact occurs with some inter-civilisational dialogues between ‘the West’

and other part of the world (see Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Hobson, 2004; Hobson, 2011; Nisancioglu, 2014).

It is within this framework Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015) proposes the geopolitical approach to understand the origin of capitalism. According to Anievas and Nisancioglu, capitalism was not reproduced automatically in

Europe, through the so-called ‘industrial revolution’, but was also enabled by

the slave market in the Atlantic, labor market and mercantilist economic project in Southeast Asia, and the counterhegemonic strategy to prevent

Ottoman’s invasion in Eastern Europe (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015).

Moreover, Anievas and Nisancioglu argues that it was the inter-societal interactions (some with peaceful way through trade, some with violent ways with slavery and invasion) that enables the birth of capitalism as a hegemonic social forces in the 19th century. In the similar vein, Lawson and Buzan (2015) also argues that the modernisation project in the 20th century, that is arguably

central in the birth of ‘modern’ International Relations, was enabled by the

uneven and combined historical development in the 19th century (Lawson and Buzan, 2015).

This re-conceptualisation of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ has thus

given some promises for non-Eurocentric account of Historical Materialist approach to world politics (see Mollaer, 2015; Tansel, 2015). To understand the historical development of a particular society, according to this framework, one needs to acknowledge the multiplicity of society and the intercivilisational/inter-societal interactions that reproduce the mode of production in a society. Methodologically, it would also involve the longue-duree historical analysis to understand the continuity of change in world politics since colonial era (see Nisancioglu, 2012). It furthermore requires

International Relations to free itself from the ‘prison of political science’ and

acknowledges a more interdisciplinary approach to International Relations.

7

Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism

The uses of uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework

thus reject the English School assumption that ‘International Society’ was

originally constructed from the European states and subsequently expanded

to the ‘rest’ of the world (see, for example, Bull and Watson, 1984). This paper also in a different position with the theory of ‘norm localisation’, as

demonstrated by Acharya (2004) in understanding Southeast Asian regionalism. Acharya, following constructivist theories, argues that the idea of

‘regionalism’ has had its origin in ‘external’ form of knowledge that was

localised through the interaction between states in the region (see Acharya, 2004). This assumption has, as critically demonstrated by Hobson (2012), contained a degree of Eurocentric conception of world/regional politics, and

therefore neglects the ‘non-Western’ subjectivity in theorising the

world/regional politics.

Beyond State Debate: Southeast Asian Regionalism in a Longue Duree Historical Perspective

This theoretical approach has therefore led us to move beyond ‘state debate’

in theorising Southeast Asian regionalism. As discussed above, contending perspectives on Southeast Asian regionalism has been entrapped by a state-

centric approach (although with various degree of ‘state agential status’) and

therefore neglects the historicity of the state and the region itself. Rather, this

paper argues that both state and non-state actors’ agential status should be

historically and sociologically traced since the pre-colonial era. Therefore, it is important for us to re-assess the origin of Southeast Asia as a region, which was built since the pre-colonial era and, through the law of uneven and combined development, continue until the colonial era.

This paper will conceptualise regionalism in terms of what Rosenberg (2010)

termed as ‘multiplicity of society’ and ‘inter-societal interaction’. Firstly, regionalism needs to be theoretically understood as the formation of ‘order’

within a particular geopolitical spectrum. The geographical and geopolitical proximity constitutes the most important aspect of regionalism. However, it is the multiple societies within the geographical spectrum, who interacts each other, that gives birth to the regionalism. The formation of regionalism,

therefore requires the ‘inter-societal interactions’, which then forms the notion ‘regional’ as the interaction goes beyond the political boundaries.

Therefore, our conceptual understanding of regionalism should be brought

beyond the present-day conception of ‘state’. Regarding that, this paper

proposes an argument that regionalism was built through a series of historical events in a long-term basis, built upon the interaction of many forms

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    The relationship between indirect rule and Quranic education Considerations for the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism in Northern Nigeria D Ukwandu Department of Public Management and Governance University of Johannesburg ABSTRACT This article reviews the historical legacy of the British policy of indirect rule and how its colonial policy of preserving the local traditions of the people through Quranic education contributed to the rise of Boko Haram terrorism. The narrative of hatred and anger against Western education is deeply ingrained and rooted in the political and religious culture of the region. Hence, the article traces the continuities between the colonial past and post-colonial Northern Nigeria and unveils the similarities contained therein. This article asserts that the policy of indirect rule and the official apathy towards Islamic and Quranic education in the region has led to this rise of unregulated and unreformed fundamentalist Quranic schools in Northern Nigeria. Under British rule, Quranic education in Northern Nigeria was left unregulated and unchecked due to fear of a backlash from the region’s religious and political leaders. The British needed these leaders to further consolidate colonial rule in the area. Although the colonial government was aware of the enormous danger of spreading Islamic fundamentalism, the region remained unregulated. This governmental apathy towards reforming the basic tenets of Quranic schools persisted in post- independence Nigeria. The article also suggests that efforts to combat Boko Haram terrorism in Northern Nigeria should involve policies to reform and regulate the thousands of Quranic schools in the north. These schools target desperately poor, unemployed and unemployable young men and women, who are recruited easily as foot soldiers by Boko Haram leaders.
  • Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective

    Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective

    Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective Daron Acemogluy Isaías N. Chavesz Philip Osafo-Kwaakox James A. Robinson{ This Version: April 2014 Abstract A fundamental problem for economic development is that most poor countries have ‘weak states’which are incapable or unwilling to provide basic public goods such as law enforcement, order, education and infrastructure. In Africa this is often attributed to the persistence of ‘indirect rule’ from the colonial period. In this paper we discuss the ways in which a state constructed on the basis of indirect rule is weak and the mechanisms via which this has persisted since independence in Sierra Leone. We also present a hypothesis as to why the extent to which indirect rule has persisted varies greatly within Africa, linking it to the presence or the absence of large centralized pre-colonial polities within modern countries. Countries which had such a polity, such as Ghana and Uganda, tended to abolish indirect rule since it excessively empowered traditional rulers at the expense of post-colonial elites. Our argument provides a new mechanism which can explain the positive correlation between pre-colonial political centralization and modern public goods and development outcomes. Keywords: state strength, indirect rule, development. JEL Classi…cation: D7, H11. This paper was prepared as part of the NBER Africa Project. yMassachusetts Institute of Technology and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. Address: Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, E52-380, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge MA 02142; E-mail: [email protected]. zDepartment of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-6044, email: [email protected].
  • THE MILITARY SYSTEM of BENIN KINGDOM, C.1440 - 1897

    THE MILITARY SYSTEM of BENIN KINGDOM, C.1440 - 1897

    THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF BENIN KINGDOM, c.1440 - 1897 THESIS in the Department of Philosophy and History submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Hamburg, Germany By OSARHIEME BENSON OSADOLOR, M. A. from Benin City, Nigeria Hamburg, 23 July, 2001 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE FIRST EXAMINER Professor Dr. Leonhard Harding Doctoral father (Professor für Geschichte Afrikas) Historisches Seminar, Universität Hamburg SECOND EXAMINER Professor Dr. Norbert Finzsch (Professor für Aussereuropäische Geschichte) Historisches Seminar, Universität Hamburg CHAIR Professor Dr. Arno Herzig Prodekan Fachbereich Philosophie und Geschichtswissenchaft Universität Hamburg DATE OF EXAMINATION (DISPUTATION) 23 July, 2001 ii DECLARATION I, Osarhieme Benson Osadolor, do hereby declare that I have written this doctoral thesis without assistance or help from any person(s), and that I did not consult any other sources and aid except the materials which have been acknowledged in the footnotes and bibliography. The passages from such books or maps used are identified in all my references. Hamburg, 20 December 2000 (signed) Osarhieme Benson Osadolor iii ABSTRACT The reforms introduced by Oba Ewuare the Great of Benin (c.1440-73) transformed the character of the kingdom of Benin. The reforms, calculated to eliminate rivalries between the Oba and the chiefs, established an effective political monopoly over the exertion of military power. They laid the foundation for the development of a military system which launched Benin on the path of its imperial expansion in the era of the warrior kings (c.1440-1600). The Oba emerged in supreme control, but power conflicts continued, leading to continuous administrative innovation and military reform during the period under study.
  • The Review of Economics and Statistics

    The Review of Economics and Statistics

    The Review of Economics and Statistics VOL. XCII NOVEMBER 2010 NUMBER 4 DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES Lakshmi Iyer* Abstract—This paper compares economic outcomes across areas in India India and have since been subject to a uniform administra- that were under direct British colonial rule with areas that were under indirect colonial rule. Controlling for selective annexation using a specific tive, legal, and political structure. The analysis in this paper policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly therefore cannot answer the question of what outcomes lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial would have been like in the complete absence of colonial period. I find evidence that the quality of governance in the colonial period has a significant and persistent effect on postcolonial outcomes. rule, but it does illustrate the persistent effects of different degrees of colonial rule. The major issue in such a comparison is, of course, the I. Introduction problem of selection. It is unlikely that the British randomly HETHER the experience of colonial rule has had a annexed areas for direct colonial rule. I am able to solve the Wlong-term impact on economic development is a selection problem by taking advantage of a unique feature topic that has generated considerable debate. Several schol- of British annexation policy in India. Between 1848 and ars have emphasized the negative effects of colonial rule on 1856, the British governor-general, Lord Dalhousie, imple- development, citing factors such as excessive exploitation mented the notorious Doctrine of Lapse, under which he of colonies, drain of resources, or the growth of a depen- refused to recognize adopted heirs and annexed several dency complex (see Frank, 1978, or Bagchi, 1982).
  • Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: a Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon∗

    Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: a Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon∗

    Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2012, 7: 1–46 Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon∗ Alexander Lee1 and Kenneth A. Schultz2 1Stanford University; [email protected] 2Stanford University; [email protected] ABSTRACT Colonial institutions are thought to be an important determinates of post-independence levels of political stability, economic growth, and public goods provision. In particular, many scholars have suggested that British institutional and cultural legacies are more conducive to growth than those of France or other colonizers. Systematic tests of this hypothesis are complicated by unobserved heterogeneity among nations due to variable pre- and post-colonial histories. We focus on the West African nation of Cameroon, which includes regions colonized by both Britain and France, and use the artificial former colonial boundary as a discontinuity within a national demographic survey. We show that rural areas on the British side of discontinuity have higher levels of wealth ∗ We are grateful to Rachel Stein and Luke Condra for assistance with ArcGIS and to Claire Adida for assistance in translating the survey instrument, and participants at the Stanford Comparative Politics Workshop and the American Political Science Associations 2011 annual meeting for their comments. Online Appendix available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00011022 app Supplementary Material available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00011022 supp MS submitted 23 March 2011 ; final version received 21 February 2012 ISSN 1554-0626; DOI 10.1561/100.00011022 c 2012 A. Lee and K. A. Schultz 2 Lee and Schultz and local public provision of piped water.