Wai 894 #08 lOFFICIALj L~G\\A ~ The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, 1915-1925 Steven Webster Honorary Research Fellow, Department of Anthropology, The University of Auckland. Affiliate Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle Report Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, May 2004 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 2 Contents Figures 8 Maps 9 Abbreviations 11 Introduction 14 O~ 1 A Preview of the Following Chapters 20 0.2 Tuhoe Social Organisation, 1899-1903 25 0.2.1. Reliability of the Records 27 0.2.2 Culture Change is Always Two-way 31 0.2.3 Nga Whaaea, Seniority and Hapuu 35 0.2.4 Changing Hapuu 45 0.2.5 Hapuu and Land Rights 48 0.2.6 Hapuu Clusters? 50 0.2.7 Relative Shares 51 0.2.8 Active Rights 53 0.2.9 Summary 54 0.3. Some Background to the Research 55 PART I: The Crown Purchasing Campaign 1915 - 1921 1. Some Ethnohistorical Background 60 1.1 Introduction 60 1.2 Research Sources 67 1.2.1 Primary Sources 67 1.2.2 Secondary Sources 71 1.3 An Ethnohistorical Case Study: The Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage 73 1.3.1 Spouses and Mothers 86 1.3.2 Hapuu and Land Rights in the Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage 93 1.3.3 Deaths and Successions 98 I 1.3.4 Pupuri Whenua: Patterns of Land Retention in the Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage 106 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 3 1.4 An Ethnohistorical Case Study: Ruatahuna 116 1.4.1 The Ruatahuna Partition 116 1.4.2 Ahuwhenua Proposals and the Roots of the Apitihana Movement 130 1.5 Summary 140 2. The Purchasing Strategy and Tuhoe Resistance 143 2.1 The Crown's Purchasing Strategy 143 2.1.1 'Why did the Tuhoe Sell (so much) Land?' 147 2.2 Bowler's Network of Purchasing Venues and Agents 153 2.2.1 Culture Brokers, Willing and Unwilling 158 2.3 Identifying Individual Shares and Publishing Lists of Non-sellers 167 2.3.1 Compiling a List of Non-sellers 168 2.3.2 The Mobile Card Index 172 2.3.4 A 1919 List of Non-sellers 176 2.3.5 Hoko Whenua and Pupuri Whenua 182 2.3.6 Tuhoe Responses 185 2.4 Successions, Trustees and Certification of Age 187 2.4.1 Bringing Tuhoe Minors and Recent Adults under the 1909 Act 189 2.4.2 Tuhoe Trustees 194 2.4.3 The Role of the Public Trustee 196 2.4.4 Getting on Top of Successions 201 2.4.5 Certifying Tuhoe Competence to Sell 205 2.5 The Relative Predicaments of the Crown and Tuhoe 209 2.6 Summary 212 Part II: The Arrangement and Implementation of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme, 1921 - 1926 3. The Negotiations at Tauarau, August 1921 214 3.1 Introduction 215 3.2 Previous Reports 222 3.2.1 'Modernisation' or Stopping the Bleeding? 224 3.2.2 Was the Legislation Draconian? 226 3.2.3 Some Loose Ends to Pick up 229 3.3 An Overview ofthe Tauarau Procedures 232 3.4 The Tuhoe Representatives 237 3.5 The Crown's Proposals 247 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 4 3.5.1 Assumption of the Crown's Dominance 255 3.5.2 Various Forms ofCrownPre-emptions 259 3.5.3 Comparing Some Reported Proposals 260 3.5.4 The Ambiguous Emergence of the Policy of Piecemeal Deductions 263 3.5.5 The Native Awards 267 3.6 Forming Consolidation Groups 271 3.6.1 Sorting Groups Out 275 3.6.2 Some of the More Influential Groups 279 3.6.3 The Persistence of Tuhoe Descent Groups 282 3.6.4 The Crown's Discrimination of Evacuee from Family Farm Groups 290 3.7 Groupbooks and Successions 316 3.7.2 The Organisation of the Groupbooks 322 3.7.3 Processing Successions 324 3.7.4 Final 'Allocations' 329 3.8 Conclusion 330 3.9 Summary 345 4. Implementation and Routines of the Scheme, 1921-1925 348 4.1 The Rush to Implementation 349 4.2 The Routines ofImplementation 354 4.2.1 The Official Concerns of the Commission 356 4.2.2 The Official Rudiments of Allocations 362 4.2.3 Landless Veterans and Pious Non-commitment 364 Part III: The Continuation of Crown Purchasing during the Scheme 5. Policy Conflicts and the Continuation of Purchasing 368 5.1 The Obscurity of Information 369 5.2 The First Two Restrictions 377 5.2.1 The 8 August Instruction to Cease Purchasing 381 5.2.2 The Second Instruction 384 5.3 The First Resumption of Purchases 386 5.3.1 Knight's Ambivalent Role 390 5.3.2 Te Wharepapa Reports a Calamity at Te Whaiti 395 5.4 Ngata's Intervention and the July 1922 Crisis 398 5.5 Knight's Defense 401 5.5.1 An Examination of the Purchases 5 May to 10 July 1922 405 -., - ----. -,------'---'---'---'-----' Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 5 5.5.2 Group 48 'Probable Sellers' 4lO 5.5.3 Willing Sellers 412 5.5.4 The 5 or lO July Purchases 415 5.6 A Reformed Restriction 418 6. Purchasing Under the Reformed Restriction 420 6.1 Some Suggestive Patterns 420 6.2 The Tacit Establishment of Generalised Approval 424 6.2.1 The Approval of Savings on Waikaremoana and weakening the Apitihana 430 6.3 An Analysis of the October 1923 Purchases 433 6.3.1 Ethnohistorical Illustrations: Some Selected October Purchases 440 6.4 The Purchases to Weaken the Apitihana Movement 450 6.5 The Pattern of Duplicate Purchases 456 6.5.1 A Summary Overview of the Duplicate Purchases 461 6.6 The Oamaru lC Purchase and Shifting Jurisdictions 465 6.6.1 Bullocking Oamaru lC through 470 6.7 Why was the Purchasing Continued? 473 Part IV: The Struggles to Control Allocations of Land during the Scheme 7. The Struggle to Control Allocations in the Lower Basins 476 7.1 Indications of Confrontation 478 7.1.1 Troubles Arise for the Crown all around the Urewera 482 7.2 Negotiations in the Lower Whakatane - Waimana/Tauranga Basins 486 7.2.1 Reconstructing what Happened 490 7.2.2 Subsequent Reports 496 7.3 The Crown gets Two More Blocks 502 7.3.1 'Arriving at the Minimum Requirements of the Non-seller' 509 7.4 Summary 5lO 8. Reneging on the New Native Homeland 512 8.1 The Quiet Extension of Pre-emptions to Te Purenga, Te Waipotiki, and Te Wairiko 513 8.1.1 Tuhoe Priorities in the Negotiations 515 8.1.2 The Crown's Counter-tactics 517 8.1.3 The 'Impossibility' of Locating the Crown's Interests 520 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 6 8.2 The Persistent Ambiguity of Piecemeal Deductions 526 8.2.1 The Crown's Opportunities to Clarify the Policy 527 8.2.2 Tuhoe Protests and Crown Responses 533 8.2.3 Implicit Acceptance of an Implicit Policy? 536 8.3 The Crown Retreats in Parekohe 538 8.3.1 Settling the Deals on Tauwhare and Ohiorangi 539 8.4 The Relinquishment ofTe Poroporo and Retreat in Te Tuahu 543 8.4.1 Negotiations for Te Poroporo 545 8.4.2 Plausible Trade-offs 550 8.4.4 Mana and the Power of the Crown 552 8.5 Summary 553 9. Confrontations with the Apitihana Movement 554 9.1 A Chronicle of the Confrontations, 1918 - 1925 555 9.2 The Commission Refuses to Supply 'Lists of Sellers' 570 9.2.1 Te Utu a Nga Kupapa (the Revenge of the Loyalists) 570 9.3 Tactical Implications of Knowing who the Sellers were 579 9.3.1 The Logic of the Tuhoe Demand 584 9.4 Gains and Losses for the Apitihana Movement 587 9.4.1 The Commissioners' Allocation of the Apitihana Block 587 9.4.2 Some Real Pay-offs to the Kupapa 592 9.5 Summary 594 10. A Quiet Windfall for the Crown? 596 10.1 Finding the Windfall 596 10.2 A Routine Correction ofInaccurate Surveys? 602 10.3 Figuring the Crown's Award the Other Way 604 11. Conclusions and Summary 607 11.1 The Course of this Enquiry and a List of Wrongs 609 11.2 The Urewera Consolidation Scheme 614 11.3 A Silenced History 620 11.4 The Struggles over Allocations 624 -----~-. ------:-:-:-:-:::-_--=-.:-: ---- - Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 7 Appendix A: Spreadsheets 633 Spreadsheet 1: The Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage 633 Spreadsheet 2: The Tuhoe Representatives at Tauarau 638 Spreadsheet 3: Continuing Purchases during the Urewera Consolidation Scheme 646 Spreadsheet 4: Negotiations in the Lower Whakatane-Tauranga/Waimana Basins 656 Appendix B: Supporting Papers 661 Papers 1: Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage (from AJHR 1903 order for Tauwhare-Manuka block) 661 Papers 2: Final Report (31 October 1921): 'Urewera Lands Consolidation Scheme (report on proposed)' AJHR G-7 1921 664 Papers 3: Sample Pages of Group Books A - G 687 Papers 4: Bowler's Reports of Continuing Purchases, 15 August 1921, 12 September 1921 and 3 October 1921 703 Papers 5: Knight's 7 July 1922 Defense and Schedule of continuing Purchases 707 Bibliography 711 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 8 Figures Figure 1: Urewera District Native Reserve Blocks and Hapuu Rights recognised, October 1902 46 Figure 2: Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage, 1903 84 Figure 3: Continuity of Block Rights (an abstraction from Spreadsheet 2) 162 Figure 4: Some Tuhoe certified as 21 or over, 1915 -1920 207 Figure 5: Continuity of Block Rights (an abstraction from Spreadsheet 2) 243 Figure 6: Representation of Happu by Scheme Representatives 245 Figure 7: Records of Knight's 1 August 1921 Proposals to the Tuhoe 251 Figure 8: Pupuri Whenua: Group Leaders sorted by Total Land 281 Figure 9: Urewera Consolidation Groupbooks 322 Figure 10: Hypothetical Block of Purchased Land Compared to Old 375 Figure 11: Phases of Continuing Purchases under the Urewera Consolidation Scheme 377 Figure 12: Commission Purchases in October 1923 436 Figure 13: Core Sibling Groups in Consolidation Group 42 450 Figure 14: Status of Negotiations in Lower Whakatane and TaurangalWaimana Basins, 27 August 1921 (Balneavis Report) 495 Figure 15: A Reconstruction of Negotiations over Tauwhare and Ohiorangi Blocks, August - October 1921 503 .::_-:.::-----.:; Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 9 Figure 16: Shares Proposed for Allocation by Apitihana and the 'Loyalists' 573 Maps Map 1: The Old Blocks: Urewera District Native Reserve (about 1907) 16 Map 2: Original 1901 Urewera District Native Reserve (and block regrouping proposal) 17 Map 3: Contemporary Tuhoe Blocks in the Urewera National Park 18 Map 4: Ruatahuna Partition 1913 - 1919 117 Map 5: Previous Depiction of Crown Purchases by 1919 251 Map 6: Previous Depictions of Crown Purchases by 1920 252 Map 7: Knights Proposals 6 June 1921 257 Map 8: Urewera District Native Reserve Blocks c. 1907 331 Map 9: Urewera Consolidation Scheme Blocks 334 Map 10: Urewera Consolidation Scheme Blocks (numbered key map) 335 Map 11: Map Showing Original UDNRBlocks Overlayed with USC Blocks 342 Map 12: Schematic of New Blocks (1925) overlayed on Old Blocks (1907) 347 Map 13: Urewera Consolidation Scheme 357 Map 14: Flexible Boundaries of New Blocks: Example of Paraero a B 522 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 10 Map 15: New Blocks in Lower Whakatane Basin by 1925 530 Map 16: New Blocks in Middle Whakatane Basin by 1925 531 Map 17: New Blocks in Upper Whakatane Basin by 1925 560 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 11 Ab breviations Abbreviations of References (see References) AADS Lands and Survey archives, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. AJHR Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives ATL Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington c.f. closed files GB Urewera Consolidation Group Book LINZ Land Information New Zealand MA Maori Affairs Archives, Archives New Zealand, Wellington MA-MLP Maori Affairs - Maori Land Purchase Department Archives, Archives New Zealand, Wellington MLC Maori Land Court ANZAk Archives New Zealand, Auckland ANZWgtn Archives New Zealand, Wellington NLA Native Land Act NLC Native Land Court RM Register of Maoris (1918) UAL The University of Auckland Library, Auckland. UAMB Urewera Appelate Court Minute Books 1- 2, 1912-13 UCAMB Urewera Commission Appeals Minute Books 1-3, 1906-7 UCMB Urewera Consolidation Minute Books 1-2B, 1921-26 UDNR Urewera District Native Reserve (1896 - 1922) UMB Urewera Consolidation Minute Books 1 - 9, (1899-1903) USLS Undersecretary, Lands and Survey Department USND Undersecretary, Native Department WDMLC Waiariki District Maori Land Court archives, Rotorua Abbreviations for Urewera District Native Reserve Blocks, 1903 and 1907 HH Hikurangi-Horomanga block, UDNR 1-0 Ierenui-Ohaua block, UDNR K Karioi block, UDNR Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 12 KT Kohuru-Tukuroa block, UDNR M Maungapohatu block, UDNR MT Maraitahia block, UDNR OR Ohiorangi block, UDNR OMru Omahuru block, UDNR OT Otairi block, UDNR Ota Otara block, UDNR PAnuiN. Paraoanui North block, UDNR PAnui S. Paraoanui South block, UDNR PK Parekohe block, UDNR PL Papatupu Land block, UDNR PPhtu Pukepohatu block, UDNR PRroa Paraeroa block, UDNR PU Te Purenga block, UDNR Rl Ruatoki 1 block, UDNR R2 Ruatoki 2 block, UDNR R3 Ruatoki 3 block, UDNR RS Ruatoki South block, UDNR Rthna Ruatahuna block, UDNR Tap Tapatahi block, UDNR TAwre Tauwhare block, UDNR TMka Tauwhare-Manuka block, UDNR T-Mro Tarapounamu-Matawhero block, UDNR TNta Taneatua block, UDNR TP Te Poroporo block, UDNR TR Te Ranga a Ruanuku block, UDNR TT Te Tuahu block, UDNR TUnga Tauranga block, UDNR TW Te Whaiti Nui a Toi block, UDNR TWrko Te Wairiko block, UDNR WM Waikaremoana block, UDNR ------._____ ~------·--I ---.-----~~------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 13 WPa Whaitiripapa block, UDNR Wpki Te Waipotiki block, UDNR WW Waikarewhenua block, UDNR Otamarakau Bay of Pie n t y Matata Q:" Moiuhora Is. -EB's L.Rataili Haw k e Bay Locality map Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 14 Introduction 0.1 A Preview of the Following Chapters 0.2 Tuhoe Social Organisation, 1899 - 1903 0.1.1 Reliability of the Records 0.1.2 Culture Change is always Two-way 0.1.3 Nga Whaaea, Seniority and Hapuu 0.1.4 Changing Hapuu 0.1.5 Hapuu and land Rights 0.1.6 Hapuu Clusters? 0.1.7 Relative Shares 0.1.8 Active Rights 0.3 Some Background to the Research These chapters are a description and analysis of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme which ran only four or five years (1921-26) but transformed Tuhoe lands almost entirely. At least two earlier transformations had preceded this and remained integral to the Consolidation Scheme in many ways: the Urewera District Native Reserve 1896 - 1922, and the Crown purchase campaign about 1910 - 1921. These transformations can be roughly conceptualised in terms of the' old blocks' and the 'new blocks', simplified in Map 12. This was all on top of the first Raupatu and the recovery of Tuhoe from that. Given this chaotic history of profound changes to the lands which are their own history, it is a wonder that the Tuhoe are still there, and still know who they are. Because these preceding periods are so important to understanding the consolidation scheme, I shall describe some aspects of the Urewera District Native Reserve in this Introduction, and devote the first two chapters to the Crown purchase campaign. ----- /, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 15 The Urewera is a big and rugged place, whispering with centuries of history which live on in place names and oral traditions as well as river bends, flats, the bush and steep old ranges through which the main rivers, the Whakatane and the TaurangaiWaimana, run northerly toward the Bay of Plenty. I am knowledgeable about only these more recent two or three decades of this history. The Tuhoe knew and many (including some of the young) still do know every acre of this vast area. Maps are critical to what understanding I have of it, and the more familiar an outsider gets with this big area, the more useful they become. Some of the old ones I have managed to find were actually drawn up and annotated in close communication with the ancestors and are dog-eared and darkened through their use and fingering, probably in the Urewera District Native Reserve Commission hearings themselves, beginning in 1899. The originals carry a kind oftapu, and it might be best that LINZ (the state corporation 'Land Information New Zealand') makes access to them very difficult indeed, although this is for the wrong reasons. I have included copies of several of these old maps in overlapping sections in the Appendices, and will include summary reductions of these in the text occasionally. Rei whakanoa atu nei (may they be made ordinary; and forgive my fragmentary Maori). By way of introduction, one should study the following series of three maps, the first two of which are simplified overviews and the last two of which are copies of detailed but wonderful originals (the last two are included in the Appendices as overlapping sections): Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 16 WHAIfATANE RIVER see Map 14 c1922 N 10km F==~~==;-,-----', 6miles Source: Stokes, Milroy and Melbourne, 1986, (Wai 894, record of documents, A111) Fig 11. Map 1: The Old Blocks: Urewera District Native Reserve (about 1907) -- -:..--.:::-==-=-.:::.:::~---=::.--.:-=-=-=-=-=--= Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 17 10 20km 10miles wEB, s D UDNR Boundary D Original UDNR Blocks Source: 'Plan of land as set fonh in the UDNR Act (j)-- Proposed Reordered Blocks 1896' Plan no. 6873, August 1901, LlNZ Hamilton Map 2: Original 1901 Urewera District Native Reserve (and block regrouping proposal) Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 18 m~rtjt~l Maori Land S.F. State Forests ~ Urewera National Park -- Urewera District Native Reserve o 10km 1='=="'=====;1-----" 6miles Source: Adapted from Stokes, MJ1roy and Melbourne, 1986, ai 894, record of documents, A111 Fig 18. Map 3: Contemporary Tuhoe Blocks in the Urewera National Park Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 19 Map 1 The 'old blocks' of the Urewera District Native Reserve 1903 - 1922. Map 2 (full scale in the Historical Map Book which accompanies this report) Probably the working map for the Tuhoe commissioners 1899-1903 over which a proposed regrouping ofthe original 35 old blocks into just 10 was proposed. The map 12500-2 (probably c.1920) is the clearest and most detailed compilation of the early maps which I have seen, this is included in the Historical Map Book. Map 3 The new blocks, remnants of the old, as they survive in the contemporary Urewera National Park. These were established in the consolidation scheme by about 1925 and most remain unchanged. Note the main rivers and main (named) ridgelines. Map 1 is a constant reference throughout these chapters, reflecting the historical importance of the old blocks (which were abolished in 1922). In Figure 1 I have listed them and the hapuu recognised in 1902 to have leading rights in them, along with abbreviations which are sometimes used in other figures and the spreadsheets. Another important map (Map 11) will be referred to frequently: it is an overlay of the new (1925 to present) blocks on the old (1899-1922) blocks (this is simplified in Map 12). I have had to reconstruct this from a combination of others (which were themselves hard to find) because no such comprehensive map was ever made showing all the new 'Native Reserve' blocks together, let alone where they are situated in and across the old blocks. The Crown wanted very badly to get rid of the old blocks and put all that history 'behind' us, and especially behind the Tuhoe. The evidence suggests that the political solidarity represented by the old blocks was still a threat to the Crown. Before previewing the chapters, I want to acknowledge the help I have had in doing the research and preparing this manuscript as a report to the Waitangi Tribunal. First of all, credit must go to the Tribunal as a whole, which in my experience since Judge Durie's formative influence has become both one of the most important and effective scholarly as well as judicial institutions in New Zealand history. As a scholar and teacher myself, I have watched the Tribunal closely and with excitement for years, and it was a thrill to have the opportunity to work for it on this project. The Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 20 professional research and data organisation skills of Himaima Turnoana and Clementine Fraser accomplished most of the work of archival research and collation, as well as reassure me in the panic of all. At the Tribunal Ralph Johnson, Richard Moorsom, Barry Rigby, and Leanne Boulton organised and supervised the whole project, always in the most professional yet the warmest and most considerate way I could hope for. It has been like working in the best of research universities. The extraordinary amount of extra work which Richard and Leanne put into final preparations cushioned me from having to find out too late how extensive and exhausting it all was. 0.1 A Preview of the Following Chapters The essay is in four parts: this introduction to the situation under the Urewera District Native Reserve, two chapters on the following Crown purchase campaign, two chapters on the arrangement and implementation of the consolidation scheme, two chapters on the continuation of purchases under the scheme, and three chapters on the continuing struggles over allocations of consolidated shares under the scheme. This introduction reviews some essentials of Tuhoe social organisation at the tum of the century in the Urewera District Native Reserve which, I argue, was set up largely in their own way and under their own control, although in response to and compromise with colonial demands. My aim is, first, to explore 'traditional' Tuhoe social organisation and its changing historical context at the tum of the century, but also to demonstrate the richness of the archival data for ethnohistorical reconstruction of details of this social organisation. In chapter one I furnish extended examples of such analysis. I conclude the introduction with a short section introducing my sources and myself in the context of this research. The next two chapters (Part I) examine the latter half of a Crown purchase campaign which was organised to acquire all of the Reserve if it could. However, Crown Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 21 officers had to struggle for over a decade 1910-1921 to gain somewhat over half in undivided shares in common which, ironically, still had to be shared with the Tuhoe 'in every part' of every block (as the Solicitor General characterised Native tenure in common). The Tuhoe were still there everywhere, down to each fernroot, so to speak. This was the dilemma for the Crown which the consolidation was meant to resolve. After a review of the archive and secondary sources for this history in chapter one, I present two illustrations at an ethnographic level of analysis in hopes of imparting a sense of what was going on the ground. They illustrate the richness of the data and my method of ethnohistorical analysis and interpretation. The first illustration examines the social organisation and extensive loss of land rights to the purchase campaign of a large and prestigious hapuu lineage in the Tauranga basin. The second illustration is of an alliance of leaders centred in Ruatahuna who forced through a partition of the block to reinforce hapuu solidarity and, with other leaders in Ruatoki and Waikaremoana, attempted to stem the purchase campaign by organising land development schemes. Chapter two is an analysis of the organisation of the Crown purchase campaign and the forms of Tuhoe resistance with which it struggled. After outlining the history of the Crown's extensive experience in acquisition of Maori lands, I examine the variety of venues and network of agents and assistants which were organised by the Native Land purchase officer to facilitate his purchases. Tuhoe forms of resistance are best understood in terms of the purchase officer's difficulties is identifying individuals' land rights and the tactics which he developed to do this and to encourage and expedite purchases. Next will be examined the role of deaths and succession to shares, the role of the Crown's Native Trustee or Tuhoe trustees in the purchase of minors' shares, and the certification of majority age to in the purchase of adults' shares. Finally, the relative predicaments of the Crown and the Tuhoe and the end of the purchase campaign in 1921 will be assessed. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 22 Chapters three and four (Part II) analyse the organisation of the Urewera consolidation scheme in Ruatoki in 1921, and the routines of its implementation under the consolidation commission 1921-1927. After a review of previous reports, chapter three previews the manifold procedures undertaken to arrange the Scheme at Tauarau marae in August 1921. I examine the range and adequacy to represent the Tuhoe of the 30-some persons selected to consider the Crown's proposals and lead the consolidation groups, and attempt to identify and assess the degree of acceptance of the Crown's proposals put to them. Next is examined the way in which the ISO-some consolidation groups were formed, the social organisation implicit in some of these groups, and the Crown's implicit discrimination between those it intended to tolerate and those it intended to evacuate or discourage and how it did this. Finally chapter three describes how the groupbooks were organised to reduce the shares retained unsold by individuals in different blocks, and succeeded to from the many deceased Tuhoe, to a total pence-value which was consolidated with that of others in a consolidation group, and how these groups proposed one or a few locations for their consolidated shares in the areas not pre empted by the Crown. Chapter four describes the increasingly urgent situation in late 1921 precipitated by the Crown's predicament and stalled negotiations or rising protests among Tuhoe, and the consequent rush to mobilise the commissioners in the Urewera even before the Scheme had been approved by parliament in early 1922. I then examine the adequacy and idiosyncrasies of the records of the scheme, and outline the various routines developed by the commissioners to process the numerous changes in consolidation groups, allocate their shares in particular locations fitted in with other groups, field complaints, organise the surveys, and finally to order the over 200 new blocks. The relative invisibility in the minutebooks of the Crown's own activities behind the scenes will also be assessed. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 23 The remaining five chapters pursue some of these relatively obscured aspects of the Crown's activities while implementing the consolidation scheme, with attention to the initiatives and reactions of the Tuhoe in relation to them. Chapters five and six (Part III) follow the continuation of purchasing despite the Crown's agreement to stop it, and chapters seven through nine (Part IV) follow three different aspects of the negotiations and confrontations over the allocation of land to the consolidation groups. Chapter five traces the internal conflicts and ambiguities of policy between consolidation officers and the Ministers from August 1921 through a crisis in July 1922. Our tabulation of these purchases suggests there may have been twice as many as were admitted in the commissioners' reports, and that they may account for over 8,000 acres lost to the Tuhoe. Over this period the Crown's early promise to cease the purchases swung between recognition and disregard, and Ngata as the Tuhoe representative appeared to be caught in the middle. A confrontation at Te Whaiti and Commissioner Knight's defense of his purchases offers an opportunity for some detailed description of events. Chapter six traces the resumption of Crown purchases under a reformed restriction, focusing especially on those in October 1923 which illustrate several different forms which it took. The patterns of purchase identified include an apparent targeting of Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks to enforce evacuations, a concerted attack on a leader of the oppositionist movement in Ruatahuna, extensive duplication of single purchases from other blocks on the Waikaremoana deeds, and the shifting of jurisdictions in order to purchase a block in Ruatoki, outside the Scheme. The conclusion considers what might have motivated the Crown's persistence in purchasing. Chapters seven and eight focus on the confrontation and negotiations arising over allocations of land to consolidation groups in the lower Whakatane and TaurangaiWaimana basins. Parekohe block and its periphery in both basins was immediately recognised by the Crown to be a potential trouble spot, but probably ------:..; - . ------~ ------.J _ ';------~-C-C-C-I Ie ___ ;_ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 24 related negotiations extended throughout both basins and Tuhoe stubbornness soon resulted in the breakdown of the Crown's early plan take all of the lower Tauranga basin as a Pakeha settlement area. Chapter eight traces an apparent Crown reaction reneging on its early plan to leave part of the lower Whakatane basin as the new Tuhoe homeland. However, while this resulted in further Crown pre-emption of two blocks earlier intended to be left to the Tuhoe, particular leading families were eventually able to negotiate the recovery for Tuhoe of an entire block initially to be taken by the Crown and large parts of two other blocks including more ofParekohe. Chapter eight also traces the Crown's use of one of the more subtle forms of pre emption developed in piecemeal deductions for the cost of surveys and roading taken from each allocation, and considers the extent to which Tuhoe were aware of it. I examine the ambiguities which the Crown appears to have prolonged regarding this policy, and the ways in which as a tactic it enabled the commissioners to minimise and crowd Tuhoe allocations while maximising the Crown's eventual award. Chapter nme focuses on the confrontations over the allocation of land to consolidation groups in the upper Whakatane River basin, especially Ruatahuna and Tarapounamu-Matawhero. The chapter seeks a better understanding of the Apitihana or oppositionist movement which dogged the consolidation commission throughout the implementation of the Scheme. The implications of the commissioners' refusal of a Tuhoe demand to have access to a list of sellers emerges in connection with the oppositionist movement. This information was needed in all crowded areas to ease the Tuhoe's difficult settlement of prior rights in the face of Crown pre-emptions, and to deny the Crown the opportunity to make these decisions for its own benefit. A final accounting of wins and losses for this most radical form of Tuhoe confrontation shows that while the Apitihana lost the war it won some battles. This is my general conclusion for the whole of the confrontation between the Tuhoe and the Crown in the consolidation scheme: while loosing by far most of their land, they emerged with enduring mana. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 25 The equally enduring trouble is, Tuhoe cannot live by mana alone. On top of the Crown's unrelenting demand through almost two decades for all the land it could acquire by almost any tactic, there were many stings which the Tuhoe were not even given an opportunity to confront. These stings included the quiet windfall to the Crown of almost half as much as the total land finally left to the Tuhoe, and the persistence of the Crown in the illusion that Tuhoe 'family farms' would be viable. This illusion was maintained (at least by the Crown if not the Tuhoe) while at the same time it took the best land for itself, yet soon gave up on the prospect of viable Pakeha settlement even there. The illusion was maintained while it continued to minimise and crowd the eventual Tuhoe allocations for these 'family farms' on poorer land. The crowning raupatu (blow) was to never build the roads which were the last chance for any viability - as well as a main reason the Tuhoe had struggled to locate their morehuu (remnants) of land where they did. As will be shown, these locations often salvaged a remnant of their ancestry too but, again, one does not eat one's ancestors. Even the mana with which the Tuhoe emerged had been tainted by confrontation with a less than honourable foe, he tini tangata koohuru (a treacherous multitude). Na, heoi anoo. 0.2 Tuhoe Social Organisation, 1899-1903 Analysis and especially the detailed ethnohistorical illustrations in the following chapters require an understanding of fundamental aspects of Tuhoe (or, more broadly, Maori) social organisation. Here I will describe some of these aspects in general terms as they appeared at the tum of the century in the Urewera, and briefly show how they can be identified and traced in the archival and other documentary information. I want to focus on the social organisation of hapuu kin groups and land rights, but this necessarily involves a look at social and cultural change, sibling groups, seniority, and (relatively obscured in the data) the role of women in descent and the associated land rights. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 26 My 1984-5 manuscript, distributed at that time to some Tuhoe elders, attempted an early and brief analysis of government policies bearing on Tuhoe land and society 1895-1926. 1 Archive research was relatively new to me, but I find that understanding a history adds splendor as well as tragedy to the present, and demands a better future. Now after the intervening years of the Maori renaissance and surging ethnic politics, at the end of my academic career, I have returned to study the changes of Tuhoe kinship and land through those surprisingly full decades. Although the leading cause of change over those years is the confrontation between government policies and Tuhoe in the struggle for control over Tuhoe lands, other important factors are the depressions of the 1890s and 1920s, epidemics, floods and crop failures, itinerant labour and new local industries, World War I, and the growing availability (for some) of education, healthcare, and transport. The first Urewera Commission 1899-1903, finally implementing the 1896 Urewera District Native Reserve Act, was composed of two Pakeha commissioners (Percy Smith, Chief Surveyor, D. Scannell, or W.J. Butler, both Native Land Court judges) assisted by a secretary and interpreter (the ethnologist Elsdon Best), and five Tuhoe rangatira. The Tuhoe commissioners were Numia Kereru, Hurae Puketapu, Te Pou, Mehaka Tokopounamu, and Tutakangahau, anyone of whom would step down when decisions were to be made on claims to which they were a party. The brief of the commission was to 'divide the Urewera district into blocks, adopting as far a possible hapuu boundaries, and to investigate the ownership of each block,.2 Their 1903 report lists claimants awarded shares of ownership in each of thirty-five blocks (three of which were sub-divisions of the Ruatoki block). The report goes on to call these blocks 'hapu blocks' (see Map 1 and, for more detail of different sorts, Maps 3, and map 12500-2 in the Historical Map Book). 1 Steven Webster, 'Urewera Land 1895-1926; a tentative historical survey of Government and Tuhoe relations as reflected in official records', unpublished manuscript, 50 pp, 1984-5, The University of Auckland Library. 2 W.J. Butler, 'The Urewera District Native Reserve Act, 1896',6 August 1902, AJHR, 1902, G-6, p 1. ______:0--'" __ -=--:: __ --"::..; Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 27 0.2.1. Reliability of the Records Historian Judith Binney and social anthropologist Jeff Sissons, two leading Pakeha scholars whose research among the Tuhoe for many years has earned the respect of many of them, are skeptical that the 'first' Urewera Commission (1899-1903; the 'second' Commission 1906-7 only heard appeals) fairly represented the Tuhoe and remained independent of its Pakeha chairmen. 3 I do not find their evidence convincing, and argue to the contrary. Although compromises were necessarily made, the significant losses to Tuhoe were before the establishment of the Native Reserve (especially, of course, in the Raupatu) and after the final orders of the Urewera Commission were drawn up in 1907, in the Crown purchase campaign and the consolidation scheme. It is this latter era that is thought of by some Tuhoe as a continuation of the Raupatu. These historical shifts must not be overshadowed by an ideological assumption of continuous Tuhoe victimisation. Trotsky pointed out that the history of colonisation is 'uneven,' which is to say it is usually a struggle even for the powerful to overcome the resistance and counter-tactics of the colonised.4 As Binney and Sissons well know, the Tuhoe always 'gave as good as they got', and sometimes came out on top even against overwhelming odds. How reliable are these records for analysis of Tuhoe kinship and land rights at the tum of the century? Checking of details by contemporary tohunga whakapapa will be necessary, but the 1899-1903 lists and accompanying records (especially Best's 1898 genealogical census, the minutebooks 1-7, and the special one I call UMB 8, 'Nga Whaea') are probably the most accurate and comprehensive information available on actual Tuhoe whaanau and hapuu membership and land rights at that time. Indeed, they may be the best such information on iwi anywhere. The 1896 Act was partly the result of Tuhoe lobbying and probably represented sincere intentions for 'home-rule' 3 Judith Binney, 'Encircled Lands, Part two: A History of the Urewera 1878-1912', An Overview Report on the Urewera, Crown Forestry Rental Trust, June 2002, pp 235-47; Jeffrey Sissons, 'Waimana Kaaku: A History of the Waimana Block', a report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, June 2002 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A24), Appendix 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 28 on the part of Seddon, Carroll, Smith, Best, and some benevolent parliamentarians. Until it began to be actively undermined about 1908 (as Binney systematically shows), its provisions ensured a General Committee of Tuhoe rangatira complete control over 656,000 acres of land within the Tuhoe rohe potae despite popular and commercial demands for access to it. Even after Apirana N gata broke down the solidarity of the General Committee in 1910 (as I found out for myself in 1985) and through the following decade of Crown purchasing in contempt of it, this statute continued to be a rallying point for defiant Tuhoe. The historical introduction to the 1921 report on the proposed Urewera consolidation scheme is relatively candid about this period, and sets the agenda for the following period which is the main subject of these chapters. The decisions of the first commission were certainly sometimes dominated by the Pakeha minority, especially insofar as they were experienced Native Land Court judges. However, backed by the home-rule intent of the 1896 Act, like amateur ethnologists Percy Smith and Elsdon Best they too were at pains to preserve what they saw as authentic Tuhoe tradition. The commissioners' minutebooks show that they attempted to reassure rangatira critics (Tamaikoha, in particular) that they were not operating in the then widely discredited manner of the Native Land Court. The departure from a more formal adversarial to a more informal procedure after the first very prolonged investigation into Te Purenga area and Te Waipotiki block was resisted by one of the most prestigious commissioners (Numia Kereru) but intended to avoid falling into the procedures of the court. Although an Urewera appeals commission 1906-7 (often called the '2nd Commission') had to decide on 173 appeals against the decisions of the 1899-1903 commission, most of these had to do with adding or (rarely) deleting members to the 1903 lists of owners - what can be seen as the normal dynamics of hapuu membership and land rights - especially under the duress of colonial land policies. The commission did introduce into Tuhoe land tenure the major Trojan horses which were to nearly destroy it (individual shares and 4 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982, p Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 29 line boundaries), but these were compromises which Tuhoe foresaw and which they could control as long as they controlled what the legislation guaranteed they would: the land and their domain, the Rohe Potae a Tuhoe. Elsdon Best's detailed history and genealogy in Tuhae: Children a/the Mist (much of which was drawn directly from the commission records) is often challenged among contemporary Tuhoe, although many have copies on their shelves. His evolutionist and racist dogmas certainly distorted his account of Tuhoe history, and with regard to his genealogies he might be expected to side with the views of his favourite Tuhoe informants. However, like Smith (who was his patron) Best was dedicated to recording what he saw as a dying tradition, and he did so in unusually rich ethnographic detail including verbatim extracts in Maori (in this anthropological aspect he was far ahead of his time). At least with regard to his genealogies at whaanau and recent hapuu levels, the same point can be made as with regard to the 1906 appeals: many Tuhoe criticisms probably reflect the normal or traditional disaffections and alliances between hapuu, exacerbated and often exploited by government policies. In principle, then, Best's genealogical biases can probably be identified - perhaps even revealingly - as integral to Tuhoe politics of the times. Were the Tuhoe commissioners sources of reliable information? Although they were intended to be a five-to-two majority, this was usually reduced by two or more standing down as interested parties for final decisions. They were furthermore certainly subject to extraordinary pressures: e.g., increasing Pakeha demands to alienate their lands; the rising need for cash among their people; the insistence by government that they accept boundary surveys; resulting suspicions between kaumaatua and rangatira including themselves; the commission's demand for amalgamation of blocks, compromises between opposed claims, and expedited hearings. They had been appointed on the basis of some sort of local elections soon after the legislation was passed in 1896.5 Best's possible influence in selecting the 303. 5 Binney, p 222. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 30 one replacement since then (Tutakangahau) was probably balanced by Numia Kereru, whose claim to Ruatoki offended many including Best but whose mana was probably the most widely acknowledged. In the winter of 1900 some of the Tuhoe commissioners either came under criticism or sought to resign.6 Nevertheless, the hapuu and locations each of them spoke for in the initial sitting suggests wide and overlapping not merely regional representation.7 This first sitting was almost certainly attended by many other leading Tuhoe, and these statements in public as well as in front of each other would have indicated extensive acceptance among both the people and the hapuu named, as well as a commensurate responsibility. These five were probably among the most knowledgeable and widely accepted of Tuhoe rangatira of the time who could be trusted to deal with Pakeha and colonial forces without compromising Tuhoe knowledge and ideals. I am thus doubtful that Pakeha autocrats or even the tough and experienced Land Court Judges were able to maintain any dominance over them together for very long. Although long stereotyped as barbaric and isolated, Tuhoe have also always been held in awe by other Maori as well as well as Pakeha. He te kotahi naa Tuhoe ka kata te poo (just one from Tuhoe and Death laughs - because she knows the one can cause many deaths?).8 It is likely that their joint influence in most issues prevailed in most discussions, and even when some officially stood down for final decisions their advice behind the scenes was indispensable. They probably consulted and were usually backed by other rangatira who did not wish to be on the front line; even Tamaikoha, who actively resisted the commission at least for a while,9 ended by 6 Hurae Puketapu to Smith, 25 June 1900 and Numia to Smith, 9 August 1900, MS paper 1187 folder 297, ATL; Binney 2002:237ff. 7 Waiariki District Maori Land Court, Urewera District Native Reserve Commission minute book 1 (1 February 1899 - 8 March 1900), 1 February 1899, folios 4 - 13 (full citation and repositories in references; see abbreviations). 8 I had completely mis-recorded and misunderstood this whakatauaki in an earlier draft, and owe thanks to Tama Nikora for letting me know I had. Although he did not offer an alternative, a whanaunga (who shall remain anonymous) did, but cautiously. 9 Sissons, Appendix 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 31 cooperating guardedly or resignedly. I would argue that the hostilities which Binney detects in the records and emphasises was integral to formal Tuhoe assertion of mana over lands on behalf of the several hapuu to which each was affiliated (for this reason, much to Best's incomprehension, they could even argue against themselves), and they were as closely bound together by marriages and shifting political alliances as they were opposed by claims of hapuu dominance over land rights. When irresolvable differences between the Tuhoe commissioners arose, they were probably kept in check by Tuhoe kawa, which welcomes confrontation and resolution in appropriate ways. The abiding impression in the minutebooks is that many decisions had already been made before the commission was convened, and it is not conceivable that the Tuhoe commissioners would have allowed themselves to be rubber stamps very often. They were continually answerable to their people as well as each other, and probably reassured by the 1896 Act that they were, for the foreseeable future, protected in their control over the Tuhoe rohe potae. So far, I am inclined to conclude that the resulting block boundaries and lists of individual rights reflected current land (and thus hapuu) rights as accurately and fairly as could be determined under the circumstances. The best evidence that the Tuhoe commissioners usually remained in control of the proceedings is the richness and coherence of their results, which depict the intricacies of a system of kinship and land history of which even Best never became more than vaguely aware. 0.2.2 Culture Change is Always Two-way Nevertheless, in some important ways the 1903 boundaries and lists imposed legal and social structures which were radically at odds with Tuhoe kinship and land customs. Capitalism and its cultural context, in the guise of 'modernity', was already built into these structures. For example: abstract (linear and magnetic rather than historical and narrative) boundaries; individualised and exclusive (that is, private) ownership; rights to land in a generalised sense rather than in its specific resources; relative shares in ownership; patronymic surnames; suppression of specific historical Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 32 distinctions (such as gifted lands, symbolic occupancy, or subordinate or umesolved hapuu rights). Some of the major changes in Tuhoe society and culture can be traced back to these new forces in land and kinship rights. Nevertheless, in many other ways the established kinship and land 'traditions' of Tuhoe, which had always been changing, reformulated these legal and social structures as much as the other way around. It emerges that this happened even when the imposition was more by force than paternalism, as was the case in the Urewera consolidation. Here I will briefly outline some of these probably traditional features of Tuhoe society and attempt to assess their emergence through powerful historical currents which, while precipitating change in these traditions, were themselves being changed irrevocably. As the British found out, Maori society is itself an historical force. As for Tuhoe, he te kotahi naa Tuhoe ka kata te poo. What do the 1899-1903 lists show about the social organisation of Tuhoe land and kinship at that time? The number of persons listed as having recognised land rights in one or another of 35 blocks ranges from 44 to over 900, and averages 420 persons per block, together totaling 14,712 names. However, my tabulation by surname shows that only about 1,993 different persons were named in the 35 lists. It is significant that this number is far higher than current censuses would indicate; Miles (and later Binney) carefully traces these, which appear to decline from a high of 1,650 in 1886, to 1,421 in 1896, to 1,094 in 1901.10 Although my calculation of 1,993 persons might be taken as a more reliable census of Tuhoe at that time, it must be kept in mind that this represented persons with Tuhoe land rights, not necessarily resident in the Urewera or even in the district. Insofar as land rights devolved through descent regardless of residence (at least for a few generations), it is likely that some of these persons lived outside the rohe potae, e.g., married into other Maori communities or working in itinerant labour or in towns or cities. \0 Anita Miles, Te Urewera, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whaanui district series, March 1999, pp 85-94; Binney, pp 480-497. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 33 Binney reports non-resident Tuhoe ranging from 2-10 per cent recorded III the censuses from 1886 through 1901. In 1901, about 8 per cent of the 1,094 were reported to be living outside Whakatane County. The commissioners discouraged inclusion of Tuhoe who were reported to have left the Urewera permanently, but Tuhoe probably ignored this if non-residents continued to visit and sustained some active support. Nevertheless, even if the proportion of Tuhoe with recognised land rights living outside the rohe in 1901 were granted to be 10 per cent of my higher figure (say, 200 persons), the actual number of Tuhoe resident in the rohe may have been as much as 60 per cent higher than the 1901 census indicated. This does not necessarily imply the Tuhoe had been thriving despite the 1890s depression and famines, but it may mean that the birth rate was extraordinarily high. The 1903 lists and especially the hapuu lineage examined in the chapter one suggest that it was, and it will be shown later (in sections 2.3 and 3.6) that this very high birthrate continued into the 1920s despite the high mortality of the war years, the influenza epidemic of 1918, and another depression. It is obvious on closer inspection that there is considerable overlap between the lists for each block; that is to say, many persons were recognised to hold land rights in many of the blocks. This is no surprise if land rights are seen in terms of kinship, and kinship is seen in terms of cognatic descent (through either or both parents) from a common ancestor. A few marriages between ancestors with rights to different areas (later, blocks) of land or its resources (which in tum reflects affiliation with different hapuu) would result in such an array of land rights among their descendants in just a few generations. But this array of rights also has a genealogical depth which is difficult to grasp for those of us who live in kinship systems which are not ancestrally organised. It is in this sense of whakapapa (genealogy) that land is history to Maori. This complex has long been the most intractable aspect of Maori social organisation for institutions which would transform land into commodities; the Maori Land Court has never really gotten on top of it (since the 1980s, one could even claim the reverse, although by this time 96 percent of the land had been lost). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 34 The 1903 report of the Urewera commission describes the divisions of the block lists as 'family groups,' and individuals in these groups do all bear the same surname. It is easy to be misled into assuming these are lists of whaanau or extended families. However, closer inspection shows that they are neither 'families' nor whaanau, but all are sibling groups, that is, brothers and sisters (Papers 1 (Appendix B); this is for Tauwhare-Manuka block, which may be located on Map 1). One or another of their parents usually appears in a preceding sibling group listed for the same block. The other parent often can be identified in the lists for another block in which the children are named. However, every sibling group bears a different 'surname' from either of their parents! I must explain further. Some historians must have already figured this out, but as a naive social anthropologist I had to figure it out all over again. How did Tuhoe name persons at that time, and might the same person use alternative names? Contemporary as well as Best's whakapapa (genealogies) typically use no surname, and Tuhoe still often have a few alternative names, ancestral as well as 'nicknames' (both customs are common among other cultures of the world). Maori 'aliases' have always been a big headache for government record keepers. Widespread change of names among the Tuhoe was reported in census attempts in the 1880s.11 Whether or not it was the Tuhoe custom at that time, the commission apparently required that the (first or only) names of all persons on lists of claimants be followed by their father's first (or only) name - which thus appeared as a patronymic 'surname', perhaps for the first time. This added patronym was then, I think, usually adopted as a surname in following generations. It may have already been a Maori transliteration of a Pakeha name (often unrecognisable except by knowledgeable insiders) and many Tuhoe later adopted entirely different Pakeha names. Everyone nevertheless knows the old family name - which was originally an ancestral 'first' name subsequently imposed colonially as a patronym, quite arbitrarily from a Maori point of view (which is cognatic). Thus are the ironies of cultural changes, which continue whether or not in a colonial history.! Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 35 would argue that alternative names for the same person, always a major problem in censuses, is not a significant problem in these lists. Nor do I feel it is a big problem in the following 1907 and 1921 lists resulting from appeals and the consolidation scheme, respectively, nor in comparisons across these three sets of lists. My main reason for this assumption is that the Tuhoe commissioners and other leaders would have seen these lists as part of the legal basis for the autonomy promised them in the 1896 Act, and later as the only legal basis for defense of their precious ancestral rights to land - including defense of the morehuu (remnants) of it remaining by 1921. Bitterly, it turned out that the legal protection of consistent names was turned against them in the Crown purchase campaign 1915-21. Nevertheless, until this happened they would have usually been careful to avoid confusion and consistently use one name for each person. The striking internal consistency between lists for different blocks corroborates this. As might be seen in Papers I(Appendix B), up to four successive generations of sibling groups appear in the 1899-1903 lists (but note: even this would not be a 'whaanau', primarily because spouses are not included, but also because it is not usually a co-resident or domestic group). Because the 'surname' derives from the father's first rather last name, and this first name tends to appear unique (in fact it was often ancestral), the 'surname' thus appears to change for every successive generation. (An exception occurs when a son was given his father's 'first' name as his 'first' name - a traditional option. In this case, his first name was the same as his 'surname', and his children in tum appeared to continue his surname). 0.2.3 Nga Whaaea, Seniority and Hapuu Despite these complications, the consistent surname form used in the lists usually makes it possible to identify the father of a sibling group (and often, his father as well). However, the mother is more difficult to determine from the lists alone - to say nothing of whether different mothers or adoptions were involved. It turns out that Elsdon Best annotated a draft copy of the orders with the names of the mother (or, 11 Miles, p 92; Binney, p 488. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 36 sometimes, the mothers) of most sibling groups in at least half of the block lists in what was to be Urewera Minutebook 8 (9 appears to be lost). For him, at least, this complemented the official lists to fonn initial whakapapa: while the imposed patronyms in the latter indicated the father's side of each sibling group's genealogy, the copy annotated with the name of the mother indicated the mother's side of that genealogy. It was also probably integral to the Pakeha commissioners' understanding of land rights, insofar as these devolved from the mother as well as the father. Even without this additional infonnation one can deduce from the fonnat of the block lists that each sibling group was seen by the Tuhoe commissioners as succeeding to their array of land rights in several blocks from - or rather, through - a specific mother as well as father. An interesting exception to the patronymic rule occurs in the case of offspring designated 'h.c.' meaning 'half-caste' (until I asked a Tuhoe elder, I thought it might mean haahi catholic or Catholic church!). It appears that in all these cases the surname is the mother's first name (not because the children were born out of wedlock but), apparently because no land rights are derived through the father (I have identified no cases where the Pakeha parent was female, although there certainly were some). Because it was the patronym which was imposed (or adopted) as a surname, the mother of a sibling group is more usually difficult to identify. Next to having access to Minutebook eight (which with elation I dubbed 'Nga Whaea' when I recognised what it was), the best way to begin identification of the mother of a sibling group is to find a list in which the father does not appear. One of the sisters in the preceding sibling groups is most likely to be the mother. Narrowing down the possibilities involves recognition of the difference between tuakana and teina lines of descent, which follow the birth order among a sibling group. The offspring of each sibling is likely to follow that sibling group in the same order as their birth order. Consequently, identifying the offspring of the males (through their patronym, which is their father's 'first' name) narrows down the possibilities of which offspring groups are the children of one of the females. This procedure also, of course, helps to Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 37 identify the wife of their father. Where both parents were members of the same hapuu, the sibling groups of both the mother and the father will usually be somewhere in the list, usually with the most important source of land rights immediately preceding the offspring. If one has access to the Urewera Minutebook eight 'Nga Whaea' a lot of the guesswork in this process can be avoided. The customary principle of seniority among siblings (tuakana and teina) is strikingly reflected in the 1903 lists, probably because it was integral to the organisation of hapuu, Maori cognatic descent groups. It was also probably integral to relationships between some hapuu. It is clear that the Tuhoe commissioners usually ordered different sibling groups and their descendents in accord with this principle, even carrying it out to four generations (see Papers 1). (There are exceptions which appear to follow no particular pattern; certain of the block lists appear to be much less consistent than others). First of all, each sibling group is ordered according to birth order, and this is surprisingly consistent throughout the block lists. It is obvious where some siblings are18 years old or under, in which case their age as well as gender is recorded (I assume this was because 19 was the legal age of adulthood around 1903). Generally, in addition to this, the children of each person in a sibling group are listed in separate sibling groups (in this case, 'cousins') which are also ordered in the birth order of their parents. It is important to appreciate that there is no systematic priority by gender, for instance, males over females (this is why the kinship system is termed 'cognatic'). Where a third or even a fourth generation appears, these are sometimes listed in accord with this principle before the offspring of the next most senior grandparent are traced out. The capacity of the Tuhoe commissioners (perhaps working with tohunga whakapapa (genealogical experts) as well as between themselves) consistently to recall the details of these genealogical maze ways presumably extends well beyond the living generations, but if this is reflected in the lists I cannot yet recognise it. In the following chapters I will term such a lineal segment of a hapuu as the three or four generations depicted in Papers 1 (Appendix B) a hapuu lineage (and in chapter one I will be examining this particular example much more closely). I mean this term to designate a cognatic descent group every member of which is a descendant of a Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 38 particular ancestor through parents of either gender, but to distinguish it as a segment of a wider hapuu. A hapuu lineage may be the size of a large whaanau, but unlike a whaanau it is centred on descent rather than marriage. All the members of the wider hapuu are seen as descended from the same ancestor, but usually more generations are included and their relationship to each other cannot be traced with the clues I have described. Because the persons who connect them have died this must be known from other sources such as Tuhoe elders, Best's genealogies, or the Urewera minutebooks. Several such hapuu lineages descended from the same ancestor may appear in the same block list and together form a single hapuu. All these hapuu lineages as well as the wider hapuu which includes them also have rights in other blocks, but because they all can also trace descent from other ancestors, they all have different rights in other blocks. A 'hapuu lineage' arbitrarily designates a more readily conceptualised and perhaps visualised segment of limited genealogical depth within this maze of hapuu kinship and land rights. On the other hand, a hapuu lineage must be distinguished from a whaanau (,extended family') because a whaanau usually includes members whose primary affiliation is with another ancestor and thus to another hapuu (especially spouses). Conversely, while all the members of a whaanau work and live on a regular basis together, at least some members of a hapuu lineage are married or adopted into a whaanau with lives elsewhere. The point to be emphasised here is simpler: to a striking degree, the block lists reflect fundamentals of hapuu structure, along with a correlated declension of land rights, in a line of descent. For any given sibling group, both hapuu affiliation and land rights extend across several land blocks and different lists. Land rights are a reflection of hapuu affiliation, and strengthen or weaken with that affiliation. Thus the full account of land rights which the commissioners were committed to record also reflected the structure ofhapuu. The overlap of blocks by hapuu and land rights leads to many complications, however, especially if unfamiliar with the system. This is why the same person (actually, the same sibling groups) appear in the lists of many different blocks. Percy Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 39 Smith had discovered this by the time of his first annual report (which I discovered thanks to Judith Binney), and one can already hear a note of despair in his account: It was soon found that practically there are no such things as defined hapu boundaries such as were acknowledged by the people as belonging to any given hapu to the exclusion of others. As a matter of fact, nearly the whole area is subj ect to overlapping claims, sometimes three or four claims one on top of the other with discordant boundaries; and the hapus are so mixed by inter-marriage that it is difficult to say to what hapu any particular individual of the tribe belongs. As the work progressed it became apparent that the title to the whole area would require investigation before any boundaries could be determined suitable for a division into districts. 12 This was (and still is) a fair description of traditional rights to land as well as the organisation of hapuu in most Maori iwi ('tribes'), not just Tuhoe. Smith's perseverance despite his recent experience is reflected in his insistence that this 'confusion' was the result of hapuu being 'mixed by inter-marriage', still a common and misleading understanding of the normal social organisation of hapuu as cognatic descent groups. Hapuu have always been 'mixed' by intermarriage insofar as many marriages (not just by 'nobility') occur between persons whose primary affiliation is with different hapuu (and the children are born with rights in all of the hapuu to which both of their parents affiliate). This 'overlapping' of hapuu is not some deterioration of a primordial integrity of tribes such as might be imagined for patrilineal groups such as the Old Testament Jews or some African tribes (and which rarely lives up to the ideology even in such cases). Understanding of the Maori social organisation of hapuu and the land rights associated with it has also long been misled by a metaphors of growth (whaanau 'grow' into hapuu, hapuu 'grow' into iwi) or hierarchy (several whaanau are in a hapuu, and several hapuu are in an iwi).13 These metaphors probably originated in efforts by Maori to explain whanaungatanga (kinship) or cognatic descent from 12 S. Percy Smith, 'The Urewera District Native Reserve Act, 1896', undated and unsigned, AJHR, 1899, C-1, pp x-xi, cited by Binney. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 40 selected ancestors (whakapapa) to colonists or government agents, and the latter's' conceptualisation of it in handy terms. Maori still rely on these metaphors and, like Pakeha, have no trouble living the contradiction between them and the kinship system which most of them still inhabit on a daily basis. I argue that hapuu, whaanau, and iwi are distinctive rather than similar aspects of Maori social organisation. 14 Hapuu were and still are a widely dispersed category of kin descended through either gender from the same ancestor, although centred on a core of these descendants whose affiliation with the hapuu is stronger than the others due to residence or active support, usually in a locality associated with the ancestor. Nowadays, through loss of land, this 'locality' may only be a marae (ceremonial clearing) and papakaainga (common land associated with a marae or urupaa (graveyard) or even just a kaainga (homestead) or household, but in earlier days it was always one or more expanses of land. Relative strength or weakness of the affiliation is an integral characteristic of hapuu structure, and one of the ways in which hapuu rights 'overlap'. As Percy Smith found out in his Urewera experience, this domain of land was rarely held exclusively, but was usually shared in an order of relative dominance on a complex historical, ecological, and kinship basis with other hapuu (what William Martin in the l860s termed a 'community' and Ballara in 1995 termed a 'hapuu cluster' 15). While hapuu are based primarily on kinship (descent from a common ancestor, recounted by whakapapa or 'genealogy'), I argue that whaanau and iwi are quite different. Whaanau are 'extended family' or domestic groups in the sense that they are based on one or more marriages, and form a group which works together on a daily face-to-face basis in order to survive and, hopefully, thrive. Because they are 13 Steven Webster, 'Maori Hapuu and their History', The Australian Journal ofAnthropology, Vol. 8: 3,307-335,1997 and 'Maori Hapu as a Whole Way of Struggle: 1840-50s Before the Land Wars', Oceania_69:1:4-35, September 1998. 14 Ibid., 1998 pp 4-5, 15, and Steven Webster, 'Maori Retribalisation and Treaty Rights to the New Zealand Fisheries', The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 14:2, Fa112002, pp 358-9. 15 Ibid. 1998, pp 10-11. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 41 based on marriages and offspring, they necessarily include spouses who are defined as not kin, or sufficiently distant in kinship to not violate whatever incest taboo the culture adheres too (all cultures have one, in the case of the Maori it was (and still is) three or four generations between 'cousins'). Beyond this, marriage is permissible and sometimes encouraged by the elders (for instance, for alliance or to 'bring the iwi (bones) back together again'). While hapuu are based primarily on descent, and whaanau are based primarily on marriage which is distinguished from descent, iwi are best seen as confederations of hapuu based primarily on common political interests. Although they are seen and see themselves as based on kinship or whakapapa in just the same way as hapuu but more inclusively, most of the time this is an ideological rationale for these common political interests. This kinship rationale is typical of 'tribes' the world over, and is invariably associated with colonisation by imperial states, usually as a form of alliance or confederacy. As one can see, the cognatic descent structure of Maori kinship easily lends itself to the political rationalisation of iwi, most hapuu being able to affiliate with more than one iwi in much the same way that most Maori can affiliate with more than one hapuu. Some hapuu can claim to belong to two or more iwi, and some claim to belong to no iwi at all. If an iwi proclaims a common ancestor of its supposedly constituent hapuu, or even if a common whakapapa is traced for all of them, it is on a far more ideological and ambiguous basis than the ancestor from whom a hapuu traces descent of all its members. However, because descent (whakapapa) in a hapuu is cognatic descent, that is, descent of kinship rights through all offspring regardless of gender, hapuu can also change their proclaimed common ancestor over time. As will be described later, this was happening quite rapidly among Tuhoe at the time the Urewera District Native Reserve was being established. Smith resigned from chairmanship of the commISSIOn III March 1901 and was replaced by Native Land Court judge Scannell. The other Pakeha member Judge W.J. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 42 Butler took over as chairman through to the pUblication of its final orders in 1903. In May 1902 the commission decided to reduce the number ofUrewera blocks (which at the time of Smith's 1899 report stood at 57) from the final 35 to just 10 (see Map 3 and compare to Map 1). This plan was probably urged by Butler in hopes of avoiding the many appeals which by then he knew were emerging. The duplication of names in the blocks to be merged, that is, the relatively high proportion of sibling groups which held rights in many of these blocks, probably also reflected the extent of hapuu 'clusters' sharing an historical and ecological base. It was probably on this basis that the plan had at least some support among the Tuhoe commissioners. There was also probably opposition to it, and further consideration was held over because 'it would not be right to reconsider former decisions without giving ample notice to do so - as many of the persons interested had returned to their homes for the purpose of harvesting crops etc.' However, by October 1902 the plan was dropped, reportedly because 'there being some doubt as to the jurisdiction of commissioners to group blocks together under one title' .16 I suspect it was really dropped because Kereru and perhaps other commissioners had marshaled other Tuhoe leaders against it. While most other Tuhoe commissioners had agreed to it, in 1900 he had objected strongly to Smith and Butlers' argument following the very extended Waipotiki that investigations should be expedited by uniting 'lesser' cases where they had a common claim over the same prospective block of land. Kereru was also the leader in reopening the Ruatahuna case in 1912 and settling partitions which better recognised the several hapuu with rights to that block. In February 1900 speaking against hurrying claims through, Kereru had said: Yes, it takes much time to proceed with these cases under the present system but to bring cases which have different claims together under one case [as was later done for Ruatahuna and many other blocks] may be difficult indeed. Let them see to their cases whether they should unite them or not. If we follow up the present suggestion, the people might object. They might entertain the opinion that this method of procedure will prevent them from bringing 16 Waiariki District Maori Land Court, Urewera District Native Reserve Commission minute book 7, Butler, Mair, et al. (28 Apri11902-14 October 1902), pp 23-5, 43. '1 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 43 forward all their claims .... I suggest that you (the European commissioners) should consider the best system of procedure in this land. 17 The last sentence was certainly meant as a warning. Kereru had also confidently dismissed the chairman's claim that longer investigations were too expensive for the Crown. Although it was resolved that lesser claims would be amalgamated the resolution did not appear to have much real effect in the following two years. Binney emphasises that the delays continued, although I would not characterise them as 'internal wrangling' and 'internecine feuding' but rather as Kereru had: what 'the people' (that is, nga iwi) had a right to expect. Although the birth order and resulting tuakanalteina relationship built into the 1903 block orders is a fundamental basis of mana (prestige or respect) in Maori culture (especially in the case of the first-born or mataamua, and his or her descendants), the subdivision of shares between siblings and across gender in these lists is nevertheless usually equal. (Again, there are exceptions, which reflect half-siblings with different parents, adoptions, or illegitimacies). The resulting senior tuakana line of succession through two or more generations can often be connected to Best's depictions of ancestral whakapapa (genealogy), overlapping a few generations. (However, insofar as Best drew his whakapapa from these records, consistency cannot be taken as confirmation!). In these ways, then, the block lists are the whakapapa of the living in 1902, elaborated by the inclusion of all offspring, and all their offspring. In actual practice, rights to the land of the blocks was not quite as extensive and the lists would imply. While noho (use) and especially noho tuturu (permanent occupation) or ahi kaa (burning hearthfire) as well as such ancestry was (and still is) the strongest expression of these land rights, they extended and weakened to the point of an ancestral claim not reinforced or publicly demonstrated by active use for some 17 Waiariki District Maori Land Court, Urewera District Native Reserve Commission minute book 3 (identified as '3A'; English translation oflast part ofUMB 1), Smith, Butler, et aI, (9 February 1900- 8 March 1900), pp 138-9. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 44 generations, ahi teretere or ahi mataotao (flickering or cold hearthfire), what is nowadays often called tuurangawaewae ('a place to stand'). As will be discussed later, this range between relatively weak, strong, or leading land rights to a block is reflected in the shares assigned by the Tuhoe commissioners in what were called 'relative interests' of tenure in common in the Native Land Court. This was first explored at the conclusion of the Te Waipotiki case, when the distinction was worked out in terms of panga rahi and panga iti, 'big' and 'small' shares. This individualisation of shareholding was required by the 1896 Act and, as Marr points out, rendered the communal 'hapuu' titles which the Tuhoe had been assured much more vulnerable. 18 It was precisely this individualised shareholding in common which Native Minister Herries was to exploit in the Crown purchasing campaign 1915-1921 by treating it as individual private ownership - quite a different thing. It is likely that Tuhoe leaders (perhaps especially Tamaikoha) foresaw the dangers here, but it is significant that even in the assignment of individual shares the intention of the commissioners was clearly to reflect their own conception of social status, and specifically the relativity of traditional rights in common to land resources based on ancestry and use. The European law of tenure in common was a compromise, and the Crown's later pretense that this could be purchased as if it were private freehold was, simply enough, illegal. The Tuhoe could foresee this, but had no more control over it than over the Crown itself. One must then ask why the Tuhoe consented to a survey breaking up their rohe potae into discrete blocks misleadingly associated with discrete hapuu. Probably because they were under considerable pressure to accept internal as well as external surveys (Seddon had even threatened them), and the 1896 Act promised them sufficient benefits and autonomy to maintain control over such an ambiguous situation in the foreseeable future. After further comments on how hapuu emerge in the lists, I will 18 Cathy Marr, 'The Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896 and Amendments 1896-1922', a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, June 2002 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A21), pp 99-100. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 45 suggest one way in which the blocks may also have been workable approximations to probably traditional 'hapuu clusters'. 0.2.4 Changing Hapuu I think that the dynamics of overlapping hapuu rights and imposed or negotiated block boundaries are strikingly illustrated by the shifting number and names ofhapuu during the 1899-1903 investigation. The original 1899 claims were for fifty-eight 'hapuu blocks', but because the commission sought to avoid proliferation of blocks these were subsequently reduced to thirty-five 'some by arrangement among the claimants themselves and others by decisions by the Commissioners' .19 The final decisions of the commission recorded in October 1902 regarding what can be seen as 'leading' hapuu rights in each block are shown in Figure 1 below, listed in the order given?O In the minutebooks these were termed 'awards' of ownership and they thereby attained that legal status, but they should be seen as recognition of leading rights (and the minutebooks show that this is how the commissioners saw it too). The priority in which hapuu were listed is also significant, although this was not made explicit in their list - probably for reasons of tact. Also significantly, hapuu are not mentioned at all in the published orders. 21 19 Butler, AJHR G-6 1902. 2°UMB 7:43. 21 Scannell, D., 'Commissioners' Orders Under the "Urewera District Native Reserves Act, 1896''', undated, AJHR, 1903, G-6, pp 1-256. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 46 Figure 1: Urewera District Native Reserve Blocks and Hapuu Rights recognised, October 1902 UDNR Block (1903 orders) Abbrvn Hapuu Rights Recognised (Oct 1902, in order named) 1 Rikurangi-Roromanga RR Patuheuheu, N.Raka, N.Riki 2 Ierenui-Ohaua 1-0 N.Rongo, N.Rakei 4 Karioi K Ngai Te Kahu 3 Kohuru-Tukuroa KT N.Rongo, N.Tarnariwai, N.Korokaipapa 5 Maraetahia MT Ngati Tawha 6 Maungapohatu M Tamakaimoana, N.Potiki, N.Tumatawha, N.Taua, N.Mara, N.Te Ao, N.Pou (Eria's list) 17 Ohiorangi OR Ngai Tama 27 Ornahuru OMru Ngai Tatua 30 Otairi OT Ngai TeAu 11 Otara Ota Ngai Turanga 25 Paraeroa PRroa N.Rinekura, N.Mura 24 Paraoanui PAnui Ngati Taumata 32 Parekohe PK N.Turanga, Te Urewera, N. Te Kapo 23 Pukepohatu PPhtu Ngati Tokotuai 26 Ruatahuna Rthna Te Urewera, N. Te Riu, N. Kuri, N.Tu, N.Manunui, N.Kakahutapiki, N .Ruatahuna 33 Ruatoki No.1 Rl (lists and emte ordered, but no hapuu named) 34 Ruatoki No.2 R2 (lists and emte ordered, but no hapuu named) 35 Ruatoki No.3 R3 (lists and ernte ordered, but no hapuu named) 13 Ruatoki South RS Ngati Muriwai 21 Taneatua TNta N.Whakateke; N.Manutohikuia; Te Urewera; N. Ruatahuna; N.Ra; N. Tokotuwai; N. Tamakaimoana 9 Tapatahi Tap Ngati Takiri 29 Tarapounarnu-Matawhero T-Mro N.Tawhaki, N. Te Wehi 20 Tauranga TUnga N. Mahi, N. Te Kahu, N. Tamaroki. 19 Tauwhare TAwre NgatiMura 16 Tauwhare-Manuka TMka Whakatane, N.Tokotuai, N.Tamariwai 8 Te Poroporo TP Ngati Maruhakapua (N.Maru) 18 TePurenga PU NgatiKoura 28 Te Ranga-a-Ruanuku TR NgatiRa 15 TeTuahu IT Ramua 10 Te Waipotiki Wpki Ngati Rongo, Mahurehure 7 Te Wairiko TWrko Te Aitanga 0 Tanemoeahi 31 Te Whaiti Nui a Toi TWN Tuhoe (Te Urewera), N.Whare, N.Manawa 22 Waikaremoana WM Tuhoe (Te Urewera), Ruapani 14 Waikare-whenua WW Ngati Tama 12 Whaitiripapa WPa Te Urewera ------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 47 Although the early claims for blocks were often made in the name of only one or a few hapuu, the minutes show that additional claims or counter-claims from other hapuu rapidly escalated. It is no surprise that Tuhoe reacted to the enquiry in the way which had been forced upon other Maori by the design (and often, intention) of the Native Land Court since 1865, and that some Tuhoe accused the commission of proceeding as would the court. As the commission's deliberations proceeded, contestations between hapuu spokespersons resulted in the exclusion of some hapuu or groups (probably genealogical segments of other hapuu), and inclusion of others. In the minutes, although final awards of 19 blocks were made in the name of single hapuu, 13 were made in the names of two or more hapuu. Furthermore, evidence suggests that many of the awards apparently to one hapuu actually included parts of other hapuu. Interestingly, although they were named in the minutebooks, as I mentioned above no hapuu at all were named in the officially published orders. This is probably because it had come to be taken for granted among the commissioners and all parties to the investigation that many of the blocks could be informally identified with one more or less dominant hapuu among several other hapuu or sections of hapuu whose legitimate rights were also implicitly recognised in the award. However, officially to award title in the name of either one or several hapuu would invite needless offense and more appeals. In the case of Ruatoki partitions 1, 2 and 3, although block lists and block committee members were ordered in the October 1902 review of awards, no hapuu were named, presumably for the same reason. Hapuu furthermore seemed to appear and disappear during the investigation: although the number of hapuu named in the first (1899) list had changed by only two in the final (1902) list (from 46 to 48), 20 of those named in the former list were not named in the latter list (and, apparently, 22 others had replaced them)! Elsdon Best reported 24 'tuturu (true) and allied' hapuu of Tuhoe in 1886, but 69 'tribes and subtribes' appearing in his genealogical tables in volume two of Tuhoe ... (which was derived from the commission records by 1906), also substantially different from each other. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 48 This rapidly changing situation is probably best conceptualised as splits, alliances, and shifts of allegiance of segments of hapuu from one hapuu to another, sometimes formally recognised by adopting the name of another ancestor from whom all in the newly formed hapuu could trace descent. Perhaps it is not surprising - especially given the new pressures of the 1896 Act and the necessity of an internal survey into blocks - that hapuu memberships, dominant claims over particular land areas, and even eponymous ancestors (after whom the hapuu is named) were changing so quickly. This was probably a normal 'traditional' state of affairs, only intensified by the particular historical conditions. 0.2.5 Hapuu and Land Rights How is the relationship between particular hapuu and particular land rights reflected in the block lists? This can be more clearly conceptualised from the point of view of a sibling group (all of whom usually shared the same land rights). The land rights of each sibling group among the 35 blocks ranged from one to over 24 blocks, the average probably being 7-8 blocks. Potential hapuu memberships of each sibling group were probably similarly overlapping and widespread, although not so numerous. The array of each sibling group's land rights were derived from parent and preceding generations who had land rights in specific areas now drawn within one or another block. Each marriage between parents or grandparents with rights to areas in different blocks appears usually to have extended both these sets of rights to all children of the succeeding generation. Insofar as these marriages were between those with rights in the same rather than different blocks, the array of rights of their offspring would be narrowed (this was one intention of traditional hapuu endogamy). However, where both parents held hapuu rights in the same block and these were extended to their offspring, these reinforced rights were often expressed in a larger or maximum number of shares, reflecting the increased social status of the sibling group. Sometimes, one part of the same sibling group was given more shares than the other; this may have resulted from a parent having more than one spouse, one of whom had rights in the same block as the common parent while the other had lesser or no rights there. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 49 It is important to see the rights recognised in the 1903 orders as extending, like kinship or descent, rather than being succeeded to or inherited on the death of another owner, like private property. In this way, kinship rights are analogous to tenure in common, but not to private freehold property. The hapuu rights which children and infants had in virtue of their ancestry and their parents' activities were recognised by shares in their own right 'at birth'. However, the nature of the new titles as confirming private ownership of shares as distinct from kinship rights immediately began to have a major economic effect: when parents died their children succeeded to their shares as property (as hapuu rights it was something they already had). The Crown appreciated the difference. As I will explain, this unusual situation was reflected throughout the Crown purchase campaign in the preoccupation of the Crown officers with successions, certifying the age of young adults (and, the evidence shows, minors), purchase from trustees, and pressuring the Native Trustee to sell shares held for Tuhoe minors. These purchases were often, so to speak, a two-for-one opportunity. From the point of view of each sibling group, their array of land rights in various blocks probably represented their potential membership in several different hapuu. Insofar as a portion of a sibling group's land rights derived from a particular ancestor, and that ancestor was recognised as founder of a hapuu, those land rights were held in virtue of their membership in that hapuu. However, recognised hapuu memberships were probably far fewer than the number of blocks in which rights were held. Firstly, that sector of a sibling group's land rights which reflected its membership in a given hapuu probably extended into several blocks; that is to say, it is likely that through its particular history any given hapuu exercised land rights in several of the blocks to which a sibling group held their rights. Secondly, it is also likely that some or most of the numerous hapuu memberships available to a sibling group were potential rather than active, and some had virtually lapsed to mere tuurangawaewae through inactivity in those hapuu or an origin removed by several generations. These lesser rights may be represented in the lists by what often appears to be the award of a merely token Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 50 number of shares. Early in their deliberations the term panga iti (small shares) was probably coined on this basis. 0.2.6 Hapuu Clusters? I will now return to the question whether what were misleadingly termed 'hapuu blocks' nevertheless represented some traditional form of hapuu organisation which the Tuhoe commissioners recognised in 1899. From the point of view of each block, the lists probably often represented the approximation of a 'community' of several hapuu or a 'hapuu cluster' rather than a single hapuu. 22 These clusters were cooperative arrangements among several hapuu for the use of specific ecological and social resources in a particular area. These arrangements had developed over time, and thus reflected the specific history of each hapuu (e.g., migration, alliance, or intermarriage), and usually implied the political dominance of one or two hapuu over the others. On the other hand, probably none of the hapuu of a cluster were entirely localised within a given block: any particular hapuu was probably represented in more than one hapuu cluster or block. Just as one cannot tidily locate a single hapuu exclusive of members of others, neither can a 'hapuu cluster' be geographically circumscribed exclusive of other such clusters. Nevertheless, BaHara's (and William Martin's) perception of a 'hapuu cluster' or 'community' in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century got much closer to a concrete conceptualisation than the popular misconception of hapuu as a local kin group. Perhaps we can see the Tuhoe commissioners in 1899, confronted by the impossibility of locating 'hapuu blocks', themselves ending up with a similarly historical and ecological conceptualisation of several hapuu in overlapping clusters - and devised boundaries for them the best they could. From this point of view, the many appeals are not surprising. So far as my analysis indicates, the 1899-1903 lists probably closely reflect this 'traditional' social organisation despite the imposition of blocks and boundaries. 22 See BaHara 1995; Webster 1998a:l0-l1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 51 0.2.7 Relative Shares The first commission's method of assigning individual relative shares of ownership in each block was singled out for criticism in 1907 by the second commission in its final report. 23 The latter commissioners report that 'the members of the Tuhoe Tribe' complained that the first commission had laid down a fixed rule that ownership shares in each block would be differentially apportioned by generation as follows: ... twenty shares each for heads of family, ten shares each for children, five shares each for grandchildren, and three shares each for great-grandchildren respectively; and in instances where the head of a family had died, leaving a family of, say, from six to ten or even more children, each such child received an interest of twenty shares. The second commission pointed out that this system greatly favoured families who happened to have many more children and grandchildren by necessarily passing on the bulk of the land to them (their example was of three brothers one of whom had no children at all). They recommended that this unfair apportionment be changed 'so as to be more in accordance with Maori custom' . Apparently, no such revision of shares was ever made and, indeed, the supposed disparities in land ownership were probably extensive within a few generations. However, my search of the minutebooks for a rule apportioning relative shares has so far turned up no record of what the second commission criticised. Furthermore, the actual practice of assigning shares varied considerably, and was at least in some ways consistent with Maori custom. In any case, many deviations (and perhaps outright disregard) of such a mechanical differentiation on the basis of generation were evident in the actual lists. Social status, rank, or mana appears often to have overridden age or generation. The largest proportion of 20 shares (and in some blocks it was only 15) appears to have 23 Gilbert Mair, D.F.G. Barclay, P. Ngata, 'The Urewera District Native Reserve: Reports of the Commissioners appointed Under Section 10 of "The Urewera District Native Reserve Act, 1896" and Order made thereon by the Minister of Native Affairs', 28 May 1907, AJHR, 1907, G-4, P 29. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 52 been reserved for individuals in the most prestigious sibling groups, or those whose rights were recognised in many blocks. The age of youths 18 years old or less was usually reported, and these were usually assigned 5 shares or less; however, if their parents were assigned 20 shares they usually received 10 shares. Shares did appear generally to be halved for each succeeding generation, but sometimes the usual allocation of 10 shares appears to have been raised to 15 shares, perhaps where both parents were share-holders in the block and both were awarded 20 shares. 24 Most strikingly, the number of shares members of a sibling group held varied from block to block (but their generation or age, of course, did not). Clearly, shares reflected the relative strength or weakness of the sibling groups' rights in different blocks more than their generation or age. Minutebook 8, 'Nga Whaea' was probably a draft for the final orders, and Best may have worked out this identification of mothers here so that he could assess their influence on the shares which the Tuhoe commissioners assigned. However, he often also changed these assignments in major ways. I was alarmed by this until I could see that his modifications were almost entirely proportional, that is, they were across-the board reductions of 20s or 15s to lOs, lOs to 5s, and 5s to Is or 2s. His intention appears to have been merely to bring the allocation of shares in different blocks more into line with each other for the sake of the consistency of the whole. However, a more thorough examination may yet reveal some systematic biases toward certain leaders or certain hapuu. The European custom of assigning abstract shares of exclusive land ownership (rather than control over specific land resources) was probably dubious to the Tuhoe commissioners. But I doubt they would furthermore have accepted a rule for 24 Heather Bassett and Richard Kay, 'Ruatahuna: Land Ownership and Adminstration c.1896-1990', with Supporting Papers Vols I - III, report connnissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, June 2002 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A20), 2002:78-9,84. Basset and Kays' important discussion of shares allocated in the Ruatahuna block describes the Tuhoe connnissioners' distinction between fuller and lesser ownership depending on whether ancestry could be traced from both or only one of two key ancestors. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 53 differential shares which was repugnant to their custom. As suggested earlier, the Tuhoe perception of ownership shares was probably more in the nature of kinship descent than exclusive property: land rights were succeeded to upon birth without diminishing those of the parental generation, rather than inherited ,upon death to the exclusion of its grantor. Just as land rights lapse with disuse or inactivity and are taken up by others in the hapuu, those shares held by families without offspring or adopted children (whare ngaro/empty houses) would revert to other kin. While awarding fewer shares to smaller families may be seen as unfair, emphasis upon the rights of offspring, and award of substantial shares even to infants, reflects the high regard in which all children of the kin group are held by Maori. It was the Crown, not Tuhoe, which converted these land rights into something alienable to others outside the kin group. Indeed, persistence of customary practices such as neglecting successions and leaving the land in the hands of dead ancestors has tended to protect land held by a cohesive kin group of survivors. On the other hand, the colonial imposition of abstract rights of individualised ownership perpetuated regardless of need and active use has historically rendered Maori land more vulnerable to steady loss. Often for this explicit reason, it is the latter principle which has long been pressed by parliament through the Native Land Court - and the second commission might have admitted it was the most repugnant to Maori custom. In conclusion, the actual differentiation of shares approved in the final lists probably reflects careful customary distinctions in status, especially the strength of land rights through ancestral descent in specific localities (and thus aspects of mana or privilege), as well as age and generation. 0.2.8 Active Rights However, active or primary hapuu membership - sustained among one or a few hapuu by active participation or land use - remains ambiguous in the 1899-1903 lists. This is the case even where blocks were awarded to only one hapuu, because any given hapuu segment of sibling groups may have been included merely because its claim could not be definitively dismissed. There are many cases in which after the exclusive rights of one hapuu was recognised, it immediately applied to admit Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 54 segments of other hapuu or individuals to token ownership as a matter of 'aroha'. Similarly, whaanau organisation - which unlike hapuu necessarily involves a domestic group including spouses, adopted children, and others living and working together, remains opaque in this data. (For Elsdon Best, the whaanau of up to 50 people was the irreducible operating unit of Tuhoe, the foundation of their 'communism'). So far, it remains difficult to tell where people are living, or more precisely, in which block or blocks they usually lived and with whom. This was reported for a few Tuhoe in a 1918 Army census for conscription, but like the other censuses this is too generalised and unreliable.25 Ancestry backed by residence or at least active use of resources was the key basis for strong hapuu and thus land rights and is argued at length in the Urewera minutebooks, but usually for the dead not the living generations. To a certain extent, residence can be guessed at from the pattern of leading hapuu rights in 1902 and, later, the pattern of land rights retained through the Crown purchase campaign in 1921 or the location proposed for consolidated land shares in August 1921. However, Tuhoe have always been mobile throughout the Urewera, their rohe potae a Tuhoe (the boundaries of their lands). This is reflected in their scattered rights to land, and their own as well as ancestral marriages which these land rights commemorate for them and for their children and whaanau (offspring). 0.2.9 Summary The preceding outline of some fundamental aspects of Tuhoe social organisation is meant to show how details of hapuu kin groups and land rights as they appeared between 1899 and 1903 can be derived from archival and documentary records. Fuller understanding and corrections require the advice of Tuhoe tohunga whakapapa. This outline also serves as a guide for more detailed ethnohistorical examples, the most extended of which appear in chapter one. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 55 0.3. Some Background to the Research Here in the Introduction I want to acknowledge some of the other scholars upon whose work my own can build, and outline my own background in the Urewera and with the Tuhoe. Earlier reports, particularly those of Vincent O'Malley (1996), Leah Campbell (1997), Anita Miles (1999), Heather Bassett and Richard Kay (2002), and Jeff Sissons (2002), have given me a big boost in this research. Although historians, having long done the best research on the Maori, far outnumber we few social anthropologists contributing to the Waitangi Tribunal's heroic efforts, two of those I rely on are other social anthropologists. However, the earliest and still in many ways the best work on the Urewera was done back in 1986 by Evelyn Stokes, James Te Wharehuia Milroy, and Hirini Melbourne, a geographer long practiced in researching Maori land claims and two well-known Tuhoe academics. He aitua, he aureretanga roa. Takoto mai Hirini. Haere, haere koe, hei tikina atu nga mohio hou ki a tatou tuupuna 0 te ao i mua. Sidney Melbourne has recently died, far too young, gentle, and creative, so it is right to recount here a story he told me. To me it captures both the thrill of rediscovering Urewera and Tuhoe history, and the concrete, living nature of that history. Returning from Ruatoki to Hamilton and Waikato University one day, he stopped in the farmlands between Ruatoki and Taneatua and picked some berries right at the roadside, and then stopped again at the Taneatua pub for a beer. He met some cousins drinking at the bar, and opened his bag of berries to share with them. Their admiration in asking him where he picked them turned to good-humoured horror when he described the location to them. 'Oh, we can't eat those - that is the blood of our tuupuna!' 'What?!' 'Yes! don't you know?,' asked his teina (younger brothers or cousins), 'that is our own blood, spilled in the raupatu (land confiscation in the 1860s) which stopped there!' Sidney returned 25 'Register of Maoris (Arranged in Approximate Order of Districts)" 192pp, index 69pp, Wellington, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 56 'home' to Waikato University humbled, but reborn in the wisdom of his young cousins. The scholarly but wonderful and wonderfully comprehensive Urewera history he wrote with Stokes and his tuakana Te Wharehuia is an apt memorial for him. It laid the foundation for everything the rest of us have done since. Araa, e hoa, murna ki ahau aku hee ki to koutou reo. Takoto, takoto mai raa, taku ariki, he tangata ataahua rangimarie. For some knowledgeable Tuhoe the Urewera consolidation 1921-25, and the Crown purchasing campaign which preceded it 1910-21, are of a piece with the much earlier Raupatu, the confiscation of their best (or only) agricultural lands following the land wars of the 1860s. The Urewera purchase campaign and consolidation was in some ways te raupatu tuarna, the second confiscation. My own first encounter with it was in terms of the sort of objective history which Hirini Melbourne nearly ate. Back in the 1970s and 80s my family and I tried a few times to traverse the Urewera, something a Tuhoe youngster needs only a day or two, a horse and rifle, and a blanket to do effortlessly. We never made it, but we did become very familiar with the topographic map of it. When you cross the Urewera National Park, you are on Maori land some of the time all the way, although it isn't signposted (in the States it would be signposted; the people would say, 'you are in Indian Country' - and this still extends far beyond the reservations; there is also a quiet undertone that you are a guest). On a map you see a maze of small irregular shapes, connected and disconnected throughout the vast National Park (see Map 2). Why? How did that happen? 'Oh, yes, we still own land over there.' 'Yes, I grew up at Ohaua. We came out so I could go to school.' 'We go in there for pigs every summer; at night we eat like kings and sit and talk about the places the old people talk about.' A lot of history lies restively in these fragments, and also in the Crown land that now surrounds them and extends to the horizons. Government Printer, 1918. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 57 I must declare my personal interest in Tuhoe. My family and I came to the Urewera and the Tuhoe from the U.S.A. in 1972. I had taken up a teaching position in Social Anthropology at the University of Auckland and, like a good anthropologist should and with the encouragement of Bruce Biggs and Pat Hohepa, headed straight for the most notoriously remote and traditional Maori in the country. My wife and our two sons aged 5 and 7 and I spent our first New Zealand summer in Murupara, me mostly in the pub where I met Tuhoe forestry and mill workers. Soon we had been taken up into the mountains by Ruben Tahi to meet his whaanau in Mataatua, outside Ruatahuna. There, after being introduced to Te Whai a te Motu (built in 1883 for Te Kooti by Te Whenuanui) we were taken in and offered homely and unlimited hospitality, as visitors or, in Tuhoe, kaupois (American cowboys) must be. The matriarch there had just lost her own mother and her husband; so we were adopted into the void that was left in her big heart. We returned to Mataatua to visit frequently, driving the dangerous Murupara-Ruatahuna roads in the dead of night with the kids sleeping in the back of the van. Too few years later she too died, and following dear Paki Haumate we were passed on like mokai (pets) to her only son and his whaanau in Ruatoki. Now, over 30 years later, her whangai tamariki (adopted son) Paki, her only birth son, his wife, her mother and others have also died, but we remain indissolubly attached to the few offspring of that family, themselves mostly whangai tamariki and to their cousins - we, the now aging kaupois their tuupuna brought into their home in Mataatua before they were born. I was going to learn so much from her son, a quiet, wise, and respected man who himself died too young and too suddenly. Then we learned from his wife and wife's mother (the other matriarch) but they too died too soon. We lived the brute fact that Maori do not live as long as we do, and for this reason too their lives are full of tangihanga (funeral wakes). For generations this family has always been on the verge of becoming a whare ngaro, an empty house; it is kept full with whangai tamariki. We live on with their mokopuna and great grandchildren among the morehuu, the remnants of the land and the whaanau. We know some other Tuhoe whaanau, but not many. We have been to many Tuhoe hui Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 58 over the years and know some Maori words which I pronounce poorly but I still cannot speak nor understand much of the language nor can I claim to understand the culture very well. Whaanaunga have encouraged my attempts to speak or write some Maori boldly without fear of making errors, and I hope this is the way to learn and does not appear arrogant or insulting. Life is short and there is so much to learn. That buried in the Urewera is a lived history before which we are all humbled. On the other side, here in New Zealand, we have what is referred to throughout these chapters as 'the Crown'. I must also declare my personal interest in the Crown and all that word stands for. From my Illinois countryside childhood I have carried a fierce democratic contempt for undemocratic authority and especially royalty. As a cultural anthropologist in Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, and elsewhere, and in my teaching career in the Department of Anthropology at The University of Auckland, this passion was tempered and reshaped into a political economic and historical critique of colonisation. The most important intellectual guide in that reshaping has been Eric Wolf s classic critique of the global history of European colonisation and some illusions of anthropology.26 Like Wolf, I hope that my social science has been strengthened, anthropologically, with an understanding of the ways of culture. It is only since the 1980s that I realised I had to be an historian in order to be a social anthropologist. Through the following chapters I hope to avoid moralisms and to let the facts speak for themselves as much as I can before I speak for them; to appreciate the irrepressible capacity of the 'victims' of a colonial history to have actively changed its course under different conditions - and sometimes to have succeeded in changing it anyway; and to lay responsibility for injustice at the feet of those with the power to redress the past and avoid repeating history. This is the ideal I set for my own social science practice, although I often fall short of it. 26 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 59 Kaaore te poo nei moorikarika noa! Alas for this unhappy night! Te Ohonga ki te ao, rapu kau noa ahau. Waking to the world, I search about in vain. Ko te mana tuatahi ko te Tiriti 0 Waitangi, The fIrst mana is the Treaty ofWaitangi, Ko te mana tuarua ko te Kooti Whenua, The second mana is the Land Court, Ko te mana tuatoru ko te Mana Motuhake; The third mana is the Separate Mana; Ka kiia i reira ko te Rohe Pootae a Tuuhoe, Hence the Rohe Pootae ofTuuhoe, He rongo ka houhia ki a Ngaati Awa. And peace made with N gaati A wa. He kino anoo raa ka aata kitea iho lt would indeed be an evil thing Ngaa mana Maaori ka mahue kei muri! to abandon the mana of the Maori! Ka urn nei au ki te ture Kaunihera, If I submitted to [joined with?] the law of the E rua aku mahi e noho nei au: Council, Ko te hanga i nga roori, ko te hanga i ngaa Two things I would do: tiriti! Building roads, and building streets! Puukohu taairi ki Pooneke raa Yonder the mist hangs over Wellington, Ki te kaainga raa i noho ai te Minita. The home of the Minister. Ki taku whakaaro ka tae mai te Poari I fear that the Board will come Hai noho i te whenua 0 Kootitia nei; to dwell in this land of Kootitia, Paa rawa te mamae ki te tau 0 taku ate. And I am sick at heart. E te iwi nui, tuu ake ki runga raa, All my people, be watchful, Tirohia mai raa te hee 0 aku mahi! See the evil of these things! Maaku e kii atu, 'Noohia, noohia!' I say to you, 'Remain, remam [on your Noo mua iho anoo, noo ngaa kaumatua! lands]! ' N aa taku ngaakau i kimi ai ki te Ture, It is from former ages, from your ancestors! N 00 konei hoki au i kino ai ki te hoko! Because my heart has searched out the Law, Hii! Hai aha te hoko eel For this reason I abhor selling! Hii! Why se1l!27 27 Moorikarika noa! a waiata tohutohu (instruction, prophecy) sung by Te Kooti Rikirangi to Tuhoe in 1883. Contemporary singer Puke Tari [Tarei?*], as recorded and translated by Mervyn McLean in about 1958. Square brackets mark my suggestions. Copy given to me by Hilary Pound, Archives of Maori and PacifIc Music, The University of Auckland, about 1980. Part I: The Crown Purchasing Campaign, 1915-1921 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 60 1. Some Ethnohistorical Background 1.1 Introduction. 1.2 Research Sources 1.2.1 Primary Sources 1.2.2 Secondary Sources 1.3 An Ethnohistorical Case Study: The Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage 1.3.1 Spouses and Mothers 1.3.2 Hapuu and Land Rights 1.3.3 Deaths and Successions 1.3.4 Pupuri Whenua: Patterns of Land Retention 1.4 An Ethnohistorical Case Study: Ruatahuna 1.4.1 The Ruatahuna Partition 1.4.1 (a) The Partition and the Purchase Campaign 1.4.2 Ahuwhenua Proposals and the Roots of the Apitihana Movement 1.4.2(a) The Petition ofTe Amo Kokouri and 121 others 1.4.2(b) A Co-ordinated Effort 1.1 Introduction After a brief introduction to the Crown purchase campaign and the sources for researching it, most of this chapter is devoted to a detailed reconstruction of two very different situations which had developed in different parts of the Urewera a few years before the consolidation scheme was arranged in 1921. For some readers, especially the first case history will be hard work, yet anthropologically it is the most 'ethnohistorical'. This reconstruction of a hapuu lineage in the midst of the Crown purchase campaign is intended to illustrate the more general principles of Tuhoe kinship organisation, marriage alliance, and land rights laid out in the introductory chapter, but in more concrete tenns of what was actually happening between specific Tuhoe and the Crown purchase call1paign. Although the details are subj ect to correction, the consistency of the results also supports my argument that the 27 Moorikarika noa! a waiata tohutohu (instruction, prophecy) sung by Te Kooti Rikirangi to Tuhoe in 1883. Contemporary singer Puke Tari [Tarei?*], as recorded and translated by Mervyn McLean in about 1958. Square brackets mark my suggestions. Copy given to me by Hilary Pound, Archives of Maori and Pacific Music, The University of Auckland, about 1980. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 61 infonnation recorded by the Urewera Commission is a relatively reliable basis for surprisingly full ethnohistorical reconstruction. The second case study presented to conclude this chapter raises this analysis from the level of Tuhoe kinship and land rights to Tuhoe political strategy and land rights, again in the context of confrontation with the Crown purchase campaign. As well as confinning the reliability of the data, these two ethnohistorical case studies also illustrate the use to which the rich and revealing archival resources can be put in reconstruction of what happened 'on the ground' - that is, on Tuhoe whenua. Although the Urewera consolidation scheme eradicated the Urewera District Native Reserve, the efforts of the Tuhoe commissioners of 1899-1903 are thus not lost. Chapter two then resumes the analysis of the Crown purchase campaign more from the Crown's point of view. However, there and in the following chapters less extensive ethnohistorical reconstructions are intended to emphasise what was happening on the ground in confrontations between particular Tuhoe and the officers and policies ofthe Crown. Drawing the specific situations of individual Tuhoe ancestors into the wider analysis may ground it in real life, but it also risks grave offense among contemporary Tuhoe, descendants of these persons and the land. Judith Binney and others such as Jeff Sissons have done this with both fidelity to the facts and sensitivity for Tuhoe, usually by focusing on well-known leaders whose mana is relatively invulnerable. This is one reason why I chose the Tamaikoha hapuu lineage and the initiatives of Te Amo Kokouri and his son as case studies. Nevertheless, especially in the fraught context of the Crown purchase campaign, facts as well as misunderstandings of facts about specific individuals, no matter how invulnerable, might be offensive to their descendants. I proceed in hope that depiction of historical fragments of daily life in the midst of these momentous confrontations can redress my trespasses, araa, he tapuwae, he ngaakau tamariki ka kimi nga mea ngaro ki taha te marae atea. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 62 On 5 May 1915 W.H. Bowler, who was to resume the job of Crown Purchase Officer in the Urewera District Native Reserve the following month, wrote a personal note to a colleague 'Dear Dud', commenting that he was about to embark on 'a further campaign in the Urewera .. .'.28 The word 'campaign' was not bravado; it objectively described the degree of skilled organisation and intensity of the Crown purchase programme in other areas of Maori land as well as the Urewera during these years. The skills deployed also reflected decades of government experience in the acquisition of Maori land. In this and the following chapter I examine the relationship between the Crown purchase campaign and the Tuhoe, especially regarding the struggle for control over Tuhoe land rights as they had been established in the Urewera District Native Reserve. The Urewera consolidation scheme arranged in August 1921 at Tauarau marae in Ruatoki was the upshot of this struggle, and defined by its results. Bowler had been a surveyor in the Ministry of Lands in Auckland, and while he was in charge of the Urewera campaign he was also involved in the purchase of Maori lands in Auckland (Orakei), Rotorua-Taupo (Reporoa and Wharepuhunga, Tihoi, and Waihaha at Mokai), and Heruiwi block just west of the Urewera?9 He had probably been appointed to the Urewerajob because he had proven himself unusually effective and professional. Although the surviving records are chaotic, it is clear that in the space of six years Bowler organised a far-flung network of agents assisting him, maintained close communication with both the Native Ministry and the Ministry of Lands; worked knowledgeably within or around the manifold legal requirements of legitimate purchase; kept punctilious accounts dealing in thousands of pounds sterling and over 600,000 acres of Urewera land; came to understand Tuhoe leaders and social organisation rather intimately (he signed his communications with them, which were in Maori, 'Te Poura, Apiha Hoko Whenua', and gained ownership of a 28 Bowler, 5 May 1915, WDMLC c.f. 613. 29 Bowler to USND, 25 November 1919, WDMLC c.f.621. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 63 substantial majority of Tuhoe shares for the Crown in one of the largest remaining regions of continuous Maori land in the country. 3D Right up to the final decision to deploy a consolidation scheme, Bowler continued in his enthusiasm and conviction that given more time he could purchase at least some Urewera blocks in their entirety. His suggestions to his seniors that the remaining resistance to complete sales be overcome by expropriation were deprecated by them as too 'heroic,.31 Bowler apparently urged such a draconian solution even in the densely settled Ruatoki block.32 Nevertheless, the consolidation scheme to which the Tuhoe had been brought by the effectiveness of the purchase campaign was in less heroic ways virtually expropriative at least in some parts of the Urewera. However, with Richard Boast it can be argued that if there was any injustice in the procedures Bowler pursued, responsibility for it must be sheeted home to his seniors and the Crown. To view Bowler himself as predatory or unscrupulous would obscure this pivotal basis of the campaign. With some important exceptions, the evidence indicates that his role was simply punctilious, enthusiastic, and tireless professionalism. The analysis of the Urewera purchase strategy below suggests that in some basic ways the form of Maori land alienation organised by Bowler only repeated a pattern which had been established in New Zealand since the l860s, although it had often been left to private enterprise rather than reserved to the Crown. Tuhoe protest is underplayed and cooperation emphasised in the 1921 report on the proposed Urewera consolidation scheme. Nevertheless, the brief history of the purchase campaign, legislation, and the decision to arrange a consolidation scheme is 3D Bowler, Land Purchase Officer; Bowler to Pouwhare and Tu Rakuraku, 26 February 1917, WDMLC c.f. 616. 31 R.J. Knight, H. Carr, H.R.H. Balneavis, 'Urewera Lands Consolidation Scheme (Report on Proposed)', with 'Memorandum by the Han. A.T. Ngata', 31 October 1921, AJHR, 1921, G-7, pp 1-39 (Also in O'Malley Supp.Pap.!: 96-134) p 3. 32 Exchange between USND Jordan and Bowler, 13 February and 15 March (probably 1919 or 1920), WDMLC c.f. 621. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 64 candidly summarised.33 The attendant urgencies and legal ambiguities are innocently admitted but assumed resolved. This history is carefully analysed by Campbell and Miles in particular, but by way of introduction I will briefly review it here. In my unpublished 1985 manuscript I argued that Tuhoe control over their rohe potae (bounded domain) established under the UDNR Act was undermined in 1910 especially by Apirana Ngata's strategy of forcing the Tuhoe General Committee to accept voting rights of Rua Kenana's faction, which was determined to sell much of their unneeded land in the Tauranga (eastern Urewera) basin.34 Ngata probably did this because he was under pressure from Parliament to open the Urewera to Pakeha settlement, and came to realise that Numia Kereru, chairman of the Tuhoe General Committee and opposed to Rua's influence, was uncompromising in his determination to limit land alienations to short-term leases. There is also evidence that the other influential Tuhoe leaders turned against the General Committee's position and would allow no settlement at all. The protective influence which Ngata's Native Land Commission had over the Native Reserve, the largest of all the areas under its jurisdiction, had also been compromised since the 1907 Native Land Settlement Act shifted its jurisdiction to the Native Land Board.35 Ngata contended that unlike his commission, the Board was more inclined to alienation than development of Maori land. The purchases urged by Rua and his faction were undertaken by the Lands Department in seven blocks of the Tauranga basin between 1910 and 1912. However, they were made difficult by the constant disputes as to title, by the necessity of conforming to the wishes of the General Committee, and the doubt as to the legality of the course pursued in the purchases by the Crown. The procedure was first to obtain the 33 Knight et aI., AJHR G-7 1921: 1-3. 34 Steven Webster 'Urewera Land 1895-1926: A Tentative Historical Survey of Government and Tuhoe Relations as Reflected in Official Records', unpublished manuscript, 50pp, 1984-5, The University of Auckland Library. 35 R. Stout and A. Ngata, 'Native Lands and Native-Land Tenure', 12 August 1908, AJHR, 1908, G-1Q, pp 3-4. -, -- - ~ ------.:----.:.:--.:------'-- - - - ______":-.:.""1 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 65 written consent of the individual owner to the sale of his [undivided] share [in a particular block], a payment being made to him on the assessed value of his interest. It was contemplated that when a sufficient area was acquired the Crown would define by partition the interests of those who had sold [in each block], and the General Committee would then affirm the sale of that portion by resolutions and thus comply with the law. 36 These difficulties, especially the legal ambiguity of the purchases, caused the suspension of the purchase campaign in 1912. However, purchases were resumed by Bowler in June 1915, backed by the new Native Minister W.H. Herries and legislation which Herries took to legitimate such purchase of individual undivided shares throughout the Urewera. This assumption disregarded the possibility that the statutory authority of the General Committee over the alienation of Tuhoe lands continued, and was never tested in parliament or the courts. The 1921 report assumed that retroactive legislation in 1916 finally settled the legal ambiguities of this form of purchasing since 1910.37 Later I will later review Richard Boast's account of the ambiguities in this legal history. By the end of July 1921, the Crown had purchased undivided Tuhoe shares equivalent to about 350,000 or two-thirds of 520,000 acres of the UDNR which had been under purchase. Bowler could claim the credit for most of these purchases by far (about 310,000 acres). An additional 130,000 acres of the UDNR had been excluded from purchase operations by the Crown because some blocks were considered unpromising for settlement or logging, or would prompt government expenditure for roading or (in the case ofWaikaremoana, and Herries' own motive) unwelcome legal issues regarding unextinguished Maori ownership of lakebeds.38 Anita Miles reports that Bowler recommended against extending purchasing into new blocks because this resulted in slowing the progress of purchases in the blocks which the Crown preferred. 'Inevitably, he suggested, these owners had to sell their remaining interests 36 Knight et aI., AJHR G-7 1921:2; my clarification in brackets. 37 Ibid., p 3. 38 Jordan to Bowler, 25 September 1917, WDMLC c.f. 617; Bowler to DSND, 18 September 1918, MA-MLP 1 10/28/11-38 (Box 85). c __ ~~~~_~_ ------'-~--;------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 66 when the opportunity to sell in new blocks was denied' .39 It appears that Herries followed this coercive policy, opening up new blocks to purchasing only when Bowler felt it was timely. The Crown's new acquisitions were much less clearly defined legally than was Tuhoe ownership. Whereas the Tuhoe owned their land through a special statute underwriting aspects of their traditional rights well understood by the first Urewera commission and the NLC, the undivided individual shares of blocks which the Crown had purchased were defined neither internally by any specific location in the block, nor externally by a complete legal survey of block boundaries - as well as legitimised retroactively. The Crown's shares could only be held 'in common' with the Tuhoe in every part of a block, an uncomfortable situation indeed. From this point of view, it is questionable whether 'The position of the [non-sellers] was indeed worse than that of the Crown' .40 Confronted by the time-consuming and not necessarily favourable (to the Crown) alternative of turning these complications over to the Native Land Court to sort out, the Crown was able to extricate itself and its labouriously acquired land interests only by pressing through the even more laborious and expensive Urewera consolidation scheme. As I will describe in the following chapter, again with Ngata's influence and considerable bluffing as well as subterfuge the Crown did this so successfully that its interests were further increased as well as located largely according to its dictates. It might have been a different story had more of the Tuhoe held their ground against the proposal of a consolidation. On the other hand, it was the only apparent way they could 'stop the bleeding' of a decade under the purchase campaign. 39 Miles 1999:397; Bowler to USND, 1 December 1916, MA-MLPI 1910/28/1, pt.2. 40 Knight et a1., AJHR G-7 1921:3. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 67 1.2 Research Sources 1.2.1 Primary Sources This section describes the sources upon which I have relied for my interpretation of the Crown purchase campaign. Most importantly were the closed files on the Urewera held in the archives of the Waiariki District Maori Land Court in Rotorua. This is the same Native Land Court centre out of which the Urewera consolidation as well as the Crown purchase campaign were informally administered by Crown Purchase Officer Bowler and later consolidation commissioners Carr and Knight, respectively. (In formal terms, administration was from the Native Minister in Wellington and the Minister of Lands in Wellington through its Auckland office, headquarters for both Bowler and Knight). Although both operations proceeded under special legislation which circumvented the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court, the Court's judge, registrar, and clerks in Rotorua were indispensable to these successive programmes. This cooperation, of course, put the Court in an invidious position which, so far as I know, was never addressed. The Urewera closed files apparently ran from 1902 through 1926, but most pertained to the Crown purchase campaign and they were once extensive. In 1984 they were kept in the old archives building on Rui Street, and during one visit I was allowed to view them briefly while a clerk brought some out for me. There were several meters offolders and envelopes on shelves behind chicken wire (for support of the shelves as well as security). I noticed a large number of elaborately printed blanks for official certification of majority or 21 years of age. In 2002 when I next examined these records they were kept in new archives in the new offices of the Maori Land Court, and access was usually limited to archive clerks. Sometime since 1984 most files had been indexed with a number on a yellow label, and a stack of accession cards briefly identifying them had been typed up. In February 2003 the clerks were able to find 24 accession cards numbered between 582 and 884 pertaining to the Urewera, and about an equal number of files numbered between 153 and 884. (The old blank certificates of majority, at least, had apparently been thrown out). Despite confusing gaps in the numbering system I was able to identify several files as missing and wrote a letter to Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 68 the head archivist. However, by March several others were missing while a few had inexplicably appeared. After a few weeks working closely with the clerks, my colleague Himaima Tumoana was allowed to search the archives herself, and was able to find many documents and files which had been misplaced among other records and had not been found in the limited time available to the clerks.41 From the accession card descriptions, the missing files which might have been most important for my purposes were closed File 631 'Non-sellers complaints' in the consolidation scheme, and 763-4 'Drewera Consolidation Cards A-M' and ' ... M W.' The latter were almost certainly from the Crown purchase campaign rather than the DCS, and were probably Bowler's coveted set of index cards carefully developed to facilitate his purchase operations. He claimed there were 2-3000 of them, and judging the by number of non-sellers gazetted late in 1919 (about 2,400) this was not an exaggeration. These cards apparently recorded the shares held in the final 1907 order in each of the old blocks by each owner, successions to them in the event of deaths insofar as they had been processed in the NLC, and (presumably) records of the purchase of specific shares copied from the original deeds. It took Bowler and his assistants some years to compile and update this information even imperfectly, and it would probably not be possible to do it now from surviving records. This entire set of index cards has apparently been lost since the archive accession cards were made out, even since 1984 (I did not know about them at that time, and currently not even Himaima Tumoana was able to locate them in the closed archives). It was an invaluable resource for Bowler, and would again be invaluable for reconstruction of the purchase campaign history. 41 I should add that I had a similarly frustrating experience locating the full set ofUrewera Minute Books in the Wellington headquarters of Archives New Zealand. For decades, the Maori Land Court has been understaffed as well as poorly equipped, and clerks are rarely able to build up extensive experience in their archives. The nevertheless admirable policy ofMLC archives is to be as inviting and accessible as possible for their clients. As a result, research rooms are usually buzzing with excitement as well as children. In this and many other ways, the MLC has become a Maori tradition, and not merely by default. The closed files in Rotorua are nevertheless in fair condition despite poor care and storage conditions, but are deteriorating rapidly under the much increased use by researchers mobilised by the claims to the Waitangi Tribunal since the 1980s. On the other hand, research and professional experience among Maori, especially tangata whenua, has increased accordingly. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 69 These index cards would have saved me and my colleagues a great deal of meticulous labour reconstructing the record of sales and unsold interests for each person in each old UDNR block during the campaign. Ironically, we have had to do in reverse what he had to do between 1915-18. This information is indispensable to us for several reasons, the most obvious of which is that the so-called 'non-sellers' which (from the Crown's point of view) required the consolidation scheme were non-sellers only in the sense that they had not sold all their shares in Urewera lands: most had in fact sold many of their shares but (and this was the Crown's dilemma) they persisted in not selling some of them. Presumably, the way in which these Tuhoe retained at least some of their shares was not random, and merited study. Himaima and I searched archives in vain for comprehensive lists of purchases likely to have been drawn up by Bowler in conjunction with the missing index cards. Only fragmentary and outdated lists were to be found in the closed files of the Waiariki MLC (probably because they came to be replaced by the card index), and only totalised reports effacing specific blocks and individual shares could be located in other archives. Promisingly, Miles reported that among paperwork at the August 1921 Tauarau meetings was 'a list of Crown shares purchased in each block since 1910', but her source described this as 'a schedule showing the value of the interests acquired by purchase by the Crown' .42 This sounds more like the summary reports of total area purchased and area 'outstanding' in each block which Bowler regularly sent to the Native Minister and Minister of Lands, but which effaced in his totalising process all individual shares - and thus the detail needed for further analysis. I was also unable to locate until too late to be of use the set of original purchase deeds (termed Memoranda of Transfer) which have been carefully kept in Wellington since 1927.43 Until 1927 Consolidation Commissioner Knight had for some reason assumed these original deeds were to be kept at the Waiariki MLC in Rotorua, but at the 42 Miles, 1999, p 431 referring to Knight et a1., AJHR G-7 1921 P 8. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 70 puzzled insistence of the Undersecretary of Lands had them all forwarded to Wellington. 44 By the time I realised these deeds had already been located by Bassett and Kay and had an opportunity to examine them myself, I had already found microfilm copies of them for the Waikaremoana block in LINZ Hamilton, Himaima had found other microfilm copies of them for about eleven blocks in LINZ Auckland (in both cases, with our great persistence and only grudging or surreptitious help from the LINZ officers), and Clementine Fraser was well into deriving hopefully comparable information from copies of the consolidation groupbooks A-E which Himaima had labouriously pieced together in Rotorua instead. Given our progress on this alternative, I concluded that the deeds were no more accessible nor less of a task to collate coherently. While the deeds expressed purchases from sellers III shares, the Group Books recorded non-sellers' interests converted to pence, and thus would have to be converted back to shares to compare non-sellers' with sellers' rights in each block. Tracing successions among sellers would be difficult in any case: several hundred had been processed by the NLC before the consolidation, an equal number was done in arrangements for the Scheme at Tauarau, and almost as many again were carried out by the consolidation commissioners 1921-25. While the deeds often noted successions to shares carried out by the NLC before 1921 and thus not appearing in the Group Books, these earlier successions were lost in the Group Books. On the other hand, Group Books Fl and F2 recorded the details of successions not already passed through the NLC, and the commissioners' minutebooks detailed subsequent ones. Although Fl had been lost sometime after 1984 (I had seen and described it then), its organisation (by name of deceased) could be reconstructed from F2 (which listed successions by successor). Finally among my considerations was the implication that the deeds, especially with their personal signatures, also had an aura about them which seemed to me to aggravate what some Tuhoe will see as tapu or 43 MA W2150 (unserialised), boxes 12, 13, and 14. 4423 December 1926,7 January 1927,13 January 1927,17 January 1927, 20/201 Vol. vii, (p 1111), LINZ Hamilton. ______':-=--::'=-'=---=--~~~'::'~ ___-:J Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 71 profoundly sensitive matters, often with good reason. I decided to stick with the Group Books, at least for the time being. 1.2.2 Secondary Sources I can now preview some of my secondary sources. The recent reports of O'Malley, Campbell, Miles, Boast, and Bassett and Kay for the Urewera enquiry all consider the Crown purchase campaign, and some of their specific points will be examined later in the chapter. Miles' comprehensive overview of Urewera history since the early nineteenth century devotes two final chapters to the purchase campaign and the consolidation scheme.45 The scope of this report is impressive, and she frequently alerts readers to remaining gaps in our historical understanding. Included are brief case studies on purchasing in Te Whaiti, Ruatoki, and Ruatahuna blocks, and on objections to the consolidation scheme in Ruatahuna, Waikaremoana, and Te Whaiti. Miles examines socio-economic factors such as poverty, poor health and epidemics, and need for development capital which may explain why many Tuhoe sold their shares in land. (I will argue in section 2.1.1 that the form of shareholding and the strategy of the purchase campaign were more important factors). Miles also documents the frustration of the circumvented Tuhoe General committee in the face of the Crown's campaign to purchase individual undivided shares although it had been empowered under the UDNR Act with exclusive authority to sell, and the repeated obstruction by the Crown of Tuhoe desires to partition in order to stem their losses to individual purchasing. She also documents the continuation of Crown purchases in disregard of partitions which had been accepted by the Native Land Court, and repeated protests from owners in the Ruatahuna and Waikaremoana as well as Ruatoki blocks that they were successfully farming and pasturing herds on these lands46 Finally with regard to the purchase campaign, she describes the Crown's obstruction of road building and thus Tuhoe development in order to avoid raising purchase prices or motivation to retain the land. 47 45 Miles, 1999, pp 357-476. 46 Ibid., pp 404-7. 47 Ibid., pp 413. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 72 In the spirit of more detached history, one might demure that such a predatory land purchase campaign was motivated in those days by the popular as well as educated assumption that Maori in general - and certainly the 'barbaric' Tuhoe - were not competent to develop successful farming. 48 Of course, this particular racial theme does not adequately explain the equally concerted purchase campaign which Bowler was applying (at just this same time!) among owners of the remaining Ngati Whatua land in the city of Auckland. Miles' criticism is admirably focused on Native Minister Herries himself, and in conclusion she aptly points out that in 1905 he had urged legislation which would enable Maori to move into factory work. His later arrangement of a draconian land purchasing programme would have been supportive of such a goal. On the other hand, Herries should not be scapegoat for a British labour policy that goes back historically to the demise of the handloom weavers in England, and also forward to Native Minister Coates, his successor, who was apparently unmoved by the 1924 appeal of 40 landless Tuhoe war veterans. 49 Soon after Miles completed her report Richard Boast completed his 'Ngati Whare and Te Whaiti-nui-a-Toi: A History'. With regard to this block, he devotes two chapters to Crown purchasing followed by a chapter on the consolidation. 50 As Boast and other reports explain, the Te Whaiti block in the interior southeast Urewera district had long been a primary concern ofthe Crown because this area had the best potential for commercial exploitation of timber resources. Many of the shareholders of Te Whaiti had also held high hopes for gold mining in the block. Although the block was awarded to the Ngati Tuhoe hapuu as well and Ngati Whare and Ngati Manawa hapuu by the 1902 commission, because the Native Department was sympathetic with the desires of the latter two hapuu to exploit timber and gold, the second Urewera commission (1906-7) accepted their appeal and excluded Ngati Tuhoe from 48 Even Apirana Ngata felt this way about 'commoner' Maori without guidance by the 'nobility' (Webster, 1998, p 101). 49 AJHR 1924 G-7:2; also see Undersecy Lands Brodrick to NL Draftsman Knight, 16 July 1921, AADS AccW3562 bundle 617A 22/697, Box 2741919-1922. 50 Richard Boast, 'Ngati Whare and Te Whaiti Nui a Toi: A History', Claimant Report to the Waitangi Tribunal, June 1999, (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A27), pp 142-187, 197-230. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 73 ownership. 51 The 1907 decision and revised ownership list cleared the way for what the Crown hoped would be the complete sale of Te Whaiti shares. Boast uncovered some of the most extensive and detailed lists of sellers in Te Whaiti, reflecting the special effort which Bowler devoted to this block. The next chapter will examine how enough stubborn non-sellers remained in the block to frustrate consolidation officers, who had hoped for a virtually complete 'evacuation' by exchange of their shares and relocation to other blocks. In the end, ironically, this Crown aIm was more successfully pursued in the Waikaremoana block than in Te Whaiti. Heather Bassett and Richard Kay produced another 'block history' entitled 'Ruatahuna: Land Ownership and Administration c. 1896-1990' in 2002, but this work is impressively comprehensive and raises several important issues bearing on the purchase campaign as well as more broadly on the Urewera consolidation scheme. In connection with the former they have clarified the involuted series of developments which finally led to the partition of the large Ruatahuna block and the mobilisation of some of its owners to form the apitihana, 'oppositionists' to the Urewera consolidation scheme which dogged its commissioners throughout their implementation of the plan. Some of Bassett and Kays' excellent research will be examined in the next section. 1.3 An Ethnohistorical Case Study: The Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage As explained at the outset of the chapter, the following two sections are devoted to detailed ethnohistorical reconstructions which are intended to impart a sense of what was going on 'on the ground' late in the purchase campaign among certain Tuhoe in different parts of the Urewera - insofar as this can be glimpsed from the archival record. Following up on the more general analysis of Tuhoe kinship and land rights in the introductory chapter, this section will describe and analyse a spectacular and 51 MA 13/90, summary comments. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 74 historically important hapuu lineage and its changes in landholding and social organisation in the Crown purchasing campaign. In the next section I will examine what I argue to be the mobilisation and frustration of an Urewera-wide effort agriculturally to develop three blocks, and in this way hold the purchasing campaign at bay. First, to begin as concretely as possible, some fragments of correspondence between Bowler and two Tuhoe will be examined, revealing the purchase strategy and Tuhoe responses to it. Then the enquiry will be expanded to patterns of land purchasing and retention among the large hapuu lineage of which these two persons were members. It turns out that the two persons whose correspondence is examined are members of Tamaikoha's large 4-generation hapuu lineage, which is the same one used in the Introduction to illustrate the structure of sibling groups and surnames (papers 1, Appendix B; Figure 2 and Spreadsheet 1). Tamaikoha Te Ariari was the most prominent leader of several influential whaanau and two or three hapuu in the lower Whakatane and TaurangaiWaimana basins through these years. He probably died sometime before the Urewera consolidation scheme was organised, but still appeared in the group lists, an appropriate wairua matatuu over all Tuhoe as well as his struggling but numerous whaanau. The lower Whakatane-TaurangaIW aimana basins were the paramount strategic concern of the organisers of the consolidation scheme, who pointed out that the 'bulk of the government purchases are in these basins and the bulk also of the Maori cultivations and clearings, such as they are, are also in those areas,52 This dilemma probably directly reflected the role of Tamaikoha, his children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren in the purchase campaign. The earliest sales precipitated by Rua Kenana and his people immediately following Ngata's breaking of Numia's control over the Tuhoe General Committee 1910-12 had been in the middle and lower reaches of the TaurangaiWaimana basin, areas in which Tamaikoha had long held 52 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 29/417A, p 6. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 75 sway. The Crown's determination to gain most land for settlement in arable parts of both lower basins resulted in Bowler's concentration of his efforts there. The Crown enforced his campaign in this area by refusing to open up purchases in most of the interior blocks except for Te Whaiti (where logging was promising), with the result that Tuhoe needing or wishing to sell had to sell the lands which the Crown preferred. Yet there were key hold-outs in eastern as well as western Tuhoe who refused to sell shares throughout the blocks of the lower basins, and many had kaingas there as well. Given Tamaikoha's earlier role in the Native Reserve, one might suppose that the hapuu which he influenced would be among the pupuri whenua, but the picture which emerges appears ambiguous. For all these reasons, it may be supposed that considerable tensions had been built up especially in this area, and negotiations between Crown and the remaining owners was most intensive, at least in the early stages of the consolidation. This situation will be examined more fully in chapter seven. I have selected two letters between Bowler and prospective sellers of shares in various blocks. 53 These correspondences reveal some of the wider context, power, and subtleties of the purchase campaign and Tuhoe responses to it. They occurred quite late in the decade, in February and November 1920, the year before the UCS was organised, and we can assume that the experience of both most Tuhoe and Bowler with the operations of the purchase campaign were as refined as they were ever to be. Although they probably affiliated primarily with different hapuu, the two Tuhoe involved were closely related. Kahuwi Hakeke was about 40 years old and, in Maori terms, a 'father' and tuakana to Poniu Tumoana (Poniu's mother's mother's older brother's son), who was about 22 years old and Kahuwi's 'son' and teina (Kahuwi's father's younger sister's daughter's son). In Pakeha terms, then, they were 'uncle' and 53 Poniu Tumoana to Bowler, 28 February 1920, WDMLC c.f. 621; Bowler to Kahuwi Hakeke, 11 November 1920, WDMLC c.f. 627. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 76 'nephew', albeit 'once removed,.54 These relationships will be laid out in more detail below. However, at least at the time of their correspondence, Kahuwi and Poniu were widely separated geographically in New Zealand as well as probably their Urewera homes, and perhaps (judging from Poniu's address) in their daily lives. Kahuwi was probably writing from Tauwharemanuka village on the Tauranga River centred between the Tauwhare-Manuka and Papatupu Land blocks, in the middle reaches of the Tauranga basin (Maps 1 and 10). Poniu, on the other hand, had probably grown up in the Ruatoki vicinity at the lower end of the Whakatane basin. However, he was writing from Fernhill, Hastings, in Poverty Bay some hundreds of kilometers to the north, near one of New Zealand's troop embarkation ports during the recent war.55 Poniu Tumoana's exchange survives in several messages. Probably the first one was a February 1920 letter to Bowler written in script and pen on lined paper, and in Maori reads as follows: 56 Fernhill Hastings Feb 28th 1920 Kia Te Poura, Apiha Hoko whenua Maori. Akarana. Ehoa tena koe. He tono atu tenei maku kia koe mehemea kite taea ekoe te tuku mai nga moni ooku paanga inga whenua ewhai ake iraro nei. He urn tinana, he wira metuku katoa mai, engari kitaku mohio konga wira anake kai te toe, heoi ko koe kai te momo kinga mea kai te toe konga whenua tenei. Hikurangi-Horomanga Karioi Kohurn-Tukuroa Ohiorangi Te Poroporo 54 However, it would be important to note that the Maori terms 'father' and 'son', while appearing to merge parents' siblings with parents, always carry important implications of birth order in tuakana and teina lines which are obscured in Pakeha kinship terms. 55 The official spelling varies, but I will distinguish between Tauwhare-Manuka the UDNR block (hyphenating it as it was in the orders of the Native Reserve Commission, showing that it probably combined at least two earlier areas considered as possible 'blocks') and Tauwharernanuka the kaainga, which is in that block. Poniu might have gone to Fernhill near Hastings in Hawkes Bay during World War II with the intention of enlisting but not been able to for reasons of disability, or served and been released there, and then settled temporarily. He died by late 1921, leaving his land rights to his younger brother. I do not know where he was when he died, nor where he is buried. 56 Poniu Tumoana to Bowler, 28 February 1920, WDMLC c.f. 621. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 77 Tauwharemanuka No.7 Tauwharemanuka No.9 Kamutu nei nga mea hai hoko. He oi anana Poniu Tumoana Omahu Fernhill H.B. My translation would be as follows: To Mr. Bowler, Maori Land Purchase Officer Auckland. Salutations friend. This is a request from me to you on the chance that you are able to send here the money [for] my shares of land listed below here. It may be the trunks of a forest or only willows all of which you would send to me, but as far as I know it is only the willows that are left. However, it is you who knows what is left of this land: Hikurangi -Horomanga Karioi Kohuru-Tukuroa Ohiorangi Te Poroporo Tauwharemanuka No.7 Tauwharemanuka No.9 These are the only ones for sale. That's that [conventional closing] Poniu Tumoana Omahu Fernhill Hawkes Bay I encountered no copy of Bowler's reply, but Poniu's response to this was on 10 March 1920 by telegraph from Fernhill at 2:20 pm (probably collect) and was in English: Yes can sign deeds Napier Ponui Turnoana From Poniu's (it was Poniu, not 'Ponui') 10 March reply and Bowler's response, it appears that Bowler had quickly replied to Poniu's query that he would research and advise him immediately of his various land interests and their values, and asked him ifhe could go to the Bank of New Zealand Buildings in Napier to sign the deeds (an Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 78 agent through which Bowler carried out his land purchases there was B.J. Dolan and Co., of Dolan, Hallett & Major, Barristers and Solicitors in Hastings. 57 Bowler's following response was written in pencil on Poniu's 10 March1920 telegraph message (not in his own hand, but probably at the Auckland Telegraph Office and sent immediately), as follows: Interest in Blocks you mentioned worth £42.13.8 [pounds sterling, shillings, and pence]. You also have interests in Ruatahuna valued at approximately £45 Ruatoki South £20 Waipotiki £24 Parekohe £29 Ierenui[-Ohaua] £2. Shall I send Deeds for these also [?] Reply collect W.H. Bowler Poniu's following reply was in English and by telegram, saying No selling only those blocks mentioned. Later in 1920, Poniu's uncle Kahuwi Hakeke apparently wrote Bowler a similar but more tentative enquiry which I did not encounter, but sometime in November 1920 Bowler replied from Auckland in a double-spaced typed letter in Maori as follows. 58 Akarana, 11[?] Noema, 1920 Ki a Kahui Hakeke, Kua tae mai to pukapuka 0 te 15 0 nga ra 0 te marama nei, mo runga mo nga whenua a Tuhoe. Kei te rereke te utu mo ia poraka moo ia poraka. Engari ko te utu i whakaritea me te nuinga 0 nga poraka me kii tekau herenei i te eka. Na reira pea e tika ana kia kiia ko ou paanga katoa ki Te Urewera e tata ana ki te rima rau eka. Engari, koia nei te raruraru - e kore e taea e te tangata te whakatopu i enei paanga. Kei te takitaki haere nga paanga nei pena me te tapuae 0 te tangata. Me pehea e taea te whakaoti? Me pehea e taea te whakarite i tetahi tikanga pai mo te tahe ki a koe? 57 Illegible signature? to Bowler, 8 March 1921, WDMLC c.f. 627. 58 Bowler to Kahuwi Hakeke, II? November 1920, WDMLC c.f. 627. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 79 Ki taku mohio kotahi tonu te huarahi e puare ana. Me hoko i enei paanga ki te Kawanatanga, kia whai-moni koe mo etahi 0 ou take kei waho atu 0 nga whenua raruraru nei. N a, mo te taha ki te hunga e nohoo ana i te kainga, e kaha ana ahau ki te kii kua hokona te nuinga 0 0 ratou paanga. He itiiti noa iho nga eka kei te toe mo te taha ki 0 whanaunga tata ki reira, ara te uri 0 Tamaikoha, 0 Hakeke, o Tiopira. Ki taku mohio ko to koutou whenua tuturu ko Tauwharemanuka. Na reira e penei ana taku kupu ki a koe. Me pupuri e koe i 0 paanga katoa i Tauwharemanuka. Ko era atu whenua, paanga hoki, me hoko. Whakahokia maio Mehemea ka kii mai koe 'Ae' ka haere atu ahau ki kona hei whakahaere i nga take nei. Mo a reira hoki ka whakaputaina tonutia ngahereni. Kia ora ra koe. Na to hoa, Na te Poura (signed W.H. Bowler, in his hand) Apiha Hoko Whenua Maori. With Himaima Tumoana's help, my translation would be as follows: To Kahuwi [as his name was spelled in the 1903 orders] Hakeke, Greetings friend. Your letter of the 15th of this month about Tuhoe land has arrived. There are different rates for different blocks. However, the fixed rate for most blocks is 10 shillings per acre. Therefore perhaps it would be accurate to say that your total shares of the Urewera [lands] are nearly 500 acres. But here is the problem - these shares cannot be gathered together by a person. The shares are scattered like the tapu footsteps of man. How should this be settled? How should we arrange some good provisions which suit you? So far as I know, there is only one road open. Sell these shares to the Government, so you will have money for other goals away from the troublesome land. Now, so far as those other living at your settlement are concerned, I can say with certainty that they have sold most of their shares. There are very few acres that remain for your near relatives there, that is, for the descendants of Tamaikoha, of Hakeke, of Tiopira. To my knowledge, Tauwharemanuka is your (plural) true land (home). From this [fact] perhaps follows my words to you. Hang onto all your shares in Tauwharemanuka (block). As for all those other lands, and shares too, sell them. Reply. If you say 'yes' I will come there so that these matters may be settled. In that case the shillings will appear [you will be paid] immediately. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 80 Salutations to you. From your friend, From Te Bowler (signed W.H. Bowler) Maori Land Purchase Officer. Kahuwi Hakeke's answer is probably lost. However, in August 1921 at the time of the ues he still held shares equivalent to about 760 acres (at Bowler's average rate of 10/- per acre), far more than Bowler had estimated the year before. Data in Spreadsheet 1 shows that between 1903 and 1921, Kahuwi' s land rights had increased from about 77 shares in 16 blocks, to about 101 shares in 18 blocks, indicating that by 1921 he had succeeded to some shares of others who had died, apparently from his aunties, uncles, or siblings as well as his parents (many no longer appear in the 1921 lists). As can be seen from Spreadsheet 1 (Appendix A), Kahuwi and a few of his siblings were the ones who retained most of the land which remained in the hands of their hapuu lineage by the time of the consolidation, suggesting that he had become something of a leader. It is clear that he did not take Bowler's advice to sell everything but Tauwhare-Manuka, and it is likely that he sold little or nothing. However, it is also clear that most others of Kahuwi's hapuu lineage had died or sold almost all their lands. Although Bowler's letter had, of course, played down the role of his campaign in this result, he was not stretching this truth. Before identifying patterns of land purchase and retention among the members of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage, I want to comment on several implications of this correspondence. There are significant innuendos as well as a few poetic metaphors (on Bowler's as well as Poniu Tumoana's part). Poniu's metaphor contrasting tree trunks with willows implies that he sees Tuhoe or his own lands as having been radically thinned out or stripped away. This suggests that regardless of his youth and residence for some time far from the Urewera, he was aware of how much of these blocks others had already been purchased. (Later in 1921, Ngata implied that Tuhoe were not aware of this). Poniu's comment also appears to suggest that he is unclear about what shares he himself has (or has left) in which blocks, and this seems confirmed in his deference to Bowler as the one 'who knows'. Thus these sentences might have been taken by Bowler to invite his advice about what other shares in other Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 81 blocks could also be sold. However, this implication is precluded by the last sentence, which states unequivocally (assuming my translation is accurate) that 'These [blocks] are the only ones for sale.' It is significant that Bowler nevertheless tells him what his other shares are worth and asks if he should send those deeds along too. Poniu's appears to stand firm in his terse reply. I can pursue a few more likely implications of Poniu's correspondence here. Later I will examine a fragmentary record of deaths and successions which happens to record several in Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage. Despite Poniu's youth, he himself was to die by the end of the following year, and he may have been selling land to cover related expenses in Fernhill. On 13 August 1919, several months before his letter, Poniu and his younger brother Kunere were recorded as successors equally to the shares of their mother, Miria Tupaea, held in Ruatahuna partitions 1, 2, 4 and 5. 59 On 7 December 1921 both Poniu and his mother Miria were recorded as deceased, and Poniu's younger brother succeeded to the shares ofboth.6o In any case, the increased value of Poniu's shares since 1903 reported by Bowler in March 1919 suggests that succession to his mother's shares had already been approved in the NLC - or Bowler was prepared to buy the shares in advance of the approval (this issue will be taken up later). Bowler's letter to Kahuwi carnes several implications as well. Kahuwi had apparently asked what price Bowler was offering for Urewera lands and, perhaps, how much land he owned and even what he should do with it. Bowler's answer (whether or not these questions were asked) is dramatic, perhaps describing with considerable insight the origin of UDNR block shares in an interwoven history of rights established through ancestral use of specific land resources: ' ... these shares cannot be gathered together by a person. The shares are scattered like the tapu footsteps of man. ' He then goes on sympathetically to counsel Kahuwi about how 59 Undated notes on deaths and successions, WDMLC c.f.621. 60 Urewera Consolidation minute book 1, Carr, Knight, (7 December 1921 - 5 July 1923), p 2; no blocks or shares are recorded; later evidence shows that Miria had died by May 1916. 'f r I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 82 troublesome land is, and how all his relatives have already sold most of their shares, before reluctantly recommending that he should sell all of it except his homestead and devote the proceeds to other enterprises, closing by reassuring him that his need for money would be immediately satisfied. It is possible that some Tuhoe were this naive and confused about their shares in the UDNR blocks in 1915 (Bowler claims they were through 1917, and he certainly was himself), but highly unlikely by 1920. Given that Bowler's purchase campaign had been intensifying for over five years and that most Tuhoe had had direct experience with it; that Kahuwi's family was one of the largest and most influential in the Ureweras; and that after this exchange Kahuwi sold little or nothing, one must suspect that either Bowler was typically this patronising or devious, or that Kahuwi was a simpleton - or having Bowler on. It is unlikely that Bowler was often this patronising or devious with the Tuhoe (because his purchase campaign would not have been as successful as it was), or that Kahuwi was a simpleton (because he either would not have enquired, or his kinsmen would have done it for him), suggesting that Kahuwi was for some reason probing or bluffing Bowler. As Bowler had impatiently ) to remind his superiors earlier that year, 'the Maori is not altogether a fool. ,61 He may have been about to learn this lesson again himself. Kahuwi Hekeke was a son of Hakeke Tamaikoha, the oldest of Tamaikoha Te Ariari's many children (Figure 2). Poniu Tumoana was the first-born child of Miria, the first-born child of Pihitahi, Tamaikoha's second-born child and oldest daughter. Thus Kahuwi was a grandchild, and Poniu was a great-grandchild, of Tamaikoha. Tamaikoha himself may have still been living in 1921, although his oldest daughter Pihitahi's husband Tupaea Rapaera (another prominent leader in other hapuu) was nominally leader of his consolidation Group 7. Following the 1903 lists of block owners published by the commission, I will next outline part of the descent group led by Tamaikoha and discuss the rights to land and hapuu which are reflected in these lists. According to the commission block lists, Tamaikoha Te Ariari's hapuu lineage Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 83 was probably the largest among Tuhoe of the time (Figure 2). Although they had rights in many blocks, and similar lists appear in each of these blocks, I will refer primarily to the one for Tauwhare-Manuka block, because this one appears to be complete but also because this is the block where most of their shares (and by 1921 most were Kahuwi's) were eventually consolidated in the DeS. Bowler had probably been right when he said 'Ki taku mohio ko to koutou whenua tuturu ko Tauwharemanuka. ' Tamaikoha Te Ariari's hapuu lineage is recorded spectacularly in the Tauwhare Manuka block order (Papers 1, Appendix B). In 1902, he and his wives had about ten living children, all over 18 years old in 1903 (ages were recorded only for those 18 or under). His oldest son Hakeke had about sixteen living children, the youngest of which was about 11 years old. Two of Tamaikoha's other children were also relatively prolific: his second child, his oldest daughter Pihitahi, had six living children the youngest of which was eight years old (and the oldest of which was Poniu Tumoana's mother). Tamaikoha's third son, Tiopira, had seven living children between five and about 19 years old. (Besides 'Tamaikoha', 'Hakeke' and 'Tiopira' were the family names mentioned by Bowler in his letter to Kahuwi). We cannot tell from these block lists how many children in these families had not survived, but an infant mortality rate of more than 30 percent is not uncommon in such popUlations under such conditions. An unusual age gap between siblings, such as that between the sisters Mariana and Hinetarewa Hakeke (at least four years insofar as Mariana was over 18 years old in 1903) probably indicates at least one death). In addition to these large sibling groups, there are about thirteen smaller sibling groups or individuals appearing in this and other block lists who are Tamaikoha's other grandchildren or great-grandchildren. Including his own ten children, in 1902 he had at least 60 living offspring (on the Tauwhare-Manuka block list, these are numbers 93 through 151). The following diagram is a selection of some of them, various aspects of which will be examined more closely in the following pages. 61 Bowler to Under-Secretary ND, 12 March 1920, WDMLC kc.f. 621. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 84 Figure 2: Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage, 1903 Rangipa=Urunga (fn/a) Te Ariari (m) => Tiramate (f)( fnlb ) Tamaikoha => = I? Ngatua > =2? Whata( ? Te Ariari (m) Hokimoki (f) (f) I>? ?< I>? ? Tamaikoha (f) Tamaikoha (m) Tamaikoha (f) Tamaikoha (m) Tamaikoha (m) Tamaikoha (m) = Tupaea Rapaera = I? Motu = I? Ramari Miraki =Tawera Moko Hakaipari (f) (see children and other (see children at (3)) (see children at (1)) 1 (see wives #2, 3) wives at (2)) <- Wharetutu- _Paruru Takao TeAhi Tamaikoha (f) Tamaikoha (m) Tamaikoha (m) Tamaikoha (m) (Hakeke) =2? Ani Motu _ Mahia Hinetarewa__ > Konoro - Reihana _Kawehi--- - Mariana--- - Hakeke (m) (fn/c) Hakeke (f) Hakeke (m) (fn/d) Hakeke (m) Hakeke (f) Hakeke (f,14) (Hakeke) = 3? Te Uru I? Motu/Kutu I? _TeOtawa__ _Hopaea__ > <_Kete - Te Wairawaho_ _Kahuwi _Marakihau-- Hakeke (m,13) Hakeke (m,12) Hakeke (f,l1) Hakeke (m) (18+) Hakeke (m) Hakeke (f) (Hakeke) =4? < Noti _ TeKohi--- _ Wharewhakawa_ _ Te Orani Hakeke Hakeke (f,18) Hakeke (m,I?) Hakeke (f,16) (f) (18+) Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 85 (1) (Pihitahi Tamaikoha) =Tupaea Rapaera(m) Miria.__ _ _ TeUrupa__ _Te Kohunui_ _Hariata'-----__ _Whata.__ _ Turaki Tupaea (f) Tupaea (f) Tupaea (m,17) Tupaea (f,16) Tupaea (f,1O) Tupaea (f,8) = Tumoana Pokai Poniu Tumoana _ Kunere Tumoana (m,S) (m, b. 1905) I will put this large group in rough historical perspective. Tamaikoha must have been born by the early 1840s, becap.se he was a prominent leader in the late 1860s war in the Bay of Plenty and Urewera. The 1921 ues report indicates he was still alive at that late date, so he is unlikely to have been born before 1840 and was probably relatively young in the war (and in his 80s by 1921). Thus his parents Te Ariari and Tiramate were probably born before 1820, and their parents Rangipa and Urunga were probably born before 1800 (supposing an average of at least 20 years between first-born children). Again, those listed above were all living in 1902. The above diagram includes some key spouses who were living but do not appear in this part of the Tauwhare-Manuka block list, although they may appear elsewhere in this same list as well as other block lists. Again, recall that the block lists are not 62 Note: this is a simplified version of the fuller Spreadsheet 1 (Appendix A). . This diagram may not be accurate; I have described my sources, reasoning, and ambiguities in the following discussion. Symbols: = means marriage; =1, 2 etc means priority of marriages; _ connects siblings; I means parent child filiation; < or > means continued; ( ) means gender (m or f), age (in 1903), or other information; ? means information uncertain; (2) etc., means genealogy continued below. (a) Best's genealogical plates 5,6, 10, 15, 17,20,21, or 27; (b) UMB 8: Whaitiripapa block. (c) Konoro's daughter, age 13 in 1903, listed at TM #103. (d) Kawehi's children ages 5-8 in 1903, listed at TM #104-6. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 86 'families' or whaanau but rather unilateral segments (for reasons of clarity, tracing land rights through one parent only) of cognatic descent groups (in which land rights actually descend through both parents). Yet the shares allocated to each individual by the commission also usually reflected any rights to the same block through the 'absent' parent (the parent not listed nearby, usually preceding, the sibling group individual) - and this is probably why Elsdon Best drew up UMB 8 noting mothers where only the father was apparent. To put the perspective of the block lists another way, the children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren in this list appear here because from birth they have specific rights to land and hapuu membership insofar as Tamaikoha was their progenitor. (Tamaikoha himself appears in the list because he is acknowledged to be among the senior generation in the leadership of one or another of the hapuu acknowledged to control this particular area of Urewera lands now designated as a block, because of their parents and ancestors, use of the land, and other customary reasons such as gifting or conquest). The spouses of Tamaikoha and his offspring which have been included in the diagram may have also contributed to these rights, but in virtue of different predecessors (for at least three generations back). They appear in the lists of other blocks, and perhaps in this block, as descendants of their own predecessors. 63 1.3.1 Spouses and Mothers The mothers of Tamaikoha Te Ariari's ten children were recorded as Ngatua (mother of children 1-3 in Figure 2 above) and Whata (mother of children 4-10; UMB 8: Whaitiripapa block). Apparently neither were living by 1921, insofar as I have been unable to find appropriate persons in those lists. Ngatua was probably Ngatua Hokomoki, who in 1903 held rights to four of the same blocks as did Tamaikoha, 63 This cultural conception of land rights and kinship treating spouses as outsiders was the cause of some conflicts before the Native Reserve Commissions when a claimant was challenged to be claiming rights through such a spouse rather than an ancestor. Because Maori are usually well aware of the difference, such claims may have been prompted by the possibility that the Pakeha chairman of the Commission would indulge the ambiguity, or by charges of bias against the Tuhoe Commissioners. This particular issue continued to cause conflict nationally between Maori and Pakeha through the 1970s. At that time, backed by widespread Maori demand as Minister of Maori Affairs, Matiu Rata was able to repeal a provision of the 1967 Maori Affairs Act which attempted to enforce succession to land rights by spouses. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 87 although hers were stronger than his in Tauranga and Karioi. An appropriate person in the 1903 lists for Tamaikoha's other wife Whata remains unidentified (Whata Henare may have been of an appropriate age and gender, but her land rights are not extended to any of the children). However, children 4-10 hold significantly more and different land rights, presumably in virtue of their mother Whata's different - and perhaps more prestigious - rights. For instance, whereas children 1-3 held strong rights in Pukepohatu block, children 4-10 held none. (The dashes are inserted between siblings to mark this ambiguity of parent or land rights between them). On the other hand, the line between the (presumably) two mothers is ambiguous. Most of the distinctive land rights of the later-born children, suggesting another mother, appear to extend through children 5-10 rather than 4-10, leaving 4 Te Hauwaho Tamaikoha ambiguously between the two mothers, at least in terms of land rights. Whereas rights to Tauranga as well as Pukepohatu blocks were not extended to children 5-10, they enjoyed rights to Te Tuahu, Parekohe, and Otara blocks while children 1-4 had none. Further ambiguity of mothers' land rights is suggested by the extension of rights to Te Purenga, Ruatoki South, and Kohuru-Tukuroa only to children 6-10, perhaps leaving Tiopira Tamaikoha in a limnal position similar to Te Hauwaho, between divergent land rights if not different mothers. On the other hand, there is the (I think, lesser) possibility that these differences in land rights among the siblings are the result of gifts from other relatives, and do not reflect the rights of their parents. Although the identification of Tamaikoha' s second wife is itself a significant problem, It is pursued here primarily to explore some of the implications of land rights details depicted in Spreadsheet 1 (Appendices). The ambiguity of Tamaikoha's oldest son Hakeke's wife or wives, mother or mothers of his 16 children, is less easily analysed but more revealing. UMB 8 (again, Whaitiripapa block) records that Ani Motu was mother of children 1-4 and Te Uru Motu or Urekutu was mother of children 5-15 (Kahuwi is child 10; child 16, Te Orani or Te a Arani, is listed with the sibling group only for Karioi and Taneatua blocks). However, the lists of several other blocks and the 1921 ues group 12Al strongly Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 88 imply that Motu Hakaipari was the mother of some or all of Hakeke' s children. Motu Hakaipari's younger brother and his offspring, as well as herself, appear to be included in two of the four Tamaikoha consolidation groups in 1921. On the other hand, there appears to be no Motu family surname in any of the block lists. There is a Kutu family, and a Te Urn Kutu in the Tauwhare-Manuka block list immediately following all of Tamaikoha's 60 offspring (number 152). Although she is an adult, she holds a number of shares in the block equivalent to a great-grandchild. If she is or was a wife to Hakeke and mother to some of his children, this may indicate that although she has no hapuu rights in Tauwhare-Manuka block, she was granted rights through aroha. The ages of Hakeke's children, reported for those 18 or under in 1903, also suggest different mothers, but at quite a different point in the sequence of the sibling group. Children 6-9 are recorded to be from 11 to 14 years old, and children 13-15 are reported to be from 16 to 18 years old (these reports are consistent across the other block lists, as is the order of the entire sibling group). Child 16 Te Orani, again, is apparently older than 18 years old. If these reports are accurate, this suggests not only that children 1-9, 10-15, and 16 have different mothers, but also that the marriages were concurrent for a considerable period of time. For example, child 10 Kahuwi, who would have been at least 22 and probably older in 1903, may well have been born about the same time as children 1-3, and even before 1, Konoro Hakeke. However, it appears unlikely that Kahuwi was born before Konoro, because the priority of marriage between co-wives, as well as the priority of birth among siblings, is so important in Tuhoe (and generally in Maori) culture that if this were so, Hakeke's children 10-15 almost certainly would have been listed before children 1-9, in all blocks in which they had rights. On the other hand, the pattern of pupuri whenua or retention of land shares among this sibling group raises the possibility that Kahuwi was indeed the tuakana tuatahi or maataamua among all his siblings. Although it seems unlikely, this possibility could have been the case, for instance, if the mother of children 1-9 had no children for Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 89 awhile, so Hakeke married a second wife who then began to conceive before the first wife did. The ambiguity of mothers' names, at least, may be partly resolved by the distribution of land rights among Hakeke's children, which is somewhat more consistent than their distribution among Tamaikoha's children (I continue to refer to Spreadsheet 1, Appendix A). Of the 17 blocks in which Hakeke's children have rights, the majority (10 blocks) consistently list all children 1-15, excepting only 16 Te Orani; three more list all 16 children, including her as well. There is, then, as well as consistent birth order, this considerable consistency of inclusion of all Hakeke's children regardless of who their mother was (I suspect this, like occasional assignment of shares among children equal or nearly equal to their parents, reflected the mana of the whaanau as a whole). However, a certain segregation consistent with that of the reported ages of the sibling group is reflected in six other blocks. In three of the 17 blocks (Parekohe, Te Tuahu, and Omahuru) only children 1-7, 1-8, or 1-9 are listed (that is, leaving out one or two of the last-born out in two blocks). In another three of the 17 blocks (Te Waipotiki, Paraoanui, and Kohuru-Tukuroa), only children 10-15 are listed (Plus child 9 Te Otawa, strangely out-of-place, in the case of Te Waipotiki block). This pattern, regardless of exceptions (which are likely to be mistakes) confirms the suspicion raised by the reported ages that the difference of mothers lies between Hakeke's children 9 and 10 rather than between 4 and 5 as was indicated by Best in UMB8. More detailed examination of the distribution of block rights also confirms this, as well as the identity of the mothers. Motu Hakaipari's status as the mother of children 1-8 is confirmed by the extension of all her strongest land rights (Te Tuahu, Omahuru, and Waikarewhenua blocks) as well as her lesser rights to Paraoanui South to all of them in appropriate proportion (half as many shares in each block). In all cases these rights are distinctive from the block rights extended from their father Hakeke, which furthermore are mostly of lesser prestige or weight than those gained Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 90 through their mother (perhaps only because her parent who as source of her rights was not living in 1902). Similarly, Te Urn Kutu's status as the mother of children 10 through 15 (again, Kahuwi is number 10) is confirmed by the extension of her strongest land rights (Kohurn Tukuroa and Paraeroa blocks) as well as some of her lesser rights (Ruatahuna, Waipotiki, and Tarapounamu-Matawhero blocks) to them in appropriate proportion. In all these cases her block rights are distinctive from their father Hakeke's, while their childrens' many other block rights may derive from either or both of their parents. Again, the child intermediate in birth order, 9 Te Otawa Hakeke, appears to be limnal between these two otherwise unambiguous mothers, holding his strongest rights (Waikarewhenua) through Motu Hakaipari but unlike children 1-8 no rights to her other two leading blocks and, like children 10-15, lesser rights to Ruatahuna, Waipotiki, and Tarapounamu through Te Urn Kutu, but unlike them no rights to her two leading blocks. These details on the differential distribution of land rights among Hakeke' s children may sound complex, but the consistencies are quite convincing. Regardless of exceptions, these consistencies also confirm the impressive control of extensive detail in whakapapa - in all its complexities - exercised by the Tuhoe commissioners 1899- 1902. They also support my argument that the resulting data is relatively reliable for ethnohistorical reconstruction. Finally, the last (but apparently not the youngest) child of Hakeke Tamaikoha, 16 Te Orani (or Te 0 Arani) Hakeke, holds far less extensive block rights than any of her siblings, being listed only for the Taneatua, Tauranga, and Karioi blocks. Although she holds adult shares in these blocks (9, 5, and 5 shares, respectively), none appear to be distinctively from either Motu Hakaipari or Te Urn Kutu, suggesting that she may be born of yet another mother and held shares though her father only. She may thus be as old as any of her siblings, although she is consistently listed last (where she is listed at all), perhaps indicating some stigma that sets her apart. However, because Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 91 she holds nearly as many shares as Hakeke himself does in Taneatua and Karioi blocks, one may suspect that her mother also held shares in these blocks. The exclusive listing of only children 10-15 but including her in Taneatua block is probably a significant clue. It appears to imply that her rights to that block, like the others, derive from Te Uru Kutu. But this is probably an inclusion by aroha, and may conceal something more significant. If this foregoing interpretation of the data is most consistent, then the two names of mothers reported by Best in UMB 8, and the point at which their motherhood divides the sibling group, must be doubted. Even if Ani Motu and Te Uru Motu are alternative or confused names for Motu Hakaipari and Te Uru Kutu, their division of the sibling group between 1-4 and 5-16 appears to be superfluous, that is, to have no basis in the land rights of the children. It may be plausible that Ani Motu and Te Urn Motu are half-caste daughters of Motu Hakaipari by a previous marriage to a Pakeha (and thus bear her rather than his first name as their surname), but this would require further less plausible explanations. After Hakeke's children, the next sibling group depicted in Figure 2 are the children ofHakeke's sister Pihitahi, second-born of her sibling group, and another prominent leader, Tupaea Rapaera. This marriage and their children appear less problematic, but a closer look at them will be put off until later contexts. Although Figure 2 has left out most of Tamaikoha's children and several grandchildren, I have also included his child 5 Tiopira Tamaikoha, younger brother of Hakeke and Pihitahi, because his several wives and mothers of his (again, 10) children are less difficult to sort out, and their children are - surprisingly - always listed as separate sibling groups (even if they have rights in the same block), rather than as a single sibling group as Tamaikoha's and Hakeke's children usually are. As well as being another large family (or, more probably, several whaanau), Tiopira's also represented at least two important political alliances in the Ruatoki as well as TaurangaiWaimana basins: his own (early?) marriage with the older (?) sister of Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 92 another rangatira and war colleague of Tamaikoha Te Ariari, Te Whiu Miraki (see Sissons on this leader), and his oldest child's marriage with Numia Kereru, one of the leading rangatira of Tuhoe from 1896 until 1916. Tiopira's three wives and mothers of his three groups of children are documented, for instance, in UMB 8 at Waikaremoana 5 and 272-3, and Te Wairiko 219 as well as the Tauwhare-Manuka list. Although the priority of his wives remains uncertain, it has been deduced from the relative ages of their children, and the relative shares the wives are recognised to have when all hold shares in the same block. Because he had only one child, Ngahirata, by what was probably his first wife, only two of these three groups of children appears in the lists as a 'sibling group'. In 1903 his various children had their rights recognised in 24 of 35 blocks - the highest proportion encountered in the data. In 10 of these blocks only one child/sibling group is recognised; in another 10 of these blocks two child/sibling groups are recognised; and in another four of these blocks all three child/sibling groups are recognised. This degree of discrimination between rights to blocks seems to be quite different than it is among Tamaikoha's and Hakeke's children by different wives; what might account for it? There is the possibility that the three groups of children have different fathers, i.e. that there is another Tiopira than the son of Tamaikoha. Because many names are ancestral, this is always a possibility: a cousin of Tiopira Tamaikoha may have born the same name but died before the 1899 lists were drawn up, having sired one or two of these child/sibling groups. A similar situation will be examined in connection with Te Unupo; it probably derives primarily from more divergent block and perhaps hapuu rights between the three wives, but this remains to be more carefully assessed. The social and political relationship between the different child/sibling groups may also be a factor. I have included another of Tamaikoha's children, 6 Te Unupo, her husband, and their three children in Figure 2, but I will return to this part of the hapuu lineage later, in a brief analysis of deaths and successions. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 93 1.3.2 Hapuu and Land Rights in the Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage What inferences can be drawn about the hapuu affiliations of this hapuu lineage, and what block rights follow from this? Insofar as this can be determined, insights into a priority of affiliations can be attempted, and patterns of retention against the purchase campaign can be traced. Restricting my analysis just to Tamaikoha, Hakeke, and Pihitahi and their children, the evidence for hapuu affiliations at the level of their ancestors can be winnowed out. This can then be elaborated through consideration of their rights to land recorded in the Native Reserve block lists. (Again, Figure 1 in the Introduction lists all the old blocks, the hapuu with leading rights to them recognised in 1902, and the abbreviations I use for the old blocks in some figures and spreadsheets). Elsdon Best's genealogy plates 5, 6, 10, 15, 17,20,21 and 27 all mention Tamaikoha, tracing descendants of his various ancestors down through the succession of (usually) first-born (whether male or female is not usually marked in Best's - nor Tuhoe - whakapapa). Together, these whakapapa report that Tamaikoha Te Ariari was a child of Te Ariari, and Te Ariari was a child of Rangipa and Urunga (which is the father and which the mother is unclear). One of Urunga's parents was Te Ra-Mahaki. According to Best's note in UMB 8 Whaitiripapa block, Tamaikoha's mother and Te Ariari's wife was Tiramate. These, then, are some key ancestors of the whole line depicted in Figure 2. Taking these ancestors in descending order, from Best's genealogies the hapuu rights passed on by them appear as follows. 64 Through Urunga's parent Te Ra-Mahaki this whole line could claim the rights of Te Whakataane hapuu of Tuhoe (Best, plate 17; as could Numia Kereru, here closely related to Tamaikoha). Through Urunga (apparently from his or her other parent) this whole line could claim the rights of the Ngati Rawa hapuu (Best, plate 10; probably called the Ngati Rakei hapuu by 1902). 64 Elsdon Best, Tuhoe, Children of the Mist, Vol. II (genealogies), second edition, A.H. and A. W. Reed Ltd., Wellington (first published 1925 as Vol VI of the Memoirs of the Polynesian Society), 1973; genealogy plates 5, 6,10,15,17,21 and 27. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 94 Through Rangipa this whole line could claim the rights of the Ngai Tama hapuu (Best, plate 15), Tuhoe hapuu (also known as Te Urewera hapuu by 1902; neither to be confused with the contemporary Tuhoe or earlier Urewera iwi), and the Tanemoeahi hapuu (Best, plate 27). Through Te Ariari this whole line could claim the rights of Ngati Mura-kareke hapuu (although his source of these rights remains unclear; Best, plate 5). Through Te Ariari's wife and their mother Tiramate, the whole line could claim the rights of the Nga Potiki hapuu and perhaps the Ngati Tawhaki hapuu (Best, plate 6) and, again, Tuhoe or Tuhoe Potiki hapuu (Best, plate 21), also known as Te Urewera hapuu by 1902. Through Tamaikoha's first wife Ngatua, all her descendants could again claim the rights of Ngati Mura-kareke, reinforcing those from Te Ariari. I will now return to the details of land rights among Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage depicted in Spreadsheet 1 (Appendix A). Hapuu rights deriving from ancestors, such as the manifold possibilities displayed in Best's genealogies above, is narrowed down considerably by comparison with hapuu rights asserted in control over the resources of a specific area of land. Of the several different possible hapuu rights deriving from ancestors outlined above, Te Urewera hapuu (previously known as Tuhoe and Tuhoe Potiki hapuu) appears to take the lead in the land rights explicitly recognised by the UDNR commission. The new political economic conditions precipitated by the UDNR negotiations, 1896 Act, and investigations of the commission itself were probably an important factor in this selection or activation ofhapuu affiliation. Among Tuhoe and generally among Maori, stronger or primary hapuu rights must be based on relatively recent occupation, use, or symbolic acts of possession such as tohu (leaving marks), gifting, support of hui, or participation in decisions, the more active the land use the stronger the right. 65 Reciprocally, established use rights might 65 Some of these criteria are more important in contemporary Maori society, as I described in an early essay (Webster, 1975). So-called 'traditional' criteria are themselves problematic. By the 1870s the Native Land Court in its investigations of original title had nationally institutionalised similar but varying criteria of land rights in various iwi in terms of take tupuna (reasons of ancestry), take raupatu (reasons of conquest), and take tuku (reasons of gifting), any of which had to be backed to some Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 95 reinforce ancestral claims by encouraging indulgence of claims to other tupuna. Because most Tuhoe had, through diverse hapuu affiliations, established use rights to some degree in several different blocks, over a generation or two greater reliance on one land area rather than another might lead to greater emphasis on the corresponding ancestral claim and less emphasis on another. Marriages, adoptions, change of residence, new alliances between hapuu, and changing political economic conditions were major factors in such shifting ancestral allegiances and the corresponding hapuu affiliations. The several years of the Native Reserve Commission 1899-1902 appear to have precipitated many rapid changes. The sources suggest, then, that ancestral sources of rights to Te Urewera hapuu were probably Rangipa (Tamaikoha's father's parent) but also Tiramate (Tamaikoha's mother). As shown in Spreadsheet 1, these hapuu rights were recognised in Tamaikoha's leading shares (that is, in his own case, 20 shares listed early in a block list) in Whaitiripapa and Taneatua blocks, and strong shares (20, but not listed early) in Ruatahuna. These leading or strong shares were repeated down through his children and grandchildren, usually in half proportion. These hapuu rights were explicit in the case of Whaitiripapa block (Te Urewera was the only hapuu named in the award), but must be assumed in the cases of Taneatua and Ruatahuna blocks (where several other hapuu were named in the awards). In the case of Ruatahuna block, the strong shares had to be gained on appeal in 1907. degree by ahi kaa or noho (burning hearth fIres, occupation). The relative weight between take, between take and noho, and the interpretation of noho itself shifted according to the situation of the adjudication (which included political influence). Maori became adept at foreseeing the likely direction of particular judges. The deliberations of the 1st UDNR Commission were usually in terms of take tupuna and noho, and emphasised a wide interpretation of noho as, for instance, seasonal use of the resources of the land in question. Symbolic acts of use such as burial of the pito or gathering of fIrewood might qualify in an otherwise strong claim. Later, the 2nd UDNR Commission and Native Court of Appeals, and especially the DCS Commission, often used a narrow definition of noho or noho tuturu, for instance actual cultivations or fences if not permanent occupation, perhaps without close attention and necessary weight given to take tupuna. It should be no surprise that these tribunals and courts would on occasion play the same angles as Tuhoe claimants would. The real distinction between them, of course, was relative institutional power and offIcial responsibility. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 96 In addition to recognition of these rights in Te Urewera hapuu, two other hapuu appear more than once as owners of blocks in which Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage is assigned leading shares: Ngati Tokotuai and Ngati Tamariwai. Neither of these hapuu appear in either the 1896 or 1899 lists of Urewera hapuu (that is, hapuu of Tuhoe iwi), that is to say, they seem to have been renamed, or separated from other hapuu during the commission. Tamaikoha was assigned an extraordinary 30 shares (and his children and grandchildren, correspondingly, 20 or 10 shares each) in Pukepohatu block, which was awarded exclusively to Ngati Tokotuai. They were also assigned leading shares in both Tauwhare-Manuka and Taneatua blocks, in which Ngati Tokotuai was named as owners among other hapuu. Further research may show how this hapuu took shape subsequent to 1899, and if it was part of or identical to ancestral hapuu of the lineage. Ngati Tamariwai was named among other hapuu as owners of both Tauwhare-Manuka and Kohuru-Tukuroa blocks, in which the whole lineage or that part born of What a, Tamaikoha's second wife, held strong shares (this might help identify who Whata was). Although Ngati Tamariwai appears not to have been recognised as a separate hapuu in the 1896 and 1899 lists, it may have been the same as or included in Ngati Tama hapuu, which was recognised at that time and was located primarily in Te Waimana. The rights of Tamaikoha's lineage in Ngai Tama came from his father's parent Rangipa, and may have been recognised in the lineage's strong shares in Ohiorangi block, and Whata's children's' strong shares in Waikarewhenua block, as well as in the guise of Ngati Tamariwai. Finally among Tamaikoha's children, his first wife Ngatua's strong rights to Karioi and Tauranga blocks and thus to Ngai Te Kahu hapuu were added to the hapuu rights of all her children. Following Spreadsheet 1, we can similarly trace the persistence or change of hapuu rights of Hakeke's and Pihitahi's children, large sibling groups all of whom were grandchildren of Tamaikoha. Those rights devolved through Hakeke and Pihitahi themselves would usually have remained the same as those rights outlined above for their sibling group, insofar as sustained through use of resources in the blocks concerned. However, among their children hapuu rights were also reinforced or added ~==-=-=--=-=-<=-=«~. ~===~~~~=------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 97 through the spouses of these two siblings. In the case of Hakeke's 16 children, his first wife Motu Hakaipari held strong shares in Waikarewhenua block and thus added Ngati Tama hapuu to her children's rights (or, perhaps, reinforced their rights in Ngati Tamariwai). She also held strong rights in Te Tuahu and Omahuru blocks, and thus added Hamua and Ngati Tatua hapuu to her children's' rights. Hakeke's second wife Te Uru Kutu held strong shares in Kohuru-Tukuroa and Paraeroa blocks, and thus may have reinforced their Ngati Tamariwai and (from their ancestor Te Ariari) Ngati Mura-kareke hapuu, respectively, as well as adding new rights to Ngati Rongo, Ngati Korokaipapa, and Ngati Hinekura hapuu. Kahuwi Hakeke was one of those children who gained these hapuu rights through this second marriage. Pihitahi's husband Tupaea Rapaera was himself a rangatira, and reinforced or added a large number of hapuu and land rights to those their children derived through her. 66 Tupaea held leading shares in Ruatahuna, Ierenui-Ohaua, Kohuru-Tukuroa and perhaps Taneatua blocks, and strong shares in Te Ranga a Ruanuku, Waikaremoana, Maungapohatu, Waipotiki, Whaitiripapa, Ruatoki South, Tauranga, and Tauwhare Manuka blocks. This marriage thus probably reinforced their offspring's' rights in Te Urewera hapuu (Ruatahuna, Waikaremoana, Maungapohatu, Whaitiripapa, and Taneatua blocks), Ngati Tamariwai hapuu (Kohuru-Tukuroa and Tauwhare-Manuka blocks), and Ngati Tokotuai (Tauwhare-Manuka and Taneatua blocks), as well as adding strong new rights to Ngati Rongo hapuu (Ierenui-Ohaua, Kohuru-Tukuroa, 66 Tupaea Rapaera had been Prime Minister Seddon's and Native Minister Carroll's guide through the Urewera in 1895 (AJHR G-1, 1895:61,80; in O'Malley 1996 Supp.Pap. I: 3-46). He was sent from Ruatoki by his uncle Kereru Te Pukenui, a leader ofNgati Rongo and other hapuu of the Tuhoe (as they so called themselves by that time). During the meetings at Ruatoki, while Kereru Te Pukenui did the formal speaking, he apparently delegated leadership of the discussions to his teina (younger) brother Numia, who after his tuakana (older) brother's death by 1898 became known also as Kereru, and was elected to the Urewera District Native Reserve Commission. Numia was actually the potiki (youngest child) of five children of Ruakariata and Rangiwhakahaerea, all of whom were dead by 1898 except Nurnia and his tuakana sister Raiha, who was married to Moko Tupaea (Best, 1898:33). Tupaea Rapaera was the first-born son (and apparently only child) ofKereru's oldest sister Tumki, herself mataamua of five siblings, who married the influential Waimana leader Rapaera. In 1895 young Tupaea had been addressed with respect, (even before Seddon) at the other end of the Urewera in Waikaremoana. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 98 and Waipotiki blocks). Through their first-born child Miria Tupaea, Poniu Tumoana was a grandchild of this marriage between Pihitahi and Tupaea. Although these diverse hapuu rights appear to become unmanageable in ancestral terms, especially through exogamous marriages between members of different hapuu, in the mundane practice of land use they are continually being thinned out by marriage, disuse, inactivity, estrangement, and similar factors. On the basis of recognised land rights as well as ancestry it can be concluded, then, that although Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage had manifold potential hapuu rights reflected in its wide rights in land, in practical terms it appears to have been affiliated primarily with Te Urewera hapuu and probably also with Tokotuai and perhaps Tamariwai hapuu, at least at the time of the UDNR Commission. 1.3.3 Deaths and Successions Because we happen to have found the data, there is a rare opportunity to examine the effects of death and succession to shares in blocks in some whaanau of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage, and this also bears on the relation between the purchase campaign and Tuhoe responses. As will be described later in the chapter, Bowler concerned himself systematically with perhaps (according to his own account) a thousand successions as integral to his purchase campaign. This was partly because, of course, he was unable to purchase shares of deceased Tuhoe, but it was also because the purchase of successors' shares was, for various reasons which I will be considering, a purchase tactic in itself. My detour here will be to explore two families of Tamiakoha's hapuu lineage in order first to detail some deaths and successions during the purchase campaign; then, second, I will return to the wider hapuu lineage through an examination of purchases and, finally, retention of block rights in these two families. Few of the comprehensive records which Bowler must have kept of deaths and succeSSIOns carried out during the Crown purchase campaign appear to have survived. The record of successions is relatively comprehensive for the consolidation scheme from 1921 through 1925, and this includes pre-consolidation successions which were not completed in the NLC or not applied for by August 1921. However, if Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 99 succession to the land interests of deceased Tuhoe were completed in the NLC before the consolidation, the records are scattered in the minutebooks and succession orders in the old block binders, often difficult to locate or lost. Consequently, the effect of the purchase campaign on the land rights of these dead and their successors is often obscured. One of the more useful pre-Consolidation fragments is six pages recording 28 deaths and 77 successors and dated variously in August 1919, located by Himaima Tumoana. 67 It is likely that many of the deaths recorded here were a result of the influenza epidemic of 1918-19. Probably by chance, 7 of the 28 deaths recorded in these papers had to do with Pihitahi Tamaikoha, her younger sister Te Unupo Tamaikoha, and their families. There were certainly other deaths and successions from the epidemic among Tamaikoha's and Hakeke's many children and grandchildren, but it was those in Pihitahi's and Te Unupo's families (as well as families of other hapuu lineages) which happened to be presented to Bowler or the NLC at this time and recorded in these papers. Some of these deaths and successions have already been mentioned in connection with the correspondence between Bowler and Poniu Tumoana, Pihitahi's grandson, who was one of those who died (although somewhat later and probably not from the epidemic, at least not directly). However, aside from hapuu rights, we have not yet taken a closer look at this family, a prominent one among Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage because it formed yet another important political alliance through Tupaea Rapaera. As explained in the previous chapter, as well as reinforcing the rights of Te Urewera, Ngati Tamariwai, and Ngati Tokotuai, this alliance added rights of Ngati Rongo hapuu to all the others held byPihitahi's children. As is depicted in Figure 2, Pihitahi Tamaikoha had six children by Tupaea Rapaera, aged 8 through about 25 in 1903. The first-born, Miria Tupaea, was probably about 25 because her first child Poniu Tumoana was already five years old; I have included their second child Kunere Tumoana in the diagram, although he was not born until about 1905. In order better to understand implications of the deaths and successions 67 Notes, undated (7-15 August 1919), WDMLC c.f. 621. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 100 in the 6-page list, I also included in Figure 2 Tamaikoha's 6th child, Te Unupo Tamaikoha, her husband Tawera Moko, and their three children aged five through 8 years old, all of whom appear in the model Tauwhare-Manuka block list. Like her oldest sister Pihitahi's probably earlier marriage, Te Unupo's marriage reinforced an alliance with Tupaea Rapaera's influential hapuu Ngati Rongo, among whose leaders was Numia (Kereru) Ruakariata. Immediately following Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage in the Tauwhare-Manuka block list (papers 1, #153; and closely associated with this lineage in four other block lists) is Moko Tupaea, the father of Te Unupo's husband Tawera Moko. While Tupaea Rapaera's father Rapaera (Tangira?) had married Turaki, the mataamua sister of Numia Kereru, Moko Tupaea had married Raiha Ruakariata, Numia's older sister. 68 Since the death of his older brother Kereru Te Pukenui (and perhaps the death of Raiha too), at least by 1908 Numia had taken a lead in Ngati Rongo as well as other hapuu. Through their mothers, who were both Numia's older sisters, by status if not by generation Tupaea Rapaera and Tawera Moko were Numia's tuakana (they were merely his nephews by generation). Moko Tupaea's own position remains unclear to me. Because he is the first person after Tamaikoha Te Ariari himself whose rights to Tauwhare-Manuka block are recognised at the level of 20 shares, one can usually assume that this person is not a descendant of the previous person recognised at this level, but another adult who may be a close or distant cousin, and perhaps head of another hapuu lineage of small or large extent, although probably a closely related one. In Moko's case, the surname 'Tupaea' at first led me to assume that he was an older brother ofPihitahi and Tupaea Rapaera's children, probably born of another wife years earlier. However, the disparity in shares (his 20 to their 5), the ages of his three children (all over 34 by 1919), the marriage of his oldest son to the Tupaea children's' auntie (their mother's teina or younger sister) and, most importantly, his own marriage to Raiha Ruakariata, puts him unambiguously in an earlier generation and suggests that he came by the 68 Elsdon Best, 'Genealogies of the Tuhoe Tribe. Shows all living members of the tribe as in 1898, as given before the Urewera Commission setup under the act of 1896', Tuhoe Genealogies 1898 (spine title) qMS [172], ATL, Wellington, p 33. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 101 surname Tupaea differently. It can tentatively be concluded that Moko Tupaea was a cousin of Tupaea Rapaera's father Rapaera (who apparently used no surname); for instance, Rapaera may have named his son after Moko's father (Tupaea), who might have been Rapaera's uncle. The repetition of names is usually more ancestral than this (or, in previous generations, father-sonlmother-daughter), but there are many exceptions. Thus, Moko Tupaea was probably an 'uncle' to Tupaea Rapaera. In any case, probably the marriages of his predecessors had not been so propitious as those of Tupaea Rapaera's: whereas in 1903 the latter held rights in 22 blocks, Moko Tupaea held rights in only seven blocks. Seven of the deaths reported and successions arranged in the 6-page list are in this Tupaea family into which both Pihitahi and Te Unupo married. Although they were not all listed together (reports of other deaths and successions intervene) all are dated 13 August 1919. This is probably the day they were reported or recorded in this list; we do not know the actual dates of death, but it is likely that it was in the recent influenza epidemic. Moko is the first death recorded, and of the seven blocks in which he held rights in 1903, four are listed to which his oldest child, his son Tawera Moko, was to succeed 'solely', presumably to all shares (the number of shares is not listed). Tawera Moko was probably in his late 30s in 1919. His sole succession is explained by the next two entries: the deaths of both of his younger sisters Takoto Moko and Takahiao Moko are also reported (probably by him). Of the approximately 20 blocks in which the sisters held rights in 1903, only 9 are listed for Takoto and only two for Takahiao. Surprisingly, it appears that although both sisters were probably in their early 30s by the time they died, no children are named to succeed to the rights of either; instead, all their land rights reverted to their brother. It might well be that they had children born since 1903 (and therefore not in that list), but that they all also died in the epidemic. Such devastation might help to explain the deaths of both sisters and their father, even partly as a consequence. It may have been unusual even among a ravaged Urewera population. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 102 The next four deaths and successions reported in this 6-page list for the Tupaea family are from among the six children of Pihitahi Tamaikoha and Tupaea Rapaera. This, of course, must have been a terrible blow to the parents and the whole hapuu lineage (among which many more deaths probably occurred in the epidemic). Hariata Tupaea's death is the next one recorded, and of the 24 blocks in which she held rights in 1903 only her Ruatahuna block shares are listed: her shares in Ruatahuna 4 reverted to her mother Pihitahi, and her shares in Ruatahuna 1, 2 and 5 reverted to her father Tupaea. Although Hariata was about 32, again she apparently had had no children to succeed to her land rights - or they too died in the epidemic. Two pages later in the list, the remaining deaths of Whata Tupaea (female, about 26), Miria Tupaea (female, over 40), and Turaki Tupaea (female, about 24, the youngest of the sibling group and named after her father's mother) are reported, in that order. Turaki - or the epidemic - also appears to have left no children to succeed to her land rights. Of the rights in 24 blocks each of these siblings held in 1903, Turuki's rights only to Maungapohatu are listed, reverting to her father Tupaea Rapaera. Whata's rights only to Ruatahuna 1,2,4, and 5, Kohuru-Tukuroa, Ohiorangi, and Ierenui-Ohaua blocks are listed, succeeded to by her three children Tame Te Iki, Pita Te Iki, and Taekata Te Iki (reported to be aged 9-13, but this is doubtful considering their mother's age), with their grandfather Tupaea Rapaera appointed as trustee for their shares. Miria's rights only to Ruatahuna 1, 2, 4 and 5 are listed, succeeded to equally by her children Poniu Tumoana and Kunere Tumoana, aged about 21 and 14 respectively, with their grandfather Tupaea Rapaera appointed as trustee for Kunere's shares. As Poniu's correspondence with Bowler in March 1920 showed, although he sold his shares in several blocks, he turned down Bowler's offer to buy what were probably his mother's as well as his own rights in Ruatahuna and several other blocks. We thus happen to have relatively detailed information on the pre-Consolidation deaths and successions in two families closely connected to Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage: Pihitahi's and her sister Te Unupo's (from the point of view of that hapuu Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 103 lineage) or the former's husband Tupaea Rapaera's family and the latter's father-in law Moko Tupaea's family (from the point of view of their hapuu lineage). However, at least one big gap remains: to what extent had the block rights of these two families held in 1903, but not succeeded or reverted to by survivors in 1919, already been bought in the Crown purchase campaign from these individuals before they died? If this 6-page list was made by Bowler or his clerk, there is a chance that shares held by the deceased in some blocks were overlooked in the succession application. As I will elaborate later, Bowler had struggled with the problem of complete identification of block interests at least until 1918 when he finally got his card index organised. However, it is much less likely that such oversights would still be occurring in August 1919. Although they do not usually record deaths and successions completed in the NLC, consolidation records can also help to assess the question of which block rights had already been purchased from those who died. As explained earlier, aside from the deeds recording the purchases in each block archived in Wellington, the only comprehensive records from which such purchases can be reconstructed are the Group Books compiled in August 1921 detailing the value of 'non-sellers' shares remaining unpurchased in each block. If applications for deceased owners and their successors were not yet completed in the NLC, their names were included in the Group Books A-E as if they were still alive and had succeeded to no more shares. Moko Tupaea's name appears neither in the 1921 Group Books nor in the 1921 AJHR report, so it appears likely that all his shares in the three of his seven blocks not passed on to his son had been purchased before he died. Similarly, his youngest daughter Takahiao appears in neither of the 1921 records. Because her rights in only two of about 17 blocks were passed on to her brother Tawera Moko, it appears that all her shares to all other 15 blocks had been purchased before she died. Some unsold shares may have been overlooked in the succession order, but it is unlikely that they would also have been overlooked in the Group Books and the 1921 AJHR report. This grim implication is strengthened by the list of 9 blocks, rights in which were Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 104 passed on to her brother on the death of her older sister Takoto; Bowler or the clerk recording all these unsold shares of Takoto's would certainly have checked for any unsold shares of Takahiao's in the corresponding blocks. It appears that most of the shares of Takoto's other eight blocks were also purchased before she died. However, some of her shares in other blocks may have been overlooked in the succession application: although the Group Books record no unsold shares still held by her in any blocks, 9,680 pence worth (or roughly 10 unsold and unidentified shares on one or more blocks) was recorded to her credit in the 1921 AJHR report - as though she were still alive (Group 6B, 4; her group would eventually benefit someplace by this additional amount in land). Pihitahi and Tupaeas' six children held rights in about 24 blocks in 1903 (probably the most extensive holdings recorded). To what extent were these rights already purchased before four of them died? Turaki Tupaea, at 24 the youngest, appears neither in the Group Books nor in the 1921 AJHR report, so it is likely that all shares in all blocks to which she had rights were purchased from her before she died except those to Maungapohatu (which reverted to her father Tupaea Rapaera). It is possible that she had become one of Rua' s followers, and sold some or all of her shares in the other 23 blocks for his plan for the development of Maungapohatu. Her second-born older sister Te Urupa Tupaea, who apparently did not die (at least by August 1919), similarly appears in neither of the 1921 records, so it is likely that all of her shares in all 24 blocks had been purchased from her by then. If indeed she had not died, Te Urupa may have been among the kore whenua or landless persons by the time of the consolidation. The other three deceased sisters, Miria, Hariata, and Whata Tupaea, all left some shares in a few blocks (mainly Ruatahuna partitions) described earlier and succeeded to by their children or reverted to their parents, but they likewise disappear from the Group Books as though purchases and completed succession orders had exhausted their land rights. However, each one of these three sisters is listed in the 1921 AJHR report (all in Group 7 with their father and mother) and credited with 6,460 pence worth of land, as though they were still alive and contributing this value to their consolidation group. This amount would be roughly equivalent to 6-7 shares, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. lOS perhaps small holdings in a few blocks, and insofar as they were probably identical may have been overlooked by Bowler. Below I will describe the extent to which many others in Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage gave in to the purchase campaign and sold most or all of their block rights. However, the 'Tupaea' cases above are notable insofar as succession or reversion to the shares which were nevertheless retained by the deceased resulted in some extraordinary concentrations of land rights among the survivors. To put the following figures for these individuals in rough perspective, the consolidated shares still held by most individuals by 1921 varied greatly but was usually less than 10,000 pence worth of land (many far less), sometimes as much as 2S,000 pence worth, and rarely more that 40,000 pence worth ofland.69 Aside from the two 'Tupaea' families, the next 'wealthiest' land- (or rather, pence-) holding individuals listed in the DCS were Heriata Paewhenua at 118,240 pence worth (Group 32); Taraipine Te Hira at 164,282 pence worth (Groups SD1 and SE); and Matahera Te Hira at 171,177 pence worth (Groups SC, SDl, and SE). The latter two were the two daughters and only living children of Te Whenuanui II, a leader of Te Drew era and other hapuu. Tupaea Rapaera and his wife Pihitahi, along with their only son and only child retaining any rights in blocks (and shares reverting to them from their deceased children), between the three of them still held consolidated shares equivalent to 208,S39 pence worth of land (Groups 7 and 30). Moko Tawera, alone and in one block, held consolidated shares equivalent to 37S,387 pence worth ofland, far more than anyone else in the DCS. Although in such cases propitious marriages among ancestors of widespread mana in diverse hapuu is one source of such extensive land rights, the extraordinary concentration of it in some cases is probably the result of an unusual number of epidemic deaths in one family. This would compound other important factors, 69 Papers 2, Appendix B: Schedule 2 (3), AJHR G-7, 1921, pp 14-39; I will explain this land consolidation, evaluation, and conversion system more fully in chapter 3. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 106 including the high normal mortality, and the equivalence of land ownership with kinship established by the Native Reserve Commission, whereby at least some shares in blocks - as hapuu rights - were extended to all descendents, adults, children, and infants alike insofar as they maintained ahi kaa or their 'home fires burning'. On the other hand, under the new regime 'property' rights had become potential commodities which did not remain uneffected by the death of a kinperson, but reverted or were succeeded to by other kin as their property. The resulting concentrations of 'wealth', in many cases such as Tawera Moko's and Tupaea and Pihitahis', must have had a bitter taste indeed. The only thing worse would have been to lose these ancestral rights to the purchase campaign - and then the child who had lost them. 1.3.4 Pupuri Whenua: Patterns of Land Retention in the Tamaikoha Hapuu Lineage I want now to examine the pupuri whenua, or retention of rights in blocks despite the purchase campaign, among the members of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage which have so far been described (see this column in Spreadsheet 1, Appendices). Do the block rights retained exhibit any patterns? Again, the Group Books A-E compiled in August 1921 recording the shares retained by each 'non-seller' in each block, and the consolidation of these shares in pence value in the 1921 AJHR report, furnish the most useful information to approach this problem. Some additional information can sometimes be found in Group Book F2, which records the successions processed by the consolidation officers in August 1921. The proposed location of the consolidated shares of each consolidation group may also give some insight into the intentions of pupuri whenua in their retention of land rights (final report, Schedule 2 (1)). However, these intentions were likely to have changed as the purchase campaign progressed and, later, when the consolidation forced reorganisation and consolidation groups were formed - often in anticipation of specific promises of the consolidation such as roads. The data in these sources for Tamaikoha, his wives, and the generation of his ten children (Hakeke through Te Ahi) is sparse and difficult to interpret, presumably Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 107 because many had died by 1921. However, many would nevertheless be recorded because groupbooks A-E were intended to include all deceased persons whose shares had not yet been processed in NLC succession orders, and Group Book F was to process all these remaining successions (if it were enacted by Parliament). Therefore, one would suppose that anyone not listed in either Group Books A-E or F had either died and succession to all their (unsold) shares had been processed, or all their shares had been purchased and they were living but landless. However, it turns out that the records are not so consistent: Tupapaku (the dead) as well as the kore whenua (the landless) haunt the lists - the former seeming to be there, while the latter seem not to be. Tamaikoha te Ariari himself, in 1903, had had extensive leading rights in Pukepohatu, Whaitiripapa, Tauwhare-Manuka, Taneatua, Paraoanui (North) blocks, strong shares in Ohiorangi and (later 1907) Ruatahuna blocks, and significant rights in eight other blocks. Thus his leading hapuu rights were probably, as was concluded before, Te Urewera, Ngati Tokotuai, and Ngati Tamariwai. In 1921, he is not listed in the Group Books A-E, nor are his wives Ngatua Hokimoki nor any person named Whata of appropriate age and gender. However, Tamaikoha is listed in Group 7 of the 1921 AJHR report, holding 3,230 pence worth or about three shares of unidentified land, implying that he was still alive (as I earlier assumed). This group was led by his oldest daughter's husband Tupaea Rapaera, and had proposed re-Iocation of their consolidated shares to 'any vacancies' in Ruatoki 1, 2, or Whaitiripapa. We happen to know from the fragmentary record in closed file 621 that three of his grandchildren (Pihitahi's children) also listed in Group 7 had died and succession to some of their unsold shares had been applied for (if not ordered by the NLC). Yet these three grandchildren are each credited in Group 7 with 6,460 pence worth of unidentified land distinguished from those shares which had been purchased or inherited by relatives, just twice as much as Tamaikoha. (This may indicate their shares were of the same origin as his, but doubled because they were through each parent). Tamaikoha's first wife Ngatua Hokomoki had had strong rights in Karioi and Tauranga blocks in 1903, and significant rights in Taneatua and Tauwhare-Manuka Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 108 blocks. Although she is not listed in either Group Books A-E or in the 1921 AJHR report, F2 indicates that she had indeed died, leaving 23 pence worth of unidentified land to her son Te Hauwaho. By 1921 he had few other land rights. These scattered bits of evidence surely indicate some oversights, confusions, and perhaps opportunism in earlier purchase and succession procedures, as well as in the procedures of the consolidation scheme in 1921. These here are revealed only because of a convergence of other evidence, suggesting that many other unidentified shares of land of unknown origin, and deceased persons who held them as ancestral rights, might be similarly scattered in these records but invisible. Perhaps all we can do so far is keep in mind some of the logical possibilities implied by such ephemeral evidence of fragmentary land rights: (i) They may be remnants overlooked in purchase or succession procedures (or in succession - complete or incomplete - and subsequent purchase). (ii) They may be remnants overlooked in the consolidation procedures and entered here as part of 'washing up' for the AJHR report. (iii) They may be personally significant shares retained when all others had been sold. Like those who were dead, those who sold all their shares in all their blocks would usually disappear from the 1921 records. Although one must doubt this at least in the case of Tamaikoha himself (see Pihitahi's probable succession, below), the apparently low proportion of retained land shares in this hapuu lineage, and generally in eastern Tuhoe, incline me toward this interpretation. Nevertheless, insofar as any amount of shares is retained, however merely symbolic, I want to consider the possibility that the retention followed some intended pattern. Following Spreadsheet 1 and exploring such possibilities, I will review each of Tamaikoha's children (and some of their spouses) in tum. In 1903 Hakeke had held leading rights through his parents (and as mataamua, their first-born) in the same blocks where his father had leading rights, and probably in the same hapuu. Although his rights through his mother were strong but not leading, in .~.---~------~~----,.- . ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 109 the cases of Tauwhare-Manuka, Tauranga, Taneatua, and Karioi they reinforced those of his father. He also held token rights in Ruatoki South, apparently from some other source. By 1921, Hakeke is listed in neither the Group-Book A-E block rights, nor F2 successions, nor the 1921 AJHR report itself, implying either that he had died and a succession order had gone through for shares he had not sold or, ifhe was sti11living, that all his shares in all these blocks had been purchased. Because he has no shares recorded in the Group Books, we also unfortunately cannot check to see which block rights he may have succeeded to from his parents, and thus know the extent to which they had retained those shares against the purchase campaign. However, Pihitahi's, case below, helps to answer this question. I have also analysed the situation of Hakeke's wives in order to sort out which of his children were also theirs and thus joined in their different land and hapuu rights. Hakeke's first wife Motu Hakaipari is listed in both ues Groups 12A1 and 12A2, led by her husband's younger brother Takao Tamaikoha and intending to re-Iocate their shares to Omahuru, east of the river, or Paraoanui North. (Most of her shares by far were placed in the former location, with only token shares in the latter). In 1903 Motu had held rights to only four blocks, but strong rights in Omahuru, Te Tuahu, and Waikarewhenua blocks, and significant rights in Paraoanui block (Paraoanui South, in 1907). By 1921, she appears to have been one of the few members in this generation of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage who (did not die, and) against the purchase campaign retained significant portions of her original shares (or, more precisely, whose retention of shares is recorded in Group Books A-E). This record enables me to take my interpretation of the data much further. Significantly, of the shares Motu Hakaipari had originally held she retained only Omahuru, and sold half of those (retaining about 10 shares there). She also retained about five shares in nearby Parakohe and about one in Maungapohatu, apparently received since 1903 by succession, reversion, or gift (any other shares received this way were apparently sold). These retained shares probably reflect Motu's intentions against the purchase campaign, because all these blocks were under purchase for Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 110 several years. When the ues radically changed the possibilities of continued land holding in 1921, she apparently decided to consolidate almost all her shares in Omahuru block (10,172 pence, by far the largest contribution and equivalent to about 15 shares there). This group was composed of two of her own children and six of her brother's children who had retained very little of their rights to land - but who with her help could settle on ancestral land. We can furthermore deduce that in retaining her rights to Omahurn she gave up, for other reasons, rights she had long retained in Parekohe and Maungapohatu. On the other hand, for yet another reason which can be guessed at, she retained token rights to the other location proposed by her husband's younger brother's group in Paraoanui North (probably just across Waiiti Stream). Hakeke's second wife Te Urn Kutu, like Hakeke himself, in 1903 held extensive rights in many blocks but disappears with little trace by 1921. In 1903 she had held leading rights to Paraeroa and strong rights to Kohurn-Tukuroa blocks, and significant rights in Whaitiripapa, Tauwhare-Manuka, Waipotiki, Tauranga, Ruatahuna, Tarapounamu-Matawhero, Te Whaiti, and Ruatoki South blocks. By 1921 her name appears in neither the Group Books A-E, nor F2, nor the 1921 AJHR report, suggesting either that she had died and any unsold shares had already been passed on to her children or, if she was still living, that all of her shares in all these blocks had been purchased. However, as will be described below, some ofTe Urn and Hakekes' children retained considerable shares in 1921, far more in Taneatua, Paraeroa, and Kohurn-Tukuroa blocks than their own full holdings would explain, suggesting that one or both of their parents' shares had been passed on to them when they died. Thus we know that Hakeke and Te Urn had retained at least some oftheir leading or strong rights in some blocks against the purchase campaign. In 1903 second-born Pihitahi had held extensive and leading block and hapuu rights through her father and mother, much like her tuakana Hakeke, but in addition strong rights in Ruatoki 1 and 2 blocks. This was probably due to her husband Tupaea Rapaera's leading rights there (or rather those of her children by him), as well as her own family mana. This source of block (and thus even hapuu) rights, having little or Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 111 no basis in descent, is on the order of aroha or honorary. By 1921, the Group Books A-E indicate that most of Pihitahi's extensive array of block rights had been purchased, but she had retained far more shares than any of her living siblings: about 40 shares in Taneatua block; about 25 shares in the Ruatahuna partitions, and about 16 shares in Karioi block. Taneatua was one of the blocks in which her father had held leading shares and her mother strong shares; Ruatahuna and Karioi were blocks in which both held strong shares. Again, the extent of these shares indicates that in some blocks she succeeded to many more shares than she already held, probably from either her father Tamaikoha, her mother Ngatua, or both (this also indicates that her parents retained at least some of their leading shares until they died). Pihitahi had also retained a small number of shares (1-3) in Ruatoki South, Tauwhare-Manuka 3, Waikarewhenua, and Parekohe (and, according to Group Book F2, 24 pence in consolidated successions apparently from (un-named) deaths in Group 12A1). On the other hand, it appears that Pihitahi sold many of her and her parents' leading shares, including Whaitiripapa, Tauwhare Manuka, Paraoanui, and several others blocks in which her family held strong rights, including those given her in aroha in Ruatoki 1 and 2. Given Pihitahi's mana, this probably shows that no stigma necessarily attached to such sales - but I will return to this question. When in 1921 the consolidation forced the reorganisation of such retained shares, Pihitahi and Tupaea apparently elected to consolidate her shares at opposite ends of the Whakataane River, with 24,612 pence worth in Group 7 awaiting 'any vacancies' in Ruatoki 1, 2, or Whaitiripapa, and 19,098 pence worth in Group 30 proposing a precise location in Ruatahuna 5 on the boundary with partition three at Otekura toward Kakanui (probably just west of Ruatahuna settlement east of the Whakatane River). Group 7 was led by Tupaea, and included (as well as several of their dead children) their daughter Miria's son Kunere as well as their only son Te Kohunui with their relatively large number of shares. Group 30 in Ruatahuna block was led by Tahuri Te Hira and again included their son and grandson (in 1903 Tahuri's oldest ------~~~;;;;;;---;;----, --==-----_=-;--;;-===c-_,r I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 112 son was named Rapaera, suggesting he and Tupaea were cousins of some kind). Thus it looks like Pihitahi's retention of her parents' as well as her own leading or strong rights in Ruatahuna was realised there, while her retention of their strong rights in Taneatua and Karioi, as well as lesser rights in several other blocks, came to naught in their consolidation elsewhere. Although the retention of the latter blocks indicates the longer struggle against the purchase campaign, she had also had the ready opportunity to alienate her Ruatahuna shares since at least 1919. Pohe Tamaikoha's situation is harder to interpret, and I will not here attempt to follow that of her children (nor those of most other of her siblings) in what appears to be a complex of marriages. In 1903 her block rights were the same and as extensive as her older siblings, except that her share in Ruatoki block was to Ruatoki 1 only (again, probably granted in virtue of her relatively high status in a prominent sibling group but also because her children held strong rights there through their father). In 1921 she was married to Paora Rangiaho and all her shares were consolidated in the Group 23A which he led, proposing to re-Iocate their consolidated shares to Ruatoki South block.7o Although Group Books A-E record no unsold shares in specific blocks, Pohe is credited with 25,572 pence worth of unidentified lands in Group 23A, roughly equivalent to about 25 shares. Group Book F2 reports that about half of that was given her as successor to several deceased persons in Groups 12A and 12B (led by her younger brother Takao Tamaikoha and niece Hopaea Hakeke, respectively), including Hinehou, Matiu, and Urutau Paora. At least Hinehou age 26, and probably all three, were her children. However, there was no longer any of the Paora family listed with Groups 12A or B. This suggests that Pohe had earlier (in the arrangement of the ues at Tauarau in August 1921) intended to leave the shares of her dead children in these Groups, but later applied to the ues officers for succession to their shares and took them to her husband's Group 23A. A further implication of this record is that all but about 10 shares of Pohe's extensive block rights had been 70 Urewera District Native Reserve Commission minute book 8, ("Urewera Commission Minute Book 1896" in Waiariki MLC archives, bound xerox copy), probably by Elsdon Best. Draft orders, annotated with share modifications, mothers, etc., for 20 blocks; see, for instance, HH Nos. 125-7. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 113 purchased, and that we do not know in which block or blocks she retained the few shares she did. Of the seven remaining children of Tamaikoha, five do have unsold shares recorded in Group Books A-E and were listed in DeS Groups 12A or 12B. Thus they were all apparently still living, and would probably have been aged in their 50s. In 1903, all had held extensive shares in many blocks similar to those of Hakeke, Pihitahi, and Pohe, with the additional rights through Whata, the mother of several, as explained earlier. However, by 1921 almost all of these shares, which probably included at least some similarly extensive unsold rights inherited from their parents, had been purchased from all five of these siblings, who usually retained only token shares in a few blocks. Each will be examined in turn. Te Hauwaho retained about 1.3 shares in Tauwhare-Manuka three partition (plus 23 pence from his mother Ngatua shifted from Group 12A to 12B, reported in Group Book F2). It is probably significant that the remnant that he retained was in a block in which his father had held leading rights. In 1921 he held a total land value of 3,889 pence, which was consolidated in Group 12B 1. This group was headed by his niece Hopaea Hakeke, along with several other of Hakeke's children, and proposed to locate its consolidated shares in Tauwhare-Manuka partition 3. It is probably significant that Te Hauwaho's sole retained share was for this same partition. Their father's leading rights to the block may thus have survived the Des as well as the purchase campaign, at least symbolically. Wharetutu retained about eight shares in Ruatahuna block, .4 of one share in Tarapounamu-Matawhero, .25 of one share in Ruatoki South, and .04 of one share in Tauwhare-Manuka 9 partition, and succeeded to 23 pence worth of unidentified land from Te Puia Nuku who had been in Group 25D. All of these shares were consolidated as 7,790 pence worth ofland and re-Iocated to Group 12A2, headed by her younger brother Takao Tamaikoha and proposing settlement in Paraoanui North, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 114 probably adjacent to his other Group 12A1 in Omahuru block east of the river. Thus she was planning to settle with her relatives but had given up all the block rights represented by the shares she had retained. These were considerable in the case of Ruatahuna and, in the case of Tauwhare-Manuka, however slight had nevertheless carried on her father's mana there. Paruru had retained only .04 of one share each in Tauwhare-Manuka 9 partition and Ruatoki South blocks, and like his older sister Wharetutu had inherited 23 pence worth of unidentified land from Puia Nuku formerly in Group 25D. Also like his sister, by 1921 his shares were located in Group 12A2, headed by his younger brother Takao Tamaikoha and proposing re-Iocation in Paraoanui North. Thus his retention of token shares in Tauwhare-Manuka and Ruatoki South, although carrying on the mana of his father in the former case, also came to naught. Interestingly, Takao himself had retained and inherited exactly the same fragmentary shares or values as had Paruru, totaling 1,114 pence worth of land each in their new location. This is interesting because it probably implies that they agreed as to which shares they would retain, and also because it suggests that a consolidation group leader held his or her position regardless of whether they had retained a significant amount of shares or were nearly landless. The 36 persons in Group 12A2 together had only 89,742 pence worth of land in Paraoanui North, only one person contributing more than 6,000 pence in land value. Finally Te Ahi, the youngest of Tamaikoha and Whatas' children still living and retaining some shares, retained only .4 of one share in Tarapounamu-Matawhero block, and also contributed its value to Group 12A2. I have not yet tried to work out the wives or children of these children of Tamaikoha, but we should bear in mind that while they located their remnant shares with Group 12A2, they may well have been living elsewhere, most probably with their wives' families. Finally, among Tamaikoha's ten children, we again know less about Tiopira and Te Unupo, probably the first- and second-born of Whata's children. Te Unupo is listed ~ -.: '. - "-T Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 115 neither in the Group Books A-E, nor F2, nor in the 1921 AJHR report. It appears likely either that all her land was purchased and she had become a kore whenua, or that she had died and what shares she had not sold were passed on to her successors. As Figure 2 and Spreadsheet 1 have shown, Tiopira had many children by at least three different wives, the eldest of whom was Numia Kereru's wife Ngahirata Tiopira. He too had apparently either sold all his land rights or died and passed his unsold shares on to his children. We do know from Group Book F2 that at least three of his children - Rum age 30, Taahu age 28, and Tiki (apparently born after 1903) died and, apparently having no children of their own (who survived), passed all of their unsold shares on to their surviving siblings. What generalisations can be drawn from the preceding examination of a few generations of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage? Many died or lost many of their parents or children, probably often in the epidemic; most lost most of their land rights in the purchase campaign, but those who were able to retain rights often continued leading block rights of their parent or parents. On balance, the extent to which at least symbolic continuity of rights was maintained despite the purchase campaign, aggravated by war and pestilence, is surprising. In 1921 in the consolidation scheme, some furthermore proposed to locate their remaining shares on these probably selected ancestral lands. On the other hand, especially Pihitahi's case suggests that no stigma necessarily attached to the sale of one's ancestral land rights, even those representing the leading rights of one's parents or the aroha of one's in-laws. Finally, the retention of minute and apparently insignificant shares as a tuurangawaewae was itself a defiant form of resistance to the campaign, an ironic assertion of the indelible foundation of land rights in descent - and personally frustrating to Bowler and thus the Crown. It must also be kept in mind that it was in eastern Tuhoe or the TaurangaiWaimana basin where the Tamaikoha hapuu lineage held most shares, where the purchase campaign was most focused and sustained, that resistance was furthest eroded and by far the majority of land rights eventually lost. There, at least, to give in and sell one's Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 116 birthright was probably often accepted as a grim necessity. Bowler appears to have understood this, and pressed this solution (unsuccessfully) on Kahuwi. Maps 5 and 6 were probably drawn up by the Crown in the final years of the purchase campaign to show the proportion of shares purchased in each block. A glance at these maps makes it clear that losses were not so heavy outside the middle TaurangalWaimana basin, and that especially in western Tuhoe or the Whakatane basin (and Maungapohatu) retention of shares was more successful. As will be described in chapter three, the Crown was actually faced with more Tuhoe 'non-sellers' in 1921 than there were owners of the old blocks in 1903. Tamaikoha and his wives' prolific hapuu lineage did its share in this quiet little victory of numbers. Against the most overwhelming forces, then, many of their descendants lost heavily but emerged from the purchase campaign with honour, establishing a pattern which can be followed throughout the consolidation scheme. The concurrent struggle in Ruatahuna was similarly dramatic but on a more visible political scale. 1.4 An Ethnohistorical Case Study: Ruatahuna 1.4.1 The Ruatahuna Partition The case of the Ruatahuna partition and Tuhoe proposals for the development of their land between 1917 and 1919 clarifies the wider context of Crown operations and Tuhoe resistance during the later stages of the purchase campaign. Shares in the large Ruatahuna block figured prominently in successions, purchases, and retentions among Tamaikoha's descendants. Some retained their shares and in the consolidation proposed settling there. What was the situation of this block in terms of land rights and hapuu affiliations? Before focusing specifically on the Ruatahuna partition and Tuhoe development proposals, some aspects of the wider vicinity in which the Ruatahuna block was situated can be explored. There is some evidence of overlapping hapuu affiliations among the blocks of the vicinity. As described in the introductory chapter, the May- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 117 ~Kahui(2) UREWERA N. R. o 10km pi==='====;-, -----" 6 6miles Source: Drawn from Jan on Memorandum of Transfer 1913 Map 4: Ruatahuna Partitions 1913-1919 ~~::... ______::c-::;....-c:::'::-J_ 1,.- -_~__ ~_~ ___-_-_~_-_ ._--~~_-_-_~~~ ( i Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 118 October 1902 plan of the Urewera Commission intended to merge the Ruatahuna and Waikaremoana blocks in one order as a mega-block (#2), and the Ierenui-Ohaua, Kohuru-Tukuroa, and Te Ranga-a-Ruanuku blocks as another mega-block (#4) (Map 3). I suggested that although these mergers were abandoned by the commission in favour of the less inclusive blocks which had earlier been investigated and were finally ordered, they might have reflected hapuu clusters or overlapped hapuu rights in coherent ecological niches which were traditionally more cooperative with each other. Such clusters might have been less likely to pursue the objections which had persisted against the findings of the commissioners and thus the appeals which required the 1906 Urewera appeals commission to settle. In any case, the Ruatahuna partition between 1913 and 1919 was partly an upshot of dissatisfaction which was not settled in those appeals. The ambiguous pressures of the purchase campaign had also been mounting. Through late 1917, Herries' ostensive reasons for not opening Ruatahuna, Ierenui-Ohaua, and Kohuru-Tukuroa for Crown purchase were the 'cost of roading and opening up the land, as well as the unsuitability of these blocks for soldier settlement' .71 His reasons suggest some arbitrariness of policy, perhaps veiling other reasons such as coercion of Tuhoe to sell elsewhere while letting the demand to sell relatively cheaply build up among factions of Ruatahuna shareholders. By 1921 it was accepted among Crown officers that although the 'Ruatahuna Flats' were suitable for Pakeha settlement, there was 'no hope of securing' them, presumably due to resistance of some of its owners.72 Herries' explicit reasons would also have excluded from purchase the large adjacent Tarapounamu-Matawhero and Te Ranga-a-Ruanuku blocks, insofar as they were in fact predominantly rugged and inaccessible land. However, both of these blocks had earlier been opened up to the purchase campaign, probably because parts 71 Undersecretary Jordan wrote Bowler listing the following blocks as 'unpurchased' and relaying instructions from the Native Minister that additional blocks were not 'to be purchased into at present owing to the cost of roading and opening up the land, as well as the unsuitability of these blocks for soldier settlement': Ierenui Ohaua; Kohuru Tukuroa; Manuoha; Ohirangi [sic]; Pararakeke [sic]; Tapatahi; Tauwhare; Tawhiuau; Ruatahuna; Waikaremoana; Whaitiripapa (Jordan to Bowler, 25 September 1917, WDMLC c.f. 617. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 119 of the former overlapped with the commercial timber potential of Te Whaiti, and parts ofthe latter overlapped with Rua Kenana's sales areas in upper Tauranga basin, an opportunity to break down resistance to sales which had to be exploited even in relatively unfavourable lands. Other sectors of these blocks were actually of little interest to the Crown, and in the consolidation were allowed to be claimed by non selling kin groups closely affiliated with those claiming rights in Ierenui-Ohaua and Kohuru-Tukuroa blocks. Assuming Rerries was referring to Tuhoe as well as soldiers' settlement, his reluctance to open up these blocks because of 'the cost of roading and opening up the land' may also suggest some bad faith. The Crown had promised roads through these areas since Seddon's negotiation of the UDNR in 1895, and many Tuhoe with rights in Ruatahuna and these interior blocks had probably anticipated settling nearer the new roads, wherever they would be built. When this promise was renewed and specific road plans displayed in the 1921 consolidation scheme, many Tuhoe proposed that their groups and at least some of their remaining land shares be located nearer these future roads. Rerries' reasoning suggests that as early as 1917 he and perhaps others may not have been taking these promises seriously. Miles' and especially Bassett and Kays' reports have clarified the confusing developments of the Ruatahuna block during the Crown purchase campaign. The current Tuawhenua claim has further revealed a long history of grievances continuing even through the 1970s. The frequent opacity of the official record 1899 - 1925 derives in large part from rising hostility among some owners toward Crown motives, and Crown disregard or suppression of this hostility. The results are apparent in the petitions from Ruatahuna shareholders which had gathered momentum by the time of the consolidation scheme, and which have been examined by Campbell, Miles, Bassett, and Kay. 72 Knight to Undersecretary for Lands, 21 June 1921, MA 1 29/417A, P 2, and Campbell Supporting Documents Vol II: 147-149. ____ ..:_-__ -_-' __' __-_-C...::-" __- ___ ------,-,-,1 1;-_-_,_ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 120 The Apitihana or 'oppositionists' were the most striking case, but remain the most opaque because they persisted in their refusal to cooperate with the consolidation commissioners and, reciprocally, the commissioners were inclined to stereotype them. As will be shown in chapters six and nine, the commissioners sought systematically to 'weaken' the Apitihana movement in several ways. Binney's discovery and analysis of correspondence revealing a confrontation 1896-9 apparently between Tuhoe factions suggests earlier tensions which may be related. 73 She convincingly traces the schism and reunification of the factions reacting to the studied disregard of Crown officials, who even at this early date failed ominously to support the home-rule agreements of the Native Reserve. The determination with which Tuhoe regained their united front at that time is instructive. Twenty years later the Crown sought to portray the Apitihana as the recalcitrance of Ruatahuna factions while contrasting it to more cooperative owners in the lower Whakatane and Tauranga/Waimana basins. In fact, the forms which initiatives and resistance took in the two areas were often closely related, and contemporary Tuhoe recognise strong roots of the Apitihana in Ruatoki as well as Ruatahuna (stronger than in Ruatahuna, some Ruatoki Tuhoe would say!). Relying on a few primary sources to supplement Bassett, Kay, and Miles I will review the crucial period 1917-1919 when the purchase campaign, internal conflict, partition, and Tuhoe development plans all seemed to converge in the Ruatahuna block. Ruatahuna had been an important case before the Native Appellate Court hearings which ran 13 November 1912 to 15 February 1913 in Taneatua, the chief judge Jackson Palmer devoting several weeks to settling it. 74 Palmer's minutes and commentaries are often richer than most of the others in the series ofUrewera Minute Books. He frankly held the testimony of Numia Kereru in high esteem, and it was Kereru who largely determined the details of the Ruatahuna settlement, working 73 Binney, pp 222-235. 74 AREPRO 471111450,1451. ANZ Auckland. ..c'.:...:_-_'------___-_'-" ______---' - Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 121 tirelessly out of court session after session to find compromise solutions to stubbornly principled disagreements over boundaries and ownership rights (however, it is significant that other of Palmer's decisions went against Numia). Jackson Palmer had found in preliminary hearings that four of the Native Reserve blocks had become especially problematic because internal boundaries, tacitly agreed to limit hapuu rights by the first commission but not explicit in the final order, had been over-ridden when relative shares awarded to members of those hapuu were later assumed to extend equally throughout the entire block. 75 It was in the preliminary hearings that Numia described the original intention of the 1899-1902 Native Reserve Commissioners to establish five different blocks in the area which instead was finally ordered as the one large Ruatahuna block, and appealed to re-establish these internal boundaries. Tamaikoha's petition against the 1903 orders in Ruatahuna was one of the first official complaints to point out this problem. Against this, Jackson Palmer emphasised the guideline that 'hapuu boundaries are paramount over relative interest' insofar as demonstrated in appeals. Whereas this key problem had been 'put right' for the Ruatoki (1, 2 and 3) and Te Whaiti (1 and 2) blocks by Section 12 of 1911 Amendment Act, he felt it was left for his Urewera Appellate Court to do it for Taneatua and Ruatahuna blocks (Map 4). Bassett and Kay describe the Crown purchase campaign in the Ruatahuna block, attendant conflicts between those wanting to sell land shares and those resisting it, and the confused history of the Ruatahuna partition leading up to the consolidation scheme.76 There was some serendipity in this particular history. Ironically, the hard won 1913 orders had been mislaid in the NLC offices in Rotorua, so neither lists of owners nor a survey had ever been drawn up for the Ruatahuna partition. In 1917-8 when Judge Wilson of the Rotorua NLC sought to settle a conflict in the Ruatahuna block by way of partitioning, he was surprised and frustrated finally to find out that it 75 CJ Jackson-Palmer to ND, 9 October 1912, 8pp., MA 13/90 Special File 227, ANZ Wellington; Bassett and Kay also cite WDMLC c.f. 696. 76 Bassett and Kay, pp 102-121. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 122 had already been done only a few years earlier, no less than by the Chief Judge of the Native Appellate Court. It was not until he opened his court in Ruatahuna to arrange a partition that 'one Native drew my attention to the fact that the whole Block had already been partitioned at a sitting of the Appellate Court at Taneatua in 1913.'77 A search of the Appellate Court minutebooks which happened to be on hand confirmed this, but none of the orders including lists of owners and their shares in each partition could be found in the block file (which they probably had with them) nor (later) in the Waiariki NLC offices, so it was impossible to proceed with the partition. By early September 1918, however, the original orders were finally found 'in the Chief Judge's Office' ,78 and Wilson urged the Native Ministry to proceed with them as well as a survey. However, in December 1918 Herries was still considering applying to Council to have the partition cancelled, and recognised the 'danger of the values being increased if action' were not taken. 79 Strangely, Wilson's preliminary investigations since July 1917 had failed to reveal the 1913 partition, even though they included support and considerable correspondence with the Native Ministry (even advice from Solicitor-General Salmond), a visit and elaborate attempt to settle the matter by Wilson's selected representatives, and his final decision to resolve it by partition. His representatives were a (non-Tuhoe, probably East Coast) Maori court officer whom he felt would be less likely to arouse suspicion and who himself attempted a chiefly 'method of peacemaking', as well as a surveyor who even drew up a complete sketch plan and suggested putting the entire region in the hands of a Maori trustee who would negotiate sales to the Crown. The evidence presented by Bassett and Kay suggest that this preliminary investigation dealt directly with leading Ruatahuna Tuhoe. Nevertheless, the big surprise that the block had already been partitioned did not surface until Wilson himself set up his court in Ruatahuna in early February of 1918. 77 Judge T.H.Wilson to UsecyND, 16 February 1918, inMA-MLP 1, 10/28/11-38 (Box 85), and WDMLC c.f. 623. 78 Bassett and Kay 2001:125; apparently still in the office of the Native Appellate Court. 79 Ibid., P 127. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 123 It might be suggested that this oversight was due to the 1912-13 appeal having been heard in Taneatua at the other end of the Urewera rather than in Ruatahuna, but this possibility is unconvincing. Many of the leading owners of Ruatahuna block lived in Ruatoki near Taneatua. As shown by Binney and assumed by Tuhoe, regardless of the intervening terrain the relationships between Ruatoki and Ruatahuna had been intensive since earliest recorded times. Numia Kereru's careful negotiation of the 1913 partition among all leading parties with rights in the block would have insured that its results were well known in Ruatahuna only a few years later. Indeed, Ruatahuna leaders themselves produced a survey sketch plan, probably one drawn up for the 1913 partition, the day after Wilson opened his court in Rotorua and months before the official survey was finally carried out. 80 Numia himself had died in 1916 leaving Ruatahuna as well as Ruatoki leadership in some disarray, but unlikely to have been ignorant or naive regarding the status ofthe 1913 orders. Bassett and Kays' research strongly suggests that Wilson and his Maori representative and surveyor, as well as Native Minister Berries and Undersecretary Jordan, were focused more on a strategy to facilitate the purchase campaign in the Ruatahuna block than on the settlement of conflict or the partition there. Wilson's partition plan and perhaps the Native Ministry's interest in it even suggest that the conflicts were being exploited to precipitate sales (not an unusual Crown strategy with Maori land since the 1850s). Wilson's original plan was to 'cut out' only 1000 acres of the 57,823 acre block for the owners' homesteads and cultivations, leaving the balance more available to the Crown purchase campaign.8l If Bassett and Kays' suspicions of Ministry and NLC bias toward the purchase campaign are correct, the following argument between Wilson, the Native Department, and Chief Surveyor Skeets in Auckland strengthens their case. 80 Te Amo Kokouri and 16 others, 7 February 1918 petition, MA-MLP 1, 10/28 file 11 (Box 85). Unlike the sketch plan undertaken by Wilson's surveyor in the preliminary investigation, this plan outlines the five partitions established in 1912-13. The fmal survey plans ordered by Wilson in 1918 after discovery of the 1913 orders appear to be those kept in the LINZ Hamilton archives numbered MLC 11408 and 6852, dated 24 May 1919. Miles' information implies this was the result of only a compass survey for the purpose of the required re-evaluations (1999:405). Bassett and Kays' report lacks a copy of any of these plans. -----_._- -.-- -' '--.1 1:- ~_~ ______-C_-_'.-.-.--"'-' -" ___ ._- I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 124 Anticipating finalisation of his own plans for a partition of the block in February 1918, Wilson enlisted the assistance of another surveyor, H. Tai Mitchell, whose reputation for facilitating the alienation of Maori land as well as surveying it (another long-established strategy sometimes tolerated by the Crown) was taken seriously by Skeets. A few days before Wilson was to open his court in Ruatahuna, Skeets wrote to the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Lands in Wellington to advise him that ' ... as you are aware, Mr. Mitchell in addition to being a Surveyor is also a Native Agent extensively engaged in negotiation for the lease or transfer of Native Blocks to Europeans, and I have no doubt would take advantage of any opportunity that might offer to introduce land speculators into the Urewera Reserves ... '.82 The Lands undersecretary replied immediately (and directly to the Commissioner of Crown Lands), thanking Skeets but informing him that the Native Department undersecretary (Herries' assistant) considered it inadvisable to interfere with the employment of Mitchell by Wilson for the survey. Wilson went ahead despite the Chief Surveyor's doubts and appointed Mitchell as his assessor under the current Native Land Act, explaining that he was particularly anxious to have his services 'because of his intimate knowledge of the native language and customs, qualifications which seemed to me all important in these proceedings,.83 Although Mitchell was not employed in the survey of the 1913 partition which was carried out by early 1919, he apparently had support within the Ministry of Lands as well as the Native Ministry, as he was later to become the organising surveyor for the entire consolidation, working closely with commissioners Knight (himself a surveyor in the Ministry of Lands) and Carr (a registrar and later judge of the NLC). Mitchell was also a close confidant of Apirana Ngata. It is clear that he established some sort of rapport with the Tuhoe: I know that his work in the 81 Bassett and Kay, p 120. 82 Skeets to USLS, 4 February 1918, AADS AccW3562, Bundle 617, 22/6971910-18. This cannot be taken as evidence of Skeet's sympathy for the predicament of the Tuhoe: the following year he supported the delay of partitions and roads to avoid raising values and encourage Tuhoe to sell more of their shares at low prices, and even urged expropriation, although limited to 'areas where there is no settlement.' Cmsr Crown Lands Skeet to Usecy of Lands, 18 November 1919, WDMLC c.f.621. 83 Wilson to Jordan, 16 February 1918, WDMLC c.f.623 and AADS AccW3562, Bundle 617 22/697 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 125 UCS was still widely reputed among them in 1985, although I neglected to enquire what this reputation was with regard to loss or retention of their lands. It is also clear from Bassett and Kays' evidence that some Tuhoe factions were using cultivations and fencing to gain de facto control of as much of the block as possible, probably with a view to selling parts of it, and furthermore likely that Rua's land selling faction was involved in at least some of this maneuvering. One of Wilson's investigators had concluded that 'the root of the present trouble' was a confrontation between followers of Rua in the Ruatahuna block and those who resisted them. 84 I will argue below that Herries' opening up of the interior blocks was in response to Rua's urging this to Bowler, and Rua was forthright in his probably frequent public claim of credit for prompting Tuhoe sales to the Crown. There was clearly a lot more to the confrontation than the conflict over a fence which had preoccupied the NLC and other Rotorua tribunals since 1916. One might suspect that Judge Wilson's investigation and support by the Native Ministry, already biased toward the purchase campaign, had been naively taken in by such a Ruatahuna faction which hoped to ignore the previous partition and increase their control over more land for the sake of future sales. Subsequent events suggest that other Tuhoe leaders in Ruatahuna who were disdainful of this Tuhoe opportunism and aware of Crown cupidity would not demean themselves to blow the whistle on it until the Judge himself had opened his court for them - at which time all it would take was the quiet announcement from one of them ofthe 1913 partition. (This patu or sudden display of mana probably would have been Numia Kereru's way of handling the affront, especially if Rua Kenana were behind it). The inclusion of the sketch plan of the five 1913 partitions in Te Arno Kokouri's petition, dated 7 February 1918 the day after Wilson opened his court in Ruatahuna, appears to clinch the evidence for this pre-emptive sort of Tuhoe strategy.85 Map 4 of 1910-18. 84 Bassett and Kay, p 104. 85 Te Amo Kokouri and 16 others, 7 February 1918 petition MA-MLP 1, 10/28 file 11 (Box 85). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 126 the Ruatahuna partition is probably the plan that was finally surveyed in accord with the 1913 order and this sketch plan. It may furthermore be significant that this petition was addressed directly to Native Minister Herries, and asked that the NLC partition the block into 'sub-tribal [i.e., hapuu] subdivisions in a sitting at Ruatahuna'. Although it did not mention the 1913 partition, its basis had also been hapuu subdivisions, whereas Wilson's alternative plan probably avoided any such reinforcement of hapuu solidarity. Wilson's own account of his dilemma on 16 February 1918 suggested only that 'the Natives should be allowed to cut out their holdings,' that is, for permission to proceed with his own (and, presumably, the Native Ministry's) partition plan in default of the misplaced 1913 orders, cutting out a thousand acres for residents and leaving conflicts between hapuu over by far the lion's share of the block to promote Crown purchases. It may be that Te Amo Kokouri and the other Tuhoe leaders sensed this ominous possibility, and sought to back up their pre-emptive strategy through their petition to Herries, perhaps crucially accompanied by the 1913 sketch plan showing they had hard evidence of five partitions recognising different hapuu rights. However, by early September the discovery of Chief Judge Jackson Palmer's 1913 orders began to force the situation in their favour. 1.4.1(a) The Partition and the Purchase Campaign Bassett and Kay as well as Miles describe how Bowler had long been pressing the Native Ministry to extend the purchase campaign into the southern blocks including Ruatahuna. Bowler also counseled the Undersecretary to retract previous permission for the NLC to accept partition applications from Urewera block owners. He reasoned that such partitioning would increase values as well as complicate buying, and encourage some owners to retain their land (for instance, the 1913 partitions of Ruatahuna might do this through strengthening hapuu control of different sectors of the block). Bassett and Kay report his opposition in 1917 to Wilson's plan to partition the Ruatahuna block. Insofar as this plan too would probably avoid strengthening hapuu solidarity, one might suppose that Bowler saw it as infringing on his own "------_._-- --_._ ...--- --," Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 127 control of the purchase campaign. Bowler also counseled the Undersecretary to ignore the 1913 partition orders when they resurfaced in 1918, reasoning that it had already been overlooked for several years.86 Judge Wilson's subsequent order to have the 1913 partitions surveyed was a set-back to Bowler's purchase strategy, forcing Herries by early 1919 to cooperate with a new valuation of the partitions. Since January 1918 Bowler had been instructed to pursue purchases of the block at the pre-war valuation of six shillings per acre, and he was again instructed to do so 20 July 1918 at the same time that he was advised new valuations would be necessary. 87 The apparent implication was that some partition, preferably Wilson's, would eventually require values to be brought up to date, and to purchase as many shares as possible before then. The Native Ministry was able to delay this for several more months. It appears that by December 1918 Wilson finally went behind Herries' back to urge the Commissioner of Crown lands to authorise a survey of the 1913 orders. 88 Wilson may also have gone through a change of heart, arguing that like his earlier plan (which probably ignored the different hapuu rights recognised in the 1913 order) the 1913 partition would also encourage sales 'while at the same time preserving the interests of those persons who are occupying and making good use of the land.' Bassett and Kay point out that this direct approach to the Department of Lands and Survey revealed their common interest with the Native Ministry in supporting the purchase campaign, but one could add to this that Wilson's circumvention of his own superior Herries indicated his frustration with Herries' support of Bowler's perhaps less sympathetic plan. There is also the possibility that Wilson's sympathy was misplaced among hoko whenua whose fencing and professed intentions to farm had fooled him and his assistants, as well as hidden the existence of the 1913 partition. 86 Miles, p 405; Bassett and Kay, p 123. 87 Jordan to Bowler, 20 July 1918, MA-MLP 1, 1O/28/file 16 (Box 85). 88 Bassett and Kay, p 126. -- - --' - "------" ~-~-->--.:.---.:. --- - - . --- r I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 128 In early September Bowler, on his way to press the purchase campaign in Ruatahuna, stopped in Rotorua and was shown the newfound 1913 partition orders. 89 He pointedly reported that they listed over 2100 owners, although many individuals owned shares in more that one partition. The 1907 order for the whole block had been for 966 owners, indicating that the five partitions had an average overlap of about half its shareholders in other partitions, reduplicating what had been Bowler's biggest headache throughout his purchase campaign. From this point of view, it is understandable that he would continue to urge the Native Ministry to ignore the 1913 partition. Herries' July urging to press on with purchases in Ruatahuna had probably been prompted by offers from Rua Kenana and his followers to sell their shares in Ruatahuna as well as Ierenui-Ohaua and other interior blocks, and soon Bowler was able to report more fully on this promising situation. On 14 August he pointed out that although many of the Ruatahuna owners lived in the block, many others were absentee (i.e., non-resident) owners of that and also the Waikaremoana block and would be anxious to sell their shares. 9o A few days later he wrote Jordan to say that Rua was waiting to sell in Ierenui-Ohaua, Ohiorangi and Tauwhare, Kohuru-Tukuroa, and Waikaremoana as well as Ruatahuna, emphasising that Rua's mana remained strong despite his imprisonment. 91 (As had been the case since Rua's rise to influence, the implication was that Rua's followers as well as Rua himself were ready to sell their shares in those blocks). Bowler also urged that all remaining Urewera blocks be opened up to purchasing before more succession orders further delayed and 'confused' the shareholding situation. In his reply to Bowler's 18 August 1918 report, Herries told the undersecretary to open up purchases in all these blocks except Waikaremoana, which was of low value 'and would open up the question of ownership ofthe lake.' 89 Bassett and Kay, p 125; Miles, p 404. 90 Bowler to Jordan, 14 August 1918, MA-MLP 1, 10128 file 11 (Box 85). 91 Bowler to Undersecretary, 18 August 1918, MA-MLP 1, 10128 file 16 (box 85). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 129 It is likely that Bowler's warning on 18 August 1918 about more successions meant that the Urewera was in the midst of the global influenza epidemic by this time. Later that year in December 1918, again probably referring to this epidemic, Bowler expressed his desire to press on with the purchase ofRuatahuna 'if health Department restrictions' did not operate in the area.92 In October 1919 he reported 'I consider that the influenza epidemic put operations back quite a year. I had to lodge something like 1,000 applications for succession' .93 The flurry of activity indicated by Herries' 18 August 1918 response to open up most of the remaining interior blocks may have been precipitated by the opportunity offered by Rua and his hoko whenua followers, and also by the appearance of the 1913 partition orders and the consequent necessity of a survey and new valuations. In December 1918 the Government was considering applying to have the partition cancelled and recognised the 'danger of the values being increased if action' was not taken. However, the prospect of a flood of succession orders following the epidemic may also have been an important factor. In any case, except for its result in more successions, the epidemic appears to have been treated indifferently by Herries as well as Bowler, if not explicitly taken as an opportunity for the purchase campaign. Miles carefully follows the central role of valuations and survey charges in the purchase campaign. She reproduces Bowler's reports for September 1919 and April 1920, suggesting that purchases in the Ruatahuna blocks proceeded briskly regardless of the potential impediment of the 1913 partition.94 The overdue re-valuations had raised the price of partitions 1 and 2 from 6 to 15-20 shillings per acre, but the price of partitions 3, 4, and 5 remained about the same at 4-7 shillings per acre (refer to Map 4). The increased value of some partitions and the cost of the surveys may have been factors in these sales, but Bowler's exploitation of non-resident owners and the tactics of resident hoko whenua would have been the key factor. By April 1920, his reports indicated that he had managed to purchase about 44 percent each of 92 Bassett and Kay, p 127. 93 Bowler to Jordan, 11 October 1919, AADS AccW3562 bundle 617A 22/697, Box 274 1919-1922; Miles, p 408. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 130 Ruatahuna partitions 1 and 2 and roughly 17-23 percent each of Ruatahuna partitions 3, 4 and 5. However, figures compiled from Bowler's own records in July 1921 for the consolidation scheme indicate purchase of only 18-19 percent each in partitions 1 and 2, and range from 23-40 percent in each of partitions 3, 4 and 5. 95 As Bassett and Kay point out, 'there were still substantial numbers of Ruatahuna owners who would not sell to the Crown' (there were over 1800 'non-sellers' - i.e., unsold shareholdings - of the 2100 reported by Bowler in 1918), and 'sales had been more forthcoming from the less valuable blocks. ' Further implications of these ambiguous figures can be derived through examination of the purchase deeds, complete copies of which are furnished by Bassett and Kay.96 For instance, the number of persons among the original 866 or their successors who retained unsold shareholdings can be determined, and in which partitions and thus, perhaps, which hapuu. Although a study of the earlier minutebooks is needed, in 1923 the Ruatahuna leader Te Amo Kokouri - speaking for the Apitihana or the oppositionists' movement - confronted the consolidation commissioners with a declaration stating which of the five partitions belonged to which of seven hapuu, as well as where each hapuu was primarily 10cated.97 1.4.2 Ahuwhenua Proposals and the Roots of the Apitihana Movement I would like also to pursue an insight by Miles that in the face of the purchase campaign some pupuri whenua were attempting to reserve the 'Ruatahuna block, as well as Ruatoki and Waikaremoana lands ... for either occupation or agriculture', but that the Government was unsupportive of these initiatives if not actively obstructive.98 I recognise in the 1917-18 correspondence a theme which had emerged by 1908 in Numia Kereru's efforts to placate the Stout-Ngata Commission's demand for the sale or lease of 'idle' Urewera lands. 99 Numia had begun ambiguously to offer 94 Miles, p 408. 95 Bassett and Kay, p 133. 96 Supp.Pap. III: 180-290, MA W2150 box 14 files 19-23. 97 Urewera Consolidation minutebook 2A, p 1. 98 Miles, p 407; also see pp 390-1. 99 Webster 1984-5, p 18. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 131 to tuku (usually translated as 'gift', translated from the letters as 'cede') limited areas of land for ahuwhenua or agricultural development (Ngata's move to break Numia's control of the UDNR General Committee in 1910 probably came when it finally became clear to him that by 'tuku' Numia meant only to lease, and only on 21 year terms). Miles does not pursue the implications of Tuhoe ahuwhenua plans in 1917-18, but does emphasise how these initiatives reflected the repeated refusal of the Crown to clarify the ambiguous status of the UDNR General Committee and its provisional block committees. Along with the politically loaded issue of 'idle' Maori land and ahuwhenua schemes, the innovation of Native land incorporations had been of wide interest since the 1890s criticisms of the Native Land Court's adverse affect on Maori leadership and kin groups. By the time of Herries' purchase campaigns Native Land Incorporations had already been established on the East Coast through Ngata's effort. In March 1917 a Tuhoe initiative to defend their lands in the face of the purchase campaign in the Ruatoki block explicitly proposed a land incorporation of Ruatoki partitions 2 and 3.100 Later on 2 May 1917 Undersecretary Jordan instructed Bowler that in view of the purchase policy at Ruatoki, any applications for incorporation of owners at Ruatoki were to be 'strongly opposed', and Miles points out that this direction followed the Tuhoe's proposal of such an incorporation. At the other end of the Ureweras the following year, between August and October 1918 during the confrontation between Crown purchase plans and the discovery of the 1913 partition orders (probably early September), several other initiatives raised similar Tuhoe ahuwhenua plans. Probably sometime in August 1918 Wai Ihimaera and 16 others petitioned Herries to not allow the Waikaremoana and Ruatahuna blocks (specifying Huiarau or Ruatahuna partition 3) to be purchased 'as these lands are being reserved for other purposes' .101 I can add that 'Wai' was almost certainly Te Wao Ihimaera, not a holder of widespread rights in other Urewera blocks but an elder 100 Miles, pp 390-1; Akuhata te Kaha and nine others to Herries, 10 March 1917, MA-MLP1, 1910/28/10. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 132 of mana in Waikaremoana and probably more in Ruatahuna (where far fewer rights holders were granted 20 shares). In 1902 it was probably he (misspelled as Te 'Mao' Ihimaera) who had been appointed by the Native Reserve commission to the Ruatahuna-Waikaremoana block committee along with six others. In 1921 Te Wao's consolidation group intended to settle in Ruatahuna 5 (rather than 3) and Te Ranga a Ruanuku, perhaps because their rights in Waikaremoana had been pre-empted by the Crown. It is probably significant that in the August petition Waikaremoana had been named before the Ruatahuna block, and Te Wao's consolidation group may have otherwise intended to settle there. That the two blocks were named in conjunction is not surprising, as there were relatively close relations and there was much overlapping land rights between the two blocks. (The same was true of Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana, and the Crown's pre-emption of both blocks was thus probably hard on many families; Ruatahuna was to take the brunt of both evacuations). Te Wao was probably among the leaders of Te Urewera and Tuhoe (Potiki) hapuu, which were largely overlapped in membership and recognised by the Native Reserve Commission as holding strong rights to Ruatahuna and Waikaremoana, respectively. It is significant that his petition specified a Ruatahuna partition by traditional name as well as number: although the partition orders were not found until late August or early September, these details had been available on the sketch plan sent to Herries in the 7 February 1918 petition led by Te Amo Kokouri. Te Wao may have been part of or privy to this Tuhoe coup. The 'other purposes' to which Te Wao Ihimaera and 16 others were referring was clarified in another petition written in Waikaremoana. About a month later in September 1918, Rawaho Winitana headed an unusually comprehensive petition with 99 others to Herries, asking that the Waikaremoana, Ruatahuna, and Ruatoki 1, 2 and 3 blocks not be purchased; 'portions of this Ruatahuna Block have been improved 101 Miles, p 407. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 133 and sheep and cattle depastured on them. Weare agreed that this land should be conducted as a farm' .102 The last phrase echoes the 1917 petition proposing a 'land incorporation' for Ruatoki 2 and 3. Although the latter phrase is not used - perhaps intentionally - it appears that the drafting of this petition, if not Te Wao's, was influenced by the earlier one from Ruatoki explicitly proposing a land incorporation. The Waikaremoana petitioners appear to have been negotiating rather than pleading insofar as they pointed out that 'purchase has been going on in all of the other blocks in the Urewera Country' and offered agreement to that purchasing in return for not opening Waikaremoana, Ruatahuna, and Ruatoki 1, 2 and 3 to the purchase campaign. Furthermore, as Miles emphasises, they ask in view of the inactivity of the Tuhoe General Committee because of Numia Kereru's death, that Herries 're-appoint this committee to administer the Urewera Reserves Act in connection with' the three blocks to be conducted as Tuhoe farms. As Miles remarked with regard to the Ruatoki proposal, incorporation would not be needed if the General Committee and its block committees were working as agreed in the UDNR Act; the Winitana petition appeared to be seeking the same goal as the Ruatoki proposal but extending it more widely, and tactfully pointing this irony out. On the other hand, Herries had probably 'strongly opposed' incorporations for the same reasons he studiedly ignored the General Committee. It may be instructive to follow Rawaho Te Winitana's own situation. He was probably in his 40s in 1918. He was the second-born of six siblings whose strongest block rights in Waikaremoana appear to be through their mother Te Heru te Waaka, who in 1903 held 20 shares in that block. Their secondary rights were through their father Te Winitana Poututu, who in 1903 held 10 shares in Ruatahuna block (but 20 were rarely awarded there). His predecessors did not have widespread rights through \02 Rawaho Winitana and 99 others to Herries NM, 23 September 1918, MA-MLP 1, 10/28/11 (Box 85) and Miles, p 407. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 134 the Urewera blocks, and apparently none in the Ruatoki block, perhaps indicating that his support of incorporation there reflected a political alliance. The immediate future of Rawaho's own family in the UCS is obscure. His parents had probably died and passed their shares onto their children. All the shares of his two youngest siblings, who would have been in their mid-30s in 1921, had either been purchased or succeeded to in death. By the time of the consolidation he and his older sister and younger brother and sister appear to have retained most of their shares and decided to locate all of them in the 'Urewera Reserves Residue' along with 165 other Tuhoe. 103 I will discuss the role of these reserves in chapter three, but O'Malley's research has shown that the Crown gave them little choice but eventually to sell out. In March 1923 Rawaho' s younger brother Waipatu reported his death the previous year to the commissioners, and arranged for succession to his land shares by his two sons Whare and Taki Winitana. 104 No information was found on what happened to them, so it is likely that they eventually accepted the Crown's debentures in payment for their land rights, and were left landless in the Urewera. To have fallen from leading signatory of this impressive petition to such a bleak fate in four years was a tragic loss of Rawaho's leadership potential, at least. 1.4.2(a) The Petition ofTe Amo Kokouri and 121 others About three weeks later another large petition with striking similarities to the one from Waikaremoana was sent to Herries by Te Amo Kokouri and 121 others, probably mainly from persons living in Ruatahuna and the interior blocks of the upper Whakatane basin. 105 Again, this petition strikes a negotiating tone, is concerned explicitly with the same three blocks, agrees to the purchasing campaign in other blocks, asks that the General Committee and Provisional Committees be restored to administer farming on the reserved blocks, and (like the Waikaremoana petition but unlike the rejected 1917 Ruatoki petition) does not mention land incorporations as 103 AJHR G-7 1921 P 12,33-4,8 (#11); not to be confused with the Waikaremoana Reserves A-L, which are overlooked in the schedule at p 12 but listed pp 37-9. 104 UCMB 1, P 288. 105 Te Amo Kokouri and 121 others to Native Minister, 16 October 1918, MA-MLP 1, 10128 file 11 (Box 85); mentioned by Miles, p 407 and Bassett and Kay, p 126. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 135 such. However, rather than including Waikarewhenua in their ahuwhenua plans, these petitioners begin by instead urging 'That the Waikaremoana Block be allowed to be purchased. We consider that this land [is being] withheld from sale[s] upon which we could live' while they are fulfilling the provisions of the 1896 Act to farm the land with sheep and cattle and other stock 'to assist the Freezing Works at Whakatane. Wherefore, our desire is that these two blocks [Ruatahuna and Ruatoki 1,2 and 3] be set aside for farming by us. ' These petitioners appear to have decided to sacrifice the Waikarewhenua block (and, implicitly, Rawaho te Winitana and others' plans for ahuwhenua there) for the sake of having sufficient resources to develop their farms in Ruatahuna and Ruatoki. This proposed compromise mayor may not have been a bitter one for many of the 122 signatories. Tuhoe may have known what the Crown was only later to realise: the agricultural potential of Waikaremoana was even more limited than Ruatahuna and Ruatoki. In any case, the decision may help to explain the unanticipated rapidity with which Tuhoe meeting in Ruatoki two years later, in August 1921, to arrange the consolidation scheme agreed to sell almost half the total shares in Waikaremoana block. The move left many residents and pupuri whenua in that block in a difficult position which the Crown was quick to exploit. In view of the explicit reason given by the petitioners for selling Waikaremoana, Herries' response through his under-secretary appeared obtuse: Reply that their letter will have due consideration but that even if a block is under purchase it does not compel anyone to sell it is open for anyone who wants to keep his land for farming to refuse to sell but it would be hard to block those who wish to sell from disposing of their interests It is not proposed to touch the Waikaremoana blocks at present. W.T.H 12/5/19 [handwritten on underside comer of the translated petition]. Miles remarks that Herries' 'stock answer to these kinds of objections was to point out that owners were not compelled to sell their land,' but for him to add to this last sentence, in the face of the petitioners' explicit statement that they needed to be able to sell their Waikaremoana shares in order to pay for their Ruatahuna and Ruatoki Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 136 farms, might have sounded like a taunt to the petitioners. There also appears to have been an extraordinary delay between the drafting of the petition and its receipt in the Native Department (although the original is dated 16 October 1918 it is stamped as received 7 May 1919 and the translation is stamped as received 12 May 1919, the same day Herries wrote his reply). Te Amo Kokouri had also led the 7 February 1918 petition which I suggested pre empted Wilson's plans for partition of Ruatahuna by urging a partition recognising various hapuu rights and enclosing a sketch plan of five such partitions from the 1913 Court of Appeal case. He was accompanied in this petition by 16 others, including Hurae Puketapu, a commissioner on the Native Reserve Commission representing the Waikaremoana area and Tukuaterangi Tutakangahau, another commissioner who had represented the upper Tauranga basin, Maungapohatu, and Ruatahuna, Hiraka Paora, an original (October 1902) member of the UDNR Ruatahuna-Waikaremoana block committee, and Akuhata Paraki, son of another original (May 1902) member of that committee. Later that year in November, only a month after the petition of 122 persons which he had led proposing ahuwhenua incorporations for Ruatahuna and Ruatoki, Te Amo Kokouri with several others wrote two more petitions to Herries in the explicit capacity of chairman of the Native Reserve block committee they had earlier asked Herries to restore, asking that he grant an enquiry under specific sections of the amending Act 1909 to settle a fencing conflict amicably, and jurisdiction of the NLC if they were unsuccessful. 106 These later petitions followed so closely on the October one proposing the ahuwhenua incorporations that they appear to raise the stakes, and may have already anticipated not receiving a timely and supportive reply. 1.4.2(b) A Coordinated Effort So we have partial records of four petitions proposing development or ahuwhenua, beginning with the March 1917 petition from Ruatoki and followed by three in 106 Te Amo Kokouri and six others to Herries, 21 November 1918 MA-MLP 1, 10128 file 11 (Box 85); also Miles, p 407 and fn.197. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 137 succession (the last two of which were heavily supported) the next year III Waikaremoana and Ruatahuna. The case is strengthened that this series was not random but instead a coordinated initiative on the part of Tuhoe living in these widespread areas. It can be argued that it was an agreed strategy to hold the Urewera purchase campaign at bay, as well as establish the more long-term defenses of ahuwhenua against an increasingly predatory Crown policy toward Maori land nationally. The Ruatoki initiative in 1917 responded to the threat of the purchase campaign there. It was led by Akuhata te Kaha, a close ally of Numia Kereru, the year after the latter's death. After the Ruatoki initiative there was a delay, but the extension of the purchase campaign into the interior forced new initiatives, this time carefully avoiding the mention of Maori land incorporation which had apparently provoked Herries' explicit rejection. Later the following year two petitions favouring ahuwhenua in Waikaremoana as well as Ruatahuna and Ruatoki took the lead. Finally a Ruatahuna-Ruatoki axis took shape, agreeing to sacrifice their support of ahuwhenua in Waikaremoana. The mention in Te Amo Kokouri's ahuwhenua proposal for Ruatahuna of assisting 'the Freezing Works in Whakatane' through cattle raising, as well as the explicit support of ahuwhenua in Ruatoki, implies an alliance between Ruatahuna and Ruatoki petitioners. Indeed, many of the signatories in each petition held land rights in the other block (as well as in Waikaremoana), and some may have resided in the other block. Although the signatories of the four petitions are mostly different, many were affiliated with just a few hapuu Gudging their affiliation primarily by hapuu recognised in 1902 to have mana over the blocks in which a signatory held most prominent rights). The 1917 petition from Ruatoki was explicitly from Mahurehure hapuu and led by Akuhata Te Kaha, one of its kaumatua. Signatories were also strongly affiliated with Ngati Rongo and Te Urewera hapuu. Mahurehure hapuu was largely overlapped in membership with Ngati Rongo, and often represented by Akuhata and Numia Kereru, respectively. Many hapuu were represented in Te Amo Kokouri's petition but most strongly Ngati Rongo, Ngati Koura (or Ngati Muriwai), Patuheuheu, Te Urewera, and Mahurehure (approximately in this order of frequency). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 138 Te Amo himself was probably most strongly affiliated with Te Urewera and Ngati Koura or Ngati Muriwai hapuu (as well as the Whakataane hapuu of Tauranga basin), and his rights in Ruatahuna block were probably through Te Urewera hapuu. Te Urewera had apparently been called Tuhoe or Tuhoe Potiki in 1896 under the mana of Te Whenuanui II, but by the time of the commission in 1902 had come to be known either as Tuhoe (whose mana over Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana was recognised by the Tuhoe commissioners of that time) or Te Urewera (whose mana over Ruatahuna, Taneatua, Parekohe, and Whaitiripapa was recognised). Te Urewera and Ngati Rongo hapuu are closely related; the fonner was probably Numia Kereru's main source of mana in the 1912-13 partitioning of Ruatahuna block. I will furthennore argue that there was a clear continuity between the frustrated ahuwhenua initiatives of 1917-18 and the Apitihana, the concerted opposition movement which confronted the commissioners throughout their efforts. The two whaikoorero or spokespersons of this movement were Wharepouri Te Amo, Te Amo Kokouri's son, and Pomare or Pineere Hori (also known as Mata Pineere Hori and Pineere Horiwhararangi). Wharepouri probably had the most mana, at least through his father but also his mother. In the confrontation with the consolidation commissioners the old man Te Amo continued occasionally to speak for his son. Again, it may be instructive to outline here the families of these two men and their leading land and hapuu rights, so far as I have been able to trace them. Wharepouri's father Te Amo Kokouri was probably in his 70s by 1921, and had only one sibling, a younger sister Parani Kokouri (who held significantly fewer land rights, and thus may have been of a different parent or adopted). I have not identified their parents, but in three of the blocks in which Te Amo Kokouri held prominent rights, he is placed close in the list to the offspring of Te Whenuanui II (the leading chief of Tuhoe Potiki/Te UreweralTuhoe in 1896), and is thus probably their close cousin. Te Amo's own strongest land rights were in Tarapounamu-Matawhero (probably Ngati Tawhaki hapuu), Whaitiripapa (Te Urewera hapuu), and Ruatoki South (Ngati Muriwai or Ngati Koura hapuu). He also had strong rights in Te Purenga (also Ngati Koura Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 139 hapuu), where he and his sister appeared 3-4th in a list of 297, although he had been granted only 15 shares (there were very few granted 20 shares, but his sister was one of them, perhaps indicating both her parents had leading rights there). Interestingly, Te Amo Kokouri held lesser rights in Waikaremoana and Te Whaiti (10 shares each), and still less in Ruatahuna itself (5 shares). However, it is clear the Te Amo had mana in Ruatahuna: his gentle defiance of the consolidation commissioners in 1923 followed a whaikoorero (address) in which he spoke for each of the hapuu of the vicinity, identifying their dominant rights in Ruatahuna and Tarapounamu Matawhero blocks. 107 Because he led off with Ngati Rongo and Tuhoe, these were probably his own primary affiliations. Te Amo Kokouri's wife and Wharepouri's mother, Pum Tamehana, was also a woman of considerable mana. Pum also held strong rights in Ruatoki South and Te Purenga as well as Kohuru-Tukuroa and Tapatahi, and augmented Wharepouri's eventual rights to Ruatahuna with her lesser rights there (5 shares). Wharepouri Te Amo, probably in his 50s by 1921 and father of four children between 19 and 30 years old, already had rights in all these hapuu and their several blocks from both his father and mother awarded in 1902 and, as an only child, stood to inherit all of their own shares as well. As will be described later, the consolidation groups which he led were still big landholders. His wife, Whitiara Hauraki, was probably formerly the wife ofPouwhare Te Roau, a Ngati Rongo leader of Ruatoki who by 1918 had taken over Numia Kereru's role as an influential kaikoorero defending Tuhoe interests against the Crown. It is another question whether this weakened or strengthened the Ruatahuna - Ruatoki alliance at this time. The source of Pomare or Pineere Hori's mana to be a leader in the Apitihana is less obvious, and indeed I have not been able to learn much about him. His probable father, Hori Te Mataa, and his father's younger sister Hana Te Mataa were living in 1902, and Pineere and his younger sister Ngaaikiha Hori are also listed in 1902 107 Urewera Consolidation minute book 2A, Carr, Knight, (27 April 1923 - 18 December 1926), p 2. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 140 without their age noted, indicating they were both over 18 years old at that time. This only suggests that Pineere was between, say, 38 and 55 years old in 1921. I have not been able to identify Rori Te Mataa's ancestry nor his wife, Pineere's mother, from Best's whakapapa. I have also been unable to identify with assurance Pineere's wife or any children (but I suspect his wife was Putiputi Paparatu). Judging from proximity and shares in the Waikaremoana block list from 1903, Pineere's mother is likely to be Reriata Apihaka or one of her two sisters, identified as 'half-caste' but nevertheless each holding 20 shares to the block (,half-caste' children usually shared in no hapuu or land rights through their Pakeha parent, so this may indicate that the Apihaka sisters' father had been given rights through aroha). Pineere's strongest rights among the Urewera blocks were in Waikaremoana block (10 shares) probably in virtue of his mother, his only other rights being Ruatahuna (5 shares) and Taneatua (1 share). Ris rights to Ruatahuna were apparently through his father Rori Mataa, who held 10 shares in that block, as well as one share in Taneatua block. Pineere's hapuu rights are similarly obscure, although it may be supposed from his Waikaremoana block rights that they are Tuhoe (unless he was Ngati Ruapani, which seems unlikely) and thus likely to be Te Urewera among the several hapuu whose rights to Ruatahuna were recognised in 1902. Ris and his father's small rights to Taneatua block may confirm this; Te Urewera (but also Ngati Ruatahuna) are among the seven hapuu whose rights over Taneatua block were recognised in 1902. I will return to examination of these two leaders' roles in the Apitihana and in confrontations with the consolidation commission in chapters six and nine. 1.5 Summary In this first chapter, after introducing the Crown purchase campaign and explaining my source materials, two ethnohistorical case studies have been presented to illustrate in some detail two different levels of Tuhoe social interaction with the purchasing campaign in population centres at opposite ends of the Urewera. The first case history Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 141 was of a specific hapuu lineage, a lineal segment of a hapuu which was selected as both an influential and a prolific one, extending over four generations of some large sibling groups and several important marriages which were political alliances, centred in the intermediate Tauranga basin. The Tamaikoha hapuu lineage controlled many shares in many blocks under the Native Reserve, but lost most of them in the purchase campaign. Where in the Urewera and through which parent these land rights were held was traced through the first two generations, and the patterns of their retention and then their proposed locations in the consolidation were laid out, especially in the second generation of descendants. More details for the younger generations are furnished in Spreadsheet 1. Although the details adduced are subj ect to disagreement or refutation from Tuhoe oral history, the overall consistency of this extended case history of kinship and land rights displayed, I hope, the depth and reliability of the work of the Tuhoe commissioners 1899-1903. Nga mahi a nga tupuna ka tuu atu anoo. The second illustration focused instead on the social organisation of Tuhoe leadership centred in Ruatahuna in confrontation with the wider strategy of the purchase campaign in 1917-19. The first part of this illustration analysed their successful abortion of a partition plan which was probably intended to facilitate the Crown's campaign, instead forcing through a previous partition order that had been worked out between Tuhoe leaders but mislaid in the courts. The second part examined the participation of these same leaders in coordination with leaders in Ruatoki and Waikaremoana in the proposal of land incorporation or development schemes of these three blocks which would also protect them from the purchase campaign. I suggest that the Native Minister's disregard of the proposals reflected his true intentions for the Urewera, as well as provoking the rise of the Apitihana movement which was to dog the consolidation commission. As I pointed out at the end of the first case history, although Tuhoe loses were heavy in the Crown purchase campaign, a pattern of Tuhoe initiatives in resistance or defiance was set which would carry them through these continuing raupatu with honour. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 142 The following chapter two returns primarily to the Crown's side of the campaign to analyse the organisation of Crown purchasing. However, I understand this partly in terms of the different forms of Tuhoe resistance which the campaign confronted but never completely overcame. I argue that it was the Crown's predicament of extensive but nowhere complete purchases, on unsure legal footing of individual undivided shares held uncomfortably in common with Tuhoe, located nowhere in particular in blocks which remained technically unsurveyed, which forced it to press through the consolidation scheme in 1921. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 143 2. The Purchasing Strategy and Tuhoe Resistance 2.1 The Crown's Purchasing Strategy 2.1.1 'Why did Tuhoe sell (so much) Land?' 2.2. Bowler's Network of Purchasing Venues and Agents 2.2.1 Culture Brokers, Willing and Unwilling 2.3 Identifying Individual Shares and Publishing Lists of Non-sellers 2.3.1 Compiling a List of Non-sellers 2.3.2 The Mobile Card Index 2.3.3 A 1919 List of Non-sellers 2.3.4 Hoko Whenua and Pupuri Whenua 2.3.5 Tuhoe responses 2.4 Successions, Trustees and Certification of Age 2.4.1 Bringing Tuhoe Minors and Recent Adults under the 1909 Act 2.4.2 Tuhoe Trustees 2.4.3 The Role ofthe Public Trustee 2.4.4 Getting on top of Successions 2.4.5 Certifying Tuhoe Competent to Sell 2.5 The Relative Predicaments ofthe Crown and Tuhoe 2.1 The Crown's Purchasing Strategy In examining the way the purchase campaign was organised - and had to be organised to confront resistance in Tuhoe social organisation as well as individuals - several aspects of the campaign which have not been pursued in other reports for the Urewera claim can be taken up. The latter include Bowler's venues and networks for purchasing; the problem of identifying individual undivided shares; the implications of the Crown's emphasis upon pupuri whenua and hoko whenua; and purchase practices bearing on successions, trustees, and certification of adulthood. I will follow out these aspects of the campaign because they display the institutional matrix of Crown power which the Tuhoe found arrayed against them. As will be explained, the Crown's purchase of Maori land was based upon decades of experience. This experience was deployed as a strategy by just one Crown officer, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 144 usually working alone in the context of many Maori, sometimes even in venues which these Maori controlled. Thus the over-ridding power which had been mobilised under the authority of the Crown was largely invisible or ambiguous, revealed in its omnipresence wherever Tuhoe might go, and its persistence over many years. Given the asymmetry of power between the Crown and the Tuhoe and, often, the duplicity of the Crown tactics, the Tuhoe did not acquit themselves badly from this field of battle. The introduction of chapter one pointed out commentaries on the purchase campaign in previous reports, and reviewed primary resources, especially the index cards, the purchase deeds, and their indirect record in the consolidation group books drawn up for non-sellers in 1921. I want to return to some of the previous reports to take up the important question raised there: why did the Tuhoe sell land during this period? The conclusions of O'Malley, Miles, and Boast can be assessed in this regard. First of all, the point made earlier can be elaborated, that both the Crown's strategy in acquiring Urewera land and Tuhoe resistance to it had the benefit of decades of experience throughout New Zealand. Even the refined techniques developed by Bowler, and the astute tactics which were apparent in the coordinated efforts of Tuhoe to promote agricultural development schemes in Ruatoki, Waikaremoana, and Ruatahuna, were based upon knowledge which had been passed down in Government or in Maori newspapers as well as oral history over generations. Both the economic structure in which Maori land was understood by Maori as a potential commodity, and the material needs of Maori for other ordinary commodities, had already been more or less established in most regions of New 1 8 Zealand by the 1860s. 0 The commodification of land, as with some food, clothing, 108 Raymond Firth, The Economics of the New Zealand Maori, 2nd Edition, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1959; Steven Webster, 'Maori Hapu as a Whole Way of Struggle: 1840-50s Before the Land Wars', Oceania 69:1:4-35, September 1998. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 145 or tools which needed to be purchased as commodities, tended to associate it more closely with a money or market value than with the social context from which it previously could not be separated. Land was rapidly becoming seen and used as an exchangable property as well as a use right held in virtue of hapuu membership - and often conflicting with the latter. Although the Urewera was one of the several more remote interior regions, this process was well underway by the 1880s, say, two generations before purchases in the Native Reserve itself began. Although the temptation is perhaps strongest regarding the Tuhoe, we must resist the romantic vision of them as 'traditional' Maori. John White had documented one of the key relationships which by the 1860s had already developed in Northland between the commodification of Maori land (and, probably more so, everyday needs) and Maori kinship structure. 109 On the one hand, relatives with lesser hapuu rights (maintained, for example, through less frequent use of these rights, more distant residence, less agreed common ancestors, more recent marriage, gifting of land and other symbolic gestures) sometimes sought to maintain or strengthen their correspondingly lesser rights to the land of that hapuu, especially if it had become more valuable in monetary terms. On the other hand, one or more hapuu which controlled that land often sought to weaken or deny these otherwise acknowledged lesser rights. Thus the kinship dynamics of inclusion and exclusion had shifted in association with the commodity value becoming attached to land. Although the structure and processes of cognatic descent among hapuu remained the same as it had been 'traditionally' (that is, for some decades) the manifold pressures upon these processes - always changing - had gone through a profound sea-change. Because some Urewera people, regardless of their relative isolation, like all Maori had always traveled, married, and re-settled widely as had other Maori in their midst, this sea change was probably established throughout the region by the l880s. Land was already a potential commodity, they had ordinary material needs which could be 109 Webster, pp 28-9. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 146 fulfilled only with cash or other commodities, and the overlapping dynamics ofhapuu rights had probably already been modified accordingly. Between 1865 and 1870 certain rules of the newly instituted Native Land Court furthermore systematically reinforced this commodification of Maori land in the name of commerce, and exploited its effect on hapuu structure in the name of progress and breaking down 'tribal communism'. One edge of Elsdon Best's sarcasm in his Children of the Mist was directed at Tuhoe 'communism', and Firth's classic work on Primitive Maori Economy was an account of Maori private ownership and entrepreneurship countering Best. Tuhoe were neither but had to weather the storm of the latter in the name of 'modernisation'. They had already gone through at least two national crises by the time the Native Reserve was established: the wider turmoils were focused by the 1871 Hawke's Bay Commission and the 1891 Rees-Carroll commission and subsequent Maori Parliament movement. The Urewera District Native Reserve and the Crown purchase campaign cannot be clearly understood apart from these crises. In both cases, Maori protest, widespread organisation, and astute criticism led the way or were integral to developments. Briefly, the 1871 Hawke's Bay Commission exposed the exploitive complicity of the Crown and networks of private dealings including local surveyors, shopkeepers, lawyers, and Maori agents, and established the Crown's defense that all is fair in capitalist enterprise (or, as Herries was to put it to the Tuhoe, 'even if a block is under purchase it does not compel anyone to sell it ... but it would be hard to block those who wish to sell from disposing of their interests ... '). This, of course, begged another Maori challenge explicit in the Hawke's Bay confrontation: the displacement of kin group rights over land with individual 'chiefly' ownership claimable in court and tradable on the market as if it were private property. This was the principle enthusiastically pushed by the settlers, and was behind the start of the war in 1859 in Waitara. Given this potential power over commercialised land, some Maori individuals and factions would always arise to move against others in confrontations to control or trade in land. This internal polarisation among Maori Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 147 groups was the intention of the Crown, although it was rationalised as necessary in the civilisation of the Maori (or, conversely, as spontaneous in their jealous and competitive nature). This issue was to become the focus of another crisis by the l890s, centred in the Rees-Carroll commission and the Maori Parliament movement. The latter was the source of a general boycott of the Native Land Court which dogged the Urewera District Native Reserve Commission. Tuhoe leaders were probably well aware of the key threats of commodification of land, individualisation of title, surveys, their initiation by any enterprising Maori, and complicity of the Crown with private commerce some years before the Native Reserve was negotiated. The Tuhoe problem was not tribalism or traditionalism or the rustic barbarity long supposed of them; it was primarily relative political and economic power and the way it was wielded 2.1.1 'Why did the Tuhoe Sell (so much) Land?' This puts the question from the tenurial point of view which was being imposed on the Tuhoe by the purchase of individual shares in the Crown purchase campaign. The more neutral question would be: why and how did the Crown purchase so much land? The former question tends to obscure the wider context of the purchase campaign and promote the naive illusion that 'selling their lands' was simply individual Tuhoe free choice. The more pervasive and far more powerful initiative was - and had been for decades - the Crown's, and this is particularly clear in the case of the Urewera District Native Reserve. Institutionally, the Crown was able to mount sustained pressures often amounting to coercion, some of which will be explored below. The cooperation of an individual Tuhoe in a specific purchase was, of course, a 'free' choice in the trivial sense that he or she chose to sign a deed in return for cash. It might be furthermore granted that in most cases the 'seller' was aware that by so doing they were permanently giving up rights to the specified land, at least in the European sense of their ownership share of a commodity. However, this concession only recognises that the Tuhoe were not fools and not somehow suspended outside colonial history. It opens up many more important questions, such as their assumptions about their special legal status under ~=~~~~-~~.------.-- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 148 the Urewera District Native Reserve Act, and the legal nature of undivided shareholding. Again, it turns out that it was the Crown which maintained the initiative here, by disregarding these questions. Vincent O'Malley produced one of the earliest reports for the Urewera claim, concerned primarily with the predicament of Ngati Ruapani, one of the tangata whenua in the Waikaremoana block who are closely affiliated with Tuhoe. He describes the Crown purchase campaign and examines the meetings between Crown representatives and the Tuhoe in 1921 which led to organisation of the Urewera consolidation scheme, concluding trenchantly that '... Tuhoe saw the consolidation proposals as little more than a way of stopping the bleeding', that is stemming the rapid erosion of their lands and polarisation of their society through the ubiquitous and persistent purchase of undivided shares from individuals.llo Kahuwi's probe and Poniu's comments to Bowler examined in section 1.3 must be understood in the context of such 'bleeding'. I agree with O'Malley, but a closer look at the various forces involved is needed in order to appreciate the history as a struggle rather than risk trivialisation of it as victimisation. Miles and Boast later look at the question (of 'why the Tuhoe sold so much land?'), and considered the evidence more closely. Miles foresaw some of the declining socio economic conditions for Tuhoe at the tum of the century later examined in more detail by Binney, and concludes that these were the leading forces in their sale of land. III She emphasises their relative geographic isolation and increasing dependence upon limited opportunities for emigrant seasonal labour; their relative poverty and poor health conditions, aggravated by vulnerability to the epidemics, frosts, and famines in the 1890s and by the failure of staple crops such as potatoes in 1905. As had Sorrenson regarding the early Native Land Court, Miles also points out that the 110 Vincent O'Malley, 'The Crown's Acquisition of the Waikaremoana Block 1921-25', a report for the Panekiri Tribal Trust Board, with Supporting Papers Vols I-III, May 1996 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A50), p 100. III Anita Miles, Te Urewera, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whaanui Series, March 1999, p 371-5. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 149 extended hearings of the Native Reserve Commission each summer 1899-1902 required the attendance of many claimants and witnesses at the distant sittings which circuited about the periphery of the Urewera, and suggests that this was an additional drain on their precarious resources. She concludes that this gathering predicament, aggravated in the next decade by an increasing need for capital in agricultural development and the opportunities for immediate cash pressed upon them by the Crown purchase campaign, are the primary causes of Tuhoe land losses. Given Binney's further evidence of Tuhoe impoverishment at the turn of the century, I must agree that these developments were important factors, but I am skeptical that they were the leading causes. Elsdon Best's and Maui Pomare's sometimes self serving reports of health conditions probably exaggerated the impoverishment of the Tuhoe. After all, we must account for the fact that the lists of Tuhoe owners in the 1903 block orders for the Native Reserve suggests a population which was growing and perhaps 60 percent more than the census figures carefully adduced by Binney. Regarding the need of capital for development, it should first be pointed out that more fundamentally all Tuhoe increasingly needed to buy basic commodities such as tools, clothing, flour, tea, and perhaps sugar which had become urgent necessities of ordinary (even impoverished) life. On the other hand, the increasing initiatives in agricultural development undertaken by many Tuhoe beginning by 1910, although partly compelled by settler and Crown demands that Urewera lands be 'used', were attempted seriously and even suggest limited prosperity for some. So in the question of why the Crown got so much land in the following decade, priority should perhaps be given not to socio-economic but rather to political conditions, especially the long established national structure and local procedures of the Crown purchase campaign itself. To the extent that political conditions rather than poverty was the leading factor, the responsibility of the Crown for the results of its purchasing campaign are more direct and less easily rationalised as funding the impoverished Tuhoe. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 150 Although granting political conditions a secondary role, Miles appreciates the degree of organisation and subtlety of the campaign. She reports that Bowler visited 'fairs, agricultural shows, and markets ... ' as well as NLC and other court sessions in search especially for Tuhoe who were non-resident as well as those in commercial settings and wanting cash, and thus more likely to sell shares in land that was momentarily less important to them. She also briefly explores a 'climate of confusion' among Tuhoe regarding 'the actual process of individual sale and how their individualised share in a block might translate into units of legal interests (whether of acreage or money).' She notes that Bowler repeatedly found that many owners 'do not know that they retain unsold interests' in some blocks and emphasises the general insecurity of many that under these conditions they might not be able to protect the lands they wished to retain. This is an important possibility, reinforced by the fact that until Bowler finally got his index card system organised, he himself was often unable to tell Tuhoe what unsold interests they had without devoting precious time to researching the question. However, while Kahuwi and Ponius' enquiries may suggest incomplete knowledge of their holdings in various blocks, they show that even most young Tuhoe were not confused, at least by this time in the purchase campaign. Like Miles, Richard Boast examines social and economic reasons that Tuhoe sold so many shares in land during the Crown purchase campaign, but concludes that 'the legal framework of the Urewera District Reserve Act' was the crucial factor. 112 By this he means the Crown's monopoly over sales, but also the purchasing of individual undivided interests in disregard of the statutory control over alienations which Tuhoe General Committee retained. Most significantly, feeling it is important to sheet home responsibility for the course of government policy, he documents the central role of Native Minister Herries in originating this contradiction in policy.ll3 Although it 112 R.P Boast, 'Ngati Whare and Te Whaiti Nui a Toi: A History', Claimant Report to the Waitangi Tribunal, June 1999 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A27), p 147. I\3lbid., P 158-62; nor does Solicitor-General Salmond emerge blameless, p 178. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 151 appears that at least occasionally the Crown exploited the depressed social and economic condition of the Tuhoe, I agree with Boast that the Crown's method of operation was the more important factor in the success of their purchase campaign. However, Boast is inclined to underestimate the role of Native Land Purchase Officer Bowler in this method, reporting that although Bowler 'combed' through owners, 'there is nothing to indicate he exercised any unfair or undue pressure,' and pointing out that the campaign was Herries', not Bowler's.1l4 To the contrary, it can be shown that in manifold ways Herries and other policy-makers had good reason to put Bowler in charge of the purchase campaign. Herries and Bowler, along with many others, at their different levels of power, were nevertheless jointly a manifestation of the particular history of Maori land legislation and policy outlined above. Boast traces the development of what is probably the single most important factor, individual purchasing policy in the Urewera. 115 Herries appears to have decided to ignore the Native Reserve General Committee about September 1912, and led the decision of the Native Land Purchase Board to begin individual purchases in Urewera blocks in 1914. The latter policy 'was in fact illegal' but Herries 'acted on the assumption that the purchases could be retrospectively validated by Parliament' (as it purportedly was, but not until 1916). Boast argues that regardless of this legal inconsistency Herries also decided to keep the 1896 Act in place because it gave the Crown exclusive right to purchase lands, even though this Act also gave the General Committee exclusive power to approve or veto these sales. (Apparently he was reassured by Ngata's subversion of the committee in 1910 that it could be manipulated). Thus he had his cake and ate it too. The lack of sufficiently accurate surveys to cut out the Crown's increasing undivided share of each block became the next major legal impediment to the purchase campaign, but Herries also decided to disregard that. His under-secretary Fisher was apparently the only officer to be concerned by the resulting irony: because the owners of a block were normally responsible for the cost of such a survey, if a block were finally to be completely 114 Ibid., p 148. liS Ibid., P 158-162. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 152 purchased by the Crown it would nevertheless be its previous owners who would carry the debt for the subsequent survey needed to separate it from adjacent lands. Herries apparent indifference to the convergence of these several contradictions seems cynical if not reprehensible. Boast's comments on the social and economic processes prompted by this political fiat of individualised land ownership are less penetrating, and neglect the causal priority of political over economic forces which he asserts. 116 He discovered for Te Whaiti block the most detailed lists of sellers I have seen for anywhere for the Urewera, and demonstrates quantitatively from this that most sellers were non residents (for lack of data on residence, this will be difficult to show anywhere else). He points out perceptively that traditional rights to land lapsed if residence or active use were not renewed, and that the legal rights conferred by the Native Reserve orders over-rode this custom, rendering the new rights far more vulnerable. However, he reduces the unique intentions of the 1896 Act to the similar 'freezing' of land rights intended in establishment of the Native Land Court, and thus obscures important issues such as the structure of shareholding established by the Commission, why Tuhoe commissioners allowed it, why the appeals (2d) commission criticised it, and how it was eventually turned to the same purposes of alienation as the structure of ownership imposed by the NLC. (On the other hand, Boast's examination of Herries' role has gone some way toward answering the last question). Like Miles, Boast concludes that most Tuhoe sold to obtain needed cash, but furthermore he argues that at least in the early years of the campaign Bowler did not have to 'comb' the Ureweras for sellers but only had to make himself available and was often unable to buy as fast as owners sought him out to sell their shares. In pointing out that non-sellers would have known that they would finally suffer the cost of partitioning their shares out from undivided shares bought by the Crown, and that publication of non-sellers' names in the New Zealand Gazette caused 'a certain 116 Ibid., p 142-150. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 153 amount of unwelcome publicity,' Boast only broaches a few of the many causes of rising insecurity of land rights which must have been endemic, and does not attempt further explication of this 'domino effect'. Again, one is left wondering what the connections might be between the powerful imposition and exploitation of individualised ownership of Urewera lands so clearly revealed by Boast, its manifold implementation by Bowler and others, and further results and reactions among the Tuhoe confronting this shifting policy. 2.2 Bowler's Network of Purchasing Venues and Agents As outlined earlier, Bowler's headquarters was in the Auckland office ofthe Ministry of Lands. From there he carried out purchase campaigns at Bastion Point, several in the Rotorua-Taupo region, and Heruiwi, as well as the Urewera campaign. His unofficial administrative centre for all of these except Bastion Point was the Waiariki District Native Land Court in Rotorua. In connection with the Urewera campaign he also had continual correspondence with the Native Land Court in Gisborne, where the Registrar was Harold Carr (later with Knight an Urewera Consolidation Commissioner, during which time he became a judge of the NLC). Bowler set up purchasing operations mainly during the summer months, and mainly in Whakatane (where he usually stayed at the Whakatane Hotel), but for shorter periods he also set up operations at Taneatua, Waimana, and Ruatoki in the northern Urewera, occasionally at Te Houhi, Te Whaiti, Ruatahuna, and Maungapohatu in the interior, and even Wairoa, Gisbome, Nuhaka, Matapuna, Wairea, Napier, Hastings, and Taumarunui to contact Tuhoe working, traveling, or resident in those more distant East Coast centres. II7 I encountered at LINZ Hamilton a sheaf of muslin-backed Urewera maps showing the old Native Reserve blocks with proportions of them 117 Fisher to Bowler, 29 August 1915, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1; Jordan to Bowler, 21 August 1917, c.f. 617 WDMLC; Fisher to Bowler, 5 February 1916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1; Hinaki Ropiha to Bowler, 9 February 1916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1; Bowler to US, 8 December 1916, c.f. 616 WDMLC; Bowler to US, 24 January 1917, c.f. 616 WDMLC; Bowler to Cook, 5 January 1919, c.f. 621 WDMLC; T.W. to Lewis, 15 March 1920, c.f.621 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 154 coloured red and copies of Bowler's tabulation of total acreage purchased, totals paid 8 out, and acreage 'outstanding' (unsold) pasted to them. 11 It is likely he displayed these maps during some of his purchase operations, at least at central locations. If he did this, he probably intended an affect similar to his advice to prospective sellers that his or her relatives had already sold their shares, or like Poniu Tumoana's musings that rather than the trunks of a forest, only willows remained. However, the maps were fundamentally misleading insofar as they displayed the Crown's ownership of undivided shares in common as though they occupied a particular area of land within each block. As Bowler and the Minister of Lands well knew, the Crown's problem was precisely that such shares were held 'in common' with the Tuhoe in every part of every block, and would have to be partitioned out by the Native Land Court, expensively and not necessarily to the Crown's advantage. As will be described, in all the above areas Bowler established and worked closely with agents who continued to assist him in his absence. Although he was encouraged at least once (29 August 1917) to set up operations in locations where there were no hotels, so the Natives might be kept from coming under their improvident 'influence', the majority of payments were probably made in towns which Tuhoe frequented or where they could find him during visits which he publicised through his agents. The Memoranda of Transfer (deeds) authenticating purchases were apparently signed by Tuhoe in a surprising variety of places, from post offices, offices of solicitors, and offices of Justices of the Peace in towns around the Urewera to Native Land Court Registries and Native Ministry offices in Rotorua, Gisbome, Napier, Auckland, and Wellington. I 19 Bowler also made himself available at various special occasions where Tuhoe were likely to be present and perhaps in need of cash. Although I have found no direct evidence, it is likely that he attended some Tuhoe hui such as land meetings, 118 Urewera B86, LINZ, Hamilton. 119 Urewera deeds, MA W2150 boxes 12, 13 and 14, ANZ; partial microfiche copies in LINZ Hamilton and LINZ Auckland. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 155 weddings, tangi (funerals), and hurahunga kohatu (unveilings). One of his agents Mr. A. McKay, an official interpreter, invited him to Wairea (Wairoa?), predicting that as many as 900 interests (shares?) would be available there from Urewera Natives visiting their carnival week in January.120 Bowler corresponded with agents in Napier and Wellington about purchases from recruits for WWI before they shipped out, and it is likely he similarly sought out departing recruits in towns nearer to the Urewera. He apparently acted as a collector for the war effort at the same time as he was making payments for land purchases. 121 He encouraged his agents and probably himself visited military hospitals in order to encourage purchases from wounded WWI veterans, sometimes counseling his agents to advise the prospective sellers that their relatives had already sold their own shares. 122 His own trip to Maungapohatu, Ruatahuna, and Te Whaiti even before purchasing was opened in the interior blocks was for the purpose of visiting invalids and others too old to travel and thus unable to 123 seek him OUt. Bowler himself attended the 1917 trial of Rua Kenana in Hamilton for the purpose of purchasing land shares from the Tuhoe there, but proposed suspending his operations due to aspersions by the defense counsel that he was taking advantage of the Native's plight to induce them to sell their land for money to pay for Rua's defense (Bowler did hope the suspension would expedite the proceedings). 124 Although a thorough study of the purchase deeds might explain it, one must wonder how Bowler or his agents arranged the necessarily concurrent signatures of sellers and witnesses (interpreter and authenticating authority: commissioner of the NLC, solicitor, or Justice of the Peace) for the deeds in many of these locations. Bowler's purchase agents presumably encouraged sales by spreading advice that they were buying for the Native Land Purchase Officer, as well as receiving and returning documents, cheques, and vouchers from Bowler, arranging meetings of sellers, interpreters, and other witnesses, and executing the deeds. They ranged from the 120 Bowler to US, 8 December 1916, c.f. 616 WDMLC. 121 Boast 1999:175; Bowler to Fisher, 27 March 1916, c.f.612 WDMLC \22 Bowler to Registrar, 15 May 1916 NLC Rotorua, c.f.613 WDMLC. 123 Bowler to US, 24 January 1917 c.f. 616 WDMLC. 124 Bowler to US, 30 March 1917, c.f.616 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 156 Undersecretary of the Native Ministry or Ministry of Lands themselves to the Native Trustee in Auckland, Native Land Court Registrars of Rotorua and Gisbome, solicitors, interpreters, postmasters, constables, and (probably) surveyors. 125 Agents in less formal capacities or acting outside their official capacity (such as solicitors or interpreters) apparently charged a fee, and this was sometimes as much as 20 percent of the value of the land sold. 126 Crown drafts signed by Bowler were usually drawn in the name of the appropriate agent, and thus probably often incurred their fee for cashing them. These official cheques were sometimes cashed in retail stores, probably for a fee and sometimes only if unwanted goods were purchased (in one case, it was Gisbome NLC registrar and future Consolidation Commissioner Carr who advised Bowler not to cross the cheques, apparently so that they would be more readily negotiable without such special arrangements).127 Such arrangements, fees, coordinated opportunism on the part of private entrepreneurs and extension of patronage by government officers had already been long-established in Crown purchase and Native Land Court operations, and had been the subject of the 1871 Hawke's Bay Commission of Enquiry. At least one non-Tuhoe Maori apparently offered his services, urging Bowler 'to come along with the cheque-book' and he would have 40 Urewera anxious to sell, explaining that 'They are short of both food and money therefore their enquiries' . 128 Bowler's agent in Whakatane was T.M. Lawson, a licensed interpreter, and probably crucial to his central operations there. In April 1916, soon before he died, Numia 125 About 1916, passim c.f. 616 WDMLC; Bowler to US, 21 July 1915, MAlMLP 1910128/1 Part I; Fisher to Himepiri Mumo, 30 August 1915 MAlMLP 191012811 Part 1; Fisher to Bowler, 19 May 1916, c.f.613 WDMLC; Bowler to Lawson, 26 February 1917, c.f. 616 WDMLC; McCoy for Bowler to Lawson, ca. 1920, c.f. 621 WDMLC; Grant to Bowler, 5 Decemberl917, c.f.617 WDMLC; Grant to Bowler, April 1919, c.f. 622 WDMLC; Bowler to Cook, 5 January 1919, c.f.621 WDMLC; Hooper to Bowler,8 March 1920, c.f. 621 WDMLC; T.W. to Lewis esquire, 15 March 1920, c.f.621 WDMLC; Dolan, Hallett, and Major to Bowler, 8 March 1921, c.f.627 WDMLC. 126 Hall to Bowler, 15 July and 23 August 1919, c.f.622 WDMLC; Bowler to Cook, 5 January 1919, c.f. 621 WDMLC; T.W. to Lewis esquire, 15 March 1920, c.f.621 WDMLC. 127 Bowler to Registrar NLC, 5 June 1917, c.f.617 WDMLC. 128 Hinaki Ropiha to Bowler, 9 February 1916, MAlMLP 1910128/1 Part 1; Matapuna, probably a shearing gang. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 157 Kereru wrote Minister Herries in an effort to get Lawson replaced, instead suggesting a Mr. Wharetini who was also a licensed interpreter. 129 Kereru's stated reason was 'so our desires of assisting in the war effort will be prosecuted,' although he probably did not trust Lawson for other reasons. Herries consulted Bowler and Bowler protested that Lawson was excellent but he had never heard of Wharetini; although Bowler and Lawson were probably themselves collecting for the war effort, he claimed that he could not see Kereru's point in this regard. (Interestingly, in this same letter Kereru also demanded that Herries allow partitions in the Urewera blocks and - this early in the renewed purchase campaign - allow a consolidation scheme so Tuhoe could draw their dwindling interests together). I have not seen Herries' reply to Kereru. The licensed interpreter who in 1919 in Wairoa apparently charged an 11 pounds sterling fee on a 50 pounds payment was a Mr. Goffe. By late 1920 a Mr. W.E. Goffe Esquire, probably the same person, had become the Native Land Purchase Officer of Gisborne. 130 Revealingly, at that time Bowler wrote to him in an effort 'to clear up purchasable interests in view of a proposed scheme of consolidation' asking for any information on 11 persons who 'at the time of the influenza epidemic were disposed to sell' and asked Bowler to send the necessary documents to Goffe in Gisborne. It had turned out that these Tuhoe were unable to go to Gisborne because of travel restrictions during the epidemic. Bowler might have been trying to locate the documents, but more likely he was finding out if they had gone to Gisborne anyway and been paid by Goffe, and were later attempting to get paid again by Bowler for the same land shares. This old Maori ruse was a headache for Bowler and all his agents. Probably on Bowler's instructions, at least some of his agents appeared to press for further purchases of shares in other blocks from Tuhoe who were selling certain shares to them. These situations were similar to that in which Bowler advised Poniu Tumoana what other blocks he had shares in and what they were worth in each case, even though 129 Kereru to Herries, 27 April 1916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1. 130 Bowler to Goffe, 14 September 1920, c.f. 627 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 158 Poniu had explicitly limited the block shares which he wished to sell. An agent in Gisbome wrote to report purchases of shares in several blocks owned by Te Haunui Hohia, but added that he had cancelled other cheques which Bowler had sent him for other blocks in which Te Haunui Hohia held shares, because Te Haunui 'refuses to take at the present' in those other blocks. 131 The proviso suggests that the agent would nevertheless keep urging her to sell. Sometime in 1920 McCoy, probably a clerk working for Bowler in the Rotorua NLC, telegrammed Lawson in Whakatane for Bowler to advise him that the deed for Ngawini Akuhata's shares in Tauwhare Manuka block was on its way, but advising him that she also owned shares worth 37 pounds in Hikurangi block and shares worth four pounds in Waipotiki block and asking him if deeds for those should also be sent. 132 Lawson responded in the affirmative. A barristers and solicitors office in Hastings wrote Bowler to explain a delay in completing purchase of Tarapounamu-Matawhero shares form Ani Rawiri Kamau. Bowler had apparently asked them to urge her also to sell the shares of minors for whom she was acting as trustee, but they reported that after discussion 'at length' with her she had decided not to sell the minors' shares 'at present time,.133 Later will be described similar pressures which Bowler and the Undersecretary for the Native Ministry put on the Native Trustee in Auckland to sell the shares ofTuhoe minors that he held in trust for them. In this way, even the Native Trustee became an agent for Bowler's operations. 2.2.1 Culture Brokers, Willing and Unwilling It should not be a surprise or a shame that some Tuhoe themselves became agents in the Crown purchase campaign, willingly and unwillingly. Colonisation of other cultures typically results in the nurturing and recruitment of 'culture brokers' or entrepreneurs from among the colonised, and already by 1800 some Maori were quick to take up this role. Early traders and missionaries had become dependent on these middlemen, and soon after 1840 colonial officers were using compliant and sometime influential Maori to facilitate acquisition of Maori land. By the early 1900s 131 (Illegible) to Bowler, 31 October 1919, c.f. 621 WDMLC. 132 McCoy to Lawson, undated (1920?), c.f.621 WDMLC. 133 Dolan, Hallett and Major to Bowler, 8 March 1921, c.f.627 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 159 Ngata and a few other Maori had become professionals sometimes in this way and, in cases such as Ngata's, in the context of the British colonial policy of indirect rule might be said to have consciously professionalised culture brokership. The most influential Tuhoe leaders defiantly to take up this role were Rua Kenana and Tu Rakuraku, both resident in the TaurangaiWaimana river basin and probably instrumental in the disproportionate amount of land which was purchased in the eastern Urewera between 1910 and 1921. Whereas Rua was not from an influential family, Tu (or Paiaka) Rakuraku was: he was the youngest son of a prominent if ambiguous leader in the 1860-70s war in Opotiki, Ohiwa, and the Urewera. 134 I earlier mentioned Rua's role (with Apirana Ngata) in breaking Numia Kereru's control over the Tuhoe General Committee and veto over the sale of Urewera land, and his role (with Bowler) in getting Herries to open up purchases in Ruatahuna and the interior blocks Ierenui-Ohaua, Kohuru-Tukuroa, Ohiorangi, and Tauwhare in 1918. 135 Bowler had reported that far from compromising Rua's mana among his followers, the trial and imprisonment had increased it. Through his followers but also occasionally through intimidation and threat, Rua was to continue in the consolidation scheme to garner control over land and its resources, either for expanding his settlements in the TaurangaiWaimana basin or for sale and capital to invest in those settlements. Some evidence for this will be discussed in sections 3.6 and 7.1. Tu Rakuraku apparently acted as an agent more directly for Bowler, and probably for all six years in which Bowler was in charge of the purchase campaign. Only two months after he started, Bowler wrote the Native Minister, suggesting he write a note of thanks to his assistant: 'My recent operations in the Urewera District were greatly facilitated by the assistance rendered by Tu Rakuraku, of Waimana, one of the Tuhoe chiefs. He identified the payees and detected two of three attempted cases of 134 Jeffrey Sissons, Te Waimana, The Spring ofMana: Tuhoe History and the Colonial Encounter, Dunedin, 1991. 135 Bowler to US, 18 July 1918, MAlMLP 1 1910128 file 16 (box 85). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 160 impersonation and was of great use in other ways' .136 In December of the following year Bowler apparently requested that the Native Minister grant a pension to Tu Rakuraku 'in place of one formerly enjoyed by the Chief Tamikoha [sic]'. Jordan, then the Undersecretary of the Native Department responded that the Native Minister had decided not to continue the pension, but wished to reward Turakuraku for assistance in Bowler's operations and wondered whether it should be by lump sum or by the week. 137 The following day Bowler wrote Jordan recommending some payment to him, explaining that although 'having been extremely valuable in connection with the Urewera purchases .... I do not think Tu Rakuraku is at all short of money, and the matter is largely one of sentiment with him' .138 In February and again in December 1917 Bowler sent telegrams to Tu Rakuraku in Waimana announcing that he would be 'arriving in Whakatane next Monday evening. Please let everybody know', signing them 'Te Poura, Apiha Hoko Whenua' .139 (In February he sent a similar telegram to Te Pouwhare in Ruatoki North, who at that time was apparently Bowler's contact, ifnot his active agent, there). Finally, probably in April 1921, Tu Rakuraku apparently rented a coach in Opotiki and charged it to Bowler. Bowler sent a cheque for four pounds to the coaching proprietors but said he would be glad if in the future they would refrain from allowing such requests without proper authorisation. 140 One gets the impression that Tu, like Rua, was a defiantly public supporter of the purchase campaign, and perhaps even flouted his relative wealth and influence. This was probably a case quite the opposite from that of Pouwhare and especially Tamaikoha, both of whom were certainly skeptical and perhaps actively hostile to the purchase campaign, at least behind the scenes. It appears that the suggestion of transferring Tamaikoha's pension to Tu Rakuraku was the latter's idea, and Bowler may not have appreciated the brazenness of such a coupe. 136 Bowler to NM, 6 August 1915, MAlMLP 1910128/1 Part 1. 137 Jordan to Bowler, 13 December 1916, c.f. 616 WDMLC. 138 Bowler to Jordan, 14 December 1916 c.f. 616 WDMLC. 139 Bowler to Tu Rakuraku, 26 February 1917, 1 December 1917, c.f. 616 WDMLC. 140 Bowler to Messrs Kelly and Fleming, 9 May 1921, c.f. 627 WDMLC. r I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 161 In a much different way, the omnipresent pressures of the purchase campaign made many Tuhoe into Bowler's agents. At least since George Grey's first administration and the colonial policy of 'amalgamation', Maori leaders had protested that a basic principle in Maori social organisation was being subverted: while individualisation of ownership and an ethos of private enterprise encouraged the young to ignore the mana (the legitimated and often hard-won respect and corresponding authority) of their tuakana and elders, those who maintained this mana were tempted to compromise it in order to get by in the new society. In the Urewera under the Crown purchase campaign, while anyone 21 or over could sign over to the Crown ancestral rights to any block in which they held them and immediately see cash appear ('Mo a retire hoko ka whakaputaina tonutia nga hereni'... and from that, shillings will immediately be made to appear), as Bowler had assured Kahuwi Hakeke), tuakana and elders in need or wanting such cash could mobilise their juniors' shares for family necessities or their own personal ends. Elders might also feel compelled by aroha or compassion to sell land and bailout their children or grandchildren for their shortsighted actions. Consequently the wider groups of whaanau and hapuu had continually to struggle to maintain solidarity against these subversive forces released among their own ranks by the purchase campaign. The most systematic way in which these ambiguous internal forces were exploited in the campaign was the pressing forward of succession orders, pressuring of the Public Trustee to sell the shares of minors, assignment of family or public trustees for minors, certification of majority age, and application of routine pressures upon the new adults or trustees to sell these shares. I shall examine this particular combination of procedures later in this chapter. However, the subversion of mana could operate spontaneously without either purchase agents or these systematic tactics. The widespread sales frequently resulting in landlessness which were analysed earlier among Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage members can best be understood in this way. Especially in eastern Tuhoe where most of this hapuu's rights were located, these pressures were facilitated by the agencies of Rua Kenana and Tu Rakuraku. Although these agents may have gained some influence in Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage, it is likely that as well as improvident Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 162 selling by youth, elders on their own accord sometimes marshaled the shares of their subordinates and led the way in sales. The evidence in the case of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage suggests that if this was done the sales were often selective, retaining shares in chosen blocks. One early case is documented of an apparently marshaled sale of shares by three generations. Because this data is unusually coherent due to the time span of its fragments, as well as further illustrating Tuhoe social organisation, it is analysed below in some detail. The following genealogical sketch serves as a guide: Figure 3: Continuity of Block Rights (an abstraction from Spreadsheet 2) Representative Continuity Strong Block Rights Akuhata Te Hiko Fto Jto E Parekohe Albert Warbrick FtoE Te Whaiti Te Ao Tangohau Jto E Tarapounamu-Matawhero Eparaima Te Hapi F to Jto E Otara (Tauwhare-Manuka 6 pre- empted) Hauwai Tiakiwai F to Jto E Karioi (Waikarewhenua pre- empted) Hurae Puketapu F to J Ruatahuna (Waikaremoana and Te Whaiti pre-empted) Te Hata Waewae Fto J T-M, KT, WPki (Maraetahia pre-empted) Kohunui Tupaea F to Jto E Ruatahuna Mika Te Tawhao F to Jto E Te Wairiko, Ruatoki South (Waipotiki pre-empted) Paora Kingi Paora JtoE Parekohe Te Pouwhare Te Roau Fto Jto E Kohuru-Tukuroa, Ierenui- Ohaua; Parekohe RuaKenana Fto Jto E Maungapohatu RotuKereru FtoJtoE Ruatoki South Takurua Tamarau JtoE Ruatahuna Tahuri te Hira F to Jto E Ruatahuna Taipeti Matatua Jto E Ruatahuna (Waipotiki pre- empted) Tane Hauraki F to Jto E Tarapounamu-Matawhero (Te Purenga pre-empted) 141 Symbols: = means marriage; I means descent; _ means siblings; > means continued; ages in 1903; bold means topical in discussion; ? means uncertain or unknown connection. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 163 TaweraMoko FtoJtoE Ruatoki South, Ierenui-Ohaua, and Ruatahuna. Taihakoa Poniwahio F to J TR, WW, and TW (Waikarewhenua pre-empted) Teepa Koura (Mohi) FtoJtoE H-H, WP (Waipotiki pre- empted) Tikareti Te Iriwhiro FtoJtoE Ruatahuna TuRakuraku F to Jto E Otara Tupara Kaaho FtoJtoE Paraeroa (Karioi, Taneatua pre- empted) Wahia Paraki FtoJtoE Ruatahuna (Taneatua pre- empted) Wiremu W. (Motoi) F to Jto E Tarapounamu-Matawhero Wiremu T. (Popoki) JtoE Ruatahuna Te Wharepouri Te Amo Fto Jto E Ruatahuna, Kohuru-Tukuroa, Paraeroa Whetu Paerata JtoE Parekohe The purchases were among the earliest, in November 1910, suggesting that they may have been among those promised by Rua Kenana when Kereru's control of the General Committee was broken. Matiu Te Kurapa, his daughter Te Mauniko Matiu, and her (,half-caste'?) daughter Hera Te Mauniko, all sold their shares in Tauranga block together. 142 Because Hera was age 16 in 1903, we can suppose that she was about 23 in 1910 and that her mother Te Mauniko and grandfather Matiu were probably in their 40s and 60s, respectively. Due to Matiu Te Kurapa's appeal against the Native Reserve Commission's award of shares in the case of Tauranga block, his family's shares in it had been augmented: from two to 17 shares for himself; from one to 11 shares for his daughter Te Mauniko, and from one to six shares in the case of his four grandchildren (of whom Hira was the oldest). According to the 1914 review of the sale, the younger three grandchildren, Atatu, Wharekaniwha, and Rikihana Mika 'did not sell their interests in this block to the Crown.' They were aged 18, 16, and 8, respectively, and (as will be explained later) because they were under 21 were defined by the 1909 Native Land Act as incompetent to sell their shares except through a trustee. The report's emphasis on this may imply that their shares too could 142 Fisher to US Lands and Survey, 24 March 1914, AADS AccW3562, Bundle 617, 22/6971910-18; Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 164 have been purchased if trustees had been ordered or approached, and it was in 1910 that Native Minister Carroll ordered these arrangement to be started in the blocks under purchase in the Urewera. According to the record, the three who sold received a total of 217 pounds, and it is likely that this relatively large sum was for a purpose decided by the grandfather or his daughter, perhaps to Rua's community in Maungapohatu. On the other hand, these sales may have been for quite a different purpose and even in defiance of Rua's intentions for the purchases in Tauranga block (a later sale of Maungapohatu shares suggests this possibility). As well as being in one block of at least four in which the family held shares, it is also significant that most of the shares sold were gained in appeal; like those blocks in which a person had weaker rather than stronger hapuu affiliation, those gained through appeal were probably often the most expendable. Sometimes the additional shares gained through appeal were probably sold in defiance, reacting to an earlier exclusion. This case has a documented sequel which also illustrates the way in which kin subservience, loyalties, affections or disaffections were made vulnerable to the purchase campaign. In August 1915, a few months after Bowler had taken over (assisted by Tu Rakuraku especially in detecting fraudulent sales), one of the grandchildren of Matiu Te Kurapa, too young to sell their shares in 1910, was caught and charged with attempting to sell the same shares in the same block twice. 143 Wharekaniwha was by then just 21 and thus old enough to sell his own shares. He apparently admitted the charge, but explained to Native Minister Herries that he had borrowed to pay for the costs of an illness in Wanganui, and sold his shares in Tarapounamu-Matawhero block to cover that loan, while selling his shares in Tauranga block to cover his share in building a house. (It remains unclear to me what shares he had allegedly attempted to sell twice and for which use). Wharekaniwha went on to reassure Herries that he had arranged for his mother to sell her interests in AJHR G-6, 1903:124, Tauranga block order, #159-164 andAJHR G-6, 1907, Tauranga block, # 548ff. 143 W. Mika to NM, 30 August 1915 MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 165 Maungapohatu block so that Mr. Bowler could retain what he owed (presumably for the double sale) out of that money. We do not know what the outcome of Bowler's charge was for Wharekaniwha, but it probably included the purchase of his mother's shares. Thus it was probably not uncommon for a junior family member to get an elder to sell shares they might otherwise have retained, especially if the junior were in trouble. The reference to his mother's shares in Maungapohatu block may lead to another connection which has been added to Figure 3. As far as can be determined this family's block rights, including the grandfather Matiu Te Kurapa's, were limited to four blocks: Tauranga, Tarapounamu-Matawhero, Ruatoki 2, and Ruatoki 3 (by 1915 the Crown had decided not to purchase in the Ruatoki block). Although Te Mauniko Matiu bore an illustrious first name (the concurrence of her first name and her father's patronym imply that her great-grandmother was probably Te Whenuanui II's eldest daughter Te Mauniko), her own father apparently held few land rights, and any children by a Pakeha spouse would have enjoyed no increase of these rights through their father. However, it is likely that Wharekaniwha was drawing on aroha ( compassion, love) from another 'mother' than Te Mauniko (in Maori, the term whaea is extended from one's birth mother to all aunties on both sides). In the case of these siblings, the term may also have been extended to the wife of another plausible father from whom they may have taken an alias patronym they apparently all used: from Mika Te Tawhao, a prominent leader in Te Urewera hapuu mentioned earlier. Wharekaniwha and the other two younger children of Te Mauniko Matiu were recorded ambiguously with the presumed father Mika's first name as their surname in all the four block orders including the one share awarded them in Tauranga block in 1903, but with their mother's first name Te Mauniko (indicating a Pakeha father) as their surname for the five additional shares awarded them in that block on appeal in 1907. Their older sister Hera was recorded with her mother's first name as her surname in both the 1903 and 1907 order for the Tauranga block, but we know from the 1910 correspondence that Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 166 she too was known as 'Hira Amika [Hera Mika] alias Hira Te Mauniko'. Mika Te Tawhao's wife Taima Tapene (by whom he had six other children) held shares from few other blocks, but Maungapohatu was one of them. So Taima may have been the whaea to whom Wharekaniwha referred. The question would remain why Te Mauniko's children by Mika Te Tawhao were apparently not recognised to have any of his extensive land rights through him. It appears to me that the most likely explanation of the whole situation would be that Mika Te Tawhao had adopted all ofTe Mauniko's children as his whangai tamariki. It is possible that this happened because he had fathered some of them, but if this were the case their land rights would almost certainly have reflected it. Whangai tamariki were probably also usually recognised to hold land rights through their adoptive parents. I am not yet able to clarify answers to these questions. Thus these alias patronyms and matronyms in the Te MaunikolMika sibling group suggest more little-understood Tuhoe customs regarding children by 'hypergamous' marriage (in this case, termed 'half-casts'), adoption, and the land rights ofwhangai tamariki. In chapter seven I will return to some aspects of Mika Te Tawhao's negotiations with the Crown during the consolidation scheme. The eldest of his three sons by Taima Tapene was Te Haumate Mika, probably age 21 in 1915 and a brother to Te Mauniko's children. Earlier in this section I described Bowler's enquiry in September 1920 to his agent Goffe in Gisborne attempting to locate purchase records of eleven Tuhoe who in 1918 had planned to sell shares ofland to the agent in Gisborne during the influenza epidemic. Te Haumate was one of the eleven persons listed by Bowler in his enquiry. He was reported to have been preparing to sell by far the largest number of land shares, equivalent to 216 pounds sterling (Bowler did not report which blocks were involved). However, it appears that even by the time of the consolidation in 1921 Te Haumate may not have sold these shares, insofar as those he retained were extensive. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 167 Young Te Haumate's name was to live on in the Urewera, some of his likely descendants still living in Ruatoki near Waikirikiri as late as the 1980s, not far north of the large new block Tapuiwahine. Mika Te Tawhao succeeded in establishing this new block in the old block Parekohe during the consolidation despite the Crown's original plans to take all of Parekohe. I think that one of Te Haumate's special mokopuna, Paki Haumate, lies in Te Totara urupaa (graveyard) in Ruatoki, knowing in his big heart his tuupuna's battle for this land. Takoto rangimarie, e Paki, taku manawa. 2.3 Identifying Individual Shares and Publishing Lists of Non-sellers It turns out that probably the major impediment to Crown purchases throughout the campaign was the difficulty of identifying which Tuhoe had what number of shares in which blocks. There were two major developments in Bowler's struggle to identify individual Tuhoe shares in blocks: publication of a list of non-sellers, and his mobile card index. The development of each in tum will be traced, examining the reasons for these procedures. Taking their lead from Bowler's explanations for his procedures, both Miles and Boast are inclined to accept that the Urewera titles had (in Boast's words) 'fallen into complete chaos.' This was partly because some hundreds of trustee as well as succession orders dating back to 1910 had not been drawn up in the Native Land Court, and titles were often out of date. 144 Miles reports that 'in order to make Tuhoe aware of what interests they still owned' Bowler asked the Native Department for clerical assistance for the compilation of up-to-date lists of non-sellers and the printing of these lists for circulation in the Urewera. Boast quotes Bowler's explanation that 'in the case of the Urewera Blocks there are many interests which can be readily acquired if the owners are made aware of the fact that they still hold 144 Miles, p 370; Boast, pp 175-6. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 168 interests' .145 He goes on to point out that a particular headache for Bowler was 'part selling' whereby owners were (in Bowler's words) 'inclined to hang on to a portion of their interest' and sell shares piecemeal. Retention of many small shares by many members of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage is a vivid example of this. Boast adds, perceptively, that through such part-selling 'owners would try to have things both ways .... preserving tuurangawaewae status.' He also comments that the publication of non-sellers in the Gazette 'brought about a certain amount of unwelcome publicity' in what amounted to 'a domino effect' in sales. 146 A closer examination of this situation is warranted for at least two reasons which have tended to be overlooked or obscured in these and other reports. First, the 'chaos' of the Urewera titles had a unique historical genesis concerned to reflect hapuu organisation of land rights, which was unlike most titles established in the Native Land Court. While any outsider might see it as chaos, in the introductory chapter it was explained as an extended form of whakapapa closely reflecting hapuu rights to the lands of each block. The Tuhoe commissioners, as well as maintaining considerable control over the way the lists were organised, assumed they operated under a special statute designed to protect their relatively independent political organisation and control over their lands, including their management of these lists. Secondly, Bowler's emphasis on this apparent chaos may have obscured his own confusion in the face of these elaborated whakapapa and the associated maze of land rights, while buying him time to find new techniques to penetrate and overcome what had become the Tuhoe's best defense. In sum, it could be said that the chaos was more real for Bowler than for the Tuhoe, but that he effectively turned it against them. Succession and trustee orders had a particular role in this struggle, but this will be examined separately later in this chapter. 2.3.1 Compiling a List of Non-sellers The importance of the lists and index is reflected in the work that was put into them, their continuous state of incompleteness, and the repeated urgency with which 145 Bowler to Fisher, 27 March 1916, c.f.612 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 169 Bowler requested that they be printed. The Native Department took over a year to supply the first request and some months to supply the second, presumably only because of the expense and delay of printing and shipping them to Bowler, along with paying for additional clerical assistance. In September 1915, writing from the Whakatane Hotel a few months after he had taken over the purchase campaign and was preparing for the intensive efforts ofthe summer season, Bowler reported that: Many of the Natives do not know what blocks they are in. Others, having come into the titles by numerous succession orders, are unaware that they still retain unsold interests. I think that it is necessary that lists of non-sellers should be compiled, printed, and circulated among the natives. The printing should not be a very big job. Will you sanction this and let me have Mr. Swanson's services for a week or so to assist in compiling the lists?147 On this first occasion the Undersecretary directed that 'nothing should be done about this matter at present. ' Nevertheless, Bowler persisted and two months later wrote Fisher: 'I propose to compile lists of non-sellers, which I will ask you to have printed and published in the Kahiti [the Maori version of the New Zealand Gazette]. This is necessary because a number of owners have come into the titles by numerous succession orders and do not know that they still retain interests' .148 Again early the next year he pleaded for 'assistance to do the detailed work so the deeds can be checked against complete lists of non-sellers drawn up in Rotorua. Then the lists could be prepared and printed' .149 Part of the delay may have been due to Fisher's assumption that the Urewera titles were not significantly different from those ordered in the Native Land Court: a few months later he asked the Waiariki Court to please send the ownership lists for eight Urewera blocks which had been opened to the purchase campaign. ISO Receipt of them might have been his first encounter with the apparent 'chaos' even of the original orders, regardless of whether or not successions and trust orders had been 146 Boast, p 149. 147 Bowler to Fisher, 26 September 1915, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1. 148 Bowler to Fisher, 16 December 1915, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1. 149 Bowler to Fisher, 3 February 1916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1. 150 Fisher to WDMLC, 10 May 1916, c.f.613 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 170 kept up to date. Rather unlike Native Land Court orders, he would have been confronted by long lists in no apparent order except groups of surnames which lack any continuity beyond a single generation, all of which appear in most other blocks as well, yet none of which could be located except by someone who already understood the kinship system by which they had been ordered. There was no immediate action from the Native Department yet. On 7 October 1916 Bowler had again to remind Fisher that he was 'likely to come into touch with Natives who do not know they have shares in certain blocks', reported that he had the lists compiled, and advised that they be headed in Maori to say that the persons listed are non-sellers in the blocks named. 151 For some reason Native Department action was finally swift: on 19 October 1916 Fisher put in an urgent order to the Government printer, asking that the lists for each block follow each other on the same schedule rather than being on separate schedules, and that the name of the block be set out in big type. A note on the order shows that 470 copies were received and sent by 10 November 1916. Jordan later expressed surprise that the copies had not reached Bowler until 24 November, and explained that the delay at the printers was due to the large number of fractions of some shares. 152 Contrary to Bowler's wishes, however, this list was not published in the Gazette, which might have added considerably to its authority. The heading of the 1916 list of non-sellers was first in English as well as Maori, with the Maori as follows: Nga Whenua 0 te Urewera Rarangi Ingoa 0 Nga Tangata Kaore Ano i Hoko Ko nga Maori e mau ake nei nga ingoa kaore ano i hoko i 0 ratou hea ki te Karauna. Ko nga mea 0 ratou e pirangi ana ki te hoko me tuhi atu ki te Apiha Hoko Whenua Maori a te Kawanatanga, kei Akarana, mana e whakarite he taima hei hokonga i or ratou hea. 151 Bowler to Fisher, 7 October 1916, c.f.613 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 171 The English heading read as follows: 'Urewera Blocks. Lists of Non-sellers. The Natives mentioned in the schedules hereto have not yet sold certain interests to the Crown. If they desire to sell, the Native Land Purchase Officer at Auckland will arrange to purchase their interests' .153 This vaunted list of non-sellers covered only nine of the 22 (disregarding partitions) blocks under purchase by 1 December 1916.154 In October Bowler had reported that he had the lists compiled and ready for the printer. The most likely explanation of this shortfall was that the task was in fact still far from complete. Bowler appears to have concentrated his efforts on blocks in which the fewest unsold shares remained and which he hoped exhaustively to purchase, so that the undivided whole could then be declared Crown land (as it turned out, even by 1921 he was unable to do this in any blocks at all). Aside from a few of the blocks in the published list (Te Whaiti 1, Maraetahia, and Waikarewhenua), although all are lengthened substantially by the inclusion of successors, most are strikingly shorter than the 1907 orders. This dramatic indication of the extent of sales would not be overlooked by the Tuhoe, and reinforce Bowler's reminders to prospective sellers that their relatives had already sold their shares, perhaps discouraging pupuri whenua who were (as Bowler had put it) 'inclined to hang on to a portion of their interest'. The list differed in form from both the 1903 Native Reserve block orders and the later list of non-sellers which was published in the Gazette in 1919. The blocks were listed alphabetically in bold type and followed in sequence without breaks, presumably to facilitate a search for a specific name in each block. Whereas in the block orders persons were grouped by 'surname' (that is, by sibling group and hapuu lineage) without any alphabetical order and located only by a number which differed for most blocks, as in most Native Land Court block orders the 1916 list of non-sellers was 152 Fisher to Govt Printer, 19 October 1916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 pt.2; 1 December 1916 Fisher to Bowler, c.f. 616 WDMLC. 153 Undated schedule, MAlMLP 1910/2811 general file, pt.2. My translation. 154 Compare Bowler's end-of-year report, in Miles, p 398. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 172 organised alphabetically by first name within each block without any regard for social organisation. As was the case with the Native Reserve orders, each name was followed by the gender, age (if 20 rather than 18 or under), and shares held in the block. However, for each block the successors of deceased shareholders were listed in a separate alphabetisation after all original surviving shareholders were listed. Successors often held fractions of shares, (sometimes as cumbersome as 5112, 10/63, etc., reflecting division with other successors of different generations), and noting a number, probably the succession order number assigned by the Court. The list of non-sellers published in the 1919 Gazette was to dissipate the kinship organisation implicit in the UDNR orders still further, listing all non-sellers together regardless of block alphabetically by first name, noting all the blocks in which each person held shares rather than separating persons by blocks, summing each person's unsold shares in all blocks, and converting this sum to a pence value. Whereas this pence value of all unsold shares of each person wherever and whatever their source was intended to encourage their sale in 1919, it became the basis for their consolidation on land of nominally equivalent (that is, in pence value) land in the 1921 consolidation scheme, sometimes ancestral and sometimes not. 2.3.2 The Mobile Card Index Bowler began to press for a card index as a supplementary technique for identification of individual shares sometime in 1917. It too was apparently delayed, but for only a few months during which time Bowler probably continued to work to advance his block lists of pupuri whenua by checking them against the original UDNR orders, continually circulating deeds, approved succession orders, and pending succession applications (most of which he himself had solicited and submitted). He had probably already broached the card index to Fisher earlier in 1917 when he wrote to him explaining that: a card system is necessary only to enable me to be in a position to know all [underlined] interests owned by any of the Natives with whom I come into contact. The present system of making an exhaustive search through more than twenty files entails a great deal of work and, besides, interests are Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 173 frequently overlooked .... I think about 3,000 cards will be required, also a tin box with leather case in which I could carry say about 1000 to 1500 cards when on my travels. 155 This explanation best communicates the special regard in which Bowler was to come to hold his card index. There is a revealing exchange between Bowler and Mr. T. Anam, the Registrar of the Native Land Court in Rotorua: Bowler wrote to ask Anaru if he had omitted to return the index card showing the interests ofHaromi Hakaraia to the box after purchasing her Otairi interests. Anaru replied (with a light touch of cautious humour?) that a thorough search of papers and pigeonholes and drawers failed to tum up the missing card. 156 One can understand Bowler's feelings. In practical terms, both the index cards and the lists of non-sellers identified unsold individual shares, whether original or by succession, for each individual in each block which could then be pointed out to the owner, summed up on a cash value, and perhaps purchased on the spot. When he was before a particular Tuhoe armed only with the lists of non-sellers, in addition to searching through the list for each block in which the person's name might appear, insofar as these lists were not reliably completed and up to date, Bowler would have also to search through the original UDNR orders, any subsequent partition orders, and his records of any succession orders or applications. The card index, on the other hand, could be prepared in the office rather than the field, and draw all this information together. Insofar as it was reliably completed (and carried with him on his travels), it would enable him much more expediently to find all this information gathered under the name of any individual Tuhoe he came upon and present it before him or her almost as ifby magic. On 27 November 1917 Bowler reported to the Undersecretary that in preparing for yet more expedient purchasing in the coming summer season he was 155 Bowler to USND, 4 October 1917, c.f. 617 WDMLC. 156 Bowler to Anaru, 23 June 1920, c.f. 621 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 174 ... therefore getting everything in order to inaugurate a card system of owners. It is unfortunate that the printing of the cards has been so long delayed. Can anything be done to expedite this? .... Without such a system it is quite impossible to deal with these purchases to the best advantage, as it frequently happens that the Natives have a number of interests derived from several sources, and while they are willing to sell the fact cannot be detected that they have other shares until the deeds are checked after my return to Auckland .... The compilation of the system will involve a great deal of clerical work, but I am satisfied that it is well worth the trouble. 157 Bowler had apparently already submitted to the Undersecretary a draft of his proposed index card, and asked for 3,000 copies to be printed up, because here he requests that the number be increased to 7,500 copies. Notations on the margin of this letter indicate first that the draft had been approved and the printing ordered some days ago, and then that the cards had been supplied. As was described in the introduction, Bowler and his set of index cards of non-sellers were important resources in the initial organisation of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme in August 1921. The index cards were apparently preserved in the archives of the Waiariki District Maori Land Court through the time of their accession indexing, which was sometime after 1984. However, they have since been lost or misplaced. While pursuing this research in April 2003 I stumbled across what is probably two of them, misplaced between the pages of one of the consolidation groupbooks. They are 4x8 inches in size, and headed by blanks for a name, sex, and age. Columns fill the rest of the card, duplicated on both sides. From left to right, the columns are labeled as follows: Block; Shares; Amount; Successor to; Trustee, if Minor; Date purchased. The two copies I encountered had very few entries, probably in Bowler's own hand, giving names, sex, and age (in 1911) of two persons, naming two blocks and the shares held by each person in the blocks, and the amount in pounds, shillings, and pence these shares were worth. There no entries for the other columns, although consolidation group numbers were noted after each name, and a 4-digit number of shares (probably representing pence not shares) was entered in the 'Successor to' 157 Bowler to USND, 27 November 1917, MAlMLP 1910128/1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 175 column. These extraneous notes probably reflected their use during the organisation of the consolidation scheme. Bowler added to his 27 November 1917 commentary that when he had this card system in force, he would 'submit a suggestion which should, if adopted, result in the acquisition of a very substantial number of interests before the winter weather sets in.' By this suggestion he probably meant pUblication in the Gazette of an updated set of pupuri whenua lists. Bowler obviously still held such a publication in high regard as a purchasing tactic. He did urge this sometime before September 1918, although it was not published until November the following year, missing two promising summer purchase seasons. Bowler's card index system was apparently 'in force' by the end of the following summer, when he reported to Jordan that he had 'combed out the district pretty thoroughly .... The card system was of great assistance but there is now a great deal of work to do to record the succession orders made by Judge Wilson on my applications. ,158 Some documents in the archives subsequent to this date have the notation 'carded' written across information such as successions or purchases, showing that Bowler or clerks were entering the data onto the cards. It was in this March 1918 report that Bowler remarks to the Undersecretary, perhaps not without irony, that he had met the Native Minister (Herries) in the Whakatane Hotel, and that he had advised Bowler to have two bags made to carry his index card system on his travels. (I picture leather saddlebags, balancing what must have been a fair weight of cards, perhaps slung across Bowler's shoulders if not his horse. I imagine that the two batches in which these cards were accessioned in the Waiariki District Maori Land Court archives - Nos.763-4 'Urewera Consolidation Cards A-M' and ' ... M-W' - may have been kept in these two 'saddle' bags). A notation in the margin of Bowler's letter at this point suggests that Herries' suggestion was fulfilled. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 176 2.3.4 A 1919 List of Non-sellers Meanwhile, sometime before 24 September 1918, Bowler had again asked that an updated list of non-sellers be published in the Gazette. On that date Undersecretary Jordan wrote to Bowler directing him to prepare the list of all outstanding owners 'as suggested', with the value of the interest owned by each. He assured Bowler that the list would be published in the Kahiti (the Maori version of the N.Z. Gazette) when it was received from him, and a large number would be sent back to him for circulation. 159 Jordan's locution referring to outstanding owners rather than shares may have been his rather than Bowler's suggestion, signaling the important shift to a comprehensive list which subordinated the blocks to the non-sellers (heretofore it had been the unsold shares in each block which had been problematic). It may be that finally the Native Department had caught up with and even gotten ahead of Bowler in the tactics of purchasing, and were presenting in the new list format all unsold shares regardless of their ancestral location in the invitingly faceless form of a lump sum - on the barrel-head. Yet it was almost a fortnight after Jordan had called for the list that Bowler supplied it, and it was still far from complete. He described what he sent as representing about half of what would need to be printed, promised that the rest would follow in a few days, and claimed a piecemeal approach was required because they must proceed without delay.160 A few days earlier Bowler had sent a draft to the Native Land Purchase office in Auckland, explaining the new format. It was apparently the same as the list of non-sellers which was finally published in the Gazette. The list was organised in three columns: in the first column all of the non-sellers were listed alphabetically by first name without regard to the blocks they were in; ... the amounts in the second column represent the total amount payable to each owner in respect to the whole of his interests .... [and] the figures in the third column refer to [all] the blocks in which the non-sellers are interested [by their number]. An asterisk after a name indicates that the person is said to 158 Bowler to Jordan, 28 March 1918, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Pt.3. 159 Jordan to Bowler, 24 September 1918, MAlMLP 191012811 Pt.3. 160 Bowler to Jordan, 4 October 1918, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Pt.3. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 177 be deceased and that applications for succession have been lodged with the NLC. Non-sellers are recommended to get into touch with the undersigned, with a view to the completion of the sale of their interests. Purchase money is payable immediately upon execution of the instruments of alienation. 161 In the language' ... with a view to completion of the sale of their interests' Bowler was clearly intending to ratchet up the pressure a bit. I have found no information explaining why this was not published in the Kahiti for over a year. It may well be that Jordan insisted that the list be more complete, and that it took this long for Bowler and his limited clerical assistance to achieve this. On the other hand, the Maori Kahiti announced its status as 'Motuhake' (independent) in its title, and this might imply that limited resources led to delays in printing. The final version of the list was in the format Bowler had described his October 1918 draft. It was entirely in Maori, with a heading dated 1 November 1919, and signed by 'Te Poura, Apiha Hoko Whenua Maori'. The introduction read as follows: 'This is a panui (public announcement) to let it be known that this is a list of names of those persons who have not yet sold their shares in blocks being purchased by the Crown [tangata kore ana ki hoko i 0 ratau panga i nga poroka e hokona e te karaona] .... ' (my italics).162 The introduction goes on to describe how the list is organised and what is designated in each of three columns. Again, the locution '... not yet sold their shares .. .', which is repeated toward the end as well as at the beginning, appears to have been intended to press the Crown's expectations. Assuming that the Maori expressed what Bowler intended (and that it was not, for instance, a garbled translation of it), closer examination is warranted. Campbell furnishes a quite different translation by Tama Nikora of the phrases following the second emphasis: 161 Bowler to Native Land Purchase Office, 1 October 1918, Auckland, MAlMLP 1910128/1 Pt.3. th 162 Ko te Kahiti 0 Niu Tireni (Motuhake), Wellington, Friday November 20 1919 (No.49, p 811-828), Knight papers, 112/5/3, LINZ, Hamilton. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 178 ... Ko nga tangata kaore ano kia hoko e whakaarohia ana he pai, me tae mai, me tuhi mai ranei ki te tangata a mau ake i raro nei tona ingoa kia whakaotingia te hokonga i 0 ratou paanga' Which Nikora translated as: Those persons who have not [yet] sold and it is considered to be good, [they] must arrive or [write] to the person whose name is shown below to complete the purchase of their shares. 163 Citing Nikora, Campbell says 'it has been suggested that the Maori version of this notice implies that not selling was evil and that purchases should be completed as soon as possible' (my italics). My first reaction to this reading was skeptical, but then again, I would be at a loss to understand the Maori phrase '... e whakaarohia ana he pai ... ' without the guidance of Nikora' s translation. He is bilingual, but I wonder if a better English translation might be '... Those persons who have not yet sold their shares, pathetically thinking it a good thing, must.. .. '? That is to say or imply, 'they have been fools and this is their last chance before something worse happens.' Such a translation makes it clear there were good grounds for the sense of wrongdoing or threat which Nikora reads in the Maori notice. All 44 blocks (including partitions of Te Whaiti, Paraeroa, Tauwhare-Manuka, and Ruatahuna, and excluding Ruatoki 1, 2 and 3) appear to have been compiled, noting in column 3 by block number those blocks in which each person still held unsold shares. Aside from column 3, in contrast to the 1917 list of non-sellers there appeared to be a consistent effort to play down ownership in particular blocks. The emphasis instead was on a total remaining money value of unsold shares of each non-seller in all blocks, awaiting only his or her signature. However, column 3 reflected the fact that the deeds were for specific blocks and, as the legally fundamental 'instrument of alienation,' would each need to be fully executed before the proper authority, with authority, witnesses, and seller signing, before a number of shares in a particular block were legally sold to the Crown. However, the Crown appeared already to be Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 179 treating the Native Reserve as a whole, anticipating the abolition of the old blocks and the social organisation they represented. The November 1919 panui pupuri whenua (announcement of land-retainers) was 17 pages of fine print. Interestingly, there was a total of about 2,336 individuals listed as non-sellers in the 44 blocks, each retaining at least some shares in a number of blocks ranging from one to 23. An undated draft annual report that Bowler probably drew up at the end of 1920 (some parts of it were so dated) recorded almost the same number of 2,342 persons as the 'number of Natives interested in area not acquired' .164 Although the numbers would have changed through purchases alone in 1920, this figure is probably the best we can do for 1919-1920. The later report also stated that there were 7,488 'signatures required to complete' the purchase of the area. Thus on average, non-sellers still owned shares in two or three blocks each, although this varied from one to 23. The relatively high number of pupuri whenua or 'non-sellers' this late in the purchase campaign is striking. The total indicates a surprising 20 percent increase over the total number of shareholders listed in the 1903 orders (1,993). This probably shows primarily that the birth rate had outstripped the mortality rate even through a violent epidemic and a world war, but it also suggests that by the end of 1919 or 1920 not many of those Tuhoe still living had sold all their shares in all blocks. How many Tuhoe were living but left kore whenua or landless by the end of the purchase campaign? The 1924 report of the consolidation commissioners lists 31 war veterans left landless who had come forward to ask for the return of some Crown land to avoid dependency on their families. 165 The demeaning nature of this request even for veterans suggests that the total figure, veteran or not, must have been several times that. As will be described in the next chapter, comparison of figures which are 163 Campbell 1997, p 31; apparently Nikora's brackets; my italics. For additional clarification: 'the person whose name is show below' is Bowler. 164 Undated draft report in Bowler's hand, probably end of 1919 or 1920, c.f. 621 WDMLC. 165 AJHR 1924 G-7, p 2. _=-CC'--=c---=--=c--=----?"--=---=--=--==~---:===______ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 180 as accurate as we can hope for suggests that between 1919 and 1920 about 185 Tuhoe became landless - that is, in addition to the unknown number prior to November 1919. However, given the intensity and persistence of the purchase campaign, perhaps what we should be asking ourselves is how so many Tuhoe did not sell all their land. Thus if the Native Reserve titles were in chaos, it could be argued that it is important to see this more historically as well as more culturally. There was method in the madness on both sides. The evidence above suggests that while the social organisation of the Native Reserve titles seriously impeded the purchase campaign and even befuddled Bowler, the tactics which he developed to penetrate it were eventually largely successful. However, I want also to pursue the possibilities that Tuhoe took systematic advantage of Bowler's confusion (in ways other than those obvious to him such impersonation and double selling), and that when he began to gain the upper hand they devised further counter-tactics. It is clear that Bowler's repeated pleas for publication of lists he was nevertheless usually unable to complete reflected his own frustrations. His emphases that Tuhoe often did not know what shares they owned, as well as the chaos of titles, implied their confusion if not ignorance. But, ironically, individual undivided shares scattered throughout the many Urewera blocks, and long-neglected succession orders, were less of a problem for the Tuhoe than for the Crown and Bowler. (Indeed, this dilemma has followed the Maori Land Court throughout its history). Bowler's lyricism expressed to Kahuwi Hakeke that 'Kei te takitaki haere nga paanga nei pena me te tapuae 0 te tangata' (the shares are scattered like the tapu footsteps of man) reflected the grudging appreciation he had gained by 1920. Of course, the decimating effects of the individualisation and quantification of ownership, coupled with the anticipation of retrospectively legalised purchase of individual undivided shares in circumvention of the General Committee, eventually overcame Tuhoe control of their lands. But until the complete reorganisation of ~~~~~~~===~~------, - _.::...::.::....------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 181 Tuhoe land tenure in the Urewera Consolidation Scheme, the purchase campaign was actually up against a statutory formalisation of the Tuhoe system of land rights through hapuu affiliation - a difficult system even for Native Land Court officers to comprehend. The Native Reserve titles had not been designed for the alienation procedures which were promoted in the purchase campaign, and in some ways it had been designed against them by the sympathetic traditionalist romances of Seddon, Percy Smith and Elsdon Best - and by the pragmatic foresight of the Tuhoe commissioners. Some other Tuhoe leaders such as Tamaikoha may have been able to see the new pitfalls such as individualisation more clearly but, as we have seen in the case of his own hapuu lineage, had insufficient power to avoid them. To what extent were the Tuhoe themselves confused by the Native Reserve tenure? The contemporary state of Tuhoe knowledge about (contemporary) hapuu affiliations and land rights, as well as ordinary experience in the Maori Land Court, suggests they would have been well-informed - at least until the disruptions of the consolidation scheme. It is almost certain that until 1921 most adult Tuhoe knew most of their stronger block rights themselves, along with their corresponding hapuu affiliations, although not often in the new legal detail of shares, boundaries, and valuations. The full detail of their lesser block rights and correspondingly weaker hapuu affiliations were probably not so widely known. The same pattern of awareness would probably have been true of successions to stronger and weaker rights, although the profound chaos of epidemic deaths, and Bowler's pressing for hundreds of applications for trusteeships as well as successions to the NLC, may have caused considerable confusion. These pressures, and the purchase campaign itself, were the real sources of chaos. In any case, most of these details would have been available to all Tuhoe no matter the state of their own knowledge by conferring with their elders or being referred to tohunga whakapapa of the hapuu in question (this is the way such questions are approached nowadays). The relatively new (in 1903) legal details of shares, boundaries, and valuations would have been less widely familiar or available, but Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 182 most of the kaumaatua who had been involved in the deliberations of the Native Reserve Commissions would have been conversant with them. The Tuhoe commissioners (or their successors) would furthermore have been the repository (probably in the same sense as tohunga) of this information, and would also have had copies of the 1903 or 1907 orders; these were, after all, largely their decisions on these details as well as on the leading and stronger rights of all recognised Tuhoe. These decisions certainly continued to be argued over, but they would have been fully understood as hapuu affiliations and block rights. For most Tuhoe, the legal nature of their undivided shares in blocks and the imprecise nature of the boundaries - the biggest headaches for the Crown - were the least problematic aspects of their new form of tenure because it was a direct reflection of their own hapuu affiliations and those of others, the integral organisation of their hapuu. There were probably an increasing number of Tuhoe advocates of private freehold partitioning, some of which the Crown sought out and brought forward in 1921 as will be described in the next chapter. But this was after a decade of increasingly subversive purchasing strategy and can best be understood in terms of, as O'Malley put it, 'stopping the bleeding.' On the eve of his death in 1916 Numia Kereru could already see what was happening in the purchase campaign, and was among the first to demand consolidation of Tuhoe interests. He apparently had heard about Ngata's early schemes on the East Coast. Had an Urewera consolidation scheme been done at that time, while Tuhoe still held the clear majority of undivided shares in most blocks, it might have been a different story. 2.3.5 Hoko Whenua and Pup uri Whenua Bowler first gave urgent priority to a paanui pupuri whenua, publication of a list of non-sellers, for good reason. The confrontation between hoko whenua ('land sellers') and pupuri whenua (,land-keepers' or 'retainers') in Maori society was established by the 1860s, as described earlier drawing on John White's 1861 account of the effects of a market value in land in Northland. The confrontation first erupted in terms of weaker hapuu affiliations, with those holding the correlative weaker rights to land sometimes attempting to assert them for the purposes of sale, and those having Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 183 stronger hapuu affiliations and primary rights to those lands attempting to exclude those with weaker but threatening rights. This confrontation went to the heart of Maori kinship, undermining the inclusive and interlocking yet nuanced structure of hapuu. Probably since Donald McLean's development of Crown purchase strategies in the 1840s, Crown officials knowledgeable in the subtleties of Maori kinship had occasionally exploited this weakness for political as well as economic goals such as the acquisition of Maori lands. Much of the Urewera history reported by Miles, Campbell, Binney, Fraser and others can be understood in terms of factions seeing each other as hoko whenua or pupuri whenua, often precipitated by shifts in Crown policy, sometimes intentionally. Responses to such policies were echoed in Te Whitu Tekau but took more definitive shape in the early 1890s and surveying, partitioning, and rehearings of Ruatoki block. Binney's analysis of conflicts aroused by the delay and indifference in implementing the 1896 Act reveals factions which can be seen as continuing maneuvers to gain control over lands still potentially threatened by the investigation and alienation procedures for which the NLC had become notorious. Until the Urewera District Native Reserve investigations were finally underway in 1899, there was little assurance that exclusive title and sales were not a threat, and while each faction was pupuri whenua for one area it might tolerate or even lead sales as hoko whenua in another. It could be argued that this well-founded sense of insecurity was quieted (with some exceptions such as timber and gold interests in Te Whaiti block) through the period of investigation and appeals of the Native Reserve, but began to emerge again after the final orders were made in 1907. By 1910 Ngata's efforts to hold the Native Land Purchase Boards at bay, Rua's offers to sell large areas of the Native Reserve, the Crown's disinterest in supporting the organisation of the block committees and General Committee, and finally Ngata and Rua's move to break the General Committee aroused new factions of pupuri whenua against hoko whenua, imagined or real. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 184 The Crown's use ofRua Kenana and Tu Rakuraku, and the subsequent establishment of individual buying in defiance of the 1896 Act and its amendments, were only the most obvious cases of the Crown's intentional promotion and exploitation of distrust and 'competition' between hoko and pupuri whenua. Herries' policy of purchasing shares from individuals, even if carried out quite publicly as it generally was, promoted insecurity of tenure because the cumulative loss of control over Urewera land was invisible. Later in the campaign when Bowler probably displayed maps showing the proportion of shares purchased, it was already alarmingly advanced in most blocks and would have the same effect of tilting some worried shareholders toward giving up and cashing in. Publication of the lists of non-sellers, and the increasingly public and official insistence that they sell all their shares, probably did have some shaming effect (as Boast implies) through 'unwelcome publicity'. However, a more significant 'domino effect' probably worked primarily through pitting pupuri against hoko whenua, keeping the proportion of purchased shares vague until it was preponderant, and playing on the resulting insecurity of tenure. In 1912-13 the Crown also showed signs of turning the Native Reserve over to the procedures of the Native Land Court, allowing appeals in 22 blocks and partition applications in 12 blocks under its jurisdiction.166 As was illustrated by the case of the Ruatahuna partition, the partitions applications often reflected the opportunism of hoko whenua or the defensive reactions of pupuri whenua. However, beginning in 1915 in support of the purchase campaign the orders in council allowing partition applications were revoked in most cases. Enlightened by Bowler, the strategy of the Crown had again shifted, this time to avoid consolidation of pupuri whenua in control of portions of blocks, rather allowing the distrust of hoko whenua in their midst to play itself out to the advantage of the purchase campaign. This pressure was reinforced by restricting purchases to blocks of most interest to the Crown, and rejecting Tuhoe offers to sell in blocks ofless importance to them. 166 10 October 1912 and 3 October 1913, MA 13/90. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 185 It was in this context in 1916 that Kereru probably saw the direction of events and demanded partitions and a consolidation scheme, viewing it as a way to stop the bleeding by partitioning out the whole of the Urewera between pupuri whenua and the Crown. 167 However, in the later words of the Native Minister 'the situation was not yet ripe', and for several more years purchases continued apace while probable control over such a scheme passed increasingly from Tuhoe into the Crown's hands. 2.3.6 Tuhoe Responses If the development and pUblication of panui pupuri whenua had the motivations and effects argued above, what might we suppose to have been the responses of Tuhoe? The rapid success of the purchasing campaign under Bowler shows, of course, that a common response was to sell shares of blocks. This may have been accelerated by the publication of the first lists of non-sellers in late 1916. However, these lists were for less than half of the blocks in which the Crown was buying, and had been long delayed in their appearance. Bowler's frustrations had arisen in the difficulty of identifying unsold shares held by a particular Tuhoe who otherwise seemed ready to sell, and this difficulty and perhaps his frustration were probably often public. He probably could be seen searching a chaos of records which he brought with him, but more often (as he complained to the Native Department) having to return to Auckland and not have the information until the following visit. It is very likely that Tuhoe had come to know that Bowler was not yet in control of this knowledge or his records. If this were the case, it is also likely that many Tuhoe would protect their land rights (and their dignity) by pretending to not know what shares they owned in which blocks, unless they wished to sell them. These shares and blocks were, as we have seen, a great deal more than commodities. Although his Tuhoe agents would often have been able to enlighten him in private, it is not likely they would risk this affront in public. Other Tuhoe standing by would often know the seller was dissimulating, but either join in the ruse or similarly not risk affront. Besides, by 1920 (and still) the Tuhoe were notorious in their solidarity, particularly when being threatened. 167 Kerem to NM, 27 Apri11916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Part 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 186 The first appearance of Bowler's mobile set of index cards on each non-seller in early 1918 probably marked a psychological as well as practical turning point in the purchase campaign. It was suggested above that one key advantage to the index card system was that Bowler and his clerks could struggle with the complications of Tuhoe land rights under the UDNR in private and over the winter season. Probably what most gratified Bowler and endeared the index to him was to do immediately what we have seen him do in correspondence as well as the panui: tell Tuhoe who approached him to sell particular shares (or Tuhoe whom he encountered but who made no offers) just exactly what shares in which blocks they still owned and could immediately turn into cash. In addition to the obvious temptation and probably some public embarrassment, this probably had the effect of baring, even rendering whakanoa (ordinary as opposed to tapu), one's hapuu affiliations, private as well as public, weak or merely symbolic as well as strong, along with the land rights made official in the Native Reserve orders. This might well have been seen by Bowler (not likely the Tuhoe) as almost magic. Finally the Crown could be said to be gaining the upper hand in a long confrontation with Tuhoe pupuri whenua. Nevertheless, this is also when the purchase campaign was encountering declining proportions of sellers each year, and being forced to find a way out of its dilemma of how to cut out the undivided shares of the Crown in every block. It is significant that not only had no blocks been completely purchased, as pointed out earlier the total number of non-sellers in late 1919 was still larger than the number of all Tuhoe in 1903. While a small number of landless Tuhoe was probably steadily increasing, it appears that persistent retention of at least some shares somewhere, and an increasing birthrate, was resulting in a relatively steady and high number of non-sellers. It must have been increasingly clear to the Crown that while in terms of total undivided shares it appeared slowly to be winning the battle, in terms of Tuhoe in the trenches they faced increasing trouble. I would argue that many Tuhoe, whether or not they gave in to the pressures of these super-added tactics of the Crown purchase campaign, had developed counter-tactics Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 187 in defense of their lands. The wide variation of data on retention of shares in Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage suggests a roughly graded range of such tactics: (i) retention of virtually all shares, apparently relatively unusual; (ii) retention of leading or strong rights but sale of lesser rights (for instance, as suggested by Bowler to Kahuwi); (iii) retention of symbolic rights, or token shares (perhaps tuurangawaewae - 'a place to stand', as Boast suggested); (iv) sacrifice ofleading or strong rights for shares foreseen to have more practical value, near the promised roading or near centres of settlement or schooling; (v) 'banking', or selling shares piecemeal when needed for cash, often avoiding selling all shares in any block; (vi) selling everything, for instance, kia whai-moni koe mo etahi 0 ou take kei waho atu 0 nga whenua raruraru nei .. .' (as Bowler urged on Kahuwi) for some purpose or enterprise free of the troublesome land. Most of these tactics were different forms of the 'part-selling' which frustrated Bowler and made his task immeasurably more difficult. In this section I have examined the apparent 'chaos' in the Native Reserve shareholding or titles and argued that it was more real for Bowler than it was for the Tuhoe, but that Bowler devised ways to understand, access, and publish the titles which loosened Tuhoe control of them. Left for separate discussion is one integral aspect of the purchase tactics which he developed: successions, trustees, and certification of age. 2.4 Successions, Trustees and Certification of Age The land tenure processes of succession, trustees, and certification of age were integral to the purchase tactics which Bowler developed in the panui pupuri whenua and card index. Successions were both a headache and a potential windfall for the Crown. Briefly (and crudely), they were a problem because land belonging to a dead person could not be purchased until successors were determined, and they were a windfall because successions at least between the first two generations added substantially to the land shares already held by the successor in virtue of birth rights. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 188 Metaphors of morbidness for such purchasing (and selling) suggest themselves, probably to the 'mythopoeic' (Grey's word, I think) Tuhoe as well. Campbell, Miles, and Boast were aware that trust orders had a role in the purchase campaign, but do not pursue the issue; Miles was furthermore aware of the role of the Public Trustee, and urged further research. 168 Again, although the Native Reserve situation was in many ways unique, a long history of legislation, policy, and experience underlay the Native Ministry, Ministry of Lands, and Bowlers' purchase strategy. The way in which successions, trustees, and certification of age was handled was well established. From the European point of view, land as a privately owned commodity or property normally undergoes succession (when its owner dies), trusteeship (when successors to it are minors or have other disabilities), and certification of age (when owners for whom the land was held in trust gain majority or competence to hold or alienate it themselves). Although a history of special legislation for Maori land has developed, it has generally been intended to transform customary tenure into the same commodity form of individually owned, individually alienable private property. Maori land which has been processed by the Native Land Court (that is, virtually all of it by the 1930s) is in principle readily individualised by partitioning and much like any other commodity subj ect to succession, trusts and release from trusts, investment or security, and alienation. (In the case of Maori land, in the name of the national interest the legislation has been strongly inclined toward alienation since the inception of the Native Land Court in 1865). However, as has been explained, the form of tenure which emerged in the particular case of the Native Reserve was quite different in many ways, mainly because it was intended to conform to traditional tenure, that is, ownership by hapuu rather than individuals, and furthermore to protect it under the mana of committees of leaders. The integral role of hapuu rights in the lists of owners entailed another feature not typical of Native Land Court titles: all children including new-born recognised to have rights in a hapuu which had mana Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 189 over a block were also recognised to hold at least some shares of the block as a birthright. This feature also happened to offer an unusual opportunity to the purchase campaign: children not only stood to inherit the larger shares of their elders when they died, these would greatly augment those shares they already owned. In traditional terms, all children had rights at birth in all the lands in which either one of their parents had rights through the several hapuu of which each parent was a member (unless the parent's right had weakened terminally, or itself had be granted in aroha for lack of descent or occupation). The Native Reserve Commissioners devised ways in which these hapuu rights were reflected in blocks rights and - the Achilles heel of the system - individual shares. Already in 1903, children usually held 1-5 shares in several different blocks, sometimes more depending on their hapuu status in a block. To put it most tellingly: under the customary aspect of the 1896 law the children of a hapuu owned a considerable proportion of each block already in 1903, in their own right, not through succession to the rights of deceased others. European law intervened through subsequent deaths and succession, whereby minors often became owners of additional shares as their inheritance of property, that is, to the shares of their dead predecessors as well as their own. I have not seen this pointed out anywhere in the records as a windfall for purchasing; it might have been a given in the long-established strategy obvious to purchase officers. 2.4.1 Bringing Tuhoe Minors and Recent Adults under the 1909 Act Because of this special aspect of Native Reserve tenure, trusteeship and certification of age became an even more fundamental issue in the purchase campaign than succession to shares. In September 1910 a few months after the control of the General Committee had been broken and Rua had opened seven blocks to Crown purchasing, James Carroll, Native Minister at that time, directed that (i) trustees be appointed for all minors owning shares in 15 blocks (mainly in the lower TaurangaiWaimana basin 168 Campbell, 1997, p 70; Miles, p 399; Boast, 1999, p 175. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 190 and including Rua's offers) and that (ii) the necessary certificates of age be drawn up for all shareholders 21 years of age or over. 169 Although this directive could be seen as simply following the requirements of law, it was probably intended primarily to facilitate purchasing of individual shares. Why should it be supposed that Tuhoe minors and recent adults were not already provided for under the Urewera District Native Reserve Act? The law of trustees in Maori land had been modified in 1909 (by John Salmond assisted by Ngata) to put more control in the hands of the Crown's Public Trustee (previously the Native Trustee) over Maori landholding by minors, apparently intended to protect them from irresponsible sales. Under the Native Land Act 1909, any Native (that is, Maori) 21 years of age or younger was defined as a person 'under disability', and the Native Land Court was encouraged to appoint the Public Trustee to manage their property.170 That is to say, their land was to be held in trust by the Public Trustee whether or not their parents were living and competent to supervise their ownership. Appointment of the Public Trustee had to be applied for, and other trustees could be appointed, but the language of the statute makes it clear that 'anyone' could apply, and that the court would have to justify appointments of trustees (including the parents) other than the Public Trustee. While the owner did not have the power to alienate (sell or lease) his or her property, the trustee (and thus usually the Public Trustee) did have this power and could do so without permission or even consultation with either the minor or the parents. Furthermore, in the case of a price of 10 pounds sterling or more, unless the court explicitly intervened and directed otherwise, only the Public Trustee had the power to sell the land, and to hold the purchase money until the minor had reached the age of 21 (at which time it could be applied for under Section 185). 169 Carroll to NLC Rotorua, 9 September 1910, c.f. 613 WDMLC. 170 NLA 1909 s.I72; I am not sure, but minors appear to have been defined as 18 or under at the time of the 1903 and 1907 orders. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 191 Such pre-emptory legislation was later to be developed for what came to be called uneconomic shares of Maori land, and it remained in effect though the 1980s (the large amount of unclaimed funds from the Public Trustee is one source of the Maori Education Fund). However, especially considering the distinctive nature of shareholding by minors in the Native Reserve, it may be supposed that such pre emptorypowers, and Carroll's implementation of them, would have been inconsistent with and prevented by the 1896 Act. The result seems tantamount to expropriation, especially insofar as the shares were not held by succession and parents were usually alive. But then, so would one suppose that purchase of individual shares would be prevented by that Act. To what extent did the land shares of Tuhoe minors come to be held, and to what extent sold, by the Public Trustee during the purchase campaign? Whatever records may have been held by the Public Trustee have not been examined, but numerous fragments surviving in Native Land Court, Lands department, and Native Land Purchase records can be more or less coherently pieced together. A letter to the Native Department Undersecretary Fisher from the Registrar of the Waiariki District Native Land Court in May 1916 reported that although all outstanding succession orders had been drawn up, it would take considerable time to draw up orders appointing trustees for minors because each of the Urewera block titles would have to be searched. 171 This letter was probably prompted by Bowler's complaint in April to the Undersecretary that 'some hundreds of orders (mainly trustee orders) dating as far back as 1910 have not yet been drawn up, and my operations will be retarded .. .'172 The Registrar was up against the same problem as Bowler (and probably working with him): searching line-by-line through the unfamiliar format of the Native Reserve orders. In response, Fisher did arrange for clerical help, including a search of minutebooks. The Registrar's reference to 'trustees', like the 1909 legislation, means the Public Trustee (unless the Native Land 171 King to Fisher, 9 May 1916, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 part 1. 172 Bowler to Fisher, 1 April 1916, MAlMLP 1910128/1 part 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 192 Court Judge wished to draw up an additional order justifying his replacement by another trustee). Thus this correspondence implies several things: the work was progressing to shift control of several hundred minors' shares in all blocks to the Public Trustee; orders were being made by the court for that purpose and relayed to the Public Trustee; it was likely, however, that this would proceed no more quickly than Bowler's preparation of a comprehensive list of non-sellers (that is, it may not have been completed by late 1919). By 1913 some progress on Carroll's 1910 instructions regarding appointment of trustees appears already to have been made. Numia Kereru had written the Native Minister requesting 'a portion of the money for lands sold' so that he could pay a hospital bill for his daughter Tiria. 173 In 1913, Tiria would have been about 17 years old. Significantly, Undersecretary Fisher had supposed that Numia was referring to shares held by the Public Trustee, and enquired to the Lands Department about any funds laying to Tiria's credit with the Public Trustee. By 1914 the Public Trustee was selling some shares which he held for minors. 174 In 1916, when King was reporting on the situation to Fisher, the Public Trustee held the shares of several minors which Bowler was attempting to buy from him (including Te Mauniko and Kunare Tumoana, with Poniu Tumoana great-grandchildren of Tamaikoha who appear in the hapuu lineage examined earlier).175 As will be recounted later, Bowler's or the Undersecretary's urgings had worked and by June 1916 the Public Trustee was selling these shares. Frequent routine correspondence between Bowler, the Undersecretary, and the Public Trustee (also acting as Native Trustee) in each of the block files kept by the Native Land Purchase Department indicate that such sales of minors' shares probably 173 Kereru to NM, 17 September 1913, MAlMLP 191012811 part 1. Numia must have found Fisher's response rather callous as well as misunderstanding his intent: "Tiria Numia did not dispose of her interests in the Urewera blocks ... being a non-seller." It is likely that all in Numia's family were non sellers; he was probably referring - perhaps bitterly or ironically - to lands in which he and his family had rights, but which had been sold to the Crown by Rua Kenana and his followers. 174 Jordan to Public Trustee, 11 August 1914, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 part 1. 175 Bowler to Public Trustee, 4 May 1916, MAIMLP 191012811 part 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 193 steadily increased, but the only comprehensive list found was probably drawn up by 1918 in the Waiariki District Native Land Court. I76 It is a schedule of 43 payments made to the Public Trustee for the shares of 24 Tuhoe minors in 13 different blocks. I77 A draft of the list reveals that all derive from succession orders. Another list probably about the same time indicates that succession orders were an important source of orders to the Public Trustee. I78 The purchases appear to be among the shares of seven sibling groups in some but not all of the blocks in which they held shares, suggesting that Bowler and the NLC judge's trust orders were working from the information given in the succession application or hearing, and thus that the Native Reserve orders had still not been systematised sufficiently to identify the shares these minors held in their own right. It is ironic that the shares of Te Mauniko Tumoana and Kunere Tumoana in Waikarewhenua block, among those which Bowler had attempted to convince the Public Trustee that he ought to sell in May of 1916, had indeed been purchased. The draft also indicates that their mother, Miria Tupaea, had died by the time of that letter. One can understand the motives of the Crown in pressing these transactions forward. On the one hand, placing the shares of Tuhoe less than 21 years old under the control of the Public Trustee was simply conforming to the 1909 Act. On the other hand, purchasing these shares from this single source was legitimate but also facilitated the acquisition of undivided and often fragmentary shares of Urewera lands which would otherwise require piecemeal transactions with a multitude of individuals. Shortly I will examine evidence that shows the Public Trustee was often an unwilling agent in this aspect of the purchase campaign. However, first I will consider how parents or other Tuhoe trustees for these minors were also given the opportunity, or urged, to sell these shares. 176 MAlMLP 1910128 folders 2-37, and c.f. 617, 618 WDMLC. 177 Undated, c.f. 618 WDMLC. 178 Public Trustee to Native Land Purchase Officer, 8 December 1917, MAlMLP(NLP) 1910/28/5 (Tarapounamu-Matawhero ). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 194 2.4.2 Tuhoe Trustees In February 1921 Bowler wrote his agents Dolan, Hallett and Major, solicitors in Hastings, enclosing for the signature of Ani Rawiri Kamau deeds for her shares in Tarapounamu-Matawhero block. He also pointed out that she was trustee for three minors in that block, and listed them with their shares and values, saying In anticipation of the possibility that she may be disposed to sell the interests of the minors, I have recited the interests in the deed. The money would, of course, be paid to the Public Trustee in compliance with Sec. 185 of the Act, but an application to the Judge of the Native Land court under Sec 29 might result in the Court ordering payment to be made to the Trustee [that is, Ani Rawiri Kamau] by the Public Trustee. 179 Dolan et al replied 8 March 1921 returning the signed deed, but explained that after discussion 'at length' with Ani Rawiri Kamau, she decided not to sell the minors' shares 'at the present time. ' Earlier correspondence fills in some blanks in this purchase routine. In August 1917 Ngahuia Te Otimi applied to the court for such an order to transfer money paid by the Crown to the Public Trustee for minors' shares for which she had signed 'transfers', and enquired about the amounts paid. 18o In June 1920 Judge Ayson of the Waiariki Native Land Court ordered Pikake te Whaiti appointed as a trustee for 13 year old Winiata te Wiremu, and two months later he ordered under Sect 185 of the Act that Pikake was 'capable of giving a good discharge for the sum of 14 pounds 15 shillings and 10 pence held by the Native Land Purchase Officer, being the proceeds of the sale ofthe interest ofthe said minor in Otairi Block' .181 Assuming that the parts of 1909 Native Land Act pertaining to persons under disability (in this case, any Tuhoe 21 or under) held sway over the 1896 Act and its amendments in this regard, the Judge of a Native Land Court apparently had several powers: (i) to order the Public Trustee as the required trustee for the minor (the 179 Bowler to Messrs. Dolan et aI, 15 February 1921, c.f. 627 WDMLC. 180 Ngahuia te Otimi to WDMLC, 9 August 1917; Registrar to Bowler, 20 September 1917, c.f. 617 WDMLC. 181 Ayson, 18 June 1920 and 19 August 1920, c.f. 664 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 195 default or usual case); (ii) for good reason, to order additional trustees for the minor; (iii) to order payment by the Public Trustee to the other trustee of purchase funds paid the former for property of the minor; and (iv) to order that the other trustee was competent to him/herself sell the shares to the Crown. One would suppose that the deeds of purchases are probably the best surviving record for reconstructing purchases through trustees, and I have not done this thoroughly. My rough examination of the deeds or notes on them for Karioi, Ruatahuna, and Waikaremoana blocks suggest that in 1916-1919 (Karioi) few purchases were undertaken through trustees; in 1919-1921 (Ruatahuna) about 9 percent of 541 purchases were through trustees; and in 1922-24 (Waikaremoana block; during the consolidation) about 14 percent of 91 purchases were through trustees. This apparent rise in reliance on trustees accords roughly with the increasing organisation of Bowler's records but seems late, suggesting that some of the earlier records were kept elsewhere (but where, if not on the deeds?). There are only two cases of purchases from the Public Trustee, but this accords with the list of payments to him described earlier: there were only two purchases from him in Karioi block (41 others were in other blocks). These two purchases happened to be of shares owned by Toheroa and Tureiti (misspelled 'Turuhi') Tiopira, grandchildren of Tamaikoha Te Ariari whose hapuu lineage was described earlier, aged about 19 and 20, respectively. The two brothers had succeeded to their father Tiopira's shares in Karioi upon his death sometime before 22 June 1917 (when the Public Trustee sold their shares). All the other cases of purchases from Tuhoe trustees would have required two orders each by the court: one appointing a trustee in addition to the Public Trustee, and a second one certifying that this additional trustee was competent to sell the shares directly. This would reflect close cooperation between the Native Land Court Judge, Registrar, and the Purchase Officer, as well as the improving organisation and efficiency of Bowler's mobile records. However, I have not searched the files for these court documents. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 196 2.4.3 The Role of the Public Trustee A series of correspondences 1915-1919 document some recurrent reluctance of the Public Trustee to sell to the Crown the shares of Tuhoe minors for whom he was trustee. Bowler took over the purchase campaign in June 1915 but had apparently enquired about the shares of minors before the end of the month. At that time, Fisher responded that he doubted if the Public Trustee could deal with the minors' shares, and understood that so far none had been purchased. 182 The following day Bowler responded cautiously, also by telegram: 're minors quite recognise point have taken few signatures by trustees as whole purchase probably subject validating legislation do you not think it unwise to neglect opportunity obtaining further interests.' 183 A few days later Fisher relayed the suggestion of the Native Minister (Herries) that the trustees could sell minors' shares if Bowler considered it 'necessary', but that the purchase money should be lodged with the Public Trustee in accordance with Section 185. 184 In early May 1916, about the same time that King wrote to the Native Ministry to ask for help in the task of drawing up the backlog of trustee orders for the Urewera blocks, Bowler approached the Public Trustee. The tenor of his appeal suggests an earlier offer of purchases had been turned away. Bowler sent him a list of minors holding shares in Waikarewhenua and other blocks, reported that he had been appointed as their trustee, and urged him to sell the shares to the Crown. He advised the Public Trustee that 'all' relatives had sold their shares, that the Crown now held over 100,000 acres of the Reserve, and that the remaining shares of the minors were 'microscopic' and would therefore be useless if cut out of the Crown's interests. (These statements were rather overdrawn: even four years later in 1920 Tuhoe still held about 20 percent of the shares by area in Waikarewhenua). Bowler concluded his 182 Fisher to Bowler, 29 June 1915, MAlMLP 1910128/1 part 1. Fisher might have been assuming the legislation prevented this, but was misinformed on what had already happened: at least Jordan was involved in a purchase of shares in Maungapohatu block from the Public Trustee the previous year, and purchases were recorded by the latter as early as 1907 (Public Trust Office to Lands Department, 8 December 1917, MAlMLP(NLP) 1910128/5 (Tarapounamu-Matawhero). 183 Bowler to Fisher, 30 June 1915, MAlMLP 191012811 part 1. 184 Fisher to Bowler, 2 July 1915, MAlMLP 1910128/1 part 1. .~~~~~.. ~.. ~.. ~.,=. ~,===- -=-=-=-=-~-~--- --: - .------=--=------~--- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 197 request equivocally that 'If you require the Native Land Court trustee orders you can ... obtain them on application to the Native Land Court Rotorua.,185 Later in May the Public Trustee responded, asserting that he would not accept Bowler's offer to purchase the shares of the several minors in several blocks mentioned until the Native Land Court obtained the necessary Trust Orders. 186 Bowler probably then himself asked the court to forward the orders to the Trustee, and apparently the appropriate deeds for his signature as well. In June the Public Trustee returned at least two batches of receipts and acknowledged receiving sums 'being the purchase money due' to the minors listed for their shares in Te Whaiti 2, Tauranga, and other blocks.I87 The head Public Trustee in Wellington was apparently less cooperative in 1917. In March Bowler asked Undersecretary Jordan of the Native Department to intervene. Bowler had twice written the Public Trustee himself urging sale of a list of minors' shares, but twice he had refused to sell without a special valuation being carried out on the Urewera blocks concerned. 188 Bowler had replied that the prices offered were already based on a special valuation by experts for the purpose of the Crown purchasing. Bowler reasoned to Jordan that a special valuation 'in such difficult and remote country would cost practically as much as the minors' interests concerned are worth,' concluding that 'it is very desirable that the interests concerned should be bought, as the purchase of some of the blocks is almost complete - a fact that goes to show that the owners were satisfied with the price offered' (his reasons appear circular; Miles 1999 and Robertson 2002 have argued to the contrary, and I have reviewed the ways in which the Native Minister, Undersecretaries, and Bowler appeared to cooperate in enforcing what were probably unreasonably low prices). Jordan responded promptly to Bowler's request, writing the Public Trustee in Wellington on 26 March 1917. Extending Bowler's overstatement, the 185 Bowler to Public Trustee, 4 and 10 May 1916, Auckland, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 part 1. 186 Public Trustee to Bowler, 22 May 1916, MAlMLP 1910128/1 part 1. 187 Public Trustee to Bowler, 15 and 22 June 1916, MAlMLP 1910128/1 part 1. 188 Bowler to Jordan, 19 March 1917, and Jordan to Bowler 23 March 1917, c.f.616 WDMLC. _cc-=---=--=--=---=-=-=--~=_--,,=_-,_=-;~=;;_=-,~---c----c-~~~ ______ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 198 Undersecretary confidently reported that the 'purchase of quite a number of blocks is well on the way to completion, and the principal outstanding interests appear to be those of minors for whom you are trustee.,189 Jordan goes on to explain that it was quite impossible to supply special valuations of the blocks because they were unsurveyed 'and the Valuer General had on several occasions intimated that he is not in a position to make special valuations of the land.' However, the valuations on which they were proceeding had been made 'by high officials of the Lands Department and these values appear to have met with the approval of the great majority of the owners ... when selling their interests to the Crown.' In conclusion, Jordan urged the Public Trustee's reconsideration of the prices offered and drew a grim picture of the alternative: The Native Land Purchase Board is very anxious to complete the purchase of as many of the blocks as possible in order that they may be proclaimed Crown Land and opened up for settlement. If, however, it be found impossible to acquire the interests of the minors for whom you are trustee, the result will be that when the court proceeds to partition out the Crown's interest, there will be a large number of small interests scattered here and there throughout the block, thereby greatly adding to the cost of the survey and access by road, and also imposing a somewhat heavy burden upon the portions of land awarded to the minors. Although in fairness it must be admitted that even Bowler was not yet clear on the situation, there were a great many more 'non-sellers' than this supposedly deserted population of minors. Even four years later there were probably more non-sellers than there were owners in 1907. Ironically, although the Crown was to have its way with the consolidation as well as the Public Trustee, the final results were not unlike those Bowler and Jordan deprecated - except that the scattered interests were those of whole hapuu, not orphaned minors, and the roads were not built although paid for in Tuhoe land. The head Public Trustee did reconsider, and replied the following week that he was prepared to sell the undivided interests of the minors for whom he had been appointed 189 Jordan to Public Trustee, Wellington, 26 March 1917, MAlMLP 10/28/1 pt 1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 199 trustee at the prices offered by Bowler except for the Otairi block, which he understood to be worth twice as much as was being offered. 19o Jordan wrote to Bowler to announce this, and suggested he arrange for the Public Trustee at Auckland to back the Lands Department's lower price on the Otairi block because the Wellington Public Trustee would be 'unlikely to dispute the deputy' .191 He invited Bowler to send the appropriate deeds and payment checks to him in Wellington and he would personally see that the documents were executed with the Public Trustee. However, some doubts of the head Public Trustee apparently continued. In June 1917 the Native Land Purchase Officer in Wellington wrote to Bowler to report that the Public Trustee had sold the shares of ten minors in Te Whaiti, Paraoanui North, Taneatua, Ruatoki South, Te Wairiko, Paraoanui South, Tauranga, Karioi, Parekohe, and Waikarewhenua blocks, but had insisted that (thereafter, presumably) the same licensed interpreter sign for the translation of the deeds he is expected to sign as the Public Trustee. l92 He would have been referring to purchases through Tuhoe trustees who had already signed the deed, but who would not receive the purchase money from the Public Trustee unless the court so ordered. His concern appears to have been whether the Tuhoe trustees were fully aware of what they were doing, and an effort to ensure that this responsibility was focused on one rather than several officials. Given the far-flung organisation of agents (including interpreters) whom Bowler had organised, it would have been very difficult to satisfy this final request of the Public Trustee. Over the next few months correspondence shows a series of purchases from the Public Trustee were completed, apparently facilitated in the Wellington office by Undersecretary Jordan himself. However, by September 1917 Bowler or the Judge appear to have overlooked the necessary court orders appointing the Public Trustee as trustee, and the latter asserted that he was 'not prepared to negotiate for the sale of 190 Public Trustee to Jordan, 4 May 1917, MAlMLP 10/28/1 pt 1. 191 Jordan to Bowler, 17 May 1917, MAlMLP 10/28/1 pt 1. 192 Brown to Bowler, 23 June 1917, c.f. 617 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 200 interests in Tarapounamu-Matawhero, Te Rangi-a-Ruanuku, and the Hikurangi Horomanga blocks 'until the Trustee Orders are to hand,'193 It appears that by December Bowler and the Native Land Court at Rotorua were not quite able to keep up with the Public Trustee's readiness to sell: the latter had finally received the orders appointing him as trustee for the minors' shares in these three blocks, but had to invite offers to purchase them. 194 The orders included grandchildren of Tamaikoha Te Ariari whose hapuu lineage was described earlier. They were Tureiti and Toheroa Tiopira, aged six and five respectively in 1903 and successors to Tamaikoha's son Tiopira, who apparently died before Tamiakoha himself. (As had been the case with the early trustee orders, the succession order had probably prompted the original approach to the Public Trustee to sell these shares). As can be seen in Figure 2 of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage and the 1903 order for Tauwhare-Manuka block, Tiopira himself already had a grandchild by 1903: his oldest child's daughter Meto Teko, aged five at that time, given her mother's rather than her father's first name as a surname because her father was a Pakeha (and she a 'half-caste' or 'H.C.'), and holding a birthright of two shares in the block. Almost two years later in 1919 Bowler wrote the Undersecretary to say that 'Meto Teko (Tiopira)' had recently had the Public Trustee appointed as her trustee, and ask the Undersecretary to execute the documents to purchase this minor's shares in four blocks (Bowler added the grandfather's surname, probably aware that he was making further purchase inroads into this very large and influential hapuu lineage, as he thought he was with Tiopira's tuakana Hakeke's son Kahuwi the following year).195 However, the evidence indicates that in 1919 Meto Teko was probably 21 or even 22 years old, and thus no longer a minor: while she is reported to be five years old in the 1903 orders, she is reported to be 10 years old in the 1907 orders. If either is correct, then the court had incorrectly drawn up an order appointing the Public 193 Ronaldson, deputy Public Trustee to Brown, Native Land Purchase Officer, Wellington, 19 September 1917, c.f. 617 WDMLC. 194 Public Trustee to Bowler, 8 December 1917, MAlMLP(NLP) 1910/28/5 (Tarapounamu Matawhero ). 195 Bowler to USND, 16 July 1919, c.f. 622 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 201 Trustee as trustee to an adult, and the Public Trustee was illegitimately selling the shares of an adult without even notifying the owner (the usual procedure with all minors' shares). The mistake may have been an oversight, but it might also have avoided locating Meto Teko, drawing up a certificate of age by the court, and convincing her to sell. Section 173 (3) of the 1909 Act appears to be lenient regarding any such mistake, the mistake even over-ridding the fact until it is amended. Given the unseemly scramble by Bowler, the Native Land Court, the Native Department, and the Office of the Public Trustee to identify minors holding shares in one or another Urewera block in their own right, and each of their other shares through succession, get the appropriate court orders drawn up, and place the relevant offers before the Public Trustee, one may suspect that such oversights were not uncommon. Although the Tuhoe were probably far more aware than Bowler of most of the land rights they held, including many of those by succession or gift, it is probable that they usually remained unaware of these particular procedures - most of which occurred without the necessity even to notify them - and it is possible that no one ever knew agam. When the Urewera Consolidation Scheme was organised in August 1921, it seems likely that the shares of many minors had been turned over to the Public Trustee by court order, but not yet sold by him or by other trustees with the rights to sell them. If these minors had attained the age of 21, control over their shares would have automatically reverted to them under the 1909 Act (they might never have known they didn't have them). However, one wonders what happened to the unsold shares of those who remained under 21. I know of no provision in the legislation, and have encountered no record that they were transferred back to control of the commissioners for inclusion in the consolidated shares of non-sellers. 2.4.4 Getting on Top of Successions The role of the Public Trustee was a problem for the purchase campaign, then, largely because under the Native Reserve all Tuhoe no matter what age held shares as a birthright rather than through succession, and because the 1909 Act deemed any Native under 21 to be legally a person under disability to handle their own property. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 202 However, it was nevertheless successions which posed the biggest headache for the campaign. Whereas with sufficient preparation all shares of all Tuhoe minors could in principle be purchased from one person, the shares of deceased Tuhoe could not be purchased at all until the survivors were convinced something had to be done about it, the successors were identified, the necessary applications were made to the Native Land Court, and the successions were ordered by the Judge. Even then, although the shares to which all minors had succeeded could, in principal, be purchased from the Public Trustee, each adult successor had to come of their own accord to the Purchase officer or his agents to sell the shares, or had to be located and convinced to sell. This rather imposing difficulty spilled over into the Urewera Consolidation Scheme, whose officers were stultified by 'over four hundred deceased owners, and the succession orders made numbered 1,081,.196 By 1923 a further 759 successors to deceased owners were ordered before orders for the new blocks were drawn Up.197 From the point of view of contemporary Tuhoe, the bureaucratic inertia inadvertently built into Maori land ownership would be seen as a bittersweet irony: it hindered the purchase campaign. But from the point of view of the Crown at the time, it was a routine challenge in the systematic acquisition of Maori land. The officers who doggedly carried this out can be seen as heroes of a kind. The number of succession orders which had been ordered by the court during the purchase campaign is less certain, but by March 1920 Bowler reported 1,916 'succession applications lodged.,198 It was mentioned earlier that in May 1916 the Registrar announced to the Native Department that 'all successions orders affecting the Urewera blocks have been drawn up'. This was probably an optimistic claim at the time, implying that all deaths and successions to each block since 1907 had been identified and orders applied for and given in the court. Unless they are intent on partitioning, Maori are usually not concerned to 'keep titles up to date', tending to 196 Knight, AJHR G-7 1921, P 5. 197 Knight, AJHR G-7 1923, P 2. 198 Undated draft report, in Bowler's hand, c.f.621 WDMLC. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 203 view ancestral lands as patrimony that might as well remain in the names of their grandparents or great-grandparents - and this attitude would have been stronger in the UDNR insofar as it had been set up as hapuu lands. In July 1917 Bowler had lodged applications for 'a couple of hundred' successions and made arrangements to publish their court hearing, when it was scheduled, in the panui or public announcements of the Waiariki District Native Land COurt.!99 At that time, apparently rather naively, he asked the Registrar to inform him which blocks these successions applied to, 'as I desire to lodge applications in respect of other blocks.' This is interesting, because until the succession application was heard in the court with at least some witnesses and successors present, one could not be sure to whom what shares in which blocks were to go. Again, almost all Tuhoe had rights in many blocks, and there was no obvious way (such as alphabetisation) to locate the name of the deceased in the long block lists organised by hapuu rights. The land rights of the deceased, being closely associated with ancestral or hapuu rights, were (and still are) often distributed unevenly among one's children for many reasons, including the effort to keep the mana of each hapuu affiliation active or 'warm'. Nor did Tuhoe leave their land rights only to their children, but also gifted them widely to other relatives, adopted children, and close friends. It appears that Bowler intended to second-guess this distribution and make out applications for the more obvious successors (that is, the children) in all the blocks in which the deceased held shares. His method of 'lodging applications' seems to have been similarly pre-emptory. His 1918 draft for a gazetted list of non-sellers implied that he relied on hearsay (' ... the person is said to be deceased ... 'iO! and he probably drew up probable successors for the application in the same way; this sort of information was widely-known, and could have been derived from Bowler's various Tuhoe agents. 199 Bowler to King, 27 July 1917, c.f. 617 WDMLC. 200 Bowler to Native Land Purchase Office, Auckland, 1 October 1918, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Pt.3. 201 Bowler to Native Land Purchase Office, Auckland, 1 October 1918, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Pt.3. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 204 Later that year in November Bowler reported that he had 500 applications for succession (that is, 500 successors to an unmentioned number of deceased persons) before the Native Land Court for its sitting in Taneatua.202 However, he was disappointed that the sitting had been moved to Rotorua in accordance with money saving directives. Taneatua is a town a few miles from the Tuhoe settlement of Ruatoki, and Bowler probably usually arranged to have his applications heard there (and public notification in the panui accordingly) so that sufficient witnesses and successors showed up to satisfy the Judge. One would suppose that it would take the court several long sittings to work through so many succession orders, but it appears that it had done so (regardless of where it sat) by early the next year. In March 1918 Bowler expressed satisfaction with 'a great deal of work to do to record the succession orders made by Judge Wilson on my applications,' probably on his card index.203 The next year in October 1919 Bowler reported that he hoped to 'clear up many of the succession applications at court in Whakatane next month' and added that 'I consider that the influenza epidemic put operations back quite a year. I had to lodge something like 1,000 applications for succession. ,204 It was pointed out earlier that this may be the best information we have on mortality among Tuhoe from the influenza epidemic of 1918 (although deaths in WWI would probably have been included without discrimination in Bowler's succession applications). Bowler appears to have been attributing most or all of these 1000 successions to the epidemic (if that was so, and we assume an average of four successors per deceased, that implies that as many as 250 Tuhoe with children died in the epidemic. (Probably many more children and infants died, and those who held land shares would require succession orders but typically reversion to one parent or surviving sibling). In any case, this may imply that most previous successions had been 'cleared up' (that is, ordered by the court) until the epidemic struck. If so, a total of 1,500 succession applications by October 1919 tallies roughly with the total of 1,916 he reported in March 1920 if another 400 were accounted for by belated information and more deaths. 202 Bowler to USND, 27 November 1917, MAlMLP 1910/28/1. 203 Bowler to Jordan, 28 March 1918, MAlMLP 1910/28/1 Pt.3. 204 Bowler to USND 11 October 1919, AADS AccW3562 bundle 617A 22/697, Box 274. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 205 However, we do not know how many of these applications had been 'cleared up' by the time that the Urewera Consolidation Scheme took over in August 1921 without searching the minutebooks and old block files for the orders. Consequently, we don't know how many of the 1,081 successions dealt with at Tauarau where the Scheme was arranged (in a few weeks!) were hold-overs from Bowler's earlier applications. As will be described later, the Group Books A-E in which the shares of non-sellers were tabulated listed the dead along with the living, leaving them and their successors to be tabulated in Group Books F1 and F2 (which became the succession orders by fiat when Parliament legislated these arrangements for the Scheme). However, as we saw in my analysis of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage, even the final report published in October 1921 (and thus the Urewera Lands Act 1921-22 which legislated it) had at least some ghosts in it, probably including Tamaikoha Te Ariari himself. Consequently, the commissioners, in their own processing of 759 successors (through 1923) were still settling at least some of Bowler's succession applications which may have been pending for several years. Section 7 (4) of that Act actually directed the commissioners to ascertain the deceased 'in the lists', and their successors, but assured them that any which had been overlooked would not invalidate their orders.205 2.4.5 Certifying Tuhoe Competence to Sell The procedures for certification of age in the purchase campaign remain to be examined. Although the birth rights to land of all Tuhoe under 21 were supposed to put in the hands of the Public Trustee to manage, and likewise any land rights to which they succeeded before they reached that age, the 1909 Act stipulated that these powers ceased automatically when the beneficiary attained his or her majority (Section 178 (1)). The same section states that a certificate by a Judge of the Native Land Court was sufficient proof of the attainment of 21 years of age. As mentioned in the introduction of the previous chapter, in 1984 I noticed several hundred blank copies of this sort of certificate in the Urewera archives, although they were no longer there in 2003. However, in the closed files I did find several dozen copies which had 205 N.Z. Statutes, Urewera Lands Act 1921-22, MA 31121. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 206 already been made out to individuals and certified, but apparently never delivered to the persons concerned. 206 The certificates appear quite official, and one imagines that Bowler may have drawn these up (and had intended to draw up many more) to distribute to Tuhoe marking their attainment of majority and, perhaps, informing them that while in the past they could not themselves sell the land shares they held, they could now. Each certificate stated simply that the person named, 'claiming to have attained the age of twenty-one years .... After due inquiry made, it is hereby certified, in terms of section 178 of the above mentioned Act .. ,' to have reached majority. Although the Act stipulates that a Judge is to sign these certificates, Bowler himself had signed them, writing 'Commissioner' under the word 'Judge'. A letter from the Native Department dated 20 October 1917 reports that contrary to the wording of the Act, a Judge or a Commissioner of the court could authenticate the certificates of age. However, 47 of the 54 were dated before 20 October 1917, most in 1916 and one in 1915. So it appears that for some years Bowler had been going ahead in the certifications, and almost certainly the corresponding purchases, probably on the reassurance of the Undersecretary that regardless of what the Act stipulated he had the necessary official authority to be doing it. Bowler was too smart to be going out on this limb alone. This backing by the Native Department in cutting comers is also suggested by the casual manner in which Bowler assumed Tuhoe ages. Below is the information I recorded from the certificates, including the name of the person certified to be 21, an Urewera block in which the person holds an interest, and the date of the certificate. Twice Bowler added other blocks, but usually only one is named. Where the name could be found I have calculated their age at the time the certificate was signed by reference to their age in the 1903 orders and, if that appears to be under 21, checked it against their age according to the 1907 orders. As can be 206 Various dates 1 July 1915-10 March 1920, c.f. 616, 618, and 621 WDMLC, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 207 seen, according to this evidence many of the Tuhoe Bowler certified as 21 or over probably were not. Figure 4: Some Tuhoe certified as 21 or over, 1915 -1920 Certificate Date and Name Age by 1903 Orders Age by 1907 Orders 1 July 1915: Puruhi te Pou (Maungapohatu) 18 20 11, 17 November 1916: a) Manapakupaku Mika (Tauranga) 18 19 b) Tamaro te Aooterangi (Tauranga) 18 19 c) Waihuka Wakamaru (Tauranga) ? d) Rangitakohe Matehaere (Te Purenga) 20 21 e) Rangitakohe Matehaere (Te Poroporo) " " f) Tamoro te Aooterangi (Te Purenga) 18 19 g) Pango Ruka (Paraoanui So.) ? <20 h) Teki Tukuwaho (Parekohe) ? i) Te Arohi Tiaki alias Maria Tiaki (Omahure) 19 20-21 j) Te Arohi Tiaki alias Maria Tiaki (Te Tuahu) " " k) Rangitakohe Matehaere (Te Wairiko) 20 21 1) Rangitakohe Matehaere (Te Tuahu) " " m) Ngawaiata Rora (Te Whaiti 2) ? n) Ngawaiata Rora (Te Whiati 1) " 0) Hoko [Moko] Wharetuna (Taneatua and other blocks) 18 20 p) Te Whitu Turei (Paraeroa) q) Ana Reha (Waikarewhenua and other blocks) 19 20 r) Teki Tukuwaho (Waipotiki) 15 16 s) Tamaro te Aooterangi (Te Tuahu) ? t) Raha te Whetu (Te Tuahu) 18 19 22 14 March 1917: a) Hinepau Pei (Parekohe) ? <21 b) Maraea Taua (Maungapohatu) 17 18 c) Te Ahitere [Uhitere] te Paoro (Mungapohatu) 21 d) Tiakipa Tuhoro (Turanga) 19 20 e) Tamihana Erueti (Tauranga) ? <20 f) Ngatapa Paora (Paraeroa) 20 21 g) Ngatapa Paora (Tauwharumanuka No.3) " " 7,18 July 1917: a) Wharetakahia Hiki (Hikurangi Horomanga) 19 20 b) Taheke te Hauwaho (Parekohe) 15 16 c) Matemate te Mataku (Maungapohatu) 16 18 d) Te Parehohai [-kowhai?] Ereatara (Tauranga)? ? <19 e) Mauapakupaku Mika (Maungapohatu) 19 20 f) Kaikatokato te Whetu (Te Tuahu) 15 16 g) Mare Terupe (Parekohe) ? h) Ana Reha (Waipotiki) 16 17 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 208 i) Raho Paiaka (Tauranga) 20 21 NB: (there were about 11 more certificates which I did not record) 20,30 October 1917: a) Wera Tatana (Tarapounamu Matawhero) 22 b) Raiha Hiki (Te Ranga a Ruanuku) ? <15 c) Herepo Hiki (Te Ranga a Ruanuku) " " d) Tangiwaka Moa (Te Ranga a Ruanuku) 22 13 September 1917: Ruiha Tureiti (Hikurangi Horomanga) 16 17 10 March 1920: Parehuia Merito (Te Whaiti 2) The question marks note either a person who could not be located at all in the 1903 orders (probably usually because the name on the certificate was mistakenly heard or spelled), or a person whose sibling group was located but not this first name. In the latter cases a maximum age was added if the person was born after the youngest sibling. Of the 43 certificates of age recorded, it appears that Bowler certified at least 17 for persons who were under 21, sometimes several years younger. What 'due inquiry' would Bowler be expected to undertake? He might have relied on the avowal of the person certified or, as with succession orders, he might have often proceeded on hearsay. Aside from the Registry of Maoris (a roster for the World War I draft which was probably very incomplete and not drawn up until 1918) the Native Reserve orders appear to be the only documentary evidence of age for the Tuhoe at this time. These were the basic legal document establishing the shares which he was purchasing, and furthermore reported the age of minors. Bowler would certainly be expected to have consulted these, at least the 1907 final orders, in fulfillment of a due inquiry. It may be significant that the dates at which these surviving certificates of age begin to dwindle coincides with period during which Bowler and Undersecretary Jordan overcame the reluctance of the Public Trustee to sell the shares of minors. These oversights or mistakes aside, what appears to have been Bowler's procedure with the certificates of age? The grouping of dates on the certificates may indicate either that it was on these dates that these persons approached (or were approach by) Bowler, or simply that it was on these dates that he sat down to draw up as many ------~ --.-~~~~~~~--~~~ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 209 certificates as he could (many are during the winter, when he was more likely to have been in his office in Auckland). On 27 July 1917 (see this batch above) he mentioned to the Registrar of the Rotorua court that he was sending certificates of age to him for attachment to the files. 207 He was apparently making out succession applications at the same time. However, it is unclear whether he was making out certificates of age similarly in advance or in response to offers to sell. It may be significant that in all of the above cases but 9, the person named apparently did eventually sell all his or her shares in the block named (one person retained some of the shares in the block, and other persons do not appear in the Group Books, suggesting either that they died or that they sold all their shares in all their blocks). It seems likely that, as with the succession orders, Bowler was attempting to have a certificate of age ready when an opportunity presented itself to buy shares from a Tuhoe of equivocal age. He might have planned to present the certificate to a prospective seller by way of encouragement (and perhaps blandishment), and attach it to the deed when a sale was executed. This would explain the hundreds of blank forms still in the archives in 1984. However, one must then ask why so few completed forms remained in the files. 2.5 The Relative Predicaments of the Crown and Tuhoe In conclusion I want to return to a point I raised in the introduction to chapter one. While the Crown admitted in the final report (which was to become part of the Urewera Lands Act 1921-2) that it had put itself in a bad position, it claimed that 'The position of the [non-sellers] was indeed worse than that of the Crown'.z°8 To the contrary, I argued there, the predicament of the Crown might well have been the worse of the two. It is a pity that this possibility was never tested in court. Two very influential legal opinions suggesting the Crown was in the worse predicament were already in the records of the Urewera purchase campaign and consolidation scheme when the latter was pressed hurriedly past parliament and into legislation. 207 Bowler to King, 27 July 1917, c.f. 617. 208 Knight, AJHR G-7, 1921, P 3. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 210 In response to Judge Wilson's plan to partition the Ruatahuna block in 1917 (which was in ignorance of the partition already completed in 1913), Solicitor General lA. Salmond pointed out that 'A block of Native land consists of an area every part of which is owned in common by the same group of Natives. ,209 It may be supposed that, in virtue of the same principle, every share in every block of Native land which the Crown had purchased in the Urewera consisted of an area every part of which was owned in common by the same group of Natives (or, perhaps, the same group of Crown and Natives). This legal problem would be on top of the separate legal question of whether the Crown could legitimately purchase individual undivided shares in the blocks despite the legislation protecting the authority of the Tuhoe General Committee. Just what was it that the Crown had come to own? What was its relative legal grounding compared to that which grounded Tuhoe ownership of the Urewera District Native Reserve? It was suggested that the undivided individual shares of blocks which the Crown had purchased were defined neither internally by any specific location in the block, nor externally by a complete legal survey of block boundaries - on top of owning it only through retrospective legislation if at all. In Salmond's dramatic but surely authoritative terms, even if the Crown's purchases were legal, the Tuhoe continued to own every part of what the Crown owned - 'in common' with the Crown, so to speak. It might be pointed out that this is exactly the predicament of Maori land tenure which consolidation schemes were designed to overcome legally, but it could then be responded that the predicament which the Urewera Consolidation was used to overcome was not this one, but the Crown's (questionable) ownership in common with the Tuhoe. Meanwhile, the legal tenure which the Tuhoe continued to enjoy, at least until it was abolished by the 1922 legislation, was grounded in nothing less than a statute specifically designed to meet Tuhoe ends (although it had been significantly compromised in this regard in specific ways). It may furthermore be argued that the technical terms of Tuhoe customary 209 Salmond to the USND, 27 September 1917, WDMLC c.f.623; my emphasis. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 211 land rights, including the kinship rights upon which they were based, were in general tenns built into the 1896 statute which underwrote them, and in quite specific tenns built into the minutes and block orders of the commission which was fonned to carry out the statute and did so in these minutes and block orders. The other legal opinion of the time which would challenge the official assumption that the Crown was not in such a bad position as the Tuhoe non-sellers emerged in a context which will be examined in chapter four, but its essentials can be mentioned here. In November 1921, apparently in response to the pending legislation for the Urewera Consolidation, Chief Judge Jones of the Native Land Court wrote a legal opinion which is less blunt that Salmond's.210 I take the implications of his argument to be that the purchases of the Crown were invalid either because they had been in Native Titles which were invalid (for two reasons), or because the Native titles had reverted to the legal status of customary land, which likewise could not be alienated to the Crown. Insofar as this legal argument was valid (and it had also come from eminent legal authority), the whole purchase campaign had accomplished nothing and the Crown owned no shares at all. Thus it appears that the Tuhoe may well have been in a better legal position regarding their tenure than was the Crown in its purchases in their tenure, at least until the Urewera Lands Act was passed to repeal the 1896 Act and its amendments and legitimise the consolidation scheme in its place (which was not until early in 1922). Even then and still, I presume, the law of equity as well as fiduciary responsibility of the Crown would prevail. 2\0 Jones, unaddressed memorandum, 14 November 1921, N.L.P, 1921169 MAl 29/417 Pt.l. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 212 2.6 Summary The previous three chapters have attempted to layout the historical conditions underwhich the Urewera Consolidation Scheme took shape. The introduction analysed Tuhoe social organisation and especially the structure of hapuu and land rights as it was recognised under the Urewera District Native Reserve Act. Chapter one analysed the situation of the Tuhoe in the face of the Crown purchase campaign through case histories of a particular hapuu lineage and a network of leadership centred in Ruatahuna lands, both losing ground against the Crown but not without a fight. Here in chapter two I analysed the Crown's organisation of the purchase campaign. I argued that the institutional power of the Crown arrayed behind the campaign, long practiced in the acquisition of Maori land and at this time led by Herries, was probably a more important factor than the undoubted social and economic depression of the Tuhoe. Thus responsibility for the results of its campaign lie squarely with the Crown. The institutional power of the purchase campaign was laid out in terms of Bowler's venues of operation and far-flung network of informal agents, and the tactics which he struggled to develop against the Tuhoe defenses of a mazeway of hapuu rights entrenched by statute as well as ancestry in the old blocks of the Native Reserve, the tenacious resistance of some leaders, and a steady increase of the total of pupuri whenua or 'non-sellers' which his best efforts reduced only slowly. His tactics included elaborate clerical methods of identifying and locating individual unsold shares, publishing them, pitting hoko whenua against pupuri whenua, and exploiting the key role of minors in Tuhoe land rights. He was backed in all these tactics by Herries and the Native Department. Nevertheless, the facts that the Crown was unable to purchase anyone of the 35 blocks of the Tuhoe rohe in its entirety, that is was forced to organise a consolidation scheme in order to proclaim the land it had purchased illegally in undivided shares still held in common in every part of each block, and that there were more non-sellers at the time of this consolidation than there Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 213 had been owners in 1903, constitute the little triumphs of the Tuhoe, despite the Crown's acquisition of most oftheir land. The following chapters three and four consider the arrangement of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme in Ruatoki in 1921, and the routines of its implementation under the consolidation commission 1921-1927. This was the Crown's solution to its own predicament - which it presented to the public and to the Tuhoe as a solution to the predicament of the Tuhoe. Part II: The Arrangement and Implementation ofthe Urewera Consolidation Scheme, 1921-1926 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 214 3. The Negotiations at Tauarau, August 1921 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Previous Reports 3.2.1 'Modernisation' or Stopping the Bleeding? 3.2.2 Was the Legislation Draconian? 3.2.3 Some Loose Ends to Pick up 3.3 An Overview of the Tauarau Procedures 3.4 The Tuhoe Representatives 3.5 The Crown's Proposals 3.5.1 Assumption of the Crown's Dominance 3.5.2 Various Forms of Crown Pre-emptions 3.5.3 Comparing Some Reported Proposals 3.5.4 The Ambiguous Emergence of the Policy of Piecemeal Deductions 3.5.5 The Native Awards 3.6 Forming Consolidation Groups 3.6.1 Sorting Groups Out 3.6.2 Some of the More Influential Groups 3.6.1 The Persistence of Tuhoe Descent Groups 3.6.4 The Crown's Discrimination of Evacuee from Family Farm Groups 3.6.4(a) The Many Subgroups ofRua Kenana's 'Group 14' 3.6.4(b) The Te Whaiti Groups as 'Temporary' 3.6.4(c) The Waikaremoana Groups as 'Temporary' 3.6.4(d) 'Clearing the Air' at Waikaremoana 3.7 Groupbooks and Successions 3.7.1 Basis of the Scheme 3.7.2 The Organisation of the Groupbooks 3.7.3 Processing Successions 3.7.4 Final 'Allocations' 3.8 Conclusion Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 215 This chapter examines the manifold procedures undertaken to arrange the consolidation scheme at Tauarau marae in one hectic month, August 1921. I discuss the range and adequacy to represent the Tuhoe of the 39-some persons selected to consider the Crown's proposals and lead the consolidation groups, and attempt to identify and assess the degree of acceptance of the Crown's proposals put to them. Next is examined the way in which about 150 consolidation groups were formed, the social organisation implicit in some of these groups, and the Crown's implicit discrimination between those it intended to retain and those it intended to evacuate or discourage and how it did this. Finally, I describe how the groupbooks were organised to reduce the shares retained unsold by individuals in different blocks, and succeeded to from the many deceased Tuhoe, to a total pence-value which was consolidated with that of others in a consolidation group, and how these groups proposed one or a few locations for their consolidated shares in the areas not pre empted by the Crown. A question which emerges throughout is, how were the Tuhoe confronting the Crown's power and attempting to regain control in this third transformation of their land and society since 1896? And how in tum did the Crown respond? 3.1 Introduction The Crown purchase campaign cast the die for the Urewera Consolidation Scheme in several ways. Although in legal terms the Tuhoe may still have held the upper hand, after ten years of confrontation and steady loss of control it had probably become clear to them that the Crown wielded the power to avoid such a reversal. Kereru had foreseen this by 1916, after the first year of Bowler's campaign. A Native Ministry controlled by Herries and Jordan had begun to plan a consolidation scheme whereby the Crown from a position of strength could cut out the majority of undivided shares it had acquired. But by 1921 a change in administration offered the Tuhoe an opportunity to deal instead with Apirana Ngata and Gordon Coates, presumably more Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 216 sympathetic with Tuhoe interests. Although the Crown struggled with undivided shares of unsurveyed land, it now held most of it in most blocks. Although the Tuhoe had lost most of their land in this abstract sense, they still held it in the concrete terms of key parts of the law as well as ancestry and occupation, and the great majority of them still retained some shares somewhere (and many held many shares everywhere) and thus enjoyed the political solidarity of being 'non-sellers' in the eyes of the Crown. Hopefully with patrons in government Tuhoe could cut their losses and emerge with their morehuu (,remnants') better defined and protected. I note Ngata's painfully ambivalent and probably guilt-ridden actions in later contexts but do not pursue this issue. He was related by marriage to the hapuu of Te Pouwhare Te Roau, a successor to Numia Kereru's leadership in Ngati Rongo hapuu and often intermediary to the Crown's dealings, and this was certainly a root of Ngata's 1 dilemma. 21 Tai Mitchell, the influential interpreter and head surveyor for the commission, was also related in some way to Te Pouwhare and thus apparently to Ngata. The consolidation officer for the Native Department and soon one of the two consolidation commissioners was Harold Carr, a Ngati Kahungunu and nephew of Timi Kara, James Carroll the former Native Minister.212 Thus the three Maori closely involved with the Scheme all had important East Coast connections. These were the decades in which the British policy of 'indirect rule' was taking shape in many of its colonies, and its usefulness in New Zealand would not have been lost on the Crown's ministers and, indeed, in Ngata's own conception of his role in administration of the Natives.213 It is significant that by the late 1920s Ngata was reconceptualising his 211 My information and Mitchell to Ngata, 20 February 1922, Campbell Supp.Pap II: 209-13 p 3. It is occasionally said among Tuhoe that N gata oversaw the loss of much Tuhoe land to take the heat off his own East Coast people. I appreciate that this sympathy probably reflects whaanaungatanga (kinship). However, I would argue that this understanding ofNgata is misled by the popular assumption that he favoured his own iwi. It also obscurs the far more important point that Ngata was subject to the ideology of capitalist 'modernisation' as well as continually under pressure to compromise ideals which did not conform to it, for the sake of his career. The system ofland incorporations which he instituted among his own people is a prime example of such compromises. 212 Campbell, 1997, p 46 fn.11. 213 Webster, 1998b, p 94-102. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 217 personal predicament sociologically in terms of Robert Park's notion of 'marginal man' among alienated ethnic groups. Miles points out Coates' candid and perhaps rueful admission to parliament that the consolidation scheme which had been arranged by fiat, and which they were being asked to approve in legislation, could not have been organised under any existing legislation, 'and we had to depart from the law,.214 While the Crown sought to overcome an increasingly impractical and legally precarious situation by cutting out its own shares, the Tuhoe non-sellers might be given respite to regroup on specific portions of land they could defend. These remnants of earth, forest, and rivers, however, carried at their core nga iwi pupuri whenua, the social organisation of people - ancestors and descendants - who against a subversive and persistent purchase campaign had hung onto some their lands. The marks of this struggle continued to define changes in the land throughout the Urewera Consolidation Scheme. The panga whakatoopu or whakawhiti ('moving' or 'gathering together' shares in land215), like the Urewera District Native Reserve and the purchase campaign preceding it, was another sea-change or major transformation of Tuhoe social organisation as well as land tenure. Before tracing this third revolution I will preview it with some general remarks. Already foreseeing the direction of the purchase campaign in 1916, Numia Kereru had demanded a consolidation scheme while the Tuhoe still controlled the majority of their lands. When by 1921 the Crown was finally forced to do it by the realisation that some Tuhoe would continue to retain some shares in every block, his successors Te 214 Miles, p 439. 215 Both terms appear in the commentaries of the time in reference to the Consolidation Scheme. 'Whakawhiti' was the term used by Te Pouwhare in 1919 to request 'exchange' of undivided interests between non-sellers and the Crown (Webster, 1984-5:27). In 1920 Bowler, in his letter to Kahuwi Hakeke, used 'whakatoopu' to describe a 'gathering together' of ancestrally scattered shares ofland. In the 1970s the term 'whakawhiti' was translated to me as 'swapping', showing a clear understanding of the principles of consolidation (while the usual objective in consolidation schemes is for Maori to swap undivided shares among themselves to all can concentrate their scattered shares in one or a few locations, in the case of the Ureweras it was the Crown which swapped with the Tuhoe for this purpose). The contemporary Tuhoe leader Tama Nikora similarly uses the term 'whakawhiti' to refer to the Consolidation Scheme. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 218 Pouwhare Te Roau and Fred Biddle pointed out that if the Crown had Tuhoe interests at heart, 'It were better if you had visited us ten or fifteen years ago, when our tribe was as yet compact and our lands our own' .z16 This blunt truth was probably somewhat overstated because Tuhoe leaders knew things could get still worse - and in the view of many, they did. Whereas in the purchase campaign Tuhoe had been split between Bowler's agents, hoko whenua, and pupuri whenua, in the consolidation they would be split between opportunists, those who saw it as the only way to stop the bleeding, and a range of apitihana ('oppositionists'), from those struggling to minimise their losses to those who stubbornly refused to cooperate with the consolidation commissioners. Surprisingly, no reliable record had been kept of the crucial 'Tauarau meetings' at Ngati Rongo's Tauarau marae in Ruatoki. The reports to the government by the organisers allow themselves some crowing that, despite initial doubts from 'conservative elements', 'full discussion' and agreement had been reached with the Tuhoe in arrangements for the consolidation. The informal Commission made its proceedings quite informal, so as to get into direct touch with the representatives and leading men, dispense with intermediaries, conductors and lawyers, and ran as it were with the mood of the people. It was wonderful to see how they responded. The entered readily into the spirit of the game .... 217 A consolidation scheme is not the simple affair that it would appear to be from an official chair away from the scene of operations. I am very glad to have had the experience of the last month so as to appreciate the mass of detail that must be attended to in a consolidation scheme, right on the spot in momentary conference with those whose interests are affected. Decision had to be given straight away, and the fullest possible advantage taken of the presence of the Native owners gathered from all parts of the Urewera Country and neighborhood.218 216 In Campbell, 1997, p 35. 217 Carr to Coates, 20 September 1921, MA 29/417A. 218 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 29/417A. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 219 This apparent euphoria may have been promotional, but in any case was short-lived. Later completing his work as consolidation commissioner, (by then) Judge Harry Carr was more candid about his attitude toward the Tuhoe: ' ... We realised that the Tuhoe people were not so enlightened as those of other districts and so required patient attention which we endeavoured to give them. ,219 As will become apparent, this pique was probably defensive and regarded the astute resistance rather than the unenlightenment of some Tuhoe. One report of the Tauarau meetings which may be attributed with assurance to R.J. Knight, soon to be appointed as the other consolidation commissioner, displayed an already jaded attitude of noblesse oblige toward the labours which confronted him: The acceptance by the Natives of the proposals to take sections laid out on settlement lines in lieu of the former titles and to have their several scattered interests consolidated ... place upon us the onerous duty of determining on a monetary basis exactly what their several interests amounted to, making 1081 Succession Orders to bring the titles right up to date, and sorting 8931 Natives into 119 distinct groups arranging in which particular part of the district their section should be located.22o Aside from misleading claims of 'acceptance' (ambiguous at best), Succession 'Orders' (they had no such jurisdiction), 8931 'Natives' (he confuses shares in the blocks with Tuhoe persons, of which there were less than 2,000), 119 'distinct' groups (other officials reported 50, 99, or 150), and continued careless misspellings of Maori block and place names elsewhere in the report, Knight made these labours sound like they were what the Tuhoe rather than the Crown itself had demanded. The other side of this patronising attitude was disciplinarian. It is significant that the formal 'Report on the proposed Urewera Lands Consolidation Scheme' 31 October 1921 to the Minister of Lands and Native Minister is more cautious, maintaining instead a tone of candid but authoritative decisiveness (it was probably written by Ngata and Balneavis). Tuhoe resistance is implicit in a final statement that 'In conclusion, we venture the opinion that among the younger Natives of the Urewera 219 Carr to USND, 20 May 1925, MA 29/417 pt.2. 220 Unsigned to Guthrie, 3 October 1921; Campbell Supp.Pap.II: 160-171, p 8. ------C_--"-C_-_-_-______-- ---' - Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 220 country there is a strong and a genuine desire to be put in a position to fann some of their lands'.221 Certainly Ngata and Balneavis but also the Ministers were probably aware that a tight lid would have to be kept on the situation, and the extraordinary powers granted the consolidation commissioners by Parliament reflect this (Campbell details those powers). However, the so-called conservative elements admitted by Balneavis never did subside and probably gained momentum in dissident movements of which the Apitihana was only the most uncompromising. These movements spanned generations rather than setting old conservatives against young progressives (still a rationale for authoritarian or reactionary 'progress' against Maori social organisation). Campbell and Miles carefully document the stream of objections and petitions which continued through 1925. With regard to the initial negotiations at Tauarau, it should be emphasised that an effort made by Te Arno Kokouri, father of Te Wharepouri Te Arno later an Apitihana leader, to call time-out for further consultation among Tuhoe leaders to discuss apparent disregard of earlier agreements for the Crown to withdraw from some blocks, was apparently refused by Ngata.222 Te Arno's later account of this confrontation to the commissioners was furthennore omitted from the consolidation minutebooks although it survived in Commissioner Knight's notebooks. Te Arno supported his son Te Wharepouri in his continuing protests to the commissioners as speaker for the Apitihana, fruitlessly repeating as late as 1924 that 'the 'Tauarau' agreements were not being adhered to' ?23 Chapters eight and nine return to examine some implications of these confrontations. Another Apitihana leader Wahia Paraki's supporting comment was recorded in the minutebook: he demanded that his Waikaremoana shares be fixed in Ruatahuna and not left 'floating about the lake;' Wahia asserted confidently that 'we were quite clear 221 Knight, AJHR G-7, 1921, P 7. 222 Evelyn Stokes, J. Te Wharehuia Milroy and Hirini Melbourne, Te Urewera; nga iwi, te Whenua, te Ngahere; People, Land and Forests ofTe Urewera, University ofWaikato, Hamilton, N.Z., 1986 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc All), p 74. 223 In Campbell, 1997, p 92. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 221 what we were doing at Ruatoki and we will stick to that' .224 Ngata's private secretary H.R.H. Balneavis had reported the Tuhoe use of this metaphor in the Tauarau meetings to describe their doubts about how the consolidation scheme might 225 whakamoana them - caste their land rights adrift on the sea. Although the cooperation of many Tuhoe had been gained, it is clear from these admissions as well as the continuing objections and petitions detailed by Campbell and Miles that there was resistance from the beginning which was suppressed rather than resolved or won over. Although the arrangements and detailed data of the consolidation drawn up in just three weeks of meetings at Tauarau marae were carried directly into final legislation soon after the end of the year, our understanding of those crucial weeks must rely on sparse and cryptic primary historical evidence. Bassett and Kay point out that especially the several days' discussion between the Tuhoe leaders and Ngata apparently remains unrecorded.226 Although Ngata was at the same time an MP and assistant to Native Minister Coates, he acted as official representative of the Tuhoe throughout the Tauarau proceedings. In this ambiguous capacity 'in behalf ofthe non sellers' he signed the plan 12500 which was probably used as a continual reference in the Tauarau meetings, along with R.J. Knight for the Department of Lands and Balneavis and H. Carr for the Native Ministry.227 To my knowledge, no Tuhoe signatures appear anywhere in the record; the final proposal of the Scheme published in the AJHR is signed by the same four persons, but Ngata signs only for himself. The remaining record of these 'three strenuous weeks' does include a few telegrams and letters, especially between Balneavis and Coates. Aside from this there are only a dozen ledgers, some indexes, and a few other papers which were used to tabulate and process the voluminous details of the scheme - and these are often opaque for anyone not already familiar with the involuted procedures of consolidation schemes 224 UCMB 1 :32-3. 225 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 29/417A. 226 Bassett and Kay, p 137-8. 227 Urewera Plan 12500 (B83) LINZ, Hamilton. Two probably relevant files ofNgata's papers remain completely restricted in the A TL: Urewera solidation [sic] scheme (a) 1921 MS-Papers-7 57 5-025 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 222 Consistent with the official disregard or avoidance of Tuhoe hapuu since 1907, a prime objective of the Crown in the consolidation scheme was to abolish the old blocks and replace them with family farms that 'would be free of the old-time restrictions, and owned not tribally or by hapus, but by compact families, with eyes looking forward ... '.228 It was this demand which 'meant to them that the landmarks settled after generations of quarrel and bloodshed and later of protracted litigations were to be wiped out. Their expressive way of stating the position was that the titles were to be 'whakamoana-ed' (literally, put out to sea)' .229 Although Balneavis was Maori (and interpreter for the Tauarau meetings), ironically Bowler had put it more understandingly and with less cynical romanticism to Kahuwi Hakeke when he said that the Tuhoe shares in lands 'kei te takitaki haere ... nei pena me te tapu[w]ae 0 te tangata' (are scattered like the sacred footsteps of (I would add) the ancestors). I hope I have adequately described in previous chapters the extent to which the Native Reserve blocks and shares in them represented an intricate historical network of descent, marriage, alliance, personal status, and other rights and obligations. The repeated metaphor of being 'set adrift' showed that the Tuhoe were acutely aware that, at least in tough legal and practical terms of rights to land, all this was to be swept away by the consolidation scheme. One can understand why nowadays some draw no distinction between the raupatu ('blow') of the 1860-70 confiscations and the raupatu of the purchase campaign and consolidation scheme. 3.2 Previous Reports Except for Stokes, Milroy, and Melboumes' 1986 monograph, Vincent O'Malley's report on the Waikaremoana block in 1996 was one of the earliest of the series emerging for the Urewera claim. (Chapter three examined the role of two Waikaremoana leaders in petitions for ahuwhenua or agricultural development in that and (b) 1921 MS-Papers-7575-026. 228 Knight, AJHR G-7 1921, P 7. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 223 block, attempts to stem the purchase campaign in 1918). O'Malley examined implications of the meetings earlier in 1921 leading up to the scheme organised at Tauarau marae in August of that year. He was the first to point out that Native Minister Coates had confidentially reassured Minister of Lands Guthrie that the 'underlying principle of consolidation of [Maori land] interests is the extinction of existing titles and the substitution of another form which knows no more of ancestral rights to particular portions of land' .z30 This is a strikingly high-level conspiracy to undermine Tuhoe kinship and political solidarity, initiated by the minister from whom - after Herries - they had probably hoped to have some relief. Coates' confidential conviction must have been communicated to the organisers of the 'unofficial' meetings at Tauarau, insofar as it appears to have been echoed in the sonorous concluding paragraph of their October 1921 proposal of the scheme to him and Guthrie. O'Malley suggests that in view of this implicit Ministerial goal the final sentence is somewhat disingenuous: ' ... that these [new] sections would be free of the old-time restrictions, and owned not tribally or by hapus, but by compact families ... whose only link with the past would be that the sections comprise the homes and cultivations of their ancestors.' If the new sections were to not be owned 'tribally or by hapus' then they could comprise 'the homes and cultivations of their ancestors' only in the most abstract sense, barren of the concrete historical matrix by which Tuhoe held their lands even under the 1896 Act. As will continue to described in the case histories of particular hapuu lineages, some Tuhoe kin groups were successful in retaining against the purchase campaign their leading or strongest ancestral and occupational rights in certain blocks, and furthermore in surviving the abolition of these blocks in the consolidation scheme by getting their consolidated shares located in them. These triumphs were, however, not predominant and always compromised; the Crown's intention to disrupt these sources of 'conservative' solidarity were instead the rule 229 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1919, MA 29/417A. 230 O'Malley, p 100. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 224 3.2.1 'Modernisation' or Stopping the Bleeding? There is no doubt that some Tuhoe sought 'modem' individual land title in the sense which the Crown sought to impose: private ownership of land as a commodity subject to market forces. O'Malley points out that when the government decided upon a consolidation scheme as the best way out of their dilemma, official reports presented persons with this motive as speaking for Tuhoe generally.231 He cites my 1984-5 report of Te Pouwhare Te Roau's suggestion, speaking for the Tuhoe General Committee in 1919, that Tuhoe exchange (whakawhiti) their undivided interests with those ofthe Crown. O'Malley goes on to report that when in February 1921 Ngata led a parliamentary delegation to Ruatoki, Te Pouwhare again said Tuhoe desired that 'the interests of the Government and those of the Maori be consolidated and defined, that each may know what is theirs.' Probably also speaking for the (officially disregarded) General Committee but apparently representing the younger generation (at least for the benefit of the delegation), Fred Biddle said 'The young people want to see some document evidencing their titles, to have something tangible to indicate their ownership of a defined piece of land.' While the Whakatane Press, and N gata in his report, presented this as evidence that the Tuhoe non-sellers sought private ownership of their lands organised through a consolidation scheme, O'Malley emphasises instead that they sought this to put an end to the disruption especially of the decade-long purchase campaign. 'It is doubtful whether Tuhoe saw the consolidation proposals as little more than a way of stopping the bleeding. ,232 I agree with O'Malley and Campbells' skepticism. The groupbooks show that Te Pouwhare Te Roau's own retention of some land rights had been left precarious by the purchase campaign. If Biddle was speaking for others going by that name in Hikurangi-Horomanga block, the Crown had left them defending less than 20 per cent of the remaining shares. It should be emphasised that Numia Kereru, surely no advocate of consolidation for the purposes of privatising Tuhoe title, in 1916 was himself among the first to propose a consolidation of Tuhoe shares, probably to 231lbid., P 80-81. ------.- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 225 protect them from the purchase campaign. It is likely that three years later Te Pouwhare, probably replacing Kereru in Ngati Rongo leadership as well as chairmanship of the Tuhoe General Committee, recommended consolidation with this in mind while tactfully choosing his words. O'Malley's sources apparently also presented Biddle as supporting Te Pouwhare; however, Tuhoe kawa (custom) would have had Biddle, as a leader junior to Te Pouwhare, speaking first. If this were the actual order of their speaking, Te Pouwhare's statement is (as Tuhoe kawa would have it) a significant re-orientation of Biddle's points. It should also be pointed out that the Crown's (and the Whakatane Press's) translation of what Te Pouwhare and Biddle said would be crucial in construing their intended meanings. O'Malley devotes most of his investigation to the predicament of Ngati Ruapani, tangata whenua in the Waikaremoana block who were closely affiliated with Tuhoe. The Waikaremoana block was one of those which the Crown refused to open up to purchasing. Chapter one recounted Rerries' rather obtuse reasoning in his refusal of the petition ofTe Amo Kokouri and 121 others to allow them to sell Waikaremoana shares so they could subsist while developing farming in the Ruatahuna and Ruatoki blocks. O'Malley describes how at Tauarau it was belatedly discovered that by moving decisively among shareholders worried that the block would be summarily taken, the Crown could acquire all or most of it. A few days after getting approval from the Minister to include it in the consolidation scheme, 26,000 acres or 35 percent of the block was offered for sale, probably by non-resident shareholders.233 I earlier raised the possibility that Te Amo Kokouri and others' 1918 proposal appearing to sacrifice plans to develop Waikaremoana for the sake of those at Ruatahuna and Ruatoki may have been a precedent for this decision at Tauarau a few years later. 232 Ibid., P 100; following O'Malley, Campbell views Te Pouwhare and BiddIes' statements similarly (1997:35). 233 Ibid., p 89. .-=--=---:-~=------.:..:.-. -- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 226 O'Malley examines especially the 196 listed members of the N gati Ruapani hapuu (or iwi) who refused to vacate their kaingas in the block, endured repeated compromises forced upon them, and fought long to get local reserves protecting their tenure. These Waikaremoana Reserves A through L were promised to the members of Ngati Ruapani listed in Schedule 2 (3) of the final report published in the AJHR (Paper 2, Appendix B). Significantly, the Waikaremoana Reserves appear on pp 37-9, but were left out of Schedules 1 p 9 and 2 (1) P 12. O'Malley's analysis prompts further consideration of several problems which will be returned to in my comments on Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks as the two most obvious cases of 'evacuation' enforced by the Crown in the consolidation scheme. 3.2.2 Was the Legislation Draconian? SKL Campbell's 1997 report was the next to examine the consolidation scheme, and supplemented with Miles' later study remains the most thorough general treatment. Campbell's account follows an opening chapter on the alienation of the Native Reserve 1915-1920, devoting a chapter to 'Preparing consolidation 1919-1921' and another to 'Implementing the August arrangements 1922 - 1926,.234 Like O'Malley but concerned with the entire district, she focuses on the emerging issues and meetings which resulted in the comprehensive proposal and fait accompli of August 1921, and the numerous petitions, objections, and complaints which were pressed while the proposal was implemented 1922-1926. Campbell juxtaposes the continuing assertions of Urewera acceptance of the scheme by the commissioners and the continuing serious and often unanswered objections to it. She treats complaints between Maori separately from those directed at the consolidation commissioners, but argues that these were often precipitated by the consolidation procedures. Her analysis ranges widely enough to broach the influence of the Waikato King movement through followers of Taingakawa, as well as keep track of higher levels of government decision-making and legislation. 234 Campbell, SKL, 'Land Alienation, Consolidation, and Development in the Urewera 1912-1950', a report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, Urewera Overview Project, July 1997, pp 43-109. - -,- :- --~ -~ ----..:..-- -,~:::-----~-~:-,:::::: --.:---::.-::.--::.----: Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 227 Campbell's examination of the legislation is insightful: for instance, she argues that the Urewera Lands Act 1921122 which put the Scheme into effect redoubled the already wide powers of the commissioners by authorising their settlement of the Crown awards ahead of those of the non-sellers?35 The commissioners' had only to consult the Tuhoe 'so far as practicable', and their decisions could not be appealed. To this the parliament in Section 5 of the Act superadded the power to co-opt specific Tuhoe rights to land wherever in the Urewera it decided was best for the Crown. Campbell's own evidence offers a revealing illustration. In Te Wharepouri's 1924 objection to the commissioners raised earlier, he pointed out that 'The resident owners were not being cut out first inasmuch as Scenic reserves were being surveyed for the Crown prior to the Natives being located' .236 I can elaborate on Campbell here. Te Wharepouri's point was simply that insofar as Crown interests took priority in location and survey, this was tantamount to pre emption of locations in the midst of Tuhoe allocations, perhaps specific locations which the Tuhoe had never sold. As will be traced in some detail in section 8.2, this form of pre-emption was actually extended less obviously to piecemeal deductions of land from each allocation for the cost of surveys and roads, and this was probably also part of Te Wharepouri's point. These forms of pre-emption were aggravated by the Tuhoe's ability to distinguish within a block between localities in which different families had specific leading rights, and were probably asserting these against the Crown (I pointed out in section 1.4.1 that these distinctions had been recognised by the 1912-13 Court of Appeals as well as the Native Reserve Commission). Conversely, had these specific rights been sold by the family concerned, the Tuhoe probably would have deferred to the Crown even though in equity the Crown could assert no prior right insofar as technically it had purchased only undivided and unlocated shares in the block. (I will return to this particular implication in chapter 9). 235 Ibid., pp 67-8. 236 Ibid., P 92. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 228 However, because Parliament had given the commissioners this additional power to assert such a priority for the Crown's undivided shares, the commissioners could simply have informed Te Wharepouri of this power. It is significant that they did not, but rather chose to tum his demand against him. As a member as well as leader of the Apitihana, Te Wharepouri had refused to submit a list and their preferred location for the consolidated shares of the groups which he had headed at Tauarau. The commissioner's perhaps duplicitous reply to his objection was 'That if Wharepouri would indicate where he desired his holdings they would receive prior attention' .237 They were thus apparently offering him special privileges they had the power to deny others, if he were to give up the principles of the opposition which he led. In chapter six I will describe a more severe discipline which - with the knowledge of the Ministers - was exacted on Pomare, the other most outspoken leader ofthe Apitihana. The virtually unfettered power conferred to declare Crown ahead of Tuhoe land had extensive implications which will later be pursued, especially in connection with the consequent crowding of allocations and 'overflow' locations for the new Tuhoe blocks. Here, another specific implication of Campbell's point can be elaborated. Referring to Section 5 of the Act, she emphasises that 'The commissioners were empowered to make orders defining the Crown's interests whether these represented the block or blocks referred to in the instruments of alienation or not.... [and to] include any portion of the Waikaremoana block as they saw fit, even though no interests had been purchased by the Crown' .238 Section 5(3) of the Act did refer specifically to the Waikaremoana block, supporting the details proposed in paragraph 12 Schedule 1 of the 1921 AJHR report regarding that block (Paper 2, Appendix B). Ironically, this was one of the few remaining blocks in which the Crown had allowed no sales of shares, thus it remained exclusively in Tuhoe title under the UDNR Act. The planned purchase of Waikaremoana shares which had been offered at Tauarau awaited legitimation by the statute being considered; no deeds had been signed. Even in the quasi-legal terms under which the purchase of individual undivided shares had 237 Campbell, 1997, p 92. 238 Ibid., pp 67-8. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 229 proceeded in the purchase campaign, each Urewera block was treated as a separate legal title which had to be entirely extinguished by the deeds of purchase before it could be declared Crown land. In these terms, the Crown had no legal foothold at all in the Waikaremoana block, let alone the majority of shares it had obtained in most other blocks. However, the commissioners were given the power (and were clearly expected by parliament as well as the Ministers) to take the entire block while nominally compensating the majority of its owners and establishing recalcitrants in a few small reserves. O'Malley shows how reluctantly even this redress was carried through. This appears to be a clear case of virtual Crown expropriation or, as the Tuhoe sometimes refer to the consolidation: a continuation of the 1870s raupatu. However, pursuing Campbell's point, it can be argued that Section 5 of the Act underwrote this sort of expropriation widely if less obviously in most of the old blocks of the UDNR, first in its pre-emption of whole areas or blocks from Tuhoe preferences at the outset, and later in the guise of sections for overflow and residues from crowded allocations, themselves often a result of piecemeal deductions from each allocation for the cost of surveys and roading. A layman might suppose that abolishing the old blocks in the same Act in which parts or all of them were pre-emptorily taken probably did not resolve the legal dilemma which the Crown faced. Several other of the points which Campbell briefly but insightfully raised regarding the arrangement of the consolidation invite elaboration later in these chapters: the confrontation in the lower Whakatane and TaurangaiWaimana basins; the evacuation ofWaikaremoana and Te Whaiti blocks; Tuhoe representation and the establishment of consolidation groups; the allocation of consolidated shares and the Tuhoe demand to know who had sold what before they could settle their preferred locations; continuing Crown purchases of individual undivided shares. 3.2.3 Some Loose Ends to Pick up I introduced Anita Miles' comprehensive 'Te Urewera' report with regard to the Crown purchase campaign in the previous chapter. Miles' account of the Urewera ------~-- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 230 Consolidation Scheme, like Campbell's, focuses on the succession of proposals leading to the August 1921 meeting at Tauarau marae and the objections which dogged the implementation of the scheme through to its conclusion in 1925.239 The August hui (ceremonial gathering) at Tauarau is examined in some detail, and I will later pursue some of her points. I have not elsewhere seen the August meetings referred to as a hui, but this has interesting implications. Many of the Crown officials were themselves Maori (at least Ngata, Balneavis, Carr, and H.M. Awarau) and were probably all fluent in the language, and there is little doubt that the meetings were treated in this way. Although Maori often demand their own marae as venues to settle differences, this does not necessarily put them at an advantage: at least since the time of Governor George Grey and Crown purchase officer Donald McLean it has been appreciated that astute use of Maori kawa by Crown officers can maintain an advantage over the hosts, for instance as manuhiri (guests). Ngata and Balneavis would have been especially able in this tactic, and the latter's position as interpreter and the former's as the representative of the Tuhoe to the Crown would have put them at a further advantage. Like Campbell, Miles emphasises the precarious legality with which the scheme proceeded virtually as a fait accompli, and traces in somewhat more detail the urgency of the following legislation retroactively to legitimise it. This was candidly admitted in the 1921 report on the proposed scheme published in the AJHR, and also by Native Minister Coates himself in the parliamentary debates on the bil1. 24o Again, Miles details the extraordinary powers of the consolidation commissioners nevertheless authorised by the Urewera Lands Act 1921-2. Chapter one pursued at length the agricultural development proposals in Ruatoki, Ruatahuna, and Waikaremoana which Miles points out. The following chapters will return to other points which she raises in my discussion of Crown pre-emption of some blocks and the problem of allocation of consolidated shares. 239 Anita Miles, Te Urewera, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whaanui Series, March 1999, P 417-477. 240 Ibid., P 439. T I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 231 Richard Boast includes a chapter on the consolidation in his history of the Te Whaiti block, which I earlier examined in connection with the Crown purchase campaign.241 There it was pointed out that despite a sustained effort to buyout all shares in the block (held only by Ngati Whare and Ngati Manawa after the exclusion of Ngati Tuhoe hapuu in the 1906 appeals hearings), enough stubborn non-sellers resident in the block refused to sell or relocate their consolidated shares and thus frustrated the consolidation officers' intention to evacuate the block entirely. Boast also retraces the early correspondence and meetings leading to the August organisation of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme. He has discovered and displayed a wider variety of recorded detail on the consolidation than other commentators, but he finds most of it inchoate and attempts little analysis even of the Te Whaiti materials. He includes as an appendix an apparently comprehensive list of sellers as well as non-sellers in Te Whaiti 1; we unsuccessfully searched for the equivalent in any of the Urewera blocks.242 The list is doubly unusual in reporting the residence of many of the owners, and Boast is able to demonstrate that most sellers resided outside the block. Later in this chapter I will pursue points he raises in connection with the continuation of Crown purchasing as well as what may be seen to be the attempted evacuation and reluctant allocation of sections to non-sellers in the Te Whaiti block. I relied on Heather Bassett and Richard Kays' history of the Ruatahuna block in chapter one, especially to pursue the partitioning of the block and the rise of the Apitihana movement. Later in this chapter I will return to points they raise regarding confusion about agreements at the Tauarau meetings, representation of Ruatahuna among the consolidation group leaders, the problem of non-seller refugees from the evacuation of Waikaremoana block, and a important example of continuing Crown purchases. 241 Boast, 1999, pp 197-230. 242 Ibid., pp 187-193; he seems aware that it is an unusual find: pp 145-6, 186. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 232 3.3 An Overview of the Tauarau Procedures The general procedure of consolidation of Maori land shares had been developed, primarily by Ngata, to address the problem of fragmentation or the proliferation of undivided shares among successors to Maori land title established under the Native Land Court. Of course, this was not necessarily a problem from the point of view of Maori owners, insofar as it approximated customary tenure or hapuu rights. It was a problem from the point of view of a capitalist economy committed to land as a marketable value and increasing the productivity of it (and, of course, some Maori also pursued this ideal). By 1921 there had been only a few trials of the procedure on the East Coast and Taupo districts. Campbell reviews the history of consolidations, and argues that although in the case of the Urewera it was done to cut out the Crown's rather than Maori shares for more efficient use, the Urewera Consolidation Scheme nevertheless became the model for increasing use of the procedure.243 Previous reports have examined the Crown's deliberations over the preceding years and meetings with the Tuhoe earlier in 1921 which led up to the Tauarau meetings. By 1919 it was becoming apparent that even Bowler's purchase strategy would be unable to acquire all shares in any of the Urewera blocks, let alone those more agriculturally-promising and accessible blocks which the Crown intended to use for settlement ofPakeha. The Crown's determination to extinguish all Maori title to some blocks, if not evacuate them by fiat, was clear in Undersecretary Jordan's proposal to Bowler at the end of 1919. Pointing out that consolidations had been successfully trialed in East Coast and Tokaanu districts, he outlined the procedure for Bowler's views and proposed that: ... a properly carried out scheme of consolidation would enable the Crown to place most of the non-sellers in say 3 or 4 blocks. The Crown, by exchanging interests (up to an equal value) which it already has in these 3 or 4 blocks for the interests of the non-sellers in a large number of other blocks, should be able to get entirely rid of the non-sellers from the latter blocks, thru enabling 243 SKL Campbell, 'National Overview on Land Consolidation Schemes 1909-1931', a report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, June 1998. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 233 them to be proclaimed [Crown land]. Of course, it may be fOUTId necessary to have more than 3 or 4 blocks into which to put non-sellers.244 The ambiguous word 'non-seller' needs to be looked at again. The assumption always appears to have been that a minority of stubborn 'non-sellers' owned remnant shares in many blocks and, between them, some shares in all blocks. Thus the Maori phrase pupuri whenua had been replaced in English with the word 'non-seller' often implying derogatorily a Maori who sold no land at all. The implication was virtually of a minority of 'Tuhoe trouble-makers,' and the previous chapter discussed the attitude and tactical effect of the panui of non-sellers which Bowler long insisted upon and was finally able to circulate. Nowhere in the literature from Bowler's era to the present have I encoUTItered a consideration of the possibility that the 'non-sellers' were a substantial majority of the Tuhoe. Yet scrutiny of the actual purchases in particular hapuu lineages shows that very few Tuhoe sold no land at all, and that most by far retained some shares in some blocks, however token. The 'non-sellers' were, in fact, almost all 'part-sellers' - and almost all the Tuhoe. Comparison of the lists of so-called 'non-sellers' show that far from being a recalcitrant minority, even in 1921 they included by far the majority of Tuhoe who were still living, totaling more than the original owners had in 1903. As the Crown was finding out, a Tuhoe hanging on to token shares obstructed its goals as effectively as a Tuhoe hanging on to all of them. Jordan's vision of just a few blocks being sufficient for these non-sellers was later echoed in Balneavis' vision of resettling most of them in the northwestern blocks of the Urewera south of Ruatoki, like in a homeland - a plan which had to be quietly aborted, as will be discussed in chapter eight. Before taking up several particular issues needing further analysis, I will outline the consolidation procedures worked through during the August meetings at Tauarau marae, Ruatoki. The meetings had originally been scheduled to begin 18 July, but were delayed until 1 August because Ngata was involved in another early consolidation scheme in Waiapu on the East Cape. The August meetings extended 244 Jordan to Bowler, 6 November 1919, MA 1 29/4/7; quoted in Campbell, 1997, p 32. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 234 through the first three weeks of the month, during which time a few of the several officers involved visited Te Whaiti, and after which time the whole party visited Waikaremoana. Later I will discuss how the Crown still hoped for virtual evacuation of these two blocks. Before the end of August, Balneavis had submitted his complete report on the Scheme as it had emerged. Although negotiations between the Crown and Tuhoe apparently continued at least through October, the August arrangements (and especially Balneavis' report on it) formed the basis of the 'report on the proposed Urewera Consolidation Scheme' presented to the Minister of Lands Guthrie and Native Minister Coates at the end of October by Knight, Carr, Balneavis, and Ngata (Papers 2, Appendix B). In December 1921 this report was brought before parliament by these Ministers, and it was incorporated into the subsequent Act by February 1922.245 Previous Tribunal reports as well as the original officers' reports have already described some aspects of the August procedures at Tauarau, but a hopefully comprehensive review will be helpful here before examining certain aspects more fully. It was an impressively busy and efficient three weeks, variously expressed in the officers' reports as 'strenuous', inspiring, or 'onerous'. We can begin with a bare (and innocent) list of the procedures adopted at Tauarau, insofar as it can be deduced from the several primary sources still available. These sources ranged from the card index, ledgers, group books and maps used on site to consult and collate information, and reports and telegrams from the Crown officers concerned, to a draft and the final report and proposal of the Scheme to the Ministers. Significantly, apparently no minutes or diaries have been encountered among the basic primary historical evidence, although the officers' reports were probably written from such notes. • Gathering 1 August 1921 at Ruatoki of Crown officers and many Tuhoe or their representatives from all over the Urewera. 245 NZ Statutes; Urewera Lands Act 1921-22: An Act to faciltate the Settlement of Lands in the Urewera District (in Campbell Supp.Pap.vol.l: 18-24). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 235 • Bowler and Native Land Court furnishes documents, including lists of non sellers, card index, schedule of block values, and compiled plan 12500. • 37-40 representatives of all non-seller Tuhoe are appointed by the non-sellers. • Ngata confers with non-seller representatives and is appointed to represent their interests in negotiations with the Crown. • Ngata discusses consolidation proposals of the Crown with the non-sellers' representatives and, after two days, obtains general acceptance. • Knight reads out the Crown proposals at the opening ofthe first meeting. • The list of non-sellers is read out publicly for each block in tum, totaling 8,931 names. • The non-sellers are sorted out by their representatives into about 49 separate consolidation groups according to their family affinities or proposed locations. The groups were in tum broken down into about 150 subgroups. • Names or duplications are corrected, aliases noted, and deceased non-sellers to whom successors had not yet been appointed by the court are listed for later succession hearings. • A series of 'group books' A-E and G are used to record and collate by group and sub-group the unsold shares of each non-seller in each of 44 of the old blocks in which they hold shares. • Deceased owners yet to be succeeded to are included as if they were still living; those for whom succession orders have been drawn up by the court are replaced in the lists by their successors. • The unsold shares of each non-seller in each block is converted to a value in pence in the group books, in accordance with the price paid during Crown purchasing for a share in that block. • The total of unsold shares expressed in pence for each non-seller in each block is totaled for a value of unsold shares in all blocks for each non seller, to be consolidated in one location, 'or in as few locations as possible'. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 236 • Group books A-D carry forward the shares of all non-sellers in all blocks except Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana, spreading the work among the officers in A and B but progressively reducing duplications and accommodating changes for a comprehensive collation of consolidation groups in groupbooks C and D. • Group books E and G separately process Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks, respectively. • 'There was a continual shuffling and reshuffling of individuals composmg a group, the relatives claiming inclusion in one group or the other according to the sources from which rights were derived,' that is, from kin and rights to the old blocks, continuing more or less throughout the whole period of the meetings. • Group books FI and F2 process and index successions, distributing proportions of the total value in pence for the shares of over 400 deceased owners in all blocks to his or her successors, which totaled 1,081. • Final changes of proposed location responding to successions, and final changes to groups responding to these locations, are settled. • The resulting groups with their proposed locations, members, and shares in pence from group books A-D, E, F1, G, and the Urewera Reserves are collated and added up in Allocation Group Books HI and H2. • The results from group books HI and H2 are summarised in the Second Schedule to AJHR G-7 1921 in three lists: a summary of groups and proposed locations; a summary of the old blocks and proposed locations; and group lists (paper 3.1, Appendices). • The resulting report is presented to the Ministers on 31 October 1921, placed before parliament in December, and enacted in law by February 1922. • Commissioners begin their work to implement these arrangements throughout the Urewera in December 1921, sitting in communities and visiting the locations as necessary, authorising further transfers of persons or shares between groups, settling disputes, appointing further trustees, ordering surveys, and finally ordering lists of owners for 211 new blocks by late 1925. ------1 i:-- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 237 The last two steps actually occurred after the August meetings at Tauarau. Between the end of August and the end of October 1921 there were apparently continuing negotiations between the Tuhoe and the Crown which must be deduced from the few reports and drafts. I will attempt to reconstruct some developments during this time. By December 1921 these negotiations were followed by the implementation of the Scheme, which continued for several years. The next chapter will describe this implementation and the limited sources from which it can be understood. 3.4 The Tuhoe Representatives The following sections willmore closely examine some of the steps taken at Tauarau. First the selection of Tuhoe representatives and the proposals put before them will be assessed. Balneavis describes this situation most fully, reporting that: The first meeting with the Ureweras was held at Ruatoki on Monday the 1st August, and a committee of 40 was selected to receive the Crown proposals which Mr. Knight submitted in detail. These proposals are already on your 246 file, stated in a memorandum dated the 21 st June 1921. The final report lists these representatives, stating that: The Ureweras attended in large numbers, every family of non-sellers being represented. A committee of thirty-seven representatives was selected to receive the proposals of the Crown, and the Hon. Mr. Ngata was unanimously asked to act on behalf of the non-sellers,z47 Spreadsheet 2 (Appendix A) lists the representatives as published in the AJHR along with various information on them including their old block rights, hapuu affiliations, their predecessors' participation in the early UDNR, and retained lands. Another useful reference is my Figure 8 later in this chapter, which ranks the leaders of these groups in terms of the total shares of each group awaiting allocation, and which may 246 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 29/417A. 247 Knight et aI., AJHR G-7, P 4 (Papers 2, Appendix B). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 238 be taken as a rough indicator of their influence in implementation of the Scheme as well as among other Tuhoe at this time. Campbell furnishes a copy of the list of representatives and points out that there were actually 38 listed (by my count there are 39), and cites the variation of sources stating there were between 37 and 40.248 Although this variation surely reflects some confusion right up to the last minute, this is not surprising insofar as these representatives of all non-sellers were also representatives of the consolidation groups and, as the report and later the commissioners emphasised, these groups changed, subdivided, and merged continually. Examination of my tabulation (Spreadsheet 2, Appendix A) shows four cases of alternative names for the same representative, and some are identified differently in the schedules to the report. Two representatives appear to have been replaced. Two representatives along with their consolidation groups were 'absorbed' or sold all their shares within a few months (Te Whaiti L and Group 44). I am unable to locate three of the representatives in any of my indexes. The range of mana or seniority among the representatives was apparently wide: I of the 39 was a female (and also very young: Rotu Numia); 16 of the 39 were between 33 and 49 years old; 9 of the 39 were 50 years old or over; 6 of the 39 were under 33 years old (ages 18, 19,28,30, 31, 33). It is likely that in cases of presumably lesser mana among Tuhoe, a younger 'culture broker' acts as front-man (or woman; that is, for instance, capable in English, knowledgeable in government land policies, familiar with Crown officers, or simply opportunistic) for the grey eminences of the whaanau and hapuu represented. However, the nature of their representation is a crucial problem, especially given the central role of this group representing over two thousand non-sellers, negotiating with Ngata as their representative, and (presumably) negotiating throughout the consolidation with the Crown's Consolidation Commissioners Knight and Carr. For example, Bassett and Kay expressed the hope that Tuawhenua claimants could 248 Campbell, 1997, p 49 fnl24; Supp. Docs II: 48. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 239 identify the significant Ruatahuna leaders among the representatives. 249 From the data in Spreadsheet 2, it may be supposed that these were primarily Te Wharepouri te Arno, Wahia Paraki, Tikareti Te Iriwhiro, and Hurae Puketapu, but others with a strong vested interest in Ruatahuna would include Rehua Te Wao, Taipeti Matatua, Taane Hauraki, Tihi Te Peeti, Wirimu Popoki (Trainor), Kohunui Tupaea, and Takao Tamaikoha. Sissons is skeptical that the group was fairly representative and suspicious that they may have been selected to rubber-stamp Ngata's role as representative of all the non sellers.25o He points out that they were not from the block committees; that if the 'Ureweras attended in large numbers, every family of non-sellers being represented' there would certainly be more than 37 'families' present; and that only two of the seven whaanau living in Matahi were directly represented. I am sympathetic with Sissons' position, but his reasons do not hold up. By my count, of the 39 representatives 25 of them (either they themselves, their father, or a senior sibling) had been named to the block committees in 1902. As I will discuss later, the word 'families' was being used loosely in the report; it is clear that if these persons were representatives, it was of quite large groups because 39 of them represented at least 49 consolidation groups ranging from six to a few hundred Tuhoe. It is likely that their representation was roughly of hapuu. On the other hand, I will argue in section 3.6 that the groups which these representatives headed cannot themselves be seen as hapuu; they were being formed for a different purpose. As was explained in the Introduction, the number of Tuhoe hapuu varied considerably but we know that 31 were named in 1899 and were recognised as owners of the UDNR blocks in 1902, and 18 other hapuu had appeared by that time. The seven 249 Heather Bassett and Richard Kay, 'Ruatahuna: Land Ownership and Adminstration c.1896-1990', with Supporting Papers Vols I - III, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, June 2002 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A20), P 13l. 250 Sissons, p 121-2. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 240 whaanau in Matahii were probably primarily affiliated with two to four hapuu: in 1899 the Tuhoe commissioners had named 14 hapuu in the TaurangafWaimana valley in terms of three areas: Waimana, Tawhana, and Maungapohatu. For their Waimana area (which would probably have included Matahi) they named seven hapuu. Six of these hapuu have two or more potential representatives in the 1921 list: • Ngati Tatua (Akuhata Te Riko and Rua Kenana); • Whakatane (Te Rata Waewae, Tihi Te Peeti, and Taane Rauraki); and • Ngati Tamaroki (Tahuri Te Rira and Tu Rakuraku). In this manner, it is likely that all or most Tuhoe hapuu operating in 1921 could be shown to be represented to a reasonable degree by these 39 persons. In order for me to argue this, I must rely on several characteristics of Tuhoe hapuu and hapuu affiliation which can be recounted here: that Tuhoe leaders maintain several hapuu affiliations; that leading, strong, or weaker Native Reserve block rights are the correlative of leading, strong, or weaker hapuu affiliations; that speaking or acting for a hapuu (such as in the 1899 block claims and 1902 block committees) necessarily implies a strong affiliation with (and some mana in) that hapuu, and so on. Further analysis ofthe list of representatives tends to support this interpretation. First of all, there is significant consistency or continuity of block rights shown in Spreadsheet 2 for most of the representatives, despite the major changes in land tenure they were undergoing. If, as I argue, these block rights are the correlative of hapuu rights, then the grounds to suppose that representation rested in hapuu affiliation are strengthened. The columns in Spreadsheet 2 are arranged to display the relationship between block and hapuu rights. Information from some of these has been abstracted in the simplified list below (Figure 5). The evidence for block rights of the representatives is tabulated in columns E, F, and J. In column 'E' is the proposed location of consolidated shares of the groups which were formed at Tauarau under leadership of Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 241 the representative. In column 'F' are the strongest block rights ofthe representative in the 1907 final UDNR orders. In column J are the pupuri whenua or block rights retained by the representative at the conclusion of Crown purchase campaign in 1921. The evidence for hapuu affiliations of the representatives is tabulated in columns G, H, and I. In column 'G' are primary hapuu affiliations of each representative deduced from his or her leading block rights. In column 'H' are claimants of blocks in the name ofhapuu in 1899, fathers or senior siblings if not the representative. In column 'I' are block committee representatives established in 1902, again fathers or senior siblings if not the representative. I would suppose that ideally a Tuhoe's strongest block rights, being based in hapuu ancestry and occupation, are asserted and defended across generations or at least decades, and change only slowly. It may further be supposed that this inclination is strongest among leaders who are chosen and supported for their mana (as is probably reflected in Figure 8 in the later section on groups). On the other hand, this ideal expectation would be tested most severely by the conditions of the Native Reserve, the purchase campaign, and the arrangements for the consolidation scheme, to say nothing of the varying motives of representatives under these conditions. While the Tauarau meetings were taken by the Crown as well as the Tuhoe as a resolution for the different but increasingly urgent dilemmas which the purchase campaign had brought upon them, it was also a major coup for the Crown, whose first move was to 'take' or pre-empt from the Tuhoe many entire blocks and thus severely restrict where the non-sellers could locate their consolidated shares. With these countervailing forces in mind, what can be seen in the evidence presented in columns E, F, and J of Spreadsheet 2? Specifically, to what extent are each representative's strongest block rights in 1907 (F) maintained in block shares retained in 1921 despite the purchase campaign (J)? Following on from this, to what extent are each representative's retained rights in the old blocks (J) reflected in the location proposed for the consolidation of his or her group's shares in the new consolidation blocks (E)? (that is, F to J to E). Again, we cannot expect too much continuity in this --- -, -- -"-=--=--=--=--=-.::.------.:.:------'.:.------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 242 development, because rarely were these situations the result of individual choice. Most clearly, in both the purchase campaign and the proposal of location for consolidated shares, the representative was probably acting in concert with (not necessarily in agreement with) others of his or her whaanau, hapuu, or consolidation group, especially one's siblings and the elders among it. The results of this analysis of Spreadsheet 2 are listed below in Figure 5. Although my assessment is partly intuitive, and the exceptions are many (and some may be more significant than the rule), I would point out that there is considerable continuity of block rights in accord with my supposed ideal above. Of the 39 listed representatives, 28 cases show significant continuity, 18 of them F to J to E; 6 of them J to E; 3 of them F to J; and I F to E. The following 28 representatives are listed in the original order, noting the extent of this continuity and the blocks or blocks which show it. If the choice of a proposed location for a group's consolidated shares (E) was or may have been restricted by the Crown's pre-emption of blocks in which shares had been retained by the representative (J), the pre-empted blocks have also been noted. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 243 Figure 5: Continuity of Block Rights (an abstraction from Spreadsheet 2) Representative Continuity Strong Block Rights Akuhata Te Hiko FtoJtoE Parekohe Albert Warbrick FtoE Te Whaiti Te Ao Tangohau Jto E Tarapounamu-Matawhero Eparaima Te Hapi FtoJtoE Otara (Tauwhare-Manuka 6 pre-empted) Hauwai Tiakiwai F to Jto E Karioi (Waikarewhenua pre-empted) Hurae Puketapu Fto J Ruatahuna (Waikaremoana and Te Whaiti pre-empted) Te Hata Waewae Fto J T-M, KT, WPki (Maraetahia pre-empted) Kohunui Tupaea Fto Jto E Ruatahuna Mika Te Tawhao F to Jto E Te Wairiko, Ruatoki South (Waipotiki pre-empted) Paora Kingi Paora Jto E Parekohe Te Pouwhare Te Roau FtoJtoE Kohuru-Tukuroa, Ierenui-Ohaua; Parekohe RuaKenana F to Jto E Maungapohatu RotuKereru Fto Jto E Ruatoki South Takurua Tamarau Jto E Ruatahuna Tahuri te Hira F to Jto E Ruatahuna Taipeti Matatua Jto E Ruatahuna (Waipotiki pre-empted) Tane Hauraki F to Jto E Tarapounamu-Matawhero (Te Purenga pre-empted) TaweraMoko Fto Jto E Ruatoki South, Ierenui-Ohaua, and Ruatahuna. Taihakoa Poniwahio Fto J TR, WW, and TW (Waikarewhenua pre- empted) Teepa Koura (Mohi) FtoJtoE H-H, WP (Waipotiki pre-empted) Tikareti Te Iriwhiro FtoJtoE Ruatahuna TuRakuraku FtoJtoE Otara Tupara Kaaho FtoJtoE Paraeroa (Karioi, Taneatua pre-empted) Wahia Paraki FtoJtoE Ruatahuna (Taneatua pre-empted) Wiremu W. (Motoi) FtoJtoE Tarapounamu-Matawhero Wiremu T. (Popoki) Jto E Ruatahuna Te Wharepouri Te Arno F to Jto E Ruatahuna, Kohuru-Tukuroa, Paraeroa Whetu Paerata Jto E Parekohe These continuities, of course, are those maintained by individual Tuhoe leaders, rather than by the whole consolidation group which these individuals represented. While the strongest block rights (F) were often mirrored among other members of the consolidation group because many were of the same descent group, and the proposed location for consolidation shares (E) probably reflected the influence of others with Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 244 mana in the group, the purchase campaign had gone some way toward breaking down these bases of solidarity. Because land rights had been reduced to privately owned individual shares in legal terms, and the whole campaign was focussed upon individuals, the strategies developed and pattern of land rights retained by Tuhoe varied greatly. Although many of the representatives were clearly leaders of established mana, and would thus attempt to maintain an ideal for their followers, the example of Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage examined in the previous chapter demonstrated the wide divergence between his descendants in the retention of land rights despite his extraordinary mana. There was also wide variation among the representatives themselves. Nevertheless, I conclude from the data above that a large proportion maintained some continuity of ancestrally significant land rights despite the array of forces they were up against. Whereas this list focuses on aspects of leadership rather than relative wealth, the two would have been importantly related. Later in this chapter in the examination of how consolidation groups were formed, I will return to the issue of the relative influence or control over resources retained by some of these groups. Figure 8 has arranged in rank order of retained (and pooled) land wealth all the groups with a total of 100,000 pennies worth of consolidated land between them. Many of the same leaders who here display retention of significant ancestral rights emerge there with impressive groups and joint control over what resources remained to them. Again, if the block rights traced in Figure 5 above are the correlative of hapuu rights, then the grounds to suppose that representation rested in hapuu affiliation are strengthened. A simple count of the hapuu named in Spreadsheet 2 shows that of the 31 hapuu listed by the Tuhoe commissioners in 1899 and recognised to have rights to blocks in 1902, 21 appear among the representatives' probable affiliations (see Figure 6 below). Usually a hapuu is represented by more than one person, and some are represented by several. Conversely, many persons represent more than one hapuu. If the list of hapuu is extended to those not listed in 1899 but appearing among the block awards given in 1902, the count declines somewhat to 29 of 49 hapuu Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 245 represented. However, many of the apparently unrepresented hapuu are probably closely related to others that are represented (that is to say, their membership overlaps extensively). In an effort to reduce the complexity of Spreadsheet 2 (Appendix A), the Figure 6: Representation of Happu by Scheme Representatives I. 31 Hapuu were Listed 1899 and were Named in Awards 1902: Hapuu Des Representatives Probably Affiliated Ha,N. Kohunui Tupaea, Te Pouwhare Te Roau. Hape,N. Hiki, N. Mika Te Tawhao. Hinekura, N. Paora Rangiaho, Rehua Te Wao, Tupara Kaaho. KahuIKakahutapiki, N. Koura, N. Takurua Tamarau, Te Wharepouri Te Amo Kuri, N. Tikareti Te Iriwhiro Mahurehure Maihi, Ngai Paora Kingi Paora, Tahuri Te Hira, Tu Rakuraku. Manawa,N. Albert Warbrick, Tane Hauraki, Teepa Koura. Manunui, N. Wahia Paraki. Maru,N. Muriwai, N. Eparaima Te Hapi, Hauwai Tiakiwai, Mika Te Tawhao, Rotu Kereru, Tawera Moko, Te Wharepouri Te Amo. Patuheuheu Potiki, N. Mika Te Tawhao, Rotu Kereru, Tawera Moko. Rakei, N. Teepa Koura. Rongo,N. Te Hata Waewae, Kohunui Tupaea, Te Pouwhare Te Roau, Rotu Kereru, Tawera Moko, Teepa Koura, Tihi Te Peeti, Wahia Paraki, Whetu Paerata. Ruatahuna, N. Te Wharepouri Te Amo. Tamakaimoana Akuhata Te Hiko, Rua Kenana, Tu Rakuraku, Te Wharepouri Te Amo. Tama,N. Eparaima Te Hapi, Hauwai Tiakiwai, Rotu Kereru. Tamaroki, N. Tahuri Te Hira, Tu Rakuraku. Tatua/Te Atua, N. Tawhaki, N. Takao Tamaikoha, Te Wharepouri Te Amo. TeAu,N. TeKahu, N. Tahuri Te Hira, Tu Rakuraku. TeKapo,N. TeRiu, N. Takao Tamaikoha, Tupara Kaaho. Turnatawha, N. Turanga, N. Te Whakatane Te Hata Waewae, Tane Hauraki, Tihi Te Peeti. Whare,N. Albert Warbrick, Tane Hauraki, Teepa Koura. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 246 II. 18 Hapuu that were not in 1896,1899 Lists, but Appeared in 1902 Awards Hapuu ues Representatives Probably Affiliated Haka,N. Manutohikuia, N. Maruhakapua, N. Mura, N. Paora Rangiaho,Taihakoa Poniwahio, Tupara Kaaho. Pou,N. Puhi, N. Ruapani, N. Takiri, N., Te Ao Tangohau, Paora Kingi Paora, Tu Rakuraku. Tamariwai, N., Te Hata Waewae, Tihi Te Peeti. Taua, Ngai, Tu Rakuraku. Taumata, N. Tawha, Ngai Te Aitanga a Tanemoeahi Mika Te Tawhao, Taihakoa Poniwahio. Tokotuai, N. Takao Tamaikoha, Tihi Te Peeti. TU,N. Tuhoe Hurae Puketapu, Tane Hauraki, Tihi Te Peeti. TeUrewera Kohunui Tupaea, Takao Tamaikoha, Tihi Te Peeti, Te Wharepouri Te Amo. Whakateke, N. names of some hapuu the rights of which to some blocks were recognised in 1902 orders have been omitted, mentioning them as 'others'; had they been included the degree of representation might be increased. I nonetheless consider representation to be extensive given fewer than 39 representatives. Perhaps the most obvious argument that the Tuhoe representatives were fairly representative of the Tuhoe 'non-sellers' need not rely directly on either the continuity of block rights or their hapuu affiliations. Early in the August meetings at Tauarau these representatives served to represent the non-sellers as a whole (to the Crown, at least), and thus to authorise Ngata to represent them. However, for the rest of the meetings, and (at least nominally) for the duration of several years that it took to implement the Scheme, these representatives were the official spokespersons of the 49 or more consolidation groups. The formation of these groups will be examined shortly, but they began to be formed immediately after the Crown's initial proposals were discussed, early in the first week of the August meetings. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 247 Although these groups continued to change throughout the arrangement (and, indeed, the later implementation) of the Scheme, they usually turned out to be 10-50 persons closely-knit by descent, marriage, or (in the case of Rua Kenana's groups), religion. Most of the representatives had probably actually been put forward by the leaders of the wider extension of this group, probably a hapuu. If the official representative were the stooge of Ngata or the Crown, it is unlikely that they would be allowed to function other than as front-persons or culture-brokers with little real influence on the course of events. In some cases, the Crown and Ngata's ideology of progress as private ownership of family farms may have convinced the whaanau or hapuu to put forward a representative who shared this ideology. However, he or she is unlikely to have had a free hand and would probably be closely interrogated and supervised by the elders ofthe group. 3.5 The Crown's Proposals The proposals put to the Tuhoe by the Crown at the opening of the Tauarau meetings, and apparently accepted by them, also require scrutiny. Miles reports cautiously that one can see from Schedule 1 that 'the Crown ostensibly managed to gain Tuhoe consent to most of the proposals its representatives had taken to the August hui', but adds that it was unlikely that the deal on survey costs had been fully digested by them.251 Closer scrutiny has led me to much stronger doubts regarding what proposals were put to them as well as agreement gained. Again, Balneavis describes this situation more adequately than others, including the surprising report that the supposed acceptance of the Tuhoe needed two days of discussion either with Ngata or among themselves, and even after that was apparently acceding to Ngata's 'advice' rather than their own joint decision. 251 Miles, p 433. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 248 It was at once apparent that these proposals to the Maori mind were of a most far-reaching and revolutionary character, and the measure of the intelligence and reasonableness of the Urewera people may be gauged by the readiness with which, on Mr. Ngata's advice, they decided two days later to accept the Crown proposals as the basis of a general settlement, subject to modifications and variations in detail. 252 Balneavis' candid description of Tuhoe doubt, emphasis on their 'reasonableness', and admission that their decision relied on Ngata's advice seems gauged to record the precariousness of the agreement. Actually, as will be explained, tense negotiations and compromises appear to have continued at least through the drafting of the consolidation statute at the end ofthe year. It may be significant that the final report presented to the Ministers on 3l0ctober192l makes no claim that these proposals were accepted by the Tuhoe, simply stating instead that they ' ... are outlined here because in the main they were the principles to which the details of the Urewera consolidation were made to conform' .253 That is to say, authority rather than consent is confidently invoked. As noted by Bassett and Kay there are apparently no minutes or notes of what passed between Ngata and the representatives during these rather important two days, although later Tuhoe protests frequently referred to it.254 Balneavis if not others was probably involved in these negotiations as well, insofar as he was the official interpreter for the meetings (although Ngata, at least, would have needed no interpreter) as well as Ngata's private secretary. As will be shown, the proposals upon which these discussions were focussed are also difficult to identify. I will examine the continuation of Crown purchases during implementation as well as the arrangement of the consolidation scheme in chapters five and six. This was to become one of the most contentious issues in the historical record. None of the sources on the proposals put to the Tuhoe even mention this issue, but by July 1922 252 Balneavis to NM, 27 August 1921, MA 29/417A, P 3. 253 Knight et aI., AJHR G-7 1921, p 4. 254 Bassett and Kay, pp 137-8. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 249 after considerable turmoil it was accepted by the Native Minister Coates himself (probably on Ngata's witness) that' ... a promise was distinctly made to the Urewera Natives that further purchasing would be stopped and [this] was the intention when the Act was framed' .255 If, as I argued in the previous chapter in agreement with O'Malley, a major motive among the Tuhoe for cooperating with the consolidation scheme was to stop the Crown purchase campaign, this issue would have had to arise and be explicitly resolved in Ngata's meetings with the Tuhoe on the proposals, ifnot in the proposals themselves. The thinness of the record on these crucial turning points in the August meeting would not itself be cause for concern except that the preliminary, presumably much less momentous meeting which had been held in May was treated formally and minutes kept which are presented as a verbatim record of the exchange between Crown officers and the Tuhoe. After all, it was at the August meeting that formal agreement is said to have been reached and the details of the entire consolidation scheme hammered out through great effort. Yet it was on Coates' instructions that the crucial August meeting was 'formulated without jurisdiction, and with no authority other than the ministerial instructions. The whole of the proceedings [were] therefore informal' .256 This approach was probably urged on Coates by Ngata as the best way to handle the Tuhoe. Miles points out that the signatories to the final report 'applauded the Government strategy of conducting informal negotiations "unhampered by legislative and other restrictions.,,257 By contrast to the more formal approach taken in the preliminary well-documented meeting it may explain the paucity and inconsistency of the record of the August meeting, but it also forces the question of why the approach was reversed. The official Crown proposals had been put to the Tuhoe at the opening meeting by Knight, but it is also unclear just what these were. Four different versions of the 1 255 Coates to Guthrie, 1 July 1922, MA 1 29/417 Pt.l. 256 Knight et aI., AJHR G-7 1921, P 5. 257 Miles, p 439, citing P 6. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 250 August 1921 proposals have been located, but vary considerably from one another.258 Below in Figure 7 are brief synopses of them rearranged side by side for comparison, preserving the original enumeration if there was any. I have also kept some of the syntax, which varies between dictatorial and negotiative tones. 258 Knight to Undersecretary for Lands, 21 June 1921, MA 1, 29/417A and Campbell Supporting Documents Vol II: 147-149; Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 1, 29/417A; AllIR G-7 1921:1- 39; unsigned letter (Knight?) to Ministers of Lands and Native Affairs, 3 October 1921, WDMLC c.f. 623 and Campbell Supporting Documents Vol II: 160-171. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 251 N o 10km p'==~===j------" 6 Smiles Area of Crown Interest. Source: Stokes, Milro and Melbourne, 1986, Wai 894, record of documents, A111 Fi 12. Map 5: Previous Depiction of Crown Purchases by 1919 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 252 N 2, , 10,km o 6miles Area of Crown .... Interest Source: Stokes Milro and Melbourne 1986 Wai 894 record of documents A111 Fi 13. Map 6: Previous Depiction of Crown Purchases by 1920 ,______r. _ _ - _- ______- __ ~ _ _ -- J:..c-C-C_:-..:-_-C_-:..-_...:...:_-:-:--...::--C-C_--'--'_ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 253 Figure 7: Records of Knight's 1 August 1921 Proposals to the Tuhoe Knight Balneavis Knight (?) AJHR G-7 1921 (21 June 1921) (27 August 1921) (3 October 1921) Crown takes its interests (a) Natives evacuate TW 2. Crown's interests to 1. Crown asked for complete in two areas: 1, 2 except for small be located awards ofTW 1,2, Maraetahia, (i) TW and adj lands reserves near settlement. (i) area betw Whakatane Tawhiuau, Otairi except for sm less any settlemts. (b) Natives evacuate and Waimana Rivers reserves for non-sellers, who (ii) composite blk to Whakatane and (ii) Te Whaiti district, would take bulk of their awards north on either side of Waimana basins 20 ill. and (iii) in addn, has elsewhere in territory. Whakatane and south of Ruatoki taken/will take any steep 2. Crown asked for bulk of its Waimana valleys. settlement bush along banks of purchases to be located betw streams which it finds Whakatane Riv and Waimana necessary for basin south of Ruatoki settlmt preservation and flood control. Native interests: (c) Abolition of existing 1. Existing boundaries to 5. Crown proposed that existing (i) cancel present orders titles and surveys, and be disregarded, including titles and surveys and tribal and partitions; substitution of LT titles subdivisions (except Te boundaries be concelled and (ii) survey into consolidating interests of Whaiti, which has no abolished, and new titles settlements where families or hapus. real connection to the established. appropriate; Ureweras) (iii) set aside useless (pp. 7-8) bulk oflands 4. After definition of lands for costs of taken for roading and Crown awards, non- surveys and roads surveys would come out sellers lands to be (iv) after surveys of 'useless lands' for surveyed and titled in completed and costs settlement but important lieu of cancelled orders. defmed, open these for conservation 3. If any Native useless lands to cultivation is abandoned purchasing operations to facilitate Crown settlement, improvements will be compensated. Half of roading costs Native contribution of 5. Native contribution of 4. Crown asked for contribution could be taken at once in £32,000 for arterial £20,000 in land towards of £32,000 ofland toward cost an area out of useless roads. cost of survey and of arterial roads. lands constructing main arterial roads. 6. Road lines on plan 12500 to vest in Crown as public roads. ,---._------ ------~~---- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 254 Ngata's proposal of 20,000 acres to landless Natives: refuse or be non-committal? Exchanges outside district? Take land in satisfaction of £3,000 due on Ruatoki and Ruatahuna surveys. £6,000 for cost of troops to Galatea in 1893? 7. All interests of Crown 1. Scheme to cover only those or Natives to be blocks in which Crown had expressed in money purchased. based on prices at which Crown had purchased and transferred into blocks at such prices. Several things need to be clarified here before a comparison is attempted. In the summary table above, Knight's proposals to the Tuhoe occurred on 1 August 1921, between his outline of them to Guthrie on 21 June 1921 and Balneavis' report of them to Coates on 27 August 1921, after the Tauarau meetings and the visits to Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana. In Balneavis' report of Knight's proposals he refers Coates to a copy of Knight's 21 June letter to Guthrie (which was in Coates' files) as though (i) Knight's proposals to the Tuhoe on 1 August at Tauarau were the same as those in his earlier letter to Guthrie, and (ii) Balneavis' own account in his 27 August report repeats these proposals. However, comparison of Balneavis' report and Knight's earlier letter shows many differences, leaving Knight's actual proposals to the Tuhoe in the dark. It turns out that subsequent reports of these proposals, by (probably) Knight himself on 3 October and, finally, by (probably) Balneavis and Ngata to the Ministers on 31 October (later published as the final report, AJHR G-7 1921) only complicate the problem of knowing what the original proposals were. There may be other reports, but they have not come to light. It is possible that Tuhoe have written records of the proposals made to them, but I have not heard of any (they had been keeping written ---'--- --~--"------,- - . ------~--~------::.-==------.::.; - Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 255 records for years as Native Reserve committees, and these committees were still being taken seriously by the Tuhoe if not the government - and had not yet been officially abolished). It would be ironic if history were dependent upon the Tuhoe records; indeed, this is a case in which the oral tradition might be more reliable than the written one. Although the 3 October 1921 report is unsigned, I have concluded that Knight authored it because (i) his name leads among the three consolidation officers signing the final report in the AJHR (Knight, Carr, and Balneavis), but while reports from the latter two are in the archives, no corresponding report signed by him has been encountered; (ii) he was the official Crown representative and the only member of Lands and Survey among the consolidation officers; and (iii) the 3 October report is on Department of Lands and Survey letterhead addressed to both Ministers Guthrie and Coates, and (iv) the 3 October report appears to be written in behalf of all three officers but is quite different from the other two reports. 3.5.1 Assumption of the Crown's Dominance Finally, in assessing these accounts of the proposals, it is important to keep in mind that the Crown was not necessarily in a dominant position for negotiations. Nevertheless, in arrangement of the consolidation scheme the Crown was able repeatedly to pre-empt Tuhoe rights to specific lands as though they were unquestionably dominant in the negotiations, and as though the Tuhoe were supplicants. Why was this so? Insofar as I will be identifying further such efforts on the part of the Crown, in the proposals at Tauarau as well as continuing negotiations and throughout the implementation of the consolidation, it would be well to examine the ambiguity of this presumed dominance more carefully. The Crown's strategy in this regard was already being laid in the preliminary 22 May 1921 meeting at Ruatoki. The May meeting has been closely examined in previous reports to the Tribunal, but some aspects bearing on the question of the Crown's assumption of dominance can be reviewed. Miles notes some crucial maneuvers, including Ngata's comment that' I don't think the Natives are aware of the extent to Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 256 which the Crown has acquired the Native interests ... ,' and Guthrie's raising of the stakes by doubting that the Crown could fulfill Ngata's assurance that the non-sellers would 'concentrate their interests round about the settlements they now occupy' (as was apparently accepted by the Crown in the February meeting).259 Ngata later went on to imply that only 'small remnants' of land, even as little as 50,000 out of the 650,000 acres of the Urewera, were left to the Tuhoe, and bluntly claimed that the 'Crown has such a large area purchased that it is for the Government to concede settlement blocks to the non-sellers round their existing kaingas' (pp.lO-ll; my emphasis). It appears that the Crown officers, despite superficial appearances of disagreement among themselves, were already boldly resting their case on their legally precarious hold of a majority of undivided and unlocated shares in unsurveyed blocks, and furthermore tactfully giving notice that some established Tuhoe settlements might have to be evacuated. While taking up responsibility for promotion of the Scheme for the Crown in the May meeting, Ngata had also arranged his representation of Tuhoe interests: 'I offered my services on behalf of the Natives, and I would be only too glad to see the matter put in hand right away' .260 Quietly backing up Ngata's suggestion that the Tuhoe were unaware of how serious their position was, Guthrie displayed the relative position of Crown and Tuhoe on a map which apparently divided each block into colours representing the proportion of shares held by each (Maps 5 and 6). The map to which Guthrie referred is well-worn but probably the one still archived for the Lands Department, and displays copies of Bowler's reports of acreage purchased and 'outstanding' (that is, unpurchased) in each block, as well as a division of each block into a red area representing purchases of the Crown.261 It was in reference to this map that Guthrie expressed grave doubt that 'we should retain some of the kaaingas', arguing that were the Crown to favour any particular kaainga, all would demand 259 Miles, pp 424-5; 18 June 1921: 'Meeting of the representatives of the Urewera Natives with the Hon. D.H. Guthrie ... ', 22 May 1921' in MA 29/417A, pp 9,13. 260 Ibid., P 12; Miles, p 424. 261 Campbe111997:31-33, from Stokes, Milroy, and Melbourne 1986:65-66; probably 125001B83 and 12502/B83 in LINZ Hamilton archives. "------ ------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 257 WHAKATANE 9 10km :===:!:==j,---" b 6miles N (1) "Part proposed Crown award" ~ "Part proposed Crown award" @ "Useless lands from which Crown might take lands for costs of surveying native sections and UREWERA roading contribution" RESERVE @ "Part to be sectionised for natives" Source: Adapted from Miles, 1999 (Wai 894, record of documents, A111) Fig 19. Map 7: Knight's Proposals 6 June 1921 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 258 favour (Ngata had actually twice implied that all presently occupied settlements would be retained). Apparently nothing was said by Ngata let alone the parties representing the Crown to acknowledge to the Tuhoe that the spatial representation on the map and Bowler's reports were a misrepresentation of the legal nature of undivided and unlocated shares in 'every part' of which Tuhoe held shares in the Crown's midst. Apparently Ngata himself had misleadingly referred to the Crown purchases as comprising an 'area' (p.ll), although he was a trained lawyer and had helped Salmond (from whom the clause 'every part' had come) draft the 1909 Native Land Act, and would have fully understood the implications of tenure in common as well its special status under the 1896 Act. His estimate of the relative proportions of shares controlled by Tuhoe and the Crown was also grossly inaccurate (even compared to the maps). The most obvious disadvantage of the Crown also apparently remained unacknowledged to the Tuhoe: were they simply to refuse a consolidation of the Crown shares, the Crown would be left with the dilemma it had been increasingly struggling with, between partitioning each block in the Native Land Court or outright expropriation. It is likely that some Tuhoe already understood these fine points, but - without adequate advice from their advocate - were not in a sufficiently strong position to insist on them. More might have sensed that the Crown was bluffing. Regardless of translations, few would have missed the mildly threatening undertones behind the formalities. It is likely that after the experience ofNgata's guidance in 1910 and the lead-up to the Crown purchase campaign, many had doubts about Ngata's offer to represent them but felt they had no better choice among themselves, and gambled on their hopes for fairer policies under Coates; Herries had been the devil they did not know. Insofar as it took Ngata two days of the Tauarau meetings to get them just to accept his advice provisionally to accept the Crown's proposals, it appears that serious doubts continued - but also considerable independence and confidence despite the Crown's effort to intimidate them. _-_-_-_-~-~--~-_-_j 1,.-. _ _ _" ___ -'_-__-_..:_--"----_---' ___-..:..:_~=.::-~:::::._:::, _____ ".::...::...::..:::-=-=-=-__ _ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 259 3.5.2 Various Forms of Crown Pre-emptions The precarious assumption of the Crown's dominant position which was established in the May meeting best explains the series of bold pre-emptions of otherwise legally secure Tuhoe land rights which defines much of the consolidation scheme. The way in which Tuhoe were to pay in land for surveys and roading, and the evacuation of the Waikaremoana block were two forms these pre-emptions were to take, and ambiguous groundwork for both were laid in the May meetings by comments of Guthrie and Ngata which, given the advantage of retrospect, appear pregnant with significance (pp.10-13). While it became clear that a share of the roading would be paid for in land, this was apparently not made explicit with regard to surveys. There was no mention at all that these deductions in land would be taken from each Tuhoe allotment. I will be returning to this key issue in chapter 7. I have forecast my concern with these pre-emptions, first with Te Wharepouri's protest against the sitting of Crown reserves in 1924, which exemplified Campbell's concern with Section 5 of the Urewera Consolidation Act. Although Bowler's repeated recommendation that non-sellers' shares simply be expropriated by the Crown was abjured with distaste by his superiors, ironically this section gave the commissioners virtually unfettered power to pre-empt specific lands anywhere in the Urewera regardless of any prior rights of the Tuhoe. This is what was done in several areas including the Waikaremoana block, the lower Whakatane and TaurangaJWaimana basins, and generally in the arrangement of the consolidation at Tauarau, where proposals of locations for consolidated shares were invited from each group only after the Crown had staked out its own awards. Although one may suppose that the power authorised in Section 5 was used judiciously by the commissioners, it had actually already been used far more widely in the Tauarau arrangements, and thus was among the many fait accompli in urgent need of retrospective legislation. Some of the pre-emptions were explicit or implicit in the Crown's proposals at Tauarau, and can be pursued a bit further here. It is clear that the Crown insisted on .-.::-.:.-.:. __ ..:.-.:. -:'':'-:'-:'-.:0---:'':'_ :=.-.:. -:.-:. ~-.:. :..--~.:. ______.::.; Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 260 reserving - and thus forbade the Tuhoe from reserving - certain large areas where it wanted to locate its shares. In the end, the Crown got away with this pre-emption in three very large areas which, for different reasons, were also the most valuable in the Urewera: (i) most of the lower Whakatane and TaurangaJWaimana basins, for Pakeha settlement purposes (ii) the whole of the Te Whaiti-Maraetahia-Otairi blocks, for its timber resources, and (iii) the Waikaremoana block (in which it had owned no shares at all), for its water conservation and scenic purposes. However, I will later consider how in all three of these areas the Tuhoe refused to 'evacuate' entirely, and the Crown was forced to retreat somewhat. It is significant that the Ruatahuna 'Flats', because they were also suitable for Pakeha settlement, might have been intended to be a fourth area among these pre-emptions. Bassett and Kay show that although the purchase campaign had gotten a late start there, Bowler had gained rapid inroads for Crown ownership of undivided shares especially in three of the five partitions. However, by June if not before, Tuhoe resistance there had apparently become notorious. In his 6 June 1921 letter to Guthrie, after recommending that the Crown take its interests in the Te Whaiti area and lower Whakatane and TaurangaJWaimana basins, Knight remarks that an 'arrangement on these lines would give the Crown the Te Whaiti timber and the land most suitable for settlement, excepting the Ruatahuna Flats which I see no hope of securing. ,262 Insofar as Knight was in the same Lands Office in Auckland as Bowler, it is likely he was drawing on the latter's first-hand experience with the Tuhoe residents of Ruatahuna. Thus already by June the Crown had given considerable ground to the Tuhoe, but appeared careful not to compromise its assumed position of dominance by publishing the fact. 3.5.3 Comparing Some Reported Proposals With this background clarified, I can now offer a comparison of the several reports of the Crown proposals to the Tuhoe (Figure 7). A comparison of the reports is facilitated by a map which almost certainly accompanied Knight's 6 June 1921 report Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 261 to Guthrie (Map 7),z63 At the bottom of p.2 of that letter Knight refers to a 'litho' with red lines marking roads, as they do on this map. Knight's proposal in the letter of four general areas are also in the same terms that appear scrawled in blue marker on the map: (1) one area labeled 'Part proposed Crown award' (all blocks of the lower Whakatane and TaurangaiWaimana basins); (2) another area labeled 'Part proposed Crown award' (Te Whaiti-Maraetahia-Otairi blocks); (3) a long swath of land from northern Hikurangi-Horomanga block through southern Tarapounamu Matawhero and southern Ruatahuna and up through Waikaremoana, Manuoha, and Paharakeke blocks, labeled 'useless lands from which Crown might take lands for costs of surveying native sections and roading contribution'; and (4) a central section labeled 'Part to be sectionised for natives' including all of Ierenui-Ohaua, Kohuru Tukuroa, Te Ranga-a-Ruanuku, Waikarewhenua, the small blocks Tauwhare and Ohiorangi, and large parts of Tarapounamu-Matawhero, Ruatahuna, Maungapohatu, and Tauranga surrounding these blocks. Knight's June letter clarifies that by the so called 'useless' lands of area 3 he means useless for settlement purposes. Knight had probably caught the attention of Guthrie when both were at the May meeting with Tuhoe at Ruatoki, and was thus invited to submit the 21 June proposal. As a surveyor-draftsman, his suggestions were informed by a general topographical assessment ofthe lands in terms of their use and potential. He also probably conferred closely with Bowler with regard to Tuhoe attitudes. The sketch map makes it clear that topographically he was thinking of the above areas in terms of (1) the lower Whakatane and TaurangaiWaimana basins for Pakeha settlement; (4) the intermediate to upper Whakatane and Tauranga River flats and major tributaries for Tuhoe settlement and resettlement; (3) the steep and broken flanks and dominant ridge1ines and summits surrounding these two areas for lands 'useless' to either, eventually to be held by the Crown for conservation purposes; and the Te Whaiti skirt extending 262 Knight to Undersecretary for Lands, 6 June 1921, p 2, MA 1, 29/417A and Campbell Supporting Documents VollI: 147-149. 263 Undated unsigned markings in blue and red ink on the common 1907 lithograph sketch plan of UDNR, on top of AADS AccW3562, Bundle 617, 22/697 1910-18. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 262 southwest from these ridge1ines toward the Galatea and Kaingaroa plains, long coveted for is better timber resources. While this sketch map presents the Crown's ideal as proposed by Knight, it treats the Tuhoe and their possession of the land as a secondary consideration. It may be suggested that the wide differences which can be seen from a comparison of this June sketch map with that finally published with the October report in the AJHR reflect the fact that the Tuhoe sti11lived and used, as well as held legal title to the entire area, and forced some compromises upon the Crown's ideal. Thus a comparison between the two maps gives us the outlines of negotiations which otherwise we know little about. There is some consistency in the reports of the proposals regarding the Crown's own anticipated awards (see the first row of Figure 7). All accounts focus upon the first two 'Part proposed Crown awards' above, although the definition of each varies considerably (the Waikaremoana block was belatedly added to the Crown awards when early in the Tauarau meetings it was realised that the Crown could probably buyout many owners). Whereas in June Knight had proposed to Guthrie that the Crown 'take' an award on both sides of both the Whakatane and Waimana Rivers in the northern, most promising part of the Urewera for Pakeha settlement, in October he reported proposing to the Tuhoe the area between the two rivers. In neither case was the north-south location or extent of the proposed Crown award specified. In late August Balneavis reported that Knight had proposed to the Tuhoe that the Natives 'evacuate' an area of both basins (that is, both sides of both rivers) beginning (?) about 20 miles south of the Ruatoki settlement. In the official report at the end of October, he and Ngata reported that Knight had 'asked' that the Crown's award there be located 'between' the two rivers. With regard to the Crown's award in the Te Whaiti area, in June Knight proposed to Guthrie that the Crown 'take' Te Whaiti and adjacent lands less any settlements, but on 3 October he does not mention excluding the Te Whaiti settlements from the award. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 263 Significantly, Knight's 3 October report of his proposals reverses a basic assumption of his 21 June letter to Guthrie: he shifts the extensive 'useless lands' from the Native to the Crown award. According to his October report he told the Tuhoe that the Crown 'has taken' (these words are crossed out and replaced with 'will take') any (all?) steep bush along banks of streams which it finds necessary for preservation and flood control. Although the apparent limitation to stream banks is ambiguous, he probably meant by this description the entire arc of uplands around the Pakeha and Maori settlement areas described in his June sketch map as useless lands. Although his 21 June letter had proposed the useless lands as part of the Native rather than Crown award, some or all of it was to be taken for costs of the surveys and road. If these lands were now to be part of the Crown award from the beginning, the question arises from where would the Crown take the land for these costs? 3.5.4 The Ambiguous Emergence of the Policy of Piecemeal Deductions This significant shift in his proposals represents a tentative pre-emption of these so- called useless lands, but other implications might be as significant. The shift might have signaled (i) a decision to take the lands for payment of surveys and roads from the native settlement areas themselves rather than from the useless lands, (ii) a reminder to the owners and especially the residents of the Waikaremoana block that the same rationale for pre-emption could be extended to that block, or (iii) anticipation that the Crown would need lands to exchange in the case of pre-emptions in Tuhoe settlement areas. All three possibilities would be at the cost of Tuhoe settlements, and in the end the Crown award was actually to be extended on all three of these fronts. The first of these three tactics would indeed complete the reversal of Knight's 21 June proposal. There he had considered it only a remote contingency that if the useless lands were insufficient to cover the cost of surveys and a share of the roads 'then the Crown will have to be awarded supplementary areas in the Native Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 264 sections' ?64 However, the new policy was to take the payment for surveys and roads first from the Native sections themselves. According to the 3 October 1921 report of Knight's proposals to the Tuhoe, although he includes their contribution of 20,000 pounds sterling in land for the building of the roads, he was not explicit about what land would be taken for these costs and says nothing about the survey of the Native sections. However, a few pages later in another context he states confidently' ... until the survey of the Native sections has been completed, it having been agreed that the proportion of the contribution towards roading and also the cost of the survey of the sections shall be taken in area from each section as the survey proceeds. The cost of the surveys will amount to a considerable sum.. .'265 The reversal of his relatively benevolent proposal of 21 June does become more or less explicit by the time the final report was completed 31 October 1921. Although again it is not reported to be among Knight's proposals, it is first mentioned in paragraph 3 of the final (31 October) report under 'Proposed legislation' and finally made explicit in Schedule 1, item 8, which says: The survey of all Native sections shall be carried out by the Crown, at the cost of those sections, to be paid for in land. The cost of the survey shall be estimated beforehand, and the area of land to defray the same shall be deducted from the area of the native section to be surveyed and awarded to the Crown. The area need not be cut off contiguous to the Native section, or it may take the form of scenic and water-conservation or forest-conservation area within the boundaries of the Native section.266 When and how did this reversal occur? Except for Knight's 21 June report, Balneavis' report alone raises the notion of 'useless' lands and states that in his proposals to the Tuhoe at Tauarau Knight had designated them rather than their own sections as source of the Tuhoe payments for surveys and roading: Mr. Knight specified in his proposals that he contemplated that the contribution should come out of 'useless lands - useless for settlement, but 264 Unsigned letter (probably Knight) to Guthrie, 3 October 1921, p 3, MA 29/7/4A and Campbell Supp.Pap.Vol II: 160-71. 265 Ibid., pp 3, 7. 266 Knight et aI., AJHR G-7 1921, P 8; my emphasis. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 265 necessary for conservation for climatic purposes', and it is acknowledged that the bulk of such lands are in Hikurangi-Horomanga, Tarapounamu Matawhero, Ruatahuna, and Maungapohatu Blocks.267 The evidence suggests a fairly direct contradiction in the arrangements for deductions which were said to have been put to the Tuhoe. A series of objections were put to the commissioners in their first sitting at Ruatahuna by Te Wharepouri Te Amo, who was a representative of the non-sellers present at Tauarau, and who claimed that surveys were not discussed at Ruatoki.268 Te Wharepouri also claimed that he had tried to raise objections at the Tauarau meeting, but Ngata had disregarded them. By 1922 Te Wharepouri was a key leader of the Apitihana movement opposing any cooperation with the consolidation scheme. A 1927 protest from Te Whaiti residents also claimed that an agreement at Tauarau was that while Tuhoe would be given their awards in the front of blocks, the Crown would take their awards in the hinterland.269 On the other hand, the quotation from Balneavis appears to come from Knight's 21 June letter rather than verbatim from his proposal to the Tuhoe. So the balance of evidence might swing to the conclusion that something on the order of Knight's afterthought in his 3 October report and the later Schedule 1 (regarding deductions 'from the area of the native section to be surveyed') was indeed put to the Tuhoe at Tauarau. However, it is difficult to believe that an official as meticulous and candid as Balneavis generally was would have misreported this important detail. His statement at least shows that he probably believed Knight had not proposed the procedure of piecemeal deductions to the Tuhoe (for me, this point is conclusive). In this fuller context the explicit assertion of one Tuhoe representative who participated in the discussions of the proposals with Ngata would seem to be decisive: in the first sitting of the commission in Ruatahuna and the first confrontation with the Apitihana movement, Te Wharepouri Te Amo claimed that the matter of surveys was 'not discussed at Ruatoki' .270 267 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1919, MA 29/4I7A, P 8. 268 UCMB 1, P 31. 269 Miles 1999:462: Te Huriwaka Wharekotua to Coates, 21 February 1927, MAl 9/417 P 2. 270 UCMB 1:31. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 266 In any case, if Knight did put the procedure of piecemeal deductions to the Tuhoe, this still leaves their acceptance in question, and also throws into harsh light the Crown's decision, apparently not frankly shared with the Tuhoe, to reverse Knight's earlier proposal of deductions from useless lands elsewhere to a far more aggressive alternative. In the absence of a clear understanding from either the May meeting or the Crown proposals in August regarding how the cost of surveys would be taken in land, what would have been Tuhoe assumptions? From Tuhoe experience of surveys in the Ruatoki and several UDNR blocks since the 1890s, as well as the experience of most Maori, surveys were paid for in money not land, and furthermore not immediate cash but by paying off Crown charging orders over a period of time. Knight's 21 June proposal included the suggestion that additional land be taken in satisfaction of the 3,000 pounds sterling still owing on the Ruatoki and Ruatahuna surveys (taken, that is, in bulk from the 'useless' lands), but Schedule 1 paragraph 14 ended by canceling the latter. Thus it might well have been assumed by Tuhoe that if payment had to be in land rather than cash, it would be taken in the way cash was owed, by lump sum. It would also be reasonable for them to assume that such a lump sum would be taken in their less-favoured lands rather than from each of their allotments. This is indeed what Knight had proposed in his 21 June letter following the May meeting, so if anything was made clear in that meeting regarding how the cost of surveys would be taken in land, one would suppose that this would have been the understanding. On 27 August Balneavis reported that Knight had proposed the Natives evacuate all of Te Whaiti (both partitions 1 and 2) except for small reserves near the settlement, but did not mention Maraetahia and Otairi blocks. However, in the final report he and Ngata stated that Knight had 'asked' for Maraetahia, Tawhiuau (a partition of Hikurangi-Horomanga block), and Otairi blocks as well as both partitions of Te Whaiti block, and furthermore specified that the reserves which the Crown would allow non-sellers in Te Whaiti would be 'small' because they would take the bulk of Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 267 their awards 'elsewhere in the territory.' The pressures which encouraged this evacuation will be described later. 3.5.5 The Native Awards There was less consistency in the accounts regarding what Knight proposed to the Tuhoe about the extent and location of their own 'awards'. Significantly, prominent in all of the accounts was the insistence that the tribal boundaries, surveys, partitions, court orders, or titles established at length under the UDNR be abolished and replaced by land transfer titles enabling ordinary market dealings under the Native Land Court. This proposal reflected the ideology of progress or 'modernisation' which Ngata as well as the Land and Native Ministries espoused. Although some Tuhoe also supported it, many had accepted it as the only way to protect the morehuu or remnants of land they still controlled. This proposal echoed Coates' and Guthrie's confidential agreement that a consolidation in the Urewera would be 'the extinction of existing titles and the substitution of another form which knows no more of ancestral rights to particular portions ofland' and also perhaps a pervasive uneasiness with hapuu as the persistent ground of Tuhoe political solidarity. The final report explicitly sought the abolition of the Local and General Committees set up to represent hapuu in the blocks, claiming that 'there is now no need of these, and the majority of the Ureweras are opposed to their continuance'. Miles points out the dissonance of this claim insofar as the Crown's disregard of the committees had left them without function for some years.271 None of the accounts of Knight's proposals report any specific locations or extent of the Native awards. The apparent avoidance of Crown commitment probably reflects the implicit consensus among the Crown's officers that this could be worked out in the remaining lands once the Crown pre-emptions were established. Knight's 21 June proposal to Guthrie had been much more explicit, suggesting that (i) the Native awards be surveyed into settlements where appropriate, that (ii) useless lands be set aside for the Natives but that deductions for costs of surveys and roads be taken from 271 Knight, et aI., AJHR G-7 1921, P 5; Miles, p 434. ------1 -----~------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 268 this, and that (iii) these useless Native lands be opened (again) to Crown purchase operations. Thus the more explicit plans for the Native awards foreshadowed in Knight's June letter to Guthrie render conspicuous their absence from all three accounts of what he proposed to the Tuhoe on 1 August. Similarly, the apparently silent shift of the useless lands from the Native to the Crown award prompts the question of what land would be taken for survey and roading expenses. Although all three accounts report a proposal that Tuhoe should contribute land for the survey of their new blocks and a share of the roading costs, none mention from what part of the Native award these deductions were to come. In his 21 June report Knight had furthermore advised Guthrie that in order to minimise survey costs to the Crown, purchases not be started in the remaining Native award of useless lands until surveys of the Native awards and the deductions for costs of roads and surveys from the useless lands was completed. In this way, most of the Crown's award would have already been surveyed by the outer boundaries of the Native awards, which would be paid for in further land from the Natives. From the point of view of the Ministry of Lands, and perhaps the Native Ministry as well, this was probably seen as ordinary economising practice for the Crown, not exploitive of their clients. The Crown would be left to pay only the cost of survey lines cutting out the deductions from the Natives' useless land where it did not adjoin surveys made at the Tuhoe's cost. So Knight's proposals to Guthrie regarding the Native awards were revealing especially where they were not implemented, or implemented apparently without proposing them to the Tuhoe. By contrast with the three accounts which suggest he went no further than to inform the Tuhoe that the UDNR boundaries would be abolished, his proposals to Guthrie suggest the Crown foresaw several ways to minimise the Native while maximising the Crown award (insofar as his suggestions to indemnify in land the cost of the Ruatoki and Ruatahuna surveys, and even the cost of troops in 1893, were dropped, apparently Guthrie or Coates thought this would be going too far!). His original proposals suggest that while the Crown was ready to let Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 269 the Tuhoe consolidation groups propose locations widely in the Urewera - outside the areas pre-empted for the Crown awards - they probably planned to gain control of much of it for preservation and flood control purposes in addition to deductions from Tuhoe lands for surveys and a share of the roading costs which would furthermore cover most of the surveys needed for the Crown's own pre-empted lands. The ambiguous appearance of a policy to take the survey as well as roading costs from each allocation was a major coup for the Crown. It meant not only that each Tuhoe section would be significantly reduced by deductions for surveys and roads, and more of the Crown's own survey lines paid for by the Tuhoe, but also that the Crown would have further flexibility to reduce or expand the areas which the Tuhoe were allowed. Thus (as implied in Schedule 1 paragraph 8) in these limited remaining areas the Crown could reserve to itself the option of taking the Crown's deductions from among the proposed locations themselves, thus limiting the number of them that could be taken there by the Tuhoe, or taking the deductions from less useful lands, and crowding more of the consolidation groups into the same favoured area. In either case, the resulting over-crowding of the consolidation groups in their preferred localities would often require that some of them, rather than the Crown, had to accept what came to be called 'balances' or 'overflow' areas in the so-called useless lands. As Wahia Paraki and others put it in 1925: Tuawhaa I runga ano ito kupu i whaka Takoto ai kia Tuhoe i Ruatahuna ko te Waahi Pai 0 to Matou Whenua ki Matau ano ko te Wahi kin kite karauna Tuarima engari iruna ite Whaka Takoto Tanga 0 nga Ruri kua whiua Te nuinga 0 amatou eka kirunga ki Nga pari kinga Whenua awai ki Runga kite kino noa ihi no Reira 0 kai Pitihana e whaka heana. Fourthly, on the words set before Tuhoe at Ruatahuna the better parts of our land were to be left to us, and the undesirable to the Crown. Fifthly, but when the surveys were done the majority of our acreage was thrown up onto the bluffslhillsides onto uselesslbad land only. So we the appellants say it is wrong. 272 272 Wahia Paraki and others, 23 July 1925, WDMLC c.f.623; translation by Himaima Tumoana. ------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 270 Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that it took two days for Ngata to achieve some agreement with the Tuhoe - or rather, according to Balneavis, to get them to accept his advice that they accept the proposals 'as the basis of a general settlement, subject to modifications and variations in detail' ?73 I described earlier Balneavis' equally candid description of the Tuhoe protest at this time in response to the announcement that all tribal boundaries and titles of the UDNR would be abolished: 'Their expressive way of stating the position was that the titles were to be 'whakamoana-ed' (literally, put out to sea).' Balneavis was dismissive of this protest as sentimental nostalgia and emphasised instead the reassurance accepted by progressive Tuhoe that their new titles would be freeholds. However, the following year in February Wahia Paraki, another representative present at Tauarau and supporting Te Wharepouri Te Amo, returned to the metaphor of being 'adrift', asserting that they did not want their land rights left 'floating about the lake' and that 'we were quite clear what we were doing at Ruatoki and we will stick to that'. 274 This continuity of an astute perception of the emerging implications of the consolidation scheme, and a joint resolve to demand adherence to their understanding of what had been agreed at Tauarau, may be a more objective account of the Tuhoe position. Schedule 1 of the 1921 report published in the AJHR lays out the details of the Scheme for the approval of parliament (Paper 3.1, Appendices). These have been discussed fully in previous reports to the Tribunal. Although quite different, they appear to be intended to echo the proposals listed at the outset of the final report and attributed to Knight. Whereas Balneavis' 27 August account had reported Tuhoe approval of the proposals, Schedule 1 like the list of Knight's proposals makes no such claim. In the final paragraph of the report but not in association with either lists there is an oblique and ambiguous claim that the 'Urewera Natives were moved to agree to the consolidation proposals chiefly by the consideration that out of the 273 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1919, MA 29/417A. 274 UCMB 1 :32-3. ------J __ :,.-...:-______ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 271 scheme would emerge ... '.275 It is probably significant, however, that the draft of the final report had included a final section (preceding Schedule 1) entitled 'Basis of the Scheme' which more explicitly claimed it was 'based on an agreement as to the following matters,' but which in the final report was cut down and merged with Schedule 1 without making any such claim.276 Thus it appears that regardless of some early efforts to claim Tuhoe agreement with the Scheme, in the end Ngata and Balneavis (the probable authors of the draft) dropped these efforts, and parliament needed no more explicit assurance of agreement or even consultation than the final mention, almost as a rhetorical afterthought, that the Tuhoe were 'moved' to agree. What had probably in fact been extended, tense, and often unsuccessful negotiations were almost entirely obscured from the record. Coates' instructions to proceed in an informal manner was certainly intended to facilitate communication with the Tuhoe, but this result casts some doubt on the reasons for this apparently casual approach. 3.6 Forming Consolidation Groups The nature and formation of the groups established at Tauarau in order to consolidate their shares in one location needs to be examined. (It must be kept in mind, of course, that the Crown's primary intention was to consolidate its own shares). Although these groups changed during the Tauarau meetings and continued to change while the Scheme was implemented, the lists furnished in Schedule 2 of the final 1921 report are rich with information and the subsequent changes can often be traced and understood relative to them (Paper 3.1, Appendices). Balneavis describes most fully the way in which the consolidation groups were formed, and his sometimes candid words merit close attention. The consolidation 275 AJHR G-7 1921:7. 276 NgataiBalneavis, revised draft for AJHR G-7 1921 report, MA 28/7/5 binder 5/l. -"------"." -", Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 272 officers apparently began to 'sort out' these groups immediately after the proposals had been discussed with the representatives of the non-sellers, and usually these same individuals then became representatives of the consolidation groups. Balneavis and Ngatas' description appears in the final report as follows: Having the compiled lists of non-sellers, and the Crown proposals outlined by Mr. Knight, it was decided to proceed at once to sort out the owners according to their family affinities or proposed locations. The lists were read in public, block by block, the representatives (who had been allotted group numbers or letters) indicating to which group an owner should go. Disputes as to grouping were determined there and then. The individual names numbered 8,941. Aliases and duplications were thus revealed and noted, misspellings of names corrected, and the names of deceased owners to whom successors had not been appointed were marked off. This was a labourious proceeding, and occupied, off and on, the whole of our stay in Ruatoki .... There was continual shuffling and reshuffling of individuals composing a group, the relatives claiming inclusion in one group or the other according to the sources from which rights were derived.... The final grouping was determined by the proposals for location. There were 150 groups (a subgroup being reckoned as a distinct group for the purpose).277 I will start to unpack this description with a consideration of the lists which were read off 'block by block', apparently covering 8,941 'names'. These names must be distinguished from the non-seller persons insofar as the same non-seller held shares in several blocks. How many non-sellers were there at this time? Schedule 2(1) of the same report gives a total of 2,093 non-seller persons, arriving at this sum by adding the names in each of the lists of about 150 subgroups. However, this total is misleading insofar as some persons appear in more than one group, even though the consolidation officers discouraged it. An alphabetised index of non sellers, probably drawn up later that year to show what group each person was in, lists about 1,981 persons and shows that about 13 per cent of them were in more than one groUp.278 It appears that this was permitted for some of the larger shareholders, probably in deference to their mana (or their demand). Significantly, however, this 277 AJHR G-7 1921:5. 278 Unsigned undated draft report in Bowler's hand, WDMLC c.f.630. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 273 index left out all the groups, reserves, and residues of Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks, so its total overlooks any Tuhoe who had shares only in those blocks. Schedule 2 (1) also overlooks the Waikaremoana reserves groups. I will return to the significance of these omissions later. In chapter two I concluded from the evidence of the panui pupuri whenua of November 1919 and a comprehensive report from Bowler sometime later that there were at that time about 2,336-2,342 'non-sellers' (that is, mostly part-sellers), a striking increase of20 per cent over the 1903 orders. This was probably explained by a birth-rate which outstripped even the high mortality of those war- and epidemic plagued years, as well as stubborn Tuhoe 'part-selling' in the face of a purchase campaign which worked very hard to buy all of each person's shares and was 'non committal' toward Tuhoe landlessness. Clementine Fraser's careful tabulation and culling of 'non-seller' names from several available primary sources on the consolidation and comes up with a total of 2,157 probably different persons being processed in late 1921.279 Although this total does not consider the dead whose successions remained incomplete and who were kept on these lists, and the successions which continued to be processed, this is now the most accurate figure we have been able to attain. A comparison of the 1919-1920 figures with this late 1921 figure may indicate that as many as 185 additional Tuhoe were made landlesslkore whenua in the last two years of the purchase campaign (I have attempted no estimate of the number made landless prior to November 1919). This very rough figure could be refined by close comparison of the lists, but this would not be likely to change it much. As was pointed out in chapter two, the grim fact that nearly 40 war veterans supplicated the Crown for a token return of some land so they could avoid dependency supports the likelihood that there were many times more lost, from the records ifnot from te poho hoohonu a Tuhoe (the ample breast of Tuhoe). 279 Fraser 2004: Urewera Consolidation Data Compilation; Consolidation Totals. ------~-I ~ _____ - ____ --" __ =-_:..:..-o-__ --:..:-_---=--.:... _____ ~_ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 274 The question remains, what lists were used to read 8,941 names of non-sellers block by block? The final report claims that 'Lists were compiled [by Bowler and the Registrar] giving the names of the Natives who retained their interests, and the value of those interests expressed in pence' (p.4). This number certainly refers not to the number of non-seller persons, but rather to block lists in which their shares appear, and most persons had shares in several blocks even this late in the purchase campaign. The lists were apparently not the final 1907 block orders, which by my count comes to about 14,151 names and which Bowler probably reported as 14,367, the 'total number of original owners in blocks (not including successions),.280 The missing lists may have been a copy of the AJHR 1907 block orders annotated with deaths and successions which had been completed in the NLC by 1921; there was a copy like this among Knight's papers.281 In any case, one must ask why some version of the massively overlapping block lists were used in preference to already-compiled lists which Bowler certainly had available and had probably kept more or less up to date: either his card index or an updated version of the 1919 panui pupuri whenua. A plausible answer is that he had acknowledged these were umeliable, and had been told to go back and prepare reliable lists from the original orders and purchase deeds themselves. This would have been a mammoth task which Bowler's attempts since 1915 had already showed were beyond even his considerable abilities. As will be discussed later, a draft final report in October 1921 suggests that although the consolidation officers were painfully aware of the implications, the deeds were never systematically checked against the original orders. Bowler probably drew up the list he had been instructed to prepare by annotating a set of the 1907 orders the best he could, working from his card index. From this point of view, simply because the lists read were of only 8,941 names (rather than the more than 14,000 names in the original block orders), many non-sellers may have been overlooked in the public reading of names. Thus the data 280 Unsigned undated draft report in Bowler's hand, c.f. 621 WDMLC; his emphasis. This figure is apparently what led Campbell's estimate astray, 1997:42. 281 Held in LINZ, Hamilton, archives. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 275 basis of the whole Scheme remained no better than Bowler's on-going records had ever been. This too was ruefully admitted by the consolidation officers in reports and drafts, but apparently never to parliament, and the data with all its shortcomings duly became law. 3.6.1 Sorting Groups Out How did the 'sorting out' of persons into groups actually occur? Descriptions of the procedures encourage an assumption that the groups were mostly present: 'The Ureweras attended in large numbers, every family of non-sellers being represented .... The lists were read in public, block by block, the representatives... indicating to which group and owner should go' .282 'It was decided to proceed forthwith .... all non-sellers interests were fully represented .... There was continual shuffling and re shuffling of individuals composing a group, the relatives claiming inclusion in one group or the other ... '.283 At times I have envisioned the actual groups standing separately on the marae and reforming every day for further adjustments. However, although many leaders and others were probably present most of the time, it is likely that more than half the 2,153 persons were never in Ruatoki, let alone at Tauarau during the three weeks of meetings. The strain on local hospitality and resources would have been too much, and the weather in August would have made it harder. Certainly few of the women and fewer of the children in the group lists would have attended. The consolidation officers probably slept and worked in the Tauarau wharenui (meetinghouse) Rongokarae, hosted by some Tuhoe kaumaatua and eating in the nearby dining hall, with most of the group representatives and perhaps a few hundred persons including most important kaumaatua visiting most days while staying elsewhere in Ruatoki with their relatives if not usually residing there, and others from elsewhere in the Urewera would visit Ruatoki for shorter periods. A great deal of discussion and agreements among Tuhoe during these three or four weeks must have occurred away from Tauarau and been passed by word-of-mouth over the considerable and rugged distances involved. Most decisions would have had 282 AJHR G-7 1921, P 4. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 276 to be made by 'representatives', probably often with limited legitimacy, without close consultation, and rarely reflecting the consensus and solidarity which Tuhoe notoriously took the time to reach in major decisions such as these. 284 Although normal Maori social processes and the pressures of the Scheme might sufficiently explain the changes of groups which continued through 1924, this difficulty of satisfactory communication over a relatively brief and intense period leads us to suspect that these weeks were even more chaotic than it was described to be. The groups were sorted out 'according to their family affinities or proposed locations ... according to sources from which rights were derived' and the 'final grouping was determined by the proposals for location.' Although the groups were not themselves hapuu, the relationship which Balneavis describes here between kinship and land is consistent with the dynamics of hapuu structure I have described. 'Family affinities' and 'location' were intrinsically related. In virtue of ancestry and occupation or established local resource use, any whaanau as well as any individual in Tuhoe society would be able to claim rights of different strength or weakness in several different hapuu, and thus in many different localities throughout the Urewera. In this context of extensive kinship and land rights, current solidarities (and antipathies) of kinship, marriage, and residence would tend to be carried over into the group which was being formed, but new plans would also emerge. Other factors had been introduced by the plans for consolidation: it had been made clear to the non sellers that they were expected to develop 'family farms', and whether or not they were cooperating with this expectation they certainly considered locations in terms of proximity to promised as well as existing roads. (That these roads were never built is one of the more ironic but economically damaging upshots of the Scheme). Balneavis offers an example of the dispersal of 300 pounds sterling in land among seven groups to illustrate how this affects 'the area of the section each group is 283 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 29/417A, pp 3-4. 284 Webster, 1998b, p 93. ~~~~~~~,=--=,=--,=- =--==-----~------=---:..------.::~~------~~--.:------=------. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 277 entitled to receive. ,285 (Because this patrimony was relatively large (72,000 pence) it is intriguing to consider that this recently deceased person may have been Tamaikoha, seven of whose children had retained some land - although with his wife they proposed locations in five rather than seven different groups). As a Maori, Balneavis would probably have been aware that this dispersal was not of money among groups but of hapuu land rights among descendants or other successors - quite a different thing. He would have been especially aware that this ran counter to the goal of consolidation to pool land resources without regard to 'fragmented' ancestral land rights (and also that many living kaumaatua were also doing this by distributing the members of their whaanau into different groups!). Balneavis concludes by emphasising that location determined the final groupings. The implications of this are extensive, and I will return to it. However, I am also surprised to learn that apparently there were open disputes as to grouping, and that in shuffling from one group to another 'relatives' might simply claim 'inclusion in one group or the other according to the sources from which rights were derived.' I would have assumed that representatives 'indicating' to which group a person would go, and 'determining' disputes 'there and then', reflected deference to or assertion of the authority of any kaumaatua (leader), tuakana (senior by birth order), or maatua (parent), especially in this relatively formal and public context. It can be assumed that an important factor in this context would have been not only the different mana of different persons, but also their reputation in terms of pupuri whenua, the extent of and reasons for holding onto their rights to lands (and, as trustees, the land rights of minors) despite the purchase campaign. Although there was probably little stigma attached to selling, at least among peripheral or weaker land rights, there was probably considerable respect or mana attached to hanging on to most of one's land rights. As we have seen, this varied greatly between individuals of all ages (including successors to persons who had died as pupuri whenua), and also between siblings. It may not have always been widely known, but in this context, where the issue was 285 Balneavis to Coates, 27 August 1919, MA 29/417A. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 278 precisely how many shares from which blocks each person brought to a group, one supposes that over three weeks it would have gained more currency in most cases. Lumped together this way, these puzzling aspects of BaIne avis' description suggest a plausible explanation. Men and women of some mana, especially if mataamua (eldest sibling or cousin) or tuakana, as responsible leaders to a greater or lesser extent, were most likely to be the ones who were present at Tauarau, especially if they did not live too far away. Correlatively, their juniors, and often their wives, would be more likely to leave matters to them, especially if they lived at some distance. In this context, both the assertion of authority and the occasional defiance of it would be more understandable, especially because new forms of value (abstract value of land as a commodity and location as private property) were being taken up or imposed and assumed to over-ride established values. Thus one might understand 'disputes' between, for instance, leaders or members of different groups over which of them should receive a (more junior, or absent) person who had retained considerable land rights. One can also more easily understand that some relatives of mana or pupuri whenua could simply 'claim' inclusion in a group on the basis of a weak ancestral right to their proposed location, for instance, because their contribution in shares would enable the group to claim a greater acreage or another location. There would be many more subtle combinations of factors. Another important possible source of these 'disputes' is suggested in Balneavis' earlier telegram to Coates, which mentioned these as 'disputes as to locations' rather than groupS.286 This sort of dispute was normal between hapuu in that for any given location there is a hierarchy of rights to the resources from relatively weak to relatively strong based on the specific history of kinship, marriage, and alliance of those in control of them. The establishment of the UDNR had settled many but given rise to other such disputes, especially through abstract survey ('straight-line') boundaries which displaced more social and negotiable oral histories. However, the 286 Campbell, 1997, p 55; Supp.Pap II p 178. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 279 Crown purchase campaign had added several pressures to this, most importantly the tensions between pupuri whenua and hoko whenua. Finally, the Crown's pre-emption of several blocks had displaced many whaanau from what otherwise would have been their established or preferred location, forcing the necessity to reconsider the priorities of rights in all remaining locations, but I especially in those which might be most advantageous under the new conditions of farming and promises of roading. The result was certainly crowding and probably disputes between consolidation groups proposing location in the same or nearby locations. Continuing forms of Crown pre-emption of favoured lands, especially for survey and roading costs, greatly increased this crowding and forced a resulting 'overflow' into less favoured areas. In such a hotbed of new factors, it is also understandable that location determined final groupings. For instance, a group with more resources (pennies) at its disposal than anticipated could change its proposed location to a more expensive or larger one (depending on the different prices which Bowler had paid in different blocks), and this in tum would precipitate the loss of some members or addition of others in response to this new location, in combination with the group. It is not surprising that these dynamics took on the shape of free market dealings or commodity fetishism (Marx's vivid phrase), insofar as this was the ideology underpinning the coerced 'modernisation' of Maori land tenure. It would also be predictable that the resulting groups were relatively unstable, and that such changes continued throughout the implementation of the Scheme. The question rather becomes the extent to which Tuhoe ideals (not necessarily traditions) were nevertheless sustained or raised against the imposed ideology. 3.6.2 Some of the More Influential Groups With these dynamics in mind, it is instructive to examine a list of these groups which has been sorted into a hierarchy of relatively strong to weaker influence primarily in terms of retained land rights but also leadership (I would not presume to designate it as mana in this case, although these would be factors in a person's mana). Factors ======~~====------~ ___ cc_-_-~ _____ ~~-~-_-~"_~_ ~ ______- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 280 which are used here are (i) pupuri whenua, which are the shares (here, reduced abstractly to pennies value) of land retained despite the purchase campaign (what proportion of this is shares originally held under the 1903 or 1907 orders is another and difficult question which can nevertheless be answered); (ii) the number of subgroups represented by the same person; or (iii) the number of subgroups with the same number; and (iv) the number of persons in the group. While the first factor measures the extent that land was retained by all the members of a group (as a sum of its subgroups) regardless of how much was originally held, the last three factors measure the extent to which a group of subgroups is held together, by kinship or by one or a few persons, or by a number (presumably controlled by kinship or persons) and, often, by fertility and luck against mortality (the whare ngaro, empty house, was a well-known tragedy especially in those days, Pihitahi Tamaikoha and Tupaea Rapaeras' being an example). This list is a very rough measure of influence, but useful in becoming familiar with some important names and keeping an eye on who is who in the operation of the Scheme, especially in the minutebooks. (It is there that one comes to appreciate how much influence, at least in the implementation of the Scheme, a relatively limited number of Tuhoe leaders had). For instance, this list is useful in following the struggle to control the allocation of consolidation groups to new blocks, which will be examined in later chapters. For this reason, the list below is headed by names, usually patronyms, of the leaders. Arbitrarily, only those groups which together held 100,000 shares or more have been listed. This amount of shares would be equivalent to about 476 acres of land at the average price set by the Crown (10 shillings per acre). Quite unjustly, the Waikaremoana Reserve groups have been left out because they were being made into refugees in their own lands, holding shares in tiny reserves the sum of which was only 600 acres. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 281 Other limitations of this summary are apparent in the striking case of the Tamaikoha hapuu lineage, which may have originally held by far the most extensive hapuu and land rights, but by the end the Crown purchase campaign had been relatively impoverished in terms of land rights. The mana of the descendants may nevertheless have remained very high. Similarly, the Tutakangahau family was land poor by 1921, but of high mana. On the other hand, throughout New Zealand money and mana had been in confrontation for several decades.287 Figure 8: Pupuri Whenua: Group Leaders sorted by Total Land Group Leaders Names Consolidation Total Shares of Members Number of Group Group Retained in Group Subgroups All subgroups of Group 14 2,028,882 19 Peene, Paora, Natanahiri, Mohi, 47 1,482,636 183 8 Herni, Tihema, etc., (BiddIes? Hikurangi-Horomanga). Motoi, Wirihana, Rawiri, Tangohau, 39 1,458,944 124 13 Tihi (esp. Tarapounamu-Matawhero) Te Hata Waewae 5 1,084,970 60 8 Te Amo, Wharepouri 25 910,418 126 7 Taane Hauraki 20 783,395 54 2 Tupara Kaaho, Te Ahikaiata 21 638,462 49 2 Peene, Whakari, Taiha 22 616,292 69 4 TeManihera 36 594,242 14 2 TaweraMoko 6 5~1,406 14 2 WiMei 43 475,824 28 3 Taratoa (Waikite, Whakamoe, 38 471,332 40 1 Matika, Mihaka) Taihakoa Poniwahio, Tutakangahau 19 425,515 46 3 Takurua Tamarau 32 423,526 32 1 Tamaikoha, Hakeke 12 420,482 51 4 Te Hira (Tahuri), Herernia, Tarei 30 359,919 38 1 Rangiaho 23 348,339 36 2 Mika Te Tawhao 3 344,565 33 5 Nurnia 1 322,463 6 1 Hipirini TWC 304,347 36 1 Te Mataku, Te Kaha, Herernia 27 296,218 60 5 Ereatara, Wharetuna 8 288,967 55 2 Rakuraku, Te Whiu 17 250,925 28 3 Paparatu, Wharekiri 13 245,840 19 2 Akuhata Te Hiko, Hukanui 11 244,114 35 1 Paraki 37 242,497 15 1 Whatanui TWB 242,169 25 1 Wharetuna 2 241,105 20 2 287 Webster, 1998a, pp 15-32. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 282 Tupaea Rapaera 7 239,072 15 1 Te Iriwhiro 35 233,288 26 1 Te Paerata, Te Aoterangi, Nikora 15 215,091 14 1 Te Wao, lhirnaera 24 207,955 19 2 TeTuhi TWF 206,627 10 1 Te Hira (Metekuare) TWA 202,914 26 1 Te Pouwhare Te Roau, Reha 4 200,335 26 2 Tiakiwai, Turei 26 177,639 26 1 RuaKenana 141A 163,470 14 2 Te Mata (Pine ere Hori) 42 156,986 38 1 Make, Mikaere 34 148,910 13 2 Bird TWM 143,906 29 1 OrupeHoani 31 128,875 15 1 Mauparaoa TWJ 125,991 9 1 Te Meihana TWH 109,761 15 1 Tamehana Te Puia, Atarea 33 108,154 33 1 Hatata 41 107,176 18 1 3.6.3 The Persistence of Tuhoe Descent Groups What were these 'groups'? At one level, they are laid out in detail in Schedule 2 of the 1921 AJHR report (Paper 3.1, Appendices). However, Schedule 2 is not transparent, and itself requires clarification. At another level the consolidation groups reflect social organisation on the order of the Tamaikoha hapuu lineage, parts of which appear in several different consolidation groups and subgroups. The tenninology used by the Crown officers arranging the consolidation is vague and inconsistent. After examining the evidence, I will argue that most consolidation groups were organised around descent, although sibling groups were fragmented and marriages often united two or more such fragments. Significantly, the persistence of descent groups appears to have defied the intentions of the consolidation scheme for the reorganisation of Tuhoe tenure. Campbell concludes from an examination of the reports on the Tauarau meetings that 'owners were initially roughly divided into 38 groups supposedly corresponding to hapu and the location of interests. Each hapu then indicated which group it was to be solely affiliated with - effectually relinquishing ancestral rights.,.. in all other groups' .289 She cites no specific source for the association of these groups with 288 Only groups holding 100,000 pence or more; from AJHR G-7 1921, Schedule 2 (1). 289 Campbell, 1997, p 53. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 283 hapuu, and I have encountered none. Quoting Balneavis' 27 August report, Campbell continues that during the process it was found 'necessary to fonn 99 groups of non sellers, a group consisting for the most part of one family or part of a family. Very few groups comprised more than this unit, and time will convince the families composing these groups of the wisdom of subdividing further' (my emphasis). Campbell notes that the final report published in the AJHR states that 150 (rather than 99 or 38) groups were fonned, it being explained there that 'a subgroup [was] reckoned as a distinct group for the purpose'. She remarks that these groups ranged 'in size from 1 to 197 persons, including one group of probable sellers' .290 A final claim in the concluding paragraph of the report that the new land sections would be 'owned not tribally or by hapus, but by compact families ... ' may be added to these ambiguous descriptions of the groups (my emphasis). By my count there were 162 groups, ranging from 1 to 317 persons (the groups are listed in three different ways in Schedule 2, but Schedule 2 (3) 'Group Lists' is the most complete listing; see Paper 3.1 in the Appendices). Relying on the summary Schedule 2 (1) augmented by the Waikaremoana reserves groups A-L (which are mistakenly left out of it), the average size of all the groups (or subgroups, if a group is subdivided) is about 20 persons, and the range breaks down as follows: 72 groups of 10 persons or less; 39 groups of 11-20 persons; 29 groups of21-30 persons; 14 groups of31-40 persons; 2 groups of 41-50 persons; 5 groups of over 50 persons. However, as I will explain, the Te Whaiti, Urewera Reserves, and Waikaremoana series of groups (about 28 groups) are treated separately from all the others, designated generally by letters or as 'residues' and have no subgroups at all. If we confine the analysis to the numbered groups 1-47, of which 24 have been divided into 290 Campbell 1997, p 54; AJHR G-7 1921, P 5. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 284 subgroups (which are designated by letters following their number), a quite different picture emerges. My examination of many of these has shown that the subgroups are closely related to one another by kinship or marriage within the wider group, and that the proposed locations of the subgroups were probably coordinated within the group. Often key members of the wider group were listed in more than one and sometimes several of the subgroups, implying that the subgroups were not being treated simply as residential groups. It is also significant that 21 of the 24 subdivided groups are nominally headed by one or more persons from the list of 39 non-seller representatives. If we take a count only of the 24 groups which have been divided into subgroups, and list the totals for these groups as though they had not been subdivided, the average size of these groups is 50 persons. They range from 14 to 408 persons, but break down as follows: 8 groups of 11-20 persons; 6 groups of21-30 persons; 2 groups of 31-40 persons; 2 groups of 41-50 persons; 4 groups of 51-60 persons; 2 groups of61-70 persons; 3 groups of over 100 persons. This analysis suggests that the numbered groups 1-47 were those which were originally proposed by the Tuhoe (perhaps by the representatives) as consolidation groups, and that 24 or more than half of these were subsequently divided into subgroups in response to the urging of the consolidation officers. The high proportion of representatives among the subdivided groups may also suggest that they were more responsive to this urging. However, I find no grounds either in the data or in the reports and other records to consider these groups either 'families' of any sort or hapuu. These characterisations ------" Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 285 are misleading in divergent ways. Balneavis must have been using the notion of family in a very loose sense even wider than what is more commonly called an 'extended family' or small whaanau. He appears to have been frustrated that subdivisions had not proceeded as far as was wished. Like Coates and Guthrie, Ngata's general ideal in Maori land development at this time was to promote enterprising nuclear families on 'family farms', to sweep 'away communal land ownership and [replace] it with the English conception of a man's home being his castle ... ' .291 The proliferation of 37-47 original groups to 99 or 150 or 162 subgroups probably reflects the insistence of the consolidation officers on this ideal of smaller family farms. After three weeks of this, less than half of the subgroups were 10 persons or less, and most of the intermediate-sized subgroups were larger than an extended family. From this point of view, one must ask why so many Tuhoe resisted this pressure and insisted on larger consolidation groups. The increased cost of surveys per person may have been a factor, but I will argue later that there is no evidence that the way in which surveys would be paid for was understood this early in the arrangements. Nor was this factor mentioned in any of the reports. Tuhoe knowledge of the limited carrying capacity of the lands, and reliance on large families to cope in difficult conditions, were other likely factors. 3.6.3(a) The Consolidation Groups were Hybrids Campbell appears to have assumed that the 38 representatives were hapuu leaders and, because their group number is given in their list, accepts that the groups were intended to be hapuu. However, no other sources suggest this assumption, and I do not think it can be reconciled with the data. Of course, in many cases the representatives were 'hapuu leaders' in the general sense that most hapuu have several leaders (for example, those who sit on the pae/bench at hui/gathering), but this is insufficient basis to assume the consolidation groups were hapuu. The numbers used to designate groups run 1-49 rather than 38 (or 39), 20 of these numbers do not 291 Webster, 1998b, p 97-8. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 286 appear on the list of representatives, and there are about 36 additional groups designated by letter or description only 2 of which appear in the list of representatives. On the other hand, the analysis pursued above does reveal that many groups are relatively large if one ignores the subdivisions. Can these larger groups be seen as hapuu, or even hapuu lineages? I would argue that no, they generally cannot. Although most of the groups and subgroups are formed on the basis of kinship and marriage, probably none can be seen as either hapuu or (as Balneavis might have had it) whaanau. I have worked out the kinship and marriage relationships in some detail in about 25 of the 47 numbered groups. I have described and analysed some of these in previous contexts, and will return to others in later contexts. However, here some generalisations can be outlined regarding their social organisation. With a few instructive exceptions most of the numbered groups, including those which have been subdivided, can be shown to be organised around one or more sibling groups and (usually) one or two marriages in which both spouses are listed in the same group. The sibling groups are fragmentary with many in other groups or missing, but are nevertheless the dominant characteristic of consolidation group structure. Aside from the one or two marriages with both spouses listed, most spouses are listed in other consolidation groups, usually with their siblings, sometimes with their spouses in that group. There is a noticeable gender bias: although there are many exceptions, brothers predominate in most sibling groups listed together in the same group, and most spouses who are listed in the same group with their spouse rather than their sibling group are females. This bias may have occurred in consolidation groups in anticipation of the labour demands of farming, augmented by the need to undertake itinerant wage labour. Although both spouses and entire whaanau would, as usual, be working together, this bias would have frequently left ownership of the land in the hands of predominantly male sibling groups. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 287 In some cases I have been able to trace a common ancestor linking two sibling groups within a consolidation group, thus showing the central position of a hapuu lineage (but, not, of course, the wider hapuu) in the group. This is often the case between different subgroups of the same large consolidation group. On the other hand, in many cases one or two of the few marriages where both spouses are in the same group can be shown to be between the sibling groups, and thus suggest the group is based on an alliance between descent groups or hapuu lineages. In these cases it is not likely that the sibling groups are descendants of the same ancestor, at least within several generations, because the marriage would be precluded by the incest taboo. Where I have found no common ancestry between two or more sibling groups within a consolidation group, but no such significant marriage can be identified, the possibility that these sibling groups may have a common ancestor, and thus be part of the same hapuu lineage, must be left open. In earlier contexts the Maori hapuu has been described as a descent group, traced (in whakapapa) through parents of either or both genders, from a single selected ancestor which is historically subject to change. These changes reflect usually gradual political, economic, and social processes in the hapuu such as control over resources, migration, marriage alliances, and confrontations with colonial forces. Because spouses are seen as umelated or only distantly related, they are usually considered outsiders to the hapuu or, if distantly related, outsiders to the hapuu lineage (as a segment of a wider hapuu) and, like an alliance, drawing two relatively estranged lineages of the same hapuu more closely together. I argued previously that the block orders for the Native Reserve reflected the organisation of living members of one or more hapuu, most vividly in the listing of successive generations of entire sibling groups in the order of tuakana and teina, the relative seniority of their descent from a common ancestor. From this definition of hapuu, consolidation groups with both spouses listed together in the same group, or two or more sibling groups whose common ancestry is doubtful (perhaps indicated by the marriage), cannot be seen as a hapuu or even a hapuu Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 288 lineage. The gender bias evident in the predominance of brothers in sibling groups and wives as the spouses listed with their husband in other consolidation groups is also uncharacteristic of hapuu structure, which simply includes all living siblings regardless of gender. On the other hand, nor can any of the consolidation groups be seen as whaanau, as may have been assumed by Balneavis in his peculiar use of the term 'family'. As has been explained, a whaanau is a domestic group in the sense of an extended family which resides, lives, and works together to derive a living from resources more or less under its control. Elsdon Best emphasised that the everyday basis of Tuhoe social organisation was neither families (by which he meant nuclear families) nor hapuu, but stubbornly 'communistic' whaanau of about 50 persons. A Maori whaanau is centred around elderly co-resident spouses (kaumaatua) and their offspring, some of whom are also married and with co-resident spouse and children, often out to four generations. There are often widowed elders, older siblings who have not moved away into separate whaanau, less established marriages and co-resident spouses, and adopted children, but the basis of the whaanau is the working domestic group. Because co-resident spouses are so central to it, a whaanau cannot be seen as a descent group, hapuu, or hapuu lineage, regardless of the occasional presence of older sibling groups. Where the co-resident spouses are members of the same hapuu (more often the case before European forms of employment and mobility were taken up) they are nevertheless seen as members of different hapuu lineages only distantly related. Thus consolidation groups appear to have been a hybrid, even reversing the structure of whaanau as described above. Unlike whaanau, the groups tended to be based more on sibling groups and common descent than co-resident spouses. Another way of making this point is to say that the consolidation groups were not domestic groups in the sense of an extended family organised to live together on a daily basis; rather they were primarily organised as descent groups. Although all spouses undoubtedly would live together in the same consolidation group were it actually to operate (or if it Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 289 already operated, as some probably were), most were instead listed in separate I consolidation groups. Similar to hapuu, most consolidation groups were organised as land-owning or resource-controlling groups which in ordinary life would be located in several places, where joined with parts of other consolidation groups they would form domestic groups or whaanau. This striking fact suggests that the inclination to organise consolidation groups as descent groups or hapuu lineages was strong among the Tuhoe, and even stubbornly contrary to the pressure from the consolidation officers to form family farms. The emphasis on descent rather than marriage was continued even in the organisation of the subgroups. What might explain this continuity with hapuu, on the one hand, and the occasional inclusion of both spouses, on the other? How might this hybrid structure of most consolidation groups be explained? So far, the evidence indicates to me that there were several Tuhoe motives involved: (i) Like the formation of subgroups, a token married couple or two was a concession to the consolidation officers' demand to form family farms (or simply a matter of a Tuhoe marriage being stronger than either of the two hapuu involved, always happening occasionally); (ii) The wives who were listed in the same groups as their husbands were responding in some way to the gender bias which favoured brothers in sibling groups listed in the same group; (iii) The relative impoverishment of land rights brought upon many individuals in the purchasing campaign compelled more couples to pool their shares in one location; (iv) The threat to land rights in various blocks through several different hapuu which was posed by the consolidation was countered by listing some siblings in other consolidation groups, and these tended to be sisters in response to the gender bias for brothers in their other group. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 290 Much more research remains to be done on the consolidation groups along these lines, and it furthermore needs to be integrated with research on hapuu affiliations and the changing role ofhapuu through the purchase campaign. 3.6.4 The Crown's Discrimination of Evacuee from Family Farm Groups I will now return to my attempt to identify general characteristics of social organisation in the consolidation groups later with regard to specific groups. Here, in order to more fully understand the problems of arranging the consolidation scheme, I want to continue examination of some special cases among the groups depicted in Schedule 2, especially 2 (1). In many ways, this depiction is the best synopsis of the consolidation groups as they stood late in 1921, and as a baseline for following subsequent changes. While most of the groups and subgroups are internally structured on the bases of descent and marriage, several 'groups' appear to have no such basis. The following groups are conspicuously different in one way or another are (I am referring to Schedule 2 (1) but most can also be found in different form on (2) and (3)) (Paper 3.1, Appendices) : (i) The largest group 14N, associated with 18 other subgroups of group 14; (ii) Groups 48 and 49; (iii) The two 'residues' of the Te Whaiti block (Te Whaiti 1 and Te Whaiti 2, also named group 'L'); (iv) The 'Urewera Reserves residue'; and (v) Residues 1,2,3 and 4 of the Waikaremoana block. I will discuss each ofthese, what I call 'temporary' groups, below. On the other hand, the following groups were also probably internally structured on the bases of descent and marriage: (a) Te Whaiti groups lettered A through M (less 'I' which is not used, and L, which is Te Whaiti Residue 2), and the (b) Waikaremoana Reserves A through L (less 'I' which is not used; the entire series is mistakenly omitted in Schedule 2 (1) and (2) but included in Schedule 2 (3)). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 291 Waikaremoana Reserves 1-4 might also tum out to be socially organised upon further examination. However, as will be explained, all these groups (i) - (v) and (a) - (b) were actually on a different footing than any of the 47 numbered groups and subgroups. One may conclude that this was the result of the Crown's determination to evacuate both blocks, and the refusal of some residents (and perhaps some non-residents) to cooperate. The Crown's attitude is also indicated in their ambiguous reports on the number of groups. The '50' numbered groups were treated separately because their status as non-sellers needing to be appropriately settled and, where necessary, relocated was more or less accepted. This was initially not the case with all the other groups which emerged. I have concluded that as it became evident that some non-sellers in Te Whaiti, the Urewera Reserves, and Waikaremoana blocks could not be 'gotten rid of' (in Jordan's earlier words) after all, additional groups, 'residues', or 'reserves' were reluctantly set up. A count including these, as laid out in Schedule 2 (1) does come to '150' groups if one is subtracted (probably group 44, which by 31 October was reported to be 'absorbed in Urewera Reserves residue'). However, even this later count of 150 overlooked the 11 Waikaremoana Reserves, which must be discovered by searching Schedule 2 elsewhere. Even the index which I found in Waiariki District Maori Land Court closed file 630, which appears to list all non-sellers alphabetised by first names and was probably drawn up to facilitate the preparation of Schedule 2 sometime after August 1921, excludes all the Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana groups, including even Te Whaiti groups A-M and Waikaremoana Reserves A-L. Unlike consolidation groups 1-47, indications are that the Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana groups were treated as more or less 'temporary'. 3.6.4(a) The Many Subgroups ofRua Kenana 's 'Group 14' Although group 14 appears to be structureless, it was probably not intended to be temporary. The 19 subgroups (and sub-subgroups) of group 14 list 408 persons, only Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 292 two persons in the list of representatives are associated with that this group: Rua Kenana and Paora Kingi Paora. However, while in this list Paora is representative only of subgroup 14H, Rua is representative of' 14': insofar as there is no group 14 (only its 19 subgroups), this was probably intended to indicate that Rua represented all the subgroups of group 14. Unlike any of the other numbered groups and subgroups, 4 of the 19 subgroups have no person as nominal leader, but instead are identified by settlement (,Tawhana section') or block (Paraoanui North Section, Otara Section, and Maungapohatu Section). The latter section, designated 14N, would be several times larger than any of the other sections proposed by group 14, indeed almost twice the size of any other consolidation group, and lists 197 persons as its owners. Group 49A, named 'Maungapohatu residue' and along with 49B called 'ungrouped owners', is probably actually a 20th subgroup of group 14, adding 25 more persons to the large Maungapohatu group 14N. Maungapohatu had been the site of Rua Kenana's millenarian community since about 1906. The other subgroups proposed location primarily in Parekohe block, with a few also in Paraoanui North, Ruatahuna, and Otara blocks, and Tawhana settlement. All these name as their leaders other persons none of whom are in the list of representatives, except subgroups 14A 1A1 and 14A1A2 (and perhaps 14A1B; see Schedule 2 (3)) which are headed up by Rua Kenana, and subgroups 14H1 and 14H2 which are headed up by Paora Kingi Paora. Rua is the only male in the subgroup listing him, already residing in the Matahi kaainga in Parekohe block, with nine adult women only two of whom appear to be sisters, and only one child, apparently his daughter. The pence value of land held by Rua's 14A1A subgroups are relatively large (second only to the Maungapohatu Section of group 14), but by far derive mostly from Raumiria Te Haunui and Patu Ru, daughter and grand-daughter of Turaki Te Ruakariata, Numia Kereru's eldest sister and mataamua of all his siblings.292 Raumiria and Patu held leading shares in all the many blocks in which Numia did, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 293 and are always listed closely with him and Tupaea Rapaera, her half-brother by Turaki. Raumiria was probably one of Rua's wives. This might have been one source of the antipathy between Numia and Rua. Especially because she was mataamua, and many ofNumia's other siblings had died, one can understand this. It is likely that most or all 19 (or 20 including 49A) subgroups of group 14 are more or less Rua's followers, spread throughout the TaurangaiWaimana valley. Most are structured similarly to the other consolidation groups, with one or more sibling groups, generations, and a few marriages with both spouses listed, most other spouses listed in other groups. However, the very large subgroup 14N 'Maungapohatu Section' and its 'ungrouped owners' in 49A does not appear to have these typical features, and no other generalisations can be made about it. It appears that Rua identified his following among the consolidation groups by instructing them all to use the same group designation 14, and that at least in the case of the largest group 14N was successful in defying both the Tuhoe inclination to organise it by kinship and marriage relations and the consolidation officers' insistence on smaller family organisation. Even in the 1902 orders the Maungapohatu block list was the least reliably organised in terms of hapuu principles. He probably had Ngata and Balneavis' acquiescence if not support in his refusal to conform to Tuhoe behaviour, a defiant non-conformity which had often served the Crown's interests in the past. There is, however, interesting evidence that this apparent solidarity in August 1921 had restive 'subgroups' in it in January 1922. Rua was again a major influence in the sitting the commissioners held at Matahii on 22 January, but his request that he 'be shewn as group leader of 14L 14M and 14K as he conducted and formed them at Ruatoki' was revealing. 293 Subgroup 14L proposing allocation in Paraoanui North was probably led by Tahakawa Taratoa; the large subgroup 14M proposing allocation in Otara block was composed of 13 small sibling groups (the relationship between whom I have not worked out, but perhaps led by Teepu Hohaia); and subgroup 14K 292 Best, 1898, p 33. 293 UCMB 1, P 19. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 294 proposing allocation at Tawhana was composed of six sibling groups and probably led by Tatu Horopapera. Although Rua's request was 'noted' I have seen no evidence that it was implemented; while often deferring to him the commissioners also had other influential persons to consider. There is some evidence suggesting that over a period of years Rua had applied pressure to join his following and contribute land to it. In the previous chapter (PA2) I outlined the evidence that he was instrumental in getting the government to open up Ruatahuna and other interior blocks to the purchase campaign in 1918. There was also evidence that the long-running fencing dispute in Ruatahuna block revealed a wider effort by his followers residing in that block to extend fencing and cultivations which upon Judge Wilson's partitioning would be relied upon by the court as the best evidence of ownership.294 Campbell reports two confrontations with Rua which emerged in 1922-3 suggesting that even two very influential families at opposite ends of the TaurangaiWaimana valley had long been subject to intimidating tactics by him or his followers. Benefiting from the original letters supplied by Campbell, these cases can now bear a fuller account. In 1922 Takao Tamaikoha's response to an enquiry from consolidation commissioner Carr suggests that Rua Kenana had insisted that the commission 'alter what had already been decided upon as regards family as well as tribal groupings' in Matahi, Parekohe block (Takao's letter actually uses the words upokowhanau/head of whaanau instead of 'family', and hapuu instead of 'tribal groupings'), including removal of the papakaainga (communal land) to another location. Takao advised Carr against it (and closed his brief reply with a jibe at the quarreling hapuu in Ruatoki!). It is significant that Tekao (who was one of Tamaikoha's younger sons and consolidation group leader as well as a representative, but had retained only tokens of his original land rights) had apparently not been at the Matahi hearing himself and had to be approached by Carr for his nevertheless influential opinion.295 294 Bassett and Kay, 2002, p 104. 295 Campbell, 1997, pp 84-5; Supp.Docs II, pp 230-31. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 295 The following year in 1923 Huhana (Ripene) Tutakangahau, elder and mataamua sister of the Native Reserve Commissioner Pinohi (Tukuaterangi) Tutakangahau, an 'old lady... who would not give offense to anyone' (Carr's words), finally reported to Carr what appeared to be a sustained programme of intimidation by Rua and his 'lieutenant' (Carr's word) Whetu (probably Whetu Tamati, who was in group 14N) with the aim of getting her to give up all but three acres of her homestead in Maungapohatu block.296 Along with 19 other persons, Huhana and her brother were by far the largest shareholders in consolidation group 19C in Maungapohatu block, proposing one of five sections there which was, in size, second only to the very large probably communal group 14N. Her confrontation with Rua was thus a significant one, at least in terms of land. Huhana also wrote in behalf of her nephew, probably Pinohi's son Tukiwaho, who was about 19 years old, asking for clarification about which of two new blocks in Maungapohatu he had been allotted, Potahi or Pouwhenua, hoping it was the latter. Rua had himself told Huhana that Carr's settlement of the new blocks in Maungapohatu enabled him to take her to court, threatening that in the end her 'sticking out against him and getting my land separated from the rest of them really amounted to nothing.' This derision was apparently followed up by Whetu, assisted by gangs of schoolchildren, repeatedly setting dogs onto her pigs, driving her horses away, blocking up her road, opening her paddock to public access, and fencing off all but three acres of the block awarded to her, defying protest from her 'missionary friends' on the grounds that he was 'Rua's man'. Huhana added that: For many years my poor ignorant people and I have been SUbjected to this man's, Rua's, will. He played on our old superstitions and frightened us so that no one dared to oppose him, except my brother the late Tutakangahau .... For years Rua has oppressed us and kept us under his will, claimed our homes our land our all, and we knew not that there was a stronger law than his. He did whatever he wished with us, he took whatever he fancied, he said whatever he wanted to. To come back to my story, Rua has circulated such a 296 Campbe111997:84; Supp.Docs II: 223-9 (original letter in English, probably written by the nearby missionary Mrs. Laughton). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 296 lot (contrary to what I heard while you were here [)] that I don't know where I stand. Mrs. Laughton's letters of complaint to Constable Grant in Te Whaiti had been referred to other jurisdictions and ignored for some months. In response to Huhana's letter, in August 1923 Carr asked the Undersecretary to ask Ngata to bring the matter to the attention of the police, and it was apparently referred back to Grant in Te Whaiti. Nevertheless, it was not until March 1924 that the Commissioner of Police (Grant's superior?) reported that 'Everything appears to be quiet now.' In 1918 both Bowler and Wilson's surveyor Wilkinson had warned that Rua's influence would be greater after his jailing than before, and the delays on top of Grant's reluctance to investigate may confirm Huhana's charge that he had become a law unto himself, at least among many of eastern Tuhoe. The consolidation officers may have also occasionally found themselves deferring to Rua, and one may wonder if the ephemeral group 49A Maungapohatu 'residue' or 'ungrouped owners' might have been thus under similar pressure to cast in their lot with Rua, and left ungrouped until they did. By 1925, Huhana and her teina sister Whiuwhiu were the leading shareholders in the large Pouwhenua block, and her nephew Tukiwaho was the leading shareholder in Potahi block, both large new blocks in what had been the old Maungapohatu block, although together they were less than one-third the size of the new Maungapohatu block formed under Rua's influence. Groups 48 'Probable sellers' and 49B 'Miscellaneous' are both described as 'in suspense' in Schedule 2 (1) and (2). Three other subgroups are so described, but in each of these cases the subgroup appears to be related persons undecided about where to locate their shares in land, or unable to get their first choice (e.g. Whaitiripapa, which was not in the Scheme, or Otara, which was much in demand). Group 48 'probable sellers' was later to become the holding group into which Commissioner Knight transferred anyone wishing to sell their shares so that they could then be legitimately purchased by the Crown (I will examine such continuing purchases later). However, it appears that not all of its original members sold out, because Sissons reports that they joined up with one of the Tamaikoha hapuu lineage groups Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 297 12A1 (or 12AA) in the sliver ofland left in Omahuru block.297 49B 'Miscellaneous' was a subgroup with 49A, the larger 'Maungapohatu Residue', and it is possible that the Crown officers had advice (for instance, from Bowler) that the persons in each of these three groups were 'probable sellers'. In the Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks the groups designated as 'residue' appear to have been in such an ambiguous position, for various reasons still expected by the Crown to sell. On the other hand, some of these categories may have simply been lists of unsold shares of persons who could not be identified or spoken for with certainty by his or her relatives at the Tauarau meetings. This was of concern to the Crown officers, particularly in the blocks which they hoped to evacuate. 3.6.4(b) The Te Whaiti Groups as 'Temporary' The other conspicuously different groups in Schedule 2 of the AJHR report pertain to Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks, either as 'residues' which have no apparent social basis in kinship and marriage, or lettered groups or 'reserves' which do, but are probably on a more ambiguous footing than the numbered groups and subgroups. Interestingly, there are no subgroups in these two blocks, suggesting they were not under the same pressure to subdivide into viable family farms. Several other reports have been devoted to Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana, but I will here attempt to supplement them briefly with regard to the consolidation scheme. The two residues of the Te Whaiti block pertain to the two partitions of the block established between Ngati Whare and Ngati Manawa in 1913, Te Whaiti 1 and 2, respectively.298 However, they are treated quite differently in Schedule 2. 'Te Whaiti No.2 residue' is listed in Schedules 2 (1) and (2) as group L specifying 19 persons holding the largest number of shares of all 12 groups and proposing location at Minginui (at the southern roadhead in Te Whaiti 2 block), but is left out of Schedule 297 Sissons, p 125. 298 Whereas I have been referring to the people of the Urewera generally as 'Tuhoe', I must be more circumspect especially in the old blocks Te Whaiti Nui a Toi and Waikaremoana, where contemporary tangata whenua are closely related to Tuhoe but have long contended that they are separate 'iwi' or tribes. I will return briefly to this issue below. Although there is some evidence that Ngati Whare and ""r I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 298 2(3) where those 19 persons would have been listed with their individual shares converted to a pence value. 'Te Whaiti 1 residue', on the other hand, is listed in Schedule 2 (1) only in tenns of an unspecified 'balance' of shares of Te Whaiti groups A, C, D, F, G, Hand J, and all the shares of group E, and thus no location is specified. Furthennore, Te Whaiti 1 residue is not mentioned at all in Schedule 2 (2) and (3), which would list its total shares value and the persons in it, respectively. Insofar as nobody in the Residues is named anywhere, it can only be that they are the same persons as listed in the Te Whaiti groups A-M. It appears that both Te Whaiti Residues represented a large overflow area into which the 'balance' of shares the commissioners choose not to fit into the very restricted area allocated to the Te Whaiti groups would have to go. This is confinned by a statement made by Carr on a covering page of what was probably intended to be UCMB '2B', loose sheets of 'revised groups' for the consolidation scheme: Whaiti Residue Balance of Whaiti groups after providing interests sufficient to take up cultivations and papakaainga Plus those shares set out on amendments file whose interests are wholly located in this block .. .z99 One suspects that the details of these residues were intended to change in some way. Bowler had been working hard for several years to buyout all the shares in Te Whaiti, and Knight had apparently opened the Tauarau meetings by 'asking' for the complete award of the block to the Crown. In private reports Knight had used the word 'take' and Balneavis 'evacuate'. However, early in these meetings Te Whaiti residents apparently threatened to withdraw from the Scheme, and Knight had to make a special trip to negotiate with them. Apparently some surviving Te Whaiti non-sellers, mainly residents, would not cooperate with the Crown's plan to evacuate the block. Nevertheless, by 1925 it turned out that the very large Te Whaiti No.2 residue had disappeared, and the Te Whaiti 1 residue was located the furthest north Ngati Manawa were hapuu of Tuhoe until about the time the UDNR was established, they have since come to be widely recognised as independent iwi. 299 'UCMB 2B' 'revised groups' and 'draft orders'; loose unfiled sheets in WDMLC archives, discovered by Himaima Tumoana. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 299 and was nearly as large an acreage as all the other new blocks of Te Whaiti 1 and 2 put together, ('Urewera "A" Block' map included in the Historical Map Book). It appears that a large proportion of the Te Whaiti non-sellers shares had been moved north in the block off the more valuable timber lands in the south. Campbell reports a whaikoorero (address) of Pera Meihena (Te Meihana?) recorded by the Shepherd-Galvin expedition in 1936 to explore the timber resources of the interior Urewera. 300 Pera was about 63, so was probably one of three Meihana brothers who with a sister held strong rights in Te Whaiti as well as Maraetahia and Tarapounamu-Matawhero blocks in 1902. (It may have been his sister who headed up group H). By 1936 the Te Whaiti non-sellers had leased timber rights to the Te Whaiti (formerly 1) residue, and Mr. Galvin urged the sale of this block to the Crown for water conservation purposes. Meihana forcefully recapitulated the history of the UDNR, purchase campaign, and consolidation scheme before firmly rejecting Galvin's offer. He identified himself as Ngati Manawa and Ngati Whiri, the rights of which had been separated from Ngati Whare in 1907 and established in Te Whaiti 2 partition. With regard to the consolidation in Te Whaiti, he reported that Knight had wanted them out of the more valuable timber of Te Whaiti 2 and Minginui and relocated on the flat (by which Meihana apparently meant the hilly area around Te Whaiti settlement in Te Whaiti 1). He emphasised that it was only through a 'hard fight' that they were able to retain two blocks in Te Whaiti 2 (he had termed the previous confrontations 'little' fights). However, apparently the balance of their shares had to be located on 'the flat' or the hills of Te Whaiti community in Te Whaiti 1, 'and even though we got that part [2 blocks in Minginui], the Crown came along and went and made a Reserve of the roadside, and we still had to take to the back country', by which Meihana probably meant the Te Whaiti 1 residue block even further to the north in poorer timber country (see the old and new blocks overlayed on Map 11). 300 Campbell 1997, p 57 and Supp.Docs.III, pp 439-49. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 300 A clearer picture of these changes, and perhaps of a Crown tactic, emerges from a chronological comparison of various lists and reports for ,Te Whaiti in 1921. Boast I, furnishes a list ofTe Whaiti 1 non-sellers as of21 July 1921 and recapitulates a letter from Ngata to Knight on 6 August 1921 revealing (to me, anyway) his early role in the arrangements. 301 The 21 July list (probably prepared by Bowler for the consolidation), Ngata's 6 August letter to Knight, and Knight's 3 October 1921 report to the Ministers all identify the Te Whaiti consolidation groups by numbers 1-10 or I ll. With few but some significant changes, much the same groups were identified as Te Whaiti groups A-M in the final 31 October report which was published in the AlliR. Thus we have to compare four reports on consolidation negotiations in Te Whaiti between 21 July and 31 October 1921. It appears from the 2IJu1y list of non-sellers in Te Whaiti 1 that the consolidation groups for the whole block were drawn up before the August meetings in Tauarau. Bowler had probably known the non-seller kin groups, anticipated the need, and did this in addition to converting their shares to pennies (as was required in the information asked of them). All the Te Whaiti 1 non-sellers are assigned to one of eleven groups, numbered 1-11. Chronologically the next record is Ngata's letter to Knight on 6 August. Apparently Ngata had gone to Te Whaiti in the first week of the Tauarau meetings to settle their doubts. He also listed 11 consolidation groups, along with their leaders, valuation of the group's consolidated shares in pence, and approximate acreage. Although five of the leaders were listed with different groups in Bowler's list, the other six were listed with the group they led in Ngata's list. Ngata appears to have been working to segregate probable sellers as well as urge as many non-sellers as possible to transfer their shares out of Te Whaiti block: with regard to Te Whaiti 2 he decided on a reduction of 25 percent 'for roading &c' (noting this was slightly more than that agreed upon with Knight the day before) and 301 Boast, pp 208-9; 212-14. ------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 301 estimated a remaining acreage already reduced by 'owners who are transferring to Te Whaiti [1, or settlement], Hikurangi-Horomanga, Whirinaki &c. and those [who] are listed as probable sellers' .302 With regard to Te Whaiti 1 he states 'It is to be noted that a number of owners in this block have transferred their interests to other blocks' but seemed to be disappointed that 'the shares of those moving from Whaiti No 2 to No 1 almost equal those of owners vacating No. 1.' The word 'vacate' suggests that at least some and perhaps most of these 'transfers' were of residences, not merely of shares or 'interests'. Also on 6 August Knight telegraphed the Commissioner of Crown Lands in Auckland to report on progress in the meetings with the Tuhoe and said 'Te Whaiti refuse to join the Scheme. Am going there today to arrange for a partition ... ,303 Knight's 3 October report reflected further similar changes he subsequently made in Ngata's arrangement. Although Knight neglected to name leaders of most groups and the acreage of some, most of Bowler and Ngatas' numbers 1-10 were still being used and had not yet been changed to the A-M designations of the formal report. Bowler's group 11 was designated simply as Te Whaiti 2, headed up by Matekuare Te Hira in Ngata's letter and valued at 540,163 pence. In his visit later in August or by the time of his report on 3 October, Knight had arranged or decided on a deduction from Te Whaiti 2 of about 22 percent of its value for roading and survey, and an additional 4.6 percent reduction which would be restored to Albert Warbrick (Arepeti Paerau) in equivalent value from Crown land in the Whirinaki block adjoining the eastern boundary of Te Whaiti block (group K in the formal report; eventually returned to the Crown in default of survey charges, UCMB). These deductions would have brought Matekuare's shares in Te Whaiti 2 down to about 396,480 pence from the 540,163 pence reported by N gata. 302 Quoted in Boast, p 209. 303 Knight to Cmsr Crown Lands, 6 August 1921, telegraph; LINZ Hamilton, Knight papers 20/201 Vo11 1919-21. _=-=--?C-'CC--=--=C--=,"---'C'7--=-===r-~-~~~~-;-=:'-:''::-'::''::::':::L Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 302 However, by the time of the formal report, Matekuare's shares are no longer explicitly designated as shares in Te Whaiti 2, and he is reported to hold 202,914 shares located in Te Whaiti 1 (the only one designated at the papakaainga/marae) with an undefined 'balance' to go to Te Whaiti 1 residue. In Schedule 2 (1) of the final report all that remained of Ngati Manawa land in Te Whaiti 2 was group L, apparently a recently organised 'Te Whaiti 2 residue' valued at 325,280 pence. Where did this new residue come from? It may be significant that the total of the Te Whaiti 2 residue and Matekuare's new shares in Te Whaiti 1, less Warbrick's share (which was to be relocated in Whirinaki) but free of the deduction, is nearly equivalent to Matekuare's original shares in Te Whaiti 2 as reported by Ngata. So, at this point it looked like the Crown had gotten all of Te Whaiti 2 except for a large residue to which it probably hoped to have better access through further transfer and purchasing of shares. However, Meihana's criticisms of Knight's operations to the Shepherd-Galvin expedition in 1936 reported that the Te Whaiti people nevertheless had so far been able to retain two blocks at Minginui in Te Whaiti 2 through a 'hard fight. ' Meanwhile, in Te Whaiti 1 at the time of Knight's 3 October report, Group 10 was clearly becoming the residue of several other groups the acreage of which he had limited to 70-200 acres each in the vicinity of Te Whaiti settlement. Group 10 was to include the entire group 5 and be 'situated at the North Western comer of the Block, bounded on the West, North, and North East generally by the original boundaries of the block' that is, immediately south of Maraetahia block (which the Crown had taken entirely). By the time of the formal report a few weeks later, this northernmost area had been designated Te Whaiti 1 residue. Knight also specified that the acreage of Te Whaiti 1 residue was to 'suffer' (apparently a surveying term) a reduction equivalent to 'a strip of land up to the sky line along the road and on both banks of the Whirinaki River' to be taken by the Crown for scenic purposes, as well as a reduction for roading. I remain unclear about whether this was actually deducted from the value of the shares allocated to the residue; the intention of the scheme was for I I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 303 the Crown to pre-emp land for scenic reserves and allocate the Native blocks in the areas which were left. Nevertheless, through the roading and survey deductions as well as the residues a general pattern of local or piecemeal reduction of each non-sellers' proposed location was emerging in the consolidation procedures, to the benefit of the Crown award in the midst of the Ngati Whare or Ngati Manawas' own favoured areas. These tactics appear to be a less obvious extension of the pre-emption of some whole blocks announced at the outset of the consolidation arrangements, although ownership of the residues remained nominally with the non-sellers. In the case of Te Whaiti block, the tactic minimised the Native awards in the Te Whaiti settlement as well as Te Whaiti 2 and the Minginui area, while maximising the area of 'residue' in the least valuable land, and taking portions ofthat for roading and (apparently) scenic purposes. As well as pressure to transfer out was segregation or tracking of probable sellers which was to continue in other blocks, but especially in Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana. There were also further reductions of the sections planned by Te Whaiti groups A-M, already reduced by the use of residues. Additional portions of each section were to be taken for the cost of their surveys and their share of the roading from most of the 20- some new blocks these groups had formed by 1926. 304 Most significantly, like the earlier reductions for residues, because these were taken piecemeal from each group's block in tum, they in effect passed to the Crown portions of the Ngati Whare and Ngati Manawas' favoured lands from their midst, crowding them more closely together on what was left of it. This particular form of pre-emption was to be pursued in all remaining Tuhoe land and have manifold effects which will be returned to in particular cases. Although Knight was apparently a hard man, this policy was in effect a reversal of his initial proposal to Guthrie to take these deductions from 'useless lands' . 304 UCMB 2A, P 215-218. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 304 Much more detail about the Te Whaiti struggle could be worked out by tracing families' and individual roles, transfers, and sell-outs from (i) Bowler's 21 July 1921 non-seller's lists to (ii) groupbook E and through (iii) the formal report 31 October to (iv) the new block order lists. Group book E is part of the collection of Urewera Consolidation records held in the Waiariki District Maori Land Court archives. 305 It was probably collated after the Tauarau meetings but before the formal report was completed, because it is organised in terms ofTe Whaiti group series A-M rather than groups 1-11 (which Knight was still using in his 3 October report). As will be explained toward the end of this chapter, the purpose of groupbooks A-E and G was to collate the unsold shares of each non-seller in each of the old (Native Reserve) blocks and convert them to pennies for consolidation in a group of non-sellers, in this case Te Whaiti groups A-M. The rise ofNgati Whare and Ngati Manawa as iwi considered independent of Tuhoe would be one context in which such detailed research of Te Whaiti social organistion could be pursued. In his 27 August 1921 report, Balneavis had asserted that the two groups to whom Te Whaiti had been awarded on appeal in the 1907, Ngati Manawa and Ngati Whare, 'may be regarded as tribes apart from the Urewera' (that is, from the Tuhoe) insofar as a large majority of owners were not concerned in any other Urewera blocks.306 Perhaps to the contrary, groupbook E shows the considerable extent the majority, at least of those who retained some Te Whaiti shares, held shares in many other Urewera blocks. Most of those who had sold all their Te Whaiti shares probably did so because they were primarily involved in other blocks. As shown in Figure 1, the hapuu rights recognised by the UDNR commissioners were 'Tuhoe', Ngati Whare, and Ngati Manawa, in that order. On of the five Tuhoe commissioners was Mehaka Tokopounamu, who at the opening session in 1899 spoke for the ten hapuu 'at' Te Whaiti, Galatea, and Te Houhi, including Ngati Whare and Ngati 305 Groupbook E, item 161,WDMLC archives. 306 Baineavis to Coates, 27 August 1921, MA 1 29/417A. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 305 Manawa.307 At this time and even through 1923, 'Tuhoe' was coming to mean the whole Urewera iwi, but the term had earlier designated a hapuu which was becoming known as Te Urewera hapuu (as it still is).308 Although many of the Tuhoe (that is, Te Urewera) hapuu which in 1902 had been recognised as holding strong rights in the block were excluded from it in 1907 (and could be identified), many of the 'Ngati Whare' and 'Ngati Manawa' who remained in the lists would have sometimes strong affiliations with Te Urewera which could be identified, and shared in the extensive land rights of this hapuu. Although many of these persons probably resided in Te Whaiti block, Groupbook E suggests that at least a proportion resided elsewhere in the Urewera. In this sense at least, Ngati Whare and Ngati Manawa could not simply be 'regarded as tribes apart' from the Tuhoe (especially the Tuhoe hapuu which later came to be known as Te Urewera hapuu). From this point of view, Balneavis' assertion can be seen as a political contention which stemmed from the Crown's support of Ngati Whare and Ngati Manawas' bid to withdraw from the UDNR and exploit the timber and gold potential of the block soon after 1903. This withdrawal had been backed by the Urewera appeals Commission in 1906-7, and was perhaps being repeated by Balneavis to facilitate the evacuation of the block for the Crown. However, as Meihana, Wharepapa Whatanui, and other leaders would show, especially many Ngati Whare had retained their shares and were to prove difficult to dislodge. Their descendants are still there. 3.6.4(c) The Waikaremoana Groups as 'Temporary' The consolidation scheme in Waikaremoana block and the separate but included Urewera Reserves had some features in common with Te Whaiti block: (i) the Crown's determination to evacuate the whole block; (ii) the Crown's method of organising non-sellers who insisted on remaining resident in the block into consolidation groups (in this case called 'reserves' rather than groups, as they had been in Te Whaiti); (iii) organising an ambiguous remaining category of shareholders 307 Urewera Minute Book 1 (labelled '3 '), 1-3 February 1899, pp 4-13; Urewera Minute Book 7,3,6 October 1902, pp 43 ff. See bibliography. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 306 into 'residues'; (iv) distinction by the use ofletters or 'residues' rather than numbers which were used to designate 'pennanent' consolidation groups 1-47; and (v) disregard of all its groups in the alphabetical list of non-sellers. Otherwise the Scheme in Waikaremoana block was quite different. Perhaps because the pre-emption of the block was organised precipitously at the Tauarau meetings, the Crown having previously purchased no shares in it at all, the records are sparser and even more difficult to reconstruct that in the case of Te Whaiti block. Aside from the brief descriptions of operations in Waikaremoana in the series of preliminary reports leading up to the fonnal report, the only other general record that I am aware of is groupbook G 'Waikaremoana' and (presumably) a following groupbook which is unidentified because it has lost its cover, but which deals with consolidated successions to Waikaremoana shares.309 Many original shares in Waikaremoana are recorded in groupbook H 'Allocations' rather than in groupbook G. Perhaps because of the haste required for organisation of the Waikaremoana pre emption, the preliminary reports of Balneavis, Ngata, and Knight are less comprehensive and consistent than the fonnal report (which was probably written by Ngata and Balneavis). The fonnal report outlines the procedures taken with the Waikaremoana block in two places as well as in the 3 versions of Schedule 2. 310 The four very small Urewera Reserves are dealt with separately because although they were situated in Waikaremoana block, they were not part of it nor even part of the UDNR because they had been 'Crown lands granted as reserves to the Ureweras in the early days,.311 (One wonders how this land earlier became Crown land to 'grant' to the Tuhoe if from 1896 it and all the surrounding district was recognised as Tuhoe land). Ngata used an arrangement with which he had been successful establishing Maori land development schemes in the Far North: while there he had 308 Te Amo Kokouri referred to Te Urewera hapuu as 'Tuhoe' in 1923: UCMB 2A, P 1. 309 Items 163 and 164 respectively, in Urewera Consolidation groupbooks, WDMLC archives. 310 Paragraph 7, p 6 and Schedule 1, paragraphs 11 and 12, pp 8 and 9, AJHR G-7 1921. 311 Ibid., p 6. ---======~------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 307 gotten agreement to assume control of the land in exchange for paying off rates arrears, in the Ureweras he acquired for the Crown two of the four reserves III exchange for paying off their arrears. The other two Urewera reserves were to 'remain to the consolidated owners,' which is to say, the owners were expected to 'exchange north' or relocate their consolidated shares in one of the areas of the Urewera not pre-empted by the Crown. However, as O'Malley has made clear, the Ngati Ruapani resisted any plan to evacuate Waikaremoana and especially Kopani, one of these remaining reserves in which their important kaainga Waimako was located. O'Malley examines and critiques Ngata's effort to settle this confrontation. In Schedule 2 the two remaining Urewera Reserves, Te Kopani and Hei-o-Tahoka, are mentioned only in connection with another 'residue', the Urewera Reserves residue. The plans for this residue remain unclear. Both reserves are listed as the 'proposed location' of this residue, and it is added that 'all divisions oflatter [are] to be cancelled.' The 169 shareholders in this residue are listed in Schedule 2 (3), where their individual shares are converted to pence totaling 3,797.10.11 pounds sterling worth ofland. No further information is available in Balneavis', Ngata's, or Knight's reports, although the last two deal primarily with the Waikaremoana block. It may be that the 169 persons named here had declined to 'exchange north' when the opportunity arose at Tauarau, that is, insisted on locating their consolidated shares in the remaining reserves or the Waikaremoana block rather than relocating them in other Urewera blocks not pre-empted by the Crown. For those who did not live in the block or agreed to move, Groupbook H (,Allocations') adds in their Urewera Reserves shares (the column is labeled 'U/R', and precedes G, Waikaremoana block) to their consolidated shares. Thus the Urewera Reserves residue, like the Waikaremoana Reserves A-L, were probably those with rights in the remaining two reserves but refusing to 'exchange north'. Judging from the tactics of the Crown purchasing campaign in the Urewera, the abolition of Hei-o-Tahoka internal partitions may also suggest that the Crown intended to acquire at least this remaining reserve. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 308 About a dozen sibling groups (that is, 'surnames') appear to figure prominently in the Urewera Reserves residue, and some shareholdings are much larger (16-40,000 pennies) than others. So, regardless of being a 'residue' this large group may nevertheless be seen to have a social organisation of families similar to the consolidation groups in the other Urewera blocks, Te Whaiti groups A-M, and Waikaremoana Reserves A-L. Two prominent Urewera leaders are listed in the Waikaremoana block residues and Reserves A-L as well as in the Urewera Reserves residue, throwing into question the official treatment of the latter as separate from the Waikaremoana block. Of course, the appearance of separateness of the Urewera Reserves was primarily a statutory artifact, and may never have had much effect on the ground. It should be no surprise to find a close integration between hapuu (and land) rights, contemporary settlements, and the old reserves in Waikaremoana block. The consolidation groups arranged for Waikaremoana block itself were four residues shown in Schedule 2 (1) and the 11 Waikaremoana Reserves A-L (again, I is not used) left out of Schedule 2 (1) and (2) but included in Schedule 2 (3) at pages 37-9. These new reserves were reluctantly arranged to enable Ngati Ruapani to retain possession of their settlements and clearings along the northern shores of the lake. 312 Waikaremoana Residue 1 was 317 persons affiliating primarily with N gati Ruapani (most would have secondary or alternate affiliations with other Tuhoe hapuu), and some of Waikaremoana Residues 2-4 were primarily members of the different iwi Ngati Kahungunu, all of whom planned to sell out. It is certain that all these groups were closely related and, to some degree, their affiliation with one or another group was arbitrary. However, I have not examined these other three groups for their affiliations with Tuhoe. The social if not official integration of the old Urewera Reserves with the Waikaremoana block is suggested by Te Wao Ihimaera holding prominent shares in Waikaremoana Residue 1 (Ngati Ruapani) and Waikaremoana Reserve A (Te Maara a te Atua) as well as in the Urewera Reserves residue, and Rawaho Te Winitana Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 309 holding prominent shares in Waikaremoana Residue 1 and Waikaremoana Reserve C (Matuahu) as well as in the Urewera Reserves residue. Rawaho's brother Te Waipatu Te Winitana was also one of the original non-seIler's representatives with whom Ngata was reported to have negotiated the agreement of the Tuhoe to the initial consolidation proposals. However, by the time of the formal report and perhaps soon after that meeting, Waipatu and group 44, which he also represented, was 'absorbed in Urewera Reserves Residue' (Schedule 2 (1)). Waipatu as well as his sister Tipare Te Winitana are listed with Rawaho in the Urewera Reserves residue, and also the Waikaremoana Residue 1 (Ngati Ruapani). Rawaho's sister is listed with him in Waikaremoana Reserve C (Matuahu) whereas his brother Waipatu is listed in Reserve E (Mokau). Chapter three (PA7) described the leading roles and hapuu rights ofTe Wao Ihimaera and Rawaho Te Winitana in two 1918 petitions proposing ahuwhenua or land development incorporations in Waikaremoana and Ruatahuna as well as Ruatoki, in what I argued was a coordinated effort to stem the purchase campaign. Te Wao led a petition of 17 persons, and Rawaho a petition of 100 persons, phrased in such a way as to avoid the adverse reaction of Herries to the Ruatoki petition yet challenge his disregard of the UDNR legislation. Several years earlier, Rawaho had led, and Te Wao joined, a petition to have the 1903 boundary of the Waikaremoana block restored from the northwest to the southeast side of Lake Waikaremoana.313 It would be surprising if only a few years later the organisational skills and resistance of these two leaders to the Crown's tactics were not still in evidence. As described earlier, they both had some mana in Ruatahuna and held some land rights there and in a few other blocks as well as in Waikaremoana, so their decision to maintain their residence there in the face of the Crown's move to pre-empt the entire block was itself significant (I am assuming that they already did reside there). The distribution of each of their shares between three different options may also be 312 Unsigned (Knight) to Guthrie, 3 October 1921, MA 28/7/4A. 313 Rawaho Winitana and others to Ngata, 22 August 1915, LE 11915/9; O'Malley Supp.Pap.lI: 366-8. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 310 significant. Their appearance in two different relatively small Waikaremoana Reserve groups probably indicates that they planned to reside in those proposed reserves, or keep alternative residences there while continuing residence in the settlement of Waimako. Their appearance in one of the Waikaremoana Reserve residues may indicate their leading hapuu affiliation (Ngati Ruapani in both their cases), but according to Schedule 2 (1) these four residues were to receive proportions of the purchase money for their shares in the block. However, paragraph 12 (c) 1 and 2 clarify that the terms of this purchase were that the Waikaremoana Reserve groups would be provided with reserves (Te Wao to Reserve A, Rawaho and his siblings to Reserves C and E) the size of which apparently affected the purchase money and, specifically, part of the purchase money would be used by the Crown to purchase land for the expansion of the Te Kopani Urewera Reserve (in which both men were listed). Thus a possible strategy of both Te Wao Ihimaera and Rawaho Te Winitana may be glimpsed. But there may also have been a Crown tactic in play: should we suspect that the Urewera Reserve residue as well as the Waikaremoana block Residues 1-4 were being used in a way similar to the Te Whaiti residues? I doubt that either Te Wao or Rawaho would have left some of their shares in that category of their own choice. I suggest that it was the Crown's way of limiting the acreage it would have to give up to the Waikaremoana Reserves, leaving those who persisted in proposing locations in Waikaremoana block narrowing options between small reserves, 'exchanging north' (that is, moving their consolidated shares and thus residence to another Urewera block) or selling up. Despite initial arrangements with Ngata for much larger Reserves A-L along the Waikaremoana shore, Knight did enforce what he claimed to be the original agreement that their settlements and cultivations there would total no more than 607 acres. 314 314 UCMB 2A, P 228. ,-.::-.:.--=----=--=--=-=-..::-..:-:..:..::------~- ----~, Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 311 The residues held the shares of the recalcitrants, but in a limbo which made the latter alternatives look better. If the old Urewera Reserves residue was integral to this tactic, then the Crown was using the social organisation which at least N gata and Balneavis would have known straddled the Waikaremoana block and old Reserves regardless of official distinctions. A comparison can be made here with 'overflow' shares, another form of pre-emption which was to be developed especially by the Consolidation Commissioners throughout the areas remaining to the Tuhoe. Because deduction of survey and roading costs from each new Tuhoe block crowded non-sellers by passing to the Crown portions of their favoured remaining land in their midst, the shares of groups aspiring to the same location but who whose proposals were taken up later 'overflowed' into less favoured adjacent lands. That is to say, they had to defer once again to Crown pre-emptions in lands where in legal as well as historical fact their rights might have been stronger. 3.6.4(d) 'Clearing the Air' on Waikaremoana The Crown's belated realisation that the whole Waikaremoana block might be acquired without expropriation may itself be revealing. In recounting the 'series of ahuwhenualdevelopment proposals by Ruatoki, Waikaremoana, and Ruatahuna leaders in 1917 -18 (section 1.4) I described how the Ruatahuna proposal appeared to tum against inclusion of Waikaremoana and instead urge its sale to support Tuhoe families while they worked to develop Ruatoki and Ruatahuna blocks. This early readiness of some Tuhoe apparently to sacrifice the Waikaremoana block for the good of the others surfaced again in the Crown's preliminary May meeting in Ruatoki: Ngata had suggested that Tuhoe might be prepared to give the Waikaremoana block up to the Crown, and Takurua Tamarau, an influential leader in Ruatoki and Ruatahuna, expressed support. For some reason, Ngata appears not to have pursued this opportunity, but instead entertained Coates' more draconian solution. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 312 Balneavis' 27 August account of the Tauarau meetings reported that the group of non-seller representatives threatened to withdraw from the consolidation scheme when it was mentioned (apparently on Coates' instructions) that the Waikaremoana block might be taken by the Crown under the Scenery Preservation Act, but subsequent discussion of exchanges of Waikaremoana interests with Crown interests elsewhere in the Urewera 'cleared the air'. Besides revealing the precarious basis on which the Scheme was said to have been agreed to, this early confrontation shows that even Tuhoe strongly supporting consolidations reacted in unison against Crown high-handedness, and suggests that the majority of Tuhoe were ready to sacrifice the block only if they could gain favourable terms. However, this struggle had only begun. In a single night early in the meetings, Balneavis reported, Tuhoe offered Waikaremoana shares worth 25,000 acres (about one-third of the block) in such an 'exchange' with Crown shares. Balneavis had informed Coates by telegram that the chances of acquiring the whole block appeared good, and by the time of Ngata's report in September the equivalent of 29,000 acres ofWaikaremoana block had been transferred to the Crown ... By exchange as regards Native owners who have joined groups proposed to be located in lands north of Waikaremoana Block, on the basis of 6s. an acre, the Crown taking the interest thus vacated. The results of these exchanges are already incorporated in the group lists scheduled.315 What did this 'exchange north' of Waikaremoana shares really mean? In the first place, it is not surprising that over one-third of the shares in the block were immediately available: the block had not been opened up to the purchase campaign, and we have seen that most of the so-called non-sellers even this late in the campaign were not dogmatically against selling some or most of the shares which were less important to them. The ahuwhenua (development) proposal petitions in 1918 had finally urged the opening of Waikaremoana to purchases so that Ruatahuna and 315 AJHR G-7 1921 P 9. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 313 Ruatoki owners could subsist on the payments while developing their own lands. Negotiations in the August meetings apparently raised the Crown's offer to 6 shillings, still far below its average rate for other blocks but more than had been paid for some including partitions 4 and 5 of Ruatahuna block. The Crown's attitude had always been that the Waikaremoana block was very poor land. The Crown's offer of an 'exchange' for Crown land elsewhere in the Urewera was probably also still beguiling, at least this early in the arrangement of the Scheme. Many Tuhoe had apparently been taken in by the illusion promoted by the Crown that it held specific portions of each block. Few would have yet appreciated that the Crown was exchanging nothing: instead it was dictating to the Tuhoe the lands it wanted, leaving them to propose consolidation of their unsold shares in one or a few remaining places, settling these proposals as suited the Crown, shifting some of this to residues elsewhere, deducting proportions for the costs of surveys and roads, and taking the entire balance as Crown land. From this point of view, the Crown 'exchanged' nothing for the relocation of the Waikaremoana shares. The exchanges were 'already incorporated in the group lists scheduled' in just the same way they would have been if those Tuhoe had simply been taken to propose locations outside the Waikaremoana block. All the deal really amounted to was that persons holding 25,000 acres worth of shares in Waikaremoana had promised not to propose location of them in the Waikaremoana block. In some cases, the illusion of an exchange was more misleading. Balneavis' words' ... Native owners who have joined groups ... ' imply a physical re-Iocation in all cases. This did indeed happen in at least some cases, but it is clear in groupbook G that the majority of 'exchanges' were simply a transfer of Waikaremoana shares into a group's consolidated shares with the agreement to propose a location for them elsewhere. However, where these transfers were of former Waikaremoana residents or leading shareholders and into areas favoured by other Tuhoe where these latecomers had relatively weaker rights, what the Crown was actually exchanging could not honestly be presented as 'Crown land'; to do so played on the illusion that Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 314 the Crown's purchases were specific portions of each block (the illusion promoted in the May 1921 meeting Ngata and by the 1919 and 1920 Maps 5 and 6) rather than undivided shares in common. Instead, what the Crown was actually exchanging was the scarce usable land remaining to other Tuhoe after its pre-emptions of the best lands, and would result in further crowding. Another catch was that these other Tuhoe could not take Waikaremoana shares in return. Again like the Te Whaiti transfers and residues, and probably the Urewera Reserve residue, this 'exchange north' of Waikaremoana shares sometimes took the form of what was later to be termed 'overflow' by the Consolidation Commissioners. It must be seen as another form of pre-emption by the Crown. Campbell and Bassett and Kay document several cases of Waikaremoana groups whose transfer of consolidated shares caused crowding among other Tuhoe and sometimes conflict with the newcomers. The majority of these relocations may have been into Ruatahuna block where rights were frequently held by Waikaremoana people, however they were probably widespread in other blocks as well. For the same reason as Ruatahuna, they would have been more frequently into Te Whaiti were that block not entirely claimed by the Crown. Bassett and Kay report that some Waikaremoana non-sellers were allocated land around Ruatahuna, and note that 'some Tuhoe who did not have whakapapa links with Ruatahuna or its hapuu became owners in the area. At least some of these were considered outsiders, although others were accepted as belonging. And there were probably many who were already living in Ruatahuna block but relocated Waikaremoana shares there with their consolidation groUp.316 Although the reaction of Ruatahuna residents would vary with the strength of Ruatahuna rights among these new groups, all had the effect of crowding them. This would have been true even in Ruatahuna which, as Knight had implied, was sufficiently promising land for (Pakeha) settlement were it not for the reputation for recalcitrance the Tuhoe there 316 Bassett and Kay, pp 130, 142. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 315 had gained; it was more the case in the lower Whakatane and TaurangalWaimana basins where much of the best land was pre-empted by the Crown. Campbell outlines a case in point which also illustrates the related effects of 'overflow' .317 Tuhitaare Hemiteo and several others complained to the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court that 'persons who had interests in the Waikaremoana and other blocks .... outsiders [who] would not have been included in the list of owners' had it not been for a subdivision of the Pohue block, had unjustifiably been given rights to cultivate and to own land there. 'Mani' was furthermore building a house on Tuhitaare's fence line. The documents which Campbell furnishes show that the contested location is in Parekohe B, a partition on the northern boundary of Parekohe block immediately south of Whaitiripapa block (see Maps 8 and 15). Whaitiripapa, like the adjacent Ruatoki block, was excluded from the consolidation scheme supposedly because its values would have complicated consolidation exchanges, but really because both blocks (and Tapatahi) were relatively densely settled by the Tuhoe and the Crown had not tried to buy in it - and so had nothing to gain but trouble in a consolidation including them. Nevertheless, when it came time to settle consolidation groups in the immediately adjacent Parekohe B, the Consolidation Commissioners apparently did not hesitate to crowd them more closely by bringing in outsiders as well as deducting land from each new block for surveys and roads. Examination of the documents furnished by Campbell suggest that the Pohue block was originally the entire 161 acres of Parekohe B, but was subdivided by the consolidation commissioners into two new blocks, Pohue and Ngautoka, awarding the later to the outsiders from (or with stronger rights in) Waikaremoana. Most of the very small new blocks in this area involved overflow blocks in less useful land of the nearby basin. Thus further investigation of this case would probably show overflow displacing the rights of other Tuhoe from Parekohe B, as well as overflow from Waikaremoana into Parekohe B. Although Judge Carr would have been fully aware 317 Campbell, 1997, p 86; see Maps 9,10 and 11. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 316 of the causes of this situation, I have nowhere seen it explained. When queried by the Chief Judge regarding the complaint, his response might be seen as begging the question if not evasive: 'the Parekohe frontage was divided proportionately between these groups but Tuhitaare was not satisfied.' The extent to which the residues and restrictions of group locations were effective in promoting or coercing transfers and sales in Te Whaiti, the Urewera Reserves, and Waikaremoana blocks could, with considerably more intensive analysis, be assessed from the groupbooks, the revised groups and draft block orders (UCMB '2B'), and final block orders. O'Malley has given us the model for tracing the subsequent ways in which continuing resistance was worn down over the following decades. 3.7 Groupbooks and Successions Schedule 1 states confidently that 'All the steps in the process of grouping successors and distribution of interests are shown in group-books numbered A to G, deposited in the office of the Registrar of the Native Land Court, Rotorua' .318 Although most of these groupbooks are still available for public inspection, they are difficult to comprehend. The data relied upon in the groupbooks was also far more problematic than one would suppose from reading the final report. Many doubts and worries were expressed in the earlier reports and draft which were dropped in the final report, apparently relying instead on the then accepted and widely used principle of 'validation' by retrospective legislation. Any mistakes and miscalculations not only in the voluminous data produced at Tauarau, but also its problematic basis in the lists of non-sellers and their retained shares in various blocks which Bowler struggled to maintain, appear to have simply been made legal by the 1921-22 Act which, in effect, legislated the final report. 318 AJHR G-7 1921, P 8. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 317 Earlier in this chapter at the beginning of my account of the Tauarau meetings I outlined the groupbooks, along with the other series of procedures followed at Tauarau. For examples of the original groupbooks, see extracts in the Appendices (Papers 3, Appendix B). Figure 9 below is a more detailed list of the groupbooks held in the Waiariki District Maori Land Court archives, showing their relations to each other. I have also argued that the 50-150 consolidation groups which were reported to have been organised there were in practice divided between (i) the first 47-50 numbered groups and their many (lettered) subgroups, which the Crown officers assumed would have to be settled somewhere in the Ureweras with their consolidated shares, and (ii) the further groups which had to be organised in Te Whaiti, the Urewera Reserves, and Waikaremoana blocks because some non-sellers could not be compelled to evacuate these blocks for the Crown. The groupbooks, in which the shares held by each non-seller in any block were collated for consolidation, were probably initially organised to deal with the first category of groups in hopes that the latter category of groups could be more simply handled. Later, it probably became apparent that much the same procedures would have to be followed at least with the Te Whaiti groups A-M and the Waikaremoana Reserves A-L, if not the associated residue 'groups'. It is probably significant that unlike the numbered groups, none of these lettered groups were divided into subgroups. If the sub grouping of groups 1-47 was the result of urging from the consolidation officers to form smaller 'families' for family farms, then this may reflect their assumption that the Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana holdouts had no such future, or were merely temporary groupings to placate their demands while the Crown continued to press its policy of evacuation in other ways. This particular struggle between Crown expectations and Tuhoe recalcitrance is probably the reason why the groupbooks are organised into ledgers A, B, C, and D (groups 1-50), E (Te Whaiti Series), F (Successions), G (Waikaremoana), and H (Allocations). Also implicit here is the procedural decision not to tackle successions to deceased owners, but rather to list the dead in their groups, until most of the Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 318 'shuffling and reshuffling' between groups and final (proposed) locations were decided upon. I suspect the Te Whaiti groupbook preceded the Successions groupbook because Ngata's early visit there to convince the residents not to withdraw from the Scheme made it clear that these complications would have to be worked through after all. In my preview of the procedures followed at Tauarau it was described that Bowler and the Registrar the Native Land Court furnished the basic data including lists of non-sellers, Bowler's card index, a schedule of block values, and compiled plan 12500 (Map 13). Although reliance on these documents is mentioned in one or another report, there is no mention of reference to what one would suppose to be the most crucial documents of all: the deeds which legally document the purchase of each share in each block from each Tuhoe. As was described in chapter one, these deeds (termed 'Memoranda of Transfer') were tidily arranged by Native Reserve block and would have resolved some of the ambiguities which the consolidation officers apparently ran into. In his 27 August report, Balneavis explicitly cautioned that the lists of non-sellers and the value of their interests 'had not been completely checked either as to the names or as to the figures' but that these had nevertheless been 'assumed' in the collations worked through in the groupbooks over the next few weeks. He then went on to say that 'It is now recommended that the Native Land Purchase deeds affecting the Urewera Country be checked with the [1907] titles so that the basis of all future titles may be unquestioned and sound, and so that no ground of complaint may be left to the non-sellers' .319 I have encountered no evidence that this was ever done. As was described in the previous chapter, for some reason Knight did not intend to transfer the finalised deeds for deposit at the Ministry of Lands head office in Wellington as was normal practice, and as late as 1927 had to be explicitly directed to do so by the Undersecretary. In his 20 September account of the meetings at Tauarau, 319 Ba1neavis to Coates, 27 August 1921 pI, MA 29/417A. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 319 Carr reported that 'we found the index cards supplied by Mr. Bowler of use up to a point, especially as a check on the compiled lists of non-sellers, but in the actual business of grouping the owners prior to allocating them to their consolidated holdings, the cards had to be put aside. ,320 Although this comment makes it clear that Bowler's index cards had their limitations, it is puzzling insofar as they were probably the most complete and current record of purchases except for the deeds themselves - and, being alphabetised, a great deal more accessible for the massive task of collations. Earlier in this chapter I discussed the problem of what lists were prepared by Bowler and read for the original '8,931' names, and concluded that although everyone knew the results would be unreliable, this was probably merely a set of the 1907 block orders (which had over 14,000 names in them) annotated by Bowler from the 1919 panui pupuri whenua and his card index. To do the job properly from the deeds was the kind of overwhelming task which had proven unmanageable in the previous years, let alone the few weeks left before the Tauarau meeting. The precarious status of this foundational information was actually detailed in the draft for the final report of 31 October 1921, probably written by Ngata and Balneavis.32l Several specific concerns about the information relied upon for the Tauarau arrangements and the final report are raised like caveats in the draft, both in the introduction and again in a final paragraph headed 'Basis of scheme'. Nevertheless, all were dropped from the final report to parliament: 2. Urewera lands Consolidation scheme ... lists were compiled giving the names of natives who retained their interests .... acceptance of these lists as the basis of the Scheme meant a. that those whose names did not appear on the lists were assumed to have sold to the Crown; b. that the magnetic surveys resulting in the sketch plans on which the Urewera titles were based were adapted; c. that the areas shown on those plans were adapted for the purposes of calculation; 320 Carr to Coates, 20 September 1921 p 2, MA 29/4/7A. 321 Revised draft of final report, MA 28/7/5 binder 5/1. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 320 d. that the valuations used by the native land Purchase Board were adopted for calculating the [prices of the] shares acquired by the Crown or retained by the nonsellers in any block .... Basis of the Scheme The scheme is set out in detail in the first Schedule to this report. It is based on an agreement as to the following matters: 1. The list of nonsellers supplied by the Native Dept together with the interests there expressed are accepted as correct. But in view of complaints made to us at Ruatoki, it may be found necessary to check the land purchase deeds with the original official title lists, and to amend the nonsellers lists and therefore the consolidated group lists accordingly. 2. The values supplied by the Native Land purchase Officer and by him distributed (in pence) in the nonsellers lists supplied to us are in all cases (except Waikaremoana and the Urewera Reserves) adopted as correct. 3. The areas shown on the sketch-plans on which the titles are founded, are accepted as correct. 322 Somebody, either Ngata or Coates and Guthrie, probably decided that this litany of caveats was likely to cause delays and even alarm in parliament, and dropped them, instead relying upon the tactic of validation by retrospective legislation, needed by the whole Scheme in any case. Significantly, the implied claims of Tuhoe 'acceptance' and 'agreement' to the assumption of this dubious data were dropped along with these two paragraphs. As described in my analysis of the Crown's proposals, no claims of Tuhoe agreement to the Scheme appear in the final report except for the ambiguous description that they were 'moved to agree' in the final, rhetorical, paragraph. Several implications of these aborted caveats require clarification. Points (a) and (1) imply that Tuhoe presented themselves, or were spoken for, at Tauarau whose names were on 'the original official title lists' (the 1907 Urewera Native Reserve orders) but not on the list of non-sellers, and who nevertheless claimed that they still owned shares in one or another block (or, conceivably, all blocks in which they had originally held shares). Bowler was practised in watching out for double-selling, so the consolidation officers had good reason to be suspicious of such claims. On the 322 Ibid. -=---:------"----..:..------::...=------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 321 other hand, given war, epidemic, emigration, and the confusions of the meeting at Tauarau on top of a decade in the purchase campaign, some such claims might have been true. The concern that such claimants might show up at any time apparently led to the assumption that such persons had sold - in default of checking the deeds. It is also clear that many Tuhoe intended to retain only token shares of certain blocks and, on the other hand, that Bowler strongly desired to buy all the shares a person had. Together these motives encouraged oversights in the records. It would also be understandable for kore whenua, Tuhoe who realised too late that they had impetuously sold all their shares to all their lands, to claim to have found a few others which had not been sold. Fractional successions by descent or by gift which, in the confusion, were not yet known by all the survivors, greatly increased the likelihood of all these possibilities. The obvious solution to such dilemmas was to search the deeds of sale, at least for some of the blocks claimed to be unsold. However, the conclusion that in view of such complaints at Ruatoki 'it may be found necessary to check the land purchase deeds .. .' confirms my suspicion that they were not checked, and that such complaints were simply dismissed on the strength of the lists of non-sellers which had been supplied - and which were admitted to be sometimes unreliable. The draft report appears to have intended both to claim the Tuhoe had agreed to this reliance on the lists and to recommend to parliament that the deeds be checked anyway. The magnetic survey of 'hapuu' block boundaries and their approximate area in acres, as the Crown had long been uncomfortably aware, had been intended only for 'home rule' or Tuhoe use internal to the Urewera Native Reserve, and was legitimated only under that Act. These boundaries and areas were therefore useless for the purposes of Crown acquisition to which they had been put, and potentially invalidated all the efforts of the purchase campaign and the consolidation. The interim official valuations and the prices paid by the Crown to sellers, or share value retained by non sellers and used to consolidate all unsold shares under the Scheme, were probably of I I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 322 questionable validity for this reason, but the draft also appeared anxious to maintain the appearance that Tuhoe had accepted the fairness of these valuations. 3.7.2 The Organisation of the Groupbooks However, putting all these problems aside (as did the consolidation officers at Tauarau and later the legislators), the methodology of the groupbooks can be briefly described. As the final report remarks, 'this was a labourious proceeding, and occupied, of and on, the whole of our stay at Ruatoki' (p.5). Groupbooks A through H are actually comprised of 14 ledgers, as follows: Figure 9: Urewera Consolidation Groupbooks WDMLC item no. Groupbook Group numbers Remarks 154 A 1 - 13 final (carried to H) 155 A 1- 25A draft carried to 154 168 A? '9 - 23' (9-39) draft carried to all 156 B (crossed 14A- draft carried to 157 out) 157 B 14A-M/Q final (carried to H) 158 B 26 - [45] draft to C and D 159 C 15 - 39L final (carried to H) 160 D 40 - 50 final (carried to H) 161 E Te Whaiti A-M final (carried to H) none? Fl successns (missing) (carried to H) 162 F2 index to succns 163 G Waikaremoana final (carried to H) 164 (missing Waikaremoana cover) consolidated succns 165 HI Allocations 1-24 A-D+E+F2+UIR+G 166 H2 Allocations 25A - " c.f.630 H: later All allocations? " drafts These procedures may be traced in the sample pages of groupbooks A through H furnished in Papers 3 (Appendix B). The purpose of these groupbooks was to collate the number of shares retained by each non-seller in a consolidation group or subgroup. This was done by listing the shares each person held in each Urewera Native Reserve block, referring to the lists reportedly prepared by Bowler and the Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 323 Registrar or to Bowler's card index. The lists were supposed already to have converted the shares retained from relative shares to a value in pence, calculating this from the price Bowler had been paying for shares in that block. We do not know what the consolidation officers did when these lists or the card index did not have this information, and must suppose that if the deeds were not consulted it was worked out from original titles, Bowler's other records and, perhaps, word of mouth. If the deeds were not available to check suspicious claims of unsold land by persons not on the lists of non-sellers, it seems very unlikely that they were referred to for missing or inconsistent details of shares retained by persons on the lists. Once all shares in each Native Reserve block of each person in a group had been satisfactorily collated this was summed in pence, and these individual sums were totaled for the group. This procedure was done separately (i) in groupbooks A through D, for all the Native Reserve blocks in the consolidation scheme except Te Whaiti, the Urewera Reserves, and Waikaremoana blocks; (ii) in groupbook E, for Te Whaiti groups A-M .and Residues land 2; (iii) in groupbook Fl, successions (I will explain this procedure later); and (iv) in groupbook G, for 'exchanges north' into other groups, Reserves A-L, Residues, and other reserves T-W which were probably redesignated residues. The Urewera Reserves were apparently not handled in a groupbook, probably drawing instead from original orders (however, many of these shares appear to have been listed beside successors' shares in a 'Consolidated Successions' list used to sort successors and their shares from groupbook F2 into consolidation groups. 323 Groupbooks A, B, H, and probably others apparently had to be worked though in partial drafts, probably with several officers dividing up the labour, before a final draft was collated from the others. Himaima Tumoana discovered fragments of some of these drafts in the closed files. Although groupbooks A through D appear most confusing, once the final drafts are identified they are most impressive because the Native Reserve blocks are dealt with individually - for the last time (remember, a Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 324 primary objective of the consolidation scheme was to get rid of these and the 'tribal' organisation they represented). Most consolidation groups had unsold shares in 10-20 of the 44 blocks being searched, and some had shares in as many as 24 of them. The original 35 blocks had been reduced by a few which were not included in the consolidation scheme (Ruatoki 1, 2 and 3; Whaitiripapa; Tapatahi; Manuoha; and Paharakeke), but increased by partitions of some (9 for Tauwhare-Manuka; 5 for Ruatahuna; 2 each for Paraonui, Paraeroa, Te Whaiti, Hikurangi-Horomanga, and Otairi). The many blocks in which most persons had retained some shares meant that each group or subgroup would have several pages of columns collating shares for each of the blocks in which any of its members had any unsold shares. In practice, the number of blocks was not extreme because most of the persons in a group were related and thus had held shares in a similar array of blocks. There appears to be no particular order in which the blocks were searched and figures entered: this may have varied with the availability of lists to each officer working on a groupbook. Most of the groupbooks had neatly truncated pages in which several columns appear to have been cut off: probably not for viewing the following page, and perhaps to throw out earlier columns which had become untidy and were recopied. 3.7.3 Processing Successions Successions were the most continuous headache for the consolidation officers at Tauarau and later the commissioners, as they had been for Bowler. The official intrusion into Tuhoe death and survival entailed in the imposition of individual shareholding under the Native Reserve nevertheless had its benefits: officers and commissioners sometimes were inspired to record a rich array of information, however cryptically. The procedure worked out at Tauarau was complex, and Fl the first of the two succession groupbooks, and probably the richest in specific family information, has been lost at least from the Waiariki archives. 323 Manuscript' Consolidated successions', WDMLC c.f. 630, found by Himaima Tumoana. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 325 The final report described the procedure for successions as follows. 324 The names of deceased owners to whom successors had not be appointed were marked off during the public reading of the lists of non-sellers, while names were being checked and initial groupings detennined. Successors to the interests of these deceased were detennined in enquiry over eight days by Carr and assistants and, anticipating validation by legislation, incorporated with their total shares expressed in pence 'in the proposed new title lists attached to this report' (presumably, this refers to Schedule 2 (3)). Meanwhile, preparation of the groupbooks proceeded with lists of groups including the names of the deceased (probably to avoid confusion as well as awaiting the completion of the proposed successions). 'The appointment of successors to deceased owners should also precede the final and complete grouping and locating' because the redistribution of shares could substantially 'affect the area of the section that each group would be entitled to receive' and thus that final and complete grouping and locating. Finally, it was reported that the 'process of grouping involved the incorporation of successors appointed by the Native Land Court [as well as the] successors proposed as part of the scheme to owners reported to have died prior to the fonnulation thereof,' that is, the successors who had not yet been appointed by the Native Land Court. This description is not lucid, but the procedure followed can be clarified somewhat. The final report also states that 'there were over four hundred deceased owners, and the succession orders made numbered 1,081.' These are the successions which are worked through in groupbooks F1, and indexed in F2. Groupbook F1 went missing sometime between 1984 and the itemisation of the series (since it has no item number). By my count of the (unedited) spreadsheet built by Clementine Fraser for the surviving groupbook F2, the final report greatly over-estimated both the deceased and their successors. In the spreadsheet from F2, there were about 938 successions recorded from about 257 deceased non-sellers. However, because many of the successions were of the same successor succeeding to shares from different deceased 324 AJHRG-7 1921, pp 5,8 (3). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 326 persons, there were probably no more than about 600 different successors named in groupbook Fl. Likewise, the over-estimate of deceased non-sellers may have resulted from the very wide distribution of shares sometimes made of the land rights of a single deceased person. Comparison of the description of successions in the final report to the groupbooks procedure and other documents suggests that the procedure for handling successions was: (i) To compile the groupbook lists in all the groupbooks A-G (except FI Successions) including the deceased persons to whom successors had not yet been appointed by the Native Land Court, but only their successors if they had been so appointed; (ii) To compile in groupbook FI all the deceased and successors to their shares which had not been completed in the Native Land Court; (iii) To re-sort in F2, as a succession index, the details in F1 in alphabetical order by first name of successor; (iv) To sort these successors and their shares into the consolidation groups III a 'consolidated successions' list' compiled from F2' .325 (v) To add these successors to their appropriate groups in groupbook HI or H2 'Allocations', deleting from these final lists the names of the deceased from who they succeeded (often in different groups). These 'final and complete grouping[s] and locat[ions]' in groupbook H then became the basis of Schedule 2 lists 1-3. The actual procedure was not so tidy, probably due mainly to the ambiguities of Bowler's push to get successors appointed by the court during the purchase campaign as well as to actuarial confusions and oversights. There were 169 successions from 'consolidated successions' listed among the 938 successions in groupbook F2, usually with no deceased noted. These appear to have been compiled from court records, probably succession applications which had not yet been completed by the court (they 325 Ibid. T I Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 327 probably do not refer to (iv) the 'consolidated successions' list that was compiled 'from' groupbook F2, and appears to include them). Furthermore, at least some of the deceased persons carried in groupbooks A-E and G were not dropped from the lists but instead, as though they were living non-sellers, found their way through to groupbook H and even the final report. In the previous chapter I pointed out that at least 4 of the 15 persons listed in Group 7 (Tupaea Rapaera) were dead, and successors had been applied for to the court as early as 1919 (the shares of some successors had already been purchased by Bowler, perhaps before the court had appointed them). There were also dead persons listed in the final report of Tamaikoha's groups, probably including Tamaikoha himself (who was listed in Group 7). Bowler's succession applications to the court appeared to be piecemeal as he worked out which blocks were involved, and the shares attributed to dead persons in the final report sometimes appeared to be fragmentary (for instance, Tamaikoha's). Consequently, it appears likely that some of these dead were carried over into the final lists so that the consolidation commissioners could complete successions which had been discovered to be incomplete after groupbook F2 was drawn up. The Urewera Lands Act 1921-2 Section 7 (4) foresees the possibility that deceased have been included in the lists and, rather elaborately authorises this power as well as ensures the order is not invalidated by the oversight. There should be some satisfaction among Tuhoe that the mana of non-seller ancestors was sometimes carried on by parliament in these lists even though they were dead. The contemporary Maori Land Court still finds itself dealing with shares held by persons who have been dead for generations. Although this is messy from a bureaucratic point of view concerned with land as a commodity, from the point of view of many Maori, land is ancestral (or, symbolically, is ancestors), and many successors are in no hurry to succeed. It is also an ironic historical fact that the morehuu/remnants of land are safer with the ancestors: a succession order is added to the many other impediments to commercialisation or reduction to an exchange value. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 328 What are the resources for further research on Tuhoe successions in this era? There were probably over 1000 pre-consolidation successions which Bowler had pressed through to completion in the Native Land Court. Orders for these successions would have often been available in the block order files for each UDNR block, and may have already been included by Bowler in the lists of non-sellers he was instructed to prepare. They may have also been drawn up separately in a list of consolidated successions such as that which appears to have been included in groupbook F for succession applications not yet completed by the court (however, no such lists have been encountered). 'Anticipating' the necessary legislation, the completed court appointments of successors, incomplete succession applications to the court, and the successions worked out in the Tauarau meetings but needing legislation were all probably intended to be incorporated into the consolidation group lists of Schedule 2 (3). Thus in most cases which are not fully recorded in groupbook F2, the deceased person from which these successions originated remains unclear. Some of this information can be deduced from the groupbooks (as shown with Tamaikoha's hapuu lineage), comparing in each block shares retained in 1921 with shares held in 1903 or 1907. I have not searched the old block application or order binders (many of which are missing), nor the Whakatane, Opotiki, and other minutebooks for more explicit information. However, the information we now have on Urewera successions in this era is rich. Clementine Fraser has prepared for the Tribunal a valuable spreadsheet of the information in groupbook F2. She has also prepared a spreadsheet from Himaima Tumoana's index of successions from UCMB 1 (but probably not including UCMB 2A) itemising about 809 additional successions recorded by the consolidation commISSIOners between December 1921 and April 1923. The commissioners' minutebook records are surprisingly informative on successions, often including a comment describing the succession as a gift or by adoption, and even the person from whom the deceased succeeded, as well as the kin relationship between the deceased and the successor (which is, of course, given the epidemic of 1918, sometimes a reversion from child to parent or sibling). Thus we have records, albeit incomplete, of Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 329 four chronological phases of deaths and successions among the Tuhoe 1915-1923: (i) those successions ordered in the NLC by August 1921; (ii) those successions entered in the Tauarau F2 groupbook as 'consolidated successions', probably incompletely processed applications to the NLC; (iii) the other successions listed in groupbook F2 with the name of a deceased person who was source of the shares passed to a successor; and (iv) Himaima Tumoana's index of successions abstracted from UCMB 1. These are invaluable records for reconstructing relationships of adoption or aroha as well as filiation (parent-child relations), sometimes out to three or even four generations. 3.7.4 Final 'Allocations' Finally, all this information in groupbooks A-D, E, F, and G was collated into the 'Allocations' groupbooks HI and H2. When each of the separate groupbooks (of the A-D set) were completed, and probably when a 'final' location was settled upon and further shuffling of persons between groups settled down, each group was re-copied into the Allocation groupbook H. The entries in groupbook H were made in separate columns for each individual in the group: (i) total value of shares from groupbooks A through D (all Native Reserve blocks except); (ii) total value of shares from groupbook E (Te Whaiti series); (iii) total value of shares succeeded to from groupbook F2; (iv) value of shares from Urewera Reserves; (v) total value of shares from groupbook G (Waikaremoana series). These values were totaled for each group. This was then the value of land the group could propose in one or as few locations as possible (in blocks which had not yet been pre-empted by the Crown). The area of their land in the location would be determined by the price paid by Bowler for that block. As pointed out earlier, some persons were allowed to split up their total shares between more than one consolidation group, probably elders holding numerous shares or with too much prestige to refuse their demand. Figure 8 is a tabulation of the most influential groups ranked according the total number of consolidated shares they held. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 330 3.8 Conclusion To me, these records are of inestimable value in the possibility of reconstructing details of Tuhoe ethnohistory which have been lost from the oral history, or even as a counter-dialogue to the oral history (Tuhoe whaikoorero (formal discussion or discourse) thrives on such challenges). If one considers the Native Reserve blocks as historically important (for instance, insofar as they had been determined carefully over a period of years by Tuhoe rangatira to reflect hapuu rights as fairly as they were able, given the problem of boundaries, bureaucratic time limits, and so on), these groupbooks are priceless and scarce resources. They are among the very few surviving records which distinguish between the UDNR blocks in listing Tuhoe rights: I know of only the 1903 and 1907 block orders, the few partition orders, the 1917 paanui of non-sellers (the 1919 one did not so distinguish), the purchase deeds, and the consolidation groupbooks (of course, the deeds segregate the hoko whenua, and the groupbooks the pupuri whenua, in these blocks). A leading intention of the Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 331 Source: 'Urewera ReselVe', 12,500-2, Original UDNR Blocks undated, c.1920?,B83, LlNZ Hamilton Map 8: Urewera District Native Reserve Blocks c.1907 ····1 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 332 List of Original Urewera District Native Reserve Blocks (from 'Urewera Res', 12500-2, undated (c.1920?), B83, LINZ, Hamilton)326 Block Name Acreage Hikurangi-Horomanga 55,174:0:0 Irenui Ohaua 4,529:0:0 Karioi 2,420:0:00 Kohuru Tukuroa 8,224:0:0 Manuoh0327 19,672:0:0 Maungapohatu 28,462:0:0 Ohiorangi 1,190:0:0 Omahuru 6,600:0:0 Otairi 8,610:0:0 Otara 2,680:0:0 Paharekeke328 18,253:0:0 Paraeroa 13,006:0:0 Paraoanui North 3,400:0:0 Paraoanui South329 5,510:0:0 Parekohe (includes Otukanui) 20,960:0:0 Ruatahuna 57,823:0:0# Ruatoki South 6,020:0:0 Taneatua[ -Kanihif3O 17,200:0:0 Tarapounamu[-Matawhero ]331 66,537:0:0 326 This map is the clearest in detail of the old blocks which the author has discovered. It included many of the details of the more worn "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896", plan No. 6873, August 1901, LINZ Hamilton, but is a compilation of many later changes including all the subsequent partitions and even many of the new (consolidation) blocks, probably sketched in before they were surveyed. Ruatoki block and its three partitions is not included on this map. A close comparison with the 1901 map cited above may be a rich source of historical information. 327 This block was not shown on the schedule attached to "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LINZ Hamilton. On that map the area which became the Manuoho block is shown as part of the Maungapohatu block. 328 This block was not shown on the schedule attached to "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LINZ Hamilton. On that map the area which became the Paharekeke Block is shown as part of the Tauranga Block. 329 The Paraoanui North and South Blocks were subdivisions of the original Paraoanui Block. This block was on the schedule attached to "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LINZ Hamilton 330 By 1920 the name of this block had been shortened from Taneatua-Kanihi to Taneatua. The full name is shown on the schedule attached to "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LINZ Hamilton. 331 This block name is mistakenly shortened on this map to 'Tarapounamu', as it often was in other documents although there was never any partition between the Tarapounamu and Matawhero regions of the original block. The full name is shown on the ~~~~~~~~======_=_=_ --_-_-_-_-~-_____ ,:_-_..::_-_----=----- ______- __ -.C____ - Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 333 Tauranga 39,320:0:0 Tauwhare 1,300:0:0 Tauwhare-Manuka332 28,860:0:0 Tawhiuau333 6,604:0:0 Te Poroporo 2,470:0:00 TePurenga 5,680:0:0 Te Ranga-a-Ruanuku 15,000:0:0 TeTuahu 6,300:0:00 Te Wairiko 2,240:0:0 Te Whaiti [nui-a-toi] 71,340:0:0# Waikare Whenua 12,500:0:0 Waikaremoana 73,667:0:0# Waipotiki 8,200:0:0 schedule attached to "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LlNZ Hamilton and most other maps. 332 The large area of the Tauwhare-Manuka block shown on this map to the west of the Tauranga River was originally called Papatupu Land block by the UDNR Commission, but was confused with the southern portion of Paraeroa block to the west of it in the "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNRAct 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LlNZ Hamilton}. This confusion was examined by the appeals commission in 1906 and is discussed in section 7.2. The appeals commission merged it with Tauwhare-Manuka block. 333 This block was not shown on the schedule attached to "Plan of Land as Set out in the UDNR Act 1896, plan No. 6873, August 1901, LlNZ Hamilton. On that map the area which became the Tawhiuau Block is shown as part of the Otairi Block. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 334 ,--, Urewera Consolidated Blocks Source: 'Urewera 'A' Block, 482,300 CLAward' L-...J map, c.1935, MA 13/92, ANZ, Wellington Map 9: Urewera Consolidation Scheme Blocks Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 335 Heiotahoka D UDNR Boundary Source: 'Urewera "A" Block, 482,300 CLAward' o Urewera Consolidated Blocks map, c.1935, MA 13/92, ANZ, Welling:ton Map 10: Urewera Consolidation Scheme Blocks (numbered key map) Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 335A. Urewera Consolidation Blocks334 TE WHAITI SERIES Area Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock (acres/35 1 Huirangi 422 2 Kaitangikaka (included with Tahupango and Umurakau) 1,364 3 Matera 666 4 Minginui 1,355 5 Murumurunga 27* 6 PouaualPonaua 697 7 Tahupango* 2,524 8 Takahia 17 9 Tauwharekopua 458 10 Tawa-a-Tionga 432 11 TeApu 383 12 TePahou 286 13 Te Rautahi 384 14 Te Tuturi 353 15 Te Tawhitiwhiti 261 16 Te Whaiti Residue 5,544 17 Umurakau (included with Tahupango) 18 Waikotikoti No.1 3:2:29* 19 Waireporepo 1,839 20 Waikotikoti No.2 36:2:0* 21 Te Whaiti Cemetary 1 22 OkuiNo.1 21 23 OkuiNo.2 12 24 Waireporepo Urupa 1 TARAPOUNAMU SERIES Area New Name ofBlock (acres) 25 Apitihana 2,965 26 Hauwai 740 27 Heipipi 796 28 Honoi 2,975 29 Huirau 2* 30 Te Kopua 1,773 31 Mangapai 2,303 32 Ohau 1,622 33 Pamatanga 707 34 Papueru 2,409 35 Pukiore 1,334 36 Tarapounamu 20 37 Tieke 507 38 Tiritiri 1,418 334 Source: Robertson pp 141-145, checked against original in UCMB 2A pp 203-218 for spelling. Waikaremoana series in original and appended here. 335 Gross Area, those with * are estimated net area Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 336 39 TeRoto 4,372 40 Te Whatuamawakila 726 41 Uruohapopo 718 42 Umukahawai 1,990 43 Waituhi 1,960 44 Whakatau 1,585 45 Wharetangata 752 46 Ohore Papakainga 47 Pareroa Urupa 48 Tarapounamu Urupa RUATOKI SERIES Area Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock (acres) 49 Awamate 1 50 Awamutu 41:2:8 51 Hakorae 785 52 Hamoremore 34 53 Hauruia 72 54 Hokowhituatu 892 55 Kawekawe 401 56 Kohai 1,646 57 Marumaru 1,263 58 Matai 23 59 Moerangi 1,564 60 Ngamahanga 1,797 61 Ngautoka 243 62 Ohinenaenae 125 63 Onanahaea 1,063 64 Onuitera 51 65 Opoukehu 407 66 Otaneuri 1,437 67 Otiurangi 54 68 Owaka 761 69 Patiti 3,360 70 PohuiNo.l 137 71 PohuiNo.2 227 72 Poutere 247 73 Puketapu 62 74 Pukiekie 250 75 Putereopotaka 1,435 76 Rangatipiihi 674 77 Rewatu 1,146 78 Rautawhiri 3:1:25 79 Te Kiwi 779 80 TePuhi 1,281 81 Te Rara 324 82 Te Rautoa 50 83 Te Tapapatanga 75 84 Te Tarata 157 85 Te Uwira 2,150 86 Tapuiwahine 1,270 87 Tewhatewha 382 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 337 88 Toketehua 30 89 Toromiro 369 90 Tunanui 1,407 91 Tuturitanga 214 92 Urukaraka 5 93 Waitapu 227 94 Waiharuru 2,675 95 Whakarimarima 309 96 Wharekokopu 1,738 97 Wharepakuru 1,472 98 Kotehitehi Urupa 0:1:33* 99 Ohiro Urupa 1:3:9* 100 PuketapuPa 0:1:31 * 101 Waikirikiri Papakainga 4:1:27* 102 Waikirikiri Whare Runanga 1* RUATAHUNA SERIES Area Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock (aces) 103 Ahiherua 4,808 104 Araiwhenua 891 105 Apitihana 7,440 106 Hiwiotewera 6,782 107 Houhi 1,192 108 Kakanui 703 109 Kiha 482 110 Kiritahi 75 111 Kohirnarama 1,186 112 Kopuhaia 1,472 113 Maioro 2,364 114 Maramataupiri 39 115 Maurea 1,783 116 Okete 457 117 Omakoi 56 118 Oraukura 618 119 Orora 141 120 Onini 24 121 Parekaeaea 1,731 122 Paripari 155 123 Pawharaputoko 2,349 124 Porere 51 125 Tahuaroa 3,260 126 Tatahoata papakainga 59 127 Tataramoa 157 128 Taumaha 2,940 129 Tarahanga 146 130 Teti 435 131 Huia 1,042 132 TePua 102 133 Te Tawai 58 134 Umuroa 129 135 Waipakau 52 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 338 l36 Wairere l35 l37 Wharekakaho 1,006 l38 Kaimaha Cemetary 0:1:0* l39 Oputao Urupa 1:0:4* 140 Uwhiarae Papakainga 4:1:23* 141 Waiiti Papakainga 5:0:18* 142 Whakaari Urupa 4 143 Tongariro 460:2:0 144 Whakapau 1,950 RAROA SERIES Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock Area (acres) 145 Keteanoa 223 146 Kaihapuku 75 147 Otekura 152 148 Otohora 57 149 Te KoropolKorapa 57 150 Te Pa 0 TamarurangiiTamaruarangi 197 151 Te Urutawa 114 152 Wahataane 153 WAIMANA SERIES Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock Area (acres) 153 Ahirau 272 154 Hapenui 171 155 Hukanui 90 156 Kotipu 159 157 Nahunahu 346 158 Omaruwharekura 123 159 Omuruwhaka 265 160 Opei 1,476 161 Opuatawhiro 325 162 Opunua 471 163 Otuiti 373 164 Oueariu 520 165 Paemahoe 491 16 Pahekeheke 242 167 Panewhero 339 168 Papaohaki 266 169 TakapaurauteaniniJa 308 170 Tarahore 1,837 171 Taumataohine 648 172 Tawhana 1,057 173 Tuapou 531 174 Te Atuareretahi 47 175 TeKaawa 176 176 TeRere 118 177 Te Tauratepukeatua 509 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 339 178 Whakarae 295 179 Whanganui 160 180 Huinga-a-N gakaahu 154 181 Mataii Papakainga 182 Opurau School Reserve 183 Tauwharemanuka Urupa HIKURANGI-HOROMANGA SERIES Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock Area (acres) 184 Mokorua 782 185 Onapu 377 186 Oputea 4,448 187 Papapounamu 2,334 188 Pukehou 2,055 189 Tawhia 1,072 190 Tapapakiekie 2,646 191 Tukutoromiro 3,930 192 Waikokopu 10 MAUNGAPOHATU SERIES Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock Area (acres) 193 Kakewahine 1,007 194 Maungapohatu 6,392 195 Nuhaka 522 196 Potahi 873 197 Pouwhenua 1,049 198 Waipatukakahu 1,437 199 School Reserve 7:2:0* 200 Urupa 201 Te Maupo Papakainga 40* OHAUA SERIES Number on Map 10 New Name ofBlock Area (acres) 202 Korouanui 227 203 Pakihi 893 204 Raketihau 900 205 Ruahine 2,138 206 Taumapou 296 207 Totararnaru 713 208 Tutu 528 209 Mauahautoa Urupa 1* 210 Nihaohataka Urupa 2* 211 Ornaruteangi Urupa 0:2:0* 212 Rongornataka Urupa 1* 213 Te Repo Urupa 0:2:0* 214 Ohaua Papakainga 5* Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 340 W AIKAREMOANA SERIES Letter on Map 10 New Name ofBlock Area (acres) A Marau 15 B Timitaihoa 10 C Patekaha 10 D TePuna 200 E Tikitiki 30 F Takanga 15 G Hopuruahine West 100 H Horpuruahine East 100 I Te Apiti 10 J Mokau 30 K Wharekauri 20 L Taurnataua 30 M Te Maara a te Atua 50 N Waipai 10 Ngaputahi 300 Whareama 300 Te Kopani 324 ha. Heiotahoka 445.50ha. SUMMARY Series Name Gross Area (Acres) Net Area (Acres) Hikurangi-Horornanga 17,654 8,368 Maungapohatu 11,288 6,693 Ohaua 5,695 3,507 Raroa 1,028 677 Wairnana 11,769 7,327 Ruatahuna 46,270 27,932 Te Whaiti 15,622 11,661 Tarapounamu 31,672 18,260 Ruatoki 35,116 21,007 Totals 176,114 105,432 -- - ~ ---'------:>~---:::-~:::-- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 341 Map 10: Urewera Consolidation Scheme Blocks (numbered key map) i-_-____ _ - ----:::.::-..:.::..:.::.:-::::::-::..:..-..:.--"..:...:...:. -"' -::~:.::.:>..:.=-.::=-..:...:.=-:.::..::...:.-=-:..:.-:-:.:.::=-=--:.:. :-'::-1 Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 342 10 20km 10miles Heiotahoka c::J UDNR Boundary D Original UDNR Blocks Sources: 'Urewera Reserve' 12500-2, undated c.1920, B83, LlNZ, -- Urewera Consolidated Blocks Hamilton and 'Urewera "A" Block', MA 13/92, ANZ, Wellington Map 11: Map showing Original UDNR Blocks overlayed with UCS Blocks Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 343 consolidation was to erase the Native Reserve blocks from the record if not from Tuhoe memory, and it has almost succeeded. So thorough was the effort in the Ministry of Lands, at least, that I have found no copy of any plan which records in any reasonable detail both the old blocks and the new blocks. Although the cartographer Max Oulton assisting Stokes, Milroy, and Melbourne made an heroic effort to recover this bifurcated history in an overlay map (Map 12), it remains too schematic to discern any detail. I have attempted to do better on my own Maps 8 to 11 (both at end of this chapter; also see original source 'Urewera "A" Block' map in the Historical Map Book). Indeed, it was very difficult to find any compilation of the new blocks in which most detail had not been effaced to ease the compilation. The one I finally found had probably been made for the Shepherd-Galvin expedition of 1935 for the purpose of carefully identifying the boundaries, topographic characteristics, and owners of the new blocks in order to mount another systematic purchasing campaign to gain control of timber rights for the Crown. This is, unfortunately, impossible to align completely with the outlines of the old blocks (which were minimal surveys for use by the Tuhoe in home-rule), but these difficulties were not enough to justify what must have amounted to a thorough 'abolition' of the old blocks in any plan subsequent to 1921. It is as though they sought to put the Tuhoe through some time-warp which eradicated the old blocks and all they stood for. One must ask why such a Herculean task as that at Tauarau was undertaken. The answer is a good thumbnail review of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme as it had taken shape by the end of August 1921. Campbell examines the national history of consolidation schemes as they were devised largely by Ngata, and trialed in only a few places prior to the Urewera. Ngata's ideal was to extricate Maori land ownership from the diffuse and scattered form of tenure in common which it had taken under the Native Land Court and Native Land Acts, and consolidate it in one locality under individual ownership. His motive was to modernise Maori capital along with the Maori. The Native Land Acts has long been stuck with a form of tenure which, like Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 344 whakapapa, reflected an ancestral history in the land and, like whaanau (offspring) if all went well, kept proliferating. Just as Maori potentially belonged to many hapuu through this ancestry and use of the rights that devolved through it, so had they come to own shares in land which was scattered across the landscape and everywhere shared with kin. From the point of view of commodities and capital, this was usable or creditable only if extricated from that history of social relations by legal partitioning out of shares, in each particular location. ill Marx's terms, for the sake of capital mere social use value had to be transformed into exchange value. Ngata's procedure was complicated for anyone who did not understand this hybrid form of tenure born of tradition, the Native Land Court, and the colonial drive to get Maori land onto the markets. However, in a few chaotic weeks it could transform fragmented shares in Maori land into 'family farms' useful to Maori entrepreneurs and upon which banks would make loans. It was the best of several other methods developed to 'modernise' Maori land tenure in the sense that it could most fully get Maori land onto the markets. However, its shortcoming was, ironically, that if it was not soon alienated from the Maori owners, within a generation or so it would quite spontaneously rebuild the fragmented but impractical form of tenure which had become endeared to many Maori, only occasionally putting it before the Land Court to bring successions up to date or deal with partitions among restive kin. Meanwhile, the proliferation went on, reconstructing a new history in the land, useless only in the opinion of some. Again, in Marx's terms, social use value keeps emerging, quietly if not threateningly, in the expanding network of exchange values. Although Ngata's ideology of the consolidation scheme drew some Tuhoe into the Urewera Scheme, most leaders and many others saw it as the only way to stop the fatally corrosive effects of the purchasing campaign on the Rohe Potae a Tuhoe. Ngata and the others knew this. However, the big difference was that the Urewera Consolidation was forced through for the benefit of the Crown rather than the Tuhoe (and Ngata as well as the others also knew this). The evidence furthermore shows that Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 345 the Tuhoe continued to loose land during the implementation of the Scheme - but, as Pera Meihana had implied, not without a good fight. 3.9 Summary In this chapter I have examined the consolidation procedures undertaken at Tauarau in August 1921 along with their wider implications. I assessed the legitimacy of the group of Tuhoe representatives selected there; attempted to identify the Crown's proposals to the Tuhoe and assess claims of Tuhoe agreement to them; analysed the formation of consolidation groups with regard to the persistence of aspects of Tuhoe social organisation and the Crown's determination to evacuate some blocks; and attempted to unravel the groupbook procedures and assess the information upon which they were based. While I argued that the Tuhoe representatives fairly represented the numerous hapuu of Tuhoe, the Crown cannot be said to have fairly treated them; to the contrary, there is considerable evidence that it relied on subterfuge and bluff. There appears to be no consistent record of the proposals put to them except that it took two days to extract what was admitted to be their reluctant agreement not to the proposals but to rely on Ngata's assurances as their advocate. But Ngata had been less than candid with them in the May meeting regarding the undivided nature of the Crown's shares, presided over this unrecorded August session, continued to be very active indeed in pressing the interests of the Crown as well, and appears not to have intervened in their behalf in the ensuing several years except briefly for one extreme occasion (which will be examined in chapter five). The record of his interventions in Te Whaiti and Waikaremoana blocks appear to be much more in the Crown's than their behalf. I traced the emergence at Tauarau of a series of forms of Crown pre-emption ranging from the bold proclamation of some the best whole blocks in which many Tuhoe had struggled to retain their shares to several forms of less obvious piecemeal deductions from each consolidation group's eventual allocations, and I will pursue these several Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 346 tactics in more detail in chapters seven through nine. The formation of consolidation groups showed again that leading Tuhoe maintained some control, albeit without the centralised leadership guaranteed them under the UDNR Act (which was still in force). They marshalled some larger and more influential groups than the Crown would have hoped, retained the basis of their social organisation in sibling groups and ancestral descent although now fragmented, and located spouses more to extend their rights in alliance with other groups than to form 'family farms' based on marriage. On the other hand, the formation of many of these groups in blocks which the Crown was determined to evacuate reflected, especially in the insistent policy of displacing 'residue' shares and illusory 'exchanges' out of the block, the Crown's reluctance to allow them to stay and even bad faith regarding their future as family farms. Finally, an examination of the procedures pursued in groupbooks and successions revealed alarm even among the Crown's own officers regarding the incompleteness and unreliability of the data upon which the consolidation procedures were based, yet the expungment of admission of these serious shortcomings from the final report to the Ministers and parliament, almost certainly with the Ministers' knowledge. The following chapter four will describe the increasingly urgent need to back these arrangements in legislation before stalled negotiations or rising protests embarrassed the Ministers in charge, preview the routine procedures of implementation followed by the Urewera Consolidation Commissioners over the next four years, and assess the records of these operations. Chapters five through nine are then concerned to examine several developments which tend to have been obscured in these records. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 347 RUATOKI Confiscation line K UIl1!tt!i MiJori Land ..... D Crown Land ..... See maps 15 and 16 See map 18 N p 10,km , b 6miles UREWERA NATIVE RESERVE MAORI AND CROWN LAND 1925 Source: Stokes, Milroy and Melbourne, 1986, Wai 894, record of documents, A111) Fig 15. Map 12: Schematic of New Blocks (1925) overlayed on Old Blocks (1907) Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 348 4. Implementation and Routines of the Scheme, 1921- 1925 4.1 The Rush to Implementation 4.2 The Routines ofImplementation 4.2.1 The Official Concerns of the Commission 4.2.2 The Official Rudiments of Allocations 4.2.3 Landless Veterans and Pious Non-Commitment The manifold arrangements completed at Tauarau in August 1921 were really not completed for another several years of more paced but equally great effort on the part of the Tuhoe and the Urewera Consolidation Commission - efforts which continued to veer between cooperation, resignation, confrontation, and enforcement by decree. Maps 12 and 8, 9, 10 and 11 depict the dimension of the transformation of Tuhoe lands over these few years. The formalisation of the Tauarau arrangements in the final report of 31 October 1921 (Papers 2, Appendix B and Map 13) nevertheless remains crucial throughout, because it was simply turned into law as part of the Urewera Lands Act 1921-22 and backed by the unusual degree of authority given to the commissioners. The problem of interpreting the voluminous but cryptic records also continues, for two main reasons. First, there was an apparent lapse between August and December 1921 during which time a great deal was nevertheless happening, but the few reports ignore it or describe it as though it all happened at Tauarau. The other main problem is the form taken by the Commissioners' minutebooks which began in early December 1921 but maintain a one-dimensional character for the next four years, recording only implementation routines ostensibly carried out 'for the Natives' while obscuring the corresponding operations of the Crown and subterranean confrontations with the Tuhoe. This official record has been edited and quieted more than usual. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 349 The following chapters are concerned primarily with bringing to light some of that which was going on behind the scenes between the Tuhoe and the Crown. This is traced in two concurrent developments which span both the arrangements at Tauarau and the formal implementation of the Scheme between December 1921 and about 1925. So, after examining the continuation of purchasing (chapters five and 6), I will return to Tauarau and start all over again with the struggle to control allocations (chapters seven, eight, and nine). The reader will have to live twice in words and imagination fragments of the history that the Tuhoe lived only once, but as a whole. 4.1 The Rush to Implementation As the meetings at Tauarau and the following visit to Waikaremoana wound down it became steadily more urgent to produce a final report to the Ministers so that they could press for the necessary legislation. As Ngata and Balneavis candidly implied in the final report that was put before the Ministers on 31 October 1921, and Cabinet and then parliament soon thereafter, the whole Scheme had been started and virtually completed informally on Ministerial authority alone, and it needed to be underwritten retrospectively in law much as had the purchase campaign on which it was based. Meanwhile, factions of the Tuhoe were increasingly restive, making the legal limbo all the more precarious. Between August and 31 October 1921 when the final report was submitted to the Ministers, Ngata, Balneavis, and Tai Mitchell (who became the omnipresent interpreter and coordinator of surveys as well as on-the-spot confidant ofNgata), and perhaps Knight or Carr, were probably continuing negotiations with the Tuhoe which were necessary to bring the arrangement of allocations to the point at which they are detailed in groupbooks HI and H2 and especially Schedule 2 (1) of the final report. The fragmentary drafts of these groupbooks in the closed files of the Waiariki District Maori Land Court reflect a continuing effort beyond Tauarau which probably included the so-called 'final' allocations in HI and H2 themselves. Reports in mid- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 350 September and early October reveal changing arrangements as well as policies. It is clear that 31 October was an arbitrary point at which to declare the arrangements completed, and the appearance of settlement in Schedule 2 was at least partly intended to communicate optimism to parliament. Responding especially to popular and newspaper demands for settlement opportunities, there was apparently considerable pressure from Government to get the Scheme underway even before it was approved by parliament and legitimated by retrospective legislation. A week after the final report was submitted to them, on 7 November 1921 Guthrie and Coates submitted it to Cabinet recommending that 'pending the passing of such legislation and so as to take the fullest advantage of the present summer season' Knight and Carr 'be appointed as Special Officers and directed to proceed forthwith' to implement the Scheme, along with such expert assistance as they may require, including 'topographic surveys necessary for the settlement and location of disputed sections' .336 This latter comment echoed Balneavis' 27 August emphasis that survey and valuations were urgently needed in the 'key' Parekohe region to head off the threat of further Tuhoe dissent. The reference was almost certainly to Tai Mitchell as Ngata's man on the spot. However, the Ministers' urgent recommendation implied that over two months after Tauarau this key problem still threatened, although it tactfully made it sound like a dispute among Tuhoe rather than between the Crown and Tuhoe. At this time Coates probably also knew through Ngata that the Apitihana movement was mobilising in the Ruatahuna area. On 23 September 1921, a month after the Tauarau meetings, he had been reported by the Wellington Evening Post to have announced the 'completion' of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme, but quoted to say that a topographic survey would be required by 'complicated problems ... along the Whakatane Valley north of Ruatahuna' as well as in blocks adjoining the 'continuous' area of 100,000 acres 'clear of Native interests' between the Waimana 336 Guthrie and Coates to Cabinet, 7 November 1921, MAl 29/417 pt.l; O'Malley Supp.Pap II: 467-8. ---, ------~------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 351 and Whakatane valleys, that is, the Parekohe area. 337 I have not seen these problems in the valley 'north of Ruatahuna', the other end of the Urewera from the Parekohe problems, mentioned anywhere else at this early date. I suppose that Coates' information was from Ngata and regarded the Apitihana movement. On 5 October 1921 a petition was sent from Ruatahuna by three significant leaders impressively outlining a whole history of grievances and concluding with the charge that the consolidation scheme resulted in the 'confiscation' of remaining lands at Te Whaiti to cover half the cost of roading. 338 This petition will be discussed in connection with my analysis of the Apitihana movement (chapter 9), from whose leaders it appears to have come. It actually reflected a widening alliance that Ngata would probably have recognised. Campbell reports that it was not until late December that the Native Affairs Committee referred the 5 October 1921 petition to Government, and mid-February of the next year Undersecretary Jones noted that there was to be no action on it. It is likely that Coates chaired the Native Affairs Committee, and that although the final report was before parliament at this time, late December was the safest moment. Jones' (that is, Coates') decision to take no action was further delayed until after the final report had become law as part of the Urewera Lands Act 1921-2. This petition, on top of the more general information that some Tuhoe had disagreements with the Scheme, probably had the potential to raise more questions in parliament than the Ministers wanted to deal with. The threats which developed against the implementation of the Consolidation were from inside government was well as from the Parekohe and Ruatahuna axes. Guthrie and Coates' recommendations to Cabinet included the suggestion that the necessary legislation be prepared by the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court. In response to this or to some related query, on 14 November 1921 Chief Judge R.N. Jones of the Native Land Court did write what must have been a very unwelcome opinion on the 337 Coates, 23 September 1921 Evening Post; Campbe111997 Supp.Pap.II: 200. 338 Campbe111997:62 and Supp.Pap.II:201-2; Wharepouri Te Amo and others, 5 October 1921, MA 1, 19211548. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 352 state of the titles in the UDNR in the form of an unaddressed memorandum.339 In two pages of legal argument, Jones reasoned that the Crown's dealings with the UDNR had been seriously compromised by the unsatisfactory state of its titles. He detailed two circumstances either one of which appeared to invalidate the titles: the Native Reserve Commission falling short of a legal quorum in its preclusion of members with an interest in the block investigated, or the incomplete investigation of title to Papatupu Land block as reported by the Native Reserve appeals commission. From this he draws the understatement that 'It seems therefore that the Crown purchases require some stabilising' (the consolidation, of course, rested on this 'unstable' ground). Either the UDNR lands had to be treated as 'customary land' under the 1909 Act, or the Crown had to buy its lands through the Tuhoe General Committee under the 1896 Act and the 1909 amendment. But the 1909 Act forbade any alienation of customary land to the Crown. Finally, the provision for individual dealings in the 1916 Act (Herries' subterfuge to legitimate the purchase of individual undivided shares) did not 'put the matter any further', that is to say, did not enable the purchases which had taken place (and continued to take place during the consolidation). If there was respect for Judge Jones' legal reasoning, this opinion was devastating to the Scheme. The clear implication was that the Crown could not legally buy the shares it had bought, let alone consolidate its purchases of them, and that the UDNR remained intact as 'customary land' owned by the Tuhoe, and protected under the 1909 Native Land Act to be dealt with only by the Native Land Court. Although by 14 November 1921 Cabinet had already approved the proposed legislation to go to Parliament, parliament would probably have to confront these issues. It does not appear that they did, but that may be one of the reasons why the 1921-22 Act implementing the Consolidation Scheme 'attempted to remove any doubts about the legal status of any orders in favour of the Crown and the circumstances surrounding 339 Jones, 14 November 1921, unaddressed memorandum, N.L.P. 1921/69 MAl 29/4/7 Pt.1 (Campbell 1997:64 states this Judge was Browne, but the following document is signed by R.N. Jones as Chief Judge, I assume of the Native Land Court). Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 353 the purchase of undefined individual interests' .340 If it was Chief Judge Jones who went ahead and drafted this legislation, his 14 November opinion might have been a signal that this was how draconian it would have to be. On the same day the Jones wrote his memorandum, Undersecretary of Lands and Survey Brodrick wrote to Coates noting Cabinet's approval of the proposed legislation and said he was arranging the appointment of Knight to act with Carr in the capacity of Special Officers.341 On 28 November Coates asked Undersecretary Jones, as a matter of 'urgency', to instruct Carr to engage Mitchell as surveyor and 'to proceed at once to Ruatoki and Ruatahuna to clean up successions and to arrange difference amongst the Natives concerning 'maara' and group boundaries on the Parekohe, Ruatahuna and other blocks in the Urewera Country' .342 In a little over a week, by 7 December 1921, Carr was holding the first sitting of the Urewera Consolidation Commission with Mitchell in attendance in Ruatoki North, and Knight joined them at their next sitting at Tauarau marae in Ruatoki, on 19 January 1922.343 Their next sitting was held in Ruatahuna beginning 17 February 1922. Although the mobilisation of the Scheme had been on Cabinet's authority, the Act which underwrote their activities was not introduced into parliament until almost two months later on 30 January 1922 and passed into law with little debate by 2 February.344 Coates and Guthrie must have been holding their breaths. Not only was all that had already been done thereby made legitimate, if these problems with the Tuhoe did erupt they had the power to ignore them. However, on the ground the situation would continue to remain precarious throughout the implementation of the Scheme, as Tai Mitchell's comment to Ngata a few weeks later candidly implied with regard to yet another threatening centre of rebellion in Waikaremoana: 340 Cathy Marr, 'The Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896 and Amendments 1896-1922', a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, June 2002 (Wai 894 record of inquiry, doc A21), P 188. 341 Brodrick to Coates, 14 November 1921, AADS AccW3562 bundle 617A 22/697, Box 2741919- 1922. 342 Coates to US, 28 November 1921, Campbell Supp. Pap.II: 207. 343 UCMB 1, pp 1,9. 344 Marr, 2002, pp 184-7. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 354 Both H [arry Carr] and K[night] did not think it wise to bullock matters through at this stage. The Commissioners are now bound in by the four comers of the law and any stretching of the Act must be done carefully and cautiously at present whatever might be done in that direction later on. I found both Hand K very ready to discuss any easing up of the Act and Report but the trouble is that the Natives do not know what they want and these wants are accumulating day by day.345 Mitchell had apparently not yet learned how much unaccountable power had been delegated to H(arold Carr) and (R.J). K(night). Within the next few years a lot more than the Waikaremoana evacuation was 'bullocked' through. It is doubly instructive that this cautiously authoritarian attitude was shared by Ngata: the terms of Mitchell's unguarded commentary were clearly long-established between them. 4.2 The Routines of Implementation Before approaching in the remaining chapters the more obscure but important developments during the implementation of the Scheme, the more public routines which span this period can be outlined. These were recorded in a combination of the two known Urewera Consolidation Minutebooks I and 2A, and a continuation of 'Allocations' groupbooks HI and H2. The supposedly 'final' series of allocations to the consolidation groups in groupbooks HI and H2 were not final at all, but were themselves drafts of earlier versions and would continue being more systematically revised through the procedures of the commissioners' minutebooks. As will be exemplified in chapters 7, 8 and 9, the struggle to control allocations continued behind the scenes throughout the implementation of the Scheme. The real 'final' Allocation groupbook was probably intended to be the Commissioners' minutebook '2B' (why else have a '2A'?). This is a collection of loose papers variously entitled 'revised groups' and 'draft orders' (for the new 345 Mitchell to Ngata, 20 February 1922, Campbell 1997 Supp.Pap.II: 207-13, p 2. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 355 blocks) discovered by Himaima Tumoana in the Waiariki District Maori Land Court archives. Although these papers are incomplete and unindexed (they are not even a 'closed :file'), they are an invaluable compilation of the innumerable operations carried out on the consolidation groups by the commissioners and scattered throughout minutebooks 1 and 2A. The Urewera Consolidation Minutebooks 1 and 2A cover only 372 pages and 245 pages respectively, not a lot by comparison with Maori Land Court minutebooks covering a similar span of time. Minutebook 1 covers 7 December 1921 through 5 July 1923, and minutebook 2A covers 16 April 1923 through 15 July 1925. As will be described later, there is a confusing overlap of a few months between the two. This may be partly explained by the surprising fact uncovered by Stokes, Milroy, and Melbourne that Knight took the commission minutes in private notebooks and transcribed them into the official minutebooks, leaving out what he thought irrelevant or boring but perhaps other information as well (1986:73-5). I have examined these notebooks briefly (all the important work of close comparison remains to be done), but however many there were originally there are now only four, covering only 17 April 1923 through July 1925.346 That is to say, Knight's notebooks for the entire minutebook 1 appear to be missing. It would be surprising if Judge (he was promoted from Commissioner of the Native Land Court in 1923) Carr also used this questionable method, and there is no sign of his notebooks in the Rotorua court archives. I have not looked for them in the Gisbome Maori Land Court archives, which is where he took up the position of Judge after completing the Ruatoki Consolidation Scheme (which immediately followed the Urewera Scheme). The minutebooks are almost completely routinised by terse entries usually giving only the essentials of one of several procedures, one after another in the order they occurred in sittings, which are themselves recorded in a straight chronology (thus, 'minutes'). A bit more context can occasionally be detected: the date and location of 346 Knight papers, 112/3,4, and 5, black boxes, LINZ, Hamilton. ..:..:..:.::..:.-..:.----.:.---..:.--=------::..-- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 356 the sitting; a report of which commissioners are present (usually along with Tai Mitchell); a rare report of how many Natives present; a mistakable difference between Knight's and Carr's style of script, Carr's being more inclined to slip into tiny neat letters. Thankfully, both scripts are always legible (unlike Chief Judge Jones, who wrote 20 pages of, to me, almost completely illegible script resolving the Pohue case in Parekohe near Waikirikiri in 1923). Entries usually lead off with either the consolidation group number or letter, or the speaker. Occasionally the old block is mentioned, but rarely the hapuu involved (this latter would have been prominent in the Tuhoe's understanding, so was edited out either by the commissioners or by Tuhoe themselves in deference to the commissioners' disinterest, or so not to confuse them). The characteristically disjunct nature of Maori Land Court minutebooks (addressing bits of ongoing cases serially as they corne up in chronological sittings) is aggravated in the Urewera Consolidation minutebooks because the 44 old blocks had been abolished but were nevertheless being dealt with simultaneously, and although the sittings rotated through several locations resulting in some regional coherence, the Tuhoe were fairly itinerant in their movements, often appearing in sittings far from their usual horne. The reappearance of a limited number of persons, often kaikoorero, speakers and perhaps leaders of their whaanau or hapuu, eventually enables the reader momentarily to be privy to a wider social context with which the commissioners themselves were becoming familiar. This experience soon prompted me to draw up the list of influential leaders and the shares their groups held (Figure 8), which along with the group lists (Schedule 2 of the final report) is very useful in helping me appreciate the gravity and implications of situations recorded in such a way that one would otherwise not know. Again thankfully, both minutebooks have long indexes, but these are not reliable. 4.2.1 The Official Concerns of the Commission I will generalise the minutes into categories and attempt to impart a sense of the routines and departures from routine. The entries can first be categorised into those that deal with persons or groups, and those that deal with specific locations in the Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004 357 WHAKATANE RIVER -- Boundaries of original blocks liliiii Crown Land to be exchanged for Native interests in Te Whaiti I:::::!:::I Lands retained by Natives ~ Native lands subject to the Act, but excluded from the Consolidation Scheme c:J Location of Crown awards --- Arterial roads in the Waimana and Whakatane Valleys, towards the survey and construction of which the Natives contribute £20,000 worth of land. o 10,km , , o 6miles in AJHR G-7, 1921 as it a ears in Miles, 1999 Wai 894, record of documents, A11 Fi 19. Map 13: Urewera Consolidation Scheme (AJHR G-7, 1921) Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 358 Urewera, that is, their proposal of allocations which were eventually to become the series of new blocks to be formally ordered. Although the first category predominates in the first part of the minutebooks and the last in the latter part, they both appear throughout both minutebooks insofar as they were recorded as the matter arose chronologically. The most numerous entries reflected the effort to keep pace with successions, often incompletely worked out or overlooked at Tauarau. Himaima Tumoana's abstractions of successions from the minutebooks are spreadsheeted in Clementine Fraser's report. Carr was specifically instructed by the Undersecretary for Coates to proceed with successions when he opened the first session on 7 December 1921 (interestingly, as at Tauarau, he continued to have no authority to order successions until the Act was passed in February the following year). Successions were a priority because they were often to persons in other groups and thereby changed the amount of consolidated shares in each group. Tuhoe mortality and birth rate probably continued to be high and may have been increasing due to the depression affecting the country by then. Successions were usually requested by a family member or whaanau head of the deceased person, not necessarily the group leader. As in groupbook F2, unusually rich information was sometimes noted in the context of successions. For instance, one revealing minute reads as follows: Mere Kanuehe 2052 deceased. Rua Kenana. No children. interest from father Kanuehe te Waara who asks that the share go to my wife Pehirangi Kanuehi fa. (Kanehe present agreed). Takao Tamaikoha objected on behalf of children of Kanuehe as they were not well provided with land. (Proceedings were here interrupted by a bout between Rua and Takao. No decision honors even) Award to Kanuehe te Waara m. a. 347 347.UCMB 1, p 89. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 359 Interpreted for a reader not familiar with Carr's laconic style, this means that Rua applied for succession by his wife to 2052 shares held by her deceased sister (in the same group and probably also Rua's wife). The father of the two daughters, from whom the shares originated and to whom they would otherwise revert, agreed. However, Takao Tamaikoha (one of Tamaikoha's youngest surviving sons, who with his niece Hopaea Hakeke headed the four subgroups holding the remaining land shares of the hapuu lineage) objected on the grounds that Kanuehe's children (he probably implied his other remaining children) were poor in land. Takao's intervention was unusual insofar as he claimed no kin relationship, but his father's influential hapuu lineage had probably long been in confrontation with Rua's influence in the Tauranga valley, and he probably meant his intervention as an affront. This apparently resulted in a 'bout' between Rua and Takao, and I read the concluding words to be Carr's impish description of a draw in what may have been a wrestling match, and his 'award' to the father. This decision might have reflected the mana of Takao, because my impression is that Rua usually had his way with the Commission. The next most frequent minute was probably transfers of persons between consolidation groups. Himaima Tumoana's abstractions of transfers from the minutebooks are also spreadsheeted in Clementine Fraser's report and number about 376, but it would be many more if the mergers and splitting of groups were counted as transfers. These transfers were a continuation of the 'shuffling and reshuffling' between groups which Balneavis reported at Tauarau implying it eventually settled down, especially with the 'final' proposal of a locality. This was unlikely to happen given normal social processes such as shifting affiliation to one the other parent's hapuu, marriage, and disaffection, accelerated by the opportunism and individualistic ideology pressed by the Crown's policies and inherent in the resulting changes of tenure. Again, the commissioners had to try to get ahead of such transfers, because until it actually had begun to settle down, the areas of the new blocks were not precisely definable, as they had to be before surveys were undertaken. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 360 Requests for transfers were usually made by group heads, and usually not approved without the support of group heads. The record almost always made the transfer appear routine, but this probably usually obscured extensive discussion in the groups concerned, arrival at difficult decisions, and often strife. The Scheme had identified persons with shares in land viewed as commodities, and given them free play on the model of the marketplace. In the earlier part of the minutebooks the reasons for transfers were sometimes recorded, but this was increasingly dispensed with. Early reasons included: usual residence established with the group into which transfer was requested; affinity with that group or none with the current one; surprisingly, in a few cases the person being transferred was simply described by the group head as being a 'stranger' or not belonging there; and maintaining a relative's or friend's house. Earlier in the minutebooks these requests are 'noted', presumably for study of the situation or calculation of the gross changes in area involved relative to other groups proposing allocation in the same area, and later approval. Later, most are approved on the spot after asking for objections, presumably because the commissioners had become familiar with the implications. Often 'fresh' or new groups were requested by mergmg, splitting, or resorting previous groups. A new list was furnished by the group head, and probably not checked for completeness; each group was motivated to overlook no source of consolidated shares. The commissioners formed a few entirely new groups apparenly numbered 50-54, but I have not found out what happened to them. Generally there was some traceable connection between the approximately 150 consolidation groups and the approximately 211 new blocks. For example, by the time the final orders were drawn up, the 10 Te Roau consolidation subgroups 4A - 5E had become about 15 new blocks and parts of 5-6 others (meanwhile, a few individuals and parts of other groups had merged with these). The general increase of the number of new blocks over the original number of consolidation groups is probably significant. I would guess it was a result of the increasing (but tragically misleading) appeal of the promised roading system and associated opportunities for schooling, trade, and -'-' --'- -'.-'----. ------. ------ Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 361 subsistence fanning. The Tuhoe probably knew the capabilities of their lands well enough to be skeptical about the Crowns plans for more productive fanning. One of the more spectacular proposals of a merger of that I have encountered was Tupara Te Kaaho's 'wish to add Wharepouri Te Amo's group 25A to my Ngamahanga Block' .348 As can be seen from Figure 8, these two influential men led groups which were among the largest landholders of the pupuri whenua. The commissioners turned the proposal down on the grounds that Te Wharepouri was not present to approve of the merger. Until I understood the wider context better, I had jumped to the conclusion that Tupara was attempting to pull a coup on Te Wharepouri, who was refusing cooperation with the commission and might be a target of their retribution. I later came to conclude that to the contrary, Tupara was attempting to protect Te Wharepouri's rights in Paraeroa from the commissioner's retribution. When Te Wharepouri later asked for location in that vicinity, he was denied it on the quite different grounds that the only land available there was Crown land. I will return to this case in the context of the confrontation between the Crown and the Apitihana movement (chapter nine). Transfers of shares between persons, setting up of trustees, and identification of persons recorded with two names in the final report comprise the rest of the entries dealing with persons or groups rather than allocations and the new blocks. The transfer of shares between persons were like successions and usually to kin persons, but often took the fonn of gifting. This is a unique quantitative record of this typical Maori custom, and the kinship relations involved can be partly reconstructed from the record. Trustees were usually set up in the context of successions, and were sometimes involved in subsequent purchases by the commissioners from the trustees, as was the procedure worked out by Bowler. Clearing up the identity of persons with two names in groupbooks H and the final report did appear to involve a duplication of shares, but rather usually a splitting of shares probably intended to be put into 348 UCMB 2A, P 33. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 362 different groups. This was generally discouraged at Tauarau, and tends to occur only in the case of important persons with a large number of retained shares, or their similarly influential offspring. On the other hand, as was described earlier, there was probably a policy developed at Tauarau to reject most persons who turned up claiming to have had shares in the old blocks which had not already been recorded in the group books. There is apparently no record of these persons, who would emerge from the Scheme as kore whenua whether they actually were or not. There are a few cases where unrecorded retention of shares was determined and accepted by the commissioners, but these all involved purchases of them. The following chapters will examine the continuation of Crown purchases during the arrangement and implementation of the consolidation scheme. 4.2.2 The Official Rudiments of Allocations Scattered throughout both minutebooks but coming to predominate later in them is the other major category of procedures, which deals with allocations and the new blocks rather than the persons and groups which owned them. The situation as it was placed before the commissioners by the end of 1921 was depicted in Map 13, which accompanied the final report (Papers 2, Appendix B). Early in 1922 the naming of new blocks was at first treated quite formally, with official form-letters going out to the group leaders inviting them to propose names for their blocks. A few of these were returned and survive in the closed files. The gesture was apparently given up, perhaps only because changes often continued, but it suggests that the commissioners were sensitive to public relations. The location of proposed new blocks developed in the minutebooks in terms of adjacent blocks and landmarks, and finally descriptions and 'adjustments' of boundaries in ways which usually left room along at least one side for expansion or contraction. The persistent description in terms of adjacency and 'gfl' (good fencing lines) reflects a certain flexibility which the commissioners appear to have systematically retained in the Crown's interest, in order to fit as many allocations as possible into a given area. Knight's skills as a surveyor were certainly one reason he was chosen as Crown representative at Tauarau and finally one of the consolidation Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 363 commissioners. I will argue in section 8.2 that this tactic was integral to a confusing policy of piecemeal deductions for surveys and roading. What I believe to be a closely associated but similarly obscured policy of breaking up shareholdings and often the new blocks is reflected in the minutebooks in terms of allocation of 'balances' of consolidated shares to other locations, 'overflow' shares, and 'excess' shares. These are typically mentioned but include no record of explanation, discussion, or argument, as though it were somehow settled policy. There are a few recorded complaints which are probably reactions to this policy, notably Wahia Paraki's vivid charge that his block or part of it had been 'thrown up onto the bluffs' in useless backcountry. The evidence suggests that verifiable instances of displaced balances, overflows, and excesses increased later in the implementation of the Scheme at least in the lower Whakatane River valley and the Ruatahuna area. In chapters seven through nine I will examine the struggles over allocations which resulted in, and were aggravated by, these reluctant compromises. Hearing of disputes, instructions regarding surveys, and the establishment of special blocks comprised the rest of the minutes concerning allocations. Hearing of disputes, usually over boundaries, was also a regular occurrence recorded in the minutebooks. It resulted in a fuller and more discursive account than any of the other routine procedures, on the pattern of Native Land Court minutebooks. Similarly, these occasionally included sketches of boundaries and whakapapa. Instructions to surveyors included the final, formal description of boundaries (usually a separate, short paragraph recognisably in surveyor's language referring to landmarks and always providing for flexibility) and specific requests by Tuhoe to be notified so they could accompany the surveyors. (The resulting sketches and plans often have the name of the Tuhoe guide who identified streams and other landmarks, sometimes with other relatively rich notes). Finally, requests of papakainga (common, usually hapuu 'homesteads '), urupaa (graveyards), tomo (cliffs or caves where the bones of the dead were hidden), waahii tapu, and birding and other reserves are recorded. While apparently considerable care was taken in carrying the first two of these new =-~--~--=--~---=--=--==-=-=--TC,=-,= __ =_==~~-----~, __ .-- Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 364 forms of allocation through to a completed order for a new block, the latter were much more casually recorded (often only in the form that suggests they would be requested of higher authority) and often not followed through. Accolades, complaints, and special requests comprised the rest of the minutes and the least frequent entries. The commissioners appear to have been careful to record any form of accolade or compliment which the Tuhoe spokespersons made of the Scheme. These usually occurred in Tuhoe greetings (probably what were usually poowhiri or formal welcomes onto marae) or opening statements in address, and were predicable parts of Tuhoe kawa. They usually took the form of congratulations on the 'progress' of the commission, its resolution of disputes and settlement of boundaries, and encouragement of speedy settlement of titles. Complaints were also briefly recorded, but appear less frequently. The accolades were sometimes counterposed to criticisms of the Apitihana as opposing this progress, and probably carefully recorded to counter these and other complaints in the official record, but they also sometimes reflected the usual judicial routine of recording agreement in order to entrench a decision. 4.2.3 Landless Veterans and Pious Non-commitment Special requests appeared rare but were duly recorded. These included requests to search the records for shares which were claimed to have been overlooked, and although there were few reports back, they may have nevertheless been carried through and any corrections made without comment. In their annual report for 1924 the commissioners listed 31 Natives and reported a request they had received in April in Ruatoki explaining that these men had sold their lands prior to enlisting for the war and had returned to find themselves landless, and appealed to the Crown to give them land so they would not be burdens upon their families. 349 This request offers a rare opportunity to compare three versions of the same minute. It appears at minutebook 2A:168 as a request from Te!hi te Paerata made in Ruatoki on 349 AJHR G-7, 1924, P 2. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 365 1 April 1924 on the same grounds, but for 24 persons, all of whom were named in the annual report. The same request also appears in Knight's notebooks (I happen to have taken notes on the details while in the hard-to-access LINZ archives) but are recorded between 13-29 March and made by an unspecified 'Daisy', presumably a female (Te Ihi was a male, and leader of group 15).350 Daisy submitted a list of 25 persons and explained that although some held shares in Ruatoki partitions 1-3 they had sold their shares in the Urewera before going to war. Their request was for the Crown to augment the lands of their fathers, and Daisy assured the commissioners they would be satisfied if the Crown were to return one-half to one-quarter of the lands they had sold. Tupaea Rapaera and Taipeti Matatua (two prominent leaders) supported Daisy's request, and Taipeti submitted a further list, agreeing that it be amalgamated with (illegible name). Rangiaho Paora (another prominent leader) pointed out that some on Daisy's list still owned some land, and could thus be omitted. A comparison of the official minutes with Knight's original minutes suggests that one person was dropped from the former (I don't know who because I did not copy the names given in the notebook), but apparently all the rest of Daisy's list were included in the annual report, and the additional seven names in the annual report probably came from Taipeti's list (there was no record of who or how many these were in Knight's notebook). There were two comparable requests recorded at Waikirikiri marae (Ruatoki) 27 October 1922: Manuariki Taihakoa or Tamati Matiu stated that he was a returned soldier 16/812 (produced his discharge) and stated that he had sold to Crown 200 pounds sterling worth of land. as the possibility of never returning to N.Z. - asked for favorable consideration of commission as regards an increase in area or suitable location. Awhena Reha. 16/836. Makes similar request for similar reasons (Philip Reha) Noted. 351 350 Ibid., box 4. 351 UCMB 1, P 174. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 366 Although Manuariki or Tamati do not appear on Ihi Te Paerata's 1924 list, Awhena probably does, as Piripi Reha. These requests and the different way in which they were handled in three records are intrinsically interesting, but acquire an undertone of false piety in light of Knight's earlier unguarded query to Guthrie: At a meeting at Ruatahuna on the 23d ultimo, Mr. Ngata mentioned that many of the Natives as the result of selling their entire interests to the Crown were rendered landless, and suggested that the Crown should set aside 20,000 acres for them. Shall I give a definite refusal to this request or make an evasive non committal reply?352 It is surprising that Guthrie allowed Knight's candor to remain in the record, but furthermore his Undersecretary actually replied to the query, advising him to be 'non committal if asked about land for landless natives'.353 The implication here appears to be that a great deal regarding the fine lines between 'definite refusals', 'non committal replies', 'evasions', and so on - even regarding such a matter as this - was already well-understood between Knight and Minister of Lands Guthrie. One also notes that the response in the minutebooks was only a 'noted' or (non committal) assurance that it would be put before the proper authorities. Thus I suspect (but do not know for sure) that nothing was ever done by the Crown with regard to such requests which reached them. The Crown's discrimination against providing returned Maori servicemen (and Ngata's reinforcement of it during the depression) the same resources as were available to Pakeha servicemen is well-documented. In the Urewera, this is a particularly bitter irony in view of Rerries' intentions to settle Pakeha soldiers in the settlement area he hoped to vacate by the Crown purchase campaign.354 Knight's and apparently Guthrie's cynical attitude was probably also 352 Knight to Guthrie, 21 June 1921, MAl 29/4/7a; Campbell Supp. Pap.II: 147-9, p 3. 353 Undersecy Lands Brodrick to NLDraftsman Knight, 16 July 1921, AADS AccW3562 bundle 617A 22/697, Box 274 1919-1922. 354 Jordan to Bowler, 25 September 1917, WDMLC c.f. 617. Steven Webster, 'The Urewera Consolidation Scheme: Confrontations between Tuhoe and the Crown, May 2004. 367 shared by Coates, and did not bode well for less heroic or urgent Tuhoe requests for reserves in the Ureweras, even those which Ngata or the commissioners agreed to. There is one pervasive characteristic of the minutebooks that tends to be taken for granted: they are almost entirely concerned with the Tuhoe 'non-sellers' and their consolidated shares and eventual allocations, and proceed as though the Crown were merely a passive patron or partner. This, of course, obscures the facts that the Crown was the instigator of the whole affair, and extremely active throughout the implementation of the Scheme, through the legislation, commissioners, surveyors, and their entire institutional matrixes. All this and its continual influence and effects remain almost invisible in the minutebooks. It even appears that the Scheme was being done for the sake of the Tuhoe rather than the Crown, as it did in the impatient undertone of Knight's 3 October 1921 report. The following chapters are concerned primarily to recover aspects of this obscured, even suppressed, history.
Lofficialj
