SOUTHERN SYRIA Population Monitoring Initiative (PMI) Context Report September 2017 Key Findings: The 09 July ceasefire and accompanying commitment to establishing a De-Escalation Zone (DEZ) continues to hold in southern Syria with limited skirmishes and no air strikes. As a result, there was relative population stability throughout the reporting period with movements largely characterized as trickles of return and displacement movements from four areas: northern Jaydour, Yarmouk Valley, As-Sweida, and southwest Dar’a. An estimated 900 to 1,100 individuals were reported to have moved in the northern Jaydour region in northwestern Dar’a between 23 July and 20 August. However, an estimated 2,250 individuals have returned to these regions since the onset of the ceasefire. Due to fighting between Jaysh Khalid Bin Walid (JKW) and armed opposition groups (AOGs), approximately 500 to 700 individuals from Yarmouk valley were displaced north to Quneitra, and approximately 1,000 individuals were displaced east toward Mzeireb sub-district. Many villages are experiencing return movements and some have commenced some degree of reporting on them. However, these are not standardized and further assessment of these monitoring mechanisms and types of return movement is necessary to further refine the reporting on the volume and nature of these movements. Population Monitoring Initiative (PMI) IDP Density Population Monitoring Initiative (PMI) Situational Context Excluding low-intensity, steady conflict in the Yarmouk Provincial Councils (PCs) for both governorates are trying valley between AOGs and the ISIS-affiliated JKW, the to expand their authority; however, their efforts have 09 July ceasefire remained the primary pacer of conflict been met with resistance from other quasi-governance dynamics during the period of coverage. Reports structures in the region. indicated a limited number of skirmishes and indirect On 04 August, the Dar’a PC announced that all NGOs fire between AOGs and Government of Syria (GoS) wishing to continue operations are required to register forces in northwestern Dar’a, Dar’a Al Balad and the their organizations and staff. This announcement was Lajat region. This decrease, most strongly characterized perceived as a power grab in the wake of the ceasefire by the absence of airstrikes, indicates an ongoing agreement, and an attempt to position the PC as the commitment to the agreement from all sides. The primary authority for DEZ negotiations. The PC invited guarantors (Jordan, the United States, and Russia) and NGOs to register on 25 August at the PC’s headquarters participating parties (the Syrian opposition and the GoS) continue moving forward in their negotiations for the in Nawa but sources report that no NGOs attended. establishment of an official DEZ. The key stipulations Rumors that the Nawa Local Council (LC) was negotiating surrounding the DEZ include 1) the re-opening of the with GoS authorities regarding cross-line assistance set Nasib/Jaber border crossing between Jordan and Syria; off negative reactions from key stakeholders in the south. 2) the removal of GoS aligned militias (e.g. Lebanese Such negotiations in the south have been historically Hezbollah, Iranian advisors, and pro-GoS armed groups perceived as a betrayal to the Syrian opposition’s comprised of civilians) from their proximity to the ideals and were met with outspoken disapproval. Both Jordanian border; and 3) maintaining humanitarian a notable tribe in the region and the Horan Court, access to the affected populations in Dar’a and Quneitra which is an influential judicial structure in the region, (albeit with competing interests over cross-border issued separate statements publicly denouncing such versus cross-line distribution of aid). Should the DEZ negotiations. only allow for cross-line aid, serious protection concerns A notable tribe, stated these negotiations would result would arise if current operational actors were suddenly in the discontinuation of their relationship with Nawa. barred from implementing due to the lack of continuity These concerns over cross-line assistance stem from its in programming. In addition, lack of clarity remains with potential to be used politically through the targeting regards to the impact on presence-reliant humanitarian of locations, which would represent a major shift from programmes. On 23 August, the Government of Jordan announced the establishment of the “Amman Center the current needs-based humanitarian response. In the for Ceasefire Control” comprised of the three guarantors wake of ceasefires, political infighting among opposition to monitor the ceasefire and reach a consensus on affiliated actors generally occurs between two types implementing the stipulations of the DEZ. of entities: 1) groups that are historically legitimized Since the ceasefire was announced, various fractured through cross-border aid fighting against 2) less interest groups are vying for political control over the influential actors which attempt to advance their future opposition controlled areas in Dar’a and Quneitra. standing by conducting negotiations with the GoS. Population Movements 23 July - 20 August - 2017 Hadar Kammuneh Shaqraniyeh Halas Manshiyet Elsabil Ta rnaja Nabe Elfawar Alqin Bali Zbeidiyeh Sweinmreh Jbata Elkhashab Ein Al-Nuriyah Ofania Mankat Elhatab Bweidan Hurriyeh Kom Elwisseh Ayoba Ghabagheb Barraq Um Elqosur Baath Maaret Elbeida Sakra Jaba Deir Eladas Hameidiyyeh Tiha Deir Elbakht Rawadi Kafr Nassij Mothabin Mashara Mal Masmiyyeh Quneitra Um Batna Kafr Shams Aqraba Sharae Momtaneh Jbab Qahtaniyyeh Um Ezam Ta f Rweheineh Shaara Majdolieah Zamrin Qayta As-Sanamayn Western Karim Jidya Bsir Bir Ajam Hara Kom Elbasha Samlin Eib Breiqa Little Duwaya 2 Ankhal Big Duwaya Hijeh Qanniyeh Khebab Jisri Kodneh Namar Sweisa Tabneh ZabayerMatleh Esheh Al-Shyahaa Qseibeh Jasim Ein Frekha Rweisat Jadal Khirbet Rafid Sur Al-Surayah Mahjeh Qarqas Qirata Abu Ktef Hamer Asem Nasriyeh Faqie Barqa Bweir Maalaqa Najih Sokkariyeh Masikeh-Lajat Shaqra Dali Al-Khawabi Eastern Basa Ein Qadi Wrad Nawa Malzumeh Bekar Sheiliyeh Razaniyet Saida Thakar Jabaliyeh Izra' Sayda Abu Hartein Ein Bisr Elharir Lweiheq Sheikh Saed Mseitriyeh Ta ssil Sheikh Miskine Edwan Mlihet Elatash Nafeaa Qarfa Jomleh 1 Namer Nahta Arda Ash-Shajara Abtaa Mzerea Maariya Jlein Beit Ara Eastern Maliha Da'el Alma Sura Hrak Koya Hit Western Maliha Manshiyet Koya Al-Qusayr 3 Tafas Zayzun Ajam Kherbet Ghazala Tabriyat Rakhim Nahj Mzeireb Ta l Shihab Western Ghariyeh Kharab ShahemYadudeh Karak Atman Eastern Ghariyeh Um Walad Mseifra Neimeh Sayda At Tall Harasta Dar'a 5 Kahil Sahwa Duma Um Elmayathen Jizeh Tiba Moraba Jemrine Nasib Modira Ghasm Busra Esh-Sham Arbin Mataeiyeh Damascus Smad Jober Zamalka Hammura Nada Simej Rural Damascus Smaqiyat Tisiya Saqba 6 Hezzeh Abu Katuleh 4 Ein Terma Kafr Batna Jisrein “Return Movement” - Due to the challenge of verifying the nature Return Movement Areas of Influence Al-Hasakeh Aleppo and conditions of returns, the PMI Ar-Raqqa Idleb IDP Movement Lattakia Contested Areas Hama Deir-ez-Zor Seasonal Bedouin Movement has elected to use the term Tartous Government (SAA) Homs Sub - District “return movement” to describe Non-state armed groups Damascus Rural Damascus Villages Quneitra ISIS Affiliates movement of individuals to their Dara As-Sweida 0 50 100 200 Km village of origin. Annotations for these movements can be found on the next page Population Monitoring Initiative (PMI) Population Report The patterns are as follows: 11) Multiple villages reported receiving individuals displaced 55) Return movements from Kahil and other eastern villages from the Yarmouk valley due to increased fighting between heading toward Dar’a Al Balad, Neimeh, and Mzeireb. JKW and AOGs. The perception that the ceasefire has Over 6000 individuals have reportedly returned to these created a stability outside the valley has resulted in steady, villages. but minimal displacement since July. It is notable that some of the villages reporting the arrival of these Yarmouk 66) Multiple reports cited movements in Rural Damascus from IDPs define them as “newly displaced” regardless of the Jobar and Ein Terma towards Hezzeh and Kafr Batna due time of their arrival, and therefore may include families to conflict between GoS forces and AOG. According to displaced for two months or more. Key Infomants (KIs) sources, approximately 5,400 individuals were displaced. reported 500 to 700 individuals were displaced north into rural Quneitra, and approximately 1,000 individuals were Additional reports include elastic, temporary movements displaced east toward Mzeireb sub-district. from the Yarmouk valley and Dar’a Al Balad. During these movements, it was reported that individuals leave their 22) In northern Jaydour, the towns of Hara, Nimer, and villages during the day to seek refuge and purchase supplies Jasim reported that IDPs left to return to their village of in other villages. However, at night, these individuals return to origin. The primary destinations of these reported return their village of origin. movements were Tiha, Mal, Aqraba, Zamrin, Samlin, and Ankhal, which were previously considered the front line During the period of coverage, two IDP settlements were for skirmishes between GoS forces and AOGs in northern transferred under the authority of different LCs. In Eastern Dar’a. However, since the onset of the ceasefire they have Maliha, a settlement of approximately 300 to 500 individuals experienced little to no conflict. An estimated 900 to