Ideas, Ideology & Intellectuals in Search Of

Ideas, Ideology & Intellectuals in Search of Russia’s Political Future Elena Chebankova Abstract: The intellectual discourse of any state can function within two broad paradigms: consensual Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/76/1830935/daed_a_00436.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 and pluralistic. In the first case, political elites, intellectuals, and the public agree on the base parameters of what constitutes “the good life” and argue about the methods of application. In the second case, participants hold radically different, incommensurable views, which coexist in society. This essay argues that the Western political system broadly rests on the politics of liberal consensus, formed throughout the period of capitalist modernization. But Russia’s history took a different turn, following a path of alternative modernization. This engendered the politics of paradigmatic pluralism, in which a number of radically different politico-intellectual frameworks struggle for the dominant discourse. This essay examines these paradigms and argues that, due to the nature and substance of these models, fundamental change of Russia’s dominant discourse, along with its main politico-institutional parameters, is unlikely. Russia’s extant political system is stabilized through the politics of paradigmatic pluralism. More specific, two broad and radically different paradigms of “the good life” are present in Russia: pro-Western liberal and state-centered traditionalist.1 Their mutual questioning and criticism allow society to function within a relatively stable framework. While the two alternatives have struggled for discursive supremacy, the nativist and state-centered paradigm has emerged as a hegemonic discourse, with the support of the majority of the population. It is focused on avoiding shocks to the extant system and on sustaining sociopolitical stability. This essay ELENA CHEBANKOVA is Reader demonstrates that the paradigmatic split in Russia in Politics at the School of Social has been historically determined. It continues with and Political Sciences at the Uni- an examination of the main dimensions of Russia’s versity of Lincoln. She is the au- thor of Civil Society in Putin’s Russia hegemonic discourse, pointing to its general incli- (2013) and Russia’s Federal Relations: nation toward national reconciliation and political Putin’s Reforms and Management of stability. It then ponders the potential breakdown of the Regions (2009). the dichotomous nature of the existing ideological © 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00436 76 landscape and assesses the chances of a have a number of epistemes that struggle Elena third, more radical alternative capturing to agree on the “base” positions, that pro- Chebankova the field. The essay concludes that, with- pose meaningfully different ideas of socio- in the period under review, a fundamen- political development, and that compete tal change of the hegemonic paradigm in for hegemony in the discursive realm. Russia is unlikely due to the dynamics of A paradox of contemporary Russian Russia’s political system. politics is that, since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has rested on the pluralistic, rath- Until very recent years, the Western po- er than the consensus, model, with conse- litical system has mainly rested on the quences for the country’s intellectual land- politics of liberal consensus. This implies scape and potential for change to its extant Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/76/1830935/daed_a_00436.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 that society reaches a basic agreement on regime. We shall address the participants the idea of the good life within a liberal in these debates as critical intelligentsia. To framework and hopes that there will be a clarify positions at the outset, we will not gradual “step-by-step convergence of all limit our understanding of critical intelli- values with liberal values.”2 John Rawls gentsia to those who are hopeful of altering called to establish a “base consensus” that Russia’s extant political system. Rather, would rest on liberal democratic, cultur- the discussion considers all those who al, and political notions and act as a basic ponder Russia’s fate–her past, present, framework capable of encompassing di- and future in its full complexity–as intel- verging but “reasonable” ideas of the good lectuals. Hence, the account examines the life, thus buttressing pluralism of a liber- full spectrum of existing opinion, regard- al nature.3 This thinking has its origins in less of its support or criticism of the exist- the monistic tradition of Plato and Aristo- ing political structure. tle that subsequently merged with mono- The two main paradigms of the good theistic Christian conceptions to determine life–pro-Western liberal and state-cen- much of ensuing Western philosophy.4 tered traditionalist–struggle for position Critics of consensus politics represent as Russia’s hegemonic discourse. The first a less practiced alternative that calls for intellectual group, which includes some the coexistence of incommensurable par- members of the government and finan- adigms of the good life, their incessant di- cial elite, advocates the path of westerni- alogue, and mutual enrichment. This is the zation for Russia. The second group adopts intellectual posterity of Thomas Hobbes, a conservative approach insisting on the David Hume, and John Stuart Mill, ad- creation of a strong state that relies on pre- vanced in the twentieth century by Isaiah vious periods of Russia’s history and her Berlin, John Gray, Jean-François Lyotard, idiosyncratic political traditions. This par- Shmuel Eisenstadt, Bernard Williams, and adigm has a pro-Western dimension, but others. These critics point to the “absolu- it is a particular kind of westernization. It tization” of liberalism by the proponents welcomes almost all aspects of Western of liberal consensus politics and advo- modernity related to the capitalist econo- cate the need to introduce meaningfully my, nation-state, religion, and family, but different alternatives that could enrich is skeptical about the West’s postmod- the cultural landscape of society. In short, ernist path. It also insists on Russia being consensus politics seek to operate within Western and European but not subordi- one broad politically liberal episteme that nate to the West geopolitically. Although houses divergent ideas of an invariably lib- the pro-Western liberal paradigm is readily eral coloring. Pluralistic politics, in turn, available in the current political climate in 146 (2) Spring 2017 77 Ideas, Russia, it functions merely as a discursive third wave have faced the painful politi- Ideology & alternative, not as a meaningful option se- cal consequences of ideological borrow- Intellectuals in Search riously considered by the majority of the ing. A borrowed idea can be “an asset to of Russia’s population. Permanent dialogue between the development of a country and a re- Political Future the two paradigms, as well as the fact that minder of its comparative backwardness, the traditionalist discourse already con- that is both a model to be emulated and a tains some elements of the Western sys- threat to national identity. What appears tem, stabilizes the traditionalist discourse desirable from the standpoint of progress and makes unexpected shifts in the coun- often appears dangerous to national in- try’s political trajectory unlikely. dependence.”5 Hence, this cruel dilemma The paradigmatic split and the difficulties forces a split within the intellectual scene Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/76/1830935/daed_a_00436.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 experienced by the pro-Western liberal par- of second-wave industrialization states, of adigm are rooted in history; things become which Russia is part. clearer if we sketch Russia’s past three hun- Intellectuals of those countries inevita- dred years. First, Russia has a complex rela- bly face an uneasy choice between losing tionship with modernity, a social paradigm intellectual and cultural independence by that largely lends a liberal consensus matrix admitting their backwardness and adopting to the politics of most Western European the externally borrowed progressive para- states. Russia is a second-wave moderniza- digm, or reaffirming nativism and tradition country, a circumstance that predeter- tion by holding on to the previously cho- mines the paradigmatic split. Second, Rus- sen path. The drama for Russian intellectu- sia’s idiosyncratic relationship with moder- als is in the quandary of either adopting the nity barred her from forming a clear civic ideology of individual freedom and bour- identity supportive of liberal consensus pol- geois liberties, combined with embrac- itics. Finally, Russia’s tumultuous twentieth ing Western ontology, or clinging to the century further contributed to the consol- idiosyncratic centralized modes of gover- idation of the existing intellectual rift. Let nance that could conduct modernization me elaborate on these factors. and development, albeit in a risky alterna- Russia’s embrace of Western modernity tive fashion. The latter option remains less was rather tardy. The Petrine period (1682– explored, a problem that Aleksandr Dugin, 1721) was a watershed, during which Russia a Eurasianist philosopher focusing on cul- had only just launched a painful transfor- tural and geopolitical aspects of the Rus- mation toward modernity, met with resis-

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