IRumb, 37719 4543

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of Tuesday, the loth of September, 1946 by Registered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 The Air Ministry, September, 1946. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. The following despatch was submitted to the Experiences in Holland and Belgium had Secretary of State for Air on August 20th, shown what they could do with armoured 1941, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. forces operating in conjunction with an Air Dowding, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G., Arm which had substantially achieved the- com- A.D.Cs, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chiej, mand of the Air. Fighter Command, Royal Air Force. 5. This air supremacy was doubly necessary to them in attacking England ibecause the bulk PREAMBLE. of their troops and war material must neces- 1. I have been instructed by the Air Council sarily 'be conveyed by sea, and, in order to to write a Despatch on the Air Fighting of achieve success, they must be capable of giving last Autumn, which has become known as the' air protection to the passage and the landing " Battle of Britain." JThe conditions are a of troops and material. little unusual -because, firstly, the Battle ended 6. The destruction or paralysis of the Fighter many months ago, secondly, a popular account Command was therefore an essential pre- of the fighting has already been written and requisite to the invasion of these Islands. published, and, thirdly, recommendations for Mention in Despatches have already been 7. Their immediate objectives might be Con- submitted. voys, Radio-Location Stations, Fighter Aero- dromes, Seaports, Aircraft Factories, or London 2. I have endeavoured, therefore, to write a itself. Always the underlying object was to report which will, I hope, be of Historical bring the Fighter Command continuously to interest, and which will, in any case, contain battle, and to weaken its material resources and the results of more than four years' experience Intelligence facilities. of the Fighter Command in peace and war. 8. Long after the policy of " crashing August 20, 1941. through " with heavy bomber formations had been abandoned owing to the shattering losses incurred, the battle went on. Large fighter formations were sent over, a proportion of the THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. fighters being adapted to carry bombs,, in order PART I.—PRELIMINARY. that the attacks might not be ignorable. 3. In giving an account of the Ba'ttle of 9. This last phase was perhaps the most diffi- Britain it is .perhaps advisable to begin jby a cult to deal with tactically. It will be discussed definition of my conception of the meaning of in greater detail later on. the phrase. The Battle may be said to have 10. Night attacks by Heavy Bombers were started when the Germans had disposed of the continuous throughout the operations, and, French resistance in the Summer of 1940, and although they persisted and increased in in- turned their attention to this country. tensity as Day Bombing became more and more 4. The essence of their Strategy was so to expensive, they had an essentially different pur- weaken our Fighter Defences that their Air pose, and the " Battle of Britain " may be said Arm should be able to give -adequate support to have ended when the Fighter and Fighter- to an attempted invasion of the British Isles. Bomber raids died down. 4544 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 11. It is difficult to fix the exact date on clear that such an attitude was politically un- which the " Battle of Britain " can be said tenable, I wrote on the i6th September, 1939, to have begun. Operations of various kinds a letter to the Air Ministry. In this letter I merged into one another almost insensibly, and pointed out that the Air Staff Estimate of the there are grounds for choosing the date of the number of Fighter Squadrons necessary for the 8th August, on which was made the first attack defence of this country was 52, and that on the in force against laid objectives in this country, outbreak of war I had the equivalent of 34 as the beginning of the Battle. (allowing for the fact that some Auxiliary 12. On the other hand, the heavy attacks Squadrons were only partially trained and made against our Channel convoys probably equipped). constituted, in fact, the beginning of the German 17. I wanted 12 new squadrons, 'but asked offensive; because the weight and scale of the that 8 should be raised immediately, and made attack indicates that the primary object was proposals for their location and employment. rather to bring our Fighters to battle than to In a letter dated the 2ist September the Air destroy the hulls and cargoes of the small ships Ministry regretted that the most they could do engaged in the coastal trade. While we were towards meeting my requirements was to form fighting in Belgium and France, we suffered the 2 new squadrons and 2 operational training disadvantage that even the temporary stoppage units. I was invited to a meeting of the Air of an engine involved the loss of pilot and air- Council on the 26th September, craft, whereas, in similar circumstances, the 18. On the 25th September I wrote expressing German pilot might be fighting again the same my disappointment and asking for a recon- day, and his aircraft be airborne again in a sideration. As a result of this letter, the Air matter of hours. Council Meeting, and a further meeting under 13. In fighting over England these considera- the Chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Air tions were reversed, and the moral and material Staff, the Air Ministry wrote on the gth October disadvantages of fighting over enemy country sanctioning the immediate formation of 8 new may well have determined the Germans to open squadrons, though 6 of these could be formed the attack with a phase of fighting in which the initially only as half-squadrons owing to short- advantages were more evenly balanced. I have age of resources. This correspondence is too therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, chosen the lengthy to reproduce here, but it deals also events of the loth July as the opening of the with my apprehensions concerning Hurricane Battle. Although many attacks had previously wastage in France, which were realised in the been made on convoys, and even on land objec- Spring of 1940. It also dealt with an estimate tives such as Portland, the loth July saw the worked out by the Air Ministry Organisation employment by the Germans of the first really Staff that after 3 months of fighting we might big formation (70 aircraft) intended primarily expect the Fighter strength to have been re- to bring our Fighter Defence to battle on a duced to 26 squadrons. large scale. 19. In October, 1939, the Air Ministry further 14. I had 59 squadrons in various stages of reconsidered their policy, and ordered the for- efficiency. A list of these units, with supple- mation of 10 additional Fighter Squadrons, 4 of mentary information, is given in Appendix A. which were destined for the Coastal Command. Many of them were still suffering from the 20. In January, 1940, the Northern flank of effects of the fighting in Holland and Flanders, our continuous Defence organisation was on the at Dunkerque, and during the subsequent Forth, and the South-Western flank was at operations in France. Others were in process Tangmere in Sussex (with the exception of an of formation and training. But, if the lessons isolated station at Filton for .the local defence of the Battle are to be correctly appreciated, of Bristol and the mouth of the Severn). On due consideration must be given to the factors the 2nd and 4th February I wrote two letters leading up to the situation existing when it pointing out these limitations, and asking for began. Leaving out of account peace-time an extension of Aerodrome facilities, Intelli- preparations and training, the Battle of Britain gence cover and communications. began for me in the Autumn of 1939. 21. On the 9th February I was told that a 15. The first major problem arose during the paper was in preparation, and that I would be discussion of the question of sending Fighter given an opportunity to remark on the pro- Squadrons to France. The decisive factor was posals at a later stage. that of Supply. Our output at the beginning 22. On the i6th March I received the paper of the war was about 2 Hurricanes and 2 Spit- referred to and forwarded my comments on the fires per diem; and, although there were hopes 23rd March. of increasing Hurricane production, there was then no hope that Spitfire production would be 23. On the 8th May I received a leftter materially increased for about a year. It is true saying that a reply had been delayed. The that certain optimistic estimates had been made, proposals were now approved, and decisions but there were reasons to believe that these would shortly be taken. could not be implemented. At that time, we 24. This delay was presumably unavoidable, in England were out of range of German but the result was that the organisation and Fighters, and I had good hopes that unescorted development of the defences of the South and bomb raids on this country could be met and West of England were very incomplete when defeated with a very small loss in Fighters; but they were called upon to withstand the attacks there could be no illusions concerning the which the German occupation of French aero- wastage which would occur if we came up dromes made possible. against the German Fighters in France. 25. The fighting in Norway has only an 16. I therefore regarded with some appre- indirect bearing on this paper. Certain use- hension the general policy of sending Home ful tactical lessons were gamed, particularly Defence Fighter Units to France; but, as it was with regard to deflection shooting, and I trust SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4545 that the story of the epic fight of No. 263 37. Hitherto I had succeeded generally in Squadron under Squadron-Leader J. W. keeping the Spitfire Squadrons out of the Con- Donaldson, D.S.O., near Andalsnes, may not tinental fighting. The reason for this, as stated be lost to History. above, was that the supply situation was so bad 26. The outcome, as it affects this account, that they could not 'have maintained their was the virtual loss of 2 squadrons in the existence in face of the Aircraft Casualty Rate sinking of the •Aircraft Carrier Glorious after experienced in France: between the 8th May the evacuation of Narvik. and the i8th May 250 Hurricanes were lost. 38. When the Dunkerque fighting began, 27. Next came the invasion of Holland, and however, I could no longer maintain this policy, the call to send Fighters to the assistance of and the Spitfires had to take their share in the Dutch. The distance to 'Rotterdam was the fighting. about the extreme range of. the single-seater Fighter, which therefore operated under the 39. When the Dunkerque evacuation was disadvantage of having a very, brief .potential complete I had only 3 Day-Fighting Squadrons combat-time, followed by the necessity of a which had not been engaged in Continental long sea crossing on the homeward way. The fighting, and 12 Squadrons were in the line Blenheims, of course, had the necessary en- for the second time after having been with- durance, but they had not been designed as drawn to rest and re-form. fighters, and their use against day fighters 40. All this time, it must be remembered, proved costly in comparison with the limited the attack on this Country had not begun; success which they attained. with a few accidental exceptions no bomb had 28. The iDefiants were used here for the first been dropped on our soil. \L was responsible time, and, although they proved very effective for the Air Defence of Great Britain, and I against unescorted bombers, they, too, .suffered saw my resources slipping away like sand in •heavy casualties when they encountered fighters an hour-glass. The pressure for more and in strength. As the result of this experience I more assistance to France was relentless and). formed the opinion that the Blenheims should inexorable. In the latter part of May, 1940, be kept exclusively for night fighting, if pos- I sought and obtained permission to appear sible, while I retained an open mind about in person before the War Cabinet and to state the Defiants pending some experience of short- my case. I was accorded a courteous and range fighting. sympathetic hearing, and to my inexpressible relief my arguments prevailed and it was de- 29. Then began the fighting in Belgium and cided to send no more Fighter Reinforcements Northern France, and at once my fears about to France except to cover the final evacuation. the incidence of wastage in this type of fighting began to be realised. 41. I know what it must have cost the Cabinet to reach this decision, but I am pro- 30. At the beginning of April, 1940, there foundly -convinced that this was one of the were 6 Fighter Squadrons in France. great turning points of the war. 31. Then 4 more complete squadrons were 42. Another decision, of perhaps equal im- sent when the fighting began. portance, was taken at about this time. I refer 32. Then on the I3th May 32 pilots .and to the appointment of Lord Beaverbrook to aircraft were sent—say the equivalent of 2 the post of Minister of Aircraft Production. squadrons. The effect of this appointment can only be 33. Almost immediately afterwards 8 described as magical, and thereafter the Supply Half-Squadrons were sent. This was done .situation improved to such a degree that the under the impression that the loss of 8 Half- heavy aircraft wastage which was later incurred Squadrons would affect me less than that of during the " Battle of Britain " ceased to be 4 entire Squadrons, because it was supposed the primary danger, its place being taken by that H should be able to rebuild on the nuclei the difficulty of producing trained fighter pilots left behind. But this assumption was incorrect in adequate numbers. because I had neither the time nor the per- 43. After the Evacuation from Dunkerque sonnel available for purposes of reconstruction, the pressure on the Fighter Command became and the remaining half-squadrons had to be less intense, but it by no means disappeared. amalgamated into Composite Units with a re- Hard fighting took place along the coast from sulting disorganisation and loss of efficiency. Calais to Le Havre to cover the successive At this time, too, I was ordered to withdraw evacuations from that coast. Then the centre trained pilots from squadrons and to send them of gravity shifted to Cherbourg and its neigh- overseas as reinforcements. bourhood, and the " Battle of Britain " fol- 34. I had now lost the equivalent of 16 lowed on without any appreciable opportunity Squadrons, and in addition 4 Squadrons were to rest and re-form the units which had borne sent to fight in France during the day and to the brunt of the fighting. return to English bases in the evening. 35. Other pilots were withdrawn from the 44. The above considerations should be kept Command through the system by which the in mind when Appendix A (Order of Battle on Air Ministry dealt direct with Groups on ques- the 8th July, 1940) is "being studied. tions of Personnel. 45. The Guns and Searchlights available for 36. It must be remembered that during this the Air Defence of Great Britain were arranged period the Home Defence Squadrons were not as shown on the map which constitutes Appen- idle, 'but that Hurricane Squadrons were par- dix B. ticipating in the fighting to a considerable ex- 46. The fall of Belgium and France had in- tent, 4 Squadrons daily left S.E. England creased the danger to the South and West of with orders, to carry out an offensive patrol, England, and had necessitated a considerable to land and refuel in France or Belgium, and modification of the original arrangements when to carry out a second sortie before returning bombing attacks could start only .from German to England. soil. A 2 4546 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 47. The distribution of Army Units was, Barrage were continuously the objectives of as a matter of fact, in a condition of perpetual German attack; they manned their guns con- change to meet new situations as they arose, tinuously night and day, and I must pay a and I must pay a very sincere tribute to the high tribute to their morale, enthusiasm and" flexibility of the Army organisation, and to the efficiency. tact, -patience and loyalty of the Commander- A report from the 6th A.A. Division, which in-Chief of the Anti-Aircraft Command, was busily and typically employed, is included Lt.*Gen. Sir Frederick A. Pile, Bart., K.C.B., at Appendices C, C.A, C.B. and C.C. D.S.O., M.C., which enabled these constant changes to be 'made without disorganisation. 51. A short Appendix (C.D) is added show- ing the number of rounds fired per aircraft 48. In theory the Cx>mmander-in-Chief, destroyed, for the whole Anti-Aircraft Com- Fighter Command, was the authority respon- mand. sible for settling the dispositions of all guns allotted to the Air Defence of Great Britain; 52. On the map which constitutes Appen- but this was little more than a convenient fic- dix A.A. are shown the boundaries of Groups tion. The number of guns available was so and Sectors, and also the positions of the Bal- inadequate for the defence of all the vulnerable loon Barrages, together with an indication of targets in the country, and the interests con- the front covered by Radio Location Stations cerned were so diverse and powerful, that it and the area covered by the Observer Corps. was not to be supposed that an individual 53. The Balloon Barrages had, at this stage, member of any one Service would be left to had little opportunity of justifying their exist- exercise such a prerogative uninterruptedly. ence, except perhaps at Rosyth and Scapa A disproportionate amount of my time was Flow, since bombing attacks against land taken up in discussions on gun distribution, objectives in Britain had not yet begun. It and each decision was at once greeted with a was thought, however, (and later experience fresh agitation, until finally I had to ask that confirmed this opinion), that the heavy cost all proposals should be discussed by a small of their installation and maintenance, and their Committee on which all interests were repre- drain on man-power, were on the whole justi- sented, and I normally accepted the recommen- fied. It is true that their material results, in dations of this Committee during quiet periods. terms of enemy aircraft destroyed, were not During active operations I consulted General impressive, they suffered staggering casualties Pile, and we acted according to our judgment. in electric storms, and had brought down a One rather important lesson emerged from number of our own aircraft; on the other hand, our experience, viz., that the general fire-con- they exercise a very salutary moral effect upon trol of all guns in the Air Defence System the Germans and to a great extent protected should be vested in the Air Defence authori- the vital objectives, which *hey surrounded, ties. I do not, of course, mean that, if an in- against low-altitude attacks and dive-bombing. vasion had taken place, the guns co-operat- ing with the troops in the Field should have 54. This is not the place to give an account been subordinated to any A.A. Defence Com- of the romantic discovery and development of mander, bu* the existence of " free-lance " Radio Location. It may be explained, how- guns*), the positions and even the existence ever, that the backbone of the system consisted of which were unknown to me, was an appreci- of a series of large " chain " stations at inter- able handicap, especially at night. It was im- vals averaging about 30 miles. These gave possible to acquaint them with the approach 1 > warning, by means of reflected electrical of enemy raiders, or of the fact that our own echoes, of the presence of aircraft within the aircraft were working in the vicinity. radius of their effective action, which attained to nearly 200 miles in the most favourable cir- 49. When the night attacks on London began cumstances. The average effective radius was to be really serious, General Pile, in consulta- about 80 miles, but they had the serious limita- tion with myself, decided to send heavy rein- tion that they failed altogether t'j give indica- forcements. Within 24 hours the defences to tions of aircraft flying below 1,000 feet. the South and South-East of London were approximately doubled, and the great increase 55. To overcome this disability, which was in the volume of fire was immediately noticed particularly hampering to operations against and had a very good effect on public morale. low-flying minelayers, smaller units called The physical effect in the shape of .raiders " C.H.L. Stations" were included in the destroyed was by no means negligible, but the protective line. main effect was never generally known. The track of every raid was, of course, shown on 56. These had a restricted range (about 30 various operations tables, and on some nights miles), and were incapable of giving heights as many as 60 per cent, of the raiders with any degree of accuracy; they were, how- approaching London from the South turned ever, extremely accurate in azimuth, and con- back after dropping their bombs in the open stituted an essential feature of the Defensive country or on the fringe of the Barrage. and Warning Systems. 50. The A.A. Guns at Dover enjoyed 57. The Radio Location system was growing unusual opportunities for practice, with the so fast and had to meet so many calls from result that their crews became acknowledged overseas that the training of the technical per- experts in the art of Anti-Aircraft Gunnery. sonnel and the maintenance of the elaborate Their skill, however, was attained through the scientific apparatus presented great difficulties. circumstance that they and the Dover Balloon In spite of these handicaps, however, the system operated effectively, and it is not too * These guns belonged to Field Force Units. As much to say that the warnings which it gave such units were, of necessity, highly mobile, their exact location was not always known to Fighter could have been obtained by no other means Command. Nor, after a recent move, were they and constituted a vital factor in the Air always included in the telephone system. Defence of Great Britain. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4547 58. The functions of the Observer Corps 66. There were also subsidiary warnings, (since granted the " Royal " prefix) are too transmitted by a fourth operator, to close down well known to require description here. Radio Stations which might assist the enemy's Suffice it to say that this loyal and public- navigation by enabling him to use wireless spirited body of men had maintained their Direction Finding. watch with admirable efficiency since the be- 67. The credit for working out this system ginning of the war and throughout a winter in conjunction with the Home Office is due of exceptional severity. It is important to note largely to Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Cunningham, that, at this time, they constituted the sole C.B.E. means of tracking enemy raids once they had crossed the-coast line. Later experience was 68. The Fighter Command was divided to show that " sound plots," ^which were all into Groups and Sectors in accordance with the that could be given for night raiders, and air- arrangement shown in Appendix A A. Only craft flying above clouds or at extreme alti- Nos. n, 12 and 13 Groups were fully organised tudes, were not adequate for purposes of at the beginning of the Battle. Each Group accurate interception; but their work through- and Sector Headquarters had an Operations out was quite invaluable. Without it the Air Table generally similar to that already des- Raid Warning' systems could not have been cribed at Command Headquarters, but operated, and Inland. Interceptions would covering an appropriately smaller area. The rarely have been made. British Isles and neighbouring seas were covered by an imaginary " grid " which was 59. The credit for building up and develop- used by all concerned for plotting purposes. ing the Observer Corps in recent years is due An expression consisting of one letter and four ' largely to its Commandant, Ah Commodore digits gave the position of a point with an A. D. Warrington Morris; CM.G., O.B.E. accuracy of i square kilometre. • 60. The Air Raid Warning System was 69. Plots from which'tracks could be 'built operated centrally from Fighter Command up were received first from the Radio Location Headquarters (with a small exception in the Station, and later from the Observer Corps Orkneys and Shetlands). (and to a small extent from Searchlight Detach- 61. The country was divided into about 130 ments) after a raid had crossed the coast. " Warning Districts," the boundaries of which 70. All Radio Location plots came to a were determined by the lay-out of the public " Filter Room " table at Command Head- telephone system. These districts were shown quarters (next door to the room in which the on a map in my Operations Room, and the Operations Table was situated), and, after tracks of all enemy -raids, whether over the surplus information had been eliminated, tracks land or sea, were plotted by means of counters were passed -by direct telephone line simul- .deposited and removed as necessary by a taneously to my Operations Table and to those number of " Plotters." of Group.*, and Sectors concerned. 62. The counters were of three colours, • 71. Observer Corps plots, on the other hand, according to the 5-minoite period in which went first to Observer Group Centres (where they were placed on the table: This was plotting tables were also installed) and thence necessary to facilitate their removal at the end to Sector and Fighter Group Operations tables. of 15 minutes, and so to obviate the confusion The tracks were then " told " to my Operations caused by " stale plots." Room from -the Group Tables. 72. In order to avoid waste of flying effort ' 63. Three telephone operators were in con- and false Air Raid Warnings it was obviously tinuous communication with the Trunk Ex- very necessary to differentiate between friendly changes in London, Liverpool and Glasgow, and enemy formations, and this was-the most and when a raid was within 20 minutes' flying difficult as well as the most important task of distance of a warning district the Air Raid my Filter Room. Liaison Officers from Bomber Warning officer would send a message, as, for and Coastal Commands were permanently on instance: " 10. Norwich. Yellow." The duty, and they were in possession of all avail- London operator would transmit this to the able information concerning the operations of London Trunk Exchange, and the London our own Bombers and Coastal patrols. During operator would immediately retransmit it to 1940 an electrical device became generally Norwich, where other operators would pass it available which modified the echo received by on to approved recipients in the Warning Dis- the Radio Location System from our own air- trict. This was a preliminary caution for the craft in a characteristic manner. This was of information of Police, Fire Stations, &c., and the greatest value. involved no public warning. 73. The credit for working out the compli- 64. About 5 minutes later, if the said Dis- cated details of the Filter Room 'belongs largely trict were still threatened, a " Red Warning " to Wing Commander (now Group Captain) would be given. This was the signal for the R. G. Hart, C.B.E. Sirens to sound. A " Green " signal indicated 74. It appeared to me quite impossible to " Raiders Passed," and the Sirens sounded the centralise Tactical control at Command Head- " All Clear." quarters, and even Group Commanders would 65. At night, when it became essential to be too 'busy during, heavy fighting to concern maintain exposed lights in Dockyards, Rail- themselves, with details bf Interception. way Sidings and Factories up to the last 75. The system was that the Command minute, so as to obviate unnecessary loss of should be responsible for the identification of working time, a "Purple " warning was intro- approaching formations and for the allotment duced. . This was a signal for the extinction of enemy raids to Groups where any doubt of exposed lights, but it did noi connote a existed. Group Commanders decided which public warning. •' .. Sector should meet 'any specified raid and the 4548 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 strength of the Fighter force which should be 84. " Pancake " was the signal for the latter employed. Sector Commanders detailed the operation, and I therefore introduced several Fighter Units to be employed, and operated the synonyms, the significance of which was not machinery of Interception. obvious to the enemy. 76. Various states of preparedness were laid 85. The code word for height was " Angels," down, e.g., Released, Available (20 minutes), followed by the number of thousands of feet; Readiness (5 minutes), and stand-by (2 when it appeared probable that the enemy were minutes), and Sectors reported all changes to taking advantage of this information I intro- Group Headquarters, where an up-to-date duced ~a false quantity into the code signal. picture of the state of affairs was recorded by Thus " Angels 18 " really meant Fly at 21,000 lights on the walls of the Operations Room. a,nd not 18,000. On more than one occasion Various liaison officers from the Observer Corps, German Fighter formations arriving to dive on guns and searchlights were maintained in one of our patrols were themselves attacked Group and Sector Operations Rooms. from above. 86. The system as a whole had been built 77. It will ibe seen that the Sector Com- up by successive steps.over a period of about mander had on his table the ibest available four years, and I was not^flissatisfied with the information as to the position and track of an way in which it stood the test of war. enemy formation; -but, in order to effect an accurate interception, it was necessary that he 87. The steps taken to devise a system of should also know the position and track of his night Interception are described later in this own Fighters. Despatch. 78. This was recorded by means of 88. I must now give a brief account of the R/T D/F (Radio Telephony Direction characteristics of the aircraft commonly Finding). R/T signals were transmitted auto- employed on both sides. As regards the Fighter matically for 15 seconds out of each minute by types available in the Command, the bulk of selected Fighter aircraft and were picked up the force consisted of Hurricanes and Spitfires; by two or three D/F stations installed in the former were beginning to be outmoded iby Sectors for the purpose. The readings were their German counterparts. They were com- passed1 by direct telephone lines to Sector paratively slow and their performance and Headquarters, and a mechanical plotting device manoeuvrability were somewhat inadequate at altitudes above 20,000 ft. The Spitfires were gave an almost instantaneous '-plot of the equal or superior to anything which the Germans Fighter's position. possessed at the beginning of the Battle. 79. In the more recently organised Sectors 89. The Hurricanes and Spitfires had bullet- these D/F stations had not been installed, and proof windscreens and front armour between it was necessary to keep track of the Fighters the top of the engine and the windscreen. They by giving them precise orders as to speed and also had rear armour directly behind the pilot, direction, and plotting their tracks by Dead which was previously prepared and fitted as Reckoning. This method was adequate only soon as we began to meet the German Fighters. if the force and direction of the wind at various The early adoption of armour gave us an initial altitudes could be correctly estimated. advantage over the Germans, but they were 80. The Sector Commander could thus see on quick to imitate our methods. While German his operations tables the positions and courses aircraft remained unarmoured, I think it is of enemy formations and of his own Fighters, now generally agreed that the single-seater and was enabled so to direct the latter as to multi-gun fighter with fixed guns was the most make interceptions with the former in a good efficient type which could have been produced percentage of occasions by day. Interception for day fighting. With the advent of armour depended, of course, on the Fighters being able some change in armament and/or tactics to see the enemy, and, although the system became necessary,, and the subject is discussed worked adequately against enemy formations in in more detail in Appendix F. •daylight, the degree of accuracy obtainable was- 90. The Defiant, after some striking initial insufficient to effect interception against night successes, proved to be too expensive in use raiders not illuminated by Searchlights, or against Fighters and was relegated to night against individual aircraft using cloud cover work and to the attack of unescorted Bombers. by day. 91. The Blenheim was also unsuitable for 81. Orders were given to pilots in their air- day-time combat with Fighters, owing to its craft by means of a very simple code which low speed and lack of manoeuvrability. It had could be easily memorised. For instance been relegated to night duties for these reasons, " Scramble " meant Take off. " Orbit " and because adequate space was available in meant Circle. " Vector 230 " meant Fly on a its fuselage for an extra operator and the course of 230 Degrees. scientific apparatus which was necessary for the development of a new night-interception 82. I realised that the enemy might pick up technique. The cockpit had not been designed the signals and interpret them, but any elabo- for night flying and the night view was ex- rate code was out of the question if it included tremely bad. Its already low performance had reference to some written list in the air." been further reduced by certain external fittings 83. As a matter of fact the enemy did pick which were essential for the operation of the up and interpret the signals in some cases, but Radio Detecting apparatus. not much harm was done, except when they 92. The Beaufighter was looked on as a were able to discover the height at which a Blenheim replacement in which most of the formation was ordered to operate, and the time above disadvantages would be overcome. Its when it was ordered to leave its patrol line speed promised to be adequate and its arma- and land. ment consisted of 4 20-mm. Cannons instead SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4549

of the 5 .303-inch Brownings of the Blenheim. single-engined types. Its usual armament was There was thus hope that decisive fire could 2 fixed cannons and 4 machine guns firing for- be brought to bear in the short period during ward, and one free machine gun firing to the which visual contact could be expected to be rear. Our pilots regarded it as a less formid- maintained at night. able opponent than the later types of M.E. 109. 93. Like the Blenheim, it had not been de- 100. The Heinkel 113 Fighter made its signed as a Night Fighter (it was an adapta- appearance in limited numbers during the tion of the Beaufort Torpedo Bomber), and Battle. It was a single seater, generally re- the night view from the cockpit was bad; but sembling the M.E. 109. Its main attributes Air Vice-Marshal Sir Q. Brand, K.B.E., were high performance and ceiling, so that it D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., a veteran night fighter was generally used in the highest of the several of the previous war, had designed a".new cock- layers in which attacking formations were pit lay-out, which did not, unfortunately, usually built up. materialise during my tenure of the Fighter 101. The Junkers.87 was a single-engined Command. The output of Beaufighters was Dive-Bomber. It had a low performance (top also very low. speed well under 250 m.p.h.). It'had 2 fixed machine guns firing forward and one free gun 94. Another-tyge.--which was pressed, into ser- firing to the rear. When it was able to operate vice as a Night Fighter was the Douglas D.B-7 undisturbed by Fighters it was the Germans' (now the Havoc). It had low fire power and most efficient Bomber against land or sea tar- comparatively poor performance with its gets owing to the great accuracy with which original engines. Its chief advantage lay in it dropped its bombs; but when it was caught its tricycle undercarriage, which proved very by fighters it was nothing short of a death- popular for landings in bad visibility. Only trap, and formations, of J.U. 87's were prac- one Squadron of these was in being when I left tically annihilated on several occasions. the Command. 102. The Heinkel in and the various types 95. One Squadron of Gladiators was still in of Dornier (17, I7Z and 215) constituted the use in the Command. As explained above, the main element of the German striking force. organisation of No. 10 Group was not com- They were twin-engined aircraft and were plete, and there was no large aerodrome close generally similar, although the former was enough to Plymouth to allow of direct protec- slightly the larger. Their speed was something tion being given to that town and to the Dock- over 250 m.p.h., and then* armament con- yard at Devonport. A squadron of Gladiators sisted normally (-but not always) of 4 free was therefore located at a small aerodrome machine guns firing backwards and one firing called Roborough in the immediate vicinity. forwards. Their radius of action varied with The Gladiators, though slow by modern stan- tankage and bomb load, but, if necessary, all dards, were very manoeuvrable, and had given objectives in England and Northern Ireland good results in Norway by deflection shooting could be reached from aerodromes in France. in the defence of fixed objectives, where the Bombers could not avoid the Gladiators if they 103. The Junkers 88 was the most modern were to reach their targets. of the German (Bombers. It also was a twin- eng^ned type with a performance of about 96. Some American single-seater aircraft 290 m.p.h. Its armament was generally were La Great Britain, but the types then avail- similar to that of the H.E. in and the Dormers able were deficient in performance and fire and it had a slightly longer range. It could power and were not employed to any material be used on occasions as a Dive-Bomber and, extent. though probably somewhat less .accurate than 97. The Whirlwind raised high hopes in some the J.U. 87, was much less vulnerable owing quarters. It claimed a very high top speed to its superior performance and armament. and carried 4 Cannon Guns. It had, however, 1104. Before beginning an account of the a totally inadequate service ceiling (about Battle, I must refer briefly to the publication 25,000 ft.) and a poor performance at that entitled The Battle of Britain, issued by the altitude. It also suffered from a continuous Air Ministry. This, if I may say so, is an series of teething troubles, and the single admirable account of the Battle for public con- Squadron equipped with this type was never fit sumption, and I am indebted to it, as well as for operations in my time. to the book Fighter Command, by Wing Com- 98. It is very difficult to give any kind of mander A. B: Austin, for help hi the compila- concise description, of the types of Enemy Air- tion of this Despatch. There is very little craft used during the Battle. The Germans, which I should have wished to alter, even if while adhering to broad standard types, were circumstances had permitted my seeing it be- continually modifying and improving them by fore publication (I was absent in America at fitting more powerful engines and altering the the time), but there are two points to which armament. The original Messerschmitt 109, I should like to draw attention:— for instance, had a performance comparable 105. In the diagram on page 7 the speed with that of the Hurricane, but the latest type of the. Hurricane is seriously over-rated at 335 could compete with the Spitfire, and 'had a ni.p.h. I carried out a series of trials to better ceiling. Some of them had 4 machine obtain the absolute and comparative speeds guns arid others had 2 machine guns and 2 of Hurricanes and Spitfires at optimum heights. cannons. Some of them were fitted to. carry Naturally the speeds of individual aircraft bombs and some were not. varied slightly, but the average speed of six 99. The Messerschmitt no was a twin- Hurricanes came out at about 305 m.p.h. engined fighter designed primarily for escorting 106. The second' point is of greater import- Bombers arid used also as a Fighter-Bomber. ance. I quote from page 33: " What the It was somewhat faster than the Hurricane, but Luftwaffe failed to .do was to destroy the naturally much lesfe manoeuvrable than the Fighter Squadrons of the Royal Air • Force, 4550 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 which were, indeed, stronger at the ~end of the are put forward as an honest approximation. battle"than at the beginning." (The italics Judging by results, they are perhaps not far are mine.) out. 107. This statement, even if intended only 114. The German claims were, of course, for popular con-sumption, tends to lead to an ludicrous; they may have been deceived about attitude of complacency which may be very our casualties, but they know they were lying dangerous in the future. Whatever the study about their own. of paper returns may have shown, the fact is that the situation was critical in the extreme. 115. I remember being cross-examined in Pilots had to be withdrawn from the Bomber August by the Secretary of State for Air about and Coastal Commands and from the Fleet the discrepancy. He was anxious about the Air Arm and flung into the Battle after hasty effect on the American people of the wide preparation. The majority of the squadrons divergence between the claims of the two sides. had been reduced to the sjatus of training units, I replied that the Americans would soon find and were fit only for operations against un- out the truth; if the Germans' figures were escorted bombers. . The remainder were accurate they would be in London in a week, battling daily against heavy odds. otherwise they would not. 108. The indomitable courage of the Fighter 116. Our estimate of German casualties, then, Pilots and the skill of their Leaders brought us may be taken as reasonably accurate for prac- through the crises, and the morale of the tical purposes; but our estimates of the strength Germans eventually cracked because of the in which attacks were made is based on much stupendous losses which they sustained. less reliable evidence. The Radio-Location system could give only a very approximate esti- 109. Any attempt to describe the events of mate of numbers and was sometimes in error the Battle day by day would make this Des- by three or four hundred per cent. This is no patch unduly long and wouHd prevent the reflection on the System, which was not de- reader from obtaining a comprehensive picture signed or intended to be accurate in the estima- of the events. I have therefore decided to tion of considerable numbers; moreover, several show the main features of each day's fighting stations were suffering from the effects of severe in an Appendix on which our own and the bombing attacks. As the average height of Germans' aircraft casualties will be shown operations increased, the Observer Corps be- graphically. I shall then be able to deal with came Jess and less able to make accurate esti- the progress of the Battle by phases, thus avoiding the tedious and confusing method of mates of numbers, and, in fact, formations were day-to-day description. The information is often quite invisible from the ground. given in Appendix D. 117. Even the numerical estimates made by no. As regards our casualties, we generally pilots who encountered large formations in the issued statements to the effect that we lost " x" air are likely to be guesswork in many instances. aircraft from Which " y " pilots were saved. Opportunities for deliberate counting of enemy This did not of course mean that " y " pilots aircraft were the exception rather than the rule. were ready immediately to continue the Battle. 118. Although Secret Intelligence sources Many of them were suffering from wounds, supplemented the information available, it is burns or other injuries which precluded their possible that on days of heavy fighting com- return to active flying temporarily or per- plete formations may have escaped recorded manently. observation altogether. in. It might also be assumed that all Ger- 119. This is unfortunate, because it is man crews who were in aircraft brought down obviously of the greatest importance to deter- during the Battle, were permanently lost to the mine the relative strengths of the Attack and Luftwaffe. because the fighting took place on the Defence, and to know the ratio of losses to our side of the Channel. Such an assumption aircraft employed which may be expected to would not be literally true, because the Ger- bring an attack to a standstill in a given time. mans succeeded in rescuing a proportion of their History will doubtless elucidate the uncer- crews from the sea by means of rescue boats, tainty, but perhaps not in tune for the informa- • floats and aircraft which will be later described. tion to be of use in the present war. 112. The decisive features of the Battle were 120. My personal opinion is that, on days of the Ratio of Casualties incurred by ourselves slight activity, our estimates are reasonably and the Germans, and the Ratio of Casualties accurate, but that they probably err on the low to the numbers actively employed on both sides. side on days of heavy fighting when many and Appendix D has been drawn up with these large formations were employed. points in mind. 121. As has been explained above, few 113. I must disclaim any exact accuracy in squadrons were fresh and intact when the Battle the estimates of Enemy losses. All that I can began. No sufficient respite has been granted say is that the utmost care was taken to arrive since the conclusion of the Dunkerque fighting at the closest possible approximation. Special- to rest the Squadrons which had not left the intelligence officers examined pilots individually Fighter Command, and to rebuild those which after their combats, and the figures claimed are had undergone the ordeal of fighting from aero- only those recorded as " Certain." If we allow dromes in Northern France. These last had for a percentage of over-statement, and the fact been driven from aerodrome to aerodrome, able that two or more Fighters were sometimes firing only to aim at self-preservation from almost at the same enemy aircraft without being aware continuous attack by Bombers and Fighters; of the fact, this can fairly be balanced by the they were desperately weary and had lost the certainty that a proportion of aircraft reported greater part of their equipment, since aircraft as " Probably Destroyed " or " Damaged " which were unserviceable only from slight failed to return to their bases. The figures, then, defects had to be abandoned. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4551 PART II.—THE BATTLE. 131. A close liaison was kept between Nos. 122. The Battle may be said to have divided 10 and ii and 12 Groups. It sometimes hap- itself broadly into 4 Phases: First, the attack pened that, in the heaviest attacks, practically on convoys and Coastal objectives, such as .all ii Group Fighters would be in the air. Ports, Coastal Aerodromes and Radio Location 11 Group would then ask 12 'Group to send a Stations. Second, the attack of Inland Fighter formation from Duxford to patrol over the Aerodromes. Third, the attack on London. aerodromes immediately East of London so that And fourth, the Fighter-Bomber stage, where these might not be attacked when defenceless. the target was of importance quite subsidiary 132. Mutual -help was also arranged between to the main object of drawing our Fighters into Nos. 10 and H Groups. When Portsmouth the air and engaging them in circumstances as was attacked, for instance, No. 10 would help disadvantageous to us as possible. These No. ii Group, and vice versa when the attack phases indicated only general tendencies; they was on Portland or some Convoy to the West overlapped and were not mutually exclusive. of the Isle of Wight. 123. It has been estimated that the Germans 133. The amount of physical damage done sent over, on an average throughout the Battle, to Convoys during the first phase was not ex- four Fighters to_each Bomber or Fighter- cessive. About five ships (I think) were Bomber, but any such estimate must be very actually 'sunk by bombing, others were rough. damaged, and Convoys were scattered on occasion. It was, of course, much easier to 124. I must emphasise, throughout, the protect the Convoys if-they kept as close as extreme versatility of the German methods both possible to-the English Coast, but one Convoy in the timing and direction of their attacks, and at least was routed so as to pass close to in the tactical formations and methods Cherbourg, and suffered accordingly. Later, employed. it was arranged that Convoys should traverse 125. They enjoyed the great advantage of the most dangerous and exposed stretches by having a wide front from which attacks could night, and Convoys steaming in daylight either- be delivered. First a blow would be delivered had direct protection by Fighter escorts, or else from Calais, perhaps against London; then after had escorts at " Readiness " prepared to leave a carefully-timed interval, when n Group the ground directly danger threatened. Fighters might be expected to, be at the end of ,134. Three of ,the Radio Location Stations their petrol endurance, a heavy attack would in the South of England suffered rather severe be made on Southampton and Portland. Other damage and casualties. No Station was per- attacks, after being built up to formidable manently put out of action, , and the worst dimensions, would prove to be only feints, and damage was repaired in about a month, though the Bombers would turn away before reaching the Station was working at reduced efficiency coast of England, only to return again in half in about half that time. The operating per- an hour, when the Fighters, sent up to intercept sonnel, and particularly the women, behaved them, were landing. with great courage under threat of attack and 126. Time-honoured methods of escort were actual bombardment. at first employed. A strong Fighter formation 135. As regards aerodromes, Manston was would fly a mile or so behind and above the the worst sufferer at this stage. It, Hawkinge Bombers. When the Germans found that our and Lympne were the three advanced grounds Fighters could deliver a well-timed attack on the on which we relied for filling up tanks when Bombers before the Fighters could intervene, a maximum range was required for operations or when our Fighters attacked from ahead or over France. They were so heavily attacked below, each move was met by a counter-move with bombs and machine guns that they were on the part of the Germans, so that, in Septem- temporarily abandoned. This is not to say ber, Fighter escorts were flying inside the that they could not have been used if the Bomber formation, others were below, and a need had been urgent, but, for interception series of Fighters stretched upwards to 30,000 at or about our own coastline, aerodromes and feet or more. satellites farther inland were quite effective. 127. One Squadron Leader described his im- 136. Heavy damage was done to buildings, pressions of the appearance of one of these but these were mostly non-essential, 'because raids; he said it was like looking up the escala- aircraft were kept dispersed in the open, and tor at Piccadilly Circus. the number of men and women employed was 128. I must pay a very sincere tribute to the not large in comparison with the number at Air Officer Commanding No. n Group, Air a Station which was the Headquarters of a Vice-Marshal K. R. Park, C.B., M.C., D.F.C., Sector. for the way in which he adjusted his tactics and 137. Works personnel, permanent and tem- interception methods to meet each new develop- porary, and detachments of Royal Engineers ment as it occurred. were employed in filling up the craterg on the 129. Tactical control was, as has already aero'dromes. Experience at this stage showed been stated, devolved to the Groups; but that neither the personnel nor the material pro- tactical methods were normally laid down by vided were adequate to effect repairs with the Command Headquarters. During periods of necessary speed, and the strength and mobility intense fighting, however, there was no time for of the repair parties was increased. Stocks consultation, and Air Vice-Marshal Park acted of " hard-core " rubble had been collected at from day to day on his own initiative. We Fighter aerodromes before the war. discussed matters as opportunity offered. 138. It may be convenient here to continue 130. He has reported on the tactical aspects the subject of damage to Fighter Stations other of the Battle in two very interesting documents, than those attacked in the first Phase. which are, however, too long to reproduce 139. Casualties to personnel were slight, ex- here. cept in cases where a direct hit was made on 4552 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 a shelter trench. The trenches commonly in outside the radius of anything aimed at the use were lined with concrete and were roofed Sector Aerodrome, and owed then* immunity to and covered with earth; but they gave no pro- inconspiouousness. Most of these were finished tection against a direct hit, and, in the nature by October 1940. of things, they had to-be within a short distance 148. Aerodrome Defence against parachute of the hangars and offices. troops, or threat of more serious ground attack, 140. Only non-essential personnel took coyer; was an important and a difficult problem, be- aircraft crews and the staff of the Operations cause Home Defence troops w'ere few and were Room remained at their posts. The morale needed on the Beaches, and the majority of of the men and women of ground crews and troops rescued from Dunkerque were dis- staffs was high and remained so throughout. organised and unarmed. The Commander-in- 141. At Kenley and at Biggin Hill direct Chief, Home Forces, did, however, make troops hits were sustained on shelter trenches, at the available in small numbers for the more im- latter place by a bomb of 500 kilog. or more. portant aerodromes and armoured vehicles were The trench and its 40 occupants were extemporised. The difficulty was enhanced by annihilated. a comparatively recent decision of the Air Ministry to disarm the rank ajjd file of the Royal •142. Wooden hangars were generally set on Air Force. The decision was reversed, 'but it fire by a bombing attack, and everything in was some time before rifles could be provided them destroyed. and men trained in their use. 143. Steel, briok and concrete hangars, on 149. The slender resources of the Anti-Air- the other hand, stood up well against attack, craft Command were strained to provide guns though, of course, acres of glass were broken. for the defence of the most important Fighter Hangars were generally empty or nearly so, and Bomber Aerodromes. High Altitude and and those aircraft which were destroyed in Bofors guns were provided up to the limit con- hangars were generally under repair or major sidered practicable, and the effort was rein- inspection which made it necessary to work forced by the use of Royal Air Force detach- under cover. ments with 'Lewis guns and some hundreds of 144. It must, nevertheless, be definitely re- 2O-mm. Cannon which were not immediately corded that the damage done to Fighter aero- required for use in Aircraft dromes, and to their communications and 150. A type of small Rocket was also in- ground organisation, was serious, and has been stalled at many aerodromes. These were generally under-estimated. Luckily, the arranged in lines along the perimeter, and Germans did not realise the success of their could be fired up to a height of something under efforts, and shifted their objectives before the 1,000 feet in the face of low-flying attack. They cumulative effect of the damage had become carried a small bomb on the end of a wire. apparent to them. Some limited success was claimed during a low- flying attack at Kenley, and they probably had 145. Damage to aerodrome surface was not some moral effect when their existence became a major difficulty. It was possible for the known to the Enemy. They were, of course, Germans to put one or two aerodromes like capable of physical effect only against very low Mansion and Hawkinge out of action for a horizontal attacks. time, but we had so many satellite aerodromes and landing grounds available that it was quite 151. The main safeguard for Aircraft against impossible for the Germans to damage seriously air attack was Dispersal. Some experiments a number of aerodromes sufficient to cause on Salisbury Plain in the Summer of 1938 had more than temporary inconvenience. shown that dispersal alone, without any form of splinter-proof protection, afforded a reason- 146. This is an important point, because, in able safeguard against the forms of attack prac- mobile warfare, Fighter aerodromes cannot be tised by our own Bomber Command at the hastily improvised in broken country, and the time. Thirty unserviceable 'Fighters were dis- number of aerodromes actually or potentially posed in a rough ring of about 1,000 yards available is a primary factor in the " Appre- diameter, and the Bomber Command attacked ciation of a Situation." them for the inside of a week with every missile 147. Sector Operations Rooms were protected between a 500-pound bomlb and an incendiary by high earth embankments, so that they were bullet, and without any kind of opposition. The immune from everything except a direct hit, result was substantially:—3 destroyed, i and, as a matter of fact, no direct hit by a damaged beyond repair, n seriously damaged heavy bomb was obtained on any Operations but repairable, and the rest slightly damaged or Room. Communications were, however, con- untouched. siderably interrupted, and I must here pay a 152. I therefore asked that small splinter- tribute to the foresight of Air Vice-Marshal proof pens for single aircraft should be provided E. L. Gossage, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C., at all Fighter Aerodromes. This was not who commanded No. n Group during the first approved, but I was offered pens for groups of eight months of the war. At his suggestion three. I had to agree to this, because it was " Stand-by" Operations Rooms were con- linked up with the provision of, all-weather structed at a distance of two or three miles from runways which I had been insistently de- Sector Headquarters, and a move was made manding for two years, and it was impera- to these when serious attacks on Fighter Aero- tively necessary that .work on the runways dromes began. They were somewhat incon- should not be held up by further discussion venient make-shifts, and some loss of efficiency about pens. I think that the 3-aircraft pens in Interception resulted from their -use. Work were too big. They had a large open face to was put in hand immediately on more perman- the front and a concrete area, of the size of two ent and fully-equipped Operations Rooms con- tennis courts, which made an ideal surface for veniently remote from Sector Headquarters; the bursting of direct-action bombs. Eventually, these though in no way bomb-proof, were splinter-proof partitions were made inside., the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, u SEPTEMBER, 1946 4553 pens, and till then some aircraft were parked Boats " and rescue launches were extensively in the open. Losses at dispersal points were employed, and white-painted float-planes, not serious; the worst in my recollection was 5 marked with the Red Cross, were used even in aircraft destroyed or seriously damaged in one the midst of battle. We had to make it attack. Small portable tents were provided known to the Germans that we could not which could be erected over the centre portion countenance the use of the Red Cross in this of an aeroplane, leaving the tail and wing-tips manner. They were engaged in rescuing com- exposed. These protected the most important batants and taking them back to fight again, and parts and enabled ground crews to work in bad they were also in a position, if granted weather. immunity, to make valuable reconnaisance re- 153. About this time an improvised Repair ports. In spite of this, surviving crews of these System was organised and worked*well. With aircraft appeared to be surprised and aggrieved the hearty co-operation of the Ministry of at being shot down. Aircraft Production it was decided that Units 157. Our own arrangements were less should be relieved of all extensive repairs and elaborate. Life-saving jackets were painted a overhauls, both because of their preoccupation conspicuous yellow, and later the fluorescine in the Battle s(iid because of the danger of device was copied. Patrol aircraft (not under further damage b'eing done by enemy action the Red Cross) looked out for immersed crews, to aircraft under repair. Broadly speaking, and a chain of rescue launches with special any aircraft capable of returning to its base communications was installed round the coast. was capable of another 15 minutes' straight Our own shipping, too, was often on the spot, flight to a Repair Depot: aircraft incapable of and many pilots were rescued by Naval or flight were sent by road. Small repairs, such Merchant vessels. as the patching of bullet holes, were done by the Unit. Two such Repair Depots were im- 158. This is perhaps a convenient oppor- provised about 30 miles to the west of London, tunity to say a word about the ethics of shoot- and this undoubtedly prevented an accumula- ing at aircraft crews who have " baled out " tion of unserviceable aircraft at Fighter Stations. in parachutes. 154. It was also about this time that the 159. Germans descending .over 'England are final decision was made to relegate the Defiant prospective Prisoners of War, and, as such, to night operations. It had two serious dis- should be immune. On the other hand, British abilities; firstly, the brain flying the aeroplane pilots descending over England are still poten- was not the brain firing the guns: the guns tial Combatants. could not fire within 16 Degrees of the line of 160. Much indignation was caused by the flight of the aeroplane and the gunner was dis- fact that German pilots sometimes fired on our tracted from his task by having to direct the descending airmen (although, in my opinion, pilot through the Communication Set. Secondly, they were perfectly entitled to do so), but the guns could not be fired below the horizontal, I am glad to say that in many cases they re- and it was therefore necessary to keep below frained and sometimes' greeted a helpless the enemy. When beset by superior numbers adversary with a cheerful wave of the hand. of Fighters the best course to pursue was to form a descending spiral, so that one or more 161. Many of the targets attacked during the Defiants should always be in a position to bring first two phases of the iBattle were of little effective fire to bear. Such tactics were, how- military importance, and had but slight effect ever, essentially defensive, and the formation on our War Effort. Exceptions to this were sometimes got broken up before they could be day-attacks carried out on the Spitfire works^at adopted. In practice, the Defiants suffered such Southampton and the sheds at Brooklarids heavy losses that it was necessary to relegate where some of our Hurricanes were assembled them to night fighting, or to the attack of un- and tested. Both these attacks had some effect escorted Bombers. on output, which would have been serious but for the anticipatory measures taken by Ldird 155. The above remarks have carried me be- Beaverbrook. yond the first phase of the Battle and into the second; but I find it impossible to adhere to •162. About this time one Canadian, two a description of the fighting phase by phase. Polish and one Czech squadrons became fit for The Enemy's Strategical, as well as his Operations. Tactical moves had to be met from day to day 163. A squadron of Canadian pilots of the as they occurred, and I give an account of my Royal Air Force (No. 242) had been in exist- problems and the lessons to be derived from ence for some months, and was one of the them roughly in the order of their incidence. squadrons which went to France in June to The detailed sequence of events is sufficiently cover the evacuation from the West Coast. On indicated in the Diagram at Appendix " D." its return it became one of the foremost fighting 156. Throughout the Battle, of course, fight- Squadrons in the Command, under the leader- ing continually occurred over the sea, and Ger- ship of the very gallant Squadron Leader (now man aircraft, damaged over England, had to Wing Commander) D. R. S. Bader, D.S.O., return across the Straits of Dover or the English D.F.C., No. i (Canadian) Squadron, now Channel. Far more German than British crews also came into the line and acquitted itself with fell into the sea. The Germans therefore de- great distinction. veloped an elaborate system of sea-rescue. 164. I must confess that I had been a liffle Their Bombers had inflatable rubber dinghies, doubtful of the effect which their experience in and various other rescue devices were adopted. their -own countries and in France might have Crews were provided with bags of a chemical had upon the Polish and Czech pilots, but my known as fluorescine, a small quantity of which doubts were soon laid to rest, because all three stained a large area of water a vivid green. Squadrons swung in the fight with a dash and Floating refuges with provisions and wireless enthusiasm which is beyond praise. They sets were anchored off the French coast. " E were inspired by a burning hatred for the 4554 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 Germans which made them very deadly oppon- Some of the distances involved were consider- ents. The first Polish Squadron. (No. 303) able, as for instance when a Squadron from in No. ii Group, during the course of a month, Wick had to be brought down in the London shot down more Germans than any British unit Area. in the same period. Other 'Poles and Czechs 170. The First-line strength of a Squadron were used in small numbers in British was 16 aircraft, of which not more than 12 Squadrons, and fought very gallantly, but the were intended to be operationally available language was a difficulty, and they were prob- at any one time. The other 4 would normally ably most efficiently employed in their own be undergoing Inspection or Overhaul. In National units. Other foreign pilots were em- addition to this there was a small reserve-of ployed in British Squadrons, but not in appre- three to five -aircraft per Squadron available ciable numbers. The American " Eagle " on the station. Squadron was in process of formation during the Battle. 171. There was a limit to the number of 165. The Auxiliary Squadrons were by this trained pilots which could be kept on the time practically indistinguishable from strength of a Squadron even in times of opera- Regulars. It will be remembered that the tional passivity, because not more than about Scottish Auxiliaries were responsible for the 25 could be kept in full practice in Flying first Air success of the War in the Firth of Duties. Forth. To set off against the discontinuity of 172. A fresh squadron coming into an active their training in peace time they had the great Sector would generally bring with them 16 advantage of permanency of personnel, and aircraft and about 20 trained pilots. They the Flight Commanders at the outbreak of the would normally fight until they were no longer War were senior and experienced. At the same capable of putting more than 9 aircraft into time, this very permanence led to the average the air, and then they had to be relieved. This age of the pilots being rather high for intensive process occupied different periods according to fighting, which exercises a strain which the the luck and skill of the unit. The normal average man of 30 cannot support indefinitely. period was a month to six weeks, but some This point has now ceased to be of importance units had to be replaced after a week or 10 because of fresh postings. It is mentioned days. only because it is a factor to be kept in mind 173. Air Vice Marshal Park found that the in peace time. -No praise can be too high for heaviest casualties were often incurred by the Auxiliaries, both as regards their keenness newly-arrived Squadrons owing to their non- and efficiency in peace time and their fighting famih'arity with the latest developments of air record in war. fighting. 166. I may perhaps mention the question of 174. It soon became impossible to main- the Long Range Guns which were mounted tain the to-and-fro progress of complete unit along the coast of France near Cap Grisnez. personnel from end to end of the country, and They were within range of our coastal aero- the first limitation to efficiency which had to be dromes, which they occasionally i subjected to accepted was the retention of the majority of a desultory shelling. Their main targets, how- personnel at' Sector Stations and the transfer ever, were Dover and the Convoys passing only of flying personnel and aircraft crews. through the Straits. So far as I am aware, This limitation was regrettable because it neither they nor the guns which we installed meant that officers and men were strange to as, counter measures, had any great influence one another, but worse was to come. on the air fighting, but they did of course make it impossible for any of our warships 175. By the beginning of September the to approach the French coast in clear weather, incidence of casualties became so serious that a and might have had an important effect if it fresh squadron would become depleted and ex- had been possible for the Germans to launch hausted before any of the resting and reform- an invading army. ing squadrons was ready to take its place. Fighter pilots were no longer being produced 167. About the end of the second phase, the in numbers sufficient to fill the gaps in the problems of keeping units up to strength and of fighting ranks. Transfers were made from the relieving them when exhausted began to assume Fleet Air Arm and from the Bomber and formidable proportions. It was no new experi- Coastal Commands, but these pilots naturally ence, because the drain of units and pilots to required a short flying course on Hurricanes France, coupled with the Dunkerque fighting, or Spitfires and some instruction in Formation had created similar problems in the Spring. Flying, Fighter Tactics and Interception 168. The comparative relaxation in the inten- procedure. sity of the fighting in June and July had 176. I considered, but discarded, the afforded a little respite, but units had only par- advisability of combining pairs of weak units tially recovered and were neither fresh nor up to into single Squadrons at full strength, for strength when the fighting again became several reasons, one of which was the difficulty intense. of recovery when a lull should come. Another 169. When Squadrons became exhausted, was that ground personnel would be wasted, obviously the most satisfactory way of rein- and a third was that the rate at which the foftement was by means of moving complete strength of the Command was decreasing units, and this was done when time allowed. would be obvious. Serviceable aircraft were transferred by air, and Operational Aircraft Crews (about 35 men 177. 1 decided to form 3 Categories of per Squadron) were transferred by Civil Air- Squadron: — craft put at my disposal for the moves. The (a) The units of n Group and on its remainder of the personnel travelled by train immediate flanks, which were bearing the or motor transport according to circumstances. brunt of the fighting. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4555 (6) A few outside units to be maintained 185. The lack of flexibility of the Training at operational strength and to be available system, therefore, proved to be the " bottle- as Unit Reliefs in cases where this was un- neck " and was the cause of the progressively avoidable. deteriorating situation of the Fighter Com- (c) The remaining Squadron? of the Com- mand up till the end of September. This state- mand, which would be stripped of their ment is in no sense a criticism of the Flying operational pilots, for; the benefit of the A Training Command; The problem, as I state Squadrons, down to a level of 5 or 6. These it here, can have no ideal solution and some C Squadrons could devote their main ener- compromise must be adopted. gies to the training of new pilots, and, ' 186. Assuming that in periods of maximum although they would not be fit to meet Ger- quiescence the Fighter Squadrons of the Royal man Fighters, they would be quite capable Air Force require an intake of x pilots per of defending their Sectors against unescorted week, in periods of intense activity they require Bombers, which would be all that they would about ten times the number. be likely to encounter. 187. It is necessary to start the flying train- 178. The necessity for resorting to such ing of a pilot about a year before he is ready measures as this indicates the strain which had to engage Enemy Fighters, and therefore the been put on the Fighter Command and the training authorities should be warned, a year Pilot Training organisations by the casualties ahead, of the incidence of active periods. This which the Command had suffered in this is obviously impossible. If they try to be ready decisive o Battle. for all eventualities by catering for a con- 179. In the early stages of the fight Mr. tinuous output to meet a high casualty rate/ Winston Churchill spoke with affectionate rail- the result is that, during quiet periods, pilots lery of me and my " Chicks. " He could are turned out at such a rate that they cannot have said nothing to make me more proud; be absorbed, or even given enough flying to every Chick was needed before the end. prevent their forgetting what they have been 180. I trust that I may be permitted to taught. If, on the other hand, they cater for record my appreciation of the help given me by the normal wastage rate, Fighter Squadrons are the support and confidence of the Prime Minis- starved of reinforcements when they are most ter at a difficult and critical time. vitally needed. 181. In the early days of the War the ques- 188. The fundamental principle which must tion of the provision .of Operational Training be realised is that Fighter needs, -when they, Units (or Group Pools, as they were called at arise, are not comparative with those of other that time) was under discussion. It was re- Commands, btit absolute. An adequate and ferred to in the correspondence which I have efficient Fighter force ensures the Security of mentioned in paragraph 17 of this Despatch. the Base, without which continuous operations At that time I was so gravely in need of addi- are impossible. tional Fighter Squadrons that I was willing to 189. -If the Fighter defence had failed in the do without Group Pools altogether while we Autumn of 1940, England would have -been in- were still at long range from the German vaded. The paralysis of their fighters in the Fighters. Spring was an important factor in the collapse 182. The functions of these Group Pools, or of the French resistance. Later, the unavoid- O.T.Us., was to accept pilots direct from Fly- able withdrawal of the Fighters from Crete ing Training Schools or non-fighter units of rendered continued resistance impossible. the Royal Air Force and train them in the 190. Day Bomber and Army Co-operation handling of Fighter types, formation flying, aircraft can operate when their. own Fighters fighting tactics, and R/T control and intercep- are predominant, but are driven out of the skj£ tion methods. I realised that the Fighters when the Enemy Fighters have a free hand. in Francs could not undertake this work and 191. I submit some suggestions by which must have a Group Pool allotted primarily to the apparently insuperable difficulties of the meet their requirements, but I felt that, so long problem may be reduced. as we at Home were out of touch with Ger- (a) Start by aiming at a Fighter output man Fighters, I would prefer to put all avail- well above that needed in quiescent periods. able resources into new Squadrons and to (&) Ensure that at Flying Training undertake in Service Squadrons the final Schools, pupils earmarked for other duties training of pilots coming from Flying Training may be rapidly switched over \ to Fighter Schools, provided that they had done some for- training. mation flying and night flying, and had fired -their guns in the air. (c) Organise the O.T.Us. with a " Normal " and an " Emergency " 183. Of course, when intensive fighting Syllabus, the latter lasting for three weeks began, final training of pilots in Squadrons and the former twice as long. could no longer be given efficiently, and at the (d) Fill up the Service Fighter Squadrons time of the Battle three O.T.Us, were in exist- to a strength of 25 pilots, or whatever the tence. It was found that three weeks was C.-in-C. considers to be the maximum which about the mimimum period which was of prac- can be kept in flying and operational' prac- iical value, but that a longer course, up to six tice. weeks, was desirable when circumstances (e) Form Reservoirs, either at O.T.Us, or permitted. in special units where surplus pilots may 184. During the Battle the output from the maintain the flying and operational standard O.T.Us. was quite inadequate to meet the which they have reached. casualty rate, and it was not even possible (/) When the initiative lies in our hands io supply from the Flying Training Schools the (as, for instance, when we are planning to necessary intake to the O.T.Us. deliver an offensive some time ahead), the 4556 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 intake of Flying Training Schools should be obeyed, but I fear that the instinct of duty adjusted to cater for the additional stress sometimes over-rode the sense of discipline. which can be foreseen. Other measures were also taken to provide (g) (And this applies principally to over- rest and relaxation at Stations, and sometimes seas theatres of war where rapid reinforce- to find billets for pilots where they could sleep ment is impossible.) 'Let the Day Bomber away from their Aerodromes. and Army Co-operation Squadrons have a 198. During this third phase the problem number of Fighters on which they can fly arose, in an acute (form, of the strength of and train as opportunity offers. This is a Fighter formations which we should employ. revolutionary suggestion, but it is made in When time was the essence of the problem, two all seriousness. If then- Fighters are over- squadrons were generally used by A.V.-M. Park whelmed the Day Bomber and Army Co- in No. ii Group. He had the responsibility operation units will not be able to operate of meeting attacks as far to the Eastward as at all. No very high standard of training possible, and the building

These, though disappointing, were not entirely Locators. It is probable that if Searchlights negligible; several Bombers were shot down in can substitute the speed of light for that of this area during the experimental period, and sound they may take on a new lease of useful many discovered that tney were pursued and life. turned back before reaching their objectives. 255. The disadvantage of relying entirely on Night Fighting Development work was also Radio-controlled methods of Night Interception gomg on at the same time at the Fighter Inter- is that " saturation point " is quickly reached, ception Unit at Tangmere in Sussex. and when mass raids are in progress only a 248. A supplementary use was found for the limited number of fighters can be operated. A.I. by the installation of A.I. " Beacons " Results obtained in the Spring of 1941 show in the vicinity of Night Flying Aerodromes. that Day Fighters can obtain important results These afforded a valuable Navigational aid for in conditions of good visibility, especially if " Homing " in cases where any defect occurred attention is paid to all methods of improving in the R/T D/F system. the night vision of pilots. 249. Shortly before I left the Command a 256. During the Battle the " Intruder" new piece of Radio-Location apparatus became system was initiated on a small scale. Night available in the shape of the " G.C.I." set with fighters without A.I. were sent across to France the Plan Position Indicator. ' This was an in an attempt to catch Bombers .while taking Inland-Reading Set which showed the position off from, or landing at, their aerodromes; or of all aircraft within its range on a fluorescent to intercept them at points where they habitually screen as the aerial was rotated. crossed the French Coast. 250. The main advantages of this set were 257. I had to leave the Development of Night that it had a longer range than the G.L. set Interception at a very interesting stage; but it and it was possible to track the Bomber and the is perhaps not too much to say that, although Fighter by the same apparatus instead of much remained to be done, the back of toe following one with the G.L. and the other by problem had been broken. The experiments R/T D/F. Moreover it was found that in had, of course, been carried out in a small area, some circumstances the accuracy of the and raiders which avoided the area could ibe R/T D/F method was inadequate for night intercepted only by previously existing methods; interceptions. but the possibilities had been demonstrated and' 251. On the other hand, the accuracy of could be applied on a larger scale as soon as height readings by the G.C.I, apparatus was the necessary apparatus was provided. less than that obtainable with the G.L. I under- 258. The method is, of course, also applic- stand that this has now been improved. able to the day interception of raiders making 252. Whatever the exact technical method use of cloud cover, which have hitherto proved of plotting positions and tracks of aircraft, the extremely elusive; and it is not too much to object was to place the Fighter behind the hope, that the eventual development of very Bomber, and in such a position that the echo high-frequency A.I. may enable accurate fire of the latter would show in the Fighter's A.I. to be opened against unseen targets, so that not set. The Fighter then tried to overtake the even the darkest night nor the densest cloud Bomber until it became visible to the naked will serve as a protection to the Raider. eye. 259. The day may come when every Single- 253. At that time only multi-seaters could Seater Fighter is fitted with A.I., but this is be fitted with A.I., and therefore, concurrently not yet feasible. What can be done is to fit all with the Night Interception experiments, Searchlights with Radio-Location apparatus so methods were tried of using the Searchlights'as that every Searchlight Beam' is a reliable pointer pointers for Night Fighters, even if the target towards an enemy, even if the range is too great were out of range of the Searchlight Beam. for direct illumination.* If then the Fighter Experiments were made with the Searchlights in can be informed in addition of the height of " clumps" to increase their illuminating the Raider, Day Fighters will be able to join power and the visibility of their beams to usefully and economically in night operations Fighters at a distance. on dark nights. 254. A small Radio-Location set was * As a result of the experience gained during this designed to fit to the Searchlight itself, so as period, all searchlight equipments have since been fitted with Radar control. This, combined with to get over the time-lag which was such an intensified training, has made them, since 1941, insuperable obstacle to the use of Sound extremely accurate.

APPENDIX "A."

FIGHTER COMMAND. Order of Battle, 8th July, 1940.

No. 10 GROUP.

Squadron. War Station. Type of Aircraft. 87 Exeter Hurricane. 213 Exeter Hurricane. 92 Pembrey Spitfire. 234 St. Eval Spitfire. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946

APPENDIX "A."—con*.

No. ii GROUP.

43 Tangmere Hurricane. 145 Tangmere Hurricane. 601 Tangmere Hurricane. FIU Unit Tangmere Blenheim. 64 Kenley Spitfire. 6i5 Kenley Hurricane. 245 Hawkinge Hurricane. in Croydon Hurricane. 5oi Croydon Hurricane. 600 Manston Blenheim. 79 Biggin Hill Hurricane. 610 Gravesend Spitfire. 32 Biggin Hill Hurricane. 54 Rochford Spitfire. 65 Hornchurch Spitfire. 74 Hornchurch Spitfire. 56 North Weald Hurricane. 25 Martlesham Blenheim. North Weald Hurricane. Northolt Hurricane. 604 Northolt Blenheim. 609 Northolt Spitfire. 236 Middle Wallop Blenheim.

No. 12 GROUP. Duxf ord Spitfire. 26A4 Duxford Defiant. 85 Debden Hurricane. 17 Debden Hurricane. Digby Blenheim. Digby Spitfire. 46 Digby Hurricane. 23 Wittering Blenheim. 266 Wittering Spitfire. 229 Wittering Hurricane. 66 Coltishall Spitfire. 253 Kirton-in-Lindsey Hurricane. 222 Kirton-m-Lindsey Spitfire.

No. 13 GROUP. Squadron. War Station. Type of Aircraft. Catterick Spitfire. 219 Catterick Blenheim. 152 Acklington Spitfire. 72 Acklington Spitfire. 249 Leconfield Hurricane. 616 Leconfield Spitfire. 603 Turnhouse Spitfire. 141 Turnhouse Defiant. 602 Drem Spitfire. 603 B Montrose Spitfire. 3 Wick Hurricane. 504 Wick Hurricane.

NON-OPERATIONAL SQUADRONS. (Forming or reforming.) Group. Squadron. Aerodrome. Type of Aircraft. 10 Group 238 Middle Wallop Hurricane. i (Canadian) Middle Wallop Hurricane. 11 Group 257 Hendon Hurricane. 12 Group 242 Coltishall Hurricane. 13 Group 73 Church Fenton Hurricane. 605 Drem Hurricane. 607 Usworth Hurricane. 263 Grangemouth Hurricane. 4563 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946

APPENDIX " C." (iii) Searchlights. Searchlights were deployed in single light 6TH A.A. DIVISION, JULY-OCTOBER 1940. stations at approximately 6,000 yards spacing (Note.—This report relates only to 6th A.A. throughout the area, but with a closer spacing Division. It does not cover the operations of in certain instances along the coast and in A.A. Command as a whole.) " gun defended areas" where the distance between lights was approximately 3,500 yards. Glossary of Abbreviations. These lights were deployed on a brigade H.A.A Heavy Anti-Aircraft. basis following R.A.F. sectors, and each light L.A.A Light Anti-Aircraft. was connected by direct telephone line and/or G.O.R Gun Operations R.T. set No. 17 to Battery Headquarters via Room. troop H.Q. and thence to an army telephone A.A.L.M.G. ... Anti-Aircraft Light board at the R.A.F. Sector Operations Room. Machine-Gun. • The equipment of a Searchlight site con- V.I.E Visual Indicator sisted of the following:— Equipment. go-cm. Projector with, in most cases, G.P.O. Gun Position Officer. Sound Locator Mk. III. In some instances G.L Radio Location Set sites were equipped with Sound Locators for Gun Laying. Mk. VIII or Mk. IX. During the late V.P Vulnerable Point. Summer and Autumn the number of Mk. F.A.S Forward Area Sight. VIII and Mk. IX Sound Locators gradually S.O.R Sector Operator's increased, and V.I.E. equipment and 150-011. Room. Projectors were introduced. Each Search- G.D.A Gun Defended Area. light site was equipped with one A.A.L.M.G. for use against low-flying aircraft and for i. Layout of A.A. Defences. ground defence. (a) The area covered by 6th A.A. Division coincided: with the R.A.F. sectors Debden, 2. Enemy Tactics. North Weald, Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and (a) High Level Bombing Attacks. Kenley (i.e., the major part of No. n Fighter These took place generally between heights Group, R.A.F.). Thus the coastal boundary of 16,000/20,000 feet. Bombers approached extended from Lowestoft (exclusive) in the their targets in close protective formations until North to Worthing (exclusive) in the South; running up to the line of bomb release, when the internal boundary marching with that of formation was changed to Line Astern (if there the Metropolitan area. was a definite objective to the attack). Attacks (b) Distribution of A.A. defences was briefly frequently occurred in waves, each wave flying as follows:— at approximately the same height and on the same course. On engagement by H.A \. guns, (i) H.A.A. Guns. avoiding action was taken in three stages:— The Divisional area contained four main Stage i.—The bombers .gained height " gun defended areas " at Harwich, Thames steadily and maintained course and forma- and Medway North (guns emplaced along the tion. North bank of the Thames Fjstuary), Thames Stage 2.—Formations opened out widely and Medway South (guns emplaced along the and maintained course. South bank of the Thames Estuary and de- fending Chatham and Rochester) and Dover Stage 3.—Under heavy fire, formations (including Folkestone). In addition, H.A.A. split and bombers scattered widely on dif- guns were deployed for the defence of certain ferent courses. It was after this stage had aerodromes. been reached that the best opportunity was provided for fighters to engage. Each " gun defended area " was based on a Gun Operations Room: at Felixstowe, Vange, (b) Low Level and Dive Bombing Attacks. Chatham and Dover respectively. This In the latter stages of the enemy air offensive G.O.R. was connected directly to n Fighter numerous instances of low level and dive bomb- Group Operations Room at Uxbridge, from ing attacks occurred, in particular against which it received plots of enemy raids, which fighter aerodromes (Manston, Hawkinge, were in turn passed down to all gun sites. Lympne, Kenley). The armament of each H.A.A. site consisted L.A.A. and H.A.A. employed in dealing with of the following: 4 (sometimes 2) 4.5, 3.7 or these forms of attack met with varying success, 3-inch guns with predictor. Appendix " A " but in cases where no planes were brought shows the H.A.A. defences as at the beginning down the effect of fire from the A.A. defence of August 1940 and the end of October 1940. almost invariably disconcerted the dive bomber so that few bombs were dropped with accuracy. (ii) L.A.A. Guns. Considerable efforts were made by Me. log's 45 Vulnerable Points in the Divisional area and Ju. 87*5 to destroy the balloon barrage were defended by L.A.A. guns. These V.Ps. at Dover, and, though at times they partially consisted of Air Ministry Experimental Stations, succeeded, excellent targets were provided for Fighter Aerodromes, Dockyards, Oil Depots, the Dover H.A.A. and L.A.A. guns. Magazines, Industrial Undertakings and Factories. 3. Part played by H.A.A. Guns. Armament consisted of the following guns: Targets of all types presented themselves to 40-mm. Bofors (with Predictor No. 3 and H.A.A. sites, ranging from solid bomber for- Forward Area Sights), 3-inch, 20 cwt. (Case mation to single cloud hopping or dive I), A.A.L.M.G. and 20-mm. Hispano. Appen- bombers, balloon strafers or hedge hoppers, all dix " B " shows the V.Ps. with their arma- of which were successfully engaged by appro- ment as in August and October 1940. priate method of fire. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4563

The action of the defence achieved success Tilbury Docks, Chatham Dockyard, Sheerness in the following ways:— Dockyaid, Dover Harbour, Purfleet Oil and (a) The actual destruction or disablement Ammunition Depots. of enemy aircraft (see Appendix "C"). This barrage could be employed at any time (b) The breaking up of formations, thus at the discretion of the G.P.O. when he con- •enabling the R.A.F. to press home attacks sidered that other and more accurate methods on smaller groups of bombers. were unlikely to be effective. The barrage (c) Destroying the accuracy of their was designed for a height of 3,000 feet and bombing by forcing the enemy aircraft to assumed a dive angle of 60°. 'It was based take avoiding action. on a barrage circle round each gun site which (d) By pointing out to patrolling fighters was divided into 4 quadrants in which the the whereabouts of enemy formations by barrages were placed. means of shell bursts. The maximum effort from H.A.A. guns was The following methods of fire were in opera- required from the igth August to the 5th tion at this period:— October, during which time the crews had little rest, continuous 24 'horn's manning being (a) Seen Targets. required at Dover, a " duty gun station" (i) Each gun site was allotted a zone of system being worked in all areas. priority and responsibility for opening fire on Evidence is available to show how time and a target rested with the G.P.O. time again enemy bombers would not, face (ii) Targets could be engaged by day if orp to the heavy and accurate fire put up by identified as hostile beyond reasonable doubt gun stations. r Particularly worthy of mention or if a hostile act was committed. By night, are two attacks on Hornchurch aerodrome when failure to give recognition signals was an addi- on both occasions fighters were on the ground tional proviso. for refuelling. A.A. fire broke up the forma- (iii) It was the responsibility of the G.P.O. tion and prevented any damage to the station to cease fire when fighters closed to the attack. buildings and aircraft on the ground. (b) Unseen Targets. 4. Part played by L.A.A. Guns. Unseen firing at this time was in its infancy and considerable initiative was displayed in The targets which offered themselves to L.A.A. evolving methods for engaging targets unseen guns were in the main small numbers engaged by day or by night. in dive bombing or low level attacks on V.Ps. •Opportunity usually only offered fleeting tar- The following methods were employed: — gets, and quickness of thought and action was (i) Geographic Barrages. essential to make fullest use of the targets Many forms of barrage were used by different which presented themselves. G.D.As. but all were based on obtaining con- Success against targets by L.A.A. guns was centrations at a point, on a line, or over an achieved in the following ways: — area, through which the enemy aircraft must (a) The destruction or disablement of fly. 'enemy aircraft (See Appendix " C "). Suitable barrages for lines of approach and (6) The prevention of accurate bombing heights were worked out beforehand. Approach causing the bombers to pull out of their of enemy aircraft was observed by G.L. and, dive earlier than they intended. by co-ordination at G.O.Rs., the fire from each Methods of firing employed by L.A.A. guns site could be controlled to bring a maximum as follows: — concentration of shell bursts at the required point. (i) Bofors. Fire was directed either by No. 3 Predictor (ii) Precision Engagements. or by Forward area Sights; some Bofors were Method jl.y-Due to poor visibility or wrong not equipped with the Predictor when the latter speed settings searchlight intersections were method only could .be used. often made without actual illumination of the The Predictor equipped guns require a 130 aircraft. By obtaining slant range from G.L. Volt A.C. electric supply which was provided and following the intersection on the Predictor, either from engine-driven generators or from sufficient data were available to enable shells the mains. Shooting with the Predictor to burst at or near the intersection. achieved very great accuracy and the results Method B—This provided for engagement and destruction of aircraft and the average without searchlight intersections. Continuous ammunition expenditure .proved the efficiency bearings and slant ranges from the G.L. were of this equipment (see Appendix " C "). The fed into the Predictor and engagement of target F.A.S. method permitted quick engagements of undertaken on the data thus provided. For targets although without the accuracy afforded sites which were not equipped with°G.L. the by the Predictor. appropriate information was passed down from G.O.R. (ii) 3-inch 2O-cwt. Guns (Case I). It w'll be appreciated that procedure varied Some V.Ps. were equipped with the 3-inch with different Gun Zones, according to circum- 20-cwt. gun without Predictor which was fired stances and the equipment available. It should from deflection sights; shrapnel was normally be remembered that all engagements of unseen used. H.E., however, was used for targets at targets were subject to the express permission greater height. of the Group Controller at Uxbridge, so that (iii) A.A.L.M.G. danger of engaging friendly aircraft was Lewis Guns on A.A. mountings proved ex- obviated. tremely effective in attacking low-flying enemy' (c) Anti-Dive-Bombing Barrage. aircraft. These guns were mounted in single, Special barrages against dive bombers were double or quadruple mountings and were fired organised round the following V.Ps.: Harwich by the Hosepipe method using tracer ammuni- Harbour, Thameshaven Oil Installations, tion. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946

(iv) Hispano ZQ-mm. Equipment. (6) That G.L. sets sited in an anti-ship role, A few of these weapons only were deployed i.e., on the top of a cliff, were of consider- and, owing to shortage of ammunition and able value in detecting low-flying aircraft. (c) It showed the value of small R.D.F. lack of tracer, were not found very effective. detectors within the main R.A.F. chain, in plotting enemy aircraft direct to sectors. 5. Part Played by Searchlights. At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, (a) Day. 21 G.L. sets were in use by 6th A.A. Division, •Owing to the close spacing of Searchlight and by October this number had been increased sites they formed a valuable source of intelli- by another 14. gence and rapid reports were able to be made (i) G.L. at Gun Stations. upwards of casualties to friendly and enemy aircraft, pilots descending by parachute and The main function of these equipments was other incidents of importance. In addition, to provide data for Unseen target engagements they have 'been able to provide valuable reports as described above. One other function of these of isolated enemy aircraft, trace of which had sets is worth special mention. been lost by the Observer Corps. Two sets were specially sited on the cliffs at Dover to pick up targets at low level. These The value of the A.A.L.M.G. with which sets were able to register aircraft taking off each site was equipped cannot be too highly from the aerodromes immediately behind stressed, and during the 4 months under re- Calais, thereby obtaining information consider- view no less than 23 enemy aircraft were ably earlier than could be provided by the destroyed, confirmed, by AlA.L.M.G. at main R'.D.F. station on the coast. This in- Searchlight sites -(this includes a few in which formation was reported back to Oxbridge A.A.L.M.G. at H.A.A. sites also shared). Operations Room by a priority code message Prisoner of War reports showed that it was not which indicated the approximate number of generally known by the German Air Force aircraft which had taken off and their position. pilots that Searchlight sites were equipped with This report was received some 5/6 minutes be- A.A. defence. fore it could be received through the usual R.D.F. channels, and therefore enabled the (b) Night. Controller to order his Fighters off the ground Tactical employment of Searchlights at night correspondingly earlier than would otherwise was by either— have been the case. (i) 3-beam rule, in which 3 sites only This system, which was also adopted some- engaged the target; or what further along the coast in the neighbour- (ii) by the Master-beam system, in which hood of Beaclry Head, was of all the more one Master beam per three sites exposed value as the enemy were heavily bombing the and was followed by the remaining two R.D.F. stations, which were consequently beams acting under the orders of the Master sometimes out of action. •beam. ° The decision to engage was the responsibility (ii) G.L. Stations with Searchlights. of the Detachment Commander, and no direct During the latter stages of the offensive, tactical control was exercised from Battery when the night raids on London commenced, Headquarters. it was realised that the G.L. would be of con- siderable assistance to Night Fighters. An In the early stages of the Battle of Britain " elevation " attachment to the equipment was night activity was on a small scale and Search- produced and this enabled height to be ob- lights had few raids to engage. Some illumina- tained, which in conjunction with a plotting tions were effected, but throughout it was diffi- scheme at S.O.R., enabled Searchlight beams cult, by ground observations, to assess the to be directed more accurately on a target to actual numbers. Frequently illuminations were assist night fighters. The results obtained from reported by sites not engaging the targets. The this were not completely satisfactory, but they difficulty of illumination was increased as the •showed the way to the development of the number of night raids increased, owing to the present system. difficulty of sites selecting the same target. There is evidence to show that Searchlight (iii) Mine-Laying Aircraft. activity, whilst being difficult to measure, forced It was found that the experiments conducted enemy aircraft to fly at a greater height than in the iship-detector role could be very satis- they would otherwise have done. Bombs were factorily applied to detecting mine-laying air- frequently dropped when enemy aircraft were craft which flew in at a height too low to be illuminated, which were possibly intended to picked up., by the C.H. Stations. It enabled discourage Searchlights from exposing. accurate tracks of these aircraft to be kept Evasive tactics by fthe enemy consisted of which were .afterwards passed to the Naval changing height and speed continuously to Authorities, -who were then able to sweep up avoid being illuminated rather than a violent the mines which had been laid by these air- evasive action upon illumination. craft. 6. G.L. Equipment. 7. Statistics. At the beginning of August experiments had Careful records have been kept of ammuni- just been completed to determine whether G.L. tion expenditure and enemy aircraft shot down, equipment could satisfactorily be used as a and details are shown in Appendix " C." Ships detector. Apart from the results of this experiment three other facts emerged:— The following points are worthy of note:— (a) The G.L. principle was of considerable (a] The total enemy aircraft Destroyed, Con- value when used in conjunction with Search- firmed Category I by 6th A.A. Division during lights. the months July-October 1940, inclusive, was SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4565

221; of this total 104 were destroyed on seven (b) Other lessons learnt are by comparison days, thus:— of minor import. Chief among them was the 15 August, 1940 15 great vulnerability of aircraft if caught by 18 ,, ,, 22 accurate H.A.A. fire when in close formation. 24 ,, ,, 10 A good instance of this occurred in an action 3i ., ,, 20 on the 8th September, when a geschwader of 2 September, 1940 ... 13 15 Do. 173, flying in formation at 15,000 feet, 7 M ,, ... 14 approached a gun site South of River Thames. 15 » ,, ... 10 The opening salvo from the four 3.7-inch guns brought down the three leading aircraft, the 104 remaining machines turning back in disorder, scattering their bombs on the countryside in (6) A considerable number of enemy aircraft their night to the coast. • were claimed as Probably Destroyed and The value of H.A.A. fire as a means of Damaged. breaking up bomber squadrons to enable them (c) The total amount of H.A.A. expended to be more easily dealt with by our fighters was was 75,000 rounds. demonstrated on numerous occasions in the Thames Estuary. (d) The total amount of Bofors ammunition expended was 9,417 rounds. The importance of A.A. shell bursts as a "pointer" to fighters, even though1 the guns cannot themselves effectively engage the 8. Ground Defence enemy, was also frequently demonstrated. Preparations were made by all A.A. defences (c) A somewhat negative lesson was the in- to assume a secondary ground defence r61e; ability of A.A. guns, however well served, to Bofors were provided with A/T ammunition, completely deny an area to penetration by and sited to cover approaches to aerodromes, determined air attack. Evidence, however, V.Ps., #c. Certain 3.7 inch guns suitably sited was overwhelming that accurate fire, apart from were given an anti-ship role, and preparations causing casualties, did impair the enemy's aim, were made for barrages to be put on certain and thus avoid, or at least mitigate, -the damage beaches. Under the immediate threat of in- to precise targets. vasion in May 1940, mobile columns of A.A. (d) A rather unexpected result was the high troops were formed, but these troops reverted proportion (about 10 per cent.) of .-planes to their A.A. rdle before the Battle of Britain brought down by A.A.L.M.G. fire. It is doubt- began. ful, however, whether with the increased 9. Lessons Learnt. armour now carried by enemy aircraft thu lesson still obtains. (a) The outstanding lesson learnt from this intensive air attack was undoubtedly the sound- (e) The value of training in recognition was ness and suitability of the organisation and repeatedly emphasised throughout these opera- arrangements of the control and direction of tions. Fortunately, very few instances of the anti-aircraft defences. These measures de- friendly aircraft being engaged occurred. Apart vised in peace time and perfected during the from the accuracy of the information as to earlier arid quieter period of hostilities, stood movement of aircraft furnished to gun sites, the severe test with amazing resilience and this was no doubt due to a reasonable standard adaptability. No major alterations in the in recognition having been attained. system were indicated or, indeed, were made It was, and still is, continually brought home subsequent to these operations.* The way in to the A.A. gunner that, before all else, he which the activities of the anti-aircraft linked must not engage a friendly aircraft." With this in and were capable of co-ordination with the thought firmly impressed on the G.P.O., some major partners in the venture—R.A.F. Fighter instances of late engagement or failure to engage Command, No. n Fighter Group, and sector perforce occurred. In some cases, had the commands—is perhaps worthy of special note. standard of training been higher, to enable the earlier recognition of a machine as " hostile * This ' statement applies only to the higher beyond reasonable doubt," the number of organisation, and must not be taken to mean that no improvements were made in the control and machines destroyed would have been increased. direction of A.A. gunnery. Chelmsford, August 2, 1941.

APPENDIX "C.A."

H.A.A. GUN DEFENDED AREAS AND ARMAMENT.

August 1940. October 1940. G.D.A. 4-5-in. 3-7-in. 3-in. 4-5-in. 3-7-in. ., 3-in.

15 8 8 7 T and M North ... 32 8 12° 24 4 12 T and M. South ... 32 32 14 28, 20 10 Dover and Manston 12 16 12 16 \Vattisham 4 ' 4 Biggin Hill 4 > 4 Kenley 2 North Weald + 4 4 + 2 4

D 4566 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, u SEPTEMBER, 1946

APPENDIX "C.B." L.A.A., V.P.'s AND ARMAMENT.

August 1940. October 1940.

V.P. A.A.L.M.G. 4O-mm. (No. of His- 3-in.t Misc. 4O-mm. A..A.L.M.G. His- 3-in- Misc. Barrels). sauo. Case I. mno. Case I. Aerodromes. Debden, ... — — 4 3 — 4 17 — Wattisham 12 — — 8 — 4 — — — Biggin Hill 3 2 — — 6 „ 3 Manston — — — — — — 4 4 — 4 4 — — West Mailing ... 2 10 — — 10 — — — 4 — — Croydon 12 — 8 — — 4 — Kenley ... 8 — 2 10 — 4 — 4 — 3 — Redhill — 3 — — — — — — — Gravesend 4 4 4 — Shorts (Rochester — — —8 — — • — 4 3 — Detling — — 2 12 2 — —• — — Eastchurch — — 2 IO Hawkinge — — — — — — 4 4 4 4 — — Lympne — — 2 — North Weald ... 12 — — — 8 — 3 5 — — Martlesham IO — — II — 4 — 4 — Rochford 2 8 — — 4 12 — Hornchurch — — 3 * 7 5 7 — — Stapleford — — 2 Abbotts — — — — A.M.E. Stations. Darsham 2 — 2 8 7 — — — Dunkirk 3 6 3 7 Rye 6 — — ii — — 3 3 — — Pevensey 6 — — 21 3 — 3 — Bawdsey — 3 3 — — — — ii — — Great Bromley . . . 3 — Canewdon — — — — 12 — 3 4 — — 3 — Industrial and Oil Cray ford 8 — 30 i — — 3 3 — Dartford i 2O 4 — — — — 16 — — Northfleet —. — —2 — — —2 2 i — Grain (Barges) ... 4 34 — Chelmsford 8 . 2 21 — — — — Murex (Rainhamj 20 20 — Purfleet — 2 — 16 2 — 14 — Canvey ... 12 — 2 — — 12 I — — — Thameshaven ... 4 4 3 Shellhaven — 8 — — —8 i — — 3 — — Naval. Chatham _ 24 4 3 Chattenden — — — — 28 — Sheerness — — — — 22 — — — 4 5 — — Landguard — — 15 i Wrabness — — — — — 23 — — Parkeston Quay — — — — — 10 — — — — — Dover 5 —9 — 4 —9 16 4 4A/T Tilbury — __ — 18 — M — — — Southend Pier . . . _— •—~ i — 2-pd— r ~~~ •—- — i — 2-pdr.

APPENDIX "C.C." I.—AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE AND CLAIMS, CATEGORY I.

Expended. Destroyed. per E/A.

H.A.A. (seen targets) 48, MS 161 208 H.A.A. (barrage and unseen fire) 26,869 ii 2,444 L.A.A. Bofors only 9,417 47 200 A.A.L.M.G. (at S.L. and H.A.F. sites) Not recorded 23

NOTES :— (i) The above table gives records from September 3, 1939 to November 3, 1940. (ii) The total enemy aircraft destroyed during the months inclusive July-October was 221. (iii) The following ammunition was expended from September 3, 1939 to June 30, 1940— H.A.A. ... ° 2,995 L.A.A. (Bofors) ...... 1,919 (iv) All the enemy aircraft destroyed by L.A.A. (47) have been credited to Bofors for the purpose of the average ; in practice, Lewis guns had a considerable share in several of these as well as in two cases Hispano (2,941 rounds) and 3-in. Case I (194 rounds), (v) Bofors average may be still further sub-divided thus :— With Predictor 179 (3,187 rounds) With F.A.S...... 232 (6,230 rounds) SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4567

APPENDIX "C.C."—cont.

II.—TABLE SHOWING TYPES OF AIRCRAFT DESTROYED JULY-OCTOBER 1940. Type. No. HE. Ill 30 Do. 17 39 Do. 215 14 J«. 87 15 Ju. 88 19 Me. 109 80 ME. no 15 Unidentified 9 221 III. Destroyed by day 203 Destroyed by night • 18

221

APPENDIX "C.D." AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED THROUGHOUT- ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND FOR JULY, AUGUST .AND SEPTEMBER 1940. July 1940— Day* .. \344 r(^s- Per aircraft. Night •// I(2 6- a/'c =~ 8,93- 5 rds.) August 1940— Day* \232 rds. per aircraft. Night f (167 a/c = 38,764 rds.) September 1940— Dayf \I»798 rds. per aircraft. Night / (144 a/c = 258,808 rds.)

* Mainly by day, little night activity. | Including considerable night activity and large expenditure of ammunition by night.

APPENDIX "E."

FIGHTER COMMAND.

Order of Battle, November 3, 1940.

No. 9 GROUP. Squadron. War Station. Type of Aircraft. Category. 312 (Czech) Speke • Hurricane C 6n Ternhill Spitfire C 29 ($) Ternhill Blenheim Night-Flying

No. 10 GROUP. 79 Pembrey Hurricane C 87 (£) Bibury Hurricane B 504 .Filton Hurricane C 609 Middle Wallop Spitfire A 604 ' Middle Wallop Blenheim Night-Flying 238 Middle Wallop Hurricane A 56 Boscombe Down Hurricane A 152 Warmwell Spitfire A 601 Exeter -' -^Hurricane C 87 (£) Exeter ' . Hurricane B 234 St. Eval Spitfire C 247 (J) Roborough Gladiator C 4568 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946

APPENDIX "E."—-cont No. ii GROUP. 25 Debden Blenheim and Night-Flying Beaufighter 73 Castle Camp Hurricane Night-Flying *7 Martlesham Hurricane A 229 Northolt Hurricane A 615 • Northolt Hurricane A 302 (Polish) Northolt Hurricane A 257 North Weald Hurricane A 249 North Weald Hurricane A 46 Stapleford Hurricane A 264 Hornchurch Defiant Night-Flying 4i Hornchurch Spitfire A 603 Hornchurch Spitfire A 222 Rochford Spitfire A 141 Gravesend Defiant Night-Flying 74 Biggin Hill Spitfire A 92 Biggin Hill Spitfire A 66 West Mailing Spitfire A 42i (|) West Mailing Hurricane Reconnaissance 605 Croydon Hurricane A 253 Kenley Hurricane A Kenley Hurricane A 219 Redhill Blenheim and Night-Flying Beaufighter 145 Tangmere Hurricane A 213 Tangmere Hurricane Night-Flying 422 Tangmere Hurricane Night-Flying 602 West Hampnett Spitfire A 23 Ford Blenheim Night-Flying

No. 12 GROUP. Squadron. War Station. Type of Aircraft. Category. 303 (Polish) Leconfield Hurricane C 616 Kirton-in-Lindsey Spitfire C 85 Kirton-in-Lindsey Hurricane C 151 Digby Hurricane C i Wittering Hurricane C 266 Wittering Spitfire C 29(1) Wittering Blenheim Night-Flying 72 Coltishall Spitfire C 64 Coltishall Spitfire C 242 Duxford Hurricane A 310 (Czech) Duxford Hurricane A 19 Duxford Spitfire A

No. 13 GROUP. 607 Turnhouse Hurricane C 65 Turnhouse Spitfire B 232 (£) Drem Hurricane C 263 (*) Drem Hurricane C i -(Canadian) Prestwick Hurricane C 32 • Acklington Hurricane C 610 Acklington Spitfire C 600 (£) Acklington Blenheim Night-Flying 43 Usworth Hurricane C 54 Catterick Spitfire C 600 (£) Catterick Blenheim Night-Flying 245 Aldergrove Hurricane C

No. 14 GROUP. Castletown Hurricane Dyce Hurricane Montrose Hurricane SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4569 APPENDIX "E."—cont. NON-OPERATIONAL SQUADRONS. Group. Squadron. Station. Type of Aircraft. g Group 308 (Polish) Baginton Hurricane 12 Group 306 (Polish) Church Fenton Hurricane 307 (Polish) Kirton-in-Lindsey Defiant 71 (Eagle) Church Fenton Buffalo 13 Group 263 (« Drem Whirlwind

NOTE.—Two " B " Squadrons, Nos. 74 and 145, had already been thrown into the battle, leaving only two available at the end.

APPENDIX " F." 8. The Germans soon began to fit fuselage NOTE ON THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE armour to protect their pilots and crews, but EQUIPMENT OF AIRCRAFT. for some unexplained reason neither side had fitted armour behind the engines of their 1. The general principle of. developing the Bombers. The back of the engine is much more maximum possible fire power, which is vulnerable to rifle-calibre bullets than the front, accepted in all Armies and Navies, must pre- owing to the mass of ancillary equipment which sumably be applicable to Fighter Aircraft, pro- is there installed. While the back of the engine vided that this can be done without unduly lies open to attack, the rifle-calibre machine sacrificing Performance and Endurance. gun remains a useful weapon, and the fact is 2. The 8-gun fighter may be said to a fortunate one for us. exemplify this principle, and at the beginning of the war its results were decisive against Ger- 9. The application of armour to Bombers did man Bombers, which were unarmoured at that not, of course, come as a surprise to us, and time. its implications had long been discussed. 3. Our Fighter pilots were protected against 10. Excluding devices such as hanging wires, the return fire of Bombers by their engines, and exploding pilotless aircraft, etc., I have always by bullet-proof glass and armour, for their thought that the courses open to the Fighter, heads and chests respectively. when rifle-calibre machine-gun fire from astern becomes ineffective, may be summarised as 4. Furthermore, at this time the return fire follows: — from German Bombers was negligible. They had concentrated on Performance as the prin- (A) Deliver fire from ahead or from a flank. ciple means of evasion (a false lesson drawn (B) Pierce the armour. from the low speed of the Fighters used in the (C) Attack the fuel tanks with incendiary Spanish War) and the few guns which they ammunition. carried were manually controlled, and so badly (D) Destroy the structure of the aircraft by mounted that they were practically useless. means of direct hits from explosive shells. These facts, in combination with the fire power (E) Use large shells with Time and Per- and armour protection of our own Fighters, cussion fuzes. made the latter virtually immune to the fire Discussing these in order: — of unescorted Bombers, and their casualties in ii.—(A) Fire from ahead or from a flank is Home Defence fighting up to the Spring of effective but difficult to deliver accurately at 1940. were quite negligible. modern speeds. Fire from ahead proved very 5. The German Bombers had good self-seal- effective on occasions during the Battle, but ing tanks, and this was perhaps the only im- relative speeds are so high that the time avail- portant particular in which they were ahead able for shooting is very short, and Fighters of us. In our development work we had generally find themselves in a position to de- demanded that tanks should be " Crash liver such an attack more by accident than Proof " as well as self-sealing, and the drastic by design. conditions, which our experimental tanks had to meet had made them unduly heavy and 12. Beam attack is very difficult to deliver cumbrous. accurately, owing to the amount of deflection which had to be allowed. The deflection ring 6. So far as our Fighters were concerned, on a Fighter's sight allows for an enemy speed the wing tanks in the Hurricane were removed of ipo m.p.h., and therefore a full diameter and covered with a fabric known as " Linatex " outside the ring must sometimes be allowed. which had fairly good self-sealing charac- teristics. The reserve tank in the fuselage was 13. The method is effective against forma- left uncovered, as it was difficult of access and tions, when the aircraft hit is not always the it was thought that it would be substantially one aimed at, and certainly the Gladiators in protected by the armour which had been fitted. Norway developed this technique with great During the Battle, however, a great number success. On the whole, however, Fighters of Hurricanes were set on fire by incendiary which were constrained to this method of attack bullets or cannon shells, and their pilots were would have a very limited usefulness. badly burned by a sheet of flame which filled 14.—(B) The simplest reaction for the the cockpit before they could escape by para- Fighter is to pierce the armour, but it entails chute. the use of bigger calibres. It must be remem- 7. The reserve tanks were therefore covered bered also that it is not- sufficient merely to with Linatex as a matter of the highest priority, pierce the armour, but the bullet must have and a metal bulkhead was fitted in front of the sufficient remaining velocity to do lethal pilot to exclude the rash of flame from the damage thereafter. High velocities, in addition cockpit. to bigger calibres, are therefore necessary,.. 4570 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 15. The -5-inch gun appeared, at first sight, damage, will not often bring a Bomber down to be the natural successor to the .303 inch, but with a single hit. Greater damage is done if experiments showed that the type available to the fuze is given a slight delay action, so that us in the Autumn of 1940 was practically de- it bursts inside the covering of the aircraft, but feated by the 8-mm. armour carried in the small delay action fuzes are unreliable in opera- M.E. 109. It was true that the bullet would tion and difficult to manufacture, and, on the pierce 20-mm. or more of armour in the open, whole, it seems doubtful if explosive shells are but it was found that the minute deceleration as efficient as armour-piercing and incendiary and deflection of the axis of the bullet, caused projectiles, especially as they will not penetrate by its passage through the structure of the fuse- armour. Another point must be remembered, lage, exercised a very important diminution on viz., that a drum of explosive shells is a very its subsequent penetrative powers. dangerous item of cargo: if one is struck and detonated by a bullet it is not unlikely that 16. Experiments carried out with -5-inch they will all go off and blow the aeroplane guns of higher velocity in America have given to pieces. encouraging results, and it is not at present possible to dogmatise on the subject. It would, 22.—(E) The use of large shells (comparable however, be foolish to adopt a gun which could to Anti-Aircraft types) from Fighter aircraft is be defeated by a slight thickening of the armour practically prohibited by considerations of carried by the Bomber and the aim should be weight if a gun is used. The gun itself must to defeat the thickest armour which it is prac- be heavy £nd the structure must be tically possible for the enemy to carry. strengthened to withstand the shock of recoil. The walls and base cf the shell al'.o have to 17. We have at present no gun of a calibre be made uneconomically heavy to withstand the between .5-inch and 20-mm. (.8 inch). The discharge. All these difficulties, however, can latter was originally adopted by the French be- be overcome il' the Rocket principle is used. cause it was of about the right size to fire an It is true that a Rocket can be discharged explosive shell through an airscrew of a Hispano only in the direct line "of flight, but that is no Suiza engine, and was adopted by us from particular handicap to a Fighter. It can have them. If, therefore, it proves to be of the best a light firing tube, there is no recoil, and the weight and calibre for an armour piercing, that shell can be designed for optimum fragmenta- is due to accident rather than design. tion effect. (I have been told that a 3-inch 18. A study of available data might-lead one Rocket shell develops the same explosive and to suppose that a calibre of about 15-mm. would fragmentation effect as a 4.5-inch Anti-Aircraft be the ideal, and I understand that this size gun shell). It also starts with an advantage has recently been adopted by the Germans; but 'over the terrestrial rocket in that it has an we cannot now start designing a new gun for initial velocity of about 300 m.p.h. through the this war, and we must choose between the air, which gives it enhanced accuracy. For •5-inch and the 20-mm. We shall soon get this weapon a " Proximity Fuze " would be reliable data from American Fighter types in ideal, but, pending the development of this, action. They have faith in the -5-inch gun. there is no reason why the Rocket should not be used with a Time and Percussion Fuze used in 19. The Armament of the Royal Air Force conjunction with a range-finder in the Aircraft. is not its strongest point, and in my opinion we should do our own Design and Experimental 23. This item was put on the programme work, and satisfy our requirements without about 7 years ago, and I think it a great pity being dependent on Woolwich and Shoebury- that it was allowed to drop. True, unexpected ness. difficulties may be encountered, and nothing may come of the project, but it is an important 20.—(C) Incendiary ammunition may be experiment, and our knowledge of what is and fired from guns of any calibre and Bomber tanks is not possible will not be complete until it have been set on fire by .303 inch ammunition. has been tried. The bigger the bullet, however, the bigger the hole, and a small bullet stands a good chance 24. I think that our decision to adopt the of being quenched before it can take effect. 2O-mm. gun is probably the wisest which we In any case, the fuel tanks of a Bomber con- could have taken, but to carry increased load stitute so small a proportion of the whole target efficiently something bigger than the Hurricane that they cannot be made the sole objective of or Spitfire is needed. The Typhoon with attack; and it seems that the adoption of a 2,000 h.p. should be ideal when it has been large-calibre gun and the use of a proportion given an adequate ceiling. of incendiary ammunition therein will afford 25. In the meantime the Hurricane must be a satisfactory compromise. somewhat overloaded with 4 Cannons, and 21—(D) It was assumed by the French that mixed armament (2 Cannons and 4 Brownings) the 20-mm. shell would be effective against the in the Spitfire is merely a compromise neces- structure of modern aircraft. I do not know sitated by loading conditions. Might not the what trials they carried out, but the tests done high-velocity American -5-inch gun prove a by us at Shoeburyness and Orfordness indicate suitable armament for the small fighter? that the effect of a 2O-mm. shell exploring 26. As regards ammunition for the 20-mm. instantaneously on the surface of an aircraft is gun, the so-called " solid " bullet was merely almost negligible, except in a small percentage a cheap steel bullet produced by the French for of lucky strikes. The normal effect is that a practice purposes. Its mass and velocity have hole of about 6-inch diameter is blown in the enabled it hitherto to smash through armour surface, and that the effect at any distance is to which it has been opposed, but an improved nil, since the shell is blown almost into dust. design will probably be needed before long; Occasionally the fuze penetrates and does some doubtless the matter is receiving attention. I damage, but this is slight in comparison with understand that the incendiary bullet-^-the the total weight of the shell. Even the big equivalent of the de Wilde -303-inch—has been 37-mm. shell, though it may be spectacular giving good results. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 4571 27. One. other attribute of a naked steel bullet 30. The situation will be quite different, must not be overlooked, viz., its incendiary however, if turrets with .5-inch guns are com- effect "when it strikes a ferrous structure. monly u§ed in Bombers. The Bomber has the During ground trials a Blenheim was set on fire comparative advantage over the pursuing by the second hit from a " solid " bullet. Un- fortunately, German aircraft do not normally Fighter of firing '' down-wind " (one may get contain much iron or steel. a clear idea of the situation by imagining both aircraft to be anchored in space, with a 28. If we look into the not too distant future, 30o-m.p.h. wind blowing from the Bomber to I think we shall find that an additional and the Fighter). The result is likely to be that quite different reason may arise for the adoption of the high-velocity gun with a comparatively effective armouring of Fighters against return heavy projectile. I refer to the increasing inten- fire will be impossible, and fighting ranges in sity and effect of return fire from Bombers. good visibility may be considerably lengthened. 29. Our Fighters are protected to a very In such circumstances high velocity, flat trajec- large degree from the return fire of Bombers tory and a heavy projectile will attain increas- which they attack from astern, so long as they ing importance; attention will also have-to be have to sustain the impact only of rifle-calibre paid to accurate methods of sighting, and bullets. allowance for gravity drop.

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