Legislative Control Over the Executive in Latin American Presidential Systems
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Ivo Hernández-Mirabal Legislative Control over the Executive in Latin American Presidential Systems Executive-Legislative Institutional Relationship during the Stabilization and Structural Adjustment measures commonly known as “Washington Consensus”. The cases of Privatizations in Argentina and Venezuela. Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der Sozialwissenschaften in der Fakultät für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen Januar 2004 Gedruckt mit Genehmigung der Fakultät für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften der Universität Tübingen Dekan: Prof. Dr. A. Boeckh 1. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. A. Boeckh 2. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. J. Schmid Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 16 März, 2004. i 0. Introduction 1 I. Parliaments and Executive in Latin America’s Democracies 13 1. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Semi Presidential Structures 18 1.1 Parliamentarism: Concept and Historical Background 19 1.2 Parliamentarism: Ontological Problems and Criticism. 22 1.2.1 Bicameral Structure 23 1.2.2 Party Discipline 24 1.2.3 Stability 24 1.3 Parliamentarism in Latin America: Historical and Conceptual Background 25 2. Semi-Presidentialism: Concept and Operative Ground 27 2.1 Semi-Presidential Experiences in Latin America. Constitutional Previsions. 30 3. Presidentialism: Characteristics and Historical Backgrounds 33 3.1 Presidential Systems of Government: Contemporary Definitions in Political Science 35 3.2 Historical and Contemporary Observations to Presidential Systems 39 3.2.1 Temporal Rigidity 41 3.2.2 Majoritarianism 41 3.2.3 Dual Democratic Legitimacy 42 3.2.4 Delegative Democracy 44 4. Presidentialism in Latin America: Historic-Theoretical Dimensions 45 4.1 Latin American Presidential Systems. Concept and Singularities. 48 4.2 Normative and Empirical Elements in Latin American Presidential Systems 52 4.3 Critics to Latin American Presidential Systems 54 4.4 Defenses of Latin American Presidentialism 55 II. Parliaments in Presidential Democracies. Concept and Classification 60 1. Legislatures in Presidential Democracies in Latin America 65 1.1. The Central Oscillation 70 1.2. Blondel’s Paradox 73 2. Main Functions of the Parliament in Presidential Democracies in Latin America 76 2.1. Representative 78 2.2. Deliberative 79 2.3. Financial 80 2.4. Legislative 81 2.5. Control 82 3. Constitutional Attributions of the Legislatures in Latin America 84 3.1. Autonomy of the Legislative Power 87 3.2. Parliaments and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America 89 ii 4. Divided Government 92 4.1. State Indecisiveness and Institutional Irresolution 94 4.2. Separation of Power between Veto Players. Concept and Operation 98 4.3. Legislative Powers of Presidents 101 4.4. Meta-Constitutional Powers of the Presidents 105 4.4.1. Dissolution of the Assembly 108 4.5. Who sets the Agenda? 110 5. Party System and Electoral System in Congress. 114 5.1. Legislative Multipartism or Bi-Partism and Presidential Systems 126 5.2. Institutional Determinants of Party Discipline. 127 5.3. The Party Powers of the President: their effect on the Legislative 130 5.4. Executive-Ruling Party Relations 132 5.5. The State without Party, the Party without State 138 6. Types of Laws in Congress 141 III. Parliamentary Control 142 1. Public Policy Process in Latin America 143 2. Parliamentary Control as Part of the Rule of Law. Checks and Balances Theory. The Ambition Factor 146 2.1. Vertical and Horizontal Accountability 148 2.2. Accountability and Representation 150 3. Parliamentary Control Functions 151 3.1. Limitations of the Executive Powers 153 3.2. Cooperation with the Government 153 4. Parliamentary Controls in the Presidential Systems of Latin America 155 4.1. Functional Mechanisms of Parliamentary Control in Venezuela and Argentina 158 4.2. Legislative Investigations 162 4.2.1. Constitutional Backgrounds to Legislative Investigations 163 4.2.2. Limits to Congressional Investigations 165 4.2.3. Consequences of Legislative Investigations 166 4.3. Interpellation of Cabinet Members 166 4.3.1. Constitutional Background to Congressional Interpellation 167 4.4. Legislative Questioning of Cabinet Members and other Public Servants 168 4.5. Congressional Authorizations 169 4.5.1. Authorizations on Political Affairs 171 4.5.1.1. Authorization to Declare the Cease of the Emergency State 173 4.5.2. Authorizations on Military Affairs 174 4.5.3. Authorizations on Financial Affairs 174 4.5.4. Authorizations on Legislative Affairs 175 iii 4.5.4.1. Parliamentary Control over Legislative Authorizations 177 4.5.5. Authorizations on Administrative Affairs 178 4.6. Legislative Approvals 180 4.7. Memory and Account from Cabinet Members 182 4.8. Annual Presidential Message to Congress 182 4.9. National Budget Procedures 184 4.9.1. Constitutional Basis and Historical Evolution of the Budget Law 187 4.9.2. Parliamentary Control over the Budget Procedure 189 5. Other Institutions to Control Executive Power 192 6. Consequences of Parliamentary Control in Latin America 196 6.1. Political Image and Credibility of the Political Institutions. 197 6.2. Censure Vote and Removal. Functional Procedures. 198 6.2.1. Removal of Cabinet Members 199 6.2.2. Impeachment/Removal of the President 200 6.3. Presidential Powers: Functional and Constitutional Concept 204 6.4. Level and Exercise of Presidential Reactions to Parliamentary Controls 212 6.4.1. Proactive Powers: Presidential Decree and “By Pass” of the Parliament 213 6.4.1.1. Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia (Necessity and Urgency Decrees, NUD) 216 6.4.1.2. Delegated Decree Authority: Leyes Habilitantes and Economic Emergency 219 6.4.2. Reactive Powers: Presidential Veto. Political Use and Legal Grounding 223 6.4.2.1. Partial Veto or Item Veto 224 6.4.2.2. Total Veto. Functional Differences and Political Use. Constitutional Groundings 225 6.4.2.3. Veto Override. Constitutional Prescriptions and Political Use 225 IV. Congressional Control and Privatization in Venezuela 226 1. Privatization in Venezuela before 1989 227 1.1 Roots of Conflict: La Gran Venezuela 228 1.2 Stealth Privatizations: The Philanthropic Ogre 236 1.2.1 Privatizations during Herrera’s Government (1979-1983) 242 1.2.2 Privatizations during Lusinchi’s Government (1984-1988) 244 1.2.2.1 Congressional Control over Privatizations during Lusinchi’s Administration 250 2. Normative Frame and Congressional Control over Privatizations 254 before 1989 iv 2.1. Ley de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio Público (1982) 256 2.2. Ley de Enajenación de Bienes Públicos (1987) 257 2.2.1. The law of Disposal of Public Goods: a Ley Habilitante? 259 2.3 Ley Orgánica del Régimen Presupuestario (Budget Law) 261 3. State Industries and Institutional Oversight Initiatives until 1989 262 3.1 Public Finances before and during 1989: Debt Renegotiations 267 4. The Great Turnaround (1989): A Radical Stabilization and Adjustment Program 273 4.1 Privatization during 1989-1992 281 4.2 The Logics of Privatization within the Great Turnaround 284 4.3. Actors involved in the Venezuelan Privatization process 290 4.4. Fears surrounding Privatization 292 4.5. Methodology of Privatizations after 1989 294 4.6. Notable Features of the Venezuelan Privatizations after 1989 297 4.7. Privatization and Political Parties after 1989 302 4.8. Three Stages of the Privatization Process after 1989 307 5. Congress and the Privatization Bills 311 5.1. Normative Frame regulating Privatizations after 1989 316 5.2. Privatization Law (1992) 317 5.3. Privatization Law: Presentation and Congressional Reforms 320 5.4. Congressional participation in the Privatization Laws 321 5.5. The Consequences of Hostile Relations between Executive and Legislative 324 6. Two Examples of Privatization and Congressional Reactions: CANTV and Viasa 326 6.1 Privatization of Telecommunications: CANTV 327 6.2 Privatization of the National Airline: Viasa 335 V. Congressional Control and Privatization in Argentina 344 1. The Military Legacy: Economic Crisis and First Privatization Attempts 346 1.1. Privatizations without Congress 349 2. Privatizations under the Radical Administration 351 2.1 Stabilization Attempts 1983-1988 355 2.2. Structure of the State Owned Enterprises in Argentina by 1983-1989 361 2.3. Attempting Structural Reforms: The Privatization Bills in Congress 1986-1988 363 2.4. Privatization and the Political Parties 369 2.4.1. The Radical Party 373 2.4.2. The Peronist Party 375 3. 1989: Hyperinflation and Political Crisis Year 377 3.1. Elections in Advance and Institutional Pact 379 3.2. Congressional Delegation on the Executive 381 v 3.3. Delegative Laws 23.696 and 23.697 385 4. Privatizations under the Peronist Administration 390 4.1. Menem’s Adherence to the Washington Consensus 393 4.2. The Privatization Program 397 4.2.1. Forms of the Privatization Program 405 4.2.2. Methodology of the Privatization Process 406 4.2.3. Agents in the Privatization 407 4.2.4. Normative Frame of the Privatization (Laws and Decrees) 407 4.3. Presidential Power in Argentina: Decrees and Power Delegation 409 5. Congress and the Privatization Bills after 1989 415 5.1. The Radical Party 420 5.2. The Peronist Party 422 5.3. Other Political Forces 424 5.4. Privatization and Congressional Support (three phases) 425 5.5. Conflict Cases: Privatization and Congressional Control after 1995 432 6. Two Privatization Cases of 1990: EnTel and Aerolíneas Argentinas 436 6.1. The Quick Privatization of EnTel 438 6.2. The Privatization of Aerolíneas Argentinas 450 VI. Conclusions 457 VII. Bibliography 479 vi Table Index Chapter One Table