EDITORIAL AND SPECIAL ARTICLES EDITORIAL AND SPECIAL îfoto STrifante ARTICLES PART III EIGHT PAGES jtotfc SUNDAY, AUGUST 25, 1918 PART HI EIGHT PAGES AFTER_THE THIRD BATTLE OF THE SOMME German Retreat to Hindenburg Line THE THREE SOMME FRONTS Decisive Battle Will Mean a Deliberate Refusal Will Be Adjourned to 1919 Manoeuvre.War of of Battle, a Resignation of the by Move¬ Offensive, in Order to Avoid ment Not Reached and Napo¬ Defeat and Prolong War leonic Strokes Unlikely.Road to Berlin Is Long By FRANK H. SÏMONDS 1918.The Tribune Association Author of "The World War," "They Shall Not Pass" Copyright, (The New York Tribune) The active phase of the Third Battle of position delay the British and French the West front, there seemed to be the tails because it seems to me the Somme was over on Monday, August approach to the new there front, render use¬ possibility of a return to open warfare, ought to be a more 12, when the British fourth army was less all the vast general understand¬ labor.-; of the Allies in to the warfare of movement of the older ing of what is to be expected in the im- on the line of the halted approximately preparing the ground for a continuation days. Evidently the Germans expected mediate future. The possibility of Somme front of 1, the of it. the Allies feared it. And old July 1916, the Somme offensive and avoid any Obviously groat captures of armies cr a return within a of a week the Ger¬ to war of the front facing Chaulnes and Roye from serious fighting on these sectors for the yet period Napoleonic sort is slight. man wave was halted before now posi¬ Our enemy has too which Foch had launched Fayolle's army year. » many reserves, too tions. The old war movement was over many at the beginning of the first battle of prepared positions behind his and trench warfare was on again. present front, to be in the Somme. Thirty thousand prison¬ A Successful danger of disas¬ The reason was obvious. German pur¬ ter this year, and next seven hundred and cannon Man.uvre probably ers and fifty suit had outrun heavy artillery and even .disaster of the sort that France suf¬ the Paris-Amiens-Boulogne It had outrun its fered in the weeks captured, Hindenburg's reasoning was in sub¬ light artillery. provi¬ opening of 1870 and railway cleared, the Montdidier salient sions, while the Allied commanders were Prussia at Jena in 1S0G. stance this: "I cannot afford the men for out.these were the immediate able to provide reserves and artillery in a pinched another Somme battle this and the Allies Will fruits of the first Allied offensive in the year new position, and against this position, enemy is preparing to resume the as it was, the Ger¬ Retain of 1918, which in itself demon¬ strug¬ hastily improvised Offensive campaign gle. But if I retire twenty miles to man infantry, unsupported by artillery, strated that the initiative had passed could not We have the offensive. We in good positions it will take him all sum¬ make progress. shall, LudendorfT to the Allied command¬ all human retain from mer to arrive Here, then, it would seem, was a final probability, it until before the new positions the end of the war. er in chief. answer to the theory that the war of When our Ameri¬ with his communications, heavy can army is ail artillery positions was a temporary stage. There ready three of the Al¬ The Parallel and other machinery. He will not be lied armies will be able to deliver si¬ had been preparation and attack, and, multaneous the Marne able to attack the new line this year, but for the first but at the thrusts on their own fronts With time, pursuit, Before that the will be compelled to an offensive end there bad been a resumption of the day German will inevi¬ In the following week there was a slow attempt tably retire at least on earlier new new behind the Meuse either side, where the new line re¬ situation, positions, stag¬ and the but marked forward movement south of nation, and the attempts of the Germans Scheldt, possibly to his own joins the old, that is, in Flanders and on frontier, and also Chaulnes as Debeny's first army, Hum¬ to break down the new positions were so shortening improv¬ the Aisne. Ho will thus attack ing his position. Until bert's third army, and finally the French my costly they had soon to be abandoned. that day como3 flanks, when I we shall continue to tenth the Oise moved in retire my centre, but by deal local blows, army beyond up War of Movement harvest local profits, but it will line and in turn the old retiring my centre and devastating the always reoccupied posi¬ be possible by reference to the to ground before it I shall be safe from an Not Reached map tion of July, 1916. At the moment when calculate pretty accurately the pos¡ ¡ble attack there and can concentrate The same on a this article is written, on Monday, Au¬ men thing happened smaller extent of any single success. and guns on my flanks and break scale in the Flanders offensive in gust 19, the line from the Somme to the the April. Just now It on a on Foch has in two opera attacks of the foe." happened again larger scale taken from Soissons to .- Aisne, Chaulnes, coin¬ the Aisne in the German attack on advantage of wholly vicious p was May sitions into cides almost exactly with the familiar This exactly what happened. The 22. In all three the element of surprise which the Germans had put themselves as line of two years ago, and the changes retreat to the Hindenburg line ended the was present; the Allied lines were broken, preliminaries t» their grand now that in between Arras and the completely broken, on a considerable offensives, adjourned with¬ have taken place the past week lighting Soissons out date. front. There was a He has taken his profit from are the logical consequences of the ini¬ region for the year. Haig made a brief pursuit, but the pursuit presently hurled itself against German mistakes and from the acci¬ tial victory on August 8 and the follow¬ effort in front of Arras, which coincided dental weakness of new positions and had to be abandoned. German positi >na ing three days. with Nivelle's Aisne offensive. But Ni- which were not intended to be defensive Turning now to the history of the velle'.s 'attack was wrecked po! ¡tions at all. A much more soriYpres, all four the chance greatest in width and it was only forty 1918, 1919, if or the German lines have thus but the Germans will was missed. contrast expects too mucb in a Although be able once mo tions since Frederick the Great tore up By in Champagne miles. In making this forty-mile gap, brief period < on Decisive Battle in 191", and Febru¬ time. There h to he no temporarily stabilized themselves the to concentrate all their reserves on the that other scrap of paper, the Pragmatic September. Verdun, and exploiting it, upward of a mill¬ sud 'M ary, at the Somme in the British ion men were used. A tion, no sudden sweep to the Rhine an Somme front line there have con- flanks and, by reason of their ear Sanction, and stole Silesia from Maria 1916, similar attempt Adjourned the we tnued Theresa a and a operation of July and in the French cam¬ on the whole front would not less beyond Rhine; have got to ba rumors of a retirement by the Rains this year, their positions on bo century half ago. recjuire ter A paign on the Aisne in 1917, the than ten million shock the German out of one a Germans on a wide rumors retirement to the Hindenburg line The present Is perhaps a good time to surprise troops.a thing position front, which flanks are far better than were was not sufficient to ter another out of they will be a pass in review the of offensive disorganize the neither side will ever have. On the the Hindenbui Persist and raise once more the lid 7. man.uvre not without grave history the question warfare in the current whole system of defence before reserves other hand, it is quite clear that line, line of the Scheldt and tl a consequences for our allies. struggle. All by of future withdrawal of the Germans It is It will could intervene, and an effort on the Meuse, the line ci the clear that if Ludendorfl' decid the great nations were surprised in a breaking the line on a considerable front Ardennes, tl to the probably adjourn a decisive battle until of the assailant to institute a at Moselle and the Hindennurg line with a possible to retreat he abandons the offensive 1 measure.and in a very large measure part pur- one point a dislocation will be pro¬ Vosges.before we a next it will suit after a reduction of on proach the line <>f the v .2terme<üate stop on the line of the the and for the year; probably balk Foch's .by tire sudden arrival of stagnation only partial the duced both sides of the break. Thus Rhine, campaign war. Unli line led to colossal the strongest of and IjPper as plans for an upward thrust between and trenches in 1914. Certain observers enemy's casualties Germans had to leave the Marne all, behind that v Somme, precisely there con¬ Hindenburg in 1017, he can have no ho nues Arras and indeed, in each of the various armies had fore¬ and ultimate failure. following Mangin's attack at Soissons, may expect other lines, while betwe< the belief that the Germans at the of (lie attack Soissons, between It was each renewing after a deli seen of what would not until the tank attack at They had to evacuate the Montdidier series of positions there will vesle will back behind the 7'here will Ypres and Rheims, for the present year, something happen, ultimately go be no new accession of troo but none had made his voice heard and Cambrai, 1917, that the element of sur¬ salient when Rawlinson advanced from intermediate defensive positions. Aisne and but it will be a final surrender of the was even reoccupy the old Chemin-des- for the West such as the collapse of Ki no general staff had prepared to meet prise temporarily made use of. Amiens along the Roye road. It is easy I do not beüeve the German defen tames offensive and an ultimate confession that Up to this time both sides had been mul¬ to see at will endure position. On the military side the sia provided. Once on the defensive, 1 the situation. by looking the map that a suc¬ through successive defeat «¡griificance of military victory is no for Between the of tiplying their artillery preparations, cessful drive east%vard from Obviously the morale will break such retirements would Germans can have no other chance longer possible close the campaign of Ypres dow ,je with with ever lengthening periods of bom¬ would compel an evacuation of the and in the presence of simple and the reversion to the strat- the war the German and that his soie hope is to 1914, the termination of the First Bel¬ inevitable d winning than a long, costly a bardment, which served as an advertise¬ coast, a feat on the hold out until exhaustion Battle of Ypres. and the Battle of Cam¬ gian while drhe northward be¬ military side the statesrn .«yof 1917 unmistakable. terribly burdensome defensive. brings peace, ment to the of the in tween will But brai, three years later, offensive war¬ enemy direction Verdun and Rheims might compel endeavor, even at a huge price, The must be and a peace which leaves him some part which the attack was a great Hindenburg retreat of 1917 already plain that this is ab< fare was never able to pass beyond the coming and gave withdrawal of the Germans behind the avoid the fatal consequence; of invasi *as of his him the to line Meuse. Successive and it very little understood at the time all that is ¡eft for them in any case a stealings. second of what may be called the four opportunity prepare dislocations follow¬ ravage. But is essential m after line behind his front. But at successive blows are to recognize that we and was hailed as a of that may the It is worth recognizing, too, that next stages in warfare of positions: those of ing what we have are only putti proof approach- they imperil chances of (/ambrai there was a to and only brief artil¬ expect as we pass more and more to our feet on the first stretch of the re .nZ German defeat and from fensive warfare if too year the German can, if he chooses, re¬ preparation, attack, pursuit march expulsion they stay long of approach. lery preparation; the tanks went in and the grand offensive against the Germans, to Berlin. .ranee. ]t was nothing of the ¡vort. positions which arc valuable peat the H.ndenburg retirement in cleared the wire entanglements, and the only The object lessons which might have We are going to pass through p"ri *rmany had still a Russian problem on points of departure for an attack wh France and in Belgium, withdrawing, for served in British troops had before them a seven- Napoleonic Strokes < each instance were not recog¬ after period of attack, p in -*T mile gap had reserves Bands, and she believed that one more they can mi longer expect to make. ex'ample, to the line of the Scheldt and nized. All through this period a grow¬ through which, Unlikely proach t<> ne v po >iti( n 5, wil been available, they have ad¬ *»Paign would suffice to abolish the the Meuse. But this will be of less ad¬ ing tendency was manifest toward con¬ might nation. It is more essential than e A Refusal centration of vanced to Cambrai. But if the German is driven from the before Gütern front. The experiences of the vantage next year, when a vast Ameri¬ artillery and of material that soldiers train the at The chance was lost. But the lesson coast of Flanders he will presently bo in all '-'»nme had of Battle can will upon preparation, the sacrifice of the lessons of m< :. mp rary wj taught her the enormous army be able to try the offensive remained. The Germans were the first found standing on the line of the v0î-8 the element of surprise, which alone fare. Neglect of these !¦ \- now \\ of a defensive campaign of A German retreat, then, will be a between Verdun and the The to apply it. Tried first on the Russian Scheldt. If he is driven from Cham¬ pound- Vosges. could make possible a considérable vic¬ bring the most terrible burdi of c; "'K. costs which she could not well liberate refusal of a ¡ Forraine offensive is little front above Riga, with the tanks left pagne he will be found in be¬ afford battle, formal understood in tory, bringing with it a pursuit and for position ualties upon our young Vmerican am U pay, out, but with a brief intensive bombard¬ hind the Meuse. Tho whole unmistakable resignation of the off this country. It is impossible for our the moment, and for the moment only, country The 1 elief that the war of position ment, it brought immediate success. behind him is cut and seamed with :-ivc, a return to allies as as the mass and within very restricted limits, a re¬ over and the warfare ****".. of Hindenburg's strati long of the Ger¬ Tried on a switch unes Napoleonic Allies turn to the old war again very wide front in Pi- and cross lines, constitut¬ movement of ltd 7, with the realization that it man are in continued cf move¬ restored will mean the sac ,M^e troops Northern France and ment. cardy on March 21, it produced the great¬ ing alternative positions. N'o Useless retreat, single nee of hundreds oi thousands of Ami without hope of a later rett the Allies are unable to do more than est single success in line breaking on the blow that one can now forecast can bo icans unnecessarily. We an' certain Accordingly Hindenburg resolved V, to the offensive. The German will ab; match these German numbers. Successful Western front. The British line was more than a thrust which the It is compels victory now, but we have still to reg Welin« a renewal of the Battle of the don a broken on a front of forty miles. The evacuation of one lire f^r another. strategy which is based upon equally impossible for the Germans. But Surprises lat'-' the price in hum to be pi «mint, for which defending army was so disorganized that There will be a flight and a the French and Brit- effort to obtain a decision one terr when we arrive with our pursu:t for victory, and we can regulate it or by great army it All through this period there con¬ it was incapable of between the «ad made enormous in be defending supported two, with the cp'ure of by multiplying the instruction bas preparations, campaign favor of a strategy wh will possible for us to undertake tinued to be a belief that one successful until reserves could *^ir¡raw positions intervene prisoners and mate~ia!. but in eac.i upi n four years ,;f hi» who!* line between Arras seeks to avoid defeat the same man.uvre attack followed a break and the cxperien "A by prolonging Castelnau and Pau by great through German advance became a true eaco the victor will presently encoun¬ warfare of would lead to a return po ition, in tl.e nly ki ï'W'nn, and by devastating the Pi war untii exhuustion <»f undertook in August, 191-1, and of the war of pursuit over more than miles oí ter the in a new '* ' compels all there thirty vanquished position of warfare possible r y and new movement of the sort and undefended to-day likely Artois regions before hifl combatant* ''¦ .»ton, and William will be no chance of a German counter- Napoleonic country. and have to begin all over again. be in II, the end of the war of possible any future that positions. Look- Here at last, and for the first time on I dwell upen these rather dull ¿2- be foreseen. a