A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916
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Canadian Military History Volume 16 Issue 2 Article 4 2007 A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916 David Campbell Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Campbell, David "A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916." Canadian Military History 16, 2 (2007) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Campbell: A Forgotten Victory A Forgotten Victory Courcelette, 15 September 1916 David Campbell he 2nd Canadian Division, which landed and limited gains during the division’s frustrating Tin France on 15 September 1915, had second operational tour at the Somme in late established an uncertain operational record by September and early October. Nevertheless, the the summer of 1916. As part of the Canadian victory at Courcelette proved that the division Corps, the division had spent virtually all of its could successfully organize and execute a major time in or near Belgium’s notorious Ypres Salient, offensive operation. For Major-General Turner, where it was embroiled in a grim campaign of the battle stood as a personal vindication, and, trench warfare. Notable successes in trench at least in his own mind, made up for past raiding were offset by costly setbacks, such as the failures. division’s failure to hold a series of mine craters at St. Eloi in April 1916. This was followed in June by the withdrawal of one of its brigades The Battle of the Somme in the face of heavy enemy attacks at Hooge, which were part of the Germans’ ultimately hile the Canadians recovered from their unsuccessful effort to hold captured Canadian Wordeal at Hooge and Mount Sorrel, the positions around Mount Sorrel. British Fourth Army, under General Sir Henry Rawlinson, assumed the lion’s share of the Major-General Richard Turner, the greatest offensive yet launched by the British commander of 2nd Canadian Division, was Armies on the Western Front. This extended himself under a cloud. His earlier performance series of operations, known collectively as the as a brigade commander in 1st Canadian Division Battle of the Somme, began on 1 July 1916 and during the 2nd Battle of Ypres in 1915 was would continue through to 18 November, when questionable at best, and his division’s inability it finally bogged down in the autumn rain and to make sense of the bewildering topography at mud. St. Eloi in 1916 raised serious questions about his suitability for high command. Turner retained Based upon the experiences of 1915, many command of the division largely through his British senior commanders, including the personal connections with the Canadian Minister commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes.1 Haig, believed that greater application of artillery power was the key to breaking the deadlock on Redemption for 2nd Canadian Division, the Western Front. After subjecting the German and to some degree, for Turner himself, would lines north of the Somme River to prolonged finally come with the division’s successful preliminary artillery bombardments, it was storming of the French village of Courcelette hoped that the attacking British infantry would on 15 September 1916. This operation, which be able to occupy the smoldering enemy positions was part of the larger Somme offensive, was with minimal fighting. Unfortunately, the frontage 2nd Canadian Division’s first major victory of chosen for the offensive was too broad for the the First World War. Unfortunately, the glow of available artillery resources. The bombardment success would be obscured by heavy casualties in support of the opening attack on 1 July was © Canadian Military History, Volume 16, Number 2, Spring 2007, pp.27-48. 27 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4 Training for the Somme n 28 August, the men of 2nd Canadian ODivision commenced training for the upcoming operations. The intensity and tempo of the fighting at the Somme would be unlike anything the Canadians had experienced. Training would help somewhat in preparing them, and the corps commander, Lieutenant- General Byng, ensured that personal initiative was fostered during infantry training exercises. Casualties were simulated among the officers and senior NCOs, forcing junior NCOs and even private soldiers to assume leadership roles during practice attacks. This cultivation of leadership and personal initiative was an important feature of Canadian training and tactical doctrine, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 8006 Archives Canada (LAC) PA Library and which would increasingly stress the importance of devolving tactical command and control to platoon and section leaders.5 Despite the value placed upon decentralization during training, Canadian infantry tactics at the Somme were not completely flexible. This had less to do with the continuing use of successive linear wave formations (which critics of British infantry tactics at the Somme have often dwelled upon) and more to do with the fact that the various Major-General Richard Turner was the commander of types of infantry weapons (rifles, bayonets, hand 2nd Canadian Division. His generalship at the Battles grenades, rifle grenades, and Lewis guns) were of 2nd Ypres and the St. Eloi Craters had called into question his battlefield command abilities, but he was not effectively coordinated. Some of them, to prove his critics wrong at Courcelette. such as the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun (an automatic rifle), tended to be employed too dissipated to achieve the desired destructive in separate specialist sections organized and effect in most of the British sectors. As a result, often controlled by battalion headquarters. This defending German forces inflicted a staggering arrangement precluded efficient coordination 57,470 casualties on the British attackers. On the of a battalion’s full range of firepower assets other hand, French divisions, cooperating with at platoon or section levels. Although many the British astride the Somme River, achieved Canadians, in common with others among the greater success on 1 July, in part owing to heavier Allied and German armies, already appreciated concentrations of artillery.2 the value of small unit tactics during the fighting at the Somme, Canadian infantry platoons would In spite of Field Marshal Haig’s ambitions, no not become truly effective fire-units in their own breakthrough resulted during the first six weeks right until battalions were finally reorganized to of fighting.3 On 19 August, Haig announced his incorporate all of the major infantry weapons intention “to deliver a strong attack about the within each platoon. This process would not middle of September using ‘fresh forces and begin until the end of 1916.6 all available resources.’”4 Although still licking its wounds from Mount Sorrel, the Canadian Meanwhile, Major-General Turner’s men Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir took advantage of what relatively little time Julian Byng, was relatively fresh in comparison they had for training before they were thrust with other formations. Consequently, its transfer into action at the Somme in September.7 Units from Belgium to the Somme battlefront in France practiced on training grounds that were taped began in late August. off to represent enemy trenches. Manoeuvers 28 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss2/4 2 Campbell: A Forgotten Victory were carried out on successive scales, first with apart and lay between Thiepval to the west and sections, then platoons and companies, followed Morval to the east.11 The main thrust would be by entire battalions and brigades.8 These practice delivered by three corps of Rawlinson’s Fourth attacks also introduced the men to the concept Army, whose objectives included the villages of of advancing behind an artillery barrage, which Flers and Morval. To protect Rawlinson’s left on the training fields was “represented by men flank, Gough’s Reserve Army would employ carrying flags, who moved in bounds on timed the Canadian Corps to attack the area around programmes to indicate the area on which the Courcelette and secure observation points over shells would fall.” Many of these simulation the strong German defences known as the Third techniques had been used by British and Position. It was expected that the assault would Canadian troops in their rehearsals for assaults be aided by two particular innovations: the use of or trench raids before the Somme offensive.9 a large-scale creeping artillery barrage, and the employment of an entirely new type of weapon – the tank.12 The Canadians Arrive at the Somme The Canadian Corps would advance with n 30 August, the Canadian Corps began two divisions along a 2,200-yard front. The 2nd Orelieving I Anzac Corps around Pozières, Canadian Division, occupying the right sector of and Lieutenant-General Byng assumed command the Canadian front, would deliver the main attack of the sector on 3 September.10 The Canadians astride the Albert-Bapaume road. Major-General now joined General Sir Hubert Gough’s Reserve Turner’s men would have to traverse a swathe Army, which had taken over the northern portion of German-held territory ranging in depth from of the Somme battlefront from General Sir Henry 1,000 yards on the right to around 400 yards on Rawlinson’s Fourth Army on 3 July. While the 1st the left in order to gain their objectives south of Canadian Division held the entire corps front, the the village of Courcelette. These included Candy 2nd Canadian Division prepared for its part in Trench, the heavily fortified ruins of a sugar the upcoming attack, which would become known factory, and roughly 1,500 yards of Sugar Trench.