Were the French Government's Brexit-Related Worries Prior to the 2016 Referendum Overstated?
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Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2020 Were the French government’s Brexit-related worries prior to the 2016 referendum overstated? Claudia Michelle Chandra Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Other International and Area Studies Commons Recommended Citation Chandra, Claudia Michelle, "Were the French government’s Brexit-related worries prior to the 2016 referendum overstated?" (2020). CMC Senior Theses. 2512. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2512 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claremont McKenna College Were the French government’s Brexit-related worries prior to the 2016 referendum overstated? submitted to Professor Hilary Appel by Claudia Michelle Chandra for Senior Thesis Fall 2019–Spring 2020 May 11, 2020 Table of Contents Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………...... 3 Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………… 4 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………… 5 1. France’s role in European integration I. France’s leading role in integration ……………………………………………. 10 II. French leaders emerge as champions of integration …………………………… 11 III. The growth of Euroscepticism in France ………………………………………. 17 IV. Current attitudes toward integration …………………………………………… 23 2. Why France resisted the 2016 Brexit referendum I. Unpreparedness ………………………………………………………………… 30 II. Ideological worries ……………………………………………………………... 34 III. Security worries ………………………………………………………………... 37 IV. Economic worries ……………………………………………………………… 42 3. France in the Brexit negotiations I. Why France maintained a tough stance in the Brexit negotiations …………….. 48 II. The validity of France’s Brexit worries ………………………………………... 54 4. Impact of Brexit on French attitudes toward the EU I. Introduction …………………………………………………………………….. 61 II. Prior to June 2016 referendum …………………………………………………. 61 III. Post-2016 Referendum – French Presidential elections ……………………..… 66 IV. Post-Presidential elections – 2019 European Parliament elections ……………. 69 5. Impact of Brexit on French security and defense I. Introduction …………………………………………………………………….. 74 II. Brexit negatively impacts EU defense capabilities but provides opportunities for France …………………………………………………………………………... 74 III. The importance of the Anglo-French defense relationship …………………….. 75 IV. Deepening Anglo-French defense relations: challenges and achievements …… 77 V. France-EU defense relations post-Brexit: why cooperation with Germany is now necessary ……………………………………………………………………….. 81 VI. Evidence of successful Franco-German defense leadership …………………… 86 VII. The future of French defense …………………………………………………... 87 6. Impact of Brexit on free movement of French and British citizens I. Introduction …………………………………………………………………….. 90 II. Debates on the movement of people …………………………………………… 91 III. The UK and France’s Settlement Schemes …………………………………….. 94 IV. Capturing the benefits of Brexit: France’s Join the Game Campaign ……….… 95 V. Paris: Europe’s new financial center? ………………………………………….. 97 VI. The Parisian real estate market ……………………………………………….. 100 VII. Undocumented people in France and the UK ………………………………… 104 7. Impact of Brexit on free movement of goods and services between France and the UK I. Introduction …………………………………………………………………… 106 II. French agriculture…………………………………………………………...… 107 1 III. The Common Agricultural Policy ……………………………………………... 110 IV. Small to medium sized French enterprises …………………………………….. 112 V. The Calais border ……………………………………………………………… 114 VI. The end of free movement under different Brexit scenarios …………………… 116 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….... 119 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………. 125 2 Abstract The prospect of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union during the 2016 Brexit referendum was deeply troubling to French officials. As a historic leader of the European integration project, the French government and media worried that Brexit would embolden Eurosceptics in France. This threatened to undermine France’s identity as a pro-European nation. Also, due to France’s position as one of the UK’s main trading partners, French citizens and businesses feared that the end of freedom of movement between these countries would create burdensome legal and economic consequences. Nevertheless, more than three years have passed since the Brexit referendum and few of the French government’s initial fears have manifested. This leads to the question of whether French worries over Brexit were overstated. This thesis examines the impact of Brexit on France’s economy, security and attitudes toward the EU to argue that many of France’s Brexit concerns were indeed exaggerated. While the French government should remain cautious of the resurgence of Euroscepticism should populist forces like the Rassemblement National regain support, evidence shows that it has adequately prepared for the economic and security implications of Brexit. By demonstrating France’s current preparedness for the UK’s departure, the author hopes to eliminate the Brexit-related worries still held by many French citizens. 3 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my thesis reader Professor Hilary Appel for her advice and guidance from the very beginning of this project. The consistent feedback and support she provided me with was critical to the completion of my thesis. Her encouragement enabled me to discover and achieve more than I could have anticipated. Suffice to say, this project would not have been possible without her. I wish to also recognize the staff at the Honnold Mudd Library and the European Union Center of California for their assistance and contributions. In particular, I would like to thank Professor David Andrews, for fueling my curiosity over Brexit and the European Union, and Mary Martin, for helping and guiding me in the early stages of my research process. Thank you also to the International Relations Department and Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies for making this capstone project possible. The people at these institutions nurtured my intellectual curiosity over the last four years at Claremont McKenna College and helped me develop the analytical and writing skills needed for this project. Additionally, I would like to recognize all my friends for supporting me and for always sharing my enthusiasm of endlessly testing out ideas on each other. Thank you for easing my thesis writing process in the many ways you did and for believing in my ability to finish this project. Finally, I am forever grateful to my parents Herry Chandra and Diana Lim for their love and support. I appreciate all the time you have given to listen and give feedback on this project over the last nine months. Thank you for the opportunity to attend Claremont McKenna College and for always having my back. 4 Introduction The prospect of Brexit initially appeared as a crisis for the European Union. The United Kingdom’s vote to leave on June 23, 2016 was the first time a member state decided to remove itself from the bloc. The departure of the UK threatened to undermine support for the EU in remaining member states, including France. One fear was that Brexit could set a precedent for leaving the EU with ease. Some of the remaining EU27 could become inspired to follow suit if the UK’s exit left it financially better off and with greater control of its own borders and policies. Brexit could also empower growing Eurosceptic movements across Europe. This notion troubled the French government under Presidents Hollande and Macron because Eurosceptic voters had been gaining traction and were rallying behind Marine Le Pen, the leader of the right-wing Rassemblement National. Were France’s growing number of Eurosceptics to follow in the footsteps of those in the UK, France’s identity as a pro-EU nation could ultimately be compromised. Furthermore, the French government did not view Brexit favorably because it could lead to the end of the EU’s integration project. EU integration is a process which involves the “pooling” of national sovereignty and decision-making powers to a larger political body.1 By giving up jurisdiction over certain matters, such as international trade and currency, EU member states have created a supranational polity that superseded each individual member state. This is threatened by Brexit if remaining member states were to follow in the UK’s footsteps and also vote to remove their countries out of the bloc. The EU’s integration project is also threatened by the possibility of remaining member states feeling emboldened to “cherry pick,” by insisting on the ability to decide what EU institutions and initiatives they to participate in. Brexit could make 1 J. Peterson, “European integration,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, ed. James Wright, 4923–4925. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-043076- 7/01261-4. 5 the EU desperate to keep remaining member states that it has no choice but to concede to some of these demands. This situation could change the trajectory/ direction of European integration and contributes to why Brexit was not viewed enthusiastically by the French government. The UK’s exit was an especially pertinent issue in France because of