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STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017. © 2017, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 3 Brexit and European Insecurity Daniel Keohane The British exit from the EU is feeding into a general sense of uncertainty about the EU’s future. This uncertainty may be further exacerbated by US President Donald Trump, who has called into question both NATO’s and the EU’s viability. But irrespective of Brexit or the Trump administration’s ac- tions, it is vital that France, Germany, and the UK continue to work closely together on European defense post-Brexit. British Prime Minister Theresa May passes tanks at Bulford Camp on 29 September 2016 near Salisbury, England. 55 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 The British exit from theEU – “Brex- remain in the EU in the June 2016 it” – is occurring while European gov- referendum: Northern Ireland and ernments face an unprecedented con- Scotland. Depending on the econom- fluence of security crises. These range ic consequences of the UK’s Brexit from an unpredictable Russia to con- deal with the EU, instability could flicts across the Middle East, which are easily return to Northern Ireland, generating internal security tests such while Scotland (where UK nuclear as terrorist attacks and refugee flows. weapons are currently located) may The US is ambiguous about putting hold another independence referen- out all of Europe’s fires and expects dum. Both Unions – the EU and the allies to take on more of the military UK – have reasons to feel insecure be- burden. And no European country cause of Brexit. can cope alone. More specifically, that Brexit will re- More broadly, Brexit is feeding into duce the potential usefulness of EU a growing sense of European insecu- security and defense policies should rity. The new US president, Donald be self-evident, since the UK is the Trump, supports Brexit and seems largest European military spender nonplussed about the future of the in NATO. Those who believe that EU, adding succor to nationalist because the UK remains a nuclear- movements across the Union. Elec- armed member of NATO, nothing tions during 2017 in the Netherlands, much should change for European France, Germany, and perhaps Italy, defense had better think again. Brexit all founding EU member-states, may might hinder European military co- produce strong results for Brexit-lov- operation because it could greatly ing politicians – such as Marine Le strain political relationships with Pen in France – that further question other European allies, especially with the viability of the EU project. At the the next two leading military powers very least, Trump’s outlook could fur- in NATO-Europe: France and Ger- ther complicate already-difficult Brex- many. But if handled constructively, it negotiations between the UK and its military collaboration could become EU partners. one of the most fruitful areas for co- operation between the UK and the In addition to EU uncertainty, Brexit EU post-Brexit. is causing a distinct sense of self-doubt for the UK, too. Two of the four parts With regard to NATO’s future, the of the United Kingdom voted to election of Donald Trump as US 56 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY president has an even greater poten- In turn, British Defense Secretary tial to transform Europe’s strategic Michael Fallon has occasionally sug- landscape than Brexit if he scales back gested that London would veto any- the US military commitment to Euro- thing that smacked of an “EU army” pean security. But irrespective of what or undermined NATO (such as an EU Trump thinks in theory and what his version of NATO’s military headquar- administration does in practice, Euro- ters, SHAPE).1 Thankfully, this divi- pean defense post-Brexit will require sive rhetoric died down towards the much closer trilateral political and end of 2016, as it has become clear military cooperation between France, that EU security and defense plans Germany, and the UK. will not undermine NATO and that the UK will not use its veto. The Brexit Effect on EU Military Cooperation and NATO With the approval of the UK (which Following the UK vote to leave the retains its veto until it departs the EU in June 2016, the remaining 27 Union), EU heads of governments Union governments have committed approved a package of three plans themselves to improving the perfor- covering aspects of capability devel- mance of EU security and defense pol- opment, operational planning, and icies. Although it is not fair to blame military research, among other issues, the UK alone for the EU’s prior lack at a European Council summit on 15 of progress on defense, cheerleaders December 2016. However, despite for a common defense policy in Ber- their good intentions, the proposals lin, Paris and elsewhere have seized are unlikely to have much immedi- on the Brexit vote as an opportunity ate impact, and whether or not the to strengthen that policy area. In large remaining 27 EU governments will part based on a number of subsequent collectively deliver more on defense practical Franco-German proposals, remains an open question.2 EU foreign and defense ministers ap- proved new plans for EU security and For instance, while Berlin and Paris defense policies in mid-November. agree on much, there are some major differences in their respective strategic Since the Brexit vote, German Defense cultures. For one, France, as a nucle- Minister Ursula von der Leyen had at ar-armed permanent member of the times accused the UK of paralyzing UN Security Council, has a special progress on EU defense in the past, sense of responsibility for global secu- and asked it not to veto new plans. rity, and is prepared to act unilaterally 57 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 if necessary. Germany, in contrast, will terrorist attacks. But if acting through only act in coalition with others, and the EU could help ensure more mili- remains much more reluctant than tary support from other EU mem- France to deploy robust military force bers, France would find that prefer- abroad. able to acting alone. The trouble for France has been its awkward position For another, Berlin and Paris do not between a Germany reluctant to use necessarily agree on the end goal of EU robust military force abroad and a UK defense policy. Calls in the 2016 Ger- reluctant to act militarily through the man defense white paper for a “Eu- EU. ropean Security and Defense Union” in the long-term give the impression Post-Brexit, French strategic culture that EU defense is primarily a political will remain closest to that of the Brit- integration project for some in Berlin. ish. The EU could only develop a de- fense policy because France and the The French are more interested in a UK agreed that it should, at St. Malo stronger inter-governmental EU de- in 1998. Moreover, London and Paris fense policy today than a symbolic have been prepared to act together, integration project for the future, leading the charge for what became since Paris perceives acting militarily NATO’s intervention in Libya in early through the EU as an important op- 2011. To reinforce the European part tion for those crises in and around Eu- of NATO, the ongoing quiet deepen- rope in which the US does not want ing of bilateral Franco-British mili- to intervene. Because of their different tary cooperation, based on the 2010 strategic cultures, therefore, France Lancaster House treaties, is vitally and Germany may struggle to develop important. a substantially more active EU de- fense policy than their joint proposals For example, London and Paris con- would suggest.3 ducted a joint military exercise with over 5,000 troops in April 2016, as Moreover, the French do not assume part of their broader ongoing effort that their EU partners will always rush to develop a combined expeditionary to support their military operations. force, and in November 2016 they an- In general, they haven’t robustly sup- nounced that they would deepen their ported France in Africa in recent years, dependence on each other for missile although Germany has enhanced its technology. Indeed, Franco-British presence in Mali since the 2015 Paris cooperation is much more militarily 58 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY significant for European security than they do not defend themselves, they the recent developments trumpeted will no longer be defended […] the by the EU, which have produced little USA is no longer in the same mindset of concrete military value so far. Fur- of protection and defense.” Hollande thermore, Anglo-French military col- added that “Europeans must be aware laboration could become even more […] they must also be a political important if President Trump were to power with defense capabilities”.5 scale back the US military commit- ment to European security. If these Franco-British positions were to harden – because of difficult Brexit But bilateral Franco-British military negotiations – and cause a political cooperation may not be immune to rift, it could hinder not only their politics. And it is important to try to bilateral cooperation, but also coop- avoid a spillover effect from the Brexit eration through (and between) both decision onto NATO, especially any NATO and the EU.
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