STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Home , 2017 in the Netherlands, Lancaster House Treaties, Western European Union

Center for Security Studies

Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017.

Images © by Reuters

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 3 Brexit and European Insecurity Daniel Keohane

The British exit from the EU is feeding into a general sense of uncertainty about the EU’s future. This uncertainty may be further exacerbated by US President Donald Trump, who has called into question both NATO’s and the EU’s viability. But irrespective of Brexit or the Trump administration’s actions, it is vital that France, Germany, and the UK continue to work closely together on European defense post-Brexit.

British Prime Minister Theresa May passes tanks at Bulford Camp on 29 September 2016 near Salisbury, England.

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The British exit from theEU – “Brex- remain in the EU in the June 2016 it” – is occurring while European gov- referendum: Northern Ireland and ernments face an unprecedented con- Scotland. Depending on the econom- fluence of security crises. These range ic consequences of the UK’s Brexit from an unpredictable Russia to con- deal with the EU, instability could flicts across the Middle East, which are easily return to Northern Ireland, generating internal security tests such while Scotland (where UK nuclear as terrorist attacks and refugee flows. weapons are currently located) may The US is ambiguous about putting hold another independence referen- out all of Europe’s fires and expects dum. Both Unions – the EU and the allies to take on more of the military UK – have reasons to feel insecure be- burden. And no European country cause of Brexit. can cope alone. More specifically, that Brexit will re- More broadly, Brexit is feeding into duce the potential usefulness of EU a growing sense of European insecu- security and defense policies should rity. The new US president, Donald be self-evident, since the UK is the Trump, supports Brexit and seems largest European military spender nonplussed about the future of the in NATO. Those who believe that EU, adding succor to nationalist because the UK remains a nuclear- movements across the Union. Elec- armed member of NATO, nothing tions during 2017 in the Netherlands, much should change for European France, Germany, and perhaps Italy, defense had better think again. Brexit all founding EU member-states, may might hinder European military co- produce strong results for Brexit-lov- operation because it could greatly ing politicians – such as Marine Le strain political relationships with Pen in France – that further question other European allies, especially with the viability of the EU project. At the the next two leading military powers very least, Trump’s outlook could fur- in NATO-Europe: France and Ger- ther complicate already-difficult Brex- many. But if handled constructively, it negotiations between the UK and its military collaboration could become EU partners. one of the most fruitful areas for cooperation between the UK and the In addition to EU uncertainty, Brexit EU post-Brexit. is causing a distinct sense of self-doubt for the UK, too. Two of the four parts With regard to NATO’s future, the of the United Kingdom voted to election of Donald Trump as US

56 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY president has an even greater poten- In turn, British Defense Secretary tial to transform Europe’s strategic Michael Fallon has occasionally sug- landscape than Brexit if he scales back gested that London would veto any- the US military commitment to Euro- thing that smacked of an “EU army” pean security. But irrespective of what or undermined NATO (such as an EU Trump thinks in theory and what his version of NATO’s military headquar- administration does in practice, Euro- ters, SHAPE).1 Thankfully, this divi- pean defense post-Brexit will require sive rhetoric died down towards the much closer trilateral political and end of 2016, as it has become clear military cooperation between France, that EU security and defense plans Germany, and the UK. will not undermine NATO and that the UK will not use its veto. The Brexit Effect on EU Military Cooperation and NATO With the approval of the UK (which Following the UK vote to leave the retains its veto until it departs the EU in June 2016, the remaining 27 Union), EU heads of governments Union governments have committed approved a package of three plans themselves to improving the perfor- covering aspects of capability devel- mance of EU security and defense pol- opment, operational planning, and icies. Although it is not fair to blame military research, among other issues, the UK alone for the EU’s prior lack at a European Council summit on 15 of progress on defense, cheerleaders December 2016. However, despite for a common defense policy in Ber- their good intentions, the proposals lin, Paris and elsewhere have seized are unlikely to have much immedi- on the Brexit vote as an opportunity ate impact, and whether or not the to strengthen that policy area. In large remaining 27 EU governments will part based on a number of subsequent collectively deliver more on defense practical Franco-German proposals, remains an open question.2 EU foreign and defense ministers approved new plans for EU security and For instance, while Berlin and Paris defense policies in mid-November. agree on much, there are some major differences in their respective strategic Since the Brexit vote, German Defense cultures. For one, France, as a nucle- Minister Ursula von der Leyen had at ar-armed permanent member of the times accused the UK of paralyzing UN Security Council, has a special progress on EU defense in the past, sense of responsibility for global secu- and asked it not to veto new plans. rity, and is prepared to act unilaterally

57 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 if necessary. Germany, in contrast, will terrorist attacks. But if acting through only act in coalition with others, and the EU could help ensure more mili- remains much more reluctant than tary support from other EU mem- France to deploy robust military force bers, France would find that prefer- abroad. able to acting alone. The trouble for France has been its awkward position For another, Berlin and Paris do not between a Germany reluctant to use necessarily agree on the end goal of EU robust military force abroad and a UK defense policy. Calls in the 2016 Ger- reluctant to act militarily through the man defense white paper for a “Eu- EU. ropean Security and Defense Union” in the long-term give the impression Post-Brexit, French strategic culture that EU defense is primarily a political will remain closest to that of the Brit- integration project for some in Berlin. ish. TheEU could only develop a defense policy because France and the The French are more interested in a UK agreed that it should, at St. Malo stronger inter-governmental EU de- in 1998. Moreover, London and Paris fense policy today than a symbolic have been prepared to act together, integration project for the future, leading the charge for what became since Paris perceives acting militarily NATO’s intervention in Libya in early through the EU as an important op- 2011. To reinforce the European part tion for those crises in and around Eu- of NATO, the ongoing quiet deepen- rope in which the US does not want ing of bilateral Franco-British mili- to intervene. Because of their different tary cooperation, based on the 2010 strategic cultures, therefore, France Lancaster House treaties, is vitally and Germany may struggle to develop important. a substantially more active EU defense policy than their joint proposals For example, London and Paris con- would suggest.3 ducted a joint military exercise with over 5,000 troops in April 2016, as Moreover, the French do not assume part of their broader ongoing effort that their EU partners will always rush to develop a combined expeditionary to support their military operations. force, and in November 2016 they an- In general, they haven’t robustly sup- nounced that they would deepen their ported France in Africa in recent years, dependence on each other for missile although Germany has enhanced its technology. Indeed, Franco-British presence in Mali since the 2015 Paris cooperation is much more militarily

58 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY significant for European security than they do not defend themselves, they the recent developments trumpeted will no longer be defended […] the by the EU, which have produced little USA is no longer in the same mindset of concrete military value so far. Fur- of protection and defense.” Hollande thermore, Anglo-French military col- added that “Europeans must be aware laboration could become even more […] they must also be a political important if President Trump were to power with defense capabilities”.5 scale back the US military commitment to European security. If these Franco-British positions were to harden – because of difficult Brexit But bilateral Franco-British military negotiations – and cause a political cooperation may not be immune to rift, it could hinder not only their politics. And it is important to try to bilateral cooperation, but also coop- avoid a spillover effect from the Brexit eration through (and between) both decision onto NATO, especially any NATO and the EU. Strong Franco- political rift between Europe’s two British cooperation is vital for Eu- leading military powers, the tradition- ropean security, not only because ally more “Europeanist” France and of their combined military power, more “Atlanticist” UK. Even before but also because Europeans need to Trump’s election in November 2016, be able both to contribute more to in a speech on 5 September, British NATO (as the UK prioritizes) and Defense Secretary Fallon said: “Given to act autonomously if necessary (as the overlap in NATO and EU mem- France advocates, via the EU, or in bership, it’s surely in all our interests to other ways).6 ensure the EU doesn’t duplicate exist- ing structures. […] Our Trans-Atlan- However, President Trump’s admira- tic alliance works for the UK and for tion of Brexit and declaration that it Europe, making us stronger and better wouldn’t worry him if the EU broke able to meet the threats and challenges up could not only exacerbate Franco- of the future”.4 British divisions during difficult Brex- it negotiations, but could also encour- In contrast, on 6 October 2016, French age a broader divide within NATO (of president Hollande said: “There are which more below) between an An- European countries which believe that glo-sphere and a Euro-sphere. That the USA will always be there to pro- is in nobody’s interest except that of tect them […] We must therefore tell Russian President Vladimir Putin, these European countries […] that if who wishes to destabilize the Atlantic

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The European Army Alphabet Soup Institutions

NATO EU

NAC FNC CSDP PESCO

2016 Proposals + Plans

Schengen Strength- SDIP Letter of Zone for ening Four NATO NATO’s EDAP Schengen “European of Defense Pillar” EUGS ESDU

European Security EU-NATO Compact Joint Declaration

Other Formats

Multi- Bilateral Regional Ad Hoc national

Institutions EDAP European Defense Action Plan: December Proposals to NAC North Atlantic Council: Brings together all of NATO’s 28 augment financing of military research and joint equipment members, decisions are taken by inter-governmental programs, and opening up national defense markets, consensus presented by the European Commission FNC Framework Nations Concept: Forms part of broader idea SDIP Security and Defense Implementation Plan: Follow-on to strengthen the “European Pillar” of NATO, e.g. by pooling document to EUGS focusing on security and defense aspects and sharing military capabilities approved in December, drafted by EU HR/VP Mogherini CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy: Inter-govern- European Security Compact: A June Franco-German call to mental framework for military cooperation housed within beef up the EU’s contribution to international security and EU foreign policy structures, part of broader international improve EU’s ability to tackle internal security threats security policies ESDU European Security and Defense Union: A long-term goal PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation: A legal to create a common defense for the EU, proposed in July mechanism to allow a smaller group of EU countries German White Paper cooperate more closely together on military matters, may be Schengen of Defense: An August Italian proposal for a triggered during 2017 permanent multinational European force outside institutional structures but available to EU/NATO/UN. 2016 Proposals + Plans Letter of Four: An October Franco-German-Italian-Spanish call Freedom of movement for soldiers Schengen Zone for NATO: for exploring the use of the PESCO mechanism in the EU and military equipment across NATO internal borders, an treaties idea supported by US Army Europe & others Strengthening NATO’s “European Pillar”: Europeans to take Other Formats on more of NATO’s military burdens, such as meeting NATO’s Bilateral: Examples include Franco-British, German-Dutch 2% of GDP spending goal – highlighted in July German White Regional: Examples include Nordic, Benelux, Visegrad Paper Multinational: Examples include the European Air Transport EU-NATO Joint Declaration: A cooperation program agreed Command, Eurocorps at the July NATO Warsaw summit, 40+ proposals in 7 areas such as migration, cyber, hybrid threats, exercises etc. Ad Hoc: Examples include military operations like current one against Daesh EUGS EU Global Strategy: A document published in June outlining the objectives of EU foreign and security policies, drafted by EU HR/VP Mogherini

60 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY alliance. It is no wonder that other EU procurement markets, and by pro- governments are worried about the fu- viding financial incentives for more ture of European security, not only the efficient multinational equipment effect of Brexit on theEU and NATO. programs. All of this would benefit taxpayers and soldiers alike, as well as Military Cooperation Between the NATO, since 21 countries will remain UK and the EU Post-Brexit members of both the EU and NATO TheUK government should hope that post-Brexit. EU governments do deliver on their defense promises, including after the Third, theEU and NATO are deep- British exit from the EU. There are ening their practical cooperation, and three reasons for this. First, some EU European security can only benefit operations are useful for coping with from these two organizations work- the vast array of security challenges ing together. To tackle terrorism or facing Europe at large. NATO cannot the refugee crisis, between them the – and the US does not want to – be EU and NATO can connect eve- everywhere. This largely explains why rything from internal policing and most EU military operations have tak- intelligence networks to external en place in the broad geographic space military operations. Both bodies are (beyond EU territory) stretching from conducting operations to combat the Western Balkans via the Medi- people-smuggling across the Mediter- terranean and Africa to the Indian ranean, for example. To counter Rus- Ocean, to counter pirates, terrorists, sian hybrid belligerence, they are also and people smugglers, among other trying to improve the coordination of tasks. This emerging strategic necessity their various efforts, from economic helps explain why the British defense sanctions to territorial defense, cyber- secretary has said that after its depar- defense, and countering propaganda. ture, the UK could still contribute to EU operations.7 This is whyNATO Secretary Gen- eral Jens Stoltenberg has welcomed Second, Europeans need to improve the (mainly) Franco–German pro- their military capabilities and spend posals for strengthening EU security their sparse defense monies more ef- and defense policies. At a September fectively. The EU institutions in Brus- 2016 informal meeting of EU defense sels can help the governments with ministers in Bratislava, Stoltenberg funding for defense research, by open- highlighted that there is no contra- ing up protected national military diction between better EU military

61 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 cooperation and a strong NATO, not- foreign or defense policies in return ing that they are mutually reinforcing.8 for alignment with EU foreign policy positions or contributions to EU Because of these three reasons – along- operations. British diplomats would side Britain’s substantial military ca- probably prefer a permanent observer pacity, intelligence assets, and opera- status on EU foreign policy decision- tional experience – it is in everyone’s making committees to an ad-hoc, is- interest to have as close a relationship sue-by-issue approach, which implies as possible between the UK and the “take it or leave it” choices for the EU on military matters after Brexit. UK. But a permanent observer status The UK, for example, may wish to for the UK would prove difficult. continue contributing to useful EU operations. Non-EU European mem- It is true that pre-accession countries, bers of NATO, such as Norway and such as the ten governments that Turkey, have made significant contri- joined the EU in 2004, were able to butions to some EU operations in the enjoy observer status on some inter- past. governmental EU foreign policy- making formats. But the UK is not More broadly, it would make sense for trying to join the EU, it is leaving. the EU and UK to continue to align Plus, other non-EU European mem- their positions on common interna- bers of NATO who will not join the tional challenges, such as sanction- EU for the foreseeable future, par- ing Russia, and to work as closely to- ticularly Norway and Turkey, would gether as possible. Malcolm Rifkind, likely expect similar arrangements. At the former UK foreign secretary, has the same time, the remaining 27 EU suggested that: “What we will need, governments are keen to protect their in future, is a EU+1 forum whenever decision-making autonomy. the countries of Europe are seeking to promote a common foreign policy Instead, London should aim for de- to ensure that global policy is not the facto rather than de-jure influence monopoly of the US, China and Rus- post-Brexit. Beyond ad-hoc observer sia with Europe excluded.”9 status on standing inter-governmental EU decision-making committees, An EU+1 forum might work on an this could also involve selective inclu- ad-hoc basis for specific challenges. sion of the UK in some issue-specific But in general, the UK cannot real- ad-hoc decision-making formats – istically expect a formal say over EU such as steering boards – based on

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London’s willingness to participate in important things to negotiate with its a particular capability project or con- EU partners. The British government tribute to a military operation at hand. should instead wish its EU partners For example, if the UK is willing to well in their endeavors to make EU make a significant contribution to an military cooperation more effective, EU military operation, while some EU safe in the knowledge that the UK members may not wish to participate, can no longer be blamed for any fu- ways should be explored to ensure a ture lack of progress on EU defense formal say for London in how that op- policy. eration is run.10 Brexit Negotiations and the These types of ad-hoc arrangements Trump Card would require a lot of political trust Post-Brexit, European military coop- between the UK and the remaining 27 eration will continue to be pushed governments. But given the UK’s deep more by the convergence of national knowledge of EU procedures and chal- priorities than by the efforts of the EU lenges – alongside its global outlook, and NATO. European military coop- strong military capabilities, operation- eration is mainly bottom-up – driven al experience, and vast international by national governments – not top- networks and knowledge – it is likely down, meaning directed and organ- that London would have consider- ized by the institutions in Brussels. able de-facto influence on other EU European governments are increas- governments if it chose to. Handled ingly picking and choosing which constructively, defense policy could forms of military cooperation they become one of the most fruitful areas wish to pursue, depending on the ca- for cooperation between the UK and pability project, or military operation the EU after Brexit. at hand. Sometimes they act through NATO or the EU, but almost all Eu- As long as it remains an EU member, ropean governments are using other therefore, there is not much point in formats as well, whether regional, bi- London threatening to veto any fu- lateral, or ad-hoc coalitions.11 ture agreements on EU military cooperation, as they would almost certain- Other EU governments will continue ly happen anyway after the UK has to want to work with the UK in bi- left the EU. It would also needlessly lateral or other settings, as well as at antagonize France, Germany, and NATO, just as the UK should work others when the UK has much more with them. British Prime Minister

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Theresa May has constructively em- the EU’s single market, since it could phasized that regardless of Brexit, the undermine the mutual confidence UK will remain strongly committed to on which those security guarantees European security: “Britain’s unique depend. Charles Grant of the Center intelligence capabilities will continue for European Reform suggests that to help keep people in Europe safe this approach has already gone down from terrorism […] Britain’s service- badly in some Central and Eastern men and women, based in European EU members: “[TheUK ] recently countries including Estonia, Poland, sent about 1,000 troops to Estonia and Romania, will continue to do and Poland. Given this contribution their duty. We are leaving the Euro- to European security, some govern- pean Union, but we are not leaving ment advisers have suggested, EU Europe.”12 member-states – and especially those in Central Europe – should go the ex- Policy-makers in London are well tra mile to give the UK a generous exit aware that other EU governments will settlement. However […] Some Bal- want to continue working closely with tic and Polish politicians who heard the UK on security matters, to the exit last summer were miffed, saying tent that some see it as strengthening they had thought the UK was send- the UK’s Brexit negotiating position. ing troops because it cared about their Malcolm Chalmers from the Royal security; but now it appeared to be a United Services Institute has de- cynical move to ensure better terms scribed the situation thus: “As concern on a trade deal.”14 over the future terms of a Brexit deal grows, some of those involved in shap- Moreover, although the UK is the ing policy have been tempted by the largest European military spender in argument that the UK should use its NATO, its ability to contribute as ‘security surplus’ – its role as the lead- much as it would wish to European ing Western military and intelligence security may be hampered by the on- power – as a bargaining chip that going impact of Brexit on the British could be ‘traded’ in return for com- economy and the UK government mercial concessions in the post-Brexit budget. The hope is that the impact settlement with the EU.”13 of Brexit on UK military spending and capability will not be as debilitat- Chalmers cautions against taking such ing as the fallout from the economic a path, linking UK security guarantees crisis of 2008 onwards. The 2010 UK to economic interests such as access to defense review led to the reduction of

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The United Kingdom’s Trade Relations with Selected Countries As of 2014, in billion USD

Trade in Goods (Import) 58.66 64.15 Trade in Goods (Export) Trade in Services (Import) USA Trade in Services (Export)

38.55 83.28

Poland

Germany United 12.64 6.17 Kingdom 2.65 2.63 100.04 52.05

16.1 19.91

France

Iceland 43.39 32.4

19.79 19.27 Italy

28.39 14.42 Norway Spain 7.99 12.15 Estonia 21.81 14.48 Latvia Denmark Lithuania United16.88 9.11 Kingdom

Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Lux. Czech Rep. Ukraine Sources: OECD, OECD Quarterly Internationale Trade Statistics 2016, no.Slovakia 3 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017); OECD, OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services 2016France, no. 2 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016) Hungary Romania

Slovenia Italy Croatia Portugal Bosnia & Georgia Herz. Serbia

Spain Mont. Bulgaria the UK army to its lowest manpower However,Mac. Brexit is already biting into Albania Turkey numbers since the Napoleonic era, theGreece British defense budget to some de- and a number of key capability pro- gree, mainly due the fall in the value jects were scrapped or delayed (such as of the pound sterling: A January 2017 aircraft carriers).15 report from the UK National Audit

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Office said that the projected costs sovereigntist world order, not least of funding the UK’s current defense because of a re-booted “special rela- equipment plan, which takes Britain tionship” with the US. Following a from 2016 to 2026, had risen by 7 per meeting with Trump on 9 January cent during 2016, compared with a 2017, British Foreign Secretary Boris rise of 1.2 per cent between 2013 and Johnson said that the then US presi- 2015. This will require British defense dent-elect had “a very exciting agenda officials to find nearly £6 billion of ad- of change”, and that the UK was “first ditional savings from their equipment in line” for a free trade deal with the plan in ten years if they are to remain US after the Trump administration within budget.16 took office (technically, however, this cannot happen for at least two years, In addition, some in London now since the UK cannot formally agree expect that the US will reinforce the a bilateral trade deal with the US or UK’s position in its forthcoming any other non-EU country until after Brexit negotiations. President Trump it has left the EU). has declared his admiration of Brexit, and stated that it wouldn’t worry him Johnson elaborated further at the if the EU broke up. In a joint inter- Munich Security Conference in Feb- view before his inauguration with the ruary 2017, referring to Brexit as British Times and German Bild (con- “liberation” from the EU.18 But the ducted with Michael Gove, a leading UK’s embrace of Trump, combined pro-Brexit UK politician), Trump said with the US president’s nonchalance that not only would Brexit “end up be- towards the EU’s future, could di- ing a great thing”, but also that the EU vide NATO allies, with the US and would continue to break apart. Trump the UK on one side and France, Ger- explained: “People, countries, want many, Italy, and Spain on the other. their own identity and the UK wanted Similar to the bitter splits over the its own identity.”17 2003 Iraq war, this could potentially force other European governments to Some pro-Brexit politicians in the choose sides. In that scenario, every- UK interpret Trump’s November elec- one would lose out. toral victory (and outlook) as addi- tional justification for the British exit Alternatively, in a more optimistic from the EU. The world is changing, scenario, the UK could potentially act so the argument runs, and the UK as a bridge between Europe and the will emerge as a pioneer in the new new US administration on reinforcing

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NATO, which could play positively altogether re-assuring to most Euro- into the ongoing Brexit negotiations peans: “I said a long time ago that with EU partners. UK Prime Minis- NATO had problems. Number one ter Theresa May did manage during it was obsolete […] Number two the her January visit to Washington to get countries aren’t paying what they’re a public agreement from the new US supposed to pay […] which I think is president that he backs NATO “100 very unfair to the United States. With per cent”. But most other Europeans that being said, NATO is very impor- are less convinced by Trump’s words on tant to me.”21 NATO, they await his actions. Moreo- ver, in stark contrast to Boris Johnson’s The problem with Trump’s general views, the chairman of the Munich approach to world affairs is that it fa- Security Conference, Wolfgang Isch- vors creating an international bazaar inger, summed up how many in the of bilateral deals, centered on what remaining EU-27 countries feel about the president thinks is best for the US, Trump’s views on the EU, calling them over working with more stable global a form of “war without weapons”.19 and regional institutions.22 That the US created the current global system As Charles Grant from the Center for of institutions and rules – for very European Reform has put it: “A related good reasons – seems to be neither card cited by British officials is Donald here nor there for Trump. No wonder Trump. His questionable commitment that many in Brussels and elsewhere to European security, and the increas- worry for the future of both NATO ingly dangerous nature of the world, and the EU. could make partnership with Britain more valuable to continental govern- Much commentary has focused on ments. But the Trump card could eas- the key role Germany will have to ily end up hurting the British. The play to keep the EU together follow- more that British ministers cozy up to ing the UK’s Brexit vote during the Trump, and avoid criticizing his worst Trump era. The departing UK aside, excesses, the more alien the British ap- some other major EU countries may pear to other Europeans, and the more not be so resistant to the US presi- the UK’s soft power erodes.”20 dent’s ideas. The current conservative government in Warsaw shares much New Deals on European Defense? of Trump’s nationalist worldview. Fol- Trump’s views on NATO are more lowing his election, Polish Prime Min- mixed than his views on the EU, if not ister Beata Szydło said: “A certain era

67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 in world politics ends […] Democracy a course for the UK: “The election won despite the liberal propaganda.”23 of Trump as US president could also lead to further pressure on European Warsaw has been fighting with the states, including the UK, to take a EU institutions in Brussels over the greater share of responsibility for their rule of law in Poland, and meets the own security. Given this, the UK is NATO target of spending 2 per cent of likely to want to further deepen exist- GDP on defense. Sounds like Trump’s ing efforts to improve bilateral defense kind of European ally, a country he cooperation with European NATO might want to tempt to leave the EU members (for example, France).”24 with a bilateral trade deal. Moreover, if Trump continues to be dissatisfied To reinforce the European part of with NATO as a whole, might Poland NATO, the ongoing quiet deepening be tempted to try to cash in and strike of bilateral military cooperation be- a bilateral deal with the US on defense? tween Europe’s two leading military powers, France and the UK, based on Alternatively, if Trump and Putin were the 2010 Lancaster House treaties, to agree a new geopolitical arrange- is vitally important. Germany is also ment over the heads of NATO allies, working on a roadmap for military a kind of updated Yalta conference, cooperation with the UK to ensure would that push Poland towards bet- that tight cooperation on military ter bilateral relationships with Ger- matters survives Britain’s exit from many, France, the UK, and others? In the EU.25 Preserving the EU, and de- some respects, this has already been veloping more effective EU military happening. Since 2015, Germany has cooperation (as outlined above), will placed a battalion of mechanized in- depend to a large degree on stronger fantry under the command of a Polish Franco-German cooperation – al- brigade. In November 2016, Poland though the Berlin-Paris engine is in and the UK announced their ambition dire need of a kick-start. to agree on a bilateral defense treaty. However, deeper bilateralism between As Poland’s potential choices suggest, the major European powers may not deeper bilateralism across Europe may be enough to strengthen Europe’s be the best way to resist the tempta- defenses. No European member of tions and turbulences of Trump. Mal- NATO wants to lose the protection colm Chalmers of the Royal United of the US. But Europeans would be Services Institute has suggested such wise to at least collectively improve

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Selected Military Capabilities

As of 2016

seas bases)*

Defensein USDbudget billion Active troops Deployed(incl. troops onover their own Main battle tanksCombat aircraft Principalvessels surface Submarines

United Kingdom 52.5 152,350 13,418 227 279 19 11

France 47.2 202,950 18,104 200 351 24 10

Germany 38.3 176,800 3,050 306 217 15 6

Italy 22.3 174,500 4,155 160 268 19 7

Poland 9.1 99,300 583 985 98 2 5

Spain 12.2 123,200 1,086 347 182 11 3

USA 604.0 1,347,300 202,954 2,831 3,628 104 68

* not including naval missions

Source: IISS Military Balance 2017 their own defenses, in case they can no prefer to wage war via hybrid means. longer depend on NATO – meaning In 2016, France, Germany, and the the US – as much as before. Moreover, UK combined spent USD 138 bil- Europeans – in particular the French, lion on defense, whereas Russia spent the Germans, and the British – should USD 58.9 billion.26 But Russia is not probably also consider whether they the only threat to European security. would be able to defend themselves There is a wide range of security chal- collectively if they had to, a question lenges across the EU’s broad neighbor- that has been, until now, a taboo in hood that may require Europeans to European defense discussions. use military means without US help, such as preventing conflicts or helping Currently, the main state-based mili- weak states like Mali fight terrorists. tary threat to European security is Russia. Although it is possible that The elephant in the room for such a Moscow might risk a shooting war European defense plan would be nu- with a European NATO member, that clear deterrence.27 If Trump were to is far from obvious, and Russia may withdraw the US nuclear umbrella

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– which should be very unlikely – French, and German defense policies would France and the UK be willing have been showing some signs of con- and able to provide nuclear-armed vergence in recent years. Each coun- protection for other Europeans?28 try is aiming – to varying degrees – to be able to meet as broad a spectrum In any case, deeper European coop- of tasks as possible, maintain the abil- eration in the defense of Europe could ity to defend their territories, and also not be credibly carried out via the EU, deploy abroad. since the UK will depart, and some EU countries (such as Austria, Ireland, Each of them has promised to in- and Finland) are not yet willing to join crease defense spending in the com- a military alliance. TheEU , unlike ing years, reflecting the difficult secu- NATO, is not an inter-governmental rity crises that Europe faces today. All military alliance (let alone moving to- three have made important contribu- wards creating a federal European army tions to NATO’s reassurance meas- under the political control of Brussels- ures to allies in Eastern Europe, such based EU institutions), and is far from as participating in Baltic air policing. capable of defending its territory from Moreover, all three have deployed attacks by external states like Russia.29 forces to help fight Islamist terrorists in Africa and the Middle East. Depending on the precise nature of any US military scale-back, something It is true that Germany has been re- like a strengthened European pillar of luctant to take on full-blown combat NATO would probably be required.30 roles abroad. But its beefed-up sup- In the worst case, perhaps even a report for the coalition against the so- vived Western European Union – a called “Islamic State”, following the now-defunct military alliance of ten November 2015 terrorist attacks in European governments that preceded Paris, alongside its willingness to lead EU defense policy, separate from the one of NATO’s four new battalions in EU and NATO –, might be needed. 31 Eastern Europe, suggests that Germa- ny realizes that it needs to be prepared In particular, deeper European coop- to contribute more militarily to Euro- eration for defending Europe will re- pean security.32 quire much closer political and military alignment between Berlin, Paris, France has sometimes been suspected and London. One misfortune of Brexit of being too Russia-friendly, but it is that it is occurring just when British, cancelled the delivery of two Mistral

70 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY amphibious assault ships to Moscow 5 François Hollande, France’s European Vision, Jacques Delors Institute, 06.10.2016. after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Britain has long been accused of being 6 Daniel Keohane, “NATO, the EU, and the curse of Suez”, in: Carnegie Europe, anti-EU military cooperation. But the 14.10.2016. EU’s most successful military mission 7 Ben Farmer / Kate McCann, “Britain ‘can still to date, an anti-piracy operation in the join EU military missions after Brexit’”, in: waters off Somalia, has been run from Daily Telegraph, 20.07.2016. a British military headquarters. 8 NATO, NATO Secretary General welcomes discussion on strengthening European defense, 27.09.2016. In essence, European military cooperation – whether through the EU, 9 Malcom Rifkind, “Neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’: how a smart Brexit should look”, in: European NATO, or other formats – is a tale of Leadership Network, 18.10.2016. three cities, because it can fully work 10 Nicole Koenig, “EU External Action and only if Berlin, London, and Paris Brexit: Relaunch and Reconnect”, in: Jacques agree. Encouragingly, in November Delors Institut – Berlin, 22.11.2016. 2016 a joint meeting of French, Brit- 11 Daniel Keohane, “The Renationalization of ish, and German defense chiefs took European Defense Cooperation”, in: Strategic Trends (2016), 9 – 28. place in Paris. Regardless of what the Trump administration in the US 12 UK Prime Minister’s Office, The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM does, the minimum challenge now for speech, Lancaster House London, 17.01.2017. France, Germany, and the UK will be 13 Malcolm Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security to ensure that the British exit from the Policy after Brexit”, in: Royal United Services EU will not make political alignments Institute, 01.2017. on European defense more difficult to 14 Charles Grant, “Mrs May’s emerging deal on achieve. Brexit: not just hard, but also difficult”, in: Center for European Reform, 20.02.2017.

15 Daniel Keohane, “Is Britain back? The 2015 UK Defense Review”, in: CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 185 (2016). 1 Daniel Keohane, “An EU HQ? Let them at it”, in: Royal United Services Institute, 11.10.2016. 16 UK National Audit Office, Ministry of Defense: The Equipment Plan 2016 to 2026, 27.01.2017. 2 Sophia Besch, “EU Defense, Brexit and Trump: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, in: Center for 17 Full transcript of interview with Donald European Reform 14.12.2016. Trump, in: The Times, 16.01.2017.

3 Daniel Keohane, “Policy or Project? France, 18 Philip Stephens, “Boris Johnson forgets the Germany, and EU defense” in: Carnegie Europe, message”, in: Financial Times, 21.02.2017. 02.08.2016. 19 Patrick Donahue, “Germany’s Former U.S. En- 4 UK Ministry of Defense, Defense Secretary voy Warns of ‘War Without Weapons’ Between speaks at Université d’été, Paris, 05.09.2016. Trump, EU”, in: Bloomberg, 13.02.2017.

71 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

20 Charles Grant, “Mrs May’s emerging deal on Brexit: not just hard, but also difficult”, in: Center for European Reform 20.02.2017.

21 Full transcript of interview with Donald Trump, in: The Times, 16.01.2017.

22 Thomas Wright, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy”, in: Politico, 20.01.2016.

23 Rick Lyman, “Enthusiasm for Trump in Poland Is Tempered by Distrust of Putin”, in: New York Times, 19.11. 2016.

24 Malcolm Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, in: Royal United Services Institute, 01.2017.

25 Patrick Donahue / Matthew Miller, “Germany Forging Post-Brexit Defense ‘Road Map’ With the UK”, in: Bloomberg, 19.02.2017.

26 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (2017).

27 Daniel Keohane, “Make Europe Defend Again?”, in: Carnegie Europe, 18.11.2016.

28 Oliver Thränert, “No Shortcut to a European Deterrent”, in: CSS Policy Perspective 5, no. 2 (2017).

29 Daniel Keohane, “Samuel Beckett’s European Army”, in: Carnegie Europe, 16.12.2016.

30 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Why NATO needs a European pillar”, in: Politico, 11.02.2017.

31 Ann Applebaum, “Europe needs a new defense pact – and Britain can lead it”, in: Financial Times, 15.02.2017.

32 Daniel Keohane, “Constrained Leadership: Ger- many’s New Defense Policy”, in: CSS Analyses in Security Policy no. 201 (2016).