By JOSEPH C. SATTERTHWAITE
ABSTRACT: On February 21, 1947, the U.S. government was informed by the British government that by April 1 it would have to discontinue, because of its own difficulties, its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. It hoped the United States could take over this burden in both countries. Presi- dent Truman and the State, War, and Navy departments at once realized that unless the United States did so, Greece would be taken over by its communist partisans strongly sup- ported by the Soviet government working through the com- munist Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments; that if this happened Turkey would find itself in an untenable position in spite of its large but antiquated army; and that the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East in that event would inevi- tably fall under communist domination. In a dramatic mes- sage to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman said that the U.S. must take immediate and resolute action to sup- port Greece and Turkey. The Congress, after extensive hear- ings, approved this historic change in U.S. foreign policy in a bill signed May 22, known as Public Law 75. Out of the President’s message came the Truman Doctrine. The principle of assistance to countries of the free world under the threat of communist aggression having been accepted by the Congress, the Marshall Plan followed not long after. The military and economic aid given Turkey in the ensuing years was highly effective: the U.S. probably received more per dollar advanced than in any other country, at least for the period of this study —which ends with the signing of the CENTO (Baghdad) Pact in 1955.
Joseph C. Satterthwaite was appointed a Foreign Service officer in 1926 after receiving A.B. and A.M. degrees from the University of Michigan. He was Secretary of Embassy in Ankara, 1940-44. In 1945 he was assigned to the Near Eastern Division of the State Department. In 1946 he was named Special Assistant to the Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs, in 1947 the Deputy Director, and from July 1948 to July 1949 he was Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs. Subsequently he served as Ambassador to Ceylon, Diplomatic Agent in Tangier for Morocco, Ambassador to Burma, Director General of the Foreign Service, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Ambassador to South Africa. He retired from the Foreign Service at the end of 1965. Since then he has been a consultant on foreign affairs. 74 75
A fortunate coincidence the May continue their assistance to Turkey, BY1972 issue of THE ANNALS will which was maintaining the large army appear during the twenty-fifth anni- that Soviet pressure demanded, and that versary of the Truman Doctrine, the the Turks would be unable to handle subject of this article. Its scope is the the financing of both the modernization genesis of that doctrine as it related to of their army and the economic develop- Turkey and how it worked in that coun- ment of the country. The British try up to the signing of the Baghdad government hoped that the United Pact in 1955. States could take over this burden in both countries. THE DOCTRINE GENESIS OF TRUMAN Acheson instructed Henderson and On the afternoon of Friday, February John D. Hickerson, Director of the Of- 21, 1947, the Private Secretary of the fice of European Affairs (since the Soviet British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, Union, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which telephoned the Secretary of State’s of- were under his jurisdiction, constituted fice. He said his Ambassador had been the menacing threat to Greece and instructed to deliver personally to the Turkey), to begin preparations that eve- Secretary (General George C. Marshall) ning on the means to cope with the crisis a communication of great importance. with which the British note confronted He requested an appointment for that us. This they did. afternoon. The next morning, Saturday, the As it happened the Secretary had left writer-who was making preparations to shortly before for Princeton, where he head a Mission to Nepal-learned of the was to deliver an address, and would not crisis at a meeting called by Henderson return until Monday morning. The of- of the members of his staff most directly fice of the Under Secretary, Dean concerned. Henderson expressed the Acheson, was accordingly informed. As view that if the British withdrew their related in Present at the Creation: My troops from Greece, and we did not Years in the State Department, Acheson intervene, the Greek communist parti- telephoned Inverchapel, who told him sans supported by Bulgaria and Yugo- the British note contained very impor- slavia were sure to gain control of tant information about a crisis in British Greece. If this happened the free world aid to Greece. Acheson thereupon sug- would lose the eastern Mediterranean gested that the Ambassador send his and the Near East to the communists. First Secretary to the Department to Turkey, the only country in the area deliver a copy to Loy Henderson, Direc- with an army strong enough to make the tor of the Office of Near Eastern and Russians hesitate, would find itself in African Affairs. Inverchapel could then an untenable position. Therefore the carry out his orders by delivering the United States, by filling the gap caused original note to the Secretary in person by the British withdrawal, must show on Monday morning. This was done. a greater determination to resist this The First Secretary handed Hender- communist drive than the determination son not one note but two. The first of the communists to gain control of contained the startling information that Greece. Henderson told us Acheson had British aid to Greece would have to end informed President Truman of the crisis by April 1. It also described the at once and that both, he understood, rapidly deteriorating state of Greece’s agreed with his view expressed above. economy and security. The second note From then on the old State Depart- reported that the British could no longer ment moved with unaccustomed speed 76 to cope with the crisis. General The recommendations were ready the Marshall returned to his office Monday next day and the President approved morning, read the British notes and the the paper for action. The next step was background papers that had been pre- consultation with Congress, and the pared for him, and received Lord President set up a meeting for the Inverchapel at 10:00 A.M. The Ambas- next day. sador left knowing that the Secretary The President, Marshall, and Acheson fully appreciated the seriousness of the met the next morning with congressional notes he had handed him. The Secre- leaders, headed by Senator Arthur tary next instructed Acheson to take Vandenberg of Michigan who was both responsibility for action from there on, Acting-President of the Senate-there as he had to leave for Moscow in a week being no vice-president-and Chairman for the meeting of the Council of For- of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- eign Ministers and would be fully occu- mittee. He, with the President and pied with preparations for the meeting. Acheson, was to play a key role in the Acheson asked Henderson to head a success of what came to be called the team working to prepare the necessary Truman Doctrine. recommendations for the President, with After opening remarks by the Presi- Hickerson as his principal assistant. dent and Secretary Marshall, Acheson They, of course, maintained liaison made a reasoned and impassioned pre- with the officials of the Pentagon pre- sentation of the seriousness of the crisis paring the military aspects of the action facing the United States. He, with the required. full backing of the President and Mar- After the Cabinet luncheon that Mon- shall, was obviously successful in per- day morning, the President met with suading the congressional leaders present General Marshall, Secretary of War to give their support to the proposed Robert Patterson, Secretary of the program for aid to Greece and Turkey. Navy James Forrestal, Admiral Forrest Particularly important, they persuaded Sherman, and General Lauris Norstad. Senator Vandenberg, who promised his All except the President and Marshall support. met with Acheson, Henderson, and Hickerson in the Under Secretary’s office POSTWAR THREATS TO TURKEY FROM afterwards. &dquo;We agreed,&dquo; Acheson THE SOVIET UNION wrote in Present at the Creation, Because Greece was the danger spot, most of the ensuing discussions and and his advisers that the President principal statements before the congressional com- seemed convinced that it was vital to the mittees were concerned largely with that of the US for Greece and Turkey security country, but always with some mention to be to their na- strengthened preserve of the of tional independence, that only the US equal importance aiding so mention be made at could do this, that funds and the authority Turkey; might this of the threats and of Congress were necessary, and that State point pressures would prepare for concurrence by War and from the Soviet Union to which Turkey Navy specific recommendations for the had been exposed following World President. General Marshall approving, War II. Henderson and his staff worked with me When the writer returned to the preparing the recommendations.1 United States in July 1945 for the first time in more than five years, he found 1. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: there was a of the My Years in the State Department (New feeling among many York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 218. friends he met while on home leave that 77 the Soviet Union, our ally during the &dquo;Turkey will not be able to maintain in- war, could be expected to co-operate definitely a defensive posture against the Soviet Union. The burden is too with the Western world in solving grave great postwar problems. Upon reporting for for the nation’s economy to carry much duty in the Division of Near East- longer.&dquo; ern Affairs in September, however, he Thus with its experience of continuing at once learned how unrealistic that Soviet pressures and the difficulties of feeling was. modernizing its large army, Turkey Thus Turkey already knew from So- found itself more than ready to welcome viet claims on the border regions of Kars the assistance which the Truman Doc- and Ardahan, and from Soviet demands trine promised. for a new regime governing the Straits that would have Russia virtual given PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S MESSAGE TO control of them, that the Soviets had no CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947 intention of letting up on these pressures, and that its only protection was to Following the President’s meetings maintain its army of more than five hun- with congressional leaders, the State De- dred thousand men that had been mobi- partment, under the guidance of Dean lized since the early days of World War Acheson and Loy Henderson, mobilized II. all resources in drafting the required Turkey had firmly rejected all these legislation and in preparing the public Soviet proposals. To the renewed So- for what was one of the most important viet proposal of July 1946 for sole con- foreign policy decisions in our history. trol of the Straits by the Black Sea Joseph M. Jones, the Press Officer, was Powers, a proposal also repeated to the assigned to make the first draft of a mes- United States, Great Britain, and sage which the President proposed to France, the Turkish government again deliver in person before a joint session said no, this time with the full backing of Congress. Acheson himself carried of those Powers. President Truman in out the initial briefing of the press. his Memoirs said that the answer to the The Message to Congress was deliv- Soviet Union made it clear that if the ered by the President in person on Straits should become the object of Rus- March 12, 1947. So important was it, sian aggression, &dquo;the resulting situation enunciating as it did what came to be would constitute a threat to interna- known as the Truman Doctrine, that tional security and would clearly be a some of the paragraphs of his relatively matter for action on the part of the Se- short address need to be repeated here. curity Council.&dquo; Then Truman added: First the President described the So- viet pressures being applied to Greece The Turkish Government, encouraged by and Turkey, Greece’s deplorable eco- the American attitude, rejected the Soviet nomic situation, its state of exhaustion, demands and showed admirable determina- and the dangers to the free world should tion to resist if Russia should resort to it collapse. Then he added: open violence. But Turkey’s army, though sizable, was poorly equipped and would I believe it must be the policy of the have been no match for the battle-tested US to support free peoples who are re- divisions of the Kremlin. sisting attempted subjugation by armed More serious still was the drain which minorities or by outside pressures. this continuous exertion made on the na- I believe that we must assist free peoples tion’s economy. Toward the close of 1946 to work out their own destinies in their our Ambassador reported from Ankara: own ways. 78
I believe that our help should be pri- thorization to detail American civilian marily economic and financial, which is and military personnel to Greece and essential to economic stability and orderly Turkey, and that the instruction and political processes.... training of selected Greek and Turkish In helping free and independent nations personnel also be authorized. to maintain their freedom, the US will be Senator to re- giving effect to the Charter of the UN.... Vandenberg, speaking on the afternoon of the Presi- Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey porters in this fateful hour, the effect will be far- dent’s address was quoted as saying: reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute The President’s message faces facts and action.2 so must Congress. The independence of Greece and Turkey must be preserved, not The relatively short part of the Presi- only for their own sakes, but also in de- dent’s message concerning Turkey said: fense of peace and security for all of us. In such a critical moment the President’s The future of as an Turkey independent hand must be upheld. Any other course and economically sound state is clearly no would be dangerously misunderstood. But less important to the freedom-loving peo- Congress must carefully determine the of the world than the future of Greece. ples methods and explore the details in so has been the disasters that Turkey spared momentous a departure from our previous have beset Greece. And during the war policies.8 the US and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Congressional hearings needs our support. Nevertheless, Turkey The after the President’s address Since the war Turkey has sought addi- day tional financial assistance from Great to Congress, the Senate Foreign Rela- Britain and the US for the purpose of tions Committee began hearings on the effecting that modernization necessary for proposed legislation. The Senate ap- the maintenance of its national integrity. proved the bill, with amendments agree- That integrity is essential for the able to the administration, on April 22 preservation of order in the Middle East. by a vote of 67 to 23. The hearings The British Government has informed before the House Foreign Affairs Com- us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can mittee began on March 20. The House no extend financial or economic aid longer the bill on 8 a vote of to approved May by Turkey. 287 to 107. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is On Truman to have the assistance it needs, the US May 22, 1947, President must supply it. We are the only country signed the bill, which became known as able to provide that help.... Public Law 75. On signing it he issued The free peoples of the world look to us a statement which said, in part: for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter in our leadership we may This act authorizing US aid to Greece endanger the peace of the world and we and Turkey, which I have just signed, is shall surely endanger the welfare of this an important step in the building of peace. nation. Its passage by overwhelming majorities in both Houses of Congress is proof that the in President Truman asked Congress, US earnestly desires peace and is willing addition to the funds requested-$400 to make a vigorous effort to help create million for the period ending June 30, the conditions of peace. 1948, for Greece and Turkey-for au- The conditions of peace include, among 2. Harry S Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years 3. Quoted in Joseph Marion Jones, The of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947) Doubleday & Co., 1955), pp. 97-98. (New York: Viking Press, 1955), p. 174. 79
other things, the ability of nations to main- key’s military needs was organized by tain order and independence, and to sup- the Pentagon in May..It completed its port themselves economically. In extend- survey in July. the aid states members ing requested by But before an aid mission could be of the UN for the purpose of maintain- sent to Turkey, it was necessary to ne- ing these conditions, the US is helping to an aid under the terms further aims and purposes identical with gotiate agreement those of the UN. Our aim in this instance of PL 75. Although the Turks fully welcomed the of our certain is evidence not only that we pledge our prospect aid, support to the UN but that we act to stipulations of that law caused them support it. some difficulty because of their bitter memories of the of the The references to the United Nations history capitula- tions in our Am- in this statement no doubt were Turkey. Fortunately, inspired bassador to Edwin C. by the fact that the strongest opposi- Turkey, Wilson, who carried on the with the tion to the draft that developed in Con- negotiation Turkish Foreign Minister, Hasan Saka, gress was because it seemed to many was able and members to bypass the United Nations. exceptionally experienced. The Turks’ objection to use of the word For this reason our representative to the administrator was solved the United Nations, Ambassador Warren by naming Ambassador chief of the mission, with Austin, was instructed to make a state- the heads of the army, air navy, ment that that this was force, assuring body and roads the title of not the intent of the bill. Then Sena- groups having director. tor Vandenberg gained support for the More difficult was on lan- bill with his which was ac- agreeing amendment, which would meet the cepted, instructing the President to with- guage require- ment in PL 75 of access to the draw all aid if the Council or open Security work of the mission not to U.S. the General Assembly found that U.N. only but to the as well. This action had made the aid undesirable. officials, press problem was solved in the agreement So, with the adoption of PL 75 on at Ankara on 22 the President’s the signed July 12, 1947, by May by signature, in Article III the lan- Truman Doctrine became the law of the using following land. He explains it in his Memoirs guage : thus: The Government of Turkey and the I wished to state, for all the world to Government of the US will cooperate in know, what the position of the US was in assuring the peoples of the US and Turkey the face of the new totalitarian challenge. full information concerning the assistance This declaration of policy soon began to be furnished pursuant to this agreement. To referred to as &dquo;The Truman Doctrine.&dquo; this end, in so far as may be consistent This was, I believe, the turning point in with the security of the two countries: America’s foreign policy, which now de- (1) Representatives of the press and radio clared that wherever aggression, direct or of the US will be permitted to observe indirect, threatened the peace, the security fully regarding the utilization of such of the US was involved.4 assistance; and (2) the Government of Turkey will give full and continuous pub- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TURKISH licity within Turkey as to the purpose, AID PROGRAM source, character, scope, amounts and of such assistance.5 Little time was lost in implementing progress PL 75. A survey of Tur- preliminary 5. U.S., Congress, Senate, A Decade of 4. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. American Foreign Policy, Sen. Doc. No. 123, 105-6. 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949), pp. 1265-66. 80
Even before the agreement was signed, ment and training, we would make it the State Department had taken two possible for the Turkish government to administrative steps to give needed sup- devote its resources to the restoration of port to PL 75. An Office for the Coordi- the national economy. Another urgent nation of Aid to Greece and Turkey was need was the construction of all-weather approved. George C. McGhee, who had roads which not only would serve to been Special Assistant to the Under Sec- strengthen the military, but would also retary for Economic Affairs, was ap- assist in reviving Turkish agriculture. pointed the Coordinator. These points were forcefully brought Loy Henderson, Director for Near out in the messages of the President to Eastern and African Affairs, received ap- Congress supporting the annual bills proval to add a Division of Greek, Turk- authorizing continued aid to Greece and ish, and Iranian Affairs. John D. Jerne- Turkey, and by the personal appearance gan, who had done much of the spade before the Senate Foreign Relations and work during the early planning stage of the House Foreign Affairs Committees the program under Henderson, was of Under Secretary Acheson (who was named the first Chief of the Division. Acting-Secretary on a number of such The Turkish Aid Program ran so occasions and then, from 1949 to 1953, smoothly once it got started that most Secretary), our Ambassadors to Turkey, of the problems could be worked out by and the Directors of the military aid McGhee and Jernegan and their staffs. groups. The importance that both the This was fortunate for both Henderson Democratic and Republican (after Jan- and the writer, who succeeded him in uary 1953) administrations attached to July 1948, because of the many pressing continued assistance to Greece and Tur- problems facing us at the time, such as key for the entire period of this article Palestine, the Arab-Israeli war, and the is attested by the high level at which dispute over Kashmir. attention has been given to it. Their Major General Horace McBride was statements may be found in The Public appointed Director of the army group Papers of the President and in the pub- and got his mission under way in Turkey lished Hearings of both Committees. early in 1948. By the end of October From the beginning of the Truman of that year the total military and ci- Doctrine there was a feeling on the part vilian personnel serving under the Chief of our Defense officials that funds spent of the Mission (the Ambassador) was to support the Turkish armed forces 374. This had increased to 1364 per- accomplished more than aid spent any- sons by April 1, 1952. where else. One of the generals just back from Turkey near the beginning of The assistance military program the program told the writer, &dquo;A dollar It was clear from the inception of the in Turkey is worth two spent on mili- Truman Doctrine that our aid to Tur- tary support anywhere else.&dquo; Actual key should be directed at modernizing experience gained in implementing our and training the Turkish army. More aid program in Turkey proved this to than five hundred thousand men had be an understatement. been mobilized since early 1940 at great On July 23, 1951, Major General Wil- cost to the Turkish economy. But by liam H. Arnold, Director of the Joint 1947 this large force was woefully in- American Military Mission for As- adequate to cope with the Soviet army. sistance to Turkey, told the House Com- By furnishing the badly needed equip- mittee that in four years the Mission had 81 delivered substantial amounts of mili- crisis, or at least in part as a result of tary equipment and had trained twenty- it, were the North Atlantic Treaty five thousand Turkish officers and men signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, in the use of the equipment. Turkey and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- was by far the greatest point of strength zation (NATO). in the Middle East. &dquo;For your dollar The efforts of the writer and his Of- investment you are getting more for your fice of Near Eastern and African Affairs dollars than in any other place. The to have Turkey and Greece included in Turks are fighters. For dollars you get NATO did not succeed at that time. ten Turks for one American for a com- However, the North Atlantic Council in parative expense.&dquo; (The monthly pay September 1950 invited them to make of a Turkish soldier at that time, it arrangements permitting their associa- should be explained, was about twenty- tion &dquo;with such appropriate plans for one cents.) the military planning work of NATO as Major General George C. Stuart told are concerned with the defense of the the House Committee on April 13, 1954, Mediterranean.&dquo; Turkey accepted this that Turkey had an annual maintenance invitation on October 2, 1950.6 cost of $20. a head, as compared with In the meanwhile, Turkey, having $1100 in Europe and $3000 in the contributed a brigade of some five thou- United States. sand men to the U.N. forces in Korea which fought valiantly and suffered THE MARSHALL PLAN AND NATO heavy casualties, was, with Greece, in- The crucial foreign policy decision vited by NATO to become a member in that the United States would come to the September 1951. The formalities hav- assistance of Greece and Turkey to pre- ing been completed with the near unani- vent their succumbing to Soviet pres- mous vote of the Turkish Grand Na- sures having been accepted by Congress, tional Assembly, Turkey became a the State Department next turned to the member of NATO on February 28, 1952. equally urgent problem of assisting So from this time on all appropriations Europe to establish a program for its for U.S. military as well as economic economic rehabilitation. The remarks assistance were included in appropria- of Secretary Marshall at Harvard on tions supporting the Mutual Defense June 5, 1947, describing this urgency Act of 1949. However, the American led to the much vaster economic aid forces stationed in Turkey under the program known as the Marshall Plan. NATO program were of course separate The Economic Recovery Act approved from the U.S. military and economic aid April 3, 1948, provided economic aid missions in Turkey. for Greece and Turkey as well as for It is interesting to note in this con- Western Europe. Thus the Truman nection that Ambassador Wilson in a Doctrine, though no less memorable or letter dated February 10, 1948, ex- important, was somewhat overshadowed pressed Turkey’s concern over Turkey’s by the Marshall Plan. apparently minor role under the Euro- As the Economic Recovery Program pean Recovery Program. In April 1949, was getting under way, the Berlin crisis, shortly after the signing of the North At- arising from the blockade of West Ber- lantic Treaty, Turkish Foreign Minister lin the made it clear that by Russians, 6. Harry N. Howard, The Development of the of Soviet were dangers aggression US Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951 (De- not diminishing. Coming out of this partment of State Publication 4446), p. 841. 82
Necmettin Sadak made an official visit Turkish Roads Program to Washington. At a long meeting with Secretary Acheson, at which the writer Our roads program, supervised by was present, the Minister expressed the officials of the U.S. Public Roads Ad- belief that the exclusion of Turkey ministration, was part of our military aid from the Atlantic Pact made Turkey program. The pressing need for all- seem to its own people as well as to the weather roads for both military and eco- rest of the world worse off than it had nomic reasons was soon determined, and been a year earlier. The Secretary this was one of the first programs assured the Foreign Minister in reply started. There were almost no all- that Turkey was no less important in weather roads in Turkey at the begin- U.S. thinking than it had been at the ning of our aid program, so the writer inception of the Turkish Aid Program. was often told, because Ataturk had con- sidered the absence of such roads as an SUCCESS OF U.S. MILITARY AND important military deterrent, and this ECONOMIC AID was considered of even greater impor- The Turkish government and its mili- tance once World War II started. tary forces made the best possible use In an article in Foreign Affairs of of the military equipment furnished July 1954, George McGhee, the first them on a grant basis and from the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Tur- training they underwent both in Turkey key who was later Ambassador to Tur- and the United States. According to key ( 19 51-53 ) wrote that by the end of many reports, no equipment was dis- 1953 the U.S. government had made a carded-no luxury items were furnished total contribution of $27,6.00,000 toward -and nothing went on the scrap heap. Turkish road development by providing As an indication of the speed with machinery and experts from our Public which the program got under way, Sec- Roads Administration. During the same retary Marshall sent a letter to Secre- period the Turks, he said, had spent the tary of the Navy Forrestal as early as equivalent of $293,000,000 drawn from February 12, 1948, deploring long de- their own resources on roads, resulting lays in the shipment of military sup- by 1954 in a network of some thirteen plies to Turkey. He urged the Defense thousand miles of all-weather roads. to take most urgent action Department Economic Assistance to bring the rate of shipments up to the Program capacity of the Turkish ports and de- The Economic Assistance Program for pots to receive them. Turkey, begun in 1948 under the Euro- Then on October 1, 1948, our embassy pean Recovery -Program, was also very in Ankara telegraphed that the aid pro- suocessful. The first head of the mission gram was progressing satisfactorily and was Russell H. Dorr, who remained un- had already made sensational progress til 1952. by Turkish standards. In the area of agriculture, the princi- Before that, on June 5, the Depart- pal basis of Turkey’s economy, the funds ment informed Ankara in a confidential furnished made possible the purchase of telegram that the value of all Turkish tractors, plows, combines, and other aid under PL 75 for the fiscal year end- types of agricultural equipment so that ing June 30, 1948, would be about $100 greater areas could be brought under million, of which $76 million was for cultivation. The construction of all- equipment and $24 million for expenses. weather roads also contributed im- 83 mensely to an increase in agricultural used sparingly in this article. This is production. particularly the case because the two President Truman in a radio and tele- highest officials of our government con- vision address to the American people on cerned with and responsible for the evo- March 6, 1952, in giving examples of lution of the Truman Doctrine have past successes under the Mutual Security given vivid and authoritative descrip- Program, said: tions in their memoirs of their roles in the genesis of the Doctrine. Harry S Turkey is another example, where a Truman’s will be found in volume veritable revolution is 2, agricultural being Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope.77 brought about with a team of nine Amer- Dean Acheson’s of the Doc- ican experts.... In three years Turkey description trine will be found in Present at the Cre- has raised its grain production by over 50 per cent and tripled its rice production. ation : My Years in the State Depart- ment.8 As will have been noted, both Norman Director S. Paul, Regional these books have been useful to the prep- for the Near East and Africa of the aration of this article. Foreign Operations Administration, told An interesting and detailed descrip- the House Committee at a hearing on tion of the development of the Truman of on the Mutual Security Act 1953 Doctrine may also be found in The April 13, 1954: Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, Marion The There has been a great deal accomplished 1947 ) by Joseph Jones.~ author was Press Officer of the in Turkey. Forty per cent more land has Depart- been brought into use than was the case ment at the time and was involved in before we started. Twenty-five thousand the day-by-day developments at the kilometers [15,625 miles] of new roads working level as well as at the top. His have been constructed where there were book contains very good, and as far as before. now have hardly any roads They the writer can recall, accurate descrip- four very fine ports where they had none tions of the various offices of the State in 1948, and the country generally has Department collaborating in the formu- achieved a remarkable of economic degree lation for the President and the Secre- recovery. tary of State of a new foreign policy of The total amount authorized for ex- unique importance. penditures in Turkey under the aid pro- Hopefully the 1947 volume of For- grams in the form of grants and loans eign Relations o f the United States con- from July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1955- taining the as yet unpublished docu- the year Turkey joined the Baghdad ments pertaining to the Truman Doc- Pact-under the pertinent appropria- trine will also soon appear. tion acts was $452.8 million, of which CONCLUSION $195.0 million was for loans and $347.8 million for grants. Total expenditures The Truman Doctrine was indeed a for that period were $33:1.2 million. landmark of U.S. foreign policy. Our nation was fortunate that at the crucial CREDITS period of its inception we had outstand- After twenty-five years the classified material for the early part of the pro- 7. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 93-109. gram, which the writer was authorized to 8. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. review, does not add much to the ma- 217-25. terial already published; so it has been 9. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, p. 174. 84 ing leaders in President Truman, Secre- the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tary of State Marshall and Under Sec- tee and Republican leader of the Senate, retary Acheson. Although Marshall had played a vital role in persuading his Re- passed responsibility for handling this publican colleagues to support the pro- grave problem to Acheson and did not gram for aid to Greece and Turkey on take it back, he gave it his full support a nonpartisan basis. He also displayed from Moscow. A weaker man might great qualities of leadership. Both the have postponed action so displeasing to Democratic administration and the Re- the Soviet Union until after the Council publican Congress under such effective of Foreign Ministers being held in Mos- leadership accepted the seriousness of cow had adjourned. Acheson was Act- the problem facing our country with the ing Secretary during much of the period announced withdrawal of British aid to February 21-May 22, 1947. Acheson Greece and Turkey, and worked together in turn gave principal action responsibil- as a team to develop what came to be ity to Loy W. Henderson, the excep- known as the Truman Doctrine in a tionally able Director of the Office of way which assured to the United States Near Eastern and African Affairs. the unquestioned leadership of the free Senator Vandenberg, as Chairman of world for the next two decades.