The Truman Doctrine: Turkey By JOSEPH C. SATTERTHWAITE ABSTRACT: On February 21, 1947, the U.S. government was informed by the British government that by April 1 it would have to discontinue, because of its own difficulties, its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. It hoped the United States could take over this burden in both countries. Presi- dent Truman and the State, War, and Navy departments at once realized that unless the United States did so, Greece would be taken over by its communist partisans strongly sup- ported by the Soviet government working through the com- munist Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments; that if this happened Turkey would find itself in an untenable position in spite of its large but antiquated army; and that the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East in that event would inevi- tably fall under communist domination. In a dramatic mes- sage to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman said that the U.S. must take immediate and resolute action to sup- port Greece and Turkey. The Congress, after extensive hear- ings, approved this historic change in U.S. foreign policy in a bill signed May 22, known as Public Law 75. Out of the President’s message came the Truman Doctrine. The principle of assistance to countries of the free world under the threat of communist aggression having been accepted by the Congress, the Marshall Plan followed not long after. The military and economic aid given Turkey in the ensuing years was highly effective: the U.S. probably received more per dollar advanced than in any other country, at least for the period of this study —which ends with the signing of the CENTO (Baghdad) Pact in 1955. Joseph C. Satterthwaite was appointed a Foreign Service officer in 1926 after receiving A.B. and A.M. degrees from the University of Michigan. He was Secretary of Embassy in Ankara, 1940-44. In 1945 he was assigned to the Near Eastern Division of the State Department. In 1946 he was named Special Assistant to the Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs, in 1947 the Deputy Director, and from July 1948 to July 1949 he was Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs. Subsequently he served as Ambassador to Ceylon, Diplomatic Agent in Tangier for Morocco, Ambassador to Burma, Director General of the Foreign Service, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Ambassador to South Africa. He retired from the Foreign Service at the end of 1965. Since then he has been a consultant on foreign affairs. 74 75 A fortunate coincidence the May continue their assistance to Turkey, BY1972 issue of THE ANNALS will which was maintaining the large army appear during the twenty-fifth anni- that Soviet pressure demanded, and that versary of the Truman Doctrine, the the Turks would be unable to handle subject of this article. Its scope is the the financing of both the modernization genesis of that doctrine as it related to of their army and the economic develop- Turkey and how it worked in that coun- ment of the country. The British try up to the signing of the Baghdad government hoped that the United Pact in 1955. States could take over this burden in both countries. THE DOCTRINE GENESIS OF TRUMAN Acheson instructed Henderson and On the afternoon of Friday, February John D. Hickerson, Director of the Of- 21, 1947, the Private Secretary of the fice of European Affairs (since the Soviet British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, Union, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which telephoned the Secretary of State’s of- were under his jurisdiction, constituted fice. He said his Ambassador had been the menacing threat to Greece and instructed to deliver personally to the Turkey), to begin preparations that eve- Secretary (General George C. Marshall) ning on the means to cope with the crisis a communication of great importance. with which the British note confronted He requested an appointment for that us. This they did. afternoon. The next morning, Saturday, the As it happened the Secretary had left writer-who was making preparations to shortly before for Princeton, where he head a Mission to Nepal-learned of the was to deliver an address, and would not crisis at a meeting called by Henderson return until Monday morning. The of- of the members of his staff most directly fice of the Under Secretary, Dean concerned. Henderson expressed the Acheson, was accordingly informed. As view that if the British withdrew their related in Present at the Creation: My troops from Greece, and we did not Years in the State Department, Acheson intervene, the Greek communist parti- telephoned Inverchapel, who told him sans supported by Bulgaria and Yugo- the British note contained very impor- slavia were sure to gain control of tant information about a crisis in British Greece. If this happened the free world aid to Greece. Acheson thereupon sug- would lose the eastern Mediterranean gested that the Ambassador send his and the Near East to the communists. First Secretary to the Department to Turkey, the only country in the area deliver a copy to Loy Henderson, Direc- with an army strong enough to make the tor of the Office of Near Eastern and Russians hesitate, would find itself in African Affairs. Inverchapel could then an untenable position. Therefore the carry out his orders by delivering the United States, by filling the gap caused original note to the Secretary in person by the British withdrawal, must show on Monday morning. This was done. a greater determination to resist this The First Secretary handed Hender- communist drive than the determination son not one note but two. The first of the communists to gain control of contained the startling information that Greece. Henderson told us Acheson had British aid to Greece would have to end informed President Truman of the crisis by April 1. It also described the at once and that both, he understood, rapidly deteriorating state of Greece’s agreed with his view expressed above. economy and security. The second note From then on the old State Depart- reported that the British could no longer ment moved with unaccustomed speed 76 to cope with the crisis. General The recommendations were ready the Marshall returned to his office Monday next day and the President approved morning, read the British notes and the the paper for action. The next step was background papers that had been pre- consultation with Congress, and the pared for him, and received Lord President set up a meeting for the Inverchapel at 10:00 A.M. The Ambas- next day. sador left knowing that the Secretary The President, Marshall, and Acheson fully appreciated the seriousness of the met the next morning with congressional notes he had handed him. The Secre- leaders, headed by Senator Arthur tary next instructed Acheson to take Vandenberg of Michigan who was both responsibility for action from there on, Acting-President of the Senate-there as he had to leave for Moscow in a week being no vice-president-and Chairman for the meeting of the Council of For- of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- eign Ministers and would be fully occu- mittee. He, with the President and pied with preparations for the meeting. Acheson, was to play a key role in the Acheson asked Henderson to head a success of what came to be called the team working to prepare the necessary Truman Doctrine. recommendations for the President, with After opening remarks by the Presi- Hickerson as his principal assistant. dent and Secretary Marshall, Acheson They, of course, maintained liaison made a reasoned and impassioned pre- with the officials of the Pentagon pre- sentation of the seriousness of the crisis paring the military aspects of the action facing the United States. He, with the required. full backing of the President and Mar- After the Cabinet luncheon that Mon- shall, was obviously successful in per- day morning, the President met with suading the congressional leaders present General Marshall, Secretary of War to give their support to the proposed Robert Patterson, Secretary of the program for aid to Greece and Turkey. Navy James Forrestal, Admiral Forrest Particularly important, they persuaded Sherman, and General Lauris Norstad. Senator Vandenberg, who promised his All except the President and Marshall support. met with Acheson, Henderson, and Hickerson in the Under Secretary’s office POSTWAR THREATS TO TURKEY FROM afterwards. &dquo;We agreed,&dquo; Acheson THE SOVIET UNION wrote in Present at the Creation, Because Greece was the danger spot, most of the ensuing discussions and and his advisers that the President principal statements before the congressional com- seemed convinced that it was vital to the mittees were concerned largely with that of the US for Greece and Turkey security country, but always with some mention to be to their na- strengthened preserve of the of tional independence, that only the US equal importance aiding so mention be made at could do this, that funds and the authority Turkey; might this of the threats and of Congress were necessary, and that State point pressures would prepare for concurrence by War and from the Soviet Union to which Turkey Navy specific recommendations for the had been exposed following World President. General Marshall approving, War II. Henderson and his staff worked with me When the writer returned to the preparing the recommendations.1 United States in July 1945 for the first time in more than five years, he found 1. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: there was a of the My Years in the State Department (New feeling among many York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p.