Section 6.3 Military Equipment (Pre
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
SECTION 6.3 MILITARY EQUIPMENT (PRE-CONFLICT) Contents Introduction and key findings ........................................................................................... 2 Planning and readiness for expeditionary operations ...................................................... 2 Testing the UK’s expeditionary capability: lessons learned? ..................................... 6 The UK’s expeditionary capability by 2002 .............................................................. 11 Equipment preparations for the invasion (2002 to 2003) ............................................... 12 Planning begins ....................................................................................................... 12 Detailed planning for UORs begins ................................................................... 25 The decision to deploy ground forces to the South and its implications .................. 43 Concerns about Combat ID ............................................................................... 53 Progress on UORs ............................................................................................ 56 The situation in the week before the invasion .......................................................... 66 Issues that emerged post-invasion ................................................................................ 69 Desert uniforms ....................................................................................................... 77 Enhanced Combat Body Armour ............................................................................. 80 Biological and chemical warfare protection ............................................................. 84 Ammunition .............................................................................................................. 90 Combat ID ................................................................................................................ 92 Asset tracking .......................................................................................................... 93 MOD reflections on equipping the forces deployed for the conflict .......................... 99 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 106 1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses: • the arrangements made to provide equipment to forces deploying for operations in Iraq; • difficulties in the provision of Combat Identification (Combat ID), ammunition, Enhanced Combat Body Armour (ECBA), desert clothing, and equipment to protect against a chemical or biological attack; and • asset tracking. 2. This Section does not address: • the UK’s military planning for the invasion of Iraq, which is addressed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2; • the background to decisions made by the Treasury on equipment and Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) funding, which is described in Section 13.1; and • assessments of Iraq’s capabilities and intent. Intelligence assessments relevant to military planning are addressed in Section 6.2 and the UK’s assessment of Iraq’s WMD programmes in Sections 4.1 to 4.4. Key findings • The decisions taken between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003 to increase combat forces and bring forward the date on which UK forces might participate in combat operations compressed the timescales available for preparation. • The achievements made in preparing the forces in the time available were very considerable, but the deployment of forces more quickly than anticipated in the Defence Planning Assumptions meant that there were some serious equipment shortfalls when conflict began. • Those shortfalls were exacerbated by the lack of an effective asset tracking system, a lesson from previous operations and exercises that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) had identified but not adequately addressed. • Ministers were not fully aware of the risks inherent in the decisions and the MOD and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) were not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict. Planning and readiness for expeditionary operations 3. The Armed Forces’ capacity to deploy and sustain expeditionary operations was determined by decisions in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). 4. The SDR identified a major regional crisis, including in the Gulf, as the most demanding scenario against which the UK should plan for military operations. 2 6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict) 5. The SDR set out the UK’s “defence requirements in the period to 2015”.1 That included the UK’s defence priorities, the scenarios in which the Government envisaged deploying military forces, and what this meant for the UK’s military force structure. 6. The SDR explained that, “in the post Cold War world”, there was a greater need for the Armed Forces to build an expeditionary capability because “we must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us”. 7. A supporting essay to the SDR about future military capabilities listed those it considered “increasingly important”, including: • command, control, communications and computers and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR); • transport or lift capabilities because of “the trend towards force projections operations, for which we may need to deploy very rapidly in order to be successful”; • combat service support (logistics, equipment and medical support), which was “key to sustaining deployed operations, particularly those of significant duration”; and • “protection against chemical and biological weapons” which was described as critically important in some of the regions in which we are likely to have to operate, such as the Gulf”.2 8. The SDR was explicit in envisaging the UK operating in a number of areas, including the Gulf region. It stated: “We have particularly important national interests and close friendships in the Gulf … There are already significant sources of instability in these regions – including the continuing threat represented by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq … These dangers seem unlikely to diminish and may grow. Many of our Allies and Partners have similar important interests and friendships in these areas. We would therefore expect to work with them in responding to any future crises.”3 9. The SDR continued: “Outside Europe, the greatest risks to our national economic and political interest – and probably to international stability – will remain in the Gulf … this Mission may involve major combat operations … Such operations also impose demanding requirements, for example, in relation to strategic transport for deployment and supply, and to command and control … In operational terms, the most demanding individual scenario against which we must now plan is no longer all-out war in 1 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998. 2 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, July 1998. 3 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998. 3 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Europe but a major regional crisis involving our national interest, perhaps on NATO’s periphery or in the Gulf.” 10. The SDR acknowledged that “major equipments take years to develop”. 11. While the SDR identified no definitive timescales for its proposed changes, the MOD did publish a series of targets in December 1998 as part of its Public Service Agreement for 1999 to 2002.4 Targets included achieving a “Full Joint Rapid Reaction Forces Capability by October 2001” and to “achieve reductions in book value of stocks of non- munitions of £2.2bn by April 2001”. 12. The Public Service Agreement recognised that the plans set out in the SDR would “require substantial investment to improve inherited areas of weakness measured against future operational needs and to fund a continuing major equipment modernisation programme”. The resources necessary to achieve this would be found “from making savings from rationalisation in other areas, a continuing programme of efficiency improvements and smarter procurement”. 13. Decisions on the allocation of resources to the MOD, and within the MOD, were underpinned by a set of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) about the totality of the commitments that the MOD would expect to meet and sustain at any one time and the time needed to prepare for operations. 14. The ability of the UK to deploy and sustain forces on operations was determined by the size of the Armed Forces and the readiness of units within the force structure. That is still the case today. 15. Decisions on those issues and the allocation of resources to and within the MOD were based on the DPAs. DPAs were developed by the MOD to convert policy into detailed guidance that could be used by military planners.5 The DPAs outlined the levels of activity the Armed Forces were expected to be able to undertake, and the contexts in which they were expected to operate. They were (and are) used to identify and resource the planned force structure, capabilities and equipment of the Armed Forces. 16. The SDR “set some broad benchmarks for the scale of our planning” and said that the UK should be able to: “ – respond to a major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration to the Gulf War when we deployed an armoured division, 26 major warships and over 80 combat aircraft. “or 4 Public Services for the Future: Modernisation, Reform, Accountability, December 1998, Cm 4181. 5 Ministry of Defence, Strategic