Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 185 | 29.09.2015 www.osw.waw.pl Zakarpattia – together, but separated Piotr Żochowski, Tadeusz Iwański Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia has diverted the central government’s attention away from the deterioration of the security situation in regions which are not threatened by direct aggression from Russia. Zakarpattia is one of these. It is one of the poorest and most ethni- cally diverse regions of Ukraine and also its westernmost region, bordering Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland. Kyiv neglected to launch measures to weaken the position of the re- gion’s unquestioned leader, Viktor Baloha and his family, who have been in de facto control of Zakarpattia for years now. Moreover, it seems that, after the Euromaidan, Kyiv decided to give the Baloha family a ‘free hand’ in the region in exchange for maintaining stability. This further strengthened their position. As a consequence, no measures were taken to limit negative phe- nomena present in the region such as smuggling and organised crime. It was only the armed confrontation between the police and representatives of Right Sector in July 2015 in Mukacheve that strikingly revealed the extent of these problems. This was a criminal incident and a blot on the image of Kyiv which assured the public that the reform of the public security system was making rapid progress. Furthermore, it had far-reaching political consequences–it forced the government in Kyiv to attempt to regain control of the region and to weaken Baloha’s influence, as well as Baloha himself to carry out actions focused on maintaining the status quo. So far, Russian-backed Rusyn separatism and the autonomy-oriented slogans of the Hunga- rian minority have been considered the main threats to state security present in the region. It seems, however, that the potential of these movements is low, unless they receive strong external support. In this context, the fact that a criminally-motivated incident has triggered a crisis in the region which resulted in a conflict between the regional political and business elite and the central government is all the more significant. The conflict is growing in impor- tance particularly in the context of local elections planned for 25 October 2015 in which the balance of power in the region and the political future of the Baloha family is at stake. The characteristics pathian oblast is Ukraine’s westernmost region of the Transcarpathian oblast bordering four EU states and is separated from the rest of Ukraine by the Carpathians. The oblast For 900 years, until the signing of the Treaty of occupies 2.1% of the Ukrainian state’s territory, its Trianon in 1920, Zakarpattia had formed a part population (1.25 million inhabitants) accounts for of the Kingdom of Hungary (for more on the re- 2.6% of Ukraine’s total population. Two thirds of gion’s history see Appendix 1). In the interwar the oblast’s area is mountainous, it has 11 cities period, it was part of Czechoslovakia, and after inhabited by 37% of Zakarpattia’s population. World War II it was incorporated into the USSR (as Zakarpattia is one of Ukraine’s poorest regions. a component of the Ukrainian SSR). The Transcar- In January–May 2015, the oblast’s average OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 185 1 monthly salary was nearly 3,000 hryvnias (ap- contacts with the EU than residents from the proximately US$ 130), which was a half of the rest of Ukraine. This is also due to the fact that average salary offered in Kyiv. The average sal- almost the entire oblast is covered by small ary in the public sector is 50% lower. The offi- border traffic with Hungary, and also because cial rate of unemployment is 10%, in practice of its multi-ethnic nature. In this context, the however this figure is much higher and the grey policy pursued by Bucharest and by Budapest economy accounts for a large proportion of the towards the Romanian and Hungarian national local economy1. In 2013, the oblast generated minorities is also important. As a result of this 1.4% of Ukraine’s GDP. In a 2013 ranking of the policy a large portion of inhabitants of Zakar- competitiveness of Ukraine’ regions, Transcar- pattia have two passports (in Ukraine, this is pathia was ranked 20th (out of 27 regions)2. The not formally allowed, however in practice it is region’s economy is mainly food and light indus- tolerated)4. try, in particular vegetable and fruit processing, wood processing, the production of textiles The ghosts of separatism – a real threat and electronic devices. Tourism is becoming an or local flavour? increasingly important branch of the local econ- omy. This is due both to the region’s mountain- Hungarians are Zakarpattia’s largest national ous-forested landform and the large number minority group. Their number is estimated at of mineral water springs and to the contract- approximately 150,0005; they mainly live in the ing tourist offer available to domestic clients region’s southern part and form several pop- following the annexation of Crimea by Russia. ulation clusters. This minority is very well or- ganised and grouped into several organisations and associations. It is, however, divided along The Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia, ap- political lines. The division reflects the shape prox. 150,000 individuals, is very well or- of the Hungarian political scene: the Cultural ganised but divided in political terms. Union of Transcarpathian Hungarians (KMKSZ), led by Vasyl Brenzovych (László Brenzovics), is associated with the Fidesz party led by Prime Low salaries and negative prospects for the de- Minister Viktor Orbán, whereas the Democratic velopment of the region’s economy, combined Union of Ukraine’s Hungarians (UMDSZ), led by with its unique cross-border location, are ele- László Zubánics, collaborates with the Hungari- ments which foster economic migration to the an Socialist Party. Both organisations have been EU. This is also the reason behind the increasing active in Ukraine since the early 1990s. KMKSZ scale of smuggling involving mainly cigarettes, has cooperated with national-democratic par- people, drugs and illegal timber3. Due to the re- ties, such as Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine gion’s geographical location and its 19 border or currently Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc, while crossings, its inhabitants have more frequent UMDSZ in recent years cooperated with Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. 1 According to the Ministry of Economic Development of Ukraine, at present the grey economy accounts for approximately 47% of the country’s GDP; http://www. 4 According to information from the Hungarian govern- slideshare.net/apizniuk/ss-51625703 ment, until the end of 2014 Hungarian citizenship was 2 For more on this topic see: Звітпроконкурентоспром granted to 94,000 residents of Transcarpathia; http:// ожністьрегіонівУкраїни 2013, Foundation “Efficient www.mukachevo.net/ua/News/view/105782 Management”. 5 According to the most recent population census of 2001 3 Шеремет П., Закарпатськийвузол: Щороблять в області – this number is 151,516. Currently, however, the num- Москаль, Найєм і Балога, Українська правда, 20 August ber is probably lower due to the assimilation and emi- 2015. gration of a portion of the younger generation. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 185 2 The change of power which took place in Hungarians to be granted the right to have their Ukraine in February 2014 triggered changes in own self-government in Ukraine and to be is- the above mentioned organisations: the lead- sued a second (Hungarian) passport8. Currently, ers of both parties lost their positions. In the however, this issue is no longer emphasised by case of KMKSZ it was Miklós Kovács, who had Hungarian diplomacy. Similarly, after Kovács’s led the party for 18 years, and in the case of resignation KMKSZ ceased to promote auton- UMDSZ it was Istvan Gajdos who had been the omy-oriented slogans. The main political goal party’s leader for 13 years. The reasons behind pursued by Hungarians in Ukraine (by represen- the change of leaders were different. Kovács tatives of both parties) still involves the creation officially named Brenzovych his successor after of so-called Trans-Tisa region (rayon) – an ad- Brenzovych had been included in the list of can- ministrative unit with a predominant Hungar- didates supported by Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc ian minority and/or a constituency enabling ahead of the elections to the Ukrainian parlia- a representative of this minority to be elected ment in October 2014. The unofficial reason be- to the parliament in Kyiv. Currently, however, hind Kovács’s resignation was the fact that he there is no particular activity evident by Hungar- had not been approved by Ukraine’s new gov- ians in the context of a decentralisation reform ernment due to his repeated support for auton- launched in Ukraine and a voluntary grouping of omy-oriented slogans. The price for his resigna- hromadas, which in practice could bring them tion was a parliamentary seat for Brenzovych6. closer to attaining that goal. In early Septem- Gajdos, on the other hand, lost his position ber 2015, as a result of initiatives carried out by because he had compromised himself and his a representative of the Hungarian government, party which used to cooperate with the Party an agreement was reached between KMKSZ of Regions. He had been a deputy to Ukrainian and UMDSZ. Pursuant to this agreement, the parliament supported by the then ruling par- two parties are to submit joint candidates in ty and an active member of the Anti-Maidan7. local elections planned for 25 October 2015. Currently, KMKSZ appears to be the consider- ably stronger organisation grouping together Hungarians. This is due not only to its coopera- Despite the current situation, the present tion with the party led by Ukraine’s president, threat posed by Hungarian separatism in but also to the support it has from Fidesz and Zakarpattia seems to be rather insignificant, to subsidies it is receiving annually, estimated unless it receives strong external support.