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International Criminal Law Review 5: 329–342, 2005. 329 © 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
The Criminal Law of Genocide
The German Perspective
HELMUT GROPENGIEßER1
I. The German History of the Law of Genocide
The term “genocide” is inseparably connected with German history. When Raphael Lemkin2 coined this concept he had in mind the most heinous atroc- ities committed by Nazi Germany against the Jews, Poles, Gypsies and other groups during the National Socialist dictatorship and World War II which he intended to cover with one single word. But although the representatives of the National Socialist regime were held responsible for their deeds, none of them was punished for “genocide”, neither by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1946 nor later on by German courts. There are two reasons for this – at first glance – astonishing fact: When the high rank perpetrators were charged, tried and sentenced – some of them to death – by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1946,3 the term “genocide” had already been used during the trials, but it had not been written down in the Statute of the IMT itself. Thus no judgement made explicit reference to the notion of genocide;4 the legal basis for those convictions was the offence of crimes against humanity.5
1 Senior Researcher, Former Head of Sections “Spain” and “Portugal” at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg i. Br., Germany. 2 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), pp. 79 et seq.; see also in detail to the ori- gin of the concept Gil Gil, El Genocidio y Otros Crímenes Internacionales (1999), pp. 125 et seq.; Werle, Völkerstrafrecht (2003), para. 536. 3 As to the trials in Nuremberg see Ahlbrecht, Geschichte der völkerrechtlichen Strafgerichtsbarkeit im 20. Jahrhundert (1999), pp. 59 et seq.; Werle, supra note 2, para. 14 et seq. 4 See Fronza in Lattanzi/Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court I (1999), pp. 105–137, at p. 108; Gil Gil, supra note 2, pp. 131 et seq.; Hübner,
Das Verbrechen des Völkermordes im internationalen und nationalenPURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ Recht (2003), p. 58; Kreß in Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, s. 220a StGB / s. 6 VStGB (2003) para. 22. 5 Art. 6 lit. c) IMT Statute; congruent Art. 5 lit. c) IMTFE Statute. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 330
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Shortly thereafter, in December 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations explicitly addressed “genocide”;6 two years later in 1948 the Genocide Convention7 was adopted. From that time at least the con- cept of “genocide” can be considered as well established in international criminal law. In 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany ratified the Genocide Convention and transformed the international regulation – in accordance with their legal obligation to punish perpetrators of genocide8 – into a new offence of genocide in s. 220a of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch; StGB).9 But even then German courts dealing with National Socialist criminality faced constitutional obstacles. According to Article 103 paragraph 2 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz)10 criminal law may not be applied retroactively. The German courts could therefore operate only with rules which had been in force at the time when the atrocities were committed; so it was only possible to punish the accused for murder or other ordinary crimes,11 not for the ex post enacted offence of genocide.12
6 UN Doc. A/Res. 96 (I) of 11 December 1946; see also UN Doc. A/Res. 95 (I) of the same day which confirmed the principles of Nuremberg. 7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (78 UNTS 277). 8 Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations, Cornell International Law Journal 33 (2000), pp. 297–329, at p. 319; Zimmermann, Auf dem Weg zu einem deutschen Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 2002, pp. 97–102, at p. 98. 9 Gesetz über den Beitritt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu der Konvention vom 9. Dezember 1948 über die Verhütung und Bestrafung des Völkermordes vom 9. August 1954 (Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] 1954 II, pp. 729 et seq.). See in detail Bremer, Nationale Strafverfolgung internationaler Verbrechen gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht (1999), pp. 230 et seq.; Jescheck, Die internationale Genocidium-Konvention vom 9. Dezember 1948 und die Lehre vom Völkerstrafrecht, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 66 (1954), pp. 193–217, at pp. 193 et seq. For an English version of the German “Strafgesetzbuch” see
Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGHSt) 45, pp. 64–91, at p.PURL: 83. https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ 12 Jähnke in Jähnke/Laufhütte/Odersky (eds.), Leipziger Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 11th ed., s. 220a (1993) para. 7; Kreß, supra note 2, s. 220a StGB/s. 6 VStGB para. 20; Werl, supra note 2, para. 610. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 331
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For more than four decades section 220a of the Criminal Code contained the only international crime implemented in German Criminal Law,13 a pro- vision which fortunately did not have to be used for a long time, which is why some scholars indicated the offence of genocide as an example for so called “symbolic criminal law”.14 Due to the acts of violence committed in the former Yugoslavia this situation has changed: Some perpetrators were punished for genocide by German courts, but the total number of correspon- ding trials during the last ten years remained very small.15 Finally, in 2002 the German legislator passed the “Code of Crimes Against International Law” (CCAIL – Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [VStGB]). S. 220a of the German Criminal Code was transferred without any significant change of the wording and content16 from the Criminal Code into the newly created s. 6 of the CCAIL.17 Therefore it is still helpful to study the German
13 Kreß, Vom Nutzen eines deutschen VStGB (2000), p. 3; Werle/Jeßberger, Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2002, pp. 725–734, at p. 726. 14 Hassemer, Symbolisches Strafrecht und Rechtsgüterschutz, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 1989, pp. 553–559, at p. 554; see also Dietmeier, Völkerstrafrecht und deutscher Gesetzgeber – Kritische Anmerkungen zum Projekt eines “Deutschen Völkerstrafgesetzbuchs”, in Graul/Wolf (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Dieter Meurer (2002), pp. 333–343, at p. 340, with further references. 15 Cf. Ambos/Wirth, Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia Before German Criminal Courts, in Fischer/Kreß/Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law, pp. 769 et seq.; Kreicker in Eser/Kreicker (eds.), Nationale Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen, Landesbericht Deutschland (2003), pp. 427 et seq.; Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the “Crime of Crimes”, Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICL) 1 (2003), pp. 39–63, at pp. 56 et seq.; see also the homepage of the Federal Prosecutor General (Generalbundesanwalt) (
geltendes deutsches Strafrecht, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2000, pp. 755–760,PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ at p. 756. 17 S. 220a StGB was abrogated by Art. 2 no. 1 of the Gesetz zur Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches (EGVStGB; Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] 2002 I, p. 2254 [2258]) at the same time as s. 6 CCAIL was introduced by Art. 1 of the mentioned Act. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 332
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jurisprudence18 and numerous commentaries19 to the formally abrogated s. 220a.
II. A Survey of s. 6 of the CCAIL
Although obviously influenced by the text of the Genocide Convention, s. 6 of the CCAIL is more than just a copy; there are some peculiarities by which the German legislator tried to adapt the international model to the national legal system. The following synopsis may provide an overview:
Art. 6. ICC-Statute: Genocide Sec. 6 German Code of Crimes against International Law (CCAIL): Genocide20
For the purpose of this Statute, (1) Whoever with the intent of “genocide” means any of the fol- destroying as such, in whole or lowing acts committed with intent in part, a national, racial, reli- to destroy, in whole or in part, a gious or ethnic group national, ethnical, racial or reli- gious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; 1. kills a member of the group, (b) Causing serious bodily or 2. causes serious bodily or mental harm to members of mental harm to a member the group; of the group, especially of the kind referred to in s. 226 of the Criminal Code, (c) Deliberately inflicting on the 3. inflicts on the group conditions group conditions of life calcu- of life calculated to bring lated to bring about its physical about their physical destruc- destruction in whole or in part; tion in whole or in part,
18 Of extraordinary importance see the judgement of the Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 11. 19 See in particular the commentaries to the former s. 220a StGB by Eser in Lenckner et al. (eds.), Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 26th ed. (2001); Fischer in Tröndle/Fischer (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 50th ed. (2001); Horn/Wolters in Rudolphi et al. (eds.), Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 7th ed. (2002); Jähnke, supra note 12; Kühl, in: Lackner/ Kühl (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 24th ed. (2001). It is significant thatPURL: Kreß https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/(supra note 4) anno- tated both provisions together. 20 Translation by Bleehan/Duffett; see
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(d) Imposing measures intended to 4. imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; prevent births within the group, (e) Forcibly transferring children 5. forcibly transfers a child of the of the group to another group. group to another group shall be punished with imprisonment for life. (2) In less serious cases referred to under subsec. (1), numbers 2 to 5, the punishment shall be impris- onment for not less than five years.
The subsequent parts shall illustrate the German approach, concentrating on the points which may be of general interest. There exists a rather sophisti- cated discussion in Germany about the so called protected legal interest (“Rechtsgut”) of the offence of genocide. It may be assumed that this ques- tion is only of secondary importance, but in fact the answer contains the key for an in-depth understanding of the offence combined with some practical impacts (see below part III). The actus reus of s. 6 CCAIL parallels the inter- national offence to a large extent; however the German regulation comes up with some considerable details (see below part IV). One of the main prob- lems of the offence of genocide concerns the mens rea and especially the specific intent. Although it cannot be alleged that German jurisprudence has found a definitive solution, the German debate may contribute to its clarifi- cation (see below part V). The main achievement of the German legislator is probably the regulation of the legal consequences of genocide. The German judges can find some rather detailed guidelines for sentencing in s. 6 CCAIL (see below part VI).
III. The Protected Legal Interest (“Rechtsgut”) of Genocide
One of the key concepts of the German theory of criminal law is that of the “Rechtsgut”.21 This term which does not seem to have an exact equivalent either in the English language or in English criminal law may be paraphrased
21 Cf. Hefendehl/von Hirsch/Wohlers (eds.), Die RechtsgutstheoriePURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ - Legitimationsbasis des Strafrechts oder dogmatisches Glasperlenspiel? (2003); Jescheck/Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 5th ed. (1996), § 1 III; Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 3rd ed. (1997), § 2 para. 5 et seq. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 334
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according to the classical definition by Franz von Liszt22 as the “protected legal interest”. The functions which the “Rechtsgut” has to fulfil are manifold: It provides the basis for an offence: the legislator is permitted to create offences solely for the protection of legal interests. Thus scholars try to impose restrictions on attempts to criminalise behaviour which is merely “immoral”.23 And the “Rechtsgut” serves as a guideline for the interpretation of the elements of crime, especially of the actus reus: in principle a rule has to be applied in the way that optimises its protection. Finally, the “Rechtsgut” is a decisive fac- tor in the question of concurrences: If one act complies with all legal require- ments of two different offences at the same time, the perpetrator will normally be punished for both offences. But if the two offences intend to pro- tect the same legal interest, the perpetrator will be punished only for the more severe one. To give an example: Whoever kills a victim may be sentenced for manslaughter only and not for assault as well. Such a verdict is sufficient to express the wrong the accused has done. The last mentioned aspect is of importance in the case of genocide. German Courts had to judge perpetrators who killed members of a protected group.24 The question arose if the accused had to be sentenced only for geno- cide – because of the attack on the group – or for murder as well – because of the attack on the individuals. The German Federal Criminal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) favours the latter alternative and draws upon the differ- ent “Rechtsgüter” of the two offences in question.25 According to the Bundesgerichtshof the “Rechtsgut of s. 220a of the Criminal Code is the pro- tection of the social existence of the national, racial, religious or ethnic group being persecuted.” The individual victim is merely the object of the genocide attack.26 This approach does not imply that the life of the individual is of no
22 Cf. von Liszt/Schmidt, Lehrbuch des deutschen Strafrechts, 25th ed. (1927), p. 4: “Rechtsgut ist das rechtlich geschützte Interesse.” 23 Cf. Freund in Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2003), before s. 13 et seq. para. 47; cf. to the “harm principle” in English law Simester/ Sullivan, Criminal Law. Theory and Doctrine, 2nd ed. (2003), pp. 8 et seq., with further references. 24 All the cases refer to crimes committed in the Former Yugoslavia; see supra note 15. 25 BGHSt, supra note 11, pp. 64 and 91; consenting Gil Gil, Die Tatbestände der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und des Völkermordes im Römischen Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 112 (2000), pp. 381–397, at pp. 396 et seq.; Jähnke, supra note 12, s. 220a para. 14. 26 BGHSt, supra note 11, pp. 80 et seq.; see further Eser, supra notePURL: 19, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ s. 220a para. 3; Fischer, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 2; Gropengießer in Eser/Kreicker (eds.), Nationale Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen, Landesbericht Deutschland (2003), pp. 96 et seq.; Jähnke, supra note 12, s. 220a para. 8; Jescheck, supra note 9, p. 213; Kühl, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 1; ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 335
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concern to criminal law; its life is protected by the German Criminal Code as well but only by the national offences according to s. 211 et seq. of the Criminal Code and not by the international offence of genocide. Some scholars have questioned this approach and endorse a second “Rechtsgut” of the individual like, for example, the life of the group mem- ber.27 Furthermore the view is taken, that genocide also offends human dig- nity,28 because the perpetrator accepts the victim not as a person, but reduces his personality to his membership in a group.29 More recently, Kreß put for- ward the position that the offence of genocide addresses three different inter- ests, the existence of the group, the “Rechtsgut” of the individual (for example his or her life) and international peace.30
IV. The actus reus of s. 6 CCAIL
By creating the new offence in the CCAIL the German legislator intended to parallel Art. 6 ICC Statute as far as it seemed to him possible without neglecting constitutional standards and German legislation tradition31. Thus the German law mostly follows the international model and is affected by
see also on the international level Becker, Der Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit (1996), pp. 182 et seq.; Gil Gil, supra note 25, pp. 393 et seq.; Werle, supra note 2, para. 542 et seq.; see further the similar, but more precise approach of Vest, Humanitätsverbrechen – Herausforderung für das Individualstrafrecht?, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 113 (2001), pp. 457–498, at p. 476; idem, Genozid durch organisatorische Machtapparate. An der Grenze von individueller und kollektiver Verantwortlichkeit (2002), p. 99. For the opposite opinion see Triffterer, Kriminalpolitische und dogmatische Überlegungen zum Entwurf gleichlautender “Elements of Crimes” für alle Tatbestände des Völkermordes, in Schünemann et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Claus Roxin (2001), pp. 1415–1445, at p. 1433; sim- ilarly probably Horn/Wolters, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 1. 27 Satzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht (2005), § 15 para. 7; Triffterer, supra note 26, p. 1433. Cf. also ICTR, Trial Chamber, Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A, 7 June 2001, para 61. 28 Werle, supra note 2, para. 546. 29 Compare Lemkin, supra note 2, p. 79. According to the German Federal Supreme Court the inhumane character of the genocide, which raises the wrong of the action on a higher level than murder, has to be seen in the fact, that the offender does not see the victim as a human being but only as a member of the persecuted group (BGHSt, supra note 11, p. 80); concur- ring Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), p. 103. A similar approach was taken by the Rwanda-Tribunal (Trial Chamber, Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, 6 December 1999, para. 60;
Musema, ICTR-96-13, 27 January 2000, para. 165). PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ 30 Kreß, supra note 4, s. 220a StGB/ s. 6 VStGB para. 1 et seq. 31 This parallelism is expressed symbolically by the fact that the crime of genocide is regu- lated both in the Rome Statute and in the CCAIL in a section carrying the number 6. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 336
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a lot of the problems discussed in international law in the context of geno- cide. To give some examples: The number of protected groups is limited in the same way as in Art. 6 ICC Statute excluding political and cultural groups.32 In German law it is not necessary that the act of genocide is part of a widespread or systematic attack; although it is unlikely to happen in real life, one single act may constitute a case of genocide.33 Perhaps the most significant difference between s. 6 CCAIL and the ICC Statute is the method of addressing genocide. Art. 6 of the Statute is associ- ated with Art. 5 and deals with the jurisdiction of the Court.34 Such a solu- tion does not fit to the traditional German approach in criminal law, which emanates from the principle of legality (Art. 103 para. 2 of the German Constitution). Above all the offence has to address the citizen – not the tri- bunal – who should know if and under what circumstances an act is
32 Concurring Cassese, supra note 29, pp. 96 et seq.; Gil Gil, supra note 2, pp. 160 et seq.; Werle, supra note 2, para. 562 et seq. The disregard of other groups like for example political ones is criticised by many schol- ars; see Ambos, Comment on Judgement by Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht of 23 May 1997, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 1998, pp. 138–140, at p. 139; Ambos/ Ruegenberg/Woischnik, Straflosigkeit in Argentinien für während der Militärdiktatur (1976–1983) begangene Taten des “Verschwindenlassens”?/Rechtslage für Opfer mit deutscher oder anderer Staatsangehörigkeit, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 1998, pp. 468–479, at p. 470; Chalk, Redefining Genocide, in Andreopoulos (ed.), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (1994), pp. 47–63, at pp. 49 et seq.; Eser, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 3; Heintze, Die gegenwärtige Bedeutung der UN-Völkermordkonvention, in Hummel (ed.), Völkermord – friedenswissenschaftliche Annäherungen (2001), pp. 135–151, at p. 139; Vest, supra note 26 (2001), pp. 477 et seq.; idem, supra note 26 (2002), pp. 129 et seq.; as to further references see Schabas, Genocide in International Law (2000), pp. 102 et seq. The General Assembly of the UN, too, had favoured a broader version in the plenary meet- ing of 11 December 1946: “racial, religious, political and other groups” (UN Doc. A/Res. 96 [I]). During the conference at Rome there were attempts to widen the scope of protection to these groups as well, but in the end they failed (see Triffterer, supra note 26, p. 1421; idem, Der lange Weg zu einer internationalen Strafgerichtsbarkeit, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 114 (2002), pp. 321–371, at p. 369. The decision of the Rome Conference is binding on the ICC; an extension to other groups would infringe the principle of “nullum crimen sine lege” (Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, [2002], p. 452). 33 Jescheck, supra note 9, p. 213; Kreß, supra note 4, para. 14; Triffterer, supra note 26, p. 1434; Werle, supra note 2, para. 582 et seq. 34 Satzger, Das neue Völkerstrafgesetzbuch – eine kritische Würdigung, Neue Zeitschrift
für Strafrecht (NStZ) 2002, pp. 125–132, at p. 126; idem, supraPURL: note https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ 27, § 13 para. 8; idem, German Criminal Law and the Rome Statute – A Critical Analysis of the New German Code of Crimes against International Law, International Criminal Law Review (ICLR) 2 (2002), pp. 261–282, at p. 264. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 337
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forbidden, and foresee by which penalties and to what extent he may be sanc- tioned.35 An offence has typically the following structure: Whoever commits …, will be punished by … .36 The German legislator did not want to deviate from that technique and attempted to harmonise the international concepts and structures with the common practice in German criminal law.37 Furthermore the German legislator tried to formulate the actus reus more precisely in order to comply with the principle of “lex certa” as it is laid down in Art. 103 para. 2 of the German Constitution.38 Thus s. 6 of the CCAIL makes clear that under subsection 1, numbers 1, 2 and 5 it is – against the wording of Art. 6 ICC-Statute,39 but in accordance with the Elements of Crimes40 – sufficient that only one victim has suffered damages.41 In subsec. (1), number 2 the German text refers to s. 226 of the Criminal Code42 to spec- ify the more abstract term “serious bodily or mental harm”.
V. The Mental Element of s. 6 CCAIL
S. 6 of the Code of Crimes against International Law requires general intent referring to all elements of the actus reus43 and additionally the special intent to destroy the protected group. In the context of the general intent it may be
35 Satzger, ICLR, supra note 34, p. 275; see also to the problem of the addressee of norms in general Eser, Verhaltensregeln und Behandlungsnormen. Bedenkliches zur Rolle des Normadressaten im Strafrecht, in Eser/Schittenhelm/Schumann (eds.), Festschrift für Theodor Lenckner (1998), pp. 25–54, with further references. 36 Thus, the offence characterises the actus reus as well as the possible sanctions in detail. 37 Cf. Werle/Jeßberger, Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2002, pp. 725–734, at p. 729; Bundestags-Drucksache 14/8524, p. 13. See also the synopsis, supra p. 4. 38 Cf. Satzger, ICLR, supra note 34, p. 274. 39 Cf. Art. 6 lit. a), b) and e) of the ICC Statute: “members” and “children”. 40 PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 2. 41 Bundestags-Drucksache, supra note 37, p. 19; Dahm/Delbrück/Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, volume I/3: Die Formen völkerrechtlichen Handelns. Die inhaltliche Ordnung der interna- tionalen Gemeinschaft, 2nd ed. (2002), p. 1080; Satzger, supra note 27, § 15 para. 19; Werle, Konturen eines deutschen Völkerstrafrechts, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2001, pp. 885–895, at p. 892; idem, supra note 2, para. 565; Werle/Jeßberger, supra note 37, p. 725; Zimmermann, supra note 8, p. 101; idem, in Neuner (supra note 16), p. 140. 42 S. 226 subsec. 1 of the German StGB requires that the injured person 1. loses his sight in one eye or in both eyes, his hearing, his speech or his procreative capacity; 2. loses or permanently can no longer use an important bodily member;
3. is permanently disfigured in a substantial way or becomesPURL: infirm, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ paralyzed, men- tally ill or disabled. 43 Cf. the general regulations of mens rea in ss. 15 and 16 of the German Criminal Code (StGB), which, according to s. 2 of the CCAIL, are applicable. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 338
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assumed that the German understanding of “intent” is wider than the inter- national “mental element” in Art. 30 ICC Statute.44 From a German point of view “intent” includes the cases of the so called “dolus eventualis”, i.e., cases in which the perpetrator does not know with certainty if his action will be successful, but thinks, that his action will possibly cause the result, and realises his plan inspite of his doubts. This “dolus eventualis” should not be confused with the concept of “recklessness”, a category alien to German law,45 which is based on a very different approach,46 although its application in practice might result in quite similar consequences. Much more important is the second subjective requirement, the special intent to destroy, in whole or in part,47 a national, racial, religious or ethnic group, as such. With this adoption of the international criteria the German leg- islator also inherits the problem of how to interpret this concept. In Akayesu the Rwanda Tribunal has defined the special intent of a crime as a “specific intention, (…) which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged.”48 This approach will probably be compatible with the German doctrine which demands a goal-oriented will. Not sufficient are the other forms of intent like “direct intent (dolus directus) of second degree”,49 when the offender certainly knows that he will produce the unlawful results, but does not act for genocidal reasons, but for, e.g., military ones.50
44 See in detail Gropengießer, supra note 26, pp. 271 et seq., with further references. 45 Satzger, ICLR, supra note 34, p. 270. 46 Cf. Arzt, Leichtfertigkeit und recklessness, in Stree/Lenckner/Cramer/Eser (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Horst Schröder (1978), pp. 119–143, at pp. 131 et seq.; Weigend, Zwischen Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 93 (1981), pp. 657–700, at pp. 673 et seq. 47 Cf. BGHSt, supra note 11, p. 78; in detail see Kreß, supra note 4, s. 220a StGB/s. 6 VStGB para. 73 et seq.; Vest, supra note 26, pp. 486 et seq.; Wirth, Zum subjektiven Tatbestand des Völkermordes – Zerstörungsabsicht und Vertreibungsverbrechen, in Rill (ed.), Gegen Völkermord und Vertreibung. Die Überwindung des 20. Jahrhunderts (2001), pp. 59–74, at pp. 67 et seq. 48 Rwanda-Tribunal, Trial Chamber, Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, 2 September 1998, para. 498. This definition can act as a model (cf. Wirth, supra note 47, p. 64). As to further references see Ambos, Allgemeiner Teil des Völkerstrafrechts (2002), pp. 793 et seq.; Kreß, supra note 4, s. 220a StGB/s. 6 VStGB para. 80; Selbmann, Der Tatbestand des Genozids im Völkerstrafrecht (2002), pp. 165 et seq. 49 See in detail Roxin, supra note 21, § 12 para. 2. 50 Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2001, pp. 2732–2734, at p. 2733; Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1998, pp. 392–395, at p. 393; Kühl, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 3; analogically for the international
level Dahm/Delbrück/Wolfrum, supra note 41, p. 1083; SelbmannPURL:, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ supra note 48, pp. 165 et seq.; Werle, supra note 2, para. 592; Wirth, supra note 47, pp. 59, 62 et seq., 71. In practice military goals and the intent to destroy will frequently coincide; see Fischer, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 5. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 339
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This German approach isn’t as narrow as it may appear at first glance. According to the German doctrine the specific intent also has to be assumed in cases where the destruction of the group is only an intermediate goal of the offender.51 Consequently, somebody who does not have any racist preju- dice can nevertheless be punished for genocide if – for example – he wants to conquer the region in which the group lives and thinks he could not achieve his aim without destroying the group.52 Furthermore the requirement of specific intent has a more restrictive impact in German law in view of the rules about individual responsibility in cases involving more than one party. The German Criminal Code distin- guishes between the main perpetrators, called “actors” (s. 25) and (other) “participants” (with an inferior role), the “instigators” (s. 26) and the “aiders” (s. 27).53 As actor a person can be punished only when he or she acts with the intent to destroy; other offenders, acting without this intent, cannot be seen as actors of genocide, even if they, for example, kill a victim with their own hand. That does not mean that such offenders will always go unpunished. According to German law it remains possible to prosecute them for instigating or aiding54 genocide, insofar as there is at least one main per- petrator55 and they know his or her specific intent.56 Thus it is true to claim that the crime of genocide does not depend on the specific intent of the indi- vidual, but on the specific intent of the collective of offenders.57
51 Wirth, supra note 47, p. 61. As to the general question, if an intermediate goal is suffi- cient to assume specific intent, see Joecks, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2003), s. 16 para. 12; Kühl, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 4th ed. (2002), § 5 para. 35; Lenckner, in: Lenckner et al. (eds.), Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 26th (ed. 2001), s. 15 para. 66; Roxin, supra note 21, § 12 para. 10 et seq. 52 Gropengießer, supra note 26, p. 106; Hübner, supra note 4, p. 137. 53 For a translation in English see supra note 9. 54 Whereas the instigator will be punished equal to an actor, the penalty will be reduced in the case of aiding (see in detail sec. 26, 27 and 49 of the German Criminal Code). 55 Cf. Eser, supra note 19, s. 220a para. 6; as to offences which require a specific intent in general see Kühl, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (4th ed. 2002), § 20 para. 15 and 101. 56 Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, supra note 50, at p. 393, with concurring comment by Ambos, supra note 32, p. 139; see also idem, supra note 48, p. 794; Gropengießer, supra note 26, pp. 107 et seq.; Jähnke, supra note 12, s. 220a para. 12; as to the analogous situation
on the international level: see ICTR, Trial Chamber, Musema, ICTR-96-13,PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ 27 January 2000, para. 181 et seq.; ICTY, Trial Chamber, Vasiljevic, IT-98-32, 29 November 2002, para. 71; Vest, supra note 26 (2002), pp. 138 et seq.; Werle, supra note 2, para. 416. 57 Kreß, supra note 4, s. 220a StGB/s. 6 VStGB para. 86. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 340
340 HELMUT GROPENGIEßER
VI. The Legal Consequences of the Offence of Genocide
Art. 6 of the Rome Statute is merely a definition and does not contain any regulation about the legal consequences of genocide. The only corresponding norms about the legal consequences can be found in part 7 of the Statute, which provides in Arts. 77 et seq. some general statements about penalties and the criteria for sentencing without referring to genocide in particular.58 The German approach is totally different: Like any other offence in German criminal law, s. 6 CCAIL consists of two parts, the first describing the elements of crime and the second establishing the legal consequences for perpetrators of genocide.59 This approach allows a differentiating designation of the penalties according to the quality and quantity of the wrong commit- ted by the offender and his guilt.60 According to German law an offender of genocide as the “crime of crimes” is regularly sentenced to the maximum penalty permitted in the German law, i.e., to life imprisonment. But the legislator accepts that not all the cases may be of the same gravity. Therefore s. 6 CCAIL subsection 2 pro- vides the possibility of a reduction of the penalty for all those crimes in which the offender does not directly cause the death of a group member (i.e. subsection 1, number 2 to 5). In such less serious cases the legal consequence of genocide will be imprisonment from five61 to fifteen62 years.
VI. Conclusion
The German legislator did not content himself with a simple copy of the Rome Statute in order to fulfil its obligation under international law, but, adapting the international model to the specific requirements of German law, opened up – at least in part – a new path. This German Code of Crimes Against International Law is a rather forward-looking and therefore coura- geous act of legislation; it may stand the test of comparison with other laws
58 Cf. Nemitz, Strafzumessung im Völkerstrafrecht (2002); Peglau, Die Vorschriften zu Strafen und Strafzumessung für den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof und ihre Bedeutung für das nationale Strafrecht, Humanitäres Völkerrecht – Informationsschriften 2001, pp. 247–250. 59 See supra p. 9. 60 See in detail Gropengießer, supra note 26, pp. 108 et seq. 61 Again a peculiarity of the German implementing legislation: The ICC Statute does not
contain any rule about minimum penalties. PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/ 62 Cf. s. 38 subsection 2 of the German Criminal Code. The German legislator refrained from raising the maximum penalty from 15 up to 30 years as provided in Art. 77 para. 1 lit. a) ICC Statute; concurring Werle/Jeßberger, supra note 13, p. 732. ICLA_03_Gropengieber.qxd 7/26/05 12:45 PM Page 341
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implementing the Rome Statute.63 Perhaps the most important achievement of the German legislation is the sophisticated regulation of the consequences of international crimes, which has been characterised as “an important pio- neer work”.64 The much more complex regulation of the crimes against humanity and the war crimes would probably have been more appropriate to demonstrate the advantages of the CCAIL, but the section on genocide may give an adequate impression as well. Thus, two aspirations are connected with the CCAIL: Firstly that the German law will enrich the scientific and political discussion about interna- tional crimes and in particular genocide, and secondly that the international community will – in spite of the terrible legacy of German history – accept the genuine and honest endeavour of Germany today to make its contribution to the fight against genocide.
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d5d760/
63 Cf. Satzger, ICLR, supra note 34, pp. 281 et seq. 64 Werle/Jeßberger, supra note 13, p. 732.