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Transition management as a form of policy innovation. A case study of Plan C, a process in sustainable materials management in Flanders.

Erik Paredis

Centre for Sustainable Development – Ghent University Flemish Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development

October 2011 – Working Paper no. 26

1 This paper was written in the context of two research projects of the Flemish Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development, i.e. “Transition management as an instrument for long-term policy on sustainable development” and “Sustainable production and consumption patterns in Flanders: the potential of system innovation”. Reactions are welcomed: Erik Paredis Centrum voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling / Centre for Sustainable Development Universiteit Gent / Ghent University Poel 16 9000 Gent Belgium Tel. +32-9-264.82.08 Fax +32-9-264.83.90 [email protected] www.cdo.UGent.be www.steunpuntdo.be

The Flemish Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development is one of the 14 Centres for Policy Relevant Research that were established by the Flemish government in January 2007. These centres are financed for the period 2007-2011 and are expected to deliver a combination of short term and longer term policy relevant research in a wide range of policy fields. The Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development gathers 4 research groups from 3 universities (GEGSD-KUL, HIVA-KUL, MEKO-VUB, CDO-UGent). General contact address: Secretariaat Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Hoger Instituut voor de Arbeid Parkstraat 47 – Bus 5300 B – 3000 Leuven Contact person: Sonja Wuyts Tel.: (32) 016 32 31 28 Fax: (32) 016 32 33 44 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.steunpuntdo.be

2 Contents

Summary 5

1. Introduction and problem definition 9

2. Analysing the politics of transition management: a glance at research design 12 and analytical framework 2.1. The multilevel perspective and policy dynamics 12 2.2. Policy arrangements to conceptualise politics and policy innovation 13 2.3. Transition management in the analytical frame 15

3. The Flemish waste system and its policy arrangement 17 3.1. 1981-1994: A system focused on waste removal 18 3.2. 1994-2010: Reorienting the system on the basis of the waste hierarchy 19 3.2.1. Discourse 21 3.2.2. Rules 22 3.2.3. Actors 23 3.2.4. Resources 24 3.2.5. Towards a next step 24

4. The TM-process Plan C: history and characteristics 26 4.1. A history of the Plan C process 26 4.1.1. Context and predevelopments: how and why Plan C was introduced 26 4.1.2. Phase 1: The transition arena Plan C, September 2006 – May 2007 28 4.1.3. Phase 2: Broadening and deepening Plan C, May 2007 – May 2008 31 4.1.4. Phase 3: Going public and defining a business plan, May 2008 – early 2009 32 4.1.5. Phase 4: Trying to develop along several lines, early 2009 – mid 2011 33 4.1.6. Standstill or take-off: mid 2011 – … ? 38 4.2. The characteristics of Plan C as a policy arrangement 38 4.2.1. Discourse 38 4.2.2. Actors 41 4.2.3. Rules of the game 44 4.2.4. Resources 46 4.3. Some reflections and interim conclusions 48

5. A system in a state of flux: the changing waste regime, the role of Plan C, and beyond. 51 5.1. The waste regime under pressure: driving forces for change 52 5.1.1. Landscape pressures / processes of structural transformation 52 5.1.2. Regime tensions 55 5.1.3. Niche developments 56 5.2. A change in discourse? 56 5.2.1. From waste to materials 56 5.2.2. From waste to a broader agenda 58 5.3. A change in the rules of the game? 62 5.4. A change of actors? 65 5.5. A change in resources? 69 5.6. Interim conclusions 70

3

6. In search of policy lessons: understanding stability and change in policy 73 6.1. Mechanisms at work 73 6.1.1. Converging policy streams and the role of policy entrepreneurs 73 6.1.2. The influence of discourse 74 6.1.3. The prevailing modes of policy-making 76 6.2. Characterising the developments around Plan C 77 6.3. Some recommendations 82

7. Conclusions 87

Annex. List of interviews 90

References 91

Acknowledgements I thank all people from Plan C and the follow-up committee of the Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development, who gave freely of their time for interviews, feedback meetings and other exchanges. A special word of thanks to Walter Tempst (OVAM), who was an invaluable source of advice and who has supported this research project from the beginning. Remaining mistakes and all interpretations are of course the author’s responsibility.

4 Summary

This paper discusses the policy characteristics of a transition management (TM) process that was introduced by the Flemish government in 2006 with the goal of reorienting its waste policy towards a sustainable materials policy and stimulating a transformation of the waste/materials system. Part 1 of the paper concisely describes the background of the TM approach and introduces the research questions. The paper interprets TM as one particular type of a broader set of transition governance approaches. Typical characteristics of TM include working with an arena of frontrunners and the development of a long-term vision upon which transition pathways and transition experiments are based. TM has first been used in the Netherlands as a way of trying to influence and reorient socio-technical systems (such as the energy, mobility and agrofood system) in a more sustainable direction. Inspired by the Dutch example, the Flemish government decided in 2004 to experiment in its environmental policy with transition management, first in the domain of sustainable living and building (a process called DuWoBo), two years later in the domain of waste and sustainable materials management (a process called Plan C). This latter process Plan C is the empirical focus of the paper. The goal of the paper is to investigate the position and role of Plan C in the reorientation of waste policy, how and why such a TM process has influence (or not), which characteristics this influence has, and what the interaction is between this TM process and the broader political and societal context. A basic assumption of the analysis is that transitions are intrinsically political: they change long-established structures, institutions, actors and actor relations, policy discourses and ways of thinking, patterns of action and behaviour. As a consequence, policy initiatives such as TM that want to stimulate change in socio-technical systems, will unavoidably meet with resistance, power struggles, questions of trust and legitimacy. A better understanding of processes, mechanisms and patterns at work in TM processes, can help politicians and practitioners (such as civil servants and societal actors) in dealing with the politics of transitions.

The analytical framework that is used in the paper is clarified in part 2 . The analysis of Plan C builds in fact on a combination of two frameworks. The first, the multilevel perspective (MLP), is well-known in transition studies. It describes transitions as a result of interactions between a so-called socio-technical regime at meso-level, innovative niches at micro-level, and trends and pressures at macro- or landscape level. The MLP is useful for describing the context in which a TM process such as Plan C has to find its way, but the MLP does not have a good conceptualisation of politics in transitions. Therefore, to analyse change and stability of policies on the level of substance as well as organisation, the MLP is combined with the policy arrangements approach (PAA). A policy arrangement has four dimensions, where three refer to organisational elements of policy (actors and actor coalitions, resources, rules of the game) and one refers to substantial elements (discourse). Understanding how a TM process functions as a from of policy innovation can then be answered through questions such as: Do actor coalitions change under influence of Plan C? What is the influence on discourse? Does Plan C change the access to and availability of resources in the system and policy domain? Are the rules of policy-making influenced by Plan C? And how and why does all of this happen (or not)?

Part 3 starts the analysis with a description of the context in which the TM process Plan C had to play its role when it started in 2006. In terms of the analytical framework: what are the characteristics of the waste regime that Plan C wants to have influence on and what are important landscape trends? And more specifically for the policy context: what does the

5 policy arrangement look like? Part 3 sketches the growth of the current Flemish waste system and its policy arrangement. The start of waste policy as a separate policy domain is usually situated in the late seventies, early eighties. Due to the reform of the Belgian state structure in 1980, waste policy was one of the first domains to be developed under the new Flemish environmental competences. Although from the start the policy discourse prescribed a policy based on the waste hierarchy (as stated in the Waste Decree of 1981), in practice almost all efforts were focused on getting control over the situation through legislation, planning and organisation of infrastructure around landfilling and incineration. Selective collection and recycling were supportive of these policies. All of this happened through a form of planning that was strongly top-down, with the Flemish government and its agency OVAM in control. Once the basics were more or less in place, the next steps could be taken. In particular from the mid-nineties onwards, a reorientation is visible from the end towards the beginning of the waste chain. The waste hierarchy (prevention, re-use, recycling, incineration, landfilling) becomes the basic logic of the regime, strengthened by concepts such as the principle of producer responsibility and the polluter pays principle. The Waste Decree is thoroughly updated in 1994 and over the years a system of plans is developed that covers all waste streams. OVAM remains the central government actor, but municipalities play an important role in policy implementation. With the development of a waste market and a recycling industry, the private sector becomes structurally involved in the waste chain. Due to the increasing role of the private sector, the relative power of government actors has decreased. While in the eighties, resources were mainly controlled by government actors, from the nineties onwards the private sector gets an important position, certainly in the industrial waste segment.

At the beginning of the 21 st century, Flanders has succeeded in creating a well-performing waste system and it is considered top of the European class in selective collection and recycling. However, the total amount of household waste has remained virtually constant around 550 kg per person since 2000. Furthermore, industrial waste is difficult to get under control. These kind of factors led to a realisation with several OVAM officials that, in order to further reduce waste amounts, a new step in waste policy was needed. The Strategic Plan of OVAM for 2005-2009 introduced a new policy field, namely materials policy, alongside waste management. As one of the strategic goals of the plan, OVAM wanted to contribute to the introduction of thinking in terms of material streams in economic and environmental policy. One way of operationalising this goal was through the introduction of a transition process.

The Plan C process itself is analysed in depth in part 4 . It is first shown how not only the internal reflections within OVAM on a reorientation of waste policy are important for understanding the introduction of Plan C, but also the opportunities created by a huge reform of the Flemish administration, and developments in environmental policy to start experimenting with new policy approaches. The analysis then continues with a reconstruction of the history of Plan C on the basis of the main events between 2003 and 2011, and a discussion of the policy characteristics of Plan C. During the first two years the transition management approach was successful in creating a policy niche with some clearly distinctive characteristics. In contrast with the waste regime, in the Plan C discourse waste has become a small part of an overarching materials system. Production and consumption activities and related policies are reoriented towards closing of material loops and a life cycle approach. The involvement of frontrunners – actors that are usually not in the driving seat when policy is developed – is an essential element in this reorientation of the discourse. The time and space they were allowed to develop as an arena in the shadow of regular policy, was instrumental in formulating a transition agenda (with a leitbild, transition pathways,

6 proposals for experiments). In the first two years, financial means were more or less adequate for coaching the process. The legitimacy of the process seemed high with the participants (around 60 persons mid 2008) and they sided with an ambitious mission statement for the further development of Plan C. Certainly until 2008, Plan C was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management.

Over the last years, Plan C has not really been able to keep that position. As shown in part 4, this can partly be explained by problems in the internal functioning of the network: the trial- and-error process of organisation and substance development has been hindered by factors such as a lack of funding to support the process and the development of experiments, a search by involved actors to define their role and position vis-a-vis each other, the difficult translation of the discourse into action, and uncertainty about the future status of the network.

While part 4 focuses mainly on the internal dynamics of the Plan C process, in part 5 the analysis is broadened to the position of Plan C in the context of ongoing evolutions at the landscape, regime and niche levels of the waste/materials system. This context is at least as important for explaining the influence and the problems of a new policy approach such as Plan C, as is its internal functioning. Part 5 first discusses developments at landscape, regime and niche level that put the existing waste regime under pressure. It then analyses how the combination of these trends has an impact on the Flemish waste regime and its policy arrangement, and it tries to trace the influence of Plan C. At Flemish level, the change in discourse from waste to sustainable materials management is undeniable. It is not only propagated by OVAM as main government actor, it also seems to find support with all actors involved in the waste/materials system: advisory councils, different sectors of the industry, knowledge actors and ngo’s. This change in discourse finds a translation in the rules of the Materials Decree (the successor of the Waste Decree) that was approved by the government in June 2011. However, for the moment the hard requirements of the Decree remain at the level of the requirements of the EU Waste Framework Directive, but several openings have been made in the Decree that allow for the development of policy on the basis of a materials orientation. Meanwhile, new actors are entering the policy arrangement (such as the influential technological and chemical industry), while the old ones are reformulating their position. In the case of OVAM this also led to an internal restructuring which should better prepare the organisation for the challenges of the governance of the materials system. The traditional waste industry is trying to reposition itself as suppliers of secondary materials. As a consequence of this repositioning and the involvement of new actors, the resources and distribution of resources in the system are changing. New actors bring in important financial and lobbying power. Furthermore they succeed in attracting support from traditional innovation funds. This seems less the case with the actors that until now dominated the waste system. In particular OVAM, which is currently taking the lead in the materials orientation, cannot count on extra financial means for the moment, even though its tasks are expanding and getting more complex.

What may reinforce the ongoing developments towards sustainable materials management is a noticeable translation of both the sustainable materials discourse and the transition discourse to other policy areas such as the socio-economic innovation project of the Flemish government ViA and the new sustainable development policy. In this translation, sustainable materials management is not only a new approach to waste, but it is being regarded as an essential component of a greener, innovative economy and thus of a broader socio-economic agenda. There are several indications however that in this translation process to the economic and innovation field, the transition concept also loses some of its flavour of radical

7 change and becomes embedded in a rather business-as-usual competition and productivity discourse.

In all these developments, it is obvious that Plan C is one influence among many. In particular structural transformation processes at the landscape level, such as EU policy initiatives on resource efficiency and raw materials, and the growing competition worldwide for resources, are hugely influential for current and future system developments. Still, the analysis also shows that Plan C has had influence on Flemish level, in particular on the discourse that is being used at several places. Further, several actors have found inspiration in the Plan C approach to sep up their own initiatives. Although the Minister of the Environment and OVAM did not succeed in inscribing a legal structure for Plan C in the Materials Decree, the Decree still contains a form of cooperation between OVAM and several administrations to support and further develop Plan C.

Part 6 draws attention to the mechanisms that underlie the role that a TM process such as Plan C plays in influencing change and stability in policy. These mechanisms help to understand how policy change is happening and/or how stability is maintained. The importance of converging policy streams for the breakthrough of the sustainable materials agenda shows several times in the Plan C case, as does the role of so-called policy entrepreneurs for tying together dynamics at different levels and smartly making use of policy windows. Different discourse mechanisms can also work in favour of change. The new sustainable materials storyline that was developed by Plan C, was influential in redefining the policy problem, which next led to a redefinition of the interests of actors involved in the waste/materials system. However, the analysis also shows that when the new materials and transition discourse is embedded in policy domains with long established and broadly carried storylines – such as in innovation and socio-economic policy – the more transformative elements may disappear from view in order to fit in a competition and productivity discourse. Finally, prevailing modes of administrative logic and of policy-making work as a stabilising force and hinder the institutionalisation of a transition approach and the Plan C agenda. Part 6 ends with policy recommendations, in particular on the role and positioning of Plan C in a fast changing policy context.

The paper concludes in part 7 that with the start of Plan C five years ago, OVAM showed its early awareness of the new upcoming developments in the waste/materials system. The transition management approach that was used to initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse for Flanders about sustainable materials management and in starting a network of frontrunners that, certainly until 2008, was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management. However, in particular during the last two years, political and societal dynamics in the materials system have accelerated and have more or less overtaken the TM-process Plan C. The result of these dynamics is that a lot of actors have moved towards Plan C’s position and also occupy part of the sustainable materials terrain, invariably supported by more financial resources and organisational capacity. From the lone player on a previously almost unoccupied field, Plan C has become one small player among many in a field that quickly gets crowded. The analysis suggests that there is still a place in the Flemish context for a transition process such as Plan C. This requires a new focus and a repositioning (including a conception of transition governance that goes beyond TM), which can then launch Plan C for a new round of learning how to do transition governance in practice.

8 1. Introduction and problem definition

This working paper reports on the Plan C process, a policy process introduced in 2006 by the Flemish government with the goal of reorienting its waste policy towards a sustainable materials policy and stimulating a transformation of the waste/materials system. Essentially, the idea behind this policy innovation is to move from a linear materials stream – starting with the extraction of resources, manufacturing of products, consumption, and finally discarding of waste – to a closed loop system where materials remain in the system and waste is minimised and/or almost reduced to zero. The approach that is followed to innovate waste policy and transform the waste/materials system is inspired by the research field of transition studies and the practice of transition management such as it has been introduced by the Dutch government since 2001.

The research field that over the last decade has become known as research into ‘system innovations’ and ‘sustainability transitions’ takes as a starting point that a more sustainable society will to a large extent depend on a fundamental reorientation of the socio-technical systems that are at the heart of our societies, such as the energy system, the mobility system, the agro-food system and the materials system. The field of transition studies is focused around two broad themes of inquiry (Grin et al. 2010): firstly, how to understand, describe and analyse transitions and transition dynamics; and secondly, how to shape and influence transitions towards a more sustainable society. This paper focuses on aspects of the second theme, i.e. the governance of transitions.

Let me first clarify how terms such as ‘transition governance’ and ‘transition management’ are used in this paper. In the paper, I use the term transition governance to refer to all kinds of efforts to consciously influence a socio-technical system in a more sustainable direction. There are different approaches to transition governance, such as strategic niche management (Kemp et al. 1998, Geels and Schot 2007), the functions approach of technological innovation systems (Hekkert et al. 2007), a dual-track governance approach inspired by reflexive modernisation (Grin 2010), and transition management (TM – Rotmans 2003, Loorbach 2007). Transition management is undoubtedly the best known approach to influencing transitions. It is usually associated with the method developed by people like Jan Rotmans, Derk Loorbach and René Kemp, first at the research institutes ICIS and MERIT in Maastricht, and currently at the research institute DRIFT of Rotterdam University. Their typical TM approach employs a so-called ‘transition arena’ with niche-players and forward-thinking regime-players to develop a common problem structuring of the societal system under discussion, and then moves on to develop a transition agenda. This transition agenda contains a future vision for the system, transition pathways towards that vision, and a series of experiments to test and initiate the pathways in reality. The underlying rationale is one of “goal-oriented incrementalism” (Rotmans et al. 2007): controlling a transition is not possible, but transition management processes are meant to influence, modulate and accelerate changes along sustainable paths, through processes of learning and experimenting.

TM was first introduced in policy-making by the Dutch government around 2001 (VROM 2001). Inspired by the Dutch transition management policy, the Flemish government decided in 2004 to experiment in its environmental policy with transition management. Two transition processes, one in sustainable living and building (called DuWoBo) and one in sustainable material management (called Plan C), were initiated by the Flemish government in

9 respectively 2004 and 2006. As said, this working paper discusses the experiences with the Plan C process 1.

Over the years, the term ‘transition management’ has often been used as a synonym for all kinds of governance efforts to influence contemporary socio-technical systems, certainly in the Netherlands. This has led to considerable confusion of tongues and initiated a debate about the meaning of transition management. In particular non-Dutch researchers have stressed that multiple possibilities exist for influencing transitions, that consequently not all efforts at influencing transitions should follow the particular DRIFT-approach and thus that this TM-approach should be seen as but one example out of a broader palette of transition governance approaches (see e.g. the discussion between Shove and Walker (2007, 2008) and Rotmans and Kemp (2008)). Furthermore, the term ‘transition management’ has received some opposition because of the connotations of the word ‘management’, that suggests the presence of managers that have the ability to steer a system at will – a suggestion in flagrant opposition to the connotations of ‘governance’ and to the insights of transition studies in general. Anyway, in line with the current international scientific debate on the influencing of transitions, I only use the term ‘transition management’ when I refer to the particular DRIFT- approach (with its typical ingredients of an arena of frontrunners, visioning, transition pathways and experiments), which is also the method that was used to start the Flemish transition processes Plan C and DuWoBo. For referring to the influencing of transitions more in general, I use the term ‘transition governance’.

Transition governance processes – of which TM processes are thus one particular case – are meant as forms of innovation in governance that purposefully try to steer a socio-technical system in a more sustainable direction, by influencing the speed and the direction of the developments going on in and around that system. While TM advocates claim that TM is a suited governance approach for initialising systemic innovations, empirical research will have to show whether and how this works in practice. Of course, such processes do not develop in a vacuum: while they try to exert influence, they are in turn influenced by the broad societal and political context in which they are embedded.

Different conceptual angles are possible for analysing the practice and the influence of TM. Researchers have focused on how visioning functions in TM (Sondeijker et al. 2006), which role networks play in TM (Nooteboom 2006), how experiments function (Van den Bosch 2010), etcetera. Since TM is a governance approach, the political characteristics of TM are of particular interest. These are the focus of analysis in this paper. Which role does transition management play in the reorientation of policies towards sustainable development? Does it lead to innovation in governance, and if so, how? Which processes and mechanisms can be recognised? Which characteristics does TM and its influence have: what happens for example with actors and actor coalitions, power relations, discourses and the rules of policy-making in the studied policy domain? Can this teach us something for the further development of transition governance in general, and for Flanders in particular?

These kind of policy-related questions are all the more relevant since it is on its political characteristics that TM has received most criticism. In particular research into TM processes in the Netherlands shows that these processes wrestle with problems of power and political choices, and with a policy context that is adverse to ‘reflexive governance’ (Voss et al. 2009). TM aims at initiating structural, deep changes in socio-technical systems such as the energy,

1 A case study of the DuWoBo process will be published in a separate working paper. An early discussion of the two processes is to be found in Paredis 2009.

10 mobility or food system, but for the moment remains restricted to ecological modernisation. Although TM succeeds in creating a new discourse around the need for system thinking and transitions, and although it stimulates learning and experiments with new forms of governance (Kemp and Rotmans 2009), Scrase and Smith state that “the political strategies and tactics it advocates are inadequate for the task it has set itself” (2009, p. 724). In his analysis of the Dutch energy transition, Kern finds that the ambitious storyline has been narrowed down “through the capture of the process by incumbent firms and the persistence of existing institutional norms such as polder model practices”, and that, consequently, “it is doubtful whether this policy initiative will achieve its ambitions but it is too early to formally assess the success of this initiative” (Kern 2009, p. 122). Kenis and Mathijs (2011), building on Mouffe, uses the term “post-political” to qualify TM as an approach that hides conflicts, power struggles and a bias for a neoliberal market paradigm under a ‘neutral’ managerial cloak. These findings and comments reinforce earlier criticisms that TM underestimates the political dimensions of its endeavour (Shove and Walker 2007).

My position on these topics is inspired by Grin’s position that transitions are intrinsically political. Since transition governance (and TM) aims at transforming long established patterns of actions and their structural context in a more sustainable direction, it will unavoidably meet with resistance, power struggles, distrust and questions of legitimacy. Instead of seeing politics as a problem for transitions, the awareness that transitions are intrinsically political, should motivate researchers and practitioners to try to understand the political mechanisms at work in transition processes and in that way help them to deal with the politics. “An understanding of the root causes of the politics specifically associated with such efforts may help to address it” (Grin 2010, p. 225).

This paper takes an in-depth look at the Plan C process. The goal of the paper is to investigate the position and role of Plan C in the reorientation of waste policy, how and why such a TM process has influence (or not), which characteristics this influence has, and what the interaction is between this TM process and the broader political and societal context. The purpose of this kind of analysis is to shed more light on the political characteristics of transition management and on how the approach works in the practice of policy-making. And that it can thus serve to develop insights for policy-makers that wish to employ a transition governance (and TM) approach to policy, and for societal actors that are part of these processes.

First, in part 2 I introduce the theoretical framework with which Plan C is analysed. The framework leads to an analysis in different steps. The first step in part 3 consists of an analysis of the current waste system and its policy arrangement. Part 4 makes a detailed analysis of the history and the characteristics of Plan C itself. Part 5 looks at the changes the waste system is currently undergoing under influence of different processes, not only Plan C, but also a series of context factors that range from international concern over availability of resources, European waste and materials policies, to socio-economic and innovation policies at Flemish level. Part 6 discusses the main insights derived from the analysis.

In all this, it is presupposed that the reader has some basic knowledge of transition studies and transition management. For example, I do not explain in detail what the multilevel perspective (MLP) is or what the different starting points of transition management are. Readers are referred to previous working papers for the Steunpunt DO where this is treated in detail (Paredis 2008, 2009, 2010) and of course to the international literature (good starting points are Grin et al. 2010, Loorbach 2007, Geels 2005).

11 2. Analysing the politics of transition management: a glance at research design and analytical framework 2

2.1. The multilevel perspective and policy dynamics

The analysis of Plan C builds on a combination of two frameworks: the multilevel perspective and the policy arrangements approach. The most used framework in analysing transitions is the multilevel perspective (MLP). It captures the complexity and multiple dimensions of transitions: with its three levels of analysis (regime, niche, landscape) and the interaction between these levels it helps to understand how transitions come about. The main lesson from MLP analysis is, that “transitions come about through interactions between processes at different levels: (a) niche-improvements build up internal momentum, through learning processes, price/performance improvements, and support form powerful groups, (b) changes at the landscape level create pressure on the regime, (c) destabilisation of the regime creates windows of opportunity for niche-innovations. The alignment of these processes enables the breakthrough of novelties in mainstream markets where they compete with the existing regime” (Geels and Schot 2007, p. 400).

Transition studies, and in particular studies using the MLP as an analytical framework, usually take technologies at regime level or technological alternatives at niche level as a starting point for analysis. However, also non-technological niches can and will play an important role in a transition. One example are “policy niches”, a term introduced by Van der Brugge (2009). A policy niche gives room to individuals, often residing in co-called power- networks, to break away from their role as representative of an organisation, reframe problems and solutions, and develop innovative policies that may be reintroduced in the mentioned power networks. A policy niche is thus “a shadow process, running parallel to regime processes attempting to influence the regime by developing innovative perspectives” (ibid., p. 97).

Although this interpretation of niches broadens the possibilities of MLP analysis, it has repeatedly been remarked that, while the MLP has proven to be useful in painting a broad picture of how transitions come about and which mechanisms play a role, it is less suited for analysing and explaining processes, roles and strategies of actors. The MLP does not have a good conceptualisation of politics in transitions. While the policy regime is present in the MLP as one of the factors in the reproduction of socio-technical regimes, it is unclear how exactly policies and policy innovations play a role in regime change and multi-level interactions. Geels (2010) states that politics and power are usually integrated “in an ad hoc way. Because the MLP does not provide detailed explanations of the sources and changes of power, it could benefit from richer, multi-faceted views of power and conflict” (p. 506). In their discussion of the MLP and a future research agenda, Smith et al. (2010) state that the MLP will have to be further developed in dialogue with other disciplines such as political science. They select “the politics of transitions” and “opening the black-box of public policy” as important research themes.

2 For a more detailed discussion of the analytical frame, see Paredis, E., Block, T. (2010), “Transition management and its influence on existing policy arrangements: explaining the dynamics of policy change”, paper for the EASST10 Conference, 2-4 September 2010, Trento, Italy.

12 2.2. Policy arrangements to conceptualise politics and policy innovation

A potential candidate for better conceptualising politics, power struggles and policy innovations in transitions is the ‘policy arrangements approach’ (PAA), developed by Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Arts et al. 2006, Arts and Leroy 2006a). Originally, the PAA was developed to study policy change in environmental politics and it has been applied in a lot of studies in that domain. The PAA is primarily an analytical framework that draws on insights from political science and sociology, mainly structuration theory (Giddens), modernisation theory (Beck) and different strands of new institutionalism.

A policy arrangement is “the temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a policy domain, in a bounded time-space context” (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004). The concept is meant to analyse substance and organisation of a policy domain, as well as change or stability of that domain. A policy arrangement has four dimensions: actors and actor coalitions, resources, rules of the game, discourses. The first three are organisational elements of policy, the last one refers to substantial aspects. • Actors and actor coalitions: relates to the different players involved in the policy domain, e.g. from different administrations, business, ngo’s, experts, scientists, civilians etc. • Resources: the division of resources among actors (such as money, personnel, knowledge, authority, technology, relations and interpersonal networks) is one of the determinants of their capacity to influence policies and policy results. • Rules of the game: formal procedures of decision making and implementation as well as informal routines of interaction within institutions. Rules determine which actors are in and out of the game, and how actors can get in. They relate to norms, procedures, legislation, divisions of tasks etc. in a policy domain. • Discourse: interpretative schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular story lines, by which meaning is given to a policy domain. Discourses can be considered at two levels (Liefferink 2006): discourses about the concrete policy problems at stake (its character, causes and possible solutions), and discourses about the relationship between state, market and civil society, and thus the preferred mode of governance. The four dimensions are intricately connected, so that change in one of the dimensions (e.g. entrance of new actors) influences the other dimensions (e.g. new actors may lead to a different distribution of resources, new discourses, different rules to engage the players), but this influence is not an automatism.

So how do policy arrangements change and policies innovate? This happens essentially through two kind of processes. The first are “ongoing processes of structural transformation” (Grin 2010) 3: processes such as globalisation, individualisation, Europeanization of politics, the societization of science and technology, etc. These kind of structural societal trends are outside the direct grasp of policy actors, but they have an important impact on how a policy domain evolves. A second kind of processes that lead to policy innovation are the day-to-day strategic behaviour and practices of actors involved in daily policy interventions. Grin (ibid.) makes a distinction here between two kind of activities: activities that are deliberately geared toward redesigning structures in the regime, or activities that try to develop innovative practices.

3 Arts et al. (2006) use ‘political modernisation’ but because this is a somewhat confusing term, I prefer Grin’s terminology.

13 In fact, it is not difficult to recognise the similarities between processes identified in the AAP and MLP-levels in these formulations: processes of structural transformation are the political aspects of the landscape level, the existing policy arrangement is the political part of the socio-technical regime, and innovative practices are the niche level. Figure 1 tries to visualize the analytical framework. ‘Policy’ in the regime is made explicit and detailed through the dimensions of a policy arrangement. The political dimensions of the landscape that exercise pressure on the regime arrangement, are made explicit as processes of structural transformation. A TM process such as Plan C is framed as a policy niche that tries to influence the regime – with its own ‘embryonic’ discourse, actor coalitions, rules and resources.

Since a TM process is meant to have impact on and reform the existing policy regime, an essential question is how this happens. Based on their case studies in various environmental policy domains, Arts and Leroy (2006, p. 272-274) observe that the emergence of new policy arrangements can be grouped in three types: 1. the full or partial integration of existing and originally juxtaposed policy arrangements. In this case, two existing arrangements merge (or merge partially), for example because arrangement A becomes embedded and hierarchically nested within a broader arrangement B. 2. the discursive and/or organisational renewal of existing policy arrangements. In this case, a new discourse or institutional changes are introduced, which then lead to further changes in the existing arrangement. 3. the introduction of new arrangements that should then be able to perform and institutionalise. In this case, a new policy arrangement is introduced that succeeds in maintaining itself as a more or less autonomous arrangement, and possibly replacing the existing arrangement. These types of renewal are also included in figure 1. Of course, it may not always be possible to strictly separate them. What is meant as a type 3 renewal, may over time become integrated in a broader arrangement (type 1). Or it could fail as an autonomous arrangement but have a discursive or organisational influence on an existing arrangement (type 2). And perhaps other combinations are possible.

In their discussion of the energy transition in the Netherlands, Kern and Howlett (2009) remark that efforts to reform existing policy regime “are always embedded in pre-existing policy contexts with earlier policy histories sedimented in existing policy paradigms, institutions, practices and established actor networks” (p. 392). For understanding the renewal of policy arrangements (such as through TM), this implies at least two things. First, a contextualization of the renewal process (in this case the TM process Plan C) is necessary. To understand its potential influence, it is necessary to have an idea of the main features of the regime and landscape the process is confronted with, but possibly also of the broader societal and political context in which it is embedded. Second, policy renewal will often be a messy exercise, influenced as it is by the existing context. Kern and Howlett distinguish four processes that determine the outcome of efforts for policy renewal (p. 395): • Replacement: a re-creating or fundamental re-structuring of policies through the replacement of old goals and means by new ones that are coherent, consistent and congruent 4. This is often the aim of reform efforts, but in reality the following three processes are more often observed.

4 Coherency refers to whether policy goals are logically related to the same objectives or whether different goals are contradictory. Consistency refers to whether policy tools work together to support a policy goals or whether

14 • Layering: new goals and instruments are added to old ones in an existing regime without abandoning previous ones. • Drift: new goals replace old ones without changing the instruments used to implement them. • Conversion: new instrument mixes evolve while holding old goals constant. The result are often policy mixes that are “complex arrangements of multiple goals and means which, in many cases, have developed incrementally over many years (…) in which new instruments and objectives have been piled on top of older ones, creating a palimpsest-like mixture of policy elements” (ibid.).

Figure 1. The MLP and the policy arrangements approach. The PAA highlights the political aspects of a system in transition. The policy dimension of the regime is made more explicit as an arrangement of dominant discourses, actors, rules and resources. New policy arrangements are built in and around niches. Policy innovation happens through processes of institutionalisation of a new policy arrangement, renewal of existing arrangements and/or integration between policy arrangements. Of particular importance for policy innovation are landscape trends of political modernisation and structural transformation.

2.3. Transition management in the analytical frame

So, when keeping in mind the discussion so far, how can we interpret transition management in the perspective of policy arrangements and MLP? TM can be framed as a policy niche, set up alongside regular policies, with the ambition of introducing a new style and practice of governance that aims for innovation in the policy field on the level of substance as well as they work against each other and provide diverging incentives. Congruency refers to the relationship and the fit between policy goals and the means used to attain them.

15 organisation. A quick glance at the different dimensions of TM as a policy arrangement can further clarify this. On the level of discourse , the need for socio-technical system innovations, sustainability transitions, long-term thinking and transition experiments becomes prominent. When looking at actors , there is a plea for involvement of frontrunners and forward-thinking regime players. The resources of these actors can be strengthened vis-à-vis incumbents through building new networks, mobilising financial means, generating common knowledge about problem perceptions and future visions and transitions pathways, strengthening sustainable niches through experiments. New rules under TM could relate for example to new (formal or informal) procedures to involve innovative actors or adjustments to financial mechanisms in order to favour more sustainable practices. TM usually takes a normative stance towards governance: multi-actor settings, expanding networks with frontrunners, approaches such as participatory visioning are deemed necessary instruments to influence transitions.

Important questions then arise as to what extent TM really represents an innovation in governance, under what conditions it can further institutionalise, and how this process and the resulting policy can be characterised. This can only be analysed by doing empirical research, such as research into the Plan C process. Do actor coalitions change under influence of Plan C? What is the influence on discourse? Does Plan C change the access to and availability of resources in the system and policy domain? Are the rules of policy-making influenced by Plan C? And how and why does all of this happen (or not)?

Using the described analytical framework in the case study of Plan C implies a series of different steps: • Describe the properties of the dominant or regime policy arrangement and how they came about, namely its discourses, actors, rules, resources and power relations (mainly part 3); • Describe the new policy arrangement around the TM process Plan C, based on discourses used, actors, rules, resources and power relations (mainly part 4); • Determine which structural trends are relevant for the waste and materials domain and how they exert influence (through different parts); • Describe the interaction between the different levels, determine patterns and mechanisms, how and why the dominant policy arrangement changes (or not)? (mainly part 5 and 6).

In summary: building on the combined framework of MLP and PAA, it is possible to define Plan C as a policy niche that runs parallel to regime policies and attempts to influence the regime by developing innovative policy perspectives. To understand the policy characteristics of this niche and its interaction with regime policies, the policy arrangements approach can be employed. This allows for an analysis of the political characteristics of a TM process and its context in terms of discourses, actors, rules and resources. It also draws attention to the embeddedness of new policy arrangements in ongoing processes of structural transformation.

The following case study of Plan C follows a qualitative research approach. To gather empirical data, different type of data sources are used: policy documents and legal texts, secondary literature, semi-structured interviews 5, participatory observation and a feedback seminar on interim results (14 March 2011). The dimensions of the PAA are used to structure data. An important method to understand how change happens is through reconstruction of processes or process tracing.

5 See the annex for the interviews

16 3. The Flemish waste system and its policy arrangement

As mentioned a few paragraphs earlier, understanding the role that a transition management process such as Plan C can play in the renewal of policies, demands a contextualization of that process: what are established structures and patterns of action with which it is confronted? What are relevant long-term trends? In terms of the MLP: what are the characteristics of the regime that Plan C wants to have influence on and what are landscape trends? And more specifically for the policy context: what does the policy arrangement look like?

Since Plan C was introduced by the Flemish government with the aim of reorienting its waste policy towards a more broader sustainable materials policy, the analysis in this part 3 gives a concise overview of, first in 3.1. the growth of the waste regime, and second in 3.2. of the current waste regime and its policy arrangement. It is not my intention, within the constraints of the research project, to present a comprehensive analysis of the current waste regime and its historical growth, but still, the analysis aims to highlight those aspects that make a comparison possible with the features of Plan C and with the changes that seem to be currently underway in the direction of a more sustainable materials orientation. The start of waste policy as a separate policy domain is usually situated in the late seventies, early eighties. I mark the first phase of waste policy with a first policy arrangement from 1981 to 1994 (discussed in 3.1.), and a second phase with a new policy arrangement from 1994 to the present (discussed in 3.2.). Such a delineation has some arbitrariness to it: there is always a certain continuity between different periods, with policies and all kinds of initiatives crossing these dividing lines. Still, it can be argued that since the mid-nineties, the different dimensions of the policy arrangement (discourse, actors, rules, resources) differ from that in the eighties and have since then shown some consistency and robustness. The criteria for distinguishing between periods are thus a relative consistency in discourse, actors, rules, and resources configuration. Figure 2 shows where the following analysis should be situated in the analytical framework.

Figure 2. The focus of the analysis in part 3 is on the current waste regime and its policy arrangement. This is mainly discussed in paragraph 3.2. Paragraph 3.1. goes back further in time and discusses some of the historic developments in waste policy, leading up to the current policy arrangement

17 3.1. 1981-1994: A system focused on waste removal

Like most other industrialised countries, until the late sixties, early seventies Belgium had a waste system that was locally organised. Waste collection was the responsibility of municipalities and most waste was carried off to landfills. By the early seventies, mainly due to booming economic activity and changing production and consumption patterns, waste volumes had grown considerably, with a lot of qualitatively different waste (e.g. more plastics). The locally limited storage and processing capacity induced environmental and public health problems and triggered the first steps towards new waste policies. From early on the European policy level played a role, for example with the introduction of an EEC Directive in 1975 (C75/442/EEG) that obliged member states to create authorities for control of waste, planning, policy coordination and granting of permits.

The form waste policy was to get in Belgium was decisively influenced by the reform of the Belgian state structure in 1980, which transferred a lot of environmental and nature policy towards the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels). Waste and water policy were the first domains to be developed under the new Flemish environmental competences. The basic rules of the new policy domain were laid down in the Decree Regarding Prevention and Management of Waste of 2 July 1981, usually labelled as the Waste Decree. It was the first environmental Decree approved by the Flemish Parliament. From the start of waste policy, the discourse on waste mentioned the waste hierarchy 6. In its Article 2, the Waste Decree states that its goal is to protect man and the environment against the harmful influence of waste, by preventing waste, by stimulating the re-use, recovering and recycling of waste, and by organising the removal of waste. The Decree distinguishes between two man categories of waste: household waste and industrial waste. As the local and provincial level were regarded as too small scale to tackle the waste problems, the Waste Decree of 1981 established a new actor at Flemish level, the Public Waste Agency of Flanders (OVAM). OVAM becomes the central government player in the waste system, but municipalities retain an essential role for implementation at local level.

In spite of the intentions of the Waste Decree, during the eighties policy in practice almost exclusively focused on waste removal and processing. The priority during the first five years was “creating order out of chaos” (Bachus et al. 2007, p. 50): Flanders had more than 400 landfills, of which a lot were illegal and badly exploited; municipalities followed their own rules; infrastructures such as for incineration installations were spread unevenly over the territory and were far from sufficient. One of the first tasks of OVAM was to gather data that could inform planning of processing capacity and regional distribution of infrastructures. This kind of information also allowed for the start of a permits policy for installations and companies. The Waste Decree had abolished the old permits and thus allowed for a reorganization of the sector (Loorbach 2004). In line with the Decree, the Flemish government developed a first Waste Plan 1986-1990 (published in 1987). This plan continued the systematic collection of data in order to get waste removal under control. It focused on household as well as industrial waste, and it introduced the principle of environmental levies on landfilling and incineration. According to Loots et al. (2008), in that way “the waste sector got its own legislation, its own organisation, and its own rules and procedures for policy development and implementation: institutionalisation in a nutshell.”

6 In Flanders and the Netherlands, the waste hierarchy is often named “Lansink’s ladder”, referring to a motion from the Dutch politician Ad Lansink that was passed in the Dutch Parliament in 1979.

18 And the institutionalisation continues. In the second Waste Plan 1991-1995, the waste problem is framed more broadly and the discourse on problem analysis and objectives shifts from the end of the waste chain towards the beginning. Most measures are still directed at waste removal, but selective collection acquires a full place and the first traces of prevention and re-use policy appear, although these remain vague in goals and implementation. Communication and media campaigns focus predominantly on selective collection. This new focus must also be seen in connection to the increasing incineration of waste: incineration still struggles with a limited capacity and with toxic emissions, so a strategy of increased selective collection yields less residual waste, and thus less incineration (Bachus et al. 2007). The implementation of the second waste plan is supported by an environmental covenant with municipalities that the Flemish government concludes for the period 1992-1996. Municipalities can subscribe to the covenant on a voluntary basis and when they do, they are subsidised for setting up specific initiatives. Although the covenants want to stimulate local environmental policy in general, most initiatives in the first covenant are related to selective collection of waste fractions, such as glass, paper and vegetable, fruit and garden waste.

Meanwhile, specific attention was also devoted to industrial waste, inter alia because of industrial waste import from the Netherlands (after several scandals with toxic landfills – see Loorbach 2007) and because of a growing need for disposal of industrial waste from industry around the Antwerp harbour. This led amongst other things to a duty to report on industrial waste (1981), better monitoring and a ban on landfilling for imported waste (1993). In order to increase processing capacity, the NV Indaver was created in 1985, a collaboration between the government and industry to handle problematic industrial waste streams.

As different observers have noted (Geeraerts et al. 2005, Bachus et al. 2007), it can be concluded that although the discourse prescribes a waste policy that starts from prevention and moves down to incineration and landfilling, in reality policy begins at the lowest rungs of the ladder and tries to work its way up. Waste policy started by getting control over the situation through legislation, planning and organisation of infrastructure around landfilling and incineration. Selective collection and recycling were supportive of these policies. Once the basics were more or less in place, the next steps could be taken. All of this happened through a form of planning that was strongly top-down, with the Flemish government and its agency OVAM in control. The focus is also mainly on implementation and less on strategic long-term planning and coordination.

3.2. 1994-2010: Reorienting the system on the basis of the waste hierarchy

The reorientation from the end towards the beginning of the waste chain that was already visible in the second waste plan, accelerates from the mid-nineties onwards. During the implementation of the second waste plan, several bottlenecks had surfaced (Bachus et al. 2007, 51-52): the efforts for selective collection were not efficient enough because there was insufficient processing capacity in Flanders and almost no market; there is still a too limited incineration capacity and a lack of category-1 landfills (for dangerous waste, mainly from industrial sources); the societal cost for removal of waste is higher than what is effectively charged; and there are not enough people and resources for developing a prevention and recovery policy. These kind of problems lead to the conclusion that the Waste Decree from 1981 has to be thoroughly updated, which happens on 20 April 1994. The waste hierarchy not only becomes much more prominent in the discourse, but it is strengthened with concepts

19 such as producer responsibility and the polluter pays principle. New formal rules under the form of new legislation and new policy instruments are introduced, including a series of sectoral implementation plans to tackle separate waste streams.

This evolution runs in parallel to and is strengthened by another development, namely the growing consciousness that the fragmentation of environmental policy in Flanders and the available organisational and financial means are insufficient to tackle the increasing environmental problems. The first attempts at more strategic, integrated and long-term planning already dated from 1989 and 1990 when the then Minister of the Environment Kelchtermans launched two plans in a short period of time 7. On 5 April 1995, the Flemish government approved the Decree General Provisions Relating to Environmental Policy (DABM, Decreet Algemene Bepalingen Milieubeleid). The DABM stipulates that henceforth Flemish environmental policy takes its shape through a combination of environmental plans, environmental yearly programmes and environmental reports. The environmental report (MIRA) has to provide scientific support for policy. The environmental plan (MINA-plan) defines the outlines of environmental policy at Flemish regional level and at provincial and municipal level, and in that way also enhances the effectiveness, efficiency and internal congruency of policy at all levels. The environmental yearly programmes are the operationalisation of the plan in terms of timing, organisation and priorities.

The consequence for waste policy is that the separate waste plans from the previous period are abolished, because the strategic lines of waste policy are now integrated in the MINA-plans. The MINA 2-plan 1997-2001 continues the orientation towards prevention and stipulates that the objective is to reduce the amount of waste to the unavoidable minimum, while the remaining waste stream must reach a sufficient quality so that it can serve as a secondary material for the same or another product or production process (De Bruyn et al. 2003). Whereas the MINA-plan formulates the strategic outline of waste policy, the operationalisation of waste policy happens through sectoral implementation plans, as already foreseen in the Waste Decree 1994. Starting from this basic logic, since the mid-nineties waste policy has become more and more refined in its combination of rules and instruments to orient the system on the basis of the waste hierarchy.

Of course, not only the events at the level of the Flemish waste regime explain the evolutions in policy. These are also a consequence of what can be labelled landscape developments and processes of structural transformation. The early nineties is the time when sustainable developments policies increasingly receive attention in the follow-up of the 1992 UNCED- conference and the European policy level increasingly influences environmental policy, with amongst others a packaging directive in 1994, a directive concerning integrated pollution prevention and control in 1996, and a landfill directive in 1999. Between the start of the Flemish waste policy in 1981 and the present, “more than 50 Directives, Decisions and Regulations have been adopted. They relate to a whole range of themes, from the landfilling, incineration or transboundary movement of waste to the selective collection and recycling of batteries, packaging waste, end-of-life vehicles and electric equipment. In addition, a number of thematic strategies and action plans on waste-related topics have been developed at the EU level. Subjects covered in such action plans and strategies are waste prevention and recycling,

7 The Mina-plan 2000 (February 1989) was mainly written by the Minister and his cabinet and had a rather internal government character. The Milieubeleidsplan en Natuurontwikkelingsplan (February 1990) built on contributions from different administrations and for the nature part on the expertise of non-governmental experts. It was the first important document in the political and societal discussion on the headlines of environmental policy. See Loots et al. 2008.

20 sustainable consumption and production, sustainable use of natural resources and shipdismantling” (OVAM website).

As said above, it is not the intention of this paper to make a full analysis of the current waste regime or current waste policy, but to select a series of important features on the basis of the policy arrangements approach that can serve as comparative material with what happens under the Plan C process and the attempt at a shift to a sustainable materials regime.

3.2.1. Discourse

As mentioned already, the basic logic of the regime and its policy arrangement is the waste hierarchy: policy should first focus on waste prevention, followed by re-use, recycling of products and materials or valorisation by conversion in compost, incineration with energy recovery, incineration without energy recovery, and finally landfilling. Adhering to the waste hierarchy is not obvious, however. In their evaluation of 15 years of prevention policy, Bachus et al. (2007) find that prevention is the most difficult aspect of waste policy, because it is the aspect that is most influenced by context factors such as the evolution of consumption patterns, the evolution of technology, the evolution of European policies, all of which do not necessarily stimulate prevention. Within that context, Flemish prevention policy has several merits, according to Bachus et al.: it has created a legal base for prevention, it has influenced industrial practices (in particular under the form of eco-efficiency practices), it can boast several successful projects (such as in the area of composting). But on the other hand, prevention policy is still in its infancy and has a huge potential for improvement. Reasons for the low impact include: a lack of clear, strategic goals and a lot of ad hoc initiatives, a small budget for prevention activities, low political priority with a lack of willingness to interfere directly in consumption or production activities. In reality, then, the system predominantly remains a selective collection-recycling-incineration instead of a prevention system. Still, the policies that have been developed, has brought Flanders amongst the top regions of waste management worldwide, with one of the lowest landfilling rates and one of the highest recycling rates in Europe (EEA 2009).

While the waste regime and its policy arrangement converge around the idea of the waste hierarchy, the discourse contains other elements as well, which are mostly an extension or a complement to the waste hierarchy principle. Examples are the principle of producer responsibility, which states that producers are co-responsible for the products they bring to market, also when these have reached the waste phase; the polluter pays principle which states that the actor who causes pollution should pay for its removal; or the principal of self- sufficiency with regard to final disposal, which states that Flanders should try to handle its waste within its own borders. These kind of discourse elements are of course not unique for Flanders but fit within the European discourse on waste. But the way they are translated in rules and actor involvement has an important influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of the different waste systems.

21 3.2.2. Rules

Until June 2011, the basis for waste policy remained the Waste Decree of 1981/1994 8. Since this was a framework decree, implementing orders were necessary that clarified certain definitions, regulations, recognitions, compliance rules. Since 1997, these are bundled and regularly updated in VLAREA (Flemish Regulation relating to Waste Prevention and Management – Vlaams Reglement Afvalvoorkoming en –beheer). Changes in VLAREA often represent changes in thinking about waste and secondary materials. For example, in 2003 important changes were carried through in VLAREA with amongst other things new rules on waste incineration and changes about which waste streams can be taken in consideration as secondary materials (Claes et al. 2007).

As mentioned, waste policy planning is on a strategic level integrated in the MINA-plans, that set out the policy lines for Flemish environmental policy in general. The MINA 2-plan 1997- 2001, the MINA 3-plan 2003-2007 and the MINA 3+-plan 2008-2010 continue the trend of increasing attention for waste prevention in the chapters on waste. Because policy and actions on household waste are relatively successful, MINA 3 pays more attention to prevention, re- use and recycling of industrial waste and to prevention through process and product policy (such as promotion of eco-design) 9. MINA 3+ mentions the need for an additional policy line that focuses on a broadening of traditional waste policy to sustainable materials management. In parallel to this broader policy approach it mentions “the start of a transition process towards sustainable materials management that focuses on radical innovations” (LNE 2008, p. 42).

While the MINA-plans formulate the strategic direction and the outline of waste policy, policies related to specific waste streams are further detailed in a series of different implementation plans. On its website, OVAM talks about “a system of plans” that covers all relevant waste streams. These currently include amongst other things implementation plans for household waste, organic-biological waste, sound materials use and waste management in the building sector, small company industrial waste, wood waste, sludge, high-caloric waste. The actual realization of the plans is done through employment of different sorts of policy instruments at Flemish level. Furthermore, the municipalities keep their supportive role through new covenants and cooperation agreements.

One of the main policy instruments at Flemish level is the acceptance obligation, which is a translation in rules of producer responsibility. Under the acceptance obligation, companies remain responsible for the products they bring to the market and they are thus obliged to set up a selective collection and processing system once these products have become waste. Instead of doing this on an individual basis, most companies participate in so-called voluntary Environmental Policy Agreements, which is an agreement between the government (OVAM) and an industrial sector that makes the sector collectively responsible for realising prevention, selective collection and processing. Such agreements exist for example for batteries, tires, packaging material 10 , electrical and electronic equipment, cars, medicines etcetera. They are always executed through specific sectoral management organisms (such as Bebat for waste

8 On 24 June 2011, the Flemish government approved the Materials Decree. See in particular part 5. 9 MINA 3 also introduced the concept “capital stock management” and announced the start of a project to operationalise this concept as a framework for long-term environmental policy. This will provide the opportunity to initiate two transition management processes, one in sustainable materials management (Plan C) and one in sustainable housing and building (DuWoBo). See 4.1.1. 10 For the packaging sector, the term ‘take back obligation’ is used instead of ‘acceptance obligation’.

22 batteries, Fostplus for packaging waste from households, Val-I-Pac for packaging waste from industry , Recytyre for waste tires, Valorfrit for used frying fat and oil, etc.).

Another policy instrument that is characteristic of Flemish waste policy are bans on landfilling and incineration. In order to divert as much waste as possible to recycling or re-use, over the years several kind of bans have been installed. Waste that can be recycled and/or that has been selectively collected (such as paper; glass, metal and plastic packaging; vegetables, fruit and garden waste) may not be landfilled or burned. From unsorted waste, first recyclable materials are removed, before it is burned or landfilled. In the last step, only waste that cannot be burned, will be landfilled.

In addition to bans, the government also actively makes use of environmental levies on landfilling and incineration. Landfills and incineration installations pay a levy per ton of waste that is landfilled or burned to the Flemish government. The sum of the levy is dependent on the kind of waste and the way it is treated. This levy is of course passed on down the chain, so that it is in the end the producers of waste (households, companies…) that pay the levy.

In their study on waste prevention policy, Bachus et al. (2007) find that the combination of bans, levies and acceptance obligations are to a large extent responsible for the success of recycling in Flanders. But their effect on prevention is limited because they were never really conceived as instruments for prevention, only as steering instruments for moving from landfilling/incineration up the ladder towards selective collection and recycling. Prevention policy has mainly made use of communicative instruments (sensitisation campaigns, information, seminars, website…).

3.2.3. Actors

Government at several levels has always played a crucial role in the waste regime and its policy. From the nineties onwards private actors become more important, but all in all the system remains dominated by government actors. Waste policy is inside the competence of the Minister of the Environment, with OVAM as the central government actor in the administration, responsible for policy preparation and implementation. Municipalities play an important role in policy implementation, in particular for household waste, since they are responsible for the collection and processing of household waste. Almost all municipalities (306 out of 308) cooperate in intermunicipal associations. The role of these associations has grown in importance over the years. When waste policy started in the early eighties, some municipalities already cooperated in the construction and exploitation of incineration installations (Geeraerts et al. 2005). Over the years, this form of cooperation has spread over the whole of Flanders, with momentarily 25 associations. The relation between municipality and association differs between cases: sometimes the association dominates local waste policy, while in other cases the municipality still outlines its own waste policy (ibid.). Since 1996, the associations in cooperation with the association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG) have formed their own representative coordination unit (Interafval) that functions as spokesperson for their interests towards OVAM and other political bodies. Also the provinces play a role in waste policy, mainly in a supporting role for municipalities and associations.

With the development of a waste market and a recycling industry, the private sector has become structurally involved in the waste chain. Private companies sometimes participate in

23 the capital of intermunicipal associations and execute tasks such as collection, recycling or processing. But the industrial waste sector is much more important than the sector of household waste and it thus most interesting for private companies. Although some municipalities still collect waste from small and medium enterprises, over the years collecting and processing industrial waste has become a sector for private enterprises (ibid.). There is a strong tendency towards vertical integration, with operators offering a package of services covering each link in the chain, from waste collection to processing of waste matter (Claes et al. 2007). International groups have entered the market, with a growing integration of the Flemish waste market in a European market.

Producers (of products, and thus of waste) play a role mainly through the series of management organisms that they have set up as part of their duties under the acceptance obligation

3.2.4. Resources

While in the eighties, resources were mainly controlled by government actors, from the nineties onwards the private sector gets an important position, certainly in the industrial waste segment. The main government actor OVAM has around 80 million Euros available to do its job (an important part of this is spent on soil remediation and the prevention of soil pollution). Due to the increasing role of the private sector, the relative power of government actors has decreased. In December 2006, the Flemish government sold its majority share in Indaver to the Dutch group Delta Milieu and retreated from the private industrial waste market.

3.2.5. Towards a next step

At the beginning of the 21 st century, Flanders has succeeded in creating a well-performing waste system and it is considered top of the European class in selective collection and recycling. Landfill taxes and bans have reduced dumping from almost 50% of total household waste in the early nineties to 3% in 2009. The recycling rate has increased from almost 20% to 75% in the same period (VMM 2008, 2010). However, the total amount of household waste has remained virtually constant around 550 kg per person since 2000; 150 kg of this waste is “definitively removed” (usually incinerated). With these figures Flanders reaches the goals it formulated in the MINA 3+-plan, it is also among the least household waste producers in Europe, but it still remains an impressive waste heap (around 3,4 million tons in 2007), and it is far from obvious how this can be further reduced with current policies. Furthermore, industrial waste is difficult to get under control. Total amounts fluctuate but remain constantly higher than in the beginning of the century. In 2008, they were at 21,8 million tons, almost 3 million tons above the MINA 3+ goal, of which around 63% went to a form of material recycling. The period 2002-2008 showed no decoupling of industrial waste from the Flemish gross regional product.

These kind of trends were already visible for several years and led to a realisation with several OVAM officials that, in order to further reduce waste amounts, a new step in waste policy was needed. “The feeling was that there was a standstill in policy. We were not going to reach our goals by better selective collection and more recycling, but we had to work much more upstream in the chain (…) We realised we also had to look at

24 production processes, at the design phase, and that’s how the idea of materials policy grew. You always want to see an evolution, you want to progress. That was one of the main factors, the conclusion that we needed new projects and a next step in policy. Unless of course you are satisfied with what you have: we are the best sorters in Europe and now we are going to rest on our laurels” (civil servant).

This realization becomes visible in the Strategic Plan of OVAM for 2005-2009. Alongside waste management, a new policy field is introduced, namely “materials policy”. Materials policy is meant to lead “to an effective and far-reaching decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressure”. As one of the strategic goals of the plan, OVAM will contribute to the introduction of thinking in terms of material streams in economic and environmental policy. One way of operationalising this goal is through the introduction of a transition process. To fully understand this step to the introduction of a transition process, two other developments should be added. This will be further discussed in 4.1.1.

25 4. The TM-process Plan C: history and characteristics

In 2006 OVAM takes the initiative to start a transition management process, called Plan C. This part of the paper makes a detailed analysis of the characteristics of this process. In terms of the analytical framework, figure 3 illustrates the focus of this part.

Paragraph 4.1. first gives a chronological description of the main events. I divide the history of the Plan C process in six parts: a predevelopment phase, four phases between mid 2006 and mid 2011, and the future situation. Figure 4 gives an overview of the main activities, processes and context events related to Plan C. Paragraph 4.2. discusses Plan C as a policy arrangement in embryonic form.

Figure 3. The focus of analysis in part 4 is on Plan C as a TM process. Paragraph 4.1. describes the history of the process, while 4.2. makes an analysis of Plan C as a policy arrangement.

4.1. A history of Plan C

4.1.1. Context and predevelopments: how and why TM was introduced

As discussed in 3.2., the internal reflections within OVAM on policy development formed the first important element that led to the start of Plan C. Two other political developments converged that made possible the start of the transition management process. The first was related to the development of Flemish environmental policy in general. Although mainly focused on sectoral environmental policy, the Third Flemish Environmental Policy Plan (MINA-plan 2003-2007) also left some room for a broader policy focus on sustainable development. In the process leading up to the plan, a few studies had been produced that all hinted at the potential of system innovation and transition management as anchoring points for sustainable development, without however going into any detail as to how these should be applied to Flanders. Although these studies were written in different fields and for different purposes, the researchers and civil servants involved were closely connected to the field of

26 environment and/or sustainable development and usually knew each other personally. Between 2002 and 2004, several of them also went to visit Jan Rotmans and his team at ICIS Maastricht to discuss the new concept of transition management. The study of De Jonge (2003), a preparatory study for the MINA-plan 2003-2007, discusses how environmental resource policy and capital stock management can be embedded in a wider framework that focuses on system innovation. Based on Dutch examples, he proposes an “ad hoc framework” to initiate system innovation and transition management in Flanders. Van Humbeeck (2003), in a paper for the Flemish socio-economic advisory council SERV on the relation between industrial policy, innovation policy and the environment, also points out the necessity of system innovation to tackle environmental problems and to simultaneously renew the economic system. He states that incremental innovations will not suffice to solve environmental problems and discusses the importance of radical technological innovations and transitions on a systems level. In 2003 and 2004, two papers from the Flemish innovation institute IWT, written in the context of an OECD project on horizontal innovation policies, both refer to innovation, transition management and sustainable development (Van Humbeeck et al. 2003, Larosse 2004). And finally, two advisory councils to the Flemish government (the socio-economic council SERV and the environment and nature council MINA-Raad) pronounced themselves in favour of experimenting with transition processes. In 2002 during the public consultation for the MINA-plan 2003-2007, both councils pleaded for radical innovations under the form of long-term system innovations and asked the government to study the possibilities of framing these as transitions and transition management.

Inspired by these kind of studies and the support from the advisory councils, the MINA-plan 2003-2007 in its project 1 identified “capital stock management” as an important track for developing long-term policy goals and realizing sustainable development. In 2004, this project was made operational in the Environmental Year Programme 2004, where “system innovation” and “transition management” were identified as necessary for reaching goals such as factor 10. For the first time, “sustainable building” is mentioned as a possible case to test the approach of “system innovation”. This choice was reinforced when the then Flemish Minister of the Environment, Kris Peeters, in his Policy Note 2004-2009 formulated the need for an “innovative environmental policy” with as strategic long-term objective “preparing Flanders for transitions” (Peeters 2004, 81). The note states that in the long term radical transitions may be necessary that go beyond system optimisation and that require system innovations. The Flemish Region should therefore identify long-term and legislature-crossing objectives, which can then serve as orientation points for short and medium term policy. In its operational objectives the policy note then formulates the need to study the feasibility of the concept of transition management in a Flemish context “with sustainable housing and building as testing ground.” (ibid., 79). In 2004, a transition process started in sustainable housing and building (the so-called DuWoBo process). Plan C followed two years later.

The last political development that was important in the choice for a TM process, was a huge reorganisation of the Flemish administration, called Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid (BBB – Better Administrative Policy), implemented by the Flemish government since 2001. One of the main aims of this reorganisation, inspired by the principles of New Public Management, was to restructure the public administration in thirteen homogenous policy domains. In order to overcome policy fragmentation, clearly defined tasks were assigned to departments and specialised agencies. This led to considerable nervousness within the various administrations about the division of these tasks and responsibilities. The OVAM management was concerned about the assignment of the competence ‘prevention of waste’, because existing activities on eco-efficiency and eco-design need not strictly be classified as belonging to a waste

27 management agency. In mutual agreement with the cabinet of the minister of the environment, it was suggested that OVAM be assigned a new task, alternately called “stock management” and “resource flow management”, which would include prevention. Nobody really knew what the exact meaning of these new terms was, but they were picked up from the above- mentioned scientific report of De Jonge (2003) that was written as a preparatory study for the Environmental Policy Plan 2003-2007. An interviewee recalls that: “Frank Parent 11 was concerned that the BBB reform would lead to the loss of the competence ‘prevention of waste’, a concern that was apparently shared by the cabinet of the Minister. The head of cabinet opened up the report of De Jonge and encountered the term ‘resource flow management’. This seemed an appropriate steppingstone so as not to lose prevention”. (civil servant)

In the following months, OVAM official Walter Tempst prepared a note in which he suggested to interpret the new terms as “materials policy” and to reformulate the new task as “development and management of the subsystem materials”. Tempst was one of the civil servants who had visited Jan Rotmans at ICIS and who had become intrigued by the concept of transition management and its potential for policy innovation. During 2004, under his impulse OVAM ordered an internal study from ICIS Maastricht because TM seemed a good framework for thinking about the long-term policy development of OVAM. In this study (Loorbach 2004, Loorbach et al. 2004), the concepts of transitions and the approach of transition management were defined as promising concepts for OVAM to tackle sustainable materials management. In an advisory note for the Board of Directors of OVAM, these conclusions were extensively linked to the new OVAM tasks under the BBB reorganisation of the Flemish administration. Initiating and supporting the transition were defined as possible tasks for OVAM. In June 2004 the Board adopted the conclusions of the report, and even though there were some controversies about the necessity of starting a transition process, OVAM officials were commissioned in 2005 to start working on a transition arena. This would eventually evolve into Plan C.

4.1.2. Phase 1: The transition arena Plan C, June 2006 – May 2007

So, three interconnected developments converged that made the start of the Plan C process possible: internal reflections within OVAM on the developments of waste policy, the opportunity created by the BBB administrative reform to fill in a new task on ‘resource flow management’ for OVAM, and the developments in environmental policy to start experimenting with new policy approaches. After the OVAM Board of Directors permitted to set up a transition process, OVAM officials started the preparation mid 2005 with the selection of two consultant agencies (Resource Analysis, Pantopicon) to coach the process. These first screen potential Flemish participants from business, knowledge institutions and ngo’s. Early 2006, two group discussions are organised around the theme ‘broadening waste policy to materials policy’ and the participants that seem most interesting and forward- looking are asked to participate in the first transition arena. There is some contingency in this selection, “although we prepared it, the selection was not that methodical”, according to one of the interviewees: some people do not find themselves capable enough or have no time, others are stumbled upon more or less by accident, but in the end a balanced group of fifteen people is composed, from government, business, academia, consultants and ngo’s, with backgrounds in amongst other things materials, waste, chemicals, environment, consumer

11 At the time, Frank Parent was administrator-general of OVAM.

28

Figure 4. A reconstruction of the Plan C process. Underneath the time line, the picture shows the main events such as transition arena’s and conferences. Above the time line, it shows important elements of the process (such as the policy bodies, strategic discussions, consultants) and elements of the Flemish policy context (such as environmental and socio-economic policy of the Flemish government). See the text for details.

29 affairs, distribution and innovation. In transition management terminology: the group consists almost entirely of forward-looking regime players. In line with TM theory, they are also asked to participate as individuals and not as representatives of their organisations.

In June 2006, the arena is officially installed. The representative of the Minister of the Environment and the Administrator-General of OVAM address the participants and urge them to develop a long-term transition vision for sustainable materials management that can also be translated in short-term actions. In September 2006, the transition arena meets for the first working meeting. Karel Van Acker (materials scientist from KU Leuven) and Paul De Bruycker (industrial waste group Indaver) are chosen as presidents. OVAM has also reserved a limited budget for two experts in groups dynamics and multi-party collaboration (prof. Tharsi Taillieu, Marc Craps) to follow the process, draw lessons and when needed give advice on how to conduct the process. The management and coaching of the process is done by a transition secretariat made up of the consultants, OVAM officials (with Walter Tempst as central figure), the process experts and one of the presidents (Van Acker). Except for the president, these people try to stay clear from substantive discussions during the arena meetings, so as not to mix different roles. “This was one of the lessons learned from the DuWoBo transition process: you create an enormous confusion when you wear two hats”, according to an interviewee.

The working pace is high: the transition arena meets five times between September 2006 and January 2007. The meetings start from a preliminary system analysis, prepared by the consultants, which could partly benefit from the work that had been done almost two years earlier by Loorbach et al. (2004). The analysis is thoroughly discussed during the first two meetings of the transition arena. Problems identified include the environmental consequences of current production and consumption patterns, growing scarcity of resources and materials, social effects of these patterns, unequal North-South distribution, and the current culture of spending. These trends undermine welfare worldwide and necessitate the search for radical changes in the system of material use and management.

Then the group moves on to the formulation of a future vision of sustainable material use (the term leitbild is used), selecting key themes on which to focus in Flanders, defining solutions and identifying levers for change. The leitbild sketches an image of how the Flemish society should ideally deal with resources and materials. “Central in this picture of the future is a high-grade closing of the material loops . We will not use less material products, but the new resources needed have to decrease drastically. This can be realized either by closing the loop in the biosphere and/or in the technosphere” (Van Acker 2009). Society will handle resources, materials and energy responsibly and with care, and resources and materials will be regarded as common goods. Materials are managed and controlled over the whole of the life cycle in cooperating networks or clusters of producers, processing companies and consumers. The materials system will function as a subsystem of a service economy: people do no longer measure their happiness on the basis of the property of material products, but on access to services that are embedded in the social and natural environment. Flanders is a trend setter in material management, with a high level of knowledge about wise material use and the development of new materials and services. These developments also offer new opportunities for the Flemish economy as the cradle of sustainable material management.

The leitbild is more or less finished in January 2007. According to TM theory, the challenge is now to open up the original transition arena and invite new participants to align themselves with the process. The original arena members, as well as the consultants and OVAM draw on their networks to create this broadened arena. In order to facilitate discussions with the broadened group and to be able to start working groups that can develop transition pathways, the leitbild is made more concrete in the definition of five key themes for change. The transition arena defines these rather roughly. It is the task of the working groups to develop them further, to translate them into transition paths and then start formulating projects/experiments. The five themes around which working groups will be formed, are: • Smart Closing of Cycles : materials are managed as common property. Closing of circles becomes possible thanks to intelligent infrastructures which facilitate material flows. • Tailor-made Materials : access to materials is guaranteed, but this is only possible when materials and products are drastically renewed (made from renewables, multifunctional and flexible in usage, easy to disassemble and to reuse or recycle, intelligent materials). • At Your Service : people do not measure quality of life on the basis of property, but on the basis of access to services. A service economy develops with completely new type of companies. New functions and services are integrated in products. • Alert Public : consumers take on responsibility for their consumption choices and take conscious and informed decisions. They evolve from unconcerned choosing towards conscious caring. • Green Synthetics : an important Flemish industrial sector which makes use of new opportunities to become market leader in sustainable synthetics.

4.1.3. Phase 2: Broadening and deepening Plan C, May 2007 – May 2008

After finishing the leitbild in January, it takes a few months to mobilise the networks of the different arena members and to compose the broadened arena. In May 2007, about 60 persons meet in Leuven, where the original arena members introduce the new members to the work that has been done and invite them to participate in one of the five working groups. In a video message for the broadened transition arena, Kris Peeters, the Minister of the Environment, tells the participants that they “are part of a unique process. You are offered a refuge to search, experiment and learn. Alternative, innovative solutions that contribute to sustainable management of materials in Flanders are central to this (…) We urgently need a radical alternative. A Plan B seems a logical name for this new step in the process. But we are more ambitious. We are convinced that we have to think further, dare to do more and that’s why we go for a Plan C” .

The working groups are mostly headed by members of the original arena and start meeting on a regular basis until autumn 2007. Their first task is to flesh out detailed transition pathways for their themes: describe the desired future in a transition image and describe the transition pathway, the necessary steps between the current situation and that future. During two meetings in autumn 2007, the working groups present their first work to each other. In particular the meeting in October 2007 in the conference room of the Flemish Parliament is very lively and draws a lot of participants from business. At the end of the meeting, the new Minister of the Environment, Hilde Crevits, promises that the Flemish government will keep on investing in the process, while pointing out that a larger budget will be necessary to keep the process going. She also calls on other parties involved in the process to make explicit how they will translate the necessary changes in their own organisation.

The coordination and management of the process has meanwhile been transferred to a Task Force. This Task Force is essentially a merger of most members of the original arena with the presidents of the working groups and it is meant to make it easier for the transition secretariat

31 to keep an overview of the process, and to watch over the coherence between the vision developed in the original transition arena and the work in the working groups. In the Spring of 2008, the Task Force develops a mission statement for the Plan C network with high expectations for the process. Within 5 years, by 2013, the network should have become the reference in Flanders for sustainable material management, with a portfolio of 20 talked-about transition experiments, of which at least half have been initiated by private actors. By then, Plan C should succeed in creating societal awareness for a materials transition, realise some institutional changes that support self-organisation of the process and Plan C should have become an esteemed partner in European and international networks (Van Lieshout 2008). . Simultaneously, the working groups continue their work and try to define transition experiments that fit into the pathways. By May 2008, all working groups have succeeded in defining five transition pathways with 33 experiments linked to them. During a new collective meeting of all working groups in Leuven, the results are presented and discussed. At the beginning of the meeting, all participants get a document on paper of almost 185 pages, entitled the Reference document , that contains the system analysis, the leitbild, a mission statement, and the written down transition pathways and experiments. The Reference document is meant as an internal working document, later to be developed in different communication products. Apart from the substantive discussion that confirms the results so far, the meeting also devotes times to how the arena members evaluate the status of Plan C as a network. The meeting supports the mission statement of the Reference document.

During the meeting in May 2008, the administrator-general of OVAM declares that Plan C is very important for her organisation in terms of broadening the scope of work and for networking with innovative actors, but she also wishes for deliverance of concrete results and successes after the phase of envisioning. Plan C will get further support until half 2009, but she calls on other parties to contribute as well in order to transform plan C into an independent network of excellence

4.1.4. Phase 3: Going public and defining a business plan, May 2008 – early 2009

With a complete transition agenda (vision, pathways, experiments) and support from the arena members for the mission of Plan C, the time is ripe to go public and present the work and the process to the public. In October 2008, the Plan C network goes public and presents its results to an audience of around 120 participants from different sectors. The moment is also used to collect new ideas for experiments and to connect people, organisations or companies. This results in a new series of ideas, but “entrepreneurs” who can really initiate experiments are difficult to find. The participation of companies is relatively low and by now, the network seems to consist more of “thinkers” and “networkers” than of “doers”.

Meanwhile, the Task Force is confronted with a series of tasks such as the development of a strategy for further extension of the network, the development of criteria for good transition experiments and the start-up of experiments. The process management becomes time consuming and the first members of the original arena drop out, often due to time constraints. Within the group, differences of opinion exist on the strategy that should be followed: concentrate mainly on further development of the vision and set up of experiments, or devote most time to organisation development. During these months, the Task Force has a series of discussions on criteria for projects and experiments, but most energy goes into the

32 development of a business plan for Plan C. With the business plan, the network wants to develop a governance structure that is able to function as a motor, a source of inspiration and a coach for far-reaching innovations in materials management. An important concern is to develop an organisation with a lot of flexibility and speed in decision making in order to be able to easily adapt to ongoing change processes. During the discussions in the Task Force, the conviction has grown that therefore it is necessary to develop Plan C as an autonomous network, which in point of fact means that it is not dominated by a government actor such as OVAM, nor by other institutional actors (such as companies). The draft business plan states that “Plan C is made up of active individuals, for Plan C departs from individual engagement instead of representativeness. Preferably, these individuals are (formally) backed-up by their organisations. This means that all members of the network, out of their individual involvement, also ensure to watch over the autonomous course of Plan C. Plan C is a self- organising network that offers a platform for radical renewal” (unpublished document). The business plan also poses that Plan C does not have the ambition to act as a financing mechanism for experiments, but that the network wants to work towards cooperation and a consultation platform with existing funding channels. The label “Plan C experiment” should become recognised as a value-added in evaluation procedures for funding.

4.1.5. Phase 4: Trying to develop along several lines, early 2009 – mid 2011

The fourth phase of Plan C starts early 2009. Between early 2009 and mid 2011, two main and difficult tasks have characterised the Plan C process. The first is getting experiments off the ground: selecting suitable ideas, developing a methodology to bring these ideas to the stage of an actual experiment, finding funding and partners to start the experiments. The second task is developing a suitable governance structure for an autonomous Plan C, convincing actors to step into the new organisation, and finding financial means for the daily activities of the new structure. Several elements mark the beginning of this phase: the administrator-general of OVAM who announces the start of the autonomy process, the appointment of a new consultant, and the instalment of a provisional structure that has to guide the process through the interim stage to full autonomy.

For this provisional structure, the former coordinating body (the Task Force) is abandoned and replaced by two complementary bodies: the Strategisch Comité Organisatie Ontwikkeling (SCOO – strategic committee for organisation development) and the Strategisch Comité Inhoudelijke Afstemming (SCIA – strategic committee for substantive coordination). SCOO becomes responsible for the development of a new business plan and the preparation of all necessary steps towards an autonomous organisation. SCIA becomes responsible for the further realization of the transition vision through setting up of experiments. A new consultant, i-propeller, is selected to support the work of these two bodies and to develop a series of activities along these two paths. The start of the new structure also leads to further drop-outs of original arena members in the decision-making bodies, but a few new members enter; no business representatives remain.

The process of organisation development

2009 starts with a “2009 kick-off meeting” in January at the OVAM offices in Mechelen where the administrator-general of OVAM formally announces the start of the autonomy process. Over the following two years, the different aspects of this process will absorb

33 considerable time of the members of the SCOO and from mid 2010 onwards also from the SCIA. Two main questions guide the work: first, which juridical structure fits the new organisation best and what is it relation with government authorities? Second, what will the business plan of the new organisation consist of in terms of members, funding and activities?

On the juridical front, a legal consultant (Stibbe) is contracted to help analyse different possibilities. After a comparison of different legal forms, the decision is taken to develop the autonomous Plan C as a so-called vzw structure (non-profit association). The most difficult puzzle to solve is how government bodies (such as OVAM itself) should be involved. On the one hand, Plan C members do not want to be dominated by government actors and want to develop a flexible organisation, but Plan C is also in need of a stable source of funding and this can be provided by government. On the other hand, although OVAM supports autonomy, internally in OVAM discussions start about its own involvement because it does not just want to loose all control and let Plan C drift away. In the discussions during the months that follow the idea of a double structure arises.

On the one hand, the vzw Plan C is intended to group the existing actor network, with the organisations of the original arena as founding members. This switch from individuals to organisations as members is meant to strengthen the legitimacy of the vzw Plan C , while it also opens possibilities for developing an income model for the vzw. The core business of the vzw Plan C is further development and dissemination of the vision, definition and management of experiments, maintenance and animation of the learning network. Financial receipts will come from member contributions and specific support and consultancy of innovation trajectories with members. This should allow for the appointment of an operational director. The proposed business plan departs from a yearly budget of around 200.000 Euro.

On the other hand, the involvement of different public authorities and administrations is meant to be coordinated in a legal structure called Eigen Vermogen Plan C , which will be added to OVAM. The core business of this structure is the support of the Plan C network, through process support and facilitation of organisational matters. Participating authorities will group their financial contributions in the Eigen Vermogen Plan C , thus allowing for the employment of several people that will be at the service of the vzw . The structure Eigen Vermogen will become a member of the vzw Plan C, with OVAM as its representative. In this way, the government will be on equal footing with other members of the vzw Plan C, as one of a series of members. The proposed business plan for the EV departs from a yearly budget of around 465.000 Euro.

Obviously, the coordination and arrangements between the two organisations will be of crucial importance: the vzw Plan C is meant to take the lead and define the strategic objectives, while the Eigen Vermogen is supposed to aid in the implementation of the plans. A memory of understanding between the two organisations should put the cooperation on the right road.

In the autumn of 2010, the implementation of the revised European Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) opens up a possibility to give this double structure a legal basis. The Minister of the Environment and OVAM propose to translate the directive into a Materials Decree, instead of a Waste Decree, thus taking it a few steps further than strictly demanded in the Directive 12 . As part of this orientation, the proposal of Materials Decree also provides for

12 See 5.2. and 5.3. for more details on this evolution.

34 the double structure vzw Plan C / Eigen Vermogen Plan C. However, this part of the proposal encounters opposition from the Financial Inspector of the Flemish government, and thus also from the Minister for Budget. They state that the proposal for an Eigen Vermogen looks like an unnecessary proliferation of public bodies. The advice is to bring the proposal more in line with the principles of the BBB-reform of the Flemish administration (see also infra 4.1.1.) and to investigate whether the institutions created during this reform are not better suited as legal structure. Early 2011, Plan C and OVAM make a comparison of different alternative structures with support of legal consultant Stibbe. They conclude that, although typical BBB- structures such as IVA’s and EVA’s 13 are not to be excluded as legal structure, the Eigen Vermogen structure is best suited for Plan C’s ambitions, mainly because of its higher flexibility in seeking cooperation with the vzw Plan C.

Several advisory councils pronounce themselves in favour of the inclusion of Plan C in the Materials Decree, although they are not always explicit about the legal structure. The VRWI 14 advice does not mention the legal structure. The SERV/MINA 15 advice mentions the need for a specific, suited structure for transition processes, but does not make an explicit choice, seemingly due to lack of information on the exact consequences. In a remarkable advice from the advisory council on administrative matters (VLABEST, Vlaamse adviesraad voor bestuurszaken) it is stated that the council regrets the fact that a structure outside BBB is chosen, but VLABEST understands the motivation for the choice because “new societal challenges, in particular in the field of sustainability, require a policy domain exceeding approach (…) Such new policy challenges demand flexible frames for policy support and financing (…) These possibilities do not exist in the current BBB Decree and they oblige sectoral policy domains to set up legal structures that are strange to BBB. Consequently, the BBB-structure has to be broken up so as to be able to embed the way of dealing with this complex problem in a legal structure that provides space for flexibility, experiment and the contribution of different partners” (VLABEST 2011, p. 2).

When the Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe brings the proposal of Materials Decree to the government’s table on 24 June 2011, the Eigen Vermogen Plan C has been removed from the Decree. The opposition within the government coalition of the N-VA ministers 16 could not be overcome: they stuck to the view that the EV would have created a kind of shadow agency outside the BBB-structures and that this was not in line with government policy for the development of its public administration. An additional argument was that such a construct could also possibly circumvent the stop in recruitment of personnel that the Flemish government approved of. Instead of a formal legal structure such as the EV, the Materials Decree now contains a Chapter 6 that a installs a cooperation between OVAM, the departments EWI and DAR, and VITO 17 . OVAM takes the presidency of the new cooperation; other government agencies can later be included. The cooperation has three tasks: operational support for Plan C (but in principle also other organisations with a similar goal can be

13 IVA’s are internal autonomous agencies (Intern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap), EVA’s are external autonomous agencies (Extern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap). 14 VRWI, Flemish Council for Science and Innovation (Vlaamse Raad voor Wetenschap en Innovatie) 15 SERV, the Socio-Economic Council Flanders (Socio-Economische Raad Vlaanderen) and the MINA council, the Environment and Nature Council (Milieu- en Natuurraad Vlaanderen), wrote a common advice. 16 N-VA, Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie, one of the three government parties in the Flemish Government. 17 EWI, department Economy, Science and Innovation (departement Economie, Wetenschap en Innovatie); DAR, Services of General Government Policy (Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid), is the administration that is directly accountable to the Minister-President. DAR contains a Cell Sustainable Development that is involved in the Plan C process and that also provides a partial funding (see 4.2.4.). VITO is the Flemish Institute for Technological Research (Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek).

35 supported), stimulating information exchange and cooperation between government agencies with similar goals, and participating in projects where the expertise of OVAM and the other agencies can be useful. to coordinate the government agencies and the government funding. At the moment of finishing this paper (October 2011) OVAM and the Plan C SCIA are still discussing the way forward (see also 4.1.6.).

The process of developing and starting experiments

As described above, by the end of 2008 the Plan C process had produced a problem analysis of the current waste and materials system, a leitbild for a more sustainable materials system, different transition pathways towards this vision, and a lot of proposals for experiments. A first series of ideas for experiments was delivered by the working groups in May 2008; an additional series of proposals was gathered during the public presentation in October 2008. Under impulse of the new consultant i-propeller, the substantive work now focuses on selecting the best and most mature ideas, finding suitable partners to help execute the ideas, and turning them into transition experiments. Over the course of two years, different initiatives are developed to bring the process further. While in phase 1 and particularly in phase 2, part of the work (such as writing texts, organising meetings and discussions) was done by the participants themselves, most of it is now taken over by the consultant.

First, a methodology is developed to bring ideas to the stage of a feasible experiment. The methodology starts with a visioning workshop where the original idea is further elaborated. The workshop has the ambition to build a broad coalition around the idea by bringing together participants from business, research, design, public authorities, social movements. In a next step, a planning workshop develops an action plan and works towards a collective contract in which the initiator, other participants and Plan C engage in a cooperative partnership to realise the experiment. In a third step, the partnership assembles all necessary resources and makes sure all preconditions are fulfilled to start the experiment. Finally, the experiment is set up, striving for a ‘proof of concept’ that the experiment may be marketable. From step 3 onwards, experiments-in-development would also be allowed to carry a ‘Plan C label’. During 2009, this methodology is developed by coaching four project ideas (chemical leasing, leasing of comfort, sustainable festivals, closing of local production and consumption loops through 3D- printing). However, it is difficult to bring the ideas further than step 1 or 2 and deliver a label. Still, in 2011 the chemical leasing and the comfort leasing idea are translated in proposals for MIP3-projects 18 by different consortia. Only the chemical leasing project is approved (as the TABACHEM project – Take Back Chemicals). In spite of the non-approval of comfort leasing, plans remain to further develop the idea. Meanwhile, also a project on enhanced landfill mining (Jones et al. 2010) is labelled as a Plan C transition experiment, although it did not follow the methodology.

This is related to the fact that during the coaching of these projects, the impression grows that the TM-logic of vision-pathways-experiments follows a too causal innovation trajectory, while the problem of transition innovation is its unpredictability and uncontrollability. I- propeller therefore starts experimenting with what they call “an effectual innovation strategy”: “Instead of the causal approach of transition innovation where one establishes first a transition

18 MIP (Milieu- en energietechnologie Innovatie Platform - the environmental and energy technology innovation platform) is a funding programme that was launched in October 2010 and that provides 5 million Euro for research institutes and companies that want to develop sustainable technologies and products. See also part 5.5. for MIP.

36 vision for an experiment, a transition path and, finally, defines a concrete transition experiment, the effectual approach starts with the means present in its coalition (…) The consequence of the effectual approach is that the paths to entrepreneurial transition success expand in the future rather than converge (one-to-many, in contrast to causation’s many-to- one approach towards ‘the goal’)” (Paredis et al. 2010, 236). The methodology thus becomes “radical bottom-up” and leads to a series of so-called ‘ideation’ sessions throughout 2010 and 2011 where stakeholders are gathered around a theme that is relevant for the Plan C vision, and where coalitions are sought to bring experiments to life. But despite interesting sessions with a number of new people that are involved, the step towards entrepreneurial action remains a problem.

Second, in parallel to the methodology development, i-propeller is also commissioned to develop several on-line tools. One is an internal workplace, a ‘virtual office’, where documents can be posted and shared, experiments coordinated and managed, visions discussed. Another is an idea management system, that allows to list ideas, connect between people with comparable ideas and also to score ideas according to a list of criteria based on the Plan C vision.

Furthermore, thanks to additional funding from the division of sustainable development (part of the DAR, Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid ), it becomes possible in 2011 to develop two more projects. One is mainly devoted to communication, with more active development of the public website ( www.plan-c.eu ), a Twitter account and a LinkedIn group, which had around 300 followers by June 2011. The second is an attempt, in cooperation with the ngo Netwerk Bewust Verbruiken, at examining the possibilities of developing consumer experiments, in follow-up of the earlier working group around the transition pathway Alert Public.

In the course of 2009, an opportunity had already presented itself to attract funding through a common project with the other Flemish TM-process DuWoBo. Under the European EFRO- program a project gets approved to develop common instruments to upscale experiments and position them as part of the growing green economy and clean technology sector. This ISSI- project (‘Innovation System for System Innovation’) makes it possible during 2010-2011 to test the methodology in several thematic stakeholder workshops, to connect with and visit other existing Flemish innovation networks (‘ISSI on tour’) and to organise an ‘ISSI Academy’ to exchange on methodology development and application with diverse innovation networks. These different activities attract new people and form a basis on which new projects can grow.

Apart from all the work on experiments and network building, Plan C also undertook a few attempts at positioning itself in the Flemish innovation landscape, and in particular at presenting itself as an interesting partner in the so-called Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA – Flanders in Action) project. ViA is an ambitious program of the Flemish government to rejuvenate the Flemish economy and society and position Flanders in the top 5 of Europe by 2020: make it more competitive, growth-oriented and technologically at the front of Europe, but also greener and more social. In a position paper for ViA in Octobre 2009, Plan C asserts that it can fulfil a role in the breakthroughs that are envisaged by ViA, not only through its leitbild and assorted pathways and experiments, but also because of its systemic approach to societal problems and its experience with new forms of governance. The interaction with the ViA- process never fully develops, but when in the Spring of 2011 all Flemish Ministers have to propose one “flagship initiative” for the ViA-process, the Minister of the Environment proposes the theme of sustainable materials management. This results in a Round Table on

37 Sustainable Materials Management (6 June 2011) where government, industry, knowledge centres and other stakeholders discuss a whole series of aspects of the shift to a materials economy (see also 5.2.2.) During the Round Table, Plan C tried to underline its position as an innovation partner by presenting an ambitious new project, iMade. Its goal is to turn Flanders into the first experimental garden worldwide of local custom-made production, using 3D- printing and rapid manufacturing.

4.1.6. Standstill or take-off: mid 2011 – … ?

The account of phase 4 shows that a series of different steps and activities were taken to further develop the Plan C process, on the organisational level as well as on the substantive level. Still, by mid 2011, the feeling prevailed with SCIA members that a crucial time had arrived. If the autonomy process did not succeed and if no structural funding became available, it would be very hard to keep the process alive. The prevailing analysis is that the informality of the network has become an obstacle for further development, on the one hand because it hinders ownership of the process and in that way undermines the responsibility for the dynamics of the network. On the other hand because the informality and the associated lack of a legal structure also hinders the acquisition of stable funding. As mentioned above, the original arena members have been asked to persuade their organisations to become founding members of the new vzw Plan C . These contacts have clarified, however, that such an engagement in a new structure is dependent on how the public authorities will organise themselves. An Eigen Vermogen structure would have stabilised the government involvement in a legal structure and provided a stable funding base. However, as seen above, this structure has not been approved by the government and has been removed from the Materials Decree. Instead, a form of cooperation has been inscribed in the Decree that starts with OVAM, the innovation department EWI, the general policy department DAR and the technology institute VITO. In a later stage, other government agencies may join in.

At the moment of finishing this report, the implications of this decision still have to crystallize out. First, it has to be clarified what the implications are for the different government agencies and for the form their cooperation will take. During the summer 2011, OVAM has invited the other institutes to discuss three concrete tasks for the cooperation: operational support of Plan C (including personnel and finance), deliberation about the participation of government agencies in the Round Table on Sustainable Materials Management that was installed in June 2011 (see 5.2.2.), and the follow-up of the new scientific Research Centre on Sustainable Materials Management that will start in January 2012 (see 5.5.). Negotiations are still ongoing. Second, there are the implications for the willingness of societal actors to participate in a vzw Plan C . Also here, negotiations are ongoing.

4.2. The characteristics of Plan C as a policy arrangement

Until now, I have presented a history of the TM process Plan C on the basis of the main events since the first preparations of the process in 2003-2004. This gives some idea of the dynamics, potential and problems of the Plan C process. Still, this is only part of the story and it is necessary to go beyond this description to better understand the position of Plan C and its potential role and influence as a TM process in a quickly changing policy context. As said above, a TM process such as Plan C can be framed as a policy niche, set up alongside regular policies, with the ambition of introducing a new style and practice of governance that aims for

38 innovation in the policy field on the level of substance as well as organisation. The different dimensions of the policy arrangement approach then allow us to describe in more detail the policy characteristics of Plan C. The following analysis remains largely restricted to the inner workings of Plan C, while part 5 delves deeper into its relation with regime policies and the broader political and societal context.

4.2.1. Discourse

Plan C was introduced as a process that should contribute to a reorientation of waste policy towards sustainable materials policy. The discourse dimension defines the substantive side of this renewal. An analysis of the problem analysis, the leitbild and the transition pathways of Plan C that were developed in phase 1 and 2 (between September 2006 and May 2008) shows that these can be characterised as a mixture of what can be called ‘ecological modernisation’ elements and ‘transformation’ elements. Ecological modernisation has confidence in reaching a more sustainable society through market mechanisms, technological innovation, industry. Typical ecological modernisation elements of the Plan C discourse include: getting the prices right, fast technology development and diffusion, new types of materials and products (renewable, reusable, modular), product-service combination, closed materials loops, not less consumption but better consumption, strategic availability of resources for the Flemish economy, Flanders as expertise centre in sustainable materials management. Some elements of the leitbild refer to more radical change and can be characterised as ‘transformational’: they require changes in the economic and power structures of our society and also in cultural attitudes (Hopwood et al. 2005, Paredis 2010, Crivits et al. 2010). Elements of this transformational vision include: materials as a commons with new property regimes, integrity and common responsibility for materials, materials and technology development as functional for societal needs, absolute decoupling of economic growth from resource use, common knowledge infrastructure, no social or ecological burden shifting worldwide. Parts of the discourse also refer to new governance models that should build on “synergetic interaction” between government, companies, science and society.

Bouwen et al. (s.d.), who studied the group dynamics during phase 1 and 2, find that in the formulation of the leitbild “there is a careful crafting of a shared image, so that as much elements as possible could be included”. However, “the ultimate discussion between radical societal reform versus innovative industrial flexibility as mechanisms to reach material management sustainability went under-explored. Most participants expressed their regret of this afterward” (p. 11). This becomes a pattern in the following months. Because the process has to constantly move forward and show interim results, there is a lack of time and space to discuss fundamental differences. At the end of 2008, the substantive part of the discussion process was temporarily “frozen” in order to be able to move to the phase of experiments and organisation development. People who join in during phase 2, 3 and 4 are asked to brainstorm on ideas that can further develop the formulated pathways and experiments, but the essence of the vision is fixed.

Currently, several interviewees express this as a problem and it also surfaced as an issue during the feedback seminar on interim results of this research (14/03/11). In 2007-2008, Plan C was at the front of the discussion on materials, but things have changed rapidly since then. More and more companies, in particular multinationals, have become aware of the pivotal role materials, strategic materials availability and the environmental impact of materials are going to play in the next decennia and are adjusting their strategies accordingly. The European

39 Commission is quickly launching new initiatives around resource efficiency, raw materials and ecodesign. The OECD is also working on sustainable materials management. The discourse of ‘green economy’ and ‘low carbon economy’ is rapidly gaining ground and seems to become one of the spearheads of innovation worldwide. Several involved actors seem to think that if Plan C wants to preserve a place in this rapidly moving environment, it will have to reposition itself and create a more distinct profile for itself 19 , and more in particular, it will have to be able to translate the vision to concrete actions. “What I find positive about Plan C is that it has developed a good vision, it’s relatively strong with good concepts, but I’m not sure Plan C will be able to realise its vision because the business sector is absent. (…) the big problem is that you need a translation from vision to concrete actions, and that’s not self- evident (…) You can have a beautiful vision but if you don’t know how to get there and through which initiatives, you get stuck. A vision can be confronting and can encourage people to think (…) but momentarily, it doesn’t have enough links to reality, because Plan C does not have enough information about the economic reality.” (societal actor)

“We are convinced that a reflection process that is somewhat detached from daily discussions is meaningful (…) we accept that it is sometimes a bit far from our reality, it is very fundamental, but that’s not the problem as such. Sometimes it is necessary to start thinking this way. Still, a second remark is that we have the feeling that consciously one does not want to make the link with daily practice.” (societal actor)

At least part of the problem seems to be a lack of people, time and resources to move ahead and proof how transition experiments work in practice (see also 4.2.4.). But the problem is more subtle. The TM-approach uses a discourse on transition experiments that characterises experiments as projects contributing to the societal challenge of transition, with high potential but also high risk, and with learning as a central goal. However, “It is difficult to explain what transition experiments are exactly, what they have more to offer than the innovation projects that are already being supported. Of course there are differences: what we try to do, starts from a common vision or leitbild, while innovation in Flanders strongly builds on bottom-up without any guidance. Another point is that the level of risk is very high, which they find difficult to cope with, because one wants to see results: how much Euro does it yield within the one or two years? And the more societal aspects are also integrated in a project, for which we do not really have tools to bring them into account. That’s something you see a lot less in current projects, that’s all very technologic and economic.” (knowledge actor)

Over the last two years, Plan C has taken two courses to cope with the problem of translating long-term vision into short-term action. First, there is an attempt during 2009-2010 at developing the experiment methodology in such a way that, after a project has gone through several steps, it can gain a label ‘Plan C experiment’. Such a label is meant to be a quality mark with which companies or organisations can show their commitment to system innovation and/or that might give them some extra access to subsidy channels. The idea is that Plan C offers this methodology to interested companies and coaches them in the development of the experiment. However, as mentioned above, it is difficult to coach projects through these

19 For the role that the Plan C discourse itself may have played in some of these evolutions, I refer to part 5.

40 different stages and in practice the label has not yet been used. Furthermore, some SCIA- members doubt the relevance and usefulness of this line of label development. They propose a more pragmatic approach where Plan C tries to align itself to ongoing or starting projects, such as in the context of the MIP3 Fund 20 .

“[The Plan C experiment approach] is a lot of effort for too few results (…). While MIP gets 12 applications for research projects and 30 for feasibility studies, Plan C keeps on thinking about how are we going to generate ideas, and what are the criteria for fixing a Plan C label to it, and watch out ! – if it does not pass the whole circuit, we are not going to give this label. Then I think “come on, guys, go to MIP” and use of course your criteria list, but those projects that fit the vision, why don’t you connect to them (…) I see a knot in too much sticking to principles of ‘we must let our own ideas grow into experiments’ (…) It is a rather protectionist vision, it can only be Plan C if it fits our criteria” (knowledge actor).

A second course for coping with the problem of relation between long-term vision and short- term practice shows a partial shift in discourse, with more emphasis on the process aspects of Plan C and TM instead of on the substantive aspects of the vision. Here, Plan C tries to position itself as a process that has a unique expertise and the methodology for generating, selecting and developing ideas towards marketable experiments and projects. This is most visible in the initiative ISSI Academy , where under impulse of consultant i-propeller, the two TM-networks Plan C and DuWoBo present their approach to other innovation networks and exchange experiences with them. The three Academies organised in the Spring of 2011 generated quite some interest from other networks and received positive comments.

4.2.2. Actors

Transition theory usually draws a sharp distinction between regimes and competing niches, and their respective actors. The Plan C case shows how the central government actor in waste policy, OVAM, initiates the transition process. The regime actor creates the policy niche and strategically uses it: on the one hand to help revive and reorient its own policies, on the other hand to try and initiate a broader innovation movement around materials, with new networking with actors that may become essential in the future materials economy. “That’s an added value of Plan C, because without Plan C some of these contacts would not have existed. It does not only create more contacts with the business world and ngo’s, but also between public services. It’s a kind of meeting place for people that look and think forward, also within government (…) I think that OVAM will have to make maximum use of Plan C as a network, in order to find partners that want to go further than current policies.” (civil servant)

The transition arena of Plan C that was composed in 2006 consisted of mainly forward- looking regime players. Between 2006 and 2008, this group succeeded in creating a dynamic process and engaging around 60 people that enthusiastically shared in the work of visioning, formulating transition pathways and experiments. This broader group consisted of representatives from government, business, science, ngo’s. People from labour unions were not present. Already during 2008, however, the group starts falling apart. One of TM’s ideas – that the enthusiasm and the alignment of visions is enough to create a self-organising process

20 See footnote 18 and part 5.5.

41 – does not seem to work from that point onwards. Different priorities and different strategies of members become visible. Some think Plan C has a technocratic edge to it, and they want to devote more time to civil society networks that act as a countervailing power to current policies 21 . Others can reserve time in their agendas only as long as the potential added value of Plan C is obvious for them. In particular business representatives seem to have a problem here after 2008. Throughout the whole Plan C process, there seems to be a lack of entrepreneurial actors that can take the process beyond the stadium of ideas for experiments. “We created a momentum with industry during 2007, but seemed to lose it during 2008. I find it difficult to say what the exact problem was, a lack of action and a lack of a clear business case that led to questions about added value (…) At a certain moment, the question becomes ‘do I need Plan C for what I want to do?’” (societal actor).

Most interviewees agree that since 2009 it is difficult to speak of a stable actor coalition and/or lead actors that actively take the process forward. Without the involvement of OVAM and the activities of the consultant i-propeller, the process would probably have been very low profile over the last two years. Internal documents that argue for the creation of an independent vzw Plan C speak of “an untenable situation. Lack of ownership through informality undermines the responsibility for the dynamics” of the Plan C process.

Who should take the lead in the process? Different interpretations exist of the role actors are currently playing and/or should play. The ministerial cabinet takes the position that it wants to continue the Plan C process “but it has always been our point that it is not the task of the government to pay fully for such a process. It also makes no sense that the authorities would impose this from above. It’s something that has to grow from below (…) I think we waited somewhat to see: what will come out of this group? But saying ‘stop, it makes no…’ that has certainly never happened. Q: But has it been a conscious choice to say ‘we keep it somewhat experimental’? A: For me certainly, in the sense that this is not something that the government alone must do and pull forward; it has to grow bottom-up.”

This comes close to the self-organisation logic that is present in TM theory. It is also the main logic behind the autonomy process such as formulated in the business plan of the Task Force at the end of 2008. One driver for the plan was a concern for balance between different actors involved, and in particular a wariness of a too dominant position for government actors. Plan C should remain a flexible organisation that can easily adapt to new circumstances, and participants feared that government dominance might suffocate initiatives and kill creativity. On the other hand however, societal actors seem to be simultaneously looking for support, guidance and legitimacy of the process through the involvement of OVAM and the cabinet. Several interviewees express this as the responsibility of the government to guarantee a structural funding base on which the process can build. “You need that structure. According to me, we should at least expect the government to support something like that, for the simple reason that such support is about the long-term perspective of the initiative, with high societal relevance, but also with high risks. You can only do something like that when you tap a collective source of funding, and that’s the government; at least that’s my opinion.” (knowledge actor)

21 One of the results is a “transition network of civil society” that was established mid 2010.

42

The search for a suited form of interaction between government and societal actors is a leitmotiv in the process. It culminates in the proposals and discussions of the autonomy process, where the proposed solution is a double structure. The different societal actors organise themselves in a non-profit organisation vzw Plan C , while the involved government actors group themselves and their funding under a legal structure called Eigen Vermogen . This Eigen Vermogen is meant to provide a structural basis for the workings of vzw Plan C . However, as mentioned above, this form of institutionalisation has not been approved by the government. It got opposed mainly because it runs into incumbent administrative structures and procedures, in particular those installed under the BBB-reform. In its place, a more informal cooperation structure has been approved between OVAM and other government institutions. This brings some closely involved actors to the conclusion that politicians are willing to initiate and support an experiment such as Plan C, see what happens and use some of its results, but that they are unwilling to take a step that takes them beyond a business-as- usual scenario and changes established structures and procedures.

The problem of interaction between government bodies and societal actors, and the different roles they have to adapt to in processes such as TM, is also visible within OVAM itself. As mentioned in the Plan C history, the OVAM Board of Directors gave its approval for Plan C in 2004 and the transition process is mentioned in OVAM’s Strategic Plan 2005-2009. Still, for several years, it remained hard work for the proponents of Plan C within OVAM to defend the process and create room for its development. Two factors seem to play a role here. Firstly, OVAM needs other actors to make Plan C a success. This creates a tension between providing space and “letting others score points”, while simultaneously wanting to keep control over the process, making sure that results are useful for OVAM’s purposes and claiming some of the results. Secondly, the fact that a TM process is a goal-seeking process, where results cannot be defined exactly beforehand. In a rather traditional administration, in its working and accountability influenced by New Public Management principles, this leads to a lot of uncertainty about the added value of the process . “’When does it deliver concrete results?’ was internally one the most heard questions” , according to an OVAM official.

This led to a situation where at the start of the autonomy process in 2009, OVAM did not have the ambition to keep on playing a leading role in Plan C. It is only since mid 2010 that the process seems to have acquired more legitimacy within OVAM and that OVAM wants to remain in the lead. Interviewees mention different, complementary reasons for this shift in attitude. First, it has to do with a learning process about sustainable materials management within OVAM as a result of internal discussions on positioning and policy priorities during the formulation of a new Strategic Plan 2010-2014. Second, Plan C and the materials transition are mentioned in the coalition agreement of the Flemish government (2009-2014) and in the so-called Pact 2020 22 . This formal recognition raises the strategic importance of Plan C and opens up possibilities to link materials policy to the Flemish socio-economic agenda. Simultaneously, OVAM has also become aware that the input of Plan C creates possibilities on the international level, such as in EU and OECD forums (see also 5.1.2.). Third, other government actors and initiatives (such as VITO, MIP 3 and i-Cleantech 23 ), launched and supported by the domain of innovation policy, started using a transition discourse and assertively positioning themselves. This in turn led to a consciousness within

22 Pact 2020 is an agreement between the Flemish government, the socio-economic partners and the civil society to reach 20 societal objectives by 2020. 23 The i-Cleantech initiative aims at coordinating all initiatives in the Flemish cleantech sector. See also the discussion in part 5.4.

43 OVAM that it should safeguard its own accomplishments, assert its ambitions in the materials domain, and strengthen its position as a partner in innovation for a green economy. Plan C can play a role in support of this ambition.

It should be added here that the relationship with VITO – which, by the way, controls the MIP3 and i-Cleantech initiatives – has always been a cause of some tension. From the interviews, the reasons for these tensions seem to relate to a combination of a lack of understanding of each other’s objectives and roles, a lack of trust in each other’s intentions, and some personal elements. In 2005, VITO (in cooperation with DRIFT) had applied as a candidate for consultancy of the Plan C process, but this was granted to a consortium of Resource Analysis and Pantopicon 24 . VITO was no member of the first arena and only became actively involved from 2009 onwards. Even then, it had difficulty in finding its position and sensed a lack of trust in its intentions. For an important institute in the Flemish cleantech and environment sector, this seems to have been an unusual and uneasy experience. It is relatively well-known that actors outside VITO often regard the institute as a magnet that can rely on a lot of political goodwill and attention, easily succeeds in attracting funding, and thus has a position of power that makes it difficult to work with, even “arrogant”, according to some interviewees. These kind of tensions form the basis for its difficult positioning in Plan C.

4.2.3. Rules of the game

The preceding discussion of the interaction between government and the societal actors involved in Plan C can also be interpreted as a discussion over the rules of the ‘TM game’. TM defines itself as a ‘governance’ approach, where it is not the government that is steering the process, but where the government is one actor in a network of change-minded actors. What the exact relationships should be within this network is not predefined, and is in a sense a question of error and trial, although terminology such as government as ‘initiator’, ‘coordinator’, facilitator’ or ‘partner’ abound. The discussion about the autonomy process, the role of vzw and Eigen Vermogen , and the internal discussions in OVAM about its role testify to that.

Although TM does not have formal rules of how interactions should be organised, it does have some guidelines. Important guidelines (or ‘informal rules’) include: ‘work with frontrunners from niches and regime’, ‘develop and grow in the shadow of policy’, ‘develop as a network with government as one player among many’, ‘use the network, vision development and experiments to learn about direction and about what works’.

Working with frontrunners was an explicit choice of the initiators and also the minister of the environment was aware that this was a departure from the stakeholder engagement rules that are usually followed in a policy preparation process and that rely on representation of interest groups. During the installation meeting of the Plan C arena in June 2006, the representative of the Minister stated that “finding the proper discussion partners, the right participants, is a crucial part of the transition approach (…) That’s among other things the difference with thinking in terms of ‘representation structures’, which until now has usually been dominant in other processes. Status, position or representativeness is not our first concern. The idea is that a ‘commando approach’ should also be more effective: bringing together small teams

24 The first TM process in Flanders DuWoBo (in the field of housing and building) that started in 2004, was supported by a consultancy consortium consisting of two Dutch teams (TNO, DRIFT/Rotterdam University) and two Flemish teams (CDO/Ghent University, Pantopicon).

44 with people that trust each other and that succeed in combining courage and perseverance with creativity (…) Because of its ‘strike power’, this may work better than existing organisation structures”.

It is remarkable that after five years the composition of the original arena of 2006 still influences the process. An informal rule seems to be that these people and their respective organisations somehow retain a form of ownership of the process. This shows itself in the fact that the founding members of the vzw Plan C are sought within the original group, even though some participants dropped out of the process more than two years ago and even though new members entered the SCIA. The main argument is that a line has to be drawn between who is invited and who is not, and that falling back on the original composition provides the clearest decision. But this in turn causes some tension with SCIA members such as VITO, that has an important position in the Flemish innovation landscape but is not invited to serve as a founding member because it was not part of the original arena 25 .

Another informal rule concerns the relation between the TM process and regular policy. TM theory usually advises that TM processes function for some time ‘in the shadow of policy’. The hope is that this provides some mental space to think freely, not hindered by stringent deadlines and touchy political discussions. From the start, this has been one of the working principles of Plan C. During the June 2006 meeting, the representative of the then Minister of the Environment Peeters explicitly hinted at it when he declared that “there will always be pressure to present tangible results in a relative short time, or because outsiders want to interfere in the process. To keep pressure away from the transition arena the minister wants to provide space and time to deliver good work. You cannot speed up the growth of a plant by pulling it, because that’s when it breaks.” Later on, in May 2007, the Minister repeats this message in a video message, stating that participants “are offered a refuge to search, experiment and learn” (see also 4.1.3.).

Yet, currently not all interviewees are convinced that it was a good idea to stick to this strategy after 2008. With the 2008 business plan and the start of the autonomy process, the task force wanted to guard over the power balance between participants “because the fear was that if we involve the political world too early in the process, they will try to capture it, and it will overshoot the mark, and then it stops. Looking back, I think it was a mistake that we involved politicians so late in the process (…) I think we would have been more exposed to attempts at claiming Plan C. But that moment comes anyhow. I hope you don’t think that at the moment they do not try to lay their hands on it.” (knowledge actor)

One of the main challenges seems to be that it is difficult to communicate the philosophy and logics behind the whole process, in particular the interaction between government and societal actors that has grown during the process and the need for a double structure to revive the dynamics of it.

Finally, the learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning that is deemed essential in transition processes has been a point of attention from the start of Plan C. As mentioned, two scientists were engaged to document the experiences of the original transition arena and to reflect on them. The analytical framework used was based in multi-actor and inter-organizational collaboration theories (Bouwen and Taillieu 2004). This led to several interesting conference

25 It was the intention to broaden the member base immediately after the founding of the vzw during the first meeting of the Board of Directors, and to include VITO at that moment.

45 papers that were also co-authored with some of the involved participants, but the results never really served as discussion material for the group. In 2009, one of the consultants wrote a short report on the usefulness of the method of ‘learning histories’, but time and money constraints hindered further use. This seems to be a constant problem throughout the process, although it is not something that participants are unaware of. “That’s an aspect that’s been underexposed , to say it euphemistically. I think – and it is also something I hear in the political world – that we have to make analyses of what happens: what do we learn, also about regulation, the attitude of public authorities, other initiatives, and then speak out clearly, without being moralising toward policy . That’s also what is expected from us: Plan C should not be afraid to take position and make suggestions towards the government (…) But that takes time, things have to run for some time before you can start learning. But if we could do that now already, it would probably improve political goodwill” (knowledge actor).

4.2.4. Resources

I mentioned above that when the Flemish government decided in 2004 to start transition processes, these were set up as experiments in “innovative environmental policy” (Peeters 2004, p. 81). The financial means available for the two processes that started – Plan C and the housing and building process DuWoBo – have always been quite limited. In the case of Plan C: a part-time official from OVAM to support the process, and money to pay for consultants to do the daily process management and to set up activities. The yearly support is estimated at 250.000 Euro direct costs, minimum 60.000 Euro indirectly through OVAM personnel and around 25.000 Euro indirectly through personnel from other administrations. Since 2011, an additional subsidy of around 90.000 Euro is available from the division sustainable development/DAR. All other actors have been engaged in the process on a voluntary basis, often as a sideline of the activities in their jobs. This worked relatively well in phase 1 and 2 of the process when the main task was to develop a transition vision and a network that could support that vision. The results of these phases raised high expectations from participants on the substantive as well as on the process side. On the substantive side, participants hoped for a quick launch of the first experiments under the different transition pathways. On the process side, the hope was that the network would grow and turn into a dynamic and influential movement that could set the agenda for sustainable materials management. Currently, most involved actors seem to agree that the buildup of financial means since mid 2008 has been inadequate for the management of such a complex and ambitious process as Plan C.

On the management side, the operational means for maintaining daily activities and coaching the process have hardly increased, even though Plan C has become more demanding from mid 2008 onwards. It is in fact only the activity of the consultant i-propeller that keeps the process going. Finding a structural basis for operational means was the main reason behind the Eigen Vermogen Plan C construction. It should have allowed the involved government actors to group their financial contributions and in that way ensure the permanent employment of 3 to 4 civil servants. As mentioned above, the proposed business plan departed from a yearly budget of 465.000 Euro, which is more or less equal to the present government funding. The vzw Plan C hopes to gather budget of around 200.000 Euro yearly on the basis of member fees and other revenues. However, as mentioned above (4.1.6.), the Eigen Vermogen part has been ruled out by the government decision of 24 June 2011 on the Materials Decree and has been replaced by a more informal form of cooperation between OVAM, the departments EWI and

46 DAR, and VITO. What this implies for government funding and for the vzw structure is currently unclear, but negotiations are ongoing.

The complicated situation for attracting financial means is illustrated by how, since 2011, the extra funding from the division sustainable development/DAR (for the communication project and the project on consumption experiments – see 4.1.5.) reaches Plan C. The rules for funding from this division stipulate that it can only be granted to non-profit organisations, so- called vzw’s. However, as extensively discussed, Plan C still does not have the vzw statute. Consequently, it was necessary to seek cooperation with the ngo Netwerk Bewust Verbruiken (NBV) and find an agreement on how the funding could be deployed for Plan C. Part of the deal was that half of the money should be spent on the consumption theme, also the main working field of NBV.

Its operational means are limited, but Plan C does not have funding for transition experiments either. From 2008 onwards, the option has been to try to mobilise existing innovation funds. This option is in fact a necessity, because the environmental policy domain (and OVAM) does not have specific funding available for investing in transition experiments, which are essentially innovation projects. The consequence is, however, that criteria of existing innovation funds might steer potential experiments. There have been a few contacts between Plan C members and administrators of innovation funds to discuss the possibility of a specialised transition fund or specific criteria for transition experiments in existing funds, but these have not yielded results. The recently launched MIP3 Fund explicitly uses transition terminology to frame its call for projects. It does not make a difference however between ‘regular’ innovation projects and transition experiments, and it only contains ecological modernisation elements of the discourse. The lack of specific funding for experiments is by most interviewees quoted as an essential reason why business involvement has diminished after 2008. “For me, Plan C stands in relative isolation. Not because its vision is wrong, on the contrary, I find that very strong, but fundamentally the reason is that there is no funding mechanism behind it. The reason why MIP succeeds in mobilising 300 people and companies is simply because money is being distributed. That’s what attracts companies. Plan C doesn’t have that and companies come once out of curiosity, but not twice (...) I regret that immensely, the fact that we don’t succeed in coupling Plan C with a funding channel (…) Coupling is enough for me; Plan C does not necessarily need its own means. But those who receive them should link with Plan C or DuWoBo, so that the limited resources that we spend on innovation are at least directed towards sustainability in a well-founded manner” (societal actor).

As shown above (4.1.1.), some actors in Plan C think that a more pragmatic approach of connecting with starting MIP-projects might overcome some of the problems of defining and financing experiments.

Knowledge is another resource that is needed in transition processes such as Plan C and it comes under different forms. One is the technical expertise on new and more sustainable materials, closing of production and consumption cycles, replacement of materials by services etcetera. This is partly available and growing fast, in the business world as well as the academic world. Still, the needed expertise is not always easy to mobilize. In essence, Plan C has chosen to be a platform of open innovation, treating commonly build knowledge as ‘open source’. However, business representatives have indicated that this may hinder participation

47 of industry, either because they have no experience of working under such an intellectual property rights regime, or because they are afraid of sharing expertise with potential competitors.

Another aspect of knowledge relates to expertise on transition governance, on the level of the process itself as well as on the policy level. At the process level, it demands for example knowledge of managing multi-party collaboration, group processes, functioning as a learning network and learning from experiences. At the policy level, it demands knowledge of integration between policy fields, connecting between different policy streams, decision- making processes, coping with interest politics etcetera. These forms of knowledge have only to a very limited extent been mobilised in Plan C (see also 4.2.3.).

Finally, a crucial resource is the legitimacy that transition processes such as Plan C are able to build. Formal legitimacy is relatively well covered. From the start of the process, the Minister of the Environment has politically supported the creation of an “experiment space” for Plan C. As explained above, the process later found its way into the Flemish government agreement and the Pact 2020. Recently, sustainable materials management (which is broader than just Plan C) has also been chosen as a “flagship initiative” in the socio-economic Vlaanderen in Actie agenda. And as will be described in part 5, sustainable materials management is an essential part of the new Materials Decree, the Flemish translation of the EU Waste Directive. Paradoxically, in spite of this growing formal legitimacy, the ‘informal’ legitimacy with closely involved individuals and organisations seems to dwindle. An important cause is the slow and uncertain development of the process, its activities and in particular the problem of autonomy and organisation development since 2009. This diminishes the trust in the creation of a dynamic network and undermines legitimacy. The current lack of active business involvement in the decision-making bodies can partly be explained by the slow progress and the uncertain added value, but in turn causes a legitimacy problem with the business sector. It is hoped that this can be resolved with the creation of the vzw Plan C and that some “big names” will somehow be involved and support the network. “Of course, you can ask yourself why that’s not the case now. I fear that some people have become reticent: we see the potential, it’s a good initiative, but it’s new, we will have to stick our neck out, and there’s always the danger that politics says ‘well, in the end, let’s just forget it’. (…) There are several actors that say ‘if it has been established, we absolutely want to be a member, preferably a member of the Board, or co-finance it’, but first they want to see that green light” (knowledge actor).

4.2.5. Some reflections and interim conclusions

With the start in 2006 of a TM-process in sustainable materials management, OVAM aimed at innovating its policies and creating a network of frontrunners that could help support a transition process and carry it forward. When we compare Plan C as an embryonic policy arrangement with the characteristics of the policy arrangement of the current waste regime (cf. part 3), several distinctions are obvious. In contrast with the waste regime, in the Plan C discourse waste has become a small part of an overarching materials system. Production and consumption activities and related policies are reoriented towards closing of material loops and a life cycle approach. The involvement of frontrunners – actors that are usually not in the driving seat when policy is developed – is an essential element in this reorientation of the discourse. The time and space they were allowed to develop as an arena in the shadow of

48 regular policy, was instrumental in formulating a transition agenda (with leitbild , transition pathways, proposals for experiments). In the first two years, financial means were more or less adequate for coaching the process. The legitimacy of the process seems high with the participants (around 60 persons mid 2008) and they side with an ambitious mission statement for the further development of Plan C.

It can thus be concluded that during the first two years the transition management approach was successful in creating a policy niche with some clearly distinctive characteristics: a new discourse, based on the contributions of frontrunners working under new interaction rules between government and societal actors. The financial means came from traditional funding sources. Nevertheless, by mid 2008 the tensions within the new policy niche are growing and during the following years these turn into problems that seriously hamper its further development. When observing the evolutions though the lens of the policy arrangement approach, several tensions are revealed: • In the actors dimension a shift is visible in the carriers of the Plan C network and process. The coalition between OVAM and the frontrunners involved starts to break up. It seems particularly difficult to keep the business world involved as carriers of the process. In general, there is a lack of “doers” and entrepreneurial individuals/organisations to bring the process to a next level. The declining participation in the lead of the process is partly accommodated by a switch in role of the consultants involved, from “facilitating” until end 2008 to “carrying” by 2011. Also, after a time of hesitation about the role of Plan C, OVAM itself seems to have made up its mind that it wants to invest in Plan C as a vehicle that can be useful in furthering the transition to sustainable materials management. • The tension at the actor level can be partly explained by the resources problem of Plan C. While the ambitions of the network were growing and the management of organisation and substance became more complex, the financial means for daily operations did not grow. These means where sufficient to coach a visioning process during the first two years, but they were no longer sufficient to manage a growing network in its different dimensions and ambitions. Besides, Plan C has no resources available for what according to TM theory is the main task after formulating a transition agenda (after phase 2 and 3 above), namely developing and carrying out experiments. This creates a huge problem in attracting entrepreneurs and convincing them to risk the step to investing in transition experiments. • Some of the tensions are also related to presuppositions in the theory of transition management that do not seem to turn out well in the case of Plan C. The idea that transition management should lead to a self-organising process is clearly not an automatism. Working in the shadow of policy was helpful for developing the transition agenda, but now that the process wants to assert itself as an autonomous partner in the policy regime, the low profile hinders its positioning. This has in particular been the case for bringing the autonomy process forward. While end 2008 the hope was that Plan C would become autonomous within 8 to 12 months, the dragging on of this discussion and the lack of political decision-making weighed heavily on all activity development. The belief in the dynamic potential of the network is dwindling with actors that should take ownership of the process, although simultaneously the formal legitimacy is growing. The precise effect of the approval of the Materials Decree with a cooperation between OVAM and other government agencies (but without a legal Eigen Vermogen structure) is still unclear, but is at least intended to provide operational support – under the form of personnel and/or finance – to Plan C and coordinate government involvement. • One of the dimensions where the partial standstill is visible, is the state of affairs of the discourse. While in 2007/8 Plan C was at the front of the discourse in sustainable

49 materials management, three years later comparable ideas are spreading in policy circles at EU, UN and OECD level, in part of the business community and is also finding its way in innovation discourse in Flanders. This leads some actors to questioning the current added value of Plan C.

The analysis in part 4 has so far focused on the characteristics of the Plan C process as a policy niche and has rather strictly been limited to the internal working of this niche as an embryonic policy arrangement for reorienting waste policy to sustainable materials management. The TM approach worked fairly well during the first two years to start developing the policy niche, but after 2008 becomes problematic for maintaining the niche. In fact, TM theory does not give any hint as to what should happen once the phase of experiments has been reached, certainly not if these do not get off the ground through self- organisation, nor does it have guidelines of how to connect with regular policies. The analysis shows how the trial-and-error process of organisation and substance development that followed, has been hindered by problems such as a lack of funding to support the process and the development of experiments, a search by involved actors to define their role and position vis-a-vis each other, the difficult translation of the discourse into action, and uncertainty about the future status of the network.

The analysis is however incomplete if we want to understand the potential role of transition management processes in the innovation of policy. First, it says nothing about the influence Plan C may have had on the policy arrangement of the waste regime such as if has been described in part 3. Second, one of the lessons of research in policy analysis is that the context in which new policy processes have to perform is of immense importance for explaining their success and failure. Explaining the influence and the problems of Plan C solely on the basis of the internal functioning of the policy niche, thus seems a bit simplistic. Therefore, part 5 continues the analysis by investigating the position of Plan C in the ongoing evolution of the waste and materials regime.

50 5. A system in a state of flux: the changing waste regime, the role of Plan C, and beyond.

Building on the observation that its waste policy had more or less come to a standstill, OVAM introduced a transition management process in 2006. As shown in part 4, the frontrunners that were gathered under Plan C succeeded in formulating a new discourse on a materials economy and then started building a network around it, which at the moment tries to find an autonomous position and start up experiments. How such a transition trajectory is accompanied by considerable tensions and difficult decisions at the level of Plan C as a process, was also clarified in part 4. The question now is: does a transition management process such as Plan C lead to innovation in the existing policy regime, and if so, can we explain how this influence happens and why? And how does this relate to changes in the broader policy context?

Referring back to the analytical framework, the question is now whether we see changes in the waste regime and what influences these changes. Paragraph 5.1. discusses several influences on the current waste and materials system that can be interpreted as driving forces steering the system in a new direction. The MLP is used to group them according to landscape, regime and niche pressures. Plan C is obviously one force among many. Paragraphs 5.2. to 5.5. use the dimensions of policy arrangements to try to get a grip on what is happening in the incumbent waste policy regime and on the role of Plan C. In the introduction to part 3 and the description of the current waste regime, I said that there is some arbitrariness in delineating periods and different policy arrangements. The same can be said here. There are several indications that we may currently (mid 2011) be witnessing the start of a new policy regime in Flanders. There is little doubt that new developments are under way, such as a noticeable shift in discourse from “waste” to “materials”. This renewal in discourse already finds some institutionalisation, for example in a Flemish Materials Decree that in 2011 will replace the old Waste Decree, but also in the new strategic plan and an internal reorganisation of the main governmental actor (the Public Waste Agency OVAM). Nevertheless, the current regime is still firmly in place and it is as of yet unclear how it will further develop. Researchers in 5 to 10 years from now will be better able to judge the current developments.

The focus of analysis in this part 5 is depicted in figure 5: the analysis tries to understand the changes that are happening in the waste regime, taking into account the different pressures for change that arise from landscape, regime and niche developments, as well as the interactions between the levels. The focus is on how the policy arrangement of the regime is changing. In the course of my analysis, however, it became clear that this approach captures only partially the role that Plan C is playing. In fact, for understanding the current and potential role of Plan C it is not only necessary to look at the waste regime and its shift towards a materials regime, but also at interactions with fields such as socio-economic and innovation policy, the institutional organisation of government policy, and the broader environmental and sustainable development policy. The analysis of which changes take place, why and how, can thus get quite complicated due to a “fanning out” of relevant systems and policies. These kind of influences and interactions cannot easily be captured in the analytical framework. It leads in fact to a question about the appropriateness of analytical tools that are in use in transition studies. The MLP and TM focus on one socio-technical system; the policy arrangements approach focuses on one policy field, while here the relations between different socio- technical systems and different policy fields also become important. I cannot go into this methodological discussion here, but where appropriate I try to accommodate for the problem by discussing the links with adjacent policy field more or less in the environmental domain

51 (such as renewable energy policy and minerals policy) or the interactions with socio- economic and innovation policy and general environmental policy and sustainable development policy. In particular in these last cases, the fanning out to a broader agenda is also influenced by the combined dynamics of Plan C and the other Flemish TM process DuWoBo.

Figure 5. The focus of analysis in part 5 is on the kind of change that is happening in the waste regime and the role and involvement of Plan C. Plan C is one influence among several influences resulting from developments at the level of the landscape, regime and niches.

5.1. The waste regime under pressure: driving forces for change

As will be shown below, Plan C has had influence in the changes that are currently taking place in the Flemish waste regime and its possible shift to a materials regime. However, Plan C is only one of the influences and the changes that can be observed result from an interplay between different levels and driving forces. This paragraph 5.1. gives a concise overview of important developments at landscape, regime and niche level. The overview is meant to introduce and better understand changes in the different dimensions of the policy arrangement that will be discussed next (5.2. to 5.5.).

5.1.1. Landscape pressures / processes of structural transformation

Part 3 showed how the Flemish waste system was build up during the eighties with a strong focus on waste removal and on cleaning up the most visible excrescences of landfilling. During the nineties the system was reoriented on the basis of the waste hierarchy, with most attention going to selective collection and recycling. These developments are of course not specific for Flanders but can in different degrees be observed in other industrialised countries as well. But in spite of a focus on recycling and more attention for prevention, the prevailing logic in current modern economies in relation to materials still is a linear one: resources are extracted and transported, materials manufactured, products designed, assembled, distributed

52 and consumed, and the materials finally ends up as waste. Over the last few years, this logic has come under pressure from different kind of developments: • Probably the most important trend is the fast rise in demand for resources worldwide. Global resource extraction was at 40 billion tonnes in 1980, in 2002 at 55 billion tonnes and is expected to rise to 80 billion tonnes by 2020 (OECD 2008). While over the past decennia this rise was mostly due to OECD countries, for the future the impact of fast- growing economies, rapid industrialization and urbanisation of emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil will be a major factor. Still, at the moment inhabitants of the EU consume three times as many resources as inhabitants of Asia and more that four times as much as an average African (this rises to 10 times more for the US) (SERI 2009, p. 21). • Import dependency of OECD countries and in particular the EU. According to OECD- figures, the supply-dependency of the OECD area on the rest of the world is rising for all commodities and groups of materials. OECD net imports have increased by 80% since 1980 (OECD 2008, p. 38). In particular for the EU-27, there is a “massive asymmetry” in trade in fuels and mining products with the rest of the world (EEA 2010, 16). In 2008 the EU imported six times more materials than it imported and this dependency is a long-term structural trend, since EU-27 imports in tonnes increased by 30% during the period 1999- 2008 (ibid.). • Distribution of reserves. Of course, reserves of resources are where they have always been, but the growth in resource consumption coupled with import dependency, have fuelled an alarm over the availability of resources for national economies and over easy access to the proven reserves. The EU, the US and China do not possess large domestic deposits of fossil fuels and metals (SERI 2009). The EU has even listed 14 raw materials as “critical” because they are in risk of supply shortage due to the fact that a high share of world production comes from a handful of countries such as China, Russia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Brazil (EC 2011a). China has already limited exports of some raw materials in order to ensure privileged access for its domestic industry (EC 2008b). • Rising prices for resources. As a result of rising demand and growing competition for access, the prices of a lot of resources have been increasing during the last decade. The prices in markets for energy, metals and minerals, agriculture and food reached a peak in 2008, declined sharply in the second half of 2008, but have been increasing again since the summer of 2009 (EC 2011a). The markets have also seen a growing interdependence of commodity markets and financial markets, with a surge of flows into commodity derivative markets. • Increasing interference between systems of materials, energy, food and water. Awareness is growing that solving problems in one system has impact on others. High performance batteries and photovoltaic cells in the energy system require specific materials which may be in short supply or not easily accessible. Renewable biomass energy policies may hinder the development of a bio-based materials economy, or may have impact on food security. This nexus between systems and its policy impacts is labelled by the OECD as “one of the greatest challenges of policy assessment” in sustainable materials management (OECD 2010, p. 10).

As a result of these kinds of pressure, during the past years we have witnessed a rapid rise in attention for resources and materials at international policy level. An example is the working group on Sustainable Materials Management of the OECD. The initiative started in 2005 with a workshop in Korea, a second workshop in 2008 in Israel and a third workshop in 2010 in Belgium, the last one organised by OVAM. Based on the observation of a “fundamental tension” (OECD 2010, p. 11) between environmental protection and the increasing demand

53 for materials associated with economic growth, the OECD tries to clarify the meaning of SMM and the policy principles on which it can be based.

Of course, the attention for materials on international level is not isolated from other trends. On the one hand, it occurs in parallel to growing concerns over climate change, loss of biodiversity, water stress or food shortages. On the other hand, it is embedded in a broader discourse about greening of the economy, a transition towards a low-carbon economy, and sustainable development in general.

Since this paper is interested in the changes in the Flemish waste regime, the developments at EU level are particularly important. The general framework for current European policy- making is the Europe 2020 strategy, adopted in March 2010 as a follow-up to the Lisbon strategy. This strategy was launched as an answer to the economic and financial crisis and must “turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion” (EC 2010, p. 3). “Smart” refers to an economy based on knowledge and innovation, “sustainable” to promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy, and “inclusive” to fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion. The Commission formulated seven flagship initiatives to translate the goals into action. One of these is a flagship initiative for a “Resource efficient Europe”. In January 2011, European Commissioner for the Environment Potocnik presented the initiative that aims at boosting economic growth and competitiveness, creating new opportunities for innovation while simultaneously reducing resource use, fighting climate change and ensuring security of supply of essential resources. Over the following years, the Commission will propose resource efficiency strategies in areas such as energy, climate change, research and innovation industry, transport, agriculture, fisheries and environment policy (EC 2011b)

A few years ago in 2008, the European Commission had already launched the Raw Materials initiative (EC 2008a). This initiative grew out of anxiety over the availability of resources for the European economy and has three pillars: ensuring access to raw materials on international markets under the same conditions as other industrial competitors; fostering sustainable supply of raw materials from within Europe; and boosting overall resource efficiency and promote recycling to reduce the EU’s consumption of primary raw materials and decrease the relative import dependence.

A series of other EU initiatives are of importance for understanding the shifting landscape and the impact these policies have on shaping national and regional policy regimes. In the case of the waste system, these include the thematic strategy on the sustainable use of natural resources (2005), the thematic strategy on prevention and recycling of waste (2005), the action plan on sustainable consumption and production (2008), the ecodesign directive (2005), the integrated product policy (2001, 2003). A common characteristic of most of these initiatives is that they depart from a broad vision on resources and materials and in that way try to guard over the linkages between the different strategies and plans.

Of particular significance for the developments in the Flemish waste system is the Waste Framework Directive (EU 2008). As part of the thematic strategy on prevention and recycling of waste, the existing EU legislation was revised, simplified and clarified. The revision of the Waste Framework directive included: introducing life cycle thinking, clarifying when waste ceases to be waste and the definitions of recovery and disposal, introducing a definition of recycling, and solving overlaps between different pieces of waste and other environmental

54 legislation (EC 2005). In general, the aim is to strengthen the waste hierarchy in the waste policies of EU member states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste policies between member states. As will be shown below, the implementation of the Waste Framework Directive is seized at in Flanders to reorient the existing Waste Decree to a Materials Decree, in that way anchoring the first rules of a new materials economy.

5.1.2. Regime tensions

Although current materials policy is strongly influenced by landscape factors such as the growing global demand for resources and the concern over access to reserves, this was not the main driver behind Plan C when the first ideas for such process were formulated in 2003. “The theme of scarcity of resources is something of the last five years (…) Five years ago, for example when the thematic strategy on natural resources was made, the discourse was ‘scarcity of resources is not a topic; the impact is most important.’ (…) But during the last five years, the industry has noticed an enormous shift in resource flows towards China and other growth countries, India is also an important player. I don’t think that was the most important impulse for an orientation towards materials policy here at OVAM. Our concern was more ‘we have to reduce impacts, we have to reduce the amount of waste, and therefore materials policy is necessary.’ In fact, resource scarcity is an opportunity we have used to say ‘look, this is not just an environmental story, it’s obviously also an economic story.’” (civil servant)

As was already observed in part 3, the Flemish waste systems ranks amongst the top of Europe. Landfill taxes and bans have reduced dumping from almost 50% of total household waste in the early nineties to 3% in 2009. The recycling rate has increased from almost 20% to 75% in the same period (VMM 2008, 2010). However, the total amount of household waste has remained virtually constant around 550 kg per person since 2000. Furthermore, industrial waste is difficult to get under control. Total amounts fluctuate but remain constantly higher than in the beginning of the century. Around 63% of primary industrial waste was subject to a form of material recovery (re-use, use as secondary resource, recycling, composting) (VMM 2010, p. 116).

This kind of tension at regime level is much more obvious when looked at from a European point of view. Although the waste hierarchy has been the basis of EU waste policy for years, and although recycling and incineration are increasing, “overall waste volumes are growing (…) and the absolute amounts of waste landfilled are not decreasing because of the growth in waste generation” (EC 2005, p. 5). Even though waste management is improving, 51,5% was still landfilled in 2006, 43,6% recovered and recycled and 4,9% incinerated (EEA 2010, p. 24).

While the global demand for materials is growing, several features of the waste system may hinder closing of material loops. Incineration, more and more combined with energy recovery, may be leading waste streams away from recycling, in particular when incineration counts as green electricity and is favoured through tariff systems (such as green electricity certificates in Flanders). Since the recycling industry does not receive these kind of subsidies, it is structurally put at a disadvantage. Furthermore, to keep incinerator ovens profitable they have to function at optimum level, which necessitates a guaranteed flow of waste. Until end 2010, EU waste policies were based on self-sufficiency and treatment of waste streams within national borders. This principle determined planning of incinerator installations within

55 Flanders. However, since 2011, the new Waste Directive determines that incinerators all over Europe that conform to a so-called R-1 status (mainly based on energy-efficiency of the installation) can attract industrial waste from other European countries. Again, this may lead materials away from recycling. Flanders seems particularly vulnerable because of overcapacity in incineration in the Netherlands and Germany, where the incineration sector is attracting waste flows with favourable incineration tariffs. Furthermore, a decision in June 2011 of the Flemish Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe to grant a licence to a new incineration installation of Bionerga in Houthalen-Helchteren and to extend the license of the ISVAG installation in Wilrijk, attracts criticism because it also threatens to install overcapacity in Flanders.

5.1.3. Niche developments

In part 2 of this paper, I defined Plan C as a policy niche where a network of frontrunners develops alternatives for current policies. In transition studies it is however more customary to look for technological niches that challenge the regime. The niche that over the past few years has probably been most challenging for the waste regime is the Cradle to Cradle approach (C2C), defined by Braungart and McDonough (2002). The approach not only wants to replace linear logics in materials management by closed cycles, but questions the resource efficiency approach at heart. Being efficient in a bad system makes no sense. The goal should not be to be less bad by minimizing resources and waste, but to be “eco-effective”: designing products from materials that have a positive impact on the environment. According to Braungart and McDonough, this can be done by creating two materials cycles: a technical cycle where non-renewable materials are kept in a closed loop, and a biological cycle where at the end of their lifecycle products can be discarded and serve as a nutrient for nature. The famous “waste equals food” maxim refers to this continuance of cycles. In 2010 and 2011, OVAM is one of the partners in the European Interreg IVC- project Cradle to Cradle Network . The project brings together EU regions to share and capitalise on regional good practice in implementing C2C principles in relation to waste prevention and management. OVAM is responsible for the governance part of the project.

5.2. A change in discourse?

So, what influence does the combination of trends at landscape, regime and niche level have at the discourse in the Flemish waste system? Do we see a change happening and is it possible to trace the role of the policy niche Plan C? As said in the introductory paragraphs of part 5, during the analysis it became clear that changes are visible in the waste regime as well as in a set of policies beyond waste policy, such as socio-economic and innovation policy, environmental and sustainable development policy. This distinction is followed in 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.

5.2.1. From waste to materials

As discussed above, it is impossible to strictly delineate between policy arrangements. Traces of a shift from a waste to a materials discourse can be found for example in OVAM documents at least since 2003. But the implementation in Flanders of the Waste Framework Directive (EU 2008) definitely marks a change in discourse. As discussed above, the

56 Directive’s main goal is to strengthen the waste hierarchy in the waste policies of EU member states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste policies between member states. Although it introduces a few new elements such as life-cycle thinking and extended producer responsibility, conceptually it starts from the idea of management of waste streams, not material chains and cycles. The Flemish Minister of the Environment and OVAM proposed to translate the directive into a Materials Decree instead of a new Waste Decree, which should be in place by the second half of 2011. In the text of the Materials Decree, the well-known language of the waste hierarchy is extended with language on materials and material cycles. The explanatory memorandum explicitly refers to the need to develop a sustainable materials economy in the decades to come and to capitalize on upcoming trends at EU and OECD level. “Apart from the framework directive, there is a trend at Flemish, European and international level to situate waste policy in a broader context. To reduce the environmental effects of the waste phase, it is necessary to look at decision taken before the material has become waste (…) The final goal is to design material cycles that stay within ecological carrying capacity and generate wellbeing for current and future generations. This requires a far-reaching integrated policy that is known as ‘sustainable materials policy’ or ‘sustainable management of material cycles’” (Vlaamse Regering 2010).

This discourse on materials and the step to go beyond traditional waste management is supported by important advisory councils such as the SERV, MINA Council and VRWI. In a common advice, SERV and MINA Council urge the government and OVAM to embed the Materials Decree in the resource efficiency flagship of the EU and to use it as an instrument in the greening of the economy. The VRWI “fully supports the transition from a waste management problem to cyclical thinking” (VRWI 2011, p. 5) and hopes the decree favourably influences innovation opportunities for a green economy. These councils also support the idea of a specific position for Plan C as a network where government and other societal actors meet, think and discuss new pathways towards a sustainable materials society.

A notable example of the role and influence of the new discourse is to be found in the results of the Belgian EU presidency in the Environment Council 26 . It is worthwhile describing this in some detail because it shows by which mechanisms discourses can flow through policy- making. Because Belgium is a federal state, the preparation of a task such as a European presidency requires a lot of coordination between the federal and the regional level. During the preparation process, the presidency of each policy domain is divided between the levels. In that way, Joke Schauvlieghe, Flemish Minister for the Environment became responsible for the presidency of the EU Environment Council. It is a tradition at European level that each presidency formulates a few own priorities, so during the preparations for the environmental presidency at Flemish level, OVAM proposed materials policy as one of the priorities. Together with climate and biodiversity, this was accepted. “I think that this can be attributed to two things. First, OVAM has a good reputation for its European policy work. That has strengthened the confidence when we brought up a theme for the presidency, ‘okay, when it is assigned to OVAM, it will run well’. Second, materials policy is mentioned in the government declaration, it is in the policy note of the minister, it is mentioned in ViA, so the cabinet was willing to put the theme in the picture.” (civil servant)

The Belgian presidency formulated “sustainable materials management” as one of its environmental spearheads and in July 2010 an informal Environment Council in Ghent was

26 Belgium was president of the EU in the second half of 2010.

57 devoted to the theme. A background study for the informal council (Rossy et al. 2010), ordered by the Flemish government, situated sustainable materials management against a broad background of respecting ecological limits and the need for “breakthrough system-level innovations” (ibid., p. 5). It explicitly mentions the need for knowledge networks for transitions and uses Plan C as an example. It recommends the establishment of “a multi- stakeholder European SMM Transition Platform, similar to the Flemish ‘Plan C’” (ibid., p. 65) 27 . OVAM served as penholder for preparing the conclusions of the informal council and of the formal Council of December 2010. These mention inter alia the need of system innovation for a sustainable and resource-efficient Europe and they invite the Commission to “consider how the objectives on resource efficiency can be supported and implemented by the creation of a multi-actor transition platform on resource efficiency”, in that way making the link with the flagship initiative on resource efficiency. “It is partly thanks to Plan C that this reached the conclusions. The line is very direct: OVAM prepared the conclusions, we are penholder, so we put these concepts in there. You can see a clear causal link between what lives in Plan C and what was discussed at the Council (…). For example, the Council asks the Commission to set up a European transition platform to help in drawing up a resource efficiency roadmap. However, the Commission does not know very well what to do with it, so now they ask us ‘do you have concrete ideas for that?’ So now we have a chance to translate the transition approach to a European level. But that will of course be quite challenging, because how do you do that?” (civil servant).

In early 2011, OVAM received an invitation from the Commission to discuss their experience with Plan C. OVAM organised one meeting with experts on which kind of input could be given to the Commission, but this got no further follow-up.

5.2.2. From waste to a broader agenda

It has already been hinted at several times: the shift form a waste to a materials discourse has implications that go beyond the strict materials system. In fact there are three movements of ‘fanning out’ visible. In the first the materials discourse is linked up with a broader discourse about the need for transformation of the Flemish economy and innovation for a green economy. In the second the transition element of the discourse is taken up in Flemish sustainable development policy. In the third and a very recent development at the moment of writing of this paper, the transition discourse also seems to move to the heart of the socio- economic and innovation discourse.

The first movement is linked to what is currently the most important initiative for innovating the socio-economic web of Flanders, the Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA) agenda and the Pact 2020. ViA was introduced in 2006 under the Leterme government, was revived under the Peeters I government and has with the start of Peeters II and its explicit link to the governmental declaration 2009-2014 gained even more strategic importance. One of the prominent results is the so-called Pact 2020 , signed in 2009 by the government, social partners and civil society organisations. It is meant as a long-term strategy for Flanders, aimed at turning the region “into a trend-setting knowledge economy with strong entrepreneurship and a strong international orientation that can create welfare in a sustainable manner” (Vlaamse Regering

27 One of the authors of the study, Peter Tom Jones, was a member of the Plan C transition arena in phase 1 to 3 (see 4.1.2-4.1.4).

58 2009, p. 8) and thus belonging amongst the top 5 regions of Europe by 2020. The Pact 2020 also expresses the intention to take steps for a transition towards a sustainable energy, materials and mobility system. The intentions of ViA and Pact 2020 found their way into the Flemish governmental agreement 2009-2014 that uses several terms to refer to the needed transformation of the Flemish economy, such as “breakthroughs”, “a renewal of the dna of the Flemish economy”, “green economy” and “big projects for societal renewal”. “ViA has put the idea of ‘transformation’ on the Flemish agenda, although this is not necessarily green transformation (…). Until recently, greening was a bonus to make entrepreneurs more competitive; it was not really fundamental for economic policy. But with transformation policy, the core is that in order to be competitive you also have to be sustainable. That legitimisation comes form ViA and Pact 2020, the transformation of our economic web, a new dna, greening, whitening: all these terms have been brought in there, but perhaps not everybody realises their potential to effectively go for structural changes” (civil servant).

As said above, Plan C has tried to position itself as a partner in this innovation debate but with limited success. However, mainly under impulse of several European developments (such as the Waste Directive / Materials Decree, the flagship resource efficiency, the experiences during the EU Belgian presidency, the Europe 2020 strategy), the sustainable materials discourse is rapidly attracting attention and being perceived as an essential ingredient of an innovative, job-creating and greener economy. Proof of that is the fact that, when early 2011 all Flemish ministers had to propose a flagship initiative for the ViA-strategy, Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe proposed sustainable materials management, with that positioning materials as an essential part of the transformation and innovation of the Flemish economy. This resulted at 6 June 2011 in a Round Table on Sustainable Materials Management where industry, knowledge centres and other societal partners signed a Declaration in which they engage themselves to work towards a Materials Pact and an operational plan on sustainable materials by June 2012. The pact and the plan will be prepared by a steering group of public and private actors. A sounding board group “with broad societal representation” will do the follow-up of the process. Although the declaration uses terms such as ‘multi-stakeholder processes’, ‘support for frontrunners’, ‘government as partner and facilitator’, Plan C is not mentioned in the declaration and its role in the process and vis-a-vis the new steering group is unclear. As said earlier (in 4.1.5), Plan C tried to position itself during the Round Table by presenting the ambitious iMade project.

So, in a first movement of ‘fanning out’, we do not only see how the discourse of the waste regime changes to a materials discourse, but also how the materials discourse becomes embedded in a broader discourse of innovation and transformation of the Flemish economy. Elements of this are also visible in the Witboek Nieuw Industrieel Beleid voor Vlaanderen (White Paper New Industrial Policy for Flanders) that formulates a future vision for the industry in Flanders. The central insight of the Witboek is that the industry is in need of new productivity growth and new models of value creation. Energy and materials efficiency are elements of this transformation, including concepts such as design for recycling (C2C) and product-service combinations. The document also uses the term “system innovations” (Vlaamse Regering 2011, p. 43) to refer to the need to develop new infrastructures to support space for experiments and niches that can grow into seeds for a new growth model. Elements from the transitions discourse are placed here exclusively in a competition and productivity discourse.

59 A second movement of fanning out is not related to the ‘materials’ part of the discourse, but to the ‘transitions’ and ‘transition management’ part of the discourse of Plan C. The Flemish government initiated two transition management processes as forms of innovative environmental policy, DuWoBo in 2004 and Plan C in 2006. Although these processes are relatively small, over the years the attention for their approach has been growing slowly. An important breakthrough for the transition discourse was realised during the preparation for the second Flemish Sustainable Development Strategy 28 (VSDO). The first strategy was adopted in 2006 and followed a ‘traditional’ approach, building on Brundtland, the UNCED-process and in particular the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development. The process for the preparation of the second strategy was started early 2010. Several elements converged at the time to lead to the decision that ‘transitions’ would become a central theme in the new strategy. These included: the past experience with DuWoBo and Plan C and the realisation that the transition discourse had a strong appeal for strengthening and reframing the sustainability debate, a new team leader (Ilse Dries) for the administrative Cell Sustainable Development who was also project leader of the DuWoBo-process and was thus familiar with the transitions discourse, the input from the scientists of the Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development who had amongst other things been working on sustainable development policy and transitions, and a ministerial cabinet that was supportive of a new approach for sustainable development policy.

During the spring of 2010 an intensive process was set up with all Flemish administrations and relevant stakeholders to discuss the contents of the second strategy. This included amongst other things two workshops with all relevant stakeholders (2 April 2010, 20 May 2010). The idea of transitions and transition governance for a series of socio-technical systems was the central element of the discussions. When by the Summer of 2010 the proposal for a new VSDO strategy went to the government, its main components were: • a long-term vision 2050 which states that we are in need of transitions in systems that are central to our welfare. The vision consists of short sketches of the situation in 2050 after transitions in seven systems: housing and building, materials, energy, mobility, agriculture and food, health, knowledge. It also formulates short visions for the economic, socio- cultural, ecological, international and institutional dimensions of society. • A series of midterm and short-term objectives and actions for the seven systems and five dimensions. These are mainly based on the Flemish Pact 2020 and the Europe 2020 strategy, when necessary supplemented with objectives from the governmental declaration or the EU SDS. • A methodological framework that proposes transition management as a key element of a Flemish policy for sustainable development. It states that for complex societal problems, we are in need of ‘governance beyond government’ with shared responsibilities between public actors, market parties and civil society actors. It also promotes new and better participation processes. In May 2011, the government approved the strategy with these elements. “The VSDO has been a means to present these kind of fundamental change processes as the core of policy, in a way and at a scale and with a horizontal spread that we have never seen before. That makes me optimistic for what may happen with it. A second reason for optimism (…) is that those societal actors that want to use it as a means for exercising political pressure and to refer to, that they can use it that way. That was not the case with the previous strategy, which

28 For a detailed discussion of the different aspects of Flemish sustainable development policy, I refer to Spillemaeckers and Bachus (2009). Kris Bachus and Matthias Bussels (HIVA/KULeuven) are currently preparing a new paper on the latest developments around the VSDO.

60 was too weak (…) This one has potential for developing agency (…) I think that this is the first document in Flanders that couples a long-term vision with mid- term policy planning and a fundamental vision on what has to change if we ever want to move into the direction of sustainability” (knowledge actor).

The fact that fundamental change processes have been formulated as the core of policy, brings me to the third movement of fanning out of the discourse: since the Spring of 2011, the transition discourse seems to move to the centre of the ViA discourse and thus becomes a central part of the transformation and innovation agenda. The approach of transition management is seen as promising for realising breakthroughs and contributing to the goal of making Flanders a top 5 region in Europe by 2020. Several interviewees confirm that over the past two years, the ViA process had trouble in finding a suited approach that fitted the high ambitions. A lot of administrative processes have been launched in particular on the level of planning and monitoring, but involving business and civil society is more difficult than foreseen. Furthermore, the transformational changes that ViA aims for, require more than business-as-usual policy. However, the policy system seems to run into limits to formulate these new kind of solutions. “Everybody seems ready, these sustainability things are ripe, it is mainstream. Policy coordination, that’s also almost evident that we should do that. But our structures prevent that (…) But something like a transition approach, the way it is slumbering now, that has the potential to fill the vacuum. There is a vacuum of how to work with a long-term perspective (…) so now there is a supply that can capitalize on the demand of the policy market. And then you need policy-makers that are ready (…) and when the right moment is there can supply the right approach, a good combination of features that catches on” (civil servant).

At the same moment, in parallel to the observation in the ViA process that it is difficult to find a suited approach for its ambitions, the VSDO process was underway. A lot of the people that were involved in the VSDO process – all departments and all advisory councils were present in the preparatory meetings – are also somehow involved in the ViA process. Furthermore, the Cell SD organised a seminar about transitions and transition management for civil servants that are involved with ViA (on 28 April 2010). “It seems that the fundamental ideas that were present in the VSDO, have seeped through more than previous documents – except perhaps for Pact 2020 (…) And the ideas that were in there have intellectually been picked up by a number of people present, on a kind of cognitive level, and that the two [transitions and ViA – EP] have somehow become coupled” (knowledge actor).

One element in effectively translating the transitions idea from the VSDO and DuWoBo/Plan C to the ViA circles, is the role played by the so-called Council of the Sages, an advisory body of stakeholders and scientists that as part of the ViA process has been installed by the Flemish government. During a meeting of this Council in March with Flemish ministers and the top of the Flemish administrations, the potential of a transitions approach for furthering ViA was discussed. Members such as scientist Hans Bruyninckx had already repeatedly stressed the potential of it 29 . Furthermore, important civil society actors such as ACW (the

29 Hans Bruyninckx (KULeuven) is also coordinator of the Policy Research Centre for Sustainable Development (Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling). He played an important role during the preparatory phase of the VSDO.

61 umbrella of Christian workers’ organisations) strongly supported the transitions approach 30 , while also several administrations were in favour of trying it. “The question is of course what will happen with all this. We have witnessed the post-Rio period when everything was going to change (…) But I have the impression that this discourse is more fundamental and less soft, which keeps actors on board. It is about innovation, that’s the first word. And the second word is ‘systems carrying our economy’ and that brings you immediately to the actors carrying our economy (…) However, we are still in embryonic processes.” (knowledge actor).

Another element that played a role in translating the transitions discourse between VSDO and ViA, is their institutional embedding. ViA and VSDO both fall under the competence of Minister-President Peeters, and as a consequence are both coordinated from within the DAR- department. This has considerably simplified contacts and cooperation between the Cell SD and the ViA team. One of the result of all these dynamics is that within the ViA process several projects were defined as ‘transversal projects’ and that these should be further developed on the basis of a transitions approach. No less than eight transversal projects were identified for a transitions approach: ranging from international entrepreneurship over poverty and smart grids, to sustainable housing and building and sustainable materials management.

The final picture thus looks quite complicated and gives an impression of parallel initiatives, with a lot of links between them, but without clear coordination: the initiatives in the framework of the Materials decree, the Round Table with its ambition of a Materials Pact guided by a steering group and a sounding board, the transversal ViA initiative on sustainable materials, elements of industrial transformation in the White Paper on New Industrial Policy, and of course Plan C itself. OVAM officials admit that coordination and mutual reinforcement of initiatives will be of utmost importance in the governance of this breakthrough of the materials discourse.

5.3. A change in the rules of the game?

Under what form does the materials discourse find a reflection in rules? The most visible form has been mentioned a few times already: the Materials Decree, which is the Flemish implementation form of the Waste Framework Directive. As discussed under 5.2.1., the discourse in the Materials Decree goes several steps further than the Directive. However, this does not imply that the rules go further than Europe requires. The Materials Decree has conceptually been built in such a way that it provides a legal basis not only for the management of waste, but also for the management of materials and material chains. For example, under its Article 4, the waste hierarchy is reformulated as a materials hierarchy in such a way that it becomes possible to focus policy instruments not only on waste streams, but also on non-waste materials streams. This means that it becomes possible to define conditions for the use of materials. Another example is that the extended producer responsibility has been relaxed so that it becomes possible to go beyond the current acceptance obligation (see also 3.2.). Under the acceptance obligation, producers are only responsible for waste that has been collected through their collection system. The system stimulates separate collection and recycling, but is unsuccessful in stimulating greener products or ecodesign. The new proposal

30 Christian and socialist workers’ organisations are currently also part of the transition network of civil society, cf. footnote 20.

62 creates the possibility to make producers and even each actor in the chain between extraction of a resource and end-use, responsible for all waste that results from products they bring to the market. It also allows the introduction of new instruments to stimulate prevention of waste and materials use. “However, when you look at the hard obligations, then [the Materials Decree] is restricted to traditional waste policy. You cannot say that the Materials Decree will contain more stringent rules than the Waste Framework Directive. So, on the level of hard rules we just apply what Europe says. But conceptually, the philosophy with which it has been made and the potential it contains, go a lot further than the Directive” (civil servant).

The real impact of the Materials Decree will thus depend on how over the following months and years the legislation and policy instruments are formulated and implemented. In dialogue with relevant stakeholders, OVAM foresees a reformulation of policy instruments such as implementation plans, a revision of economic instruments such as environmental levies or a different implementation of extended producer responsibility. A new division within OVAM, the division Policy Innovation, is partly responsible for the renewal of these policy instruments (see also 5.4.).

An element that is repeatedly stressed by the involved actors is that the broadening from waste to materials requires more consultation and harmonisation between different policy domains, in the first instance with domains that belong more or less to environmental policy, such as renewable energy policy, extraction of minerals in Flanders, and environmental permits policy. OVAM officials expect that the process of cooperation will lead to a reformulation of several policies.

In the cooperation with ALBON (the division amongst other things responsible for policy on extraction of minerals in Flanders), the possibility for the use of alternatives for primary minerals extraction in Flanders is an important theme. The policy of the Flemish government is to make minerals extraction in Flanders more sustainable and to extract no more than absolutely necessary. This means that alternatives for primary materials, so-called secondary minerals, become more important. The new Materials Decree can have an impact on the availability of these alternatives, more in particular it broadens the potential for deployment of certain waste streams as secondary minerals. For example, the Materials Decree introduces the concept of a “materials declaration” that can be granted to a producer and which states that a particular material is no or no longer waste, thus providing the opportunity to bring it back into the materials cycle.” “When they ask us for alternatives to primary extraction, we automatically end up with OVAM, because alternatives means either recycled waste, excavated soil or dredged materials, and all these fall under the competencies of OVAM. They are also responsible for the legislation. The new Materials Decree is a very good evolution for the sections waste and dredged materials. You have this materials declaration, the whole philosophy changes, the change from what is considered waste to what is materials will come earlier according to the legislation… for us these are all positive evolutions from the point of view of secondary minerals. The next step is to consider excavated soil, because in the current soil legislation this is only considered from the point of pollution control, while from the point of view of minerals, this can also be defined as secondary material (…) but OVAM seems to have the willingness to cooperate in this discussion (…) In fact, the Decree has led to a better understanding of each other’s needs.” (civil servant)

63

In the cooperation with VEA, the question of the role of biomass and of waste as a materials source or as an energy source has a central role. Under the European Directive on the use of energy from renewable resources (2009/28/EC) Belgium has an objective of producing 13% of its energy from renewable sources by 2020. Since this is being regarded as an ambitious objective, input from all possible sources will be necessary. This implies possible interference with materials policy on several levels. A first level is the use of biomass: in order to fulfil its obligations on renewable energy, Flanders counts on 70% production of renewable energy from biomass. However, biomass will also be necessary as a resource in a bio-based chemical industry, or it is needed as resource in the manufacturing industry (such as the wood industry). A second level is the incineration of waste to produce energy instead of recycling the waste as materials, which threatens to undermine the recycling industry. In both cases, the subsidy system for the production of green energy – such as the green electricity certificates – attracts biomass or waste as a resource for energy production instead of a resource for closed material loops. “Current policy already tries to take account of some of these aspects. The Flemish legislation gives priority to material recycling and to wood as an industrial resource, which cannot qualify for green electricity certificates. We are currently working on an action plan for green warmth, but will follow the same line there. The problem is less a Flemish one, because of our specific legislation that prohibits support for these uses, but the problem is rather Europe and also Wallonia, where they do not have these bans. Our fear is that these flows will be exported abroad or to Wallonia to use it as renewable energy. In that case it cannot be used for our wood sector, nor for energy, so we lose twice.” (civil servant)

From the discussion so far it can be concluded that, in general terms, with the Materials Decree a framework is in place for formulating new formal rules from a materials perspective, but that the rules themselves are still under discussion and construction. There are as of yet no major indications that the governance of the new materials policy domain will substantially differ from what until now has been the case in the waste regime. As discussed earlier (3.2.), in the development of policy, government stays in control but draws in stakeholders and target groups to create more involvement and develop a better founded and supported policy. OVAM has developed a tradition of stakeholder consultation and has a good reputation as to how it conducts its consultations. This was confirmed again during the preparation of the Materials Decree. In their common advice, the SERV and MINA Councils “find that OVAM has treated the process transparently and that there has been consultation with the involved stakeholders” (MINA/SERV 2011, p. 12). An interviewee mentions that “OVAM has given a lot of room for input (…) OVAM plays that game earnestly” (societal actor).

The main instrument that is currently available to follow a different governance approach is Plan C. But as shown above, the current functioning of Plan C hardly allows for a strong support of such an approach. The difficult position of Plan C is also visible in how the preparation of the Materials Pact is structured. The approach taken seems to fall back on the trusted consultation approach with a balanced representation of stakeholders, instead of on the Plan C TM approach with frontrunners. The role of Plan C in the process is not defined. With the creation of an Eigen Vermogen Plan C as part of the Materials Decree, OVAM hoped to create a legal structure for a government organisation to support a transition governance approach. Although this did not succeed – as explained in detail above – a ‘softer’ institution

64 has been created under the form of a cooperation between OVAM and other government agencies (in Chapter 6 of the Materials Decree).

Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how in the development of the transversal ViA-projects (cf. 5.2.2.) and in the VSDO the transitions approach will be filled in. These evolutions at the ViA-level and the VSDO, coupled with the dragging on of the weak institutionalisation of Plan C (and also DuWoBo), leads some interviewees to the conclusion that the government’s ambition is less to initiate a structural transition process, but rather to initiate co-creation networks for the renewal of policy. In this interpretation, the use of the transition storyline shows how the government is searching for more flexible governance approaches (or new rules of the game), but not necessarily for transitions such as interpreted in transition studies, namely deep changes in structure, culture and practices. “It shows the willingness of the government to co-create and it tries to use the transition storyline to do this. According to me, they use transitions as a synonym for co-creation (…) But transitions are more fundamental than facilitating networks and bringing people together. What happens now answers more to a need for co-creation in policy, which they need for idea generation, identifying new trends, identifying obstacles, and then agreeing on a policy concept with involved actors. But consolidation and real change, I do not have the feeling that it’s the ambition to go into that direction.” (knowledge actor)

Since almost all of these processes are only just starting, it is too early to judge the direction they will take. Time will teach which interpretation has to be given to current developments.

5.4. A change of actors?

Does the materials orientation lead to a change of actors in the existing policy arrangement? Or do we notice changes with the actors that are already involved? And is there a connection with the Plan C process?

When examining the main government actor OVAM, it quickly shows that the materials discourse has had its impact on OVAM during the past five years. The first traces of a materials discourse can be found in internal OVAM documents as early as 2003 in the context of the BBB administrative reform (see 4.1.1.). It then appears in the strategic plan of OVAM for 2005-2009 – around the same time that the Plan C process is prepared – as a third policy line for OVAM along with waste and soil management. Parallel to the Plan C process, OVAM installed an internal learning forum, called The fifth floor 31 , where the new developments were discussed and where the insight grew that materials management should not be regarded as a third policy line, but that the waste system should be regarded as part of a ‘higher’ system, the materials system. This implied that materials policy “was not something new for us, we were already doing it under the form of waste policy, we just had to change our perspective. We also started to understand that this meant an evolution within the organisation itself that was going to take some time” (civil servant).

The new orientation is translated at several levels within OVAM, with as outstanding examples an internal reorganisation of the OVAM departments and a strategic plan 2010-

31 The OVAM office in Mechelen has only four floors. The idea of a fifth floor was that the initiative did not belong to a specific OVAM department, but tried to form a bridge between departments where the new concept of sustainable materials management could be discussed.

65 2014 with an explicit materials orientation. “In a sense, the plan is a consolidation of all preceding developments, such as those around the reorientation towards sustainable materials management” , says an OVAM official. In the strategic plan, waste and materials are no longer regarded as separate policy lines but “in order to reach a green closed loop economy, the classic waste policy will once and for all be turned into a sustainable materials policy” (OVAM 2009, p. 7). The plan formulates four strategic objectives: reducing the use of primary resources in production and consumption, maximally limiting total materials dissipation, maximally limiting the use of materials per unit of production or unit of consumption, maximally limiting the total environmental impact of materials use. While in the past, the focus of attention was on households, OVAM now wants to target industry in a double track approach: first, set up ambitious experiments in chain management 32 with frontrunners; second, optimise eco-efficiency and use of secondary materials in the rest of industry. The strategic plan was formulated after a broad consultation process with stakeholders. These kind of contacts, and in particular the ones with frontrunners, are not only important for finding a support base for policy development, but also serve other strategic purposes. “It is important that these frontrunner companies support the idea of sustainable materials management, that for example Thomas Leysen [CEO of Umicore – EP] gives this message. There is more chance to get the message through with the Ministry of Economy when these frontrunner companies say ‘this is strategic for us’. When the industry says ‘we with our budget of a few milliard Euro, we want to invest in a materials economy over the next decades, but it has to be supported politically, and subsidy mechanisms have to be elaborated’, well then you have a message. These guys can open doors that we at OVAM cannot get open” (civil servant).

Meanwhile, OVAM has gone through an internal reorganisation process that is meant to prepare the organisation for its role in the coming materials economy. Since 2010, the former department waste management has been reformed into the department waste and materials management. While the old department was organised around seven specific waste flows (such as organic waste, household waste etc.), the new department is organised around two chain services (“chain management and companies” and “chain management and local government”) and a policy innovation service. Within each chain service, specific teams are created that have the ambition to do the follow-up of a whole production and consumption chain, such as a team chemistry and a team biomass that try to cover the chemical and biomass cycle respectively. The reorientation is not complete, because the focus partly remains on target groups (such as local communities) where the waste perspective still dominates. The objective of the policy innovation service is to evaluate the policy instruments OVAM currently employs and to formulate ideas for innovating instruments in such a way that they contribute to the waste-materials shift. It is interesting to note that the head of the new policy innovation service, John Wante, has played an important role in Plan C (he was amongst others the OVAM member of the first arena in 2006).

In its communication, OVAM has always stressed that it wants to act as an initiator of the materials transition in Flanders, but that it cannot be the only one responsible. Still, there does not seem to be a lack of interest for the new orientation. Established actors as well as newcomers are adopting the sustainable materials discourse. Such an established actor in the waste system is the private waste management industry, grouped in FEBEM. This sector is

32 Chain management (‘ketenbeheer’) is an approach that tries to minimise material use and environmental impact throughout the life cycle of a product.

66 rapidly repositioning itself from “handlers of waste” to “suppliers of materials and fuels from secondary processes”. The sector demands its place in the new industrial policy that is being developed at European and Flemish level. “Europe has its limits regarding primary resources. Therefore, the horizon has to be opened to secondary materials of which our region has large quantities available. Environmental companies can become the connection between companies that produce waste and side streams and those that need resources and fuels. Closing the loop is the core business of our environmental companies” (Annaert and Gimmelprez 2011, p. 11).

It is not only government polices that are causing this shift, although they play an important role. There is on the one hand a growing demand in the market for secondary materials such as recycled plastics, while on the other hand producers are starting to cooperate with these environmental companies to design products that may be better recyclable and collectable. An interviewee confirms that the mindset of the sector has changed profoundly over the last years, but that actual practices are presently particularly a case of larger companies in the sector. A lot of companies still mainly focus on waste collection and sorting out of waste. Although they do not deliver final products under the form of secondary materials, they are part of the chain towards that final product.

Perhaps the most important development that is taking place in the actor setting is the entrance of actors that were not really part of the waste system, but that will play a major role in a new materials system. Two federations and their members are currently playing an active role. One is Agoria, the federation of the Belgian technology industry, the other is Essenscia, the federation of the chemical and life sciences industry.

The technology industry (with sectors such as metals and materials, automotive, construction products, automotive, aerospace, plastics and composites) uses ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals and plastics as one of its basic ingredients. The use of materials in the sector is mainly driven by economic incentives such as the competitiveness of companies. “Most companies do not lose sleep over sustainability but over their competitive position. One aspect of competitiveness is the cost of materials: if I can sell a product with less materials but with the same functionality, then my company acquires a competitive advantage. So, economic incentives are the triggers, and the effects, such as using less materials, are regarded as an economic added value. For most companies, this is a part of their overall strategy” (societal actor).

Still, some parts of the sector, in particular in the non-ferrous metals are being confronted with a possible future shortage of materials, partly because of strategic control and increasing competition over scarce resources by countries such as China, and partly because most of these metals are not recycled and either end up as waste or are illegally exported. This ‘leakage’ of materials and precious metals that could be recycled is a growing concern, because if Europe does not have access to them, it will seriously hamper the development of new (and green) technologies and products. The industry has formulated the concept of ‘urban mining’: the city and its waste heap of electronic devices as a mine of all kind of metals. An iconic example for Flanders is Umicore, which has the world's largest recycling facility for complex precious metals and is able to recover around 20 non-ferrous metals. These kind of frontrunners show which crucial role industry can play in redesigning the materials system and in making visions such as the Plan C leitbild tangible. Although he was

67 present an individual and not as a representative of Agoria, the participation of Patrick Van den Bossche (director at Agoria) in the first transition arena of Plan C, was important for the process and its link with the concerns and aspirations of the technology industry.

Members of Essenscia got involved in Plan C through the transition pathway Green Synthetics. The discussions in the working group that formulated the transition pathway inspired an initiative by Essenscia, called Flanders strategic Initiative for Sustainable Chemistry (FISCH). The Plan C discussions capitalised on dynamics that were already playing within the chemical industry. The European chemical industry (Cefic) had launched the European technology platform SusChem in 2005, with the aim of strengthening the innovation potential of the chemical industry. At Flemish level, in 2006, a Roundtable of the chemical industry called for the start of new initiatives top strengthen the position of Flanders as a top region in chemistry. The FISCH-project tries to combine two goals: strengthening the competitive position of the Flemish chemical industry, while simultaneously acting as a catalyst for the transition of the chemical industry towards sustainable chemistry. The initiative is organised as an open knowledge organisation where industry and knowledge centres cooperate in what are meant to be “new innovative breakthrough collaborative programs”. Consortia are formed around projects such as micro alga, microtechnology, separation technology, renewable chemicals and valorisation of waste and side streams.

Not only the industry is claiming its place in the new materials economy, the role of knowledge actors is also important to support the waste-materials shift. One of the most important actors on clean technology in the Flemish knowledge system is VITO, the Flemish Institute for Technological Research, set up in 1991 by the Flemish government as a strategic research centre. In September 2008 VITO was restructured in three groups (Industrial Innovation, Quality of the Environment, Energy). This last group contains a specific unit “Transition Energy and the Environment”, which employs amongst others two researchers that investigate the potential of the transition approach for VITO. With the announcement in April 2010 of the organisation i-Cleantech vzw , aimed at coordinating all initiatives in the Flemish clean technology sector, the Flemish Minster of Innovation, Ingrid Lieten, assertively positioned VITO as actor in the Flemish green economy. VITO is the central actor in the three organisations of which i-Cleantech will exist: Flanders Cleantech Association (FCA) is meant to strengthen the networking in the cleantech industry and provide business opportunities for the sector, to create an inventory of the Flemish cleantech sector and boost its international image. The Environmental and Energy Technology Innovation Platform (MIP) is a funding institute for research in cooperation between companies and knowledge actors (see also 5.4.2.). Flanders Transition Arena (FTA) should inform the public about significance of the transition to a sustainable economy. I-Cleantech vzw stirred the political debate in February 2011 because the Financial Inspection suspected that the initiative was merely an umbrella organisation that unnecessarily created new, high-paid jobs. Below the surface and away from the media, in particular the FTA caused unrest within circles of Plan C and DuWoBo because one of its original objectives was to coordinate all transition initiatives in Flanders. Most involved actors feared the dominance of VITO over their processes. For the moment, the precise role of FTA remains vague and is related to communicating towards the population about the need for transitions.

Meanwhile, VITO and OVAM signed a cooperation agreement on 4 May 2011 to act as partners for a green, cyclical economy in Flanders, in particular for stimulating sustainable material use. The cooperation focuses on improving eco-efficiency and eco-effectiveness in business, through common projects and the creation of platforms to stimulate business

68 initiatives. These projects and platforms are primarily aimed at frontrunners that are willing to work with innovative materials, products, services, business models.

Other knowledge actors such as the universities are also seeking their position in the starting materials transition and the green economy. Important examples include KULeuven, that has a front position in materials research with its Materials Research Centre, Ghent University has its Bio-Energy Valley (for bio-based products and bio-energy) and Hasselt University has created its own Cleantech platform.

So, the shift to a sustainable materials discourse gets support from different sides: the government; traditional actors in the waste sector are trying to reposition themselves; the traditional technology and chemical industry that wants to reposition itself as a partner in more sustainable, circular economy; universities and knowledge centres such as VITO. There do not seem to be any major voices that oppose the shift. What is moreover noticeable, is that most of these actors cannot be categorised as small players of niche actors. The regime actors themselves, often larger companies, seem to be moving.

5.5. A change in resources?

New actors that enter a policy arrangement automatically imply a change in resources that are available and in the balance between different actors. Since the transition to a new materials system is only just starting, it is too early to make a detailed analysis of the new distribution of resources, but some elements can be noted.

On the level of financial means, OVAM cannot count on extra resources. Although its tasks are expanding and getting more complex under a sustainable materials orientation, its overall budget remains the same. It was hoped that Plan C could gather a yearly budget of around 465.000 Euro in the Eigen Vermogen structure and 200.000 Euro yearly in the vzw structure. Even though the EV has been replaced by a more informal cooperation agreement between OVAM and other government agencies, the hope still is that the planned budgets can be reached.

The most important change in resources comes from the new actors, such as the technology and chemical industry. These companies and their federations are very influential in the Flemish and Belgian economy as a whole, as well as in the decision-making surrounding socio-economic political priorities. Furthermore, they can count on the growing budgets from innovation funds. An example is SIM, the Strategic Initiative Materials, which was initiated by Agoria in June 2009, in cooperation with universities and research centres and the major materials producing and materials processing companies (including AGC Flat Glass, Agfa Gevaert, Arcelor-Mittal, Bekaert, Recticel, Solvay, Umicore). As part of the Flanders in Action strategy, the Flemish government invested 15 million Euro in SIM in 2009, and 20 million Euro yearly from 2010 onwards. Its aim is to strengthen the competitive position of the Flemish materials industry through basic materials research and the establishment of knowledge platforms that should support industrial valorisation of findings.

Another example form the innovation sector is the MIP3 fund that was launched in October 2010. It provides 5 million Euro for companies and research institutes that want to develop sustainable technologies and products. The manual for writing projects under the MIP3- project call explicitly situates the projects in a transition framework: “Within transition

69 thinking MIP-projects are considered experiments in the transition to a more sustainable economy. These experiments help us to make the abstract concept of a sustainable economy more concrete” (MIP, p. 4). Projects in the materials sphere have to take closing of materials cycle as starting point and the concept of Cradle to Cradle is promoted as guideline for projects.

In the framework of the White Paper on New Industrial Policy (see 5.2.2), the Flemish government created the TINA-fund (Transformation, Innovation and Acceleration Fund), that is since 30 March 2011 operational under the Participatie Maatschappij Vlaanderen (PMV), and that has a capital of 200 million Euros at its disposal. The fund invests in industrial projects of consortia of companies, with the spearhead clusters of the governmental agreement 2009-2014 as priorities. Of the six spearheads, at least three can be of direct relevance for the transition to sustainable materials management: “logistics, transport and supply chain management”, “new materials, nanotechnology and processing industry” and “energy and environment, including smart electricity grids”.

The buildup of knowledge to support the reorientation to a sustainable materials society is growing, but is currently almost exclusively technologically oriented. This is the case as well at the level of companies, research centres (such as VITO or SIRRIS, the research centre of Agoria) as universities. The call that has been launched by the Flemish government in July 2011 for a third generation of Policy Research Centres for the period 2012-2016, contains several Centres that will be of relevance for developing more knowledge on the governance of the required transition. These include a Research Centre “Transition Sustainable Development” and a research centre “Sustainable Materials Management”. This last centre was proposed by OVAM to the Minister of the Environment and approved by the government. It aims to do research on themes such as a system innovation approach to materials management, monitoring and evaluation, the link with socio-economic development, legal conditions and multi-actor governance. Cooperation between these centres could be of importance to strengthen the buildup of knowledge on governance issues, but past experience shows that these centres hardly cooperate.

The legitimacy for developing initiatives and policy towards sustainable materials management and a green economy seems high. All important policy documents are full of green discourse. The reorientation is furthermore to a large extend influenced and supported by policy initiatives at European level, at OECD and global level. Support can also be found in the discourse development and initiatives from important actors such as industry and knowledge centres. The exact meaning and interpretation of central concepts is however open for a lot of contestation.

5.6. Interim conclusions

Part 5 of this paper has tried to give an overview of the change that is currently taking place in the waste system and its policy regime. There are enough indications to state that – at least on the level of the policy arrangement of the regime – we may be witnessing the start of a shift from an arrangement focused on waste to an arrangement focused on materials. This shows in most dimensions of the policy arrangement: • The change in discourse from waste to sustainable materials management is undeniable. It is not only taken up in the Materials Decree and propagated by OVAM as main government actor, it also seems to find support with all actors involved in the

70 waste/materials system: advisory councils, different sectors of the industry, knowledge actors such as universities and VITO, and ngo’s. Furthermore, the new discourse was deemed ripe enough by the Minister of the Environment to bring it to the European level during the Belgian presidency and to promote it as a flagship for ViA. • The change in discourse finds a translation in the rules of the Materials Decree, at least potentially. The hard requirements of the Decree still stick to the requirements of the Waste Framework Directive, but several openings have been made in the Decree that allow for the development of policy on the basis of a materials orientation. The actual form governance will take in the new materials system is still unformed, but for the moment the trusted approach of government taking the lead and searching for back-up from stakeholders through consultations seems to prevail. • New actors are entering the policy arrangement, while the old ones are reformulating their position. In the case of OVAM this also led to an internal restructuring which should better prepare the organisation for the challenges of the governance of the materials system. The traditional waste industry is trying to reposition itself as suppliers of secondary materials. The new entrants such as the technological and chemical industry represent important sections of the Flemish industry. Their entrance gives the new materials orientation more strategic importance. Important knowledge actors such as VITO and several universities are also preparing themselves to play a role. Most of these actors are regime actors and cannot be labelled as niche actors. • The resources and distribution of resources in the system are changing. New actors such as (the members of) Agoria and Essenscia bring in important financial and lobbying power. Furthermore they succeed in attracting support from traditional innovation funds. This seems less the case with the actors that until now dominated the waste system. In particular OVAM, which is currently taking the lead in the materials orientation, cannot count on extra financial means for the moment, even though its tasks are expanding and getting more complex. Even if a Plan C vzw is created, supported by a cooperation of OVAM and other government agencies, this will remain a small player in the materials system that is taking shape. On the other hand, the sustainable materials discourse has acquired legitimacy through interlinked policy initiatives at different levels and OVAM has been recognised as one of the Flemish initiators and frontrunners.

While these changes on the level of the policy arrangement are taking place, it remains to be seen how they will turn out in actual practices of policy as well as in industrial practices. Policy and industrial practices are still in their infancy. They may be further supported, though, by the other development I described, namely the entry of both the sustainable materials discourse and the transition discourse in different policy areas such as the socio- economic innovation process ViA and sustainable development policy (with the VSDO). First, we see how sustainable materials management is not only a new approach to waste, but how it is being regarded as an essential component of a greener economy. Second, the transitions approach seems to offer a framework for thinking about the ViA ambitions, while it also offers a method to discuss this change with a broad range of stakeholders and search for co- creation of policies. It is too early to judge which form this co-creation will be taking and which kind of content will be discussed. Keeping in mind the ambitions of the ViA-process – turning Flanders into a competitive and innovative society, the top 5 of Europe by 2020 – it will not be self-evident to make the deep changes that transition studies propose at the level of structure, culture and practices, the focus of policy attention.

The changes that can be observed in the waste/materials system and the changes in the innovation discourse are the result of a combination of factors: pressures from landscape level,

71 developments at regime level and new initiatives at niche level. Plan C is one factor amongst many: the analysis shows that Plan C has had influence on current developments, in particular on the discourse that is being used at several places. Further, several actors have found inspiration in the Plan C approach to sep up their own initiatives (such as the FISCH initiative of Essenscia). Yet, the first major initiative that is currently being taken at political level – the Materials Pact to be developed by June 2012 – seems to provide no explicit room for Plan C. Furthermore, it was not possible to create a legal EV structure for Plan C under the Materials Decree, although a more informal form of cooperation has been inscribed, but this still has to take shape. It can thus be said that the current position and the role of Plan C in the arrangement that is being formed, is under-defined: the only task description that is currently available for the future of Plan C is the business plan that was discussed in part 4. It was shown there that the implementation of that business plan is hindered by factors at the level of the different dimensions (discourse, actors, rules, resources) of the embryonic policy arrangement that Plan C tries to be. Therefore, one of the most urgent tasks of Plan C seems to be to redefine its role and position, taking into account the new and rapidly changing context with which it is confronted.

72 6. In search of policy lessons: understanding change and stability in policy

As said in the introduction, the goal of this paper is to investigate the position and role of a transition management process such as Plan C in the reorientation of waste policy, how and why this TM process has influence (or not), which characteristics this influence has, and what the interaction is between this TM process and the broader political and societal context. The policy arrangement approach, in combination with the multi-level perspective, was used to chart the changes taking place. This has delivered a balanced image of the role of Plan C. The TM approach was useful for renewing the waste discourse and for creating a network of frontrunners around this discourse. Both have had an influence on what is currently happening in the starting shift from a waste to a materials regime. Their influence also goes beyond the strict waste/materials system and is a factor in how sustainable materials management is being perceived as an important element of a greener economy and a more sustainable society. Furthermore, the transition element of the approach is taken up in sustainable development policy, and more important, in the currently most influential socio-economic Flemish innovation process ViA. The analysis has also shown that Plan C is just one factor among many that explain these evolutions. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the dynamic Plan C process of 2006-2008 could not be maintained during the last two years and that at the moment Plan C has difficulty in finding its position in a rapidly changing policy environment.

In this part of the paper, I look at some of the mechanisms that underlie these kind of developments and that can help to understand how change is happening and/or how stability is maintained (6.1.). I then try to characterise the occurring changes on the basis of the policy arrangements literature as discussed in part 2 (6.2.) and make a brief comparison with insights from international research on political implications of TM (6.3.).

6.1. Mechanisms at work

Political science has provided a lot of explanations for how and why policies change, or how and why they remain stable. These range from explanations that focus on how the actions of self-interested decision-makers shape politics, over explanations focusing on the constraints to change that are imposed by institutions, to explanations that stress the influence of ideas. In this section, I highlight some mechanisms that stand out in the Plan C case and its relation with change and stability in the waste/materials regime and with change and stability in policies beyond the waste/materials regime. Finally, there are some thoughts on policy recommendations.

6.1.1. Converging policy streams and the role of policy entrepreneurs

The importance of converging policy streams for the breakthrough of a particular agenda shows several times in the Plan C case. It already happens at the very beginning of the process, when the BBB reform, the internal policy developments in OVAM and the MINA-plan with its project 1 converge to create an opportunity that leads to the start of Plan C. It happens again when developments at EU level such as the Waste Framework Directive and the Raw Materials Initiative, and the OECD SMM process, are integrated by OVAM to bring the materials agenda to the legal domain in the Materials Decree (including a specific place for

73 Plan C). And it shows in the tying together of agendas through the transitions and green economy discourse in ViA.

It seems that an intelligent tying together of dynamics at different levels is important to further a transition agenda. At the moment such a “policy window” (Kingdon 1984) opens, changes can go faster than at other times. However, this does not happen as an automatism but needs “policy entrepreneurs” (ibid.) or “institutional entrepreneurs” (Lowndes 2005) that recognize the possibility for change, see the opportunity and are able to combine agendas. In the case of Plan C, a name that is often mentioned in this respect is Walter Tempst (OVAM), who according to one interviewee “is someone who is constantly alert for opportunities in which different initiatives can be combined” (societal actor). Tempst is not the only one, however, because several public servants (from OVAM and other administrations) testify for example that they try to follow a kind of “detour”-strategy: initiatives that are unfamiliar to a policy environment – such as transition management – can be supported by using ongoing dynamics in other policy fields or at other levels (such as the EU). “What you have to do is try to make documents that tie in with what higher levels say that can happen, for example when Peeters [the Flemish Minister-President] and ViA say ‘transformation’, then you already have a headstart. And then you have to look how you can make it operational (…) You have to be ready at the right moment, and you need a capacity for drawing up documents that respond to a willingness from above and that you push a little bit further into the direction of topics that of which they do not even realise that they fall outside the traditional path” (civil servant) Furthermore, this can work in two directions. Interviewees explain how, on the one hand, initiatives as international level (EU, OECD) can be used to push forward Flemish initiatives such as Plan C; on the other hand, the EU and the OECD always look at existing initiatives in member states when developing new ideas. When intelligently using this reciprocal dynamics, even a small state or region can make a difference and become a good practice to be followed by other countries. This is the case with Flemish waste management and several interviewees hope this may become the case with sustainable materials management.

6.1.2. The influence of discourse

The discourse of sustainable materials management in general, and the Plan C interpretation of it, seem to be one of the major influences in the evolutions that are currently taking place in the waste/materials system. In his analysis of the Dutch energy transition, Kern also found that discourse (or storylines) was a major factor in explaining policy and institutional changes (Kern 2009) 33 . Some of the mechanisms that he distinguishes also appear in the Plan C case (ibid., p. 173-189): • New storylines transform interests: a new discourse can redefine a policy problem and lead actors to redefine their interests. The SMM discourse clearly redefines the waste/materials problem. The analysis shows how important actors are also redefining their interests: FEBEM members want to change from waste handlers to material suppliers, materials companies begin perceiving existing products as a source of materials and urban mining, the chemical sector is discovering sustainable chemistry as innovation strategy. The new discourse also has an influence on government agencies such as OVAM, that

33 Kern himself builds in particular on the work of Maarten Hajer and Vivien Schmidt.

74 discovers its interest in positioning itself as an innovation partner in ViA and the green economy debate. • A new storyline can have a positioning effect and be functional for actors’ strategies: a new storyline redefines an actor as a problem solver, or as a perpetrator, or as a victim (or something else). This may be functional for other strategies actors adhere to. In particular storylines that have a certain malleability can be used this way, because they allow actors to re-interpret a policy idea in a way which links with established norms or policies. This happened for example within OVAM, where the materials discourse was formulated in such a way that it was not a new task, but something OVAM had already been working on for years. Another example is the translation of the transitions storyline to the ViA- process: the interpretative flexibility of the transition idea provides an opportunity to connect it with the transformation agenda focused on competition and innovation, and to focus in particular on aspects of co-creation and stakeholder involvement. • Need for sensory experience: this mechanism refers to the role of direct contact with problems or new solutions, but also to the role of meetings, group discussions, symposia and face-to-face contact with experts. These experiences generate credibility and trust and are thus important in processes of change and persuasion. The intensive arena process during the early phases of Plan C was important for building the initial network of ‘believers’ in the materials storyline and it created trust within OVAM that the new discourse was robust enough to build policy on it. It also worked in the direction of stakeholders that got acquainted with another side of OVAM and OVAM officials. An interviewee recalls how “Plan C has been helpful here to talk in less traditional settings and from a less defensive position. It also changed the attitude of some actors towards us. In a traditional setting, in which the government is preparing new legislation, their main concern is ‘please, not too much red tape’, (…) but at such moments you don’t get real debates about innovation and green economy. That’s something Plan C made possible.” (civil servant) • Policy domains have historically grown, structured ways of arguing. These can be used to give a new storyline more credibility, but they can also limit the impact of the new storyline. By presenting SMM as an innovation exercise and as part of a green economy, OVAM and Plan C are able to catch the attention of the ongoing ViA debate about the transformation of the Flemish economy. However, the innovation domain has always stressed technological innovation at the service of competitiveness and economic growth. The consequence may be that some elements of the transition discourse – such as the need to put the regime under pressure, or the alert consumer pathway of Plan C – may disappear from view. An example of how this mechanism works, can be found in the White Paper on New Industrial Policy that takes elements from the materials transitions discourse but places them exclusively in a competition and productivity discourse. • Looking for new ideas from outside: policy makers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo can lead them to start looking for lessons from elsewhere to rejuvenate their own policy domain. Examples in the Plan C case are obvious. The TM approach, developed and used in the Netherlands, was brought in by OVAM to broaden its waste policy. Presently, the transition discourse is transferred to the ViA process to help in long-term thinking and co- creation.

So, ideas (discourse) are important in explaining policy change, but they do not function unambiguously. Ideas get interpreted in a particular context and can there acquire new meanings or lose others. Plan C was first in Flanders to better define the meaning of sustainable materials management and has had influence on policy and several initiatives. But now that new actors are moving in, different interpretations of sustainable materials

75 management may gain ground. This is also the case with the meaning of transitions and transition management. Other researchers (such as Kern 2009, Vosz et al. 2009) have noted the interpretative flexibility of these concepts. Now that they are being used in different forums, their meaning and application in practice may begin to shift. In particular when being applied in environments that have strong historically grown ways of arguing – such as the economic and innovation policy field – the concepts may lose their flavour of radical change and become embedded in a rather business-as-usual competition and productivity discourse.

6.1.3. The prevailing modes of policy-making

Attempts at new forms of governance, such as a transition management process (Plan C), have to find their way amongst existing practices of policy-making. Several interviewees refer to this when they assert that new governance practices remain quite problematic, in particular when they transcend individual policy domains and competences, such as is the case with the sustainable materials agenda: it does not only touch on questions of waste and materials, but has important links to the energy system, the food system, product development and to more generic policies such as innovation and technology policy or socio-economic policies. Most interviewees think that the linking of such different agenda’s demands some form of long- term strategic thinking and horizontal coordination between policy departments. The lack of this kind of coordination hinders the institutionalisation of The Plan C agenda. At least two dynamics play a role here.

The first is the administrative logic that rules the functioning of departments. Traditionally, the functioning of departments has been subject to compartmentalization, and this has not diminished with the BBB-reform that I referred to above: a reform building on principles of New Public Management, with a strict assignment of competences to administrations that functions as an obstacle in tackling multi-dimensional problems. The general principle is that the approach to such problems should be discussed in the highest administrative body, the CAG (Committee of Administrator-Generals), and that appropriate actions for cooperation or harmonisation should be taken. In practice, this does not lead to structural initiatives, although some interviewees think that the experiences with ViA may lead to new forms of cooperation. It is somewhat ironical of course, that it is also the BBB-reform that has created room for the materials orientation within OVAM. So, this dynamic does not work unidirectional. Still, it is revealing that in its advice on the EV Plan C, the advisory council on administrative matters VLABEST (Vlaamse Adviesraad voor Bestuurszaken) states that it understands why OVAM looks for a structure outside BBB: according to the council the BBB-reform did not prepare the Flemish administration for complex, domain-exceeding challenges (see also 4.1.5). VLABEST advises the Flemish government to quickly evaluate and adapt its set of institutional instruments because of “a policy context that attaches ever more importance to an inclusive and transversal approach of important societal questions, with all relevant stakeholders (cf. coalition agreement, VIA, pact 2020, VSDO …)” (VLABEST 2011, p. 3).

A second dynamic is a result of the political decision-making culture. The logic dominating a lot of Flemish government politics is one of mutual exchange of space to act and score: individual ministers guard over their competences, on the one hand not allowing others to interfere, on the other hand giving each other free play in their respective domains. But as said already, new policy questions such as a sustainable materials agenda transcend individual policy domains and competences, so this logic becomes more difficult to apply. Several interviewees relate to experiences where this leads to either blockages because individual

76 political agendas cannot be transcended, or a multiplication of initiatives because everyone wants to occupy part of the terrain with his of her own initiative. One of the interviewees formulates the challenge as “countering blocking mechanisms and finding a modus vivendi to allow scoring with common results. We should try to organise the governance of domain- transcending problems in such a way that it allows for ‘co-development’ and ‘co-glory’” (civil servant).

One of the results of the combination of these two dynamics is a multiplication of initiatives from different ministers and ministries, for example in the domain of innovation and economic policy. The challenge for Plan C, an initiative that was launched as part of environmental policy, is to position itself in this complicated tangle of different action plans, initiatives, funding mechanisms etcetera, and to find suitable partners to take its agenda forward. The failure of finding a place for the Plan C EV in the Materials Decree can be interpreted as result of these prevailing modes of policy-making. Although OVAM and the Minister of the Environment argued that new forms of cooperation between administrations were necessary to support the Plan C process, and that they tried to show with extensive legal argumentation that the EV Plan C was the most suited form for this, the proposal was not in line with the structures of the BBB-reform. This led to a blockade of one of the government parties (N-VA) against the proposal. This brings some closely involved actors to the conclusion that there is a gap between on the one hand initiating and supporting a governance experiment such as Plan C, seeing what happens and using some of its results, and on the other hand taking steps that go beyond a business-as-usual scenario and changing established structures and procedures.

6.2. Characterising the developments around Plan C

In part 2.2. I described how Arts and Leroy define three types of emergence of new policy arrangements (Arts and Leroy 2006) and how Kern and Howlett (2009) distinguish four processes that determine the outcome of efforts for policy renewal. Is it possible to characterise the Plan C process and its results, using these insights?

Arts and Leroy see three types of how policy arrangements emerge (cf. 2.2.). One possibility is the introduction of a new arrangement that next has to succeed in maintaining itself as a more or less autonomous arrangement. Since in its dimensions (discourse, actors, rules, resources) it differs quite importantly from the existing waste arrangement, a TM process such as Plan C could possibly lead to such a new arrangement. However, this potential that surfaced during the first two years, has clearly not been realised. The main change that is currently visible can be characterised through the second form of renewal that Arts and Leroy observe: the discursive and/or organisational renewal of existing policy arrangements. A new discourse was introduced through Plan C and in combination with institutional changes (such as the Materials Decree), this currently leads to a renewal of the existing arrangement: a discourse around sustainable materials management, new actors that enter the arrangement and traditional actors that reposition themselves, new resources entering the arrangement, and rules that can potentially be reformulated on the basis of the Materials Decree (but that are currently largely unchanged).

The third form of renewal that Arts and Leroy define – integration of arrangements – seems to be a possibility for the future. Since the (formal and informal) rules of this broader arrangement are still under construction, there is manoeuvring room for Plan C to find its own

77 position. Plan C may become embedded and hierarchically nested as a TM-arrangement within the broader materials arrangement, where OVAM is the main government actor. With the establishment of a Eigen Vermogen Plan C structure under the Materials Decree, this could even have been given a headstart. In spite of the abandonment of the EV Plan C, also the cooperation between OVAM and other government agencies that has been inscribed in the Materials Decree, can still imply an evolution towards an integration between arrangements.

Kern and Howlett distinguish four processes that determine the outcome of efforts for policy renewal (cf 2.2.). If we compare these to the Plan C case, it can be argued that during the first years, Plan C as a TM-process seems an example of ‘layering’: new goals (the TM vision and pathways) and instruments (the arena with its TM-approach) are added to old ones in an existing regime without abandoning previous ones. However, meanwhile the waste regime is reinventing itself as a materials regime. But the instruments to do this are not yet in place, although there are clear intentions to develop them. This looks currently more like ‘drift’: new goals replace old ones without changing the instruments used to implement them. The main new instrument that was available to work towards new goals, Plan C, is itself somewhat adrift, while OVAM is still in the preparation phase of new instruments (in particular in its policy innovation division). The whole analysis thus shows the difficulty of policy renewal in a fast changing environment. New and old policy goals and instruments exist along side each other and consequently create complex coordination problems.

These kind of observations are not unique, though, for the Flemish Plan C process and the embedment in its context. Similar experiences can be found in TM processes in the Netherlands, such as in the best studied process, the Dutch energy transition. Kern and Howlett observe that at the time when the energy transition was implemented in 2001, the Dutch energy regime was already complex, and that after the implementation “a sub-optimal regime has emerged based on the layering of new policy goals (energy security, long-term ‘system innovation) and instruments ( (…), energy transition project) upon an existing regime based on liberalization” (Kern and Howlett 2009, p. 401).

An overview article by Vosz et al. (2009) presents an opportunity to compare the analysis of Plan C more systematically with results and observations of international research on transition management. Voss et al. examine the main results of research into transition management such as I defined it above – with the typical characteristics of transition arenas, pathways, experiments. A lot of this research has been based on the experiences in the Netherlands, such as the Dutch energy transition process and the mobility transition process. Figure 6 gives an overview of the results of Voss et al. What is of interest here, is whether their conclusions on “transition management in practice” (third column of figure 6) can also be observed in the case of Plan C. I make a brief comparison. • Goals . The goal of TM is to contribute to realising a transition in important socio- technical systems, such as the waste and materials system, but Voss et al. find that in practice, the goal is often narrowed to promotion of technological niches with commercial potential for the world market. This does not seem to be case for Plan C, where from the beginning the goals were formulated as a combination of ecological modernisation and transformation elements that go beyond technological niches and market opportunities. Also today, Plan C still uses a broad discourse on sustainable development and is thus close to what Voss et al. perceive as necessary in a re-design of TM. • Organisation of transition arena . TM-theory advises to work with a combination of visionary regime actors and innovative newcomers, but in practice arenas are often dominated by regime incumbents with vested interests, according to Voss et al. Plan C has

78

Figure 6. A summary of experiences with transition management (from Voss et al. 2009). The second column summarises the propositions of TM- theory on central design issues of TM. The third column summarises actual experiences, mainly drawn from research in Dutch TM-processes. The fourth column contains proposals from Voss et al. to improve TM.

been able to follow closely the theoretical advice and consisted during the first two years of a dynamic combination of frontrunners from regime and niches. The problem since 2009 has rather been the opposite of the one in the Netherlands: it has been difficult to keep regime incumbents on board. More in particular, it proved impossible to keep business representatives aboard in the strategic steering organs of Plan C (such as SCIA and SCOO), while in the autonomy discussion, several powerful actors are hesitant to commit themselves. While this hesitation can partly be explained by the absence of a government decision on stable funding, it also shows signs of interest and power games. The power to withhold commitment and/or keep others in uncertainty about commitment, constantly reminds engaged actors of the possible fragility of the process. It also testifies to the constant weighing up of pros and cons that actors make in deciding between commitments to different processes. As one actor phrased it: “Do I need Plan C for what I want to do? Is Plan C the right channel or can I reach my objectives through other means, other platforms?” (societal actor). • Role of visions . In TM-theory, visions are constructed by the frontrunners in the arena and are meant to give guidance to strategic choices (such as transition pathways) and design of experiments. In TM-practice, Voss et al. find that visions are often constructed by incumbents and that they lack concreteness to inform strategies or select experiments. In the Plan C case, the leitbild has been created by the first transition arena that consisted mainly of visionary regime players and some niche players. During the second phase of Plan C, the leitbild could be translated in five transition pathways and 33 experiments, and at later moments, even more proposals for experiments were formulated. The problem for Plan C has never been to draw strategic orientation or experiments ideas from the leitbild , but rather to make the step towards concrete implementation. • Experimentation . A TM-process should lead to a portfolio of practical experiments that can inspire and initiate system innovation in existing socio-technical systems. In practice, all kinds of experiments are supported but political choices for or against particular technologies in a frame of system innovation for sustainable development are evaded. In Plan C, a procedure has been designed to select experiments and link them to the leitbild and transition pathways. The framework has been used for developing experiment ideas and coaching several projects, but the step towards entrepreneurial action remains problematic, partly because a lack of funding hinders connecting the procedure to project proposals. Furthermore, differences of opinion exist within the SCIA on the desirability of a specific procedure for approving experiments. In any case, the lack of tangible examples of what sustainable materials management means in practice, risks to reduce Plan C to mainly discourse and in that way undermine its credibility. • Evaluation and learning . With respect to selection, implementation and evaluation of experiments, TM is based in principles of evolutionary economics where the transition vision is meant as an alternative selection environment that can influence market choices towards projects with system innovation potential. However, Voss et al. state that experiments are mainly evaluated on narrow techno-economic criteria, such as short-term cost effectiveness and potential economic success. In the case of Plan C, this characteristic is difficult to judge, on the one hand due to the lack of clearly defined experiments linked to Plan C, on the other hand because hardly any explicit learning or evaluation has been undertaken. • Sources of legitimacy . In theory, TM should derive its legitimacy from the road towards more sustainable development that society is supposed to take. In practice, Voss et al. find that legitimacy builds on the features of participants, such as their current economic and technological position or their expertise. The experience in Plan C is more mixed. The process partly derives its legitimacy from the growing perception that the switch from waste to sustainable materials management is unavoidable. Over the last two years, this has been further strengthened by policy documents at regional, national and international level. However, it is also obvious that this does not seem enough to maintain a dynamic process. The fact that important business actors are hesitant about further active engagement in the process, coupled with the refusal of the government to provide an autonomous legal structure for funding the process, threatens to undermine the legitimacy. So also here, we find that features of participants are important for legitimacy. • Embedding in political context . TM theory supposes that an enlightened government perceives the need for transitions and for a new governance approach to initiate these, because conventional policy approaches do not seem able to resolve the encountered, persistent problems. The vision and transition pathways of the TM process can then be framed as the long-term policy perspective within which current policies have to evolve, and the new networks and experiments as first steps on the transition curve. In practice, however, the transition discourse is presented as an innovation in governance but hardly implemented, because existing institutions and power constellations succeed in reformulating the original TM concept in such a way that it fits their interests. In the case of Plan C, we see how OVAM and the Flemish government perceive the need to innovate waste policy and reorient the waste system, and strategically use a TM-process to initiate this transition. The analysis of Plan C showed that the process has had influence on the discourse of the regime and on several actors. It thus contributed to the change processes that are currently developing. However, it is equally clear that the new governance approach mainly worked when Plan C was still relatively closed and shielded from outside pressures and from the need to position itself in the rapidly evolving political and societal context. Now that the change seems to have been set in motion, it is less obvious which role Plan C can and should play.

This discussion reveals that the experiences in Plan C are not fully identical to the Dutch experiences. Plan C is less techno-centred and has been more shielded from pressures from incumbents. An important underlying reason is probably the fact that it was a rather small- scale process, with limited means available, that could develop in the shadow of policy. When the shielded environment falls away, it becomes much more difficult to find a position in a rapidly evolving policy environment, in particular when the process is ambitious but hindered by limited funding and a lack of clarity about its legal status. At that moment, problems surface around legitimacy and embedding in the political context. But should that come as a surprise?

That is the question James Meadowcroft asks when discussing the experiences of the Dutch TM-processes. I end these reflections on the characteristics of Plan C with a long and thoughtful quotation from Meadowcroft, that is also relevant for the Plan C case. Meadowcroft states that innovative forms of policy innovation never entirely escape “the orbit of economic and political power”. And he continues: “It is entirely understandable that transition-management-in-practice looks a bit more like policy-as-usual than would be recommended by transition-management-in-theory . What is surprising is that an idea that explicitly talks of system change ever got adopted into official circles in the first place. And the fact that regime actors have been motivated to participate in transition arenas and experiments tells us that at some level they take these initiatives seriously—at least seriously enough to allocate the time of important personnel. Of course, ‘regime players’ (like other players) may try to bend the process to accommodate their interests. But if they were not at the table this would be as likely to indicate that the transition management initiative was entirely irrelevant to real

81 developments as to signal that it was the seat of breakthrough anti-regime innovation. In any case, transition management is itself an experiment, so it may be possible to do better in the future—to draw lessons and try to increase openness and reflexivity of future iterations. Most importantly, reflexivity in governance for sustainable development should be understood primarily as a property of the governance system as a whole, rather than as a special product of transition forums. It is something that can occur in many sites and across many levels of the governance system (Hendriks and Grin 2008). Research institutes, educational establishments, business and civil society organizations, and representative political bodies can all contribute. Of course, transition arenas may contribute to this process, but much will necessarily take place within a wider institutional matrix” (Meadowcroft 2009, p. 336).

6.3. Some recommendations

The analysis made in this paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the characteristics that a transition management process such as Plan C exhibits, to insights in the role such a process can play in innovation of policy and to opportunities it creates and problems it encounters. The results in this paper have partly grown out of literature and document study and interviews, and partly out of participating observation, numerous discussions during Plan C meetings, during personal contacts, and also several moments of explicit feedback on research design and on interim results by people that are involved in the Plan C process itself or in the growing Flemish transition community. The results are thus also partly a result of co-creation between a researcher and practitioners. They do not attempt to be ‘objective and final truths’ about Plan C from a detached observer, but hope to be acceptable claims of how Plan C and the context it functions in, work.

A comparable reasoning holds for the policy recommendations that follow. The presentation of the interim results of this research about Plan C (on 14 March 2011) led SCIA-members to propose an “initiative group” to prepare a discussion on the future positioning and structure of Plan C. The following recommendations should not be read as the infallible advice of an ‘objective’ researcher, but as elements of the ongoing discussion about the position and role of Plan C, based in the preceding analysis. So, which direction for Plan C?

1. Thinking about the future role of Plan C preferably starts from an analysis of the position the process had in the past and the position it currently has. When OVAM initiated the process, it was intended as a way of reorienting its waste policy. The transition management approach that was used to initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse for Flanders about sustainable materials management and in starting a network of frontrunners that, certainly until 2008, was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management. But it can be argued that during the last two years, political and societal dynamics have accelerated and have more or less overtaken the TM-process Plan C: important companies and business networks claim that they are starting to implement SMM, research institutes are investing in knowledge generation on SMM, the SMM discourse finds its way in socio-economic innovation policies such as ViA and the green economy, European policies initiatives (e.g. on resource efficiency, raw materials) are shaping the policy environment and – not in the least – OVAM itself wants to be a central player in the starting transition. The result of these dynamics is that a lot of actors have moved towards Plan C’s position and also occupy part of the SMM-terrain, invariably supported by more financial resources and organisational capacity. From the lone player

82 on a previously almost unoccupied terrain, Plan C has become one small player among many. Furthermore, it cannot count on the legal status that was hoped for in the Materials Decree. So, recommendation 1 : make a detailed analysis of Plan C’s current position and how this relates to the position of other actors and the developments in different policy streams. It is the ambition of this paper to serve as a valuable part of that analysis. 2. If the analysis in 1 can more or less be shared, the next step should be to ask oneself which specific role Plan C can play in this new and fast evolving context. In my opinion, the analysis presented in this paper shows that Plan C has at least two features that make it still unique in the new setting: a. Most actors take a view towards SMM that is almost exclusively technologically and economically driven. This view gets more and more support though different policy instruments and funding mechanisms (such as MIP3) and thus seems to be finding its way. Plan C has from the beginning stressed the importance of socio - technical innovation. This broader perspective is, according to transition theory, inevitable for initialising deep changes in incumbent regimes, because it not only builds on technology and economic incentives, but states the necessity to combine these with changes in political and social institutions, social organisation, knowledge and capabilities of various actors, cultural meanings, everyday practices, routines and lifestyles. This is not a plea against technological experiments, on the contrary. Plan C should also intervene in the technology debate, but through embedding these kind of experiments and learning from them in a broader societal perspective, with a set of actors that goes beyond the traditional triangle industry-science-government, with goals that start from societal needs, with an approach that balances technological with different forms of social innovation, and with not only product and process innovation but system innovation on the agenda. Articulating this point of view, trying to set up projects/experiments in this vein, gathering learning experiences about socio- technical changes, defining policy directions and giving policy advice can not only be a unique position of Plan C, but is also a necessary addition to the prevailing socio-economic and innovation policy discourse that is predominantly technology- driven and based in economic competitiveness. Recommendation 2a : create a distinct profile for Plan C by focusing on what makes the sustainability transitions discourse unique, namely its emphasis on socio-technical system innovation. This point of view is currently underdeveloped in the starting sustainable materials transition. b. Plan C has built experience with transition governance, which is not the case for other initiatives in the materials system. The basic analysis under transition governance – that current problems in regimes cannot only be solved with traditional policy approaches – has lost none of its relevance. So, a transition governance process on materials still has a role to play in the Flemish context, but the pallet now has to be broadened beyond the TM approach. The vision and transition pathways – updated if so desired – can still serve as orientation, and trying to set up experiments remains necessary. However, these typical TM- activities are probably not enough in the new context. A working programme could be designed that also draws inspiration from other transition governance approaches, such as the TIS-approach (Hekkert et al. 2007) or the modernisation approach (Grin 2010, Grin and Van Staveren 2007). In the TIS case, this involves not only experimenting, but particularly trying to influence the conditions and functions that the innovation system has to fulfil in which the experiment is

83 embedded. The modernisation approach tries to combine a strengthening of agency at niche-level (through explicit attention to learning processes and buildup of power, trust and legitimacy in niches) with a redesign of structures at regime level (through e.g. policy advice and lobbying activities). This redesign can be inspired by the vision and by the problems and solutions found in innovative practices. Additionally, and in the light of point a., it is necessary to investigate whether Plan C should not link up more with social movements (such as the Transition Network Civil Society) to build a broader base for change in the materials system. Recommendation 2b : update the vision and pathways of Plan C, but do not only rely on these typical TM ingredients for developing Plan C activities. Invest in activities that build up learning and power in niches, and that aim at redesign of structural conditions. Connect with different networks, not only business and technology networks, but also networks that aim for societal change beyond technology. Do not forget to reserve time for collecting learning experiences and discussing them. 3. An important question is from which position Plan C would be able to fulfil such a programme. As shown in the analysis, Plan C’s position vis-à-vis OVAM’s own ambitions and initiatives in the frame of a materials transition, and its position vis-à-vis processes such as ViA and other innovation programmes, is currently far from obvious. Although Plan C has aspired to an autonomous position over the last few years, it has become clear that the process remains strongly reliant on OVAM, and furthermore, that OVAM is not willing to let the process simply drift away. The consequences of inscribing in the Materials Decree a cooperation between OVAM and other government agencies are not fully clear yet at the moment of writing, but it is probable that at least in the short term, this has only reinforced the dependence on OVAM. It therefore seems logical that a renewed dialogue between OVAM and the actors involved in Plan C is needed about the role and position of the process. A clearly defined role in the coming materials transition and the starting Flemish green economy, strongly backed up by OVAM (and other cooperating government agencies), can possibly revive Plan C and start a new process of learning how to do transition governance in practice. Recommendation 3 : clarify the position of the government agencies involved in Plan C, in particular OVAM’s position. Negotiate a well-defined role for Plan C in relation to OVAM’s tasks in the materials transition, and demand a well-defined role in socio- economic innovation policies such as ViA and its derived initiatives such as the Flemish flagship sustainable materials management and the Round Table on sustainable materials management. 4. Obviously, such a revival requires an organisational structure and a funding base that are suited for the role that is being defined. The draft business plan that has been developed for the vzw Plan C seems a good starting point, but several of its preconditions have not yet been fulfilled. First, it supposes a stable funding base from government sources, and since the EV Plan C is no longer available, this will depend on the cooperation agreement between different government agencies (OVAM, EWI, DAR, VITO). Second, it requires an active and engaged cooperation between the central members of the vzw. It is currently far from clear how engaged these partners are and in how far they see themselves as owner of the process. Third, it requires a solution for the problem of funding experiments. Since most actors do not think Plan C has to manage its own experiment fund, it will be necessary to investigate how specific transition experiment funding can be attached to existing innovation funds. Recommendation 4a : negotiate a stable and adequate funding base from government sources. Do not start a vzw Plan C without clear engagements.

84 Recommendation 4b : clarify the positions of potential vzw partners and their willingness to actively invest in Plan C. Recommendation 4c : negotiate specific transition experiment funding as part of existing innovation funds, or try to link ongoing projects to Plan C. 5. Referring to the quotation of Meadowcroft earlier (6.3.), it should on the one hand be realised that transition governance processes remain experiments in their own right, searching for new forms of openness and reflexivity in governance. On the other hand, while transition platforms such as Plan C are places to experiment with such approaches, the openness and reflexivity of the governance system as a whole has to increase. This is thus also a task for more traditional institutions and public and private actors that operate in the waste/materials system and beyond. Recommendation 5 : give advice on how institutions and public and private actors that are part of the materials system can increase their openness to new governance approaches such as transition governance.

Apart from these specific recommendations on Plan C there are other lessons that can be learned for transition governance (including TM) from the experiences so far. These are mostly related to the mechanisms and characterisation that were discussed earlier in this chapter (6.1.-6.2.). A concise overview: • Policy entrepreneurs that are able to connect between policy streams are important to bring a process forward. While such entrepreneurs can come from different backgrounds, it is noticeable that in this case they are often civil servants, or in other words, people that are part of the ‘policy regime’. To be able to make these connections, they need to have a relatively good overview of ongoing developments at regime level, while simultaneously being able to link these with the ambitions of the TM process. A TM process that hopes for some form of success, needs these kind of people. • The role of different regime actors to take the process forward shows throughout the whole case study. This works in two directions: sometimes as a stimulus, sometimes as an obstacle. This is most visible in the roles played by OVAM and industry in the process. From the beginning, OVAM has been essential as a driving force behind Plan C and it may be even more now, but its search for an adequate relation with Plan C has also at times hindered the process. After an initial phase of interest that was important for profiling Plan C, the hesitating position of industry representatives in committing themselves to the process has brought uncertainty and a lack of possibilities to connect with ongoing projects. This role of regime players resonates with Grin’s point (Grin, forthcoming) that a reconsideration of TM’s strong focus on frontrunners may be necessary, leading to a better balance with strategies that also aim at influencing regime players. • The previous point does not mean that frontrunners are unimportant. The Plan C case clearly shows how they are necessary to break open a discourse and create dynamics that go beyond existing regime practices. According to TM theory this should further be supported by experiments that create visible, tangible examples of the ideas. The limited amount of such experiments in the Plan C case and of other projects that can be linked to Plan C, risks to reduce Plan C to pure discourse and undermine the credibility of the process. This need of showing tangible results is something that should be kept in mind during the further development of Plan C, in particular since sustainable materials management is as yet far from a common practice (in contrast to for example sustainable housing and building, where the Flemish DuWoBo TM-process is less in need of its own experiments because large segments of the building sector are experimenting and realising examples of sustainable building in practice).

85 • The case study shows that discourse is an important element in explaining policy change. A new discourse, such as the ‘sustainable materials’ or the ‘transitions’ discourse, can redefine a policy problem and lead actors to redefine their interests. However, discourses are not stable and do not function unambiguously. Ideas get interpreted in a particular context and can there acquire new meanings or lose other meanings. This is in particular the case when new actors move in and when discourses find their way in environments that have strong historically grown ways of arguing, such as the economic and innovation policy field. This implies that TM processes constantly have to be sensitive to discourse development and interpretation, for example through guarding over interpretations, adapting their discourse to new environments, or bringing discourse up to date in a changing context. • TM processes such as Plan C inevitably run into existing structures and modes of policy- making. In the case of policy, this can be interpreted as “alarm signals” of how structures and institutions do not function adequately to tackle domain-exceeding challenges such as sustainable materials management. In the Plan C case, this even led to an advice from VLABEST to the Flemish government to adapt its institutional instruments. Experiences with TM processes can thus serve to identify obstacles in integrated and long-term policy development. • The case also shows the difficulty of policy renewal in a fast changing environment. New and old policy goals and instruments exist along side each other and consequently create complex coordination problems. Although this observation is not unique for Flemish policy or the Plan C process, it shows the need for transition practitioners to be aware of this context and search for ways to increase coherence, consistency and congruence with other policies as a way of gaining influence (cf. 2.2. and footnote 4). Taking time for learning from experience in the development of new policy approaches such as TM, can simplify this difficult task somewhat. • Methodologically, the TM-approach starts from a closed arena with a limited group of actors (around 15 in phase 1, around 60 in phase 2), relatively shielded off from outside pressures. This allows for creative thinking and building networks, but Plan C shows that once the shielded environment disappears and the process has to prove itself “in the real world”, difficult political questions have not disappeared and still have to be dealt with, such as questions of trust between actors, legitimacy of the process, resistance from incumbent actors and institutionalised ways of policy-making. • The term “management” in transition management suggests a high degree of steerability of a transition. In contrast, the presented analysis of Plan C shows a high degree of complexity and unpredictability, in particular in how the landscape develops and how regime actors will react to a combination of different pressures and policy processes (such as TM). As amply shown, the interventions from actors through Plan C – for example in discourse development or policy entrepreneurship – did make a difference, but the results were difficult to predict. In general, the case study shows how the performance of a TM process such as Plan C depends partly on its internal functioning (strategies of and dynamics between actors, discourse development, institutional structures, availability of resources…), partly on evolutions in the external context (policy developments at different levels, competing niches, positioning of outside actors and their resources…) and partly on how actors in the TM process are able to deal with these external evolutions and connect them to their own goals.

86 7. Conclusions

The analysis in this paper has shown that the waste system, such as it developed during the eighties and the nineties, is under pressure. A series of developments at international, European and national/regional level indicate that we may be witnessing the start of an orientation where materials are no longer passing through our societies in a linear way, but where closed loop economies and sustainable materials management become the new norms. Current practices in almost all countries, in industry, with consumers and in policy plans are however still far from that new norm. Over the last decennia, Flanders has been a trendsetter in the waste regime and it seems willing to take on a leading role in the new materials economy as well. With the start of Plan C five years ago, OVAM showed its early awareness of these new upcoming developments. The transition management approach that was used to initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse for Flanders about sustainable materials management and in starting a network of frontrunners that, certainly until 2008, was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management.

Over the last years, Plan C has not really been able to keep that position. This can partly be explained by problems in the internal functioning of the network: the trial-and-error process of organisation and substance development has been hindered by problems such as a lack of funding to support the process and the development of experiments, a search by involved actors to define their role and position vis-a-vis each other, the difficult translation of the discourse into action, and uncertainty about the future status of the network. At least equally important for explaining the current position of Plan C are developments in the context: pressures at landscape, regime and niche level lead to a situation where different kind of actors (government, industry, knowledge sector, ngo’s) in different policy domains (waste/materials, socio-economic innovation) are catching up with Plan C. It can in fact be argued that in particular during the last two years, political and societal dynamics in the materials system have accelerated and have more or less overtaken the TM-process Plan C. The result of these dynamics is that a lot of actors have moved towards Plan C’s position and also occupy part of the SMM-terrain, invariably supported by more financial resources and organisational capacity. From the lone player on a previously almost unoccupied field, Plan C has become one small player among many in a field that quickly gets crowded. Although Plan C cannot count on the legal Eigen Vermogen structure that was hoped for in the Materials Decree, the Decree still installs a cooperation between OVAM and other government institutions to support Plan C.

The mentioned dynamics are clearly visible in the waste and materials system, in first instance in its policy arrangement. At Flemish level, the discourse is changing rapidly towards sustainable materials management. Visible signs can be found in the Materials Decree. Although no new ‘hard’ rules have yet been installed, the Materials Decree creates openings that allow for a renewal of policy on the basis of the a material orientation. Other signs of change are the positioning of the existing waste industry and of newcomers from the technological and chemical industry. As important actors in the Flemish industry, these newcomers change the distribution of resources in the system. Meanwhile, although its tasks are expanding and getting more complex, OVAM, the main government actor until now, cannot count on extra financial means.

The dynamics with which Plan C is confronted go beyond the materials system and are also visible in innovation and socio-economic policies and in sustainable development policy. On the one hand, the transitions discourse is coupled with the growing interest in the development

87 of a greener economy. On the other hand, the transitions approach seems to offer a framework for thinking about the ambitions that ViA has formulated, while it also offers a method to discuss this change with a broad range of stakeholders and search for co-creation of policies.

Plan C has been an element in these evolutions. It has in particular had influence on the discourse and on the orientations of different actors. However, as mentioned, Plan C is just one influence among many. In particular structural transformation processes at the landscape level, such as EU policy initiatives on resource efficiency and raw materials, and the growing competition worldwide for resources, are hugely influential for current and future system developments.

The analysis further draws attention to the mechanisms that underlie the role that a TM process such as Plan C plays in influencing change and stability in policy. Changes are made easier when policy streams from different levels or different domains can be coupled. The role of policy entrepreneurs that are engaged in a transition process, is crucial for actively working on these couplings. Different discourse mechanisms can work in favour of change. The new sustainable materials storyline that was developed by Plan C, was influential in redefining the policy problem, which next led to a redefinition of the interests of actors involved in the waste/materials system. However, the analysis also shows that when the new materials and transition discourse is embedded in policy domains with long established and broadly carried storylines – such as in innovation and socio-economic policy – the more transformative elements may disappear from view in order to fit in a competition and productivity discourse. Finally, prevailing modes of administrative logic and of policy-making work as a stabilising force and hinder the institutionalisation of a transition approach and the Plan C agenda.

The paper thus shows the difficulty of policy renewal in a fast changing environment. New and old policy goals and instruments exist along side each other and consequently create complex coordination problems. This is not unique for the Flemish situation; comparable although not identical experiences can be found in Dutch TM processes. In general, Plan C seems to work with a broader vision and is less influenced by incumbents than is the case in the Netherlands. An important underlying reason is probably the fact that it was and still is a rather small-scale process, with limited means available, that could develop in the shadow of policy. When that shielded environment falls away, it becomes much more difficult to find a position in a rapidly evolving policy environment, in particular when the process is ambitious but hindered by limited funding and a lack of clarity about its legal status. At that moment, problems surface around legitimacy and embedding in the political context.

Still, the analysis also suggests that there is a place in the Flemish context for a transition governance process such as Plan C. First, most actors in the materials system and in the realms of innovation and green economy are predominantly technologically and economically driven. But initialising transitions also demands changes in political and social institutions, social organisation, knowledge and capabilities of various actors, cultural meanings, everyday practices, routines and lifestyles. Articulating this point of view of socio-technical system innovation, trying to set up projects/experiments in this vein, gathering learning experiences about such changes, defining policy directions and giving policy advice can not only be a unique position of Plan C, but is also a necessary addition to the prevailing socio-economic and innovation policy discourse.

Second, one of the insights of transition governance theory has lost none of its relevance, namely that current problems in regimes cannot only be solved with traditional policy

88 approaches. Also here, the experience of Plan C with TM makes it a suited environment for further developing transition governance in the materials system. An updated vision and transition pathways can still serve as orientation, while trying to set up experiments remains necessary as a material manifestation of the desired change. However, these typical TM- activities are probably not enough in the new context. A working programme could be designed that also draws inspiration from other transition governance approaches, that pay amongst other things much more attention to the context of transition processes and the politics at work in them.

A repositioning of Plan C along these two lines seems improbable without a renewed dialogue about the role of the process between OVAM and the actors involved in Plan C. A clearly defined role in the coming materials transition and the starting Flemish green economy, strongly backed up by OVAM, with an organisational structure and a funding base that are suited for the role that is being defined, can launch Plan C for a new round of learning how to do transition governance in practice.

89 Annex. List of interviews.

Interviews were conducted during two periods. A first series mainly in 2007-2008, a second series end 2010 – early 2011. Some of these interviews were more related to the general policy context of Plan C, than to the process itself.

Interviews 2007-2008 Name Organisation Date Function De Jonge Walter CDO, UGent 31/05/07 Knowledge actor De Leeuw Els WSE 19/05/08 Civil servant De Smedt Peter Studiedienst Vlaamse regering 21/12/07 Civil servant Dries Ilse LNE 03/07 Civil servant Larosse Jan DG research 23/05/07 Civil servant Loorbach Derk Drift 11/07/07 Knowledge actor Tempst Walter OVAM 03/07 Civil servant Van Acker Karel KU Leuven 25/02/08 Knowledge actor Van de Velde David LNE 28/11/07 Civil servant Van Humbeeck Peter SERV 10/03/08 Societal actor Van Lieshout Michael Pantopicon 22/01/08 Knowledge actor Vereecken Frank EWI 03/03/08 Civil servant Wouters Guido MIP 25/02/08 Civil servant

Interviews 2010-2011 Name Organisation Date Function Annaert Werner FEBEM 11/05/11 Societal actor Bruyninckx Hans KU Leuven 26/05/11 Knowledge actor De Brabandere Kristof BBL 22/06/10 Societal actor Dries Victor OVAM 22/06/10 Civil servant Geerts Hugo Cabinet Minister of the 15/02/11 Policy advisor Environment Larosse Jan EWI 23/11/10 Civil servant Moyersoen Johan i-propeller 17/05/11 Knowledge actor Nevens Frank VITO 27/01/11 Knowledge actor Tempst Walter OVAM 14/02/11 Civil servant Van Acker Karel KU Leuven 20/01/11 Knowledge actor Van den Bossche Agoria 26/11/10 Societal actor Patrick Van Lieshout Lieven VEA 25/05/11 Civil servant Van Roo Jan ALBON 25/05/11 Civil servant Vrancken Karl VITO 14/12/10 Knowledge actor Verheecke Jan MINA council 21/01/11 Societal actor Wante John OVAM 30/11/10 Civil servant

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