Terrorist Dropouts Learning from Those Who Have Left Michael Jacobson Policy Focus #101 | January 2010 Terrorist Dropouts Learning from Those Who Have Left Michael Jacobson Policy Focus #101 | January 2010 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2010 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2010 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: AP Photo/Muhammed Muheisen Contents About the Author . v Preface. vii Executive Summary . 1 1. Introduction. 4 2. Reasons for Leaving. 8 3. Considerations for Policymakers. 21 4. Conclusion. 34 About the Author Michael Jacobson is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and a former Soref fellow at the Institute. His areas of focus include sanctions and financial mea- sures to combat national security threats, as well as other issues related to counterterrorism, national security law, and intelligence reform—subjects covered in his 2006 Institute monograph The West at War: U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post–September 11. Mr. Jacobson was previously with the Treasury Depart- ment, where he served for two years as a senior advisor in the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). In that capacity, he fulfilled a wide range of responsibilities, including involvement in the office’s strate- gic planning, priorities, and budget. He was also a liaison to TFI’s congressional oversight committees, to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and to the National Counterterrorism Center. He previously served as counsel on the 9-11 Commission. n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v Preface I FIRST GREW INTERESTED in the subject of reviewed the available and relevant open source liter- terrorist dropouts as a result of my work on the 9-11 ature, including books, journal articles, news articles, Commission, where I was assigned to the team put- and trial transcripts. ting together the story of the plot. While it was rather Understanding how to reverse or stop radicaliza- startling that al-Qaeda had managed to convince tion takes on increased urgency for the U.S. govern- nineteen young men to participate in a suicide attack, ment as it copes with evidence of a growing problem what may have been even more interesting was that on the home front. For years, the common view has some of those selected for the plot had backed out, been that, in contrast to Europe, the United States even in the face of pressure from al-Qaeda. In review- does not have a serious radicalization issue. Yet the ing the organization’s now twenty-year history, it slew of cases over the past year involving U.S. citizens becomes clear that these so-called September 11 drop- who were radicalized and apparently eager to strike outs were hardly alone. Since al-Qaeda’s earliest days, targets here and abroad has raised new concerns seemingly committed members have withdrawn from about the threat of homegrown terrorism. Senior the group, and this trend has continued to the pres- Obama administration officials have acknowledged ent. Al-Qaeda is not alone in suffering this fate: its candidly that Washington’s view of the situation affiliates, such as Jemah Islamiyah (based in Southeast has changed. As U.S. attorney general Eric Holder Asia) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as well as observed in a July 2009 speech after a spate of arrests Hamas and other terrorist groups have all experienced in the United States, the “whole notion of radical- defections, as have Islamist extremist groups like the ization is something that did not loom as large a few international Hizb al-Tahrir. Why do people choose months ago . as it does now.”1And in December, to leave these groups? What, if anything, makes them Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano noted different from those who decide to remain? And what that “home-based terrorism is here. And like violent can the United States and other governments learn by extremism abroad, it is now part of the threat pic- studying these dropouts? ture that we must confront.”2 I am hopeful that this In this Policy Focus, I attempt to answer some of study and the recommendations I offer will be use- these questions by reviewing the publicly available ful for policymakers—both in the United States and cases of those who have left terrorist and extremist abroad—as they grapple with these difficult and sen- organizations. For this project, I conducted approxi- sitive issues. mately twenty-five interviews in the United States and This project was possible only because the Wash- abroad. I spoke to a wide variety of people, including ington Institute for Near East Policy gave me the a number of former terrorists and extremists, whose space, support, and time to research, write, and com- insights were critical to understanding the phenom- plete this study. I am especially grateful for the sup- enon. I also met with psychologists and psychiatrists port of the Institute’s Board of Directors and Board with experience in this area, current and former U.S. of Trustees, executive director Dr. Robert Satloff, and European government officials, community and deputy director for research Dr. Patrick Claw- workers, academics, and other experts. In addition, I son. Special thanks go to the two expert outside 1. Pierre Thomas, Jason Ryan, and Theresa Cook, “Holder: Homegrown Terror Threat Increasing,” ABC News, July 29, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/ Politics/story?id=8202511. 2. Department of Homeland Security, “Readout of Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks to the America-Israel Friendship League,” December 3, 2009, http:// www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1259860196559.shtm. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii Michael Jacobson Terrorist Dropouts reviewers—Paul Cruickshank at the New York Uni- contributed along the way, including Ben Freedman, versity Center for Law and Security and Lorenzo Julie Lascar, Albar Sheikh, Becca Wasser, and Sana Vidino at the United States Institute of Peace—and Mahmood. And particular thanks go to my colleague, to my colleagues at the Institute who provided valu- friend, and frequent coauthor Dr. Matthew Levitt, able feedback on drafts and helped make this a far director of the Institute’s Stein Program on Counter- better product. This project would have been very terrorism and Intelligence, with whom I’ve now had difficult to complete without the extremely able sup- the pleasure of working, both inside and outside of port of the various research assistants and interns who government, for many years. viii Policy Focus #101 Executive Summary THERE IS GROWING RECOGNITION that cap- single reason leads to their radicalization in the first turing or killing every terrorist is not a realistic strat- instance. A wide variety of triggers, ranging from egy and that we need to spend more time exploring the strategic to the petty, have ultimately led to their the radicalization process—what motivates people disillusionment. The most common factors include to become extremists in the first place. Despite this, concerns about the organization’s direction, goals, or little study has been undertaken of the “flip side”- hypocrisy; disappointment with the reality of life in —those who decide to leave terrorist and extrem- a terrorist or extremist group; and a feeling of being ist organizations.1 Developing a better grasp of this mistreated or undervalued. Families can play a key “dropout phenomenon” is critical for the counterter- role in persuading their relatives to leave these organi- rorism efforts of the United States and its allies, par- zations, though they can play a destructive role as well. ticularly because this knowledge can help shape the A change in circumstances—such as leaving a terror- myriad counterradicalization programs springing up ist training camp or a similar insular, fanatical envi- in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. ronment and relocating elsewhere—also often marks Numerous candidates present themselves for study. a significant turning point in a decision to withdraw. Despite al-Qaeda’s reputation for ferocity, secrecy, and Perhaps surprisingly, prison, which is often viewed as esprit de corps, the organization has been plagued by an incubator for radicalization, has served as an oppor- desertions since its earliest days. More recently, key ideo- tunity for people to rethink their support for terror- logues and leaders have turned against the organization, ist or extremist causes. There is no obvious profile of challenging al-Qaeda’s vision for the global jihad. Yet dropouts, and this diverse group includes leaders and al-Qaeda is hardly alone in suffering from this phenom- important ideologues, operational chiefs, midlevel enon. Some of its affiliates have experienced important operatives, foot soldiers, and prospective recruits. losses as well, ranging from foot soldiers to key leader- For policymakers, understanding what motivates ship personnel. Terrorist groups not affiliated with al- members of terrorist or extremist organizations to Qaeda, such as Hamas, have also had seemingly commit- leave is critical to designing effective programs to ted members leave the fold. Even outwardly nonviolent encourage them to make the break. Unfortunately, Islamist extremist groups are far from immune—Hizb the process of withdrawing is not always so straight- al-Tahrir, for example, has been plagued by numerous forward, making the analysis of what is likely to work defections over the years.