Countering Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies
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TOPICAL STRATEGIC MULTI-LAYER ASSESSMENT AND AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY MULTI-DISCIPLINARY WHITE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-WMD Countering Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies Revised & Updated1 July 2015 The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the organizations with which they are associated. Editor: Laurie Fenstermacher (Air Force Research Laboratory) Contributing Authors: Lt. Gen John N. “Jack” Shanahan, Ziad Alahdad, Latéfa Belarouci, Cheryl Benard, Kurt Braddock, William Casebeer, Steve Corman, Paul Davis, Karl DeRouen, Diane DiEuliis, Evelyn Early, Alexis Everington, Dipak Gupta, Tawfik Hamid, John Horgan, Qamar-ul Huda, Eric Larson, Anthony Lemieux, Robert Nill, Paulina Pospieszna, Tom Rieger, Marc Sageman, Anne Speckhard, Troy Thomas, Lorenzo Vidino Integration Editors: Sarah Canna & George Popp NSI, Inc. [email protected] 1 Originally Published September 2011 1 NOTE FROM THE EDITOR Why are we reissuing the paper collection, “Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies”? The answer is simple. Five years later, violent extremism is still an issue. In September 2014, President Obama spoke at the United Nations, calling on member nations to do more to address violent extremism. This was followed by a three-day summit in February 2015 to bring together local, federal, and international leaders to discuss approaches to counter violent extremism. The wisdom contained in this paper collection is more relevant than ever. I encourage everyone to read it, again or for the first time, in whole or in part. 2 CONTENTS Foreword (Lt. Gen. John N. “Jack” Shanahan) ............................................................................................................... 1 Preface (Diane DiEuiliis) ................................................................................................................................................ 3 Executive Summary (Laurie Fenstermacher) ................................................................................................................... 4 Section 1: Current Insights into Violent Extremism ...................................................................................................... 23 Not All Radicals are the Same: Implications for Counter-Radicalization Strategy (Tom Rieger) ................................. 23 Countering Extremist Violence (Marc Sageman) ....................................................................................................... 28 Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication (Steven R. Corman) ............................. 35 Tracking the Spread of Violent Extremism (Dipak Gupta) ....................................................................................... 44 Violent Extremism in Algeria: A Quest for Identity from Colonization to Globalization (Latéfa Belarouci) .............. 56 Section 2: Prevention of Violent Extremism ................................................................................................................. 65 Forecasting Terrorism, Predicting its Nature, and Driving Innovative Responses: “At-Risk Group Identity” as a Pivotal Concept for Understanding Political Violence (William D. Casebeer) ............................................................ 65 A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical Islam (Tawfik Hamid) ......................................................................................... 72 Prevention of Violent Extremism: “What Are The People Saying?” (Alexis Everington) ........................................... 78 Countering Violent Extremism: Shifting the Emphasis towards the Development Paradigm (Ziad Alahdad) ............ 84 The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization: The European Debate (Lorenzo Vidino) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 90 Section 3: Delegitimizing/Minimizing Popular Support for Violent Extremism............................................................. 95 The Mechanics of De-Legitimization (Cheryl Benard) .............................................................................................. 95 Exploiting Al-Qaeda’s Vulnerabilities for Delegitimization (Eric Larson) ................................................................ 104 Arab Satellite Television and Popular Culture (Evelyn A. Early) ............................................................................. 120 The Role and Impact of Music in Promoting (and Countering) Violent Extremism (Anthony Lemieux & Robert Nill) ............................................................................................................................................................................... 140 Section 4: Pursue and Protect/Risk Management/Deradicalization ............................................................................. 150 Using Citizen Messengers to Counteract Radicalism (Qamar-ul Huda) .................................................................... 150 Evaluating the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs: Towards A Scientific Approach to Terrorism Risk Reduction (John Horgan & Kurt Braddock) ........................................................................................................... 154 3 Battling the “University of Jihad:” An Evidence Based Ideological Program to Counter Militant Jihadi Groups Active on the Internet (Anne Speckhard) ........................................................................................................................... 160 Mediation and Civil Wars Involving Terrorism (Karl DeRouen & Paulina Pospieszna) ........................................... 171 Deterrence, Influence, and Violent Extremist Organizations (Paul Davis)............................................................... 181 Coercing Violent Non-State Actors (Troy Thomas) ................................................................................................ 189 4 FOREWORD (LT. GEN. JOHN N.“JACK” SHANAHAN) Lt. Gen. John N. "Jack" Shanahan Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) (DDI WS), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. It has now been five years since the events of the “Arab Spring,” and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)—ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL’s deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies—by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships—“whole of government” partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A “whack a mole” strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the “common enemy” and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, “What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture…this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life.” Likewise, keeping the conversation at the “binary,” 1 “right” versus “wrong,” level (e.g., debates regarding interpretation of ideological tenets or terms) will result in an unproductive “he says/he says” conversation. Messaging should be based on a nuanced understanding of the “mythos” rather than “logos” based reasoning.1 ISIL is, by no means, the only violent extremist organization posing a challenge. It is clear that places where governments are transitioning to or from democracy are dangerous and breed