Fallacy and Argumentational Vice

Andrew Aberdein

Humanities and Communication, Florida Institute of Technology, 150 West University Blvd, Melbourne, Florida 32901-6975, U.S.A.

[email protected] my.fit.edu/∼aberdein fit.academia.edu/AndrewAberdein

OSSA 10, Windsor, ON, May 23, 2013 Outline

A virtue theory of argumentation

Virtue theory of argumentation as

Legitimate ad hominem undercutting

The ad hominem according to virtue theory

A virtue theoretic approach to fallacy

Conclusions Daniel Cohen’s argumentational vices and virtues

Deaf dogmatist Eager Believer Quietism ↑ ↑ ↑ Willingness to Willingness to Willingness to Listen/Modify Question Engage ↓ ↓ ↓ Concessionaire Unassuring Assurer Provocateur A tentative typology of argumentational virtue

1. willingness to engage in 3. willingness to modify one’s own argumentation position 1.1 being communicative 3.1 common sense 1.2 faith in reason 3.2 intellectual candour 1.3 intellectual courage 3.3 intellectual humility 1.3.1 sense of duty 3.4 intellectual integrity 2. willingness to listen to others 3.4.1 honour 3.4.2 responsibility 2.1 intellectual empathy 3.4.3 sincerity 2.1.1 insight into persons 2.1.2 insight into problems 4. willingness to question the 2.1.3 insight into theories obvious 2.2 fairmindedness 4.1 appropriate respect for public 2.2.1 justice opinion 2.2.2 fairness in evaluating the 4.2 autonomy of others 4.3 intellectual perseverance 2.2.3 open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence 4.3.1 diligence 4.3.2 care 2.3 recognition of reliable authority 4.3.3 thoroughness 2.4 recognition of salient facts 2.4.1 sensitivity to detail Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury’s challenge

‘Any shift in the direction of an agent-based approach may itself appear to commit some kind of illegitimate ad hominem move’

Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury, 2013, Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. Informal Logic, 33(1), p. 25.

The challenge 1. All virtue based argument appraisal is agent oriented. 2. All agent oriented argument appraisal is ad hominem. 3. All ad hominem reasoning is fallacious. ∴ All virtue based argument appraisal is fallacious. Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury’s challenge

‘Any shift in the direction of an agent-based approach may itself appear to commit some kind of illegitimate ad hominem move’

Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury, 2013, Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. Informal Logic, 33(1), p. 25.

The challenge 1. All virtue based argument appraisal is agent oriented. 2. All agent oriented argument appraisal is ad hominem. 3. All ad hominem reasoning is fallacious. ∴ All virtue based argument appraisal is fallacious. Five types of ad hominem argument

ad hominem0: Arguing from the respondent’s commitments. (Lockean ad hominem.)

ad hominem1: Arguing that the respondent is disqualified from speaking. (.)

ad hominem2: Arguing that the respondent’s commitments are inconsistent. (.)

ad hominem3: Arguing that the respondent’s character rebuts his argument.

ad hominem4: Arguing that the respondent’s character undercuts his argument. Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury’s challenge refined

The challenge refined 1. All virtue based argument appraisal is agent oriented.

2. All agent oriented argument appraisal is ad hominem4.

3. All ad hominem4 reasoning is fallacious. ∴ All virtue based argument appraisal is fallacious.

‘Legitimate ad hominem arguments provide reasons to doubt the truth of a claim on the basis of facts about the person making it. It is commonly supposed that it is never reasonable to reject an argument on the basis of such facts, however’

Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury, 2013, Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. Informal Logic, 33(1), p. 25. Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury’s challenge refined

The challenge refined 1. All virtue based argument appraisal is agent oriented.

2. All agent oriented argument appraisal is ad hominem4.

3. All ad hominem4 reasoning is fallacious. ∴ All virtue based argument appraisal is fallacious.

‘Legitimate ad hominem arguments provide reasons to doubt the truth of a claim on the basis of facts about the person making it. It is commonly supposed that it is never reasonable to reject an argument on the basis of such facts, however’

Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury, 2013, Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. Informal Logic, 33(1), p. 25. John Woods’s account of ad hominem

1. Sarah makes her ad hominem retort. 2. She concludes from this that the adequacy of her opponent’s case is called into doubt. 3. She concludes from this that there is reason to think that her interlocutor’s position is false.

John Woods, 2007, Lightening up on the ad hominem. Informal Logic, 27(1), p. 124. The @BolsoverBeast argument

The @BolsoverBeast argument analysed [All millionaires will get a £42,000 tax cut tomorrow.] 18 Cabinet ministers are millionaires. So, 18 Cabinet ministers will get a £42,000 tax cut tomorrow. The @BolsoverBeast argument

The @BolsoverBeast argument analysed [All millionaires will get a £42,000 tax cut tomorrow.] 18 Cabinet ministers are millionaires. So, 18 Cabinet ministers will get a £42,000 tax cut tomorrow. 34 34 INGLISINGLISANDANDMEJIA-RAMOSMEJIA-RAMOS

Effect of named authority on persuasiveness

34 INGLIS AND MEJIA-RAMOS

FIGUREFIGURE1 Mean1 Meanlevelleofvelpersuasionof persuasionfor eachfor eachargumentargumentin Experimentin Experiment1. Error1. Errorbarsbarsrepresentrepresent1 SE1ofSEtheofmean.the mean. Downloaded By: [Loughborough University] At: 12:40 1 January 2009 Downloaded By: [Loughborough University] At: 12:40 1 January 2009 ± ± M. Inglis and J.P. Mej´ıa-Ramos,2009, The effect of authority on the persuasiveness of mathematical arguments, Cognition and Instruction, 27 SurprisinglySurprisingly, for, thefor thevisualvisualargumentargumentthe thegroupgroupconditionconditioninteractioninteractioneffecteffectwaswsignificant,as significant, F (1,372)F (1,372)12.2,12.2,MSEMSE1095.0,1095.0,p p.001..001.ConsideringConsidering× × eacheachgroupgroupseparatelyseparatelyrevealedrevealedthatthat the theresearchersresearchers= =reportedreported=a higher=a higherlevelle=vofel=persuasionof persuasionif theifythekney wkneitwwitaswwrittenas writtenby Littleby Littlewood,wood, withwitha meana meandifferencedifferenceof 17%,of 17%,t(188)t(188) 3.46,3.46,p p.001;.001;but bthisut thiswaswnotas notthe thecasecasefor forthe the students,students,whowhoshowedshoweda smalla smallandandnon-significantnon-significant= = trend=trendin= thein theoppositeoppositedirectiondirectiont(184)t(184)1.41,1.41, NS.NS. = = TheTheresearchersresearchersfoundfoundthe theinductioninductionargumentargumentto beto morebe morepersuasipersuasive thanve thanthe thestudents,students, F (1,352)F (1,352)4.40,4.40,MSEMSE914.8,914.8,p p.037..037.HoweHovweer,vthereer, therewaswnoasmainno maineffecteffectfor condition,for condition,nornor a groupa group=condition=conditioninteraction,=interaction,= F s=

FIGURE 1 Mean level of persuasion for each argument in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 1 SE of the mean. Downloaded By: [Loughborough University] At: 12:40 1 January 2009 ±

Surprisingly, for the visual argument the group condition interaction effect was significant, F (1,372) 12.2, MSE 1095.0, p .001. Considering× each group separately revealed that the researchers= reported =a higher level=of persuasion if they knew it was written by Littlewood, with a mean difference of 17%, t(188) 3.46, p .001; but this was not the case for the students, who showed a small and non-significant= trend= in the opposite direction t(184) 1.41, NS. = The researchers found the induction argument to be more persuasive than the students, F (1,352) 4.40, MSE 914.8, p .037. However, there was no main effect for condition, nor a group =condition interaction,= F s=< 1. × Ten Signs a Claimed Mathematical Breakthrough is Wrong

1. The authors don’t use TeX. 2. The authors don’t understand the question. 3. The approach seems to yield something much stronger and maybe even false (but the authors never discuss that). 4. The approach conflicts with a known impossibility result (which the authors never mention). 5. The authors themselves switch to weasel words by the end. 6. The paper jumps into technicalities without presenting a new idea. 7. The paper doesn’t build on (or in some cases even refer to) any previous work. 8. The paper wastes lots of space on standard material. 9. The paper waxes poetic about “practical consequences,” “deep philosophical implications,” etc. 10. The techniques just seem too wimpy for the problem at hand.

Scott Aaronson, 2008, http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=304 The ad hominem fallacy according to virtue theory

‘Consequently, three sorts of ad hominem arguments that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. These arguments attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices (e.g., unreliable vision); or (2) possession of full-blown responsibilist vices (e.g., dogmatism); or (3) failure to perform intellectually virtuous acts (e.g., failure to do what an open-minded person would do). [Footnote:] Ad hominems that attack a speaker’s intellectual motives will not be legitimate unless those motives prevent the speaker from performing intellectually virtuous acts’

Heather Battaly, 2010, Attacking character: Ad hominem argument and virtue epistemology. Informal Logic, 30(4), p. 367. A virtue theoretic approach to fallacy The ‘Gang of Eighteen’ and some distinctive corresponding defective virtues in proponent and respondent

Fallacy Proponent Respondent ad baculum (2)(b)(i); (3)(d)(i) (1)(c) ad hominem (2)(b)(ii) ad misericordiam (2)(a)(i); (3)(d)(iii) (4)(c)(i) ad populum (4)(a) (4)(a) ad verecundiam (2)(c); (4)(c)(iii) (2)(c); (4)(c)(iii) affirming the consequent (3)(a) (3)(a) amphiboly (2)(d)(i); (3)(d)(iii) (2)(d)(i) (3)(a) (3)(a) biased statistics (3)(b) (2)(b)(iii) (3)(b) (2)(d)(i) composition and division (2)(d)(i); (3)(d)(iii) (2)(d)(i) (3)(a) (3)(a) (2)(d)(i); (3)(d)(iii) (2)(d)(i) faulty analogy (2)(a)(ii) gambler’s (4) hasty generalization (2)(b)(iii) ignoratio elenchi (3)(b) (1)(b); (2)(b)(ii) secundum quid (2)(d)(i); (3)(a) (2)(d)(i); (3)(a) Conclusions

I once the in ‘ad hominem’ is resolved, the virtue theory of argument withstands the argument that it is inherently fallacious

I the virtue theory of argument clarifies the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem

I attention to sharpens understanding of the virtues of argumentation Conclusions

I once the ambiguity in ‘ad hominem’ is resolved, the virtue theory of argument withstands the argument that it is inherently fallacious

I the virtue theory of argument clarifies the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem

I attention to fallacies sharpens understanding of the virtues of argumentation Conclusions

I once the ambiguity in ‘ad hominem’ is resolved, the virtue theory of argument withstands the argument that it is inherently fallacious

I the virtue theory of argument clarifies the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem

I attention to fallacies sharpens understanding of the virtues of argumentation