DOCSLIB.ORG

UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Diminished Hopes: The United States and the United Nations During the Truman Years Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/96v926q8 Author LEBE, MELVIN STANTON Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Diminished Hopes: The United States and the United Nations During the Truman Years A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in History by Melvin Stanton Lebe 2012 © Copyright by Melvin Stanton Lebe 2012 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Diminished Hopes: The United States and the United Nations During the Truman Years By Melvin Stanton Lebe Doctor of Philosophy in History University of California, Los Angeles, 2012 Professor Geoffrey Robinson, Co-Chair Professor Jessica Wang, Co-Chair ii This dissertation explores the relationship between the United States and the newly founded United Nations during the presidency of Harry S. Truman. Research for this dissertation consisted primarily of the examination of official documents collected and published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in the series entitled Foreign Relations of the United States, as well as the examination of documents found at the United Nations Archive, New York, New York, the Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, and the U.S. National Archive, College Park, Maryland, as well as on various websites. Additional research consisted of the examination of news articles and opinion pieces published in selected newspapers during the relevant period. This study found that throughout the Truman presidency the United States maintained an internationalist posture of engagement vis-à-vis the United Nations, but that, under the pressure of the Cold War, the kind of internationalism embodied in U.S. policy at the UN changed from a cooperative, optimistic, Wilsonian internationalism as written into the UN Charter to a much more hard-headed, nationalistic, combative internationalism. In the process, the U.S. government backed various policies which undercut certain underlying UN principles, such as universality of membership and unanimity of “Great Power” permanent members in the Security Council, and as a result weakened the United Nations. Throughout the period the United States enjoyed substantial majority support in the UN Security Council and General Assembly, but in order to maintain that support American policy had to take into consideration, and at various times was modified by, the attitudes of allies and other governments of various middle-level and neutralist powers. American attitudes, both within government and among the public, changed iii over the course of Truman’s presidency, from initial optimism to considerable disappointment, but at no time during Truman’s presidency did the U.S. government or the American public desire to give up on the United Nations. iv The dissertation of Melvin Stanton Lebe is approved. Edward A. Alpers Joan Waugh Jonathan Zasloff Geoffrey Robinson, Committee Co-Chair Jessica Wang, Committee Co-Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2012 v TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page Copyright Page Abstract of the Dissertation ii Committee Page v Table of Contents vi Table of Abbreviations vii Vita viii Introduction 1 Chapter 1 31 Chapter 2 82 Chapter 3 137 Chapter 4 198 Chapter 5 266 Conclusion 352 Bibliography 359 vi TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS CIA Central Intelligence Agency EAM National Liberation Front NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC National Security Council PPS Policy Planning Staff PRC People’s Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea UN United Nations UNCFI United Nations Commission for Indonesia UNCOK United Nations Commission on Korea UNTCOK United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea USI United States of Indonesia POW Prisoner of War vii VITA 1957 B.S., Accounting University of California, Los Angeles 1960 L.L.B., Law University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law 2004 M.A., History University of California, Los Angeles viii DIMINISHED HOPES: THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE TRUMAN YEARS INTRODUCTION In the waning days of the Second World War the Allies met in San Francisco to draft a charter for a new United Nations Organization. The war was almost won, and the United Nations embodied hopes for world peace. U.S. Government officials shared that hope and enthusiastically supported the creation of the UN.1 Thirteen days before the planned opening of the San Francisco conference in April 1945 Franklin Roosevelt died and was replaced as president by Harry S. Truman. On the very day Truman took his oath of office, he responded without hesitation to press enquiries by stating that the conference would go forward as scheduled—his first decision as president. He later wrote that “it was of supreme importance that we build an organization to help keep the future peace of the world.”2 1 That enthusiasm, however, was not shared by all observers. See, for example, Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 6-10; George Kennan, an important foreign policy expert of the era, certainly was not enthusiastic—see George F. Kennan, Memoir, 1925-1950 (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 219-220; notwithstanding Truman’s enthusiasm he was aware, even before the San Francisco conference, of serious problems with the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Stettinius reported to Truman that he proposed to advise the Soviet government that the United States was “determined to proceed with the plans for the world organization, no matter what difficulties or differences may arise in regard to other matters,” but that the dispute over the formation of a Polish government “will cast a serious doubt upon our unity of purpose in regard to post-war collaboration.” Truman authorized Stettinius to so advise the Soviet government. “Memorandum for the President,” April 23, 1945; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; PSF: Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Russia: General: 1945-1948 [1 of 4]; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 2 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of Decisions (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955; Da Capo Press paperback edition, 1955), 9. 1 The creation of the United Nations, which was soon to follow, marked a critical juncture in American history. Having refused to join the League of Nations after the First World War and chosen instead a path of relative isolationism, the United States was now proudly and enthusiastically about to become a founding member of the United Nations. The relationship between the United States and the United Nations during its crucial formative years poses important questions for the historian: How in fact would the U.S. government interact with the UN and its member states? How would different elements of the U.S. government—the State Department and its various bureaus and officers, the military establishment, the diplomatic mission at the UN, and the President himself, compete for authority and control of U.S. policy at the UN? What effect would U.S. policy have on the new organization and, conversely, what effect would the United Nations and its various member states have on U.S. policy? How long would the new American commitment to internationalism last and what sort of internationalism would it turn out to be? Finally, would the new international organization prove capable of limiting international violence? This work explores those questions. It is an account of the relationship between the United States and the United Nations during the Truman presidency— the first seven years of the United Nation’s existence – a subject on which the historical literature has been oddly silent. I focus here on what I take to be the main purpose of the United Nations, as the historical actors viewed it at the time: the preservation of international peace. This is not to say that other purposes of the UN were and are not of great importance; but I do argue that the U.S. policy- makers involved in helping to create the UN, in “managing” U.S. entry into that body, and in shaping U.S. policy towards the new United Nations all viewed avoidance of a third world war as the chief raison d’être for the new organization. With that in mind, I examine five case 2 studies that were critically important to the success or failure of the United Nations’ mission to preserve international peace: Chapter 1 considers the issues of UN membership and voting rights, beginning in January 1946 when the Soviet Union nominated a client state, Albania, for membership. Membership issues as well as disputes about Soviet reliance on the veto continued throughout Truman’s presidency. Chapter 2 looks at trouble-spots in Iran and Greece. In January 1946 Iran brought to the Security Council the refusal of the Soviet Union to remove its military forces from Iran, which removal was finally accomplished through UN diplomacy by the end of May 1946. In February 1946 the Soviet Union brought to the Security Council the presence of the British army in Greece fighting on the side of the rightist government against leftist insurgents. The United Nations continued its involvement with the civil war in Greece until December 1951. Chapter 3 examines the war of independence in Indonesia, beginning with a Ukrainian request for Security Council action regarding British troops fighting against nationalist forces in Indonesia. UN involvement with the fighting there continued until Indonesian independence in December 1949. Chapter 4 addresses “nation-building” efforts in Korea. After the breakdown of U.S.-Soviet efforts to impose a UN trusteeship on Korea, the U.S. government turned to nation-building in South Korea, and in September 1947 the United States brought to the General Assembly the issue of independence for Korea.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 11172 May 26
    11172 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 26 Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Presi- opment of a subject or aspect of a subject, cational, scientific or cultural character pro- dent, I ask that the President be imme- or when their content is such as to main- duced by international organizations rec- diately notified of the nominations this tain, increase or diffuse knowledge, and aug- ognized by the United Nations or by any ment international understanding and of the specialized agencies. day confirmed. goodwill; and 4. On the filing of any such certificate, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without (b) When the materials are representative, there will be a decision by the appropriate objection, the President will be notified authentic, and accurate; and governmental agency of the contracting forthwith. (c) When the technical quality is such State into which entry Is sought as to that it does not interfere with the use made whether the material is entitled to the priv- of the material. ilege provided by article III, paragraph 1, of THE AGREEMENT FOR FACILITAT- ARTICLE II the present Agreement. This decision shall ING THE INTERNATIONAL CIRCU- be made after consideration of the material The provisions of the preceding article and through the application of the stand- LATION OF VISUAL AND AUDITORY shall apply to visual and auditory materials MATERIALS OF AN EDUCATION- ards provided in article I. If, as a result of of the following types and forms: that consideration, such agency of the con- AL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL (a) Films, filmstrips and microfilm in
    [Show full text]
  • George HW Bush and CHIREP at the UN 1970-1971
    University of New Orleans ScholarWorks@UNO University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations Dissertations and Theses Spring 5-22-2020 The First Cut is the Deepest: George H.W. Bush and CHIREP at the U.N. 1970-1971 James W. Weber Jr. University of New Orleans, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td Part of the American Popular Culture Commons, Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Weber, James W. Jr., "The First Cut is the Deepest: George H.W. Bush and CHIREP at the U.N. 1970-1971" (2020). University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations. 2756. https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2756 This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights- holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The First Cut is the Deepest : George H.W. Bush and CHIREP at the U.N. 1970–1971 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of New Orleans in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History by James W.
    [Show full text]
  • UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order Online
    UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order online Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Glossary 1. Executive Summary The 1999 Offensive The Chain of Command The War Crimes Tribunal Abuses by the KLA Role of the International Community 2. Background Introduction Brief History of the Kosovo Conflict Kosovo in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kosovo in the 1990s The 1998 Armed Conflict Conclusion 3. Forces of the Conflict Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Paramilitaries Chain of Command and Superior Responsibility Stucture and Strategy of the KLA Appendix: Post-War Promotions of Serbian Police and Yugoslav Army Members 4. march–june 1999: An Overview The Geography of Abuses The Killings Death Toll,the Missing and Body Removal Targeted Killings Rape and Sexual Assault Forced Expulsions Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Destruction of Civilian Property and Mosques Contamination of Water Wells Robbery and Extortion Detentions and Compulsory Labor 1 Human Shields Landmines 5. Drenica Region Izbica Rezala Poklek Staro Cikatovo The April 30 Offensive Vrbovac Stutica Baks The Cirez Mosque The Shavarina Mine Detention and Interrogation in Glogovac Detention and Compusory Labor Glogovac Town Killing of Civilians Detention and Abuse Forced Expulsion 6. Djakovica Municipality Djakovica City Phase One—March 24 to April 2 Phase Two—March 7 to March 13 The Withdrawal Meja Motives: Five Policeman Killed Perpetrators Korenica 7. Istok Municipality Dubrava Prison The Prison The NATO Bombing The Massacre The Exhumations Perpetrators 8. Lipljan Municipality Slovinje Perpetrators 9. Orahovac Municipality Pusto Selo 10. Pec Municipality Pec City The “Cleansing” Looting and Burning A Final Killing Rape Cuska Background The Killings The Attacks in Pavljan and Zahac The Perpetrators Ljubenic 11.
    [Show full text]
  • Conspiracy of Peace: the Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956
    The London School of Economics and Political Science Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956 Vladimir Dobrenko A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2015 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 90,957 words. Statement of conjoint work I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by John Clifton of www.proofreading247.co.uk/ I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition, for referencing. 2 Abstract This thesis deals with the Soviet Union’s Peace Campaign during the first decade of the Cold War as it sought to establish the Iron Curtain. The thesis focuses on the primary institutions engaged in the Peace Campaign: the World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee.
    [Show full text]
  • Eleanor Roosevelt's Traveling Suitcase
    Eleanor Roosevelt’s Traveling Suitcase Unit VII - Eleanor Roosevelt and the UDHR Lesson 1: “Where Do Human Rights Begin? In Small Places Close to Home.” “Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home, so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person: the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.” ~ Eleanor Roosevelt Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site Unit VII, Lesson 1 Title of the lesson: “Where Do Human Rights Begin? In Small Places Close to Home.” Lesson grade levels: Subject area P-3 x 9-12 Social studies 4-6 Higher education x 7-8 Social justice issues: x Civil rights Housing Democracy x Human rights Education x Living wage x Environment/going green Immigration/migrant workers x Fair labor practices x Poverty x Health Other Time requirement: 120 minutes Objectives of the lesson: Students will know the legacy of Eleanor Roosevelt and her work with social justice is- sues. Students will know the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and how it impacts their lives and the lives of all people. Students will have an understanding of Eleanor Roosevelt’s impact on the country through her “My Day” columns.
    [Show full text]
  • 5.4 Origins of the Cold
    Origins of the Cold War Truman is NOT FDR • Didn’t trust Stalin & did not feel connection to Allies – Doesn’t listen to WC on keeping troops east of line to see what Stalin will do in SoIà Withdraws troops to line & UK follows. – Thinks he can mediate like FDR • Stalin: Why do these silly Americans negotiate E.EUR on moral/legal grounds? Objective reality. Potsdam Conference • July-Aug, 1945 in eastern GER • New Big Three: Stalin, Truman, Attlee • $20B in GER reparations (1/2 to USSR) • Neisse River confusion; USSR obviously wants eastern one to make POL smaller • Stalin wants, but doesn’t get: – Base in Bosporus, Soviet trusteeship of ITA-Afr. Colonies, four- power control of Ruhr, Western recognition of Soviet govs. in ROM & BUL • Agreement: Four powers take reparations out of Zones, W. Neisse border, Stalin helps w/JPN Truman’s Journal 8/2/1945 Peace? • Sept.-Dec. 1945 – Foreign ministers meet to draw up peace treaties for FIN, HUN, ROM, BUL – Stalin accepts some democratic measures in E.EURà Basically lies. • No more Four Policemen idea • KISSINGER: Despite losing 20M people in WWII 20M in purges, and devastating W. RUS, Stalin was aggressive and had no fear of bomb. Didn’t think US would use it. – Aggressive pro-war propaganda campaign post-war because he realized USSR couldn’t exist w/ a peaceful foreign policy Iron Curtain • 3/5/1946 – Churchill gives “Iron Curtain” speech – Russians will control E.EUR, US/UK need to ally and avoid war at all costs – Sept. 1947 – Cominform – group of worldwide Communist parties in FIN, YUG, POL, CZE, ALB, BUL, ROM, HUN George Kennan • Leading anti-Soviet advisor under HST – E.EUR occupation inevitable b/c USSR forces already occupied area – BUT believed USSR couldn’t maintain domination – AMBROSE: All his predictions come true, but not for four decades – “Long Telegram” (1946) – “[USSR needed to be] contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points”à Foundation for Truman Doctrine (“Containment”) Brisk • Amb.
    [Show full text]
  • Flynn,John T.- While You Slept (PDF)
    While You Slept Other Books by John T. Flynn THE ROOSEVELT MYTH THE ROAD AHEAD: AMERICA'S CREEPING REVOLUTION While You Slept OUR TRAGEDY IN ASIA AND WHO MADE IT by JOHN T. FLYNN THE DEVIN-ADAIR COMPANY New York · 1951 Copyright 1951 by John T. Flynn. All rights reserved. Permission to reprint material from this book must be obtained in writing from the publisher. For information write: The Devin-Adair Company, 23 East 26th St., New York 10, N. Y. First Printing, November 1951 Second Printing, November 1951 Third Printing, December 1951 Fourth Printing, January 1952 MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Contents I While You Slept 9 II The Red Deluge 13 III China's Two Wars 14 IV Two Great Designs 25 V Architects of Disaster 30 VI The Road to Korea Opens 44 VII The Great Whitewash 54 VIII The Pool of Poison 59 IX The Hatchet Men 71 X Left Thunder on the Right 82 XI The Press and Pink Propaganda 88 XII Red Propaganda in the Movies 98 XIII Poison in the Air 108 XIV The Institute of Pacific Relations 116 XV The Amerasîa Case 134 XVI The Great Swap 145 XVII The China War 151 XVIII The Blunders That Lost a Continent 157 XIX America s Two Wars 178 References 187 While You Slept I While You Slept As June 1950 drew near, America was giving little attention to a place called Korea. Secretary General Trygve Lie of the United Nations was urging that Chiang Kai-shek's govern- ment be expelled from the United Nations to make room for the Chinese Communist government of Mao Tse-tung.
    [Show full text]
  • Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
    YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Deal with Russia （Cultural Internationalism Rather Than Territorial Dispute）
    How To Deal With Russia （Cultural Internationalism Rather Than Territorial Dispute） Hideaki Kinoshita Introduction Considering relations with Russia, it appears to be imperative among the Japanese people to raise the question of the Northern Territories, which comprises the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. It is because the issue is perceived by the Japanese people as the apparent act of unprovoked aggression initiated during the final stages of World War II by Russian’s illegal and perfidious attack on the Chishima Islands with a sudden shift from relations of friendship to enmity. Japan was actually courting the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics（USSR） to perform as an intermediary for the armistice with the Allied Forces. Russian’s sudden attack unilaterally abrogating the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact concluded in April, 1941 was baffling for the Japanese government, and aroused the impression to the Japanese that they were duped to the committing to the agreement. The agreement specified mutual respect of territorial integrity and inviolability as well as neutrality should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities of any third party（Slavinsky 1996: 129）. The Soviet attack no doubt was executed within the validity period of the pact and after the Japanese notification of accepting the Potsdam Declaration on August 15, 1945, and even continued after concluding the armistice on the Battleship Missouri on September 2, 1945（Iokibe, Hatano 2015: 311）. The concept, advocated by the government, of “inherent” Japanese Northern Territories helped foment the idea of the so called “residual” legal rights to the four islands in the Japanese public psyche.
    [Show full text]
  • The Generalissimo
    the generalissimo ګ The Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek and the Struggle for Modern China Jay Taylor the belknap press of harvard university press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, En gland 2009 .is Chiang Kai- shek’s surname ګ The character Copyright © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Taylor, Jay, 1931– The generalissimo : Chiang Kai- shek and the struggle for modern China / Jay Taylor.—1st. ed. â p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978- 0- 674- 03338- 2 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Chiang, Kai- shek, 1887–1975. 2. Presidents—China— Biography. 3. Presidents—Taiwan—Biography. 4. China—History—Republic, 1912–1949. 5. Taiwan—History—1945– I. Title. II. Title: Chiang Kai- shek and the struggle for modern China. DS777.488.C5T39 2009 951.04′2092—dc22 [B]â 2008040492 To John Taylor, my son, editor, and best friend Contents List of Mapsâ ix Acknowledgmentsâ xi Note on Romanizationâ xiii Prologueâ 1 I Revolution 1. A Neo- Confucian Youthâ 7 2. The Northern Expedition and Civil Warâ 49 3. The Nanking Decadeâ 97 II War of Resistance 4. The Long War Beginsâ 141 5. Chiang and His American Alliesâ 194 6. The China Theaterâ 245 7. Yalta, Manchuria, and Postwar Strategyâ 296 III Civil War 8. Chimera of Victoryâ 339 9. The Great Failureâ 378 viii Contents IV The Island 10. Streams in the Desertâ 411 11. Managing the Protectorâ 454 12. Shifting Dynamicsâ 503 13. Nixon and the Last Yearsâ 547 Epilogueâ 589 Notesâ 597 Indexâ 699 Maps Republican China, 1928â 80–81 China, 1929â 87 Allied Retreat, First Burma Campaign, April–May 1942â 206 China, 1944â 293 Acknowledgments Extensive travel, interviews, and research in Taiwan and China over five years made this book possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Drumright, Everett
    The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR EVERETT DRUMRIGHT Interviewed by: Hank Zivetz Initial interview date: July 27, 1989 Copyrig t 1998 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Ambassador Drumright discusses the various American and foreign personalities he encountered during his service as a nited States Diplomat and Consular Officer in China from 1935 to 1962. He notes particular situations and activities at each post. Shanghai, China: Vice Consul 1935-19,1 -.ith interim assignments else.here in China/ Consul 0eneral -C0/ 1d.in S. Cunningham C0 Nathaniel Davis, later Ambassador to Israel C0 Clarence 1. 0auss4 later Ambassador to China 5Terry6 Terasa7i, 8apanese Consul Chung4 9ayor of Shanghai Hang:hou, China4 Vice Consul/Consul 1931-1932, 1937-1938 C0 Walter A. Adams C0 Paul R. 8osselyn China-8apan War Repatriation of S citi:ens 2an7ing, China: 3rd Secretary 1938 Ambassador Nelson T. 8ohnson Chung7ing, China4 2nd Secretary and Consul 1938-19,1 Ambassador Nelson T. 8ohnson Ambassador Willis R. Pec7 Chinese language officer Ambassador Clarence 1d.ard 0auss Chinese language officer Chiang Kai-she7 9r. Wong Communist representation Ahou 1n-lai 1 Personal relationship 8apanese .ar offensives 9ao Aedong S media reporting 0eneral Stil.ell/ Chiang Kai-she7 relations 0eneral Still.ell/0eneral 9arshall relations Al Wedemeyer Patric7 Hurley Ambassador 0auss recalled Vie.s on .arBs outcome 0eorge Acheson Shanghai, China4 Consul 19,1-19,2 1dmund Club Internment S.iss Consulate Consul 0eneral Fran7 P.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberation in China and the Pacific
    LIBERATION IN CHINA AND THE PACIFIC RANA MITTER, PHD (Image: National Archives and Records Administration, 520868.) Between 1937 and 1945, war raged between Japan and its planes destroyed. More devastating, the Japanese attack enemies, first China, and then the United States and the killed 2,403 and wounded 1,178. President Roosevelt, British Empire. The war ended in Asia only with the atomic announcing the news to a shocked nation, declared it a bombings of Japan, but the continent failed to find peace “day which will live in infamy.” as new Cold War conflicts emerged from the rubble. When Japan decided to declare war on the United States, it ORIGINS OF THE WAR IN ASIA knew that it was taking a huge risk. One leader compared the decision to throwing himself off the Kiyomizu-dera World War II began on July 7, 1937—not in Poland or at Temple in Kyoto. However, Japan’s leaders were gambling Pearl Harbor, but in China. On that date, outside of Beijing, on winning this war swiftly by crippling America’s naval Japanese and Chinese troops clashed, and within a few capacity in the Pacific, thus preventing the United States days, the local conflict had escalated to a full, though from interfering with Japan’s expansion into Southeast undeclared, war between China and Japan. Asia. They knew, as did Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill and China’s leader Chiang Kai-shek, that the industrial capacity of the United States meant that it could The war between China and Japan was at first a conflict win a war through its sheer capacity to renew its supply of in which no western powers were openly involved.
    [Show full text]