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AABOUTBOUT THE AAUTHORUTHOR

BRUCE CCUMINGSUMINGS is the Gustavus F. and Ann M.M. Swift DistinguishedDistinguished Service ProfessorProfessor inin HistoryHistory atat the University ofof ChicagoChicago and specializesspecializes inin modernmodem KoreanKorean history,history, internationalinternational history,history, andand EastEast AsianAsian–American–American relations.

2010 Modern LibraryLibrary EditionEdition

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Published in the United States by Modern Library,Library, an imprintimprint ofof TheThe Random HouseHouse PublishingPublishing Group,Group, a division ofof RandomRandom House, Inc., New York.York.

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGINGCATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION-IN-PUBLICATION DATADATA

Cumings,Cumings, Bruce TheThe KoreanKorean War/BruceWar/Bruce Cumings. p. cm.cm.—(A—(A modern librarylibrary chronicleschronicles book)book) eISBN:eISBN: 978-0-679-60378-8978-0-679-60378-8 1.1. Korean War, 1950-1953.1950–1953. 22. KoreanKorean War, 19501950-1953—United–1953—United States. 3. Korean War,War, 19501950-1953—Social–1953—Social aspectsaspects—United—United States. I. Title. DS918.C75D5918.C75 2010 951 951.904 .9042—dc22′2—dc22 2010005629 2010005629

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CHRONOLOGY

2333 B.C.B.C. Mythical Mythical founding ofof thethe Korean nationnation byby Tangun and hishis bear wifewife.. A.D.A.D. 668-918668–918 Si Sillalla kingdom rules a Korea unifiedunified upup to the Taedong RiverRiver flowing through PyongyangPyongyang.. 918918-1392–1392 KoryoKoryo dynasty governs Korea fromfrom itsits capital at KaesongKaesong and produces the worldworld's’s most exquexquisiteisite celadon potterypottery.. 12311231 MongolsMongols sweep through China and invade KoreaKorea.. 13921392 EstablishmentEstablishment ofof thethe Choson dynasty byby GenGen.. YiYi SongSong-gye,-gye, whowho makes Seoul the capitalcapital.. 14431443 InventionInvention ofof hangul,hangul, Korea'sKorea’s unique alphabet, by scholarsscholars working for King SejongSejong.. 15921592-1598–1598 JapaneseJapanese invasions under the warlord HideyoshiHideyoshi devastate Korea, but are turned back by Adm.Adm. YiYi SunSun-shin's-shin’s forces; Hideyoshi diesdies.. 18761876 JapaneseJapanese gunboats open KoreaKorea's’s ports to foreignforeign trade and imposeimpose the first unequal treatytreaty.. 18821882 UnitedUnited States and Korea sign a similarlysimilarly unequal treatytreaty.. 18941894 TonghakTonghak peasant uprising defeateddefeated.. 18941894-1895–1895 JapanJapan defeats China in Sino-JapaneseSino-Japanese WarWar.. 18941894 SlaverySlavery abolishedabolished.. 19041904-1905–1905 JapanJapan wins Russo-JapaneseRusso-Japanese War; Korea becomes a Japanese protectorateprotectorate.. 19101910 JapanJapan annexes Korea as its colony and abolishes the Choson dynastydynasty.. 19191919 IndependenceIndependence movement against Japanese rule begins on MarchMarch 1,I, andand after many months ofof nationwidenationwide protest isis crushedcrushed.. 19321932 JapaneseJapanese establish the puppet state ofof ManchukuoManchukuo on MarchMarch 1,I, comprisingcomprising three northeastern provinces ofof ChinaChina.. 19371937 JapanJapan provokes Sino-JapaneseSino-Japanese WarWar.. 19411941 JapanJapan attacks the United States at Pearl HarborHarbor..

19451945 KoreaKorea liberated following the surrender ofof JapaneseJapanese forces toto the Allies. 19451945-1948–1948 U.S.U.S. Army MilitaryMilitary Government inin KoreaKorea.. 19481948 RepublicRepublic ofof KoreaKorea and DemocrDemocraticatic PeoplePeople's’s Republic ofof KoreaKorea establishedestablished.. 19501950-1953–1953 KoreanKorean WarWar.. 19611961 GeneralGeneral Park Chung Hee leads the firstfirst militarymilitary coupcoup.. 19801980 GeneralGeneral Chun Doo Hwan crushes the Kwangju rebellionrebellion andand leads the second militarymilitary coupcoup.. 19871987 NationwideNationwide protests force the military ddictatorshipictatorship to holdhold presidential electionselections.. 19921992 KimKim Young Sam elected president and ushers inin a moremore democraticdemocratic political eraera.. 19941994 KimKim IlIl Sung dies and his son, KimKim Jong Il,Ii, becomes top leader inin the North.North. 19971997 KimKim Dae Jung becomes the first member ofof thethe oppoppositionosition toto winwin the presidency inin the South.South. 2000 FirstFirst summit between Korean heads ofof statestate held inin Pyongyang;Pyongyang; Kim Dae Jung awarded the Nobel Peace PrizePrize.. 2002 RohRoh Moo Hyun electedelected.. 2007 LeeLee Myung Bak electedelected..

GLOSSARY

AMG U.S. Army MilitaryMilitary Government CIC CountCounter-Intelligenceer-Intelligence Corps (American)(American) DPRK Democratic People'sPeople’s Republic ofof KoreaKorea (North)(North) GG-2-2 U.S. Military Intelligence JCS Joint Chiefs ofof StaffStaff (American)(American) KCIA Korean Central Intelligence Agency KMAG Korean MilitaryMilitary Advisory Group (American) KNP Korean National Police (S(South)outh) KPA Korean PeoplePeople's’s Army (North)(North) KTRC Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South)(South) KWP Korean WorkersWorkers'’ Party (North)(North) NSC National Security Council NWY Northwest Youth Corps (South) OSS OfficeOffice of StrategicStrategic Services PLA PeoplePeople's’s Liberation Army (China) PRC PeoplPeople'se’s Republic ofof ChinaChina RAF Royal Air Force (British) ROK Republic ofof KoreaKorea (South) ROKA Republic ofof KoreaKorea Army SCAP SupremeSupreme Command, Allied Powers SKWP SouthSouth Korean WorkersWorkers'’ Party UNC United Nations Command (1950(1950—present)–present) UNCOK UN Commission on Korea UNCURK UN Commission on the UnificationUnification and ReconstructionReconstruction ofof KoreaKorea USAF U.S. Air Force USAMGIK U.S. Army MilitaryMilitary Government inin KoreaKorea (1945(1945-48)–48)

INTRODUCTION

This is a book about the Korean War, written forfor Americans and byby an American about a conflict that is ffundamentallyundamentally Korean, but oneone construed inin thethe United States to have been a discrete, encapsulated storystory beginningbeginning inin June 19501950 and ending in July 1953, in which Americans are the major actors. They intervene on the side ofof thethe good, they appear to winwin quicquicklykly onlyonly toto lose suddenly,suddenly, finally they eke out a stalemated ending thatthat was prelude toto a forgetting. Forgotten,Forgotten, never known, abandoned: AmericansAmericans sought toto grab holdhold of thisthis war and win it, only to see victory slip from their handshands and the warwar sinksink into oblivion.oblivion. A primary reason is that they never knewknew theirtheir enemy— andand theythey stillstill don't.don’t. SoSo this is also a book seeking to uncover truthstruths that mostmost Americans do not know and perhaps dondon't’t want to know, truths sometimes as shocking as they are unpalatable to AmericanAmerican selfself-esteem.-esteem. But today theythey have become commonplace knowledge in a democratized and historicallyhistorically awareaware South Korea.Korea. The year 2010 marks the sixtieth anniversary ofof thethe Korean WarWar's’s conventional start, but also the centennial ofof JapanJapan's’s colonization ofof Korea.Korea. This war had its distant gestation in that imperial history, and especiallyespecially inin northeastnortheast China (or Manchuria as it was called) at the dawn ofof JapanJapan's’s aggression inin 1931.1931. JapanJapan's’s ambitions to colonize Korea coincided withwith JapanJapan's’s rise as the firstfirst modern great power in Asia. Seizing on a major peasant rebellionrebellion inin Korea,Korea, Japan instigated war with China in 1894 and defeated itit a year later.later. After another decade of imperialimperial rivalry over Korea, Japan smashed tsaristtsarist RussiaRussia inin lightning naval and land attacks, stunning the world because a “"yellow"yellow” countrycountry had defeated a “"white"white” power. Korea became a Japanese protectorate inin 1905 and a colony in 1910, with the blessing ofof allall the great powers and especiallyespecially thethe United States (President Theodore Roosevelt admired the skills and “"virility"virility” ofof JapanJapan's’s leaders, and thought they would leadlead Korea intointo modernity.) It was a strange colony, coming “"late"late” in world time,time, after mostmost ofof thethe world had been divided up and after progressive calls had emerged toto dismantldismantlee the entire colonial system. Furthermore, Korea had most ofof thethe prerequisites forfor nationhood long before most other countries: common ethnicity,ethnicity, language, and culture, and wellwell-recognized-recognized national boundaries since the tenth century.century. So the Japanese engagedengaged in substitutions after 1910: exchanging a Japanese rulingruling eliteelite for aristocratic Korean scholarscholar-officials,-officials, most ofof whomwhom were either coco-opted-opted oror dismissed; instituting a strong central state inin place ofof thethe old governmentgovernment administration; exchanging JapaneseJapanese modern education forfor the Confucian classics; eventually they even replaced the Korean language withwith Japanese. Koreans never thanked the Japanese for these substitutions, did notnot creditcredit Japan with creations, and instead saw Japan as snatching away theirtheir ancienancien rregime,égime, KoreaKorea's’s sovereignty and independence, its indigenous ifif incipientincipient modernization,modernization, and above all its national dignity. Unlike some other colonized peoples, therefore, most Koreans never sawsaw imperial rule asas anything but illegitimate and humilhumiliating.iating. Furthermore, the veryvery closeness of thethe two nations— inin geography, in common Chinese civilizationalcivilizational influences, indeedindeed in levels of developmentdevelopment until the mid-nineteenthmid-nineteenth centurycentury—made—made JapaneseJapanese dominance all the more galling toto Koreans, and gave a peculpeculiariar intensity to the relationship, a hate/respect dynamicdynamic that suggested toto Koreans, "there“there but for accidents ofof historyhistory go we.we."” The result: neither KoreaKorea nornor Japan has ever gotten over it. In North Korea countless films and TVTV dramas stillstill focus on atrocitiesatrocities committed by the Japanese during theirtheir rule,rule, propaganda banners exhort people to “"livelive like the anti-Japaneseanti-Japanese guerrillas,guerrillas,"” and forfor decades the descendantsdescendants of KoreansKoreans deemed by the government toto have collaborated withwith the JapaneseJapanese were subject to severesevere discrimination. South Korea, however, punished very few collaborators, partly because the U.S. occupation (1945(1945-48)–48) reemployed so many ofof them,them, and partly because they were needed inin thethe fightfight against communism. The Korean conflict thus inherited a JapaJapanese-Koreannese-Korean enmityenmity thatthat brokebroke into aa decade of warfarewarfare in Manchuria inin the 1930s, and inin that sense isis almostalmost eighty years old— andand no one can say when itit willwill finallyfinally end. The grandsons ofof the aggressorsaggressors and the victims in the Pacific War retainretain power inin TTokyookyo and Pyongyang and have never reconciled. IfIf thethe conventionally defineddefined KoreanKorean WarWar is obscureobscure to most Americans, this older clash is even more murky,murky, played outout inin a distant and alien realm, one apparently marginal to the main contourscontours ofof WorldWorld War II. Our old enemy in Pyongyang, meanwhile, grabbed holdhold ofof thisthis eightyeighty yearsyears'’ warwar as they see it and perceive it, held on withwith white knuckles, and havehave never let go; they structured their entire society as a fightingfighting machine determined, sooner or later, to wiwinn a victory that was palpable forfor a moment inin 19501950 butbut has exceeded their grasp ever since. SoSo this book is about a forgotten oror nevernever-known-known warwar and therefore,therefore, ipso facto, is also about history and memory. Its major themes are the Korean originsorigins of the war,war, the cultural contradictions ofof thethe early 1950s in America, which buried this conflict almost before itit could be known, the harrowing brutalitybrutality inin the air and on the ground ofof a supposedly limited war, the recovery ofof thisthis historyhistory in South Korea, and the way inin which this unknown warwar transformedtransformed thethe American position in the world —andand history and memory. The basic military history ofof thethe 19501950-53–53 phasephase ofof thisthis war cancan be presented quickly, becausebecause the conflict divides neatly intointo threethree parts: the warwar forfor tthehe South in the summer ofof 1950,1950, the war forfor the North inin the fallfall and winterwinter ofof 1950,1950, andand ChinaChina's’s intervention, which soon brought about a stabilizationstabilization ofof thethe fighting along what is now the demilitarized zone, or DMZ,DMZ, even thoughthough a formform of trenchtrench warfare went on for another two years. IfIf therethere is anything thatthat has been well covered in the American literature, it is this military historyhistory— includingincluding volumes of officialofficial history from Roy Appleman, Clay BlairBlair's’s excellent The Forgotten War,War, and many other books. There are also various oral histories and memoirs that give insight into American servicemen inin a warwar and a landland thatthat most ofof themthem thought to be godforsaken. Least known to Americans is how appallingly dirtydirty thisthis war was,was, withwith a sordid history ofof civiliaciviliann slaughters amid whichwhich our ostensiblyostensibly democraticdemocratic allyally was the worst offender, contrary to the American image ofof thethe NorthNorth KoreansKoreans as fiendish terrorists. TheThe British author Max Hastings wrote that CommunistCommunist atrocities gavegave to the United Nations cause in KKoreaorea “"aa moralmoral legitimacylegitimacy thatthat has survived to this day.day."”1 What then ofof SouthSouth Korean atrocities,atrocities, which historianshistorians now know were far more common.? Ironically, this disturbing experience was featured in popular magazines ofof thethe time such as Life,Lift, TheThe Saturday EveningEvening Post,Post, andand CollierCollier's,’s, before MacArthurMacArthur's’s censorship descended. Then itit was suppressed, buried and forgotten for halfhalf aa century; still today, even toto talktalk aboutabout it thusthus seemsseems biased and unbalanced. Yet byby nownow itit is one ofof thethe bestbest-documented-documented aspects of the war. I have written much about the Korean WarWar inin thethe past, and thisthis book bothboth distills that knowledge for the general reader and invokes new themes, ideas, and issues. I wish II could write withwith the serene confidence that other historians do inin similarlysimilarly short bbooks,ooks, offering their settled interpretations unencumbered byby footnotes and sources. So many things about this war are stillstill so controversial, however, vehemently debated and hotly affirmed or denieddenied (or simplysimply unknown), and my head is so drilled with obligobligationsations owed to fellowfellow scholars, that II have added unobtrusive endnotes that cite important documents oror make quickquick reference to books in the bibliography. (If(If II name an author ofof oneone ofof thesethese books in the text, I dispense with notes.) Those books, in turn,turn, offer a wealthwealth ofof insightinsight and argument for readers who want to learn more about the unknown war.war. For the ever-dwindlingever-dwindling number ofof AmericanAmerican veterans ofof thisthis war, II offeroffer salutationssalutations for shouldering a thankless task and fervent hope that thisthis war willwill soon come toto an end, soso that they can again encounter their NorthNorth Korean counterparts before itit is too late—thislate—this time in peace, to share indelible memories and rediscoverrediscover eacheach otherother's’s humanity. Another comment about the evidentiary basis ofof thisthis book: How do wwee evaluate sources?sources? IfIf formerlyformerly secret American documents reveal thatthat SouthSouth Korean jails held tens of thousandsthousands ofof politicalpolitical prisoners, or that thethe policepolice worked hand in glove with fascist youth groups, or that these same forces massacred their own citizencitizenss on mere suspicion ofof leftistleftist tendencies, this is crucial evidence because one assumes that Americans on the scene wouldwould preferprefer not to report these things about their close ally. IfIf duringduring decades ofof militarymilitary dictatorships no one dares speak ofof massmass politpoliticalical murders, and then afterafter anan equally long struggle from below to oust these dictators, a newnew generation growing up in a democracy carries out careful, painstaking investigations ofof thesethese murders, that evidence is far more important than government statestatementsments toto the effect that none of itit happened, or ifif itit happened, no orders fromfrom higherhigher-ups-ups couldcould be located (unfortunately this has been the PentagonPentagon's’s typical response to recent SouthSouth Korean revelations). IfIf historicalhistorical evidence from the time contradicts tthehe contemporary image of NorthNorth Korea as the most reprehensible and intolerableintolerable dictatorship on the planet, perhaps that can help Americans understand whywhy nono military victory was possible in Korea. All Asian names except those ofof famousfamous people (like(like SyngmaSyngmann Rhee) are given last name first; for widely known individuals or forfor those who have published in the West, I use the name as they write itit (for(for example KimKim Dae Jung, or Dae-sookDae-sook Suh).

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CHAPTER EIGHTEIGHT

A “"FORGOTTENFORGOTTEN WWAR"AR” TTHATHAT RREMADETHEEMADETHE UUNITEDNITED SSTATESTATES ANDTHEAND THE CCOLDOLD WWARAR

June 25 removedremoved many things from the realm ofof theory.theory. Korea seemed toto—and—and diddid—confirm—confirm NSC 68. —DEAN ACHESONACHESON

The Korean conflict was the occasion forfor transforming the United States into a very different country than itit had ever been before: one withwith huhundredsndreds ofof permanent military bases abroad, a largelarge standing army and a permanent nationalnational securitysecurity state at home. AmericansAmericans assume that the Vietnam WarWar isis farfar moremore important, and it is, in that it created withinwithin the massive baby boomboom generationgeneration decadesdecades-long-long anxieties and a neuralgic war ofof movementmovement regardingregarding such a hosthost ofof issues (the limits of AmericanAmerican power, the proper uses ofof force,force, the coincidence ofof the war with major social change in the 1960s) that most ofof themthem remainedremained alivealive in recent presidential eelectionslections —GeorgeGeorge W.W. Bush, BillBill and HillaryHillary Clinton,Clinton, John Kerry and John McCain, for example, are still at odds over whatwhat happened backback then; Barack Obama was the first president toto campaign onon a postpost-'60s-’60s platformplatform—and—and he won (a harbinger, finally, ofof aa newnew era?). IfIf thethe VietnamVietnam WarWar seared an entire generation, beyond that itit had littlelittle effect onon American foreignforeign policy or intervention abroad (which was resurgent withinwithin a fewfew yearsyears under Reagan), and had a minuscule impact on the domestic American economyeconomy (pr(primarilyimarily the surge of inflationinflation caused by Lyndon Johnson buryingburying expenses forfor the war in other parts ofof thethe federal budget). Korea, however, had an enormous refractory effect back upon the United States. It didndidn't’t brand a generation,generation, and itit may be forgotten or unknown to the general public, but itit was the occasion forfor transforming the United States into a country that the founding fathers wouldwould barely recognize. Is this phenomenon well known? ItIt has been toto some scholars 1 for a generation. 1 OtherwiseOtherwise it isnisn't.’t. The Korean War was fought forfor mutuallymutually unknown and incommensurable (if notnot incomprehensible) goals by the two most importantimportant sides, North KoreaKorea and the United States. The NorthNorth Koreans attacked the South because ofof fearsfears that Japan'sJapan’s industrial economyeconomy and its former positionposition inin KoreaKorea were being revived by recent changes in American policy,policy, because native Koreans inin thethe SouthSouth who had long collaborated with Japanese colonizers were the KoreanKorean midwives of thisthis strategy (and now would finallyfinally get whatwhat thetheyy deserved), and because the North'sNorth’s position relative to the South wouldwould likelylikely weaken overover time.time. Kim Il Sung weighed the possibility that the United States might interveneintervene inin defense of thethe South, but probably downplayed its significance because he feltfelt he had gotten joint backing for his invasion fromfrom both StalinStalin and Mao.Mao. What he could not have known was that his invasion solved a number ofof criticalcritical problems for the Truman administration, and did wonders in building the American ColdCold War position on a woworldrld scale.

KENNAN AND AACHECHESON SON

Korea was a critical presence in American policypolicy at the dawn ofof thethe ColdCold War. AsAs we have seen, the Truman administration identifiedidentified itsits stake inin KoreaKorea inin the samesame “"fifteenfifteen weeksweeks"” in whichwhich thethe containment doctrinedoctrine and thethe MarshallMarshall Plan were hammered out. Dean Acheson, then undersecretary ofof state,state, and George Marshall, the new secretary ofof state,state, reoriented American policypolicy awayaway from the Pentagon'sPentagon’s idea that the Korean peninsula had no strategic significance, toward seeing ititss value in the context ofof rebuildingrebuilding the Japanese economy andand applying the containment doctrine to South KoreaKorea—in—in George KennanKennan's’s original,original, limited meaning ofof usingusing economic and militarymilitary aid and the resources ofof thethe United Nations to prop up nations threatenedthreatened byby communism.communism. ItIt was at thisthis time,time, in early 1947, that Washington finallyfinally got controlcontrol ofof KoreaKorea policypolicy fromfrom thethe Pentagon and the occupation; the effect was essentially to ratifyratify the de factofacto containment policies against the Korean leftleft wingwing that the ococcupationcupation hadhad been following since September 1945. George Marshall, as we saw, told Acheson inin late January to draft a plan to connect a separate South Korea withwith JapanJapan's’s economy, and a few months later Secretary ofof thethe Army WilliamWilliam DraperDraper saidsaid thatthat JapanesJapanesee influence would again develop in Korea, "since“since Korea and Japan formform a natural area for trade and commerce.commerce."” 22 Around the same time Acheson remarkedremarked in secret Senate testimony that the United States had drawndrawn the lineline inin Korea,Korea, and sought funding for a mamajorjor program to turn back communismcommunism therethere onon thethe modelmodel of “"TrumanTruman DoctrineDoctrine"” aid to Greece and Turkey. Acheson was the prime mover inin 1947 and again when the UnitedUnited States intervened to defend South Korea inin June 1950. He understood containmentcontainment toto be primarilyprimarily a political and economic problem, ofof positioningpositioning selfself-supporting,-supporting, viable regimes around the Soviet periphery; he thought the truncated KoreanKorean economyeconomy could still serve Japan'sJapan’s recovery, as part ofof whatwhat he called a “"greatgreat crescentcrescent"” from Tokyo to Alexandria,Alexandria, linking Japan withwith Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and ultimately the oil ofof thethe Persian Gulf.Gulf However, Congress and the Pentagon balked at a major commitment to Korea ($600 millionmillion was the State DepartmentDepartment's’s figure, compared to the $225 million forfor GGreecereece and TurkeyTurkey thatthat Congress approved in June 1947), and so Acheson and his advisers tooktook thethe problem to the United Nations, thus to reposition and contain KoreaKorea throughthrough collective security mechanisms. But the UN imprimatur also gave the UnitedUnited StatesStates an important stake in the continuing existence ofof SouthSouth Korea.Korea. This, inin turn, waswas the worst nightmare ofof thethe top leaders inin NorthNorth Korea, allall ofof whomwhom sawsaw a revival of KoreaKorea's’s links to the Japanese economy as a mortalmortal threat. SoSo Kim Il Sung attacked in June 11950,950, hoping toto unifyunify Korea, and quicklyquickly dispatched the Southern army and government. That led the United States toto intervene to reestablish the Republic ofof Korea,Korea, essentially under a containmentcontainment doctrine commitment that was three years old byby then. That gogoalal was nearly accomplished in late September, three months into the war, but inin the meantime Truman and Acheson had decided to roll back the Northern regimeregime as part ofof aa general offensive against communism, exemplified byby NSCNSC 68 in AprilApril 1950. The defeat ooff American and allied forces in North KoreaKorea byby Chinese and KoreanKorean peasant armies in the early winter ofof 19501950 caused the worst crisiscrisis inin U.S.U.S. foreign relations between 1945 andand the Cuban MissileMissile Crisis, led Truman toto declare a national emergency, and essentessentiallyially “"demolished"demolished” the Truman administrationadministration (as Acheson put it) —TrumanTruman could have run again inin 1952, but likelike LyndonLyndon JohnsonJohnson confronted by another impending defeat inin 1968, he chose not toto do so. China had no stomach for unifying Korea at great cost to ititself,self, however, and so withinwithin a few months the fighting stabilized roughly along what isis now the DMZ.DMZ. The Korean War was the crisis that, in Acheson'sAcheson’s subsequent words,words, “"camecame along and saved usus";”; by that he meant that itit enabled the final approval ofof NSCNSC 68 andand passage through Congress ofof a quadrupling ofof AmericanAmerican defense spending. More than that, it was this war and not WorldWorld WarWar IIII that occasioned the enormous foreign military base structure and the domestic militarymilitary-industrial-industrial complex to service it and which has come to define the sinews ofof AmericanAmerican global power ever since. Less obviously, the failure ofof thethe Korean rollbackrollback created a centrist coalition behind containment thatthat lasted downdown toto the end ofof thethe Cold War. This consensus deeply shaped how the ViVietnametnam WarWar waswas foughtfought (no(no invasion ofof thethe North), evolved into the stalemate in the 1980s between thosethose who wanted to contain NicaraguaNicaragua's’s Sandinista regime and those who wanted toto overthrow it, and governed the 1991 decisiondecision to throw Saddam HusseinHussein's’s armyarmy ooutut ofof Kuwait,Kuwait, but not to march on Baghdad. Tellingly, in the early 1950s itit waswas public advocates of rollbackrollback or “"liberation"liberation” such as Dulles and RichardRichard NixonNixon who privately toldtold the National Security Council that rollbackrollback waswas impossible against anything thatthat the Communist side took seriously;seriously; general warwar mightmight wellwell be the result otherwise. These two Korean wars —thethe victory for KennanKennan-style-style containment, and thethe defeat ofof AchesonAcheson's’s rollback—reestablishedrollback—reestablished the two Korean states and created aa tense but essentialessentiallyly stable deterrent situationsituation on the peninsula thatthat has lasted ever since; the DMZ, Panmunjom, two huge Korean armies, and otherother artifactsartifacts ofof this war (even the United Nations Command) are stillstill standing today as museums of thisthis distant conflict. Both KoreKoreasas became garrison states and the NorthNorth remains perhaps the most amazing garrison state in the world, with moremore than aa million people under arms and young men and women bothboth servingserving longlong terms inin the military. TheThe South suffered through three decades ofof mimilitarylitary dictatorshipdictatorship while building a strong economy, and after a politicalpolitical breakthrough inin the 1990s is both a flourishing democracy and the tenthtenth-largest-largest industrialindustrial economy. There are many other effects that this hot warwar had on the two Koreas, but thethe impimpactact ofof the war on the United States was determining as well. A MILITARYMILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-INDUSTRIAL CCOMPLEXOMPLEX

The indelible meaning ofof thethe Korean WarWar forfor Americans was the new andand unprecedented American militarymilitary-industrial-industrial complex that arose inin the 1950s. Until that titimeme Americans never supported a large standing army and thethe militarymilitary was a negligible factor in American history and culture, apart fromfrom itsits performance in wars. The Constitution itselfitself “"waswas constructed inin fearfear ofof aa powerful military establishment,establishment,"” C. WrigWrightht MillsMills wrote, the constituent states had their own independent militias, and onlyonly the navy seemed consonant withwith American conceptions ofof thethe uses ofof nationalnational militarymilitary force. Americans lovedloved victorious generals such as Washington, Jackson, Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower,Eisenhower, enough to make them presidents. But after each victoryvictory the militarymilitary blendedblended backback into the woodwork ofof AmericanAmerican life. After reaching 50,000 duringduring the warwar withwith Mexico in the 1840s, the army dropped to about 10,000 soldiers, 90 percent ofof thethemm arrayed against Indians in the transtrans-Mississippi-Mississippi West at seventyseventy-nine-nine posts and trailside forts. TheThe military ballooned into millions ofof citizencitizen-soldiers-soldiers duringduring the civil war and the two world wars, but alwaysalways the army witheredwithered withinwithin months and years of victoryvictory—to—to a 25,00025,000-soldier-soldier constabularyconstabulary inin the late nineteenth century (at a time when France had halfhalf aa millionmillion soldiers, Germany had 419,000, and Russia had 766,000), a neglected force ofof 135,000135,000 between thethe world wars, andand a rapid shrinkage immediatelimmediatelyy after 1945. A permanent gaingain followed each war, but untiluntil 1941 thethe American militarymilitary remained modestmodest inin sizesize compared to other great powers, poorly funded, not veryvery influential,influential, and indeedindeed not really a respected profession. Military spending was less thathann 1 percent ofof GNP throughout the nineteenth century and wellwell into the twentieth. 33 The army was reorganized under the McKinleyMcKinley-Roosevelt-Roosevelt secretary ofof warwar Elihu Root, raising its strength to 100,000, and inin 1912 the WarWar DepartmentDepartment created a Colonial Army for the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Canal Zone that, although often understaffed, lasted untiluntil World War IIII and created a “"cadrecadre ofof semipermanentsemipermanent colonialscolonials"” (in Brian LinnLinn's’s words) with much PacificPacific experience. Officers andand soldiers quickly settled into thethe unhurried, idyllic life ofof thethe Pacific Army; U.S.U.S. forcesforces in the Philippines were almost entirelyentirely unprepared forfor the Japanese attack that came a few hours after Pearl Harbor. Then came instantaneous national mobilization to more than eleven millionmillion peoplpeoplee inin uniform, but again after the war Truman shrank the military:military: the army hadhad 554,000554,000 soldiers by 1948, and the air force watched most ofof itsits contracts get canceled (aircraft industry sales dropped fromfrom $16 billion inin 1944 toto $1.2$1.2 billionbillion in 1947). In 19451945 the navy, favored under Roosevelt forfor fourfour terms, had 3.43.4 million officers and men and nearly 1,000 ships ofof allall kinds; fifteen months later it had 491,663 menmen and just over 300 ships, and itsits 1945 budget ofof $50$50 billionbillion had slipped to $6 billion. The dradraftft ended in that same year (but(but gotgot reinstatedreinstated after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia). Defense spending fellfell toto $13 billion a year, or about $175 billion in current dollars.dollars.44 As Harry Truman presided over a vast demobilization ofof thethe militarymilitary andand the wartime industrial complex, it was as ifif thethe country were returning toto the normalcy ofof a small standing army and hemispheric isolation. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan ended that idleidle dreamdream inin 1947, but TrumanTruman andand his advisers still did not have the money to fund a farfar-flung-flung globalglobal effort;effort; the defense budget was steady-statesteady-state in the late 1940s, hovering around $13 billion. Until 1950 the containment doctrine also approximated what itsits author, George F.F. Kennan, wanted it to be: a limited, focused, sober efforteffort relyingrelying mostlymostly onon diplomatic and economic measures to revive Western European and Japanese industry, andand to keep the Russians at bay.bay. IfIf thethe military came intointo the equation, Americans should send military advisory groups to threatened countriecountries,s, not intervene militarily themselves. In the aftermath ofof thethe end ofof thethe Cold War,War, Kennan providedprovided a pithypithy expression ofof thisthis limited conception: to him the containment doctrinedoctrine was “"primarilyprimarily a diplomatic and political task, though not whollywholly withoutwithout militarymilitary implications.implications."” Once the Soviets were convinced that more expansionism wouldwould not help them, "then“then the moment wouldwould have come forfor seriousserious talks withwith themthem about the future of Europe.Europe."” After Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin blockade, andand other measures, he thought that moment had arrivedarrived byby 1950.1950. However,However, “"itit was one ofof thethe great disappointments ofof mymy lifelife to discover that neither our Government nor our Western European alliesallies had anyany interestinterest inin entering into such discussions at all. WhatWhat theythey and the others wanted fromfrom Moscow, with respect to the future ofof Europe,Europe, was essentially ‘'unconditionalunconditional surrender.surrender.'’ TheyThey were prepared to wait forfor it. And this was the beginning ofof thethe 40 years of ColdCold War.War."'”5 The central front had been established and fortifiedfortified andand the industrial recovery ofof WesternWestern Europe was under way,way, and inin East Asia thethe “"reversereverse course"—whichcourse”—which Kennan was much involved inin— hadhad liftedlifted controlscontrols onon Japanese heavy industry. Soviet troops withdrew fromfrom ManchuriaManchuria inin 1946 and North KoreKoreaa in 1948. But the Chinese revolutionrevolution's’s stunning victoriesvictories over Nationalist forces made it unlikely that a Cold WarWar stabilitystability wouldwould descend onon East Asia, akin to that in Europe. KennanKennan's’s 1947 strategy— fivefive advanced industrialindustrial structuresstructures existexist inin thethe worlworld,d, we have four, Moscow has one, containment means keeping thingsthings thatthat way— mightmight have sufficed to achieve the critical goal ofof revivingreviving Western and Japanese industry. NSC 68 defined a new global strategy, but itit was really NSCNSC 48 that cast the die in the Pacific:Pacific: the United States would nownow do something utterly unimagined at the end ofof WorldWorld WarWar II:II: it wouldwould prepare to intervene militarily against anticolonial movements in East AsiaAsia—first—first Korea,Korea, then Vietnam, with the Chinese revolution as the towering backbackdrop.drop. The complexities of thisthis turning point have been analyzed and documented byby historians, but they remain largely unplumbed, even today, among experts on foreign affairs, political scientists, journalists, and pundits, because theirtheir workwork places far too much weight on realpolitikrealpolitik and the bipolar rivalryrivalry withwith Moscow,Moscow, and relegates the two biggest wars ofof thethe period to the shadows ofof globalglobal concerns. The Chinese revolution also had a dramatic effect on American partisanpartisan politics, fueling the “"whowho lost ChiChina"na” attacks by Republicans, but againagain KennanKerman took careful and sober measure ofof itsits meaning: asas Mao came toto power inin 1949,1949, Kennan convened a group ofof EastEast Asian experts at the State Department. After listening for a while, he told them, “"ChinaChina doesndoesn't’t mattematterr veryvery much.much. ItIt's’s notnot very important. It'sIt’s never going to be powerful.powerful."” China had no integrated industrial base, which Kennan thought basic to any serious capacity forfor warfare, merely an industrial fringe stitched along its coasts by the imperial powers; tthushus China should not be included in his containment strategy. Japan diddid have such a 6 base, and was therefore the key to postwar American policypolicy inin East Asia.Asia.6 The power that revolutionary nationalism could deploy inin the colonies oror semicoloniessemicolonies of EastEast Asia was but dimlydimly appreciated inin Washington atat thethe time,time, and that certainly included Kennan. Instead his attention fastened onon the onlyonly formidable industrial nation in the region, Japan, and whatwhat couldcould be done toto revive it and its economic influence in East Asia.Asia. Over nearly two years a bunch ofof paperspapers were developed inin the State Department, feeding into a long analysis known as National Security CouncilCouncil document 48/2, "Policy“Policy for Asia,"Asia,” approved byby President Truman atat thethe end ofof 1949.1949. ThisThis document is best known for its declassification withwith the Pentagon Papers in 1971, since NSC 48 called forfor shipping militarymilitary aidaid toto the French inin Indochina for the first time (aid that began arrivingarriving before the Korean WarWar startedstarted in June 1950). But its most important substasubstancence was inin the politicalpolitical economy that it imagined for East Asia. Ever sincesince the publication ofof thethe “"openopen door notesnotes"” in 1900 amid an imperial scramble forfor Chinese real estate, WashingtonWashington's’s ultimate goal had always been unimpeded access to the East Asian reregion;gion; it wanted native governments strong enough toto maintain independence but not strong enough to throw offoff WesternWestern influence. The emergence ofof antianti-colonial-colonial regimes in Korea, China, and Vietnam negated thatthat goal,goal, and so American planners forged a secondsecond-best-best worldworld that divideddivided Asia forfor a generation.generation. In earlier papers that informed the final draft ofof NSCNSC 48, American officialsofficials enumerated several principles that they thought should regulate economic exchange in a unified East Asian region (including China)China):: “"thethe establishment ofof conditions favorable to the export ofof technologytechnology and capitalcapital and toto a liberalliberal trade policy throughout the world,world,"” “"reciprocalreciprocal exchange and mutual advantage,advantage,"” “"productionproduction and trade which trulytruly reflect comparative advantage,advantage,"” and oppooppositionsition to what they called “"generalgeneral industrializationindustrialization"—something”—something that couldcould be achieved “"onlyonly at a high cost as a result ofof sacrificingsacrificing production inin fieldsfields ofof comparative advantage."advantage.” NSC 48 planners anticipated nationalistnationalist objectionsobjections inin the grand manner ooff thethe nineteenthnineteenth-century-century Rothschilds:

The complexity ofof internationalinternational trade makes itit wellwell to bear inin mindmind thatthat suchsuch ephemeral matters as national pride and ambitionambition can inhibitinhibit oror preventprevent thethe necessary degree of internationalinternational cooperation, or the developmdevelopmentent ofof aa favorablefavorable 7 atmosphere and conditions to promote economic expansion. 7

Yet “"generalgeneral industrializationindustrialization"” is just whatwhat Japan had longlong pursued, and what South Korea wanted, too—atoo—a nationalist strategy to buildbuild a comprehensive industrial basebase that contcontrastedrasted sharply withwith the Southeast Asian countriescountries (who(who tend to bebe “"niche"niche” economies like the smaller states in Europe). Dean AchesonAcheson knew next to nothing about militarymilitary power. For himhim andand other American statesmen, the defeat ofof JapanJapan and Germany and thethe sstruggletruggle with communism were but one part, and the secondary part, ofof anan American project to revive the world economy from the devastation ofof thethe global depression and world war. AchesonAcheson was an internationalistinternationalist inin his bones, lookinglooking to Europe and especially Britain for support and guidance, and seeking multilateral solutions to postwar problems. At firstfirst the problem ofof restoringrestoring the world economy seemed to be solved withwith the Bretton Woods mechanisms elaborated in 1944 (the World Bank and the International MoMonetarynetary Fund);Fund); when by 1947 they had not worked to revive the advanced industrialindustrial states, the Marshall Plan arrived in Europe and the “"reversereverse coursecourse"” inin Japan, removing controls on heavy industries in the defeated powers. When byby 19501950 the alliedallied economies were still not growing sufficiently, NSC 68, written mostly byby Paul Nitze but guided by the thinking ofof AchesonAcheson (by then President TrumanTruman's’s secretarysecretary ofof state),state), hit upon military Keynesianism as a device that did,did, finally,finally, prime the pump ofof thethe advanced inindustrialdustrial economies (and especiallyespecially Japan). The Korean War was the crisis that finallyfinally got the Japanese and WestWest GermanGerman economies growing strongly, and vastly stimulated the U.S. economy. American defense industries hardly knew that KimKim IlIl Sung wouldwould comecome along and save them either, but he inadvertently rescued a bunchbunch ofof bigbig-ticket-ticket projects —especiallyespecially on the west coast. In Southern CaliforniaCalifornia these includedincluded “"strategicstrategic bombers, supercarriers, and …... a previouslypreviously cancelled ConvairConvair contractcontract to develop an interintercontinentalcontinental rocket forfor the Air Force,Force,"” in MikeMike DavisDavis's’s words. By 1952 the aircraft industry was booming again. Los Angeles County hadhad 160,000160,000 people employed in aircraft production. In the midmid-fifties-fifties defense and aerospace accounted directly or indirectlyindirectly for 55 percent ofof employmentemployment inin thethe county, andand almost as much in San Diego (where nearly 80 percent ofof allall manufacturing was related to national defense). Fully ten thousand SouthernSouthern California factories serviced the aerospace industry byby the 1970s; CalifCaliforniaornia was always the land ofof classicclassic high-tech,high-tech, “"late"late” industries, but airpowerairpower hadhad myriadmyriad spinspin-offs-offs and forward linkages to commercial aviation (just(just gettinggetting offoff thethe ground in the 1950s), rocketry, satellites, electronics and electronicelectronic warfare, lightlight metmetalal production (aluminum, magnesium), computer software, and ultimatelyultimately thethe SiliconSilicon Valley boom ofof thethe 1990s. 88 The military was never a significant factor inin peacetime American nationalnational life beforebefore NSC 68 announcedannounced the answer to how much “"preparedness"preparedness” ththee country needed, thus closing a long American debate: and inin mainstreammainstream Washington, it has never returned. By 1951 the United States was spending $650$650 billion on defense in current dollars, and finallyfinally reached thatthat maximummaximum pointpoint again in the early part ofof thisthis new century— aa sum greater than the combined defense budgets of thethe next eighteen ranking militarymilitary powers inin 2009.

THE AARCHIPELAGORCHIPELAGO OF EEMPIREMPIRE

This new empire had to take on a militarymilitary cast: first ofof allall because byby 19501950 the problem was defined milimilitarilytarily (unlike KennanKennan's’s emphasis on economic aid, military advice, and the UN). Second,Second, the United States had nothingnothing remotelyremotely resembling an imperial civil service. Before the 1950s the Foreign ServiceService was a microcosm ofof thethe Ivy League and the Eastern estaestablishment,blishment, operating outsideoutside the sight lines of mostmost Americans and withoutwithout a wholewhole lotlot toto do. ItIt producedproduced exemplary individuals like George Kennan, but itit never had a strongstrong constituencyconstituency at home. It is well known that McCarthyMcCarthy's’s assault on officersofficers in the China service ruined American expertise on East Asia forfor a generation, but NixonNixon's’s attack onon Alger Hiss (a dyeddyed-in-the-wool-in-the-wool internationalist) may have had worse consequences: anyoneanyone in pinstripes became suspect—peoplesuspect—people seen as internal foreigners —andand the StateState Department was fatally weakened. In the 1960s came the academic specialists—McGeorgespecialists—McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, Henry Kissinger,Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski—svengalisBrzezinski—svengalis who would tutortutor the president inin the occultoccult science of foreignforeign affairs. They also made war upon the State Department, appropriating its responsibilities while ignoring it, thus diluting itsits influence even more. TheThe State Department often seems to be a foreignforeign officeoffice with no clear constituency, but the permanent military installations around the world persist and perdure; they have an eternal writ all of their own. In the second half of the twentieth century an entirely new phenomenon emerged in American history, namely, the permanent stationing of soldiers in a myriad of foreign bases across the face of the planet, connected to an enormous domestic complex of defense industries. For the first time in modern history the leading power maintained an extensive network of bases on the territories of its allies and economic competitors—Japan, Germany, Britain, Italy, South Korea, all the industrial powers save France and Russia—marking a radical break with the European balance of power and the operation of realpolitik, and a radical departure in American history: an archipelago of empire.9 The postwar order took shape through positive policy and through the establishment of distinct outer limits, the transgression of which was rare or even inconceivable, provoking immediate crisis—the orientation of West Berlin toward the Soviet bloc, for example. That’s what the bases were put there for, to defend our allies but also to limit their choices—a light hold on the jugular, which might sound too strong until Americans ask themselves, what would we think of foreign bases on our soil? The typical experience of this hegemony, however, was a mundane, benign, and mostly unremarked daily life of subtle constraint, in which the United States kept allied states on defense, resource, and, for many years, financial dependencies. The aggressors in World War II, Japan and Germany, were tied down by American bases, and they remain so: in the seventh decade after the war we still don’t know what either nation would look like if it were truly independent. We aren’t going to find out anytime soon, either. The Korean War was thus the occasion for recasting containment as an open-ended, global proposition. A mere decade later President Eisenhower could say, “We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions,” employing 3.5 million people in the defense establishment and spending more than “the net income of all United States corporations.” That was from his famous critique of the military-industrial complex in his Farewell Address; less remembered is Ike’s final news conference, where he remarked that the armaments industry was so pervasive that it effected “almost an insidious penetration of our own minds,” making Americans think that the only thing the country does is produce weapons and missiles.missiles.rn10 When Western communismcommunism collapsed, it appeared for a few years that a serious reduction inin the permanent military might occur, but “"roguerogue states"states” kept itit goinggoing and then the “"warwar onon terrorterror"” provided another amorphous, open-endedopen-ended global commitment.

KENNAN OR AACHESON?CHESON?

What our history ssinceince 1950 teaches, itit seems to me, is the following:following: first, KennanKennan's’s limited form ofof containmentcontainment worked, because after 1948 or 1949 there was nothing to contain; Russia was not goinggoing to attack WesternWestern Europe oror Japan, and so the central front in Europe was stable and the four industrialindustrial bases held byby the non-Communistnon-Communist side in the Cold WarWar remained invulnerable,invulnerable, enabling themthem to develop beyond the wildest dreams ofof AmericanAmerican planners in the 1940s. Second, AchesonAcheson's’s NSC 68 move toward globalism, requiring a huhugege defense budget andand standingstanding army, failed. It failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam,Vietnam, and itit turned the United States into a country entirely remote fromfrom whatwhat thethe foundingfounding fathers had in mind, where every foreign threat, however smallsmall oror unlikely,unlikely, bbecameecame magnified and the fundamental relationship ofof thisthis country to the worldworld was changedchanged forever. That the United States would fightfight twotwo majormajor warswars inin Korea and Vietnam could never have been imagined inin 1945, when bothboth werewere stillstill (correctly) seenseen as problemsproblems related to their long histories ofof colonialism;colonialism; that the United States would not be able to win either warwar wouldwould have seemed preposterous. For all these reasons, it wouldwould have been better toto stickstick withwith George Frost KennanKennan's’s sober strategies. At the samesame time, Acheson'sAcheson’s political economy— thethe “"greatgreat crescentcrescent"—was”—was a masterstroke. TheThe Korean War decisively interrupted American plans to restitch American and Japanese economic relations withwith otherother partsparts ofof EastEast Asia; indeed the repositioning ofof JapanJapan as a mmajorajor industrial producer inin response toto a raging antiimperial revolution on the Asian mainlandmainland is the key toto explaining most of EastEast and Southeast Asian history forfor three decades, until the Indochina War finallyfinally ended in 1975. This forced a number ofof tempotemporaryrary compromises toto AchesonAcheson's’s vision that lasted far longer than anyone expected, as East Asia remained divided for decades. But once Japanese economic influence flowedflowed back into South Korea and Taiwan inin the early 1960s, along withwith a generous showeringshowering of American aid, these two economies were the most rapidlyrapidly growinggrowing ones in the world for the next twentytwenty-five-five years. At the same time allall three states were deeply penetrated by American power and interests, yielding profound lateral weakness. They were both strong and weak, and notnot byby accident,accident, because the external shaping had its origins in the workings ofof anan AmericanAmerican-led-led worldworld economy. But the Asian divisions began dramatically to erode after the IndochinaIndochina War ended, asas People'sPeople’s China was slowly brought intintoo the worldworld economy. Now, with the growing integration ofof thethe economies ofof thethe region, Cold WarWar impediments have nearly disappeared. In that sense, the East Asian regionregion has returned to the “"firstfirst principlesprinciples"” that Americans thought appropriateappropriate beforebefore thethe CChinesehinese revolution and the Korean War demolished theirtheir plans.

CHAPTER 8: A “"FF ORGOTTEN WW ARAR”” T HATHAT R EMADETHEEMADETHE UU NITEDNITED S TATETATESS ANDAND THETHE CC OLD W AR 1.1. Odd Arne Westad, The GlobalGlobal Cold War:War: Third WorldWorld InterventionsInterventions andand thethe MakingMaking ofof Our Our TimesTimes (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 66, 416, note 58.58. 2. NA, 740.0019 file, box 3827, MarshallMarshall's’s note toto Acheson ofof Jan.Jan. 29, 1947,1947, attachedattached toto VincentVincent toto Acheson, Jan. 27, 1947; RG335, Secretary ofof thethe Army File, box 56, Draper toto Royall,Royall, Oct. 1, 1947. HereHere II draw on parts of Cumings,Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy andand AmericanAmerican PowerPower (New(New Haven,Haven, Conn.: Yale UnUniversityiversity Press, 2009). 3. C. Wright Mills, The Power EliteElite (New(New York:York: Oxford UniversityUniversity Press, 1956), 175175-76;–76; Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The MartialMartial Spirit in America, 1775-18651775–1865 (Boston:(Boston: Little,Little, Brown,Brown, 1968),1968), ch.ch. 1;1; E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age ofof Empire,Empire, 1875-19141875–1914 (New(New York:York: Pantheon Books,Books, 1987),1987), 351;351; SherrySherry (1995),(1995), 5.5. 4. Russell F. Weigley, History ofof thethe United States Army (New(New York: Macmillan, 1967),1967), 475,475, 486,486, 568;568; Gerald T. White, Billions for Defense: Government FinancingFinancing byby the Defense PlantPlant CorporationCorporation DuringDuring WorldWorld WarWar IIII (University:(University: University ofof AlabamaAlabama Press, 1980), 11-2;–2; Davis, “"TheThe NextNext LittleLittle Dollar:Dollar: The PrivatePrivate Governments of San Diego,Diego,"” in MikeMike Davis, Kelly Mayhew,Mayhew, and JimJim Miller,Miller, Under thethe PerfectPerfect Sun:Sun: The SanSan Diego Tourists NeNeverver See (New York: New Press, 2003), 65. 5.5 New York TimesTimes,, Op-Ed,Op-Ed, March 14, 1994. 6. Quoted in Cumings (1990), 55. 7. Cumings (1990), 171-75.171–75. 8. Davis, "The“The Next Little Dollar,Dollar,"” 6666-67,–67, 78; Roger W.W. Lotchin, Fortress California,California, 19101910-1961:–1961: From WarfareWarfare to Welfare (Urbana: University ofof IllinoisIllinois Press, 1992), 65, 73,73, 184, 23;23; NealNeal R.R. Peirce, TheThe Pacific States ofAmerica: People, Politics, and PowerPower inin the FiveFive PacificPacific BasinBasin States (New(New York:York: W.W. W.W. Norton, 1972), 165-69.165–69. 9. In May 1966 de Gaulle said he wanted “"fullfull sovereignty [over][over] French territoryterritory"” andand so asked Washington to take American forces and bases home. See Chalmers Johnson, The SorrowsSorrows ofof Empire: Empire: Militarism, Secrecy,Secrecy, and the End ofof thethe Republic (New(New York:York: Henry Holt,Holt, 2004), 194. 10.10. EisenhowerEisenhower quoted inin Sherry (1995), 233233-35.–35.

CHAPTER 9: R EQUIEM:EQUIEM: H ISTORYISTORY ININ THETHE T EMPEREMPER OFOF RR ECONCILIATIONECONCILIATION 1.1.NewNew York TimesTimes,, Sept. 30, 1999, A16. 2. David R. McCannMcCann's’s translation, in The Middle Hour:Hour: Selected PoemsPoems ofof Kim Kim ChiChi HaHa (Stanfordville,(Stanfordville, N.Y.: HumanHuman Rights Publishing Group, 1980), 51. 3. Knox (1985), 8282-83,–83, 449. 4. Nicolai Ourossoff, "The“The Mall and Dissonant Voices ofof Democracy,Democracy,"” New YorkYork TimesTimes (Jan.(Jan. 16,16, 2009),2009), C30. 5. Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Jiyul Kim, “"TheThe Korean WarWar AfterAfter thethe ColdCold War:War: Commemorating thethe Armistice Agreement,"Agreement,” in Jager and MitterMitter (2007),(2007), 242. 6. Chinoy (2008), 68. 7. Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw, “"PentagonPentagon PlanPlan 5030, a NewNew BlueprintBlueprint forfor FacingFacing DownDown NorthNorth Korea,Korea,"” U.S.US. NewsNews & WorlWorldd Report (July(July 21, 2003); see also Chinoy (2008),(2008), 234. 8. President Roh Moo Hyun, “"OnOn History, Nationalism and aa NortheastNortheast Asian Community,Community,"” GlobalGlobal AsiaAsia,, April 16, 2007. 9. Choe Sang-hun,Sang-hun, “"AA Korean Village Torn Apart fromfrom WithinWithin MendsMends Itself,Itself,"” NewNew YorkYork TimesTimes (Feb.(Feb. 21,21, 2008), A4. 10.10. Nietzsche (1983), 88.

F URTHER R EADINGEADING

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