The Molyneux Problem Author(S): John W

The Molyneux Problem Author(s): John W. Davis Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1960), pp. 392-408 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708144 . Accessed: 21/02/2013 03:02

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This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM

BY JOHNW. DAViS

"Prepareret interrogerun aveuglene, n'efut point et6 une occupation in- dignedes talens reunis de Newton,Descartes, Locke et Leibnitz."-Diderot

I. INTRODUCTION The generalconditions of the Molyneuxproblem are as follows: assumea manborn blind, w howhile blind has learnedto distinguish a globefrom a cube. Wouldhe, upon havinghis sightrestored, be able to distinguishthe globefrom the cube by sightbefore he had touchedthem? Because of its theoreticalsignificance the problem was discussedby someof the mosteminent thinkers of the XVIIIth centuryincluding Locke, Berkeley,Leibniz, Voltaire, Diderot, and Condillac. Likemany great problems, it has notbeen solved, appear- ing full-blownas a subjectof occasionalcomment throughout the XIXth century,al thoughby thenthe terms of reference of the issues at stakebecame that of thenativism-empiricism controversy in psychology.The attitudestoward the problem are worthtracing in some detail because of the light thrownon some importantissues of XVIIIth-centurytheories of knowledge,and becauseof the instruc- tivenessof its resultsin the historyof psychology.'The present articledoes not pretend to be a fullchronicle of the problem.I have tried,however, to takeaccount of all significantdiscussions. The problemis primarilyan epistemologicalone, involving the natureof the transitionfrom sensation to judgment.A definitivean- swerto theproblem would presumably provide an answerto someof themost vexing questions of empiricism, sensationalism and rationalism,as we have cometo name theseissues. Empiricismis the doc- trinethat all our ideas-the materialsof knowledge-comefrom experience. As Locke,who may serve as ourprincipal exponent of the empiricaldoctrine, expounded it, experiencehas twosides: sensation and reflection.On thisview, all knowledgearises in connectionwith senseexperience, but themind, through its simpleideas of reflection, is able to workon the data thusfurnished by the sensesa nd at the sametime is able to be awareof its ownoperations. Sensationalism, a variantof empiricism with Condillac as its prototype,is an attempt 1 The Molyneuxproblem is also one of the main sourcesof the conceitof the blindman so popularin XVIIIth-centuryliterature, although this paper does not treatthis phase of the problem. See MarjorieHope Nicolson,Newton Demands theMuse (Princeton,1946) 83-85,and KennethMacLean, John Locke and English Literatureof theEighteenth Century (New Haven,1936), 106-108and passim. It shouldbe notedthat Miss Nicolsonerrs in statingthat Molyneuxdiscussed this problemmore fully in the DioptricaNova. Thereis no mentionof the problem eitherin theedition of 1692or in thereprint of 1709. 392

This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM 393 to reducethe Lockean dualism of sensation and reflection to a monism in whichsensation is primaryand reflectionis onlytransformed sensation. For the sensationalist,all knowledgeis givenin sensation. Rationalism,as held forexample by Leibniz,would grant that data are obtainedfrom both sensation and reflection,but wouldalso insist thatcertain knowledge can be obtainedonly by meansof self-evident principlesof whichsensation and reflectiongive us onlya confused and provisionalview. Statedin thisway, it can be seenreadily that those who answered theMolyneux problem negatively would tend to be classifiedas either empiricistsor sensationalistsand thatthose who gave an affirmative answerwould tend toward rationalism. One must,of course,beware ofreading more precision into this classification than it willbear, since the terms'rationalism' and 'empiricism'are best understoodas names forgeneral tendencies in thoughtand not as descriptiveof mutuallyexclusive alternatives.

II. MOLYNEUX, LOCKE, AND BERKELEY: THE NEGATIVE ANSWER WilliamMolyneux, author of the Dioptrica Nova (1692), an influ- entialearly XVIIIth-century treatise in optics,was a manvery much awareof theproblems of theblind because of his wife'sloss of sight. He proposedwhat he referredto as a 'jocose problem'in a letterto Lockeon March2, 1692: Supposea manborn blind, and nowadult, and taught by histouch to distin- guishbetween a cube and a sphere(suppose) of ivory,nighly of the same bigness,so as to tellwhen he feltone and t'other,which is the cube,which the sphere. Supposethen, the cube and sphereplaced on a table,and the blindman to be madeto see; querywhether by his sight,before he touch'd tllem,he couldnow distinguish and tell whichis the globe,which the cube. I answernot; fortho' he has obtainedthe experience of how a globe,how a cubeaffects his touch, yet he has notyet attained the experience, that what affectsmy touch so or so, mustaffect sight so or so; or thata protuberant anglein thecube that press'd his handunequally, shall appear to his eye as it doesin thecube.2 In the latter part of March of the same year Locke replied to this letter,saying that " your ingeniousproblem will deserve to be published to the world."3 ThereuponLocke insertedthe problemin the secondedition (1693) and all remainingeditions of the Essay Con- cerningHuman Understanding,presenting Molyneux's problem as just given without substantial difference. Molyneux refersto his problembriefly once more in print.4 2 SomeFamiliar Letters between Mr. Lockeand severalof hisFriends (London, 1708),37-38. 3Ibid.,43. 4 In Decemberof 1695,after his correspondencewith Locke had ripenedinto warmfriendship, Molyneux enclosed a letterfrom Edward Synge to a Dr. Quayl,in

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It is generallyassumed that Locke's position and thatof Molyneux in regardto thequery are identical,since both reply to it in thenega- tive. Both Jurin5 and Priestley6 concludequite correctlythat al- thoughMolyneux and Lockeagreed on theanswer their grounds seem different.Locke, in commentingupon Molyneux's query, says: I agreewith this thinking gentleman ... and am of opinionthat the blind man,at firstsight, would not be able withcertainty to say whichwas the globe,which the cube, whilst he onlysaw them;though he couldunerringly namethem by histouch, and certainlydistinguish them by thedifference of theirfigures felt. 7 As Jurinpoints out, in Molyneux'soriginal statement of the problem, the blind man is debarredonly fromtouching the globe and the cube, whereas Locke imposes the additional conditionthat the blind man make the identificationat firstsight, i.e., presumably wlthout walking aroundand viewingthe objects from various sides. The possibledif- ferencesin the solutionthus generatedare betterconsidered after Leibniz'saffirmative solution to theMolyneux problem has beencan- vassed. Berkeleycommented on theproblem negatively both in itsoriginal versionand in versionshe constructedto exploitfor various philo- sophicalpurposes. 8For Lockethe Molyneux problem served to illustratethe " mentalinterpretation ofthe data ofsense "; 9 forBerkeley it playsa muchwider role. Cassirergoes so faras to say that" The New Theoryof Vision,which forms the prelude to Berkeley'sphilosophy,and containsall his ideas implicitly,is nothingbut an attempt at a completesystematic development and elucidationof Molyneux's problem."10 In Berkeley'searly notebooks, the PhilosophicalCom- mentaries(written from 1707-1708), there are thirteenspecific refer- encesto the problem;Berkeley uses it fora varietyof purposes,the whichSynge answered the questionin the affirmative.After noting that he has encloseda copyof Synge'sletter, Molyneux adds thathe is not budgedby Synge's contentions. r JamesJurin (1684-1750) edited Vols. XXXI-IV of the PhilosophicalTrans- actions. In an age of greatpolemicists, he was one of its best-known.He was an ardentNewtonian and a defenderof thetheory of fluxions,which involved him in a famouscontroversy with Berkeley. 6 JosephPriestley (1773-1809), Vision, Light, and Colours(London, 1772), 720. 7John Locke,Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, ed.A. C. Fraser(Oxford, 1894),I, 187. 8 Berkeley'sremarks on the Molyneuxproblem in his publishedwritings should be studiedin conjunctionwith Luce's referencesand commentson entries27 and 28 of thePhilosophical Commentaries, ed. A. A. Luce (London,1944). Cf. ColinTur- bayne,"Berkeley and Molyneuxon RetinalImages," this Journal,XVI (1955), 339-355. 9 Ibid.,editor's note to entry27, 326. 10Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of theEnlightenment (Princeton, 1950), 109.

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mainone b eingto illustratethe heterogeneity ofsight and touch. We can best summarizehis commentsby consideringonly those works whichBerkeley meant for publication, and limitingourselves to con- sideringhis works on thepsychology and philosophyof vision, for it is herethat Berkeleygives his fullestand mostinteresting remarks on the problem;elsewhere he eitherrefers to theseworks on visionor recapitulateshis argumentwithout adding new material. Berkeley'sEssay towardsa New Theoryof Vision(1709) has a precisepurpose indicated in its openingsection: My designis to shewthe manner wherein we perceive by sight the distance, magnitude,and situation of objects. Also to considerthe difference there is betwixtthe ideas of sight and touch, and whether there be anyidea common toboth senses.1" Considerfirst the latterthesis. As Karl Aschenbrennerstrikingly putsit, Berkeley " construesthe outcome of the famous 'experiment ' withMolyneux's blindman in sucha waythat it mustalways be false ' to say I see whatI touch.'1' 12 Thisheterogeneity ofsight and touch is Berkeley'smost original contribution to the psychologyof vision. He statesthe thesis as follows: The extension,figures, and motions perceived by sightare specifically dis- tinctfrom the ideas of touch called the same names, nor is thereany such thingas oneidea or kind of idea common to bothsenses. 13 The demonstrationof thisthesis consists of threearguments. In the first,Berkeley employs one ofhis own versions of the Molyneux problem, allegingthat " a man bornblind would not at firstreception thinkthe thingshe saw wereof the samenature with the objectsof touch,or had anythingin commonwith them." 14 The secondargu- menturges that because visual appearances are qualitativelydifferent fromtactual appearances,there can be nothingcommon to both senses;this is similarto his thirdargument that the visible and tan- gibleare not 'homogeneous'and thuscannot be added. In section llGeorge Berkeley,Essay towardsa New Theoryof Vision,section 1 in The Worksof GeorgeBerkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop(London, 1948), I, 222-3. All quotationsfrom Berkeley, save quotationsfrom the previously cited edi- tionof the Philosophical Commentaries, will be fromthis edition. 12 GeorgeBerkeley; Lectures delivered before the PhilosophicalUnion of the Universityof Californiain honorof thetwo hundredth anniversary of thedeath of GeorgeBerkeley (Berkeley, 1957), 44. 13Berkeley, Essay, section 127, ed. cit.,222-223. Boringsuggests that Berkeley's doctrineof heterogeneityhelps to fixupon psychologyone of its mostimportant principlesof classification,the doctrineof sensoryattributes. It developsout of Aristotle'sclassification ofthe senses and Locke'scharacteristic stress on thesensory natureof ideas. See E. G. Boring,History of ExperimentalPsychology (2nd ed.; New York,1950), 182-183. 14Berkeley, Essay, section 128, 223.

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132,Berkeley offers Locke's and Molyneux'ssolution to theMolyneux problemas " a furtherconfirmation of our tenet."15 It is not,however,until section 135 that Berkeley's own attitude toward the Moly- neuxproblem comes to the fore. His anisweris in the negative,but his denialis farmore sweeping than that of either of his predecessors. For Berkeley,the blindman would not even understand the question; it wouldseem to him" downrightbantering and unintelligible."16 Berkeleywished also to showhow distance, magnitude, and situation(orientation) are perceived by sight. In eachcase, the Molyneux problemis used to supporthis contentions.In the case of distance, Berkeleyargues that we do not immediatelysee distance;an object itselfis seenimmediately as partof the data ofconsciousness, bu thow farthe objectsare fromus is not immediatelyknown by sight. His well-knownsolution is, of course,that perception of distanceis " an act ofjudgment grounded on experience."17 His classicaccount men- tionsmost of theprimary and secondarycriteria that are recognized today.'8 Berkeleyuses his ownversion of the Molyneuxproblem in thisdiscussion of distance: ... it is a manifestconsequence that a manborn blind, being made to see, wouldat firsthave no idea of distanceby sight;the sun and stars,the re- motestobjects as well as the nearer,would all seemto be in his eye, or ratherin his mind.19 Berkeley'sdiscussion of magnitudeand situationfollow similar lines, and in sections79 and 106 thereare correspondingpassages in which the Molyneuxproblem is a test case in Berkeley'sdemonstration.

III. THE AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER Leibniz,after a fulldiscussion of the problem in theNew Essays,20 respondsto the querywith a carefullyqualified affirmative. In his answerhe explicitlyimposes a conditionimplicit in theoriginal problem; theman with restored sight must know that objects before him to be distinguishedare respectivelya globeand a cube. The judgment is made, accordingto Leibniz, " by the principlesof reason, 15Ibid., section 132, 225. In the followingsection, 133, Berkeley further main- tainsthat the solutions of Lockeand Molyneuxrequire to be valida heterogeneity betweensight and touchwhich Locke had denied. For Locke,there are " simple ideas of diverssenses " suchas thoseof space and extensionwhich " we can receive intoour minds ... bothby seeingand feeling."'Locke, Essay, II, Ch. 5, 158. 16 Berkeley,Essay, section 135, 226. 17 Ibid.,171. 18 For an analysisof Berkeley'scontribution to the psychologyof space-perception,see Boring,History, 179-186. 19Berkeley, Essay, section 41, 186. 20GottfriedLeibniz, New Essays ConcerningHuman Understanding,tr. A. G. Langley(New York,1896), II, ix,8.

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unitedwith that senseknowledge which touch has beforefurnished him."21 The data furnishedby senseupon which reason could oper- ate to makethe correct judgment are that

. . . in the globethere are no pointsdistinguished by the side of the globe itself,all therebeing level and withoutangles, while in the cubethere are eightpoints distinguished from all theothers.22 Proofof this thesis, Leibniz contends, comes from the fact that the blindhave " rudimentsof a certainnatural geometry." 23 Suppose, further,a blindman and a paralyticlearn geometry. Their two ge- ometries" mustmeet and agree,and indeedreturn to thesame ideas, althoughthere are no commonimages." 24 Here Leibnizadmits the heterogeneityinsisted upon by Berkeley,but claimsit to be a heterogeneityof images,not a heterogeneityof exactideas " whichconsist in definitions."25 By thisdistinction Leibniz saves himself from the confusionover imaginability and conceivabilityso commonin Locke and Berkeley. Furthermore,Leibniz specifically excludes from his answer the conditionthat the judgmentbe made at 'firstsight' whichLocke had imposed. Leibnizgrants that the blindman at firstwould be " dazzled and confusedby the novelty."26 Such a qualificationdoes in fact modifyLeibniz's affirmative answer. Jurin,whose distinction between the views of Locke and Molyneux has alreadybeen commentedupon, accepted the Berkeleiandoctrine of the heterogeneityof sightand touch.2 He agreedwith Berkeley thatit is onlysuggestion and experiencethat connects the two. For Jurin,however, the Molyneuxproblem does not tendto supportthe Berkeleiantheory. His statementof the problemamplifies the accountof Leibniz somewhat. For Jurin,there would be a similarityin oursense-data (called 'ideas' in theterminology ofthe period) of the globeno matterfrom what perspectiveit weretouched or viewed. Such a similaritywould be lackingin the case of the cube withits eightpoints. Thusthe individual might reason out which were which, particularlyif he knewthat an absolutedistinction existed between them. This samepoint was also madeby Edward Synge.28 21Ibid., 139. 22Ibid. 23 This suggestionforeshadows the famouscase of Saunderson,the blind mathe- maticianof Cambridge,discussed more fully later by Diderot. The notionof 'na- turalgeometry' is as old as Keplerand is madefamous by Descartes. 24Leibniz,New Essays,139. 25Ibid. 28Ibid. 27 JamesJurin, " Remarks" in RobertSmith, A CompleatSystem of Opticks(4 bks.; Cambridge,1738), II, 27-29. 28 EdwardSynge (1649-1741) was theauthor of the Gentleman'sReligion. For an accountof Synge'swritings, see JohnNichols, Literary Anecdotes (9 vols.; Lon- don,1812-1816), I, 378.

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Let us pauseto drawthe threads together. The positionsof Locke and Leibnizdiffer by but a hair'sbreadth. This is becauseLocke's empiricismis broadlyconceived. Despite some commentators to the contrary,Locke's philosophy of mind,and moreparticullarly his doctrineof our knowledge of the external world, is nota viewof the mind as a purelypassive instrument, but ratherof a mindpregnant with the capacityto functionwith data whichsense supplies. Leibnizin- vokesspecifically his own ' principlesof reason' whichare perhaps tacitlyassumed in Locke. Berkeley,on theother hand, although not appropriatelycalled a sensationalistsince he does not attemptto re- duceall perceptionand judgmentto transformedsensation, has a nar- rowlyconceived empiricism as faras our knowledgeof the external worldis concerned.Berkeley allows two classesof ideas, ideas of sense and ideas of imagination.29The ideas of senseby whichwe knowthe external world " are notexcited at ra-ndom. . . but in a reg- ular train or series,the admirableconnexion whereof sufficiently testifiesthe wisdomand benevolenceof its Author."" Although Leibniz grantsBerkeley's thesis of the heterogeneityof sightand touchas faras images(or whatwe wouldcall sense-data)are concerned,his 'exact definitions'have no analoguefor Berkeley in connectionwith the Molyneux problem. Berkeley's denial is in factmore sweepingthan either Locke's denial or Leibniz'squalified affirmation.

IV. THE EXPERIMENTAL TEST In 1728 thereappeared in the PhilosophicalTransactions an ac- countby WilliamR. Chesselden,a famousanatomist and surgeon,of the successfuloperation for cataract on a thirteen-or fourteen-year- old boywho had losthis sightvery early in life. This was thefirst of a numberof suchcases,31 and thoughit is the mostfamous, it is by 29Cf. Berkeley,Principles of Human Knowledge,section 1 in Works,II, 41, witheditor's footnote thereto. 30 Berkeley,Principles, section 30, 53. Knowledgeof mindfor Berkeley is not, of course,ideational but notional.Whether or not thisnotional knowledge is to be calledempirical is a debatableproblem. On Berkeley'sdoctrine of notionalknowl- edge,see the presentauthor's article, " Berkeley'sDoctnrne of the Notion,"Review of Metaphysics(March 1959), 378-389. 31 The Chesseldencase is reproducedin fullin Fraser'sedition of Berkeley's works. GeorgeBerkeley, Berkeley's Complete Works, ed. A. C. Fraser (4 vols.; Oxford,1901), II, 411-413. Fairlycomplete accounts of the classicalcases with commentariesare to be foundin WilliamPreyer, The Developmentof theIntellect (New York, 1889), appendixC and in B. Bourdon,La Perceptionvisuelle de l'espace (Paris, 1902), 359-391. A bibliographyof cases is to be foundin W. IUhthoff'scontribution to T. Engelman'set al., Beitragezur Psychologie und Physio- logieder Sinnesorganes;Hermann von Helmholtzals Festgrusszu seimemsiebzig- sten Geburtstag(Hamburg and Leipzig,1891). To thesecases shouldbe added thatcommented on by RobertLatta in the BritishJoural of Psychology,(1904),

This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM 399 no means the best reportedin the literature. The boy in this case failed to recognizeby sighthis cat whichhe had knownprior to the operation by touch. Upon seizing her, he said, " So, puss, I shall know you anothertime." One fact,however, comes forthclearly in this case, althoughits significancefor the Molyneuxproblem does not seem to have been appreciatedfully because of the atomisticpsychol- ogy of the time. We know now that space-perceptionis slowly ac- quired; it is, as it were,'built up' over a considerableperiod of time. The termsof the problem,in requiringthe subject to answerimme- diatelyupon restorationof sight,ask foran answerto what is not,and can neverin the natureof the case be, an experimentumcrucis. But Berkeleyand a host of otherstook the Chesseldencase as a confirma- tion of their own views. Aftersummarizing the Chesseldencase in an incompleteand somewhatinexact way, Berkeleywrote: " Thus, by fact and experiment,those points of the theorywhich seem the most remotefrom common apprehension were not a little confirmed,many years afterI had been led into the discoveryof themby reasoning."32 From an extensiveliterature, an extractfrom one of the best re- portedand mostinteresting cases is perhapsworth quotation; it indicates the generalstyle of all the cases. The investigatorin this case was Franz and the date was 1841: The windowsof the roomwere darkened with the exceptionof one,toward whichthe patient, closing his eye,turned his back. At thedistance of three feet,and on a levelwith the eye,a solid cube and a sphere,each of four inchesin diameterwere placed beforehim. I now let him open his eye. Afterattentively examining these bodies, he said he saw a quadrangularand a circularfigure, and aftersome considerationhe pronouncedthe one a squareand theother a disk. His eyebeing closed, the cube was takenaway, and a diskof equal sizesubstituted and placednext to thesphere. On again openinghis eye he observedno differencein theseobjects, but regarded them bothas disks. The solidcube was nowplaced in a somewhatoblique posi- tionbefore the eye, and closebeside it a figurecut out of pasteboard,repre- sentinga plane outlineprospect of the cube whenin thisposition. Both objectshe tookto be somethinglike flat quadrates. ... On the conclusion ofthese experiments I asked him to describethe sensationsthe objectshad produced,whereupon he said thatimmediately upon opening his eyehe had discovereda differencein the two objects,the cube and the sphere,placed beforehim, and perceivedthat thev were not drawings; but that he had not beenable to formfrom them the idea of a squareand a disk,until he per- ceiveda sensationof what he saw in thepoints of his fingers, as if he really touchedthe objects. WhenI gave the threebodies, the sphere,cube, and I, 135-150. Test-casesare largelyconfined to theXIXth century,for, as Parsons pointsout, " suchcases now rarely escape operation in infancy."Sir JohnH. Par- sons,An Introductionto theTheory of Perception (Cambridge, 1927), 157-158. 32Berkeley,Theory of VisionVindicated, section 71, 276.

This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 400 JOHN W. DAVIS pyramid,into his hand,he was muchsurprised that he had not recognized themas suchby sight,as he was wellacquainted with them by touch.83

V. THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM IN FRANCE The Molyneuxproblem reached France withVoltaire's populariza- tion of the new philosophyof Newton, Locke, and Berkeley. Vol- taire's Elements of Newton's Philosophy (1738) treatsthe Molyneux problem in a passage followinga terse summaryof the Berkeleian theoryof vision. Voltaire,after having expoundedBerkeley's views of perceptionof distance,magnitude, and situation,writes: All this could onlybe explained,and made incontestableby some Person bornblind, and restoredto the senseof Sight. For ifthis blind Person, at the Momenthe receivedSight, had judgedof Distances,Magnitudes, and Situations,it had beentrue that the optick Angles formed that instant in his Retina, had been the immediateCauses of his Thoughts.Dr. Barclay [Berkeley]accordingly has assuredus afterMr Locke (and indeedhas gone beyondMr Locke on thisPoint) that neitherSituation, Magnitude, Dis- tance,nor Figure, would be at all discernedby a BlindPerson, at the In- stanthis Eyes shouldreceive Light. 34 Afterthus acceptingBerkeley's opinions, Voltaire furthermaintains that the Chesseldencase " confirmedall that Locke and Berkeleyhad foreseen."35 His briefsummary, however, has a lucidityand clarity in what it suggeststhat is quite lackingin the recordas publishedby Chesselden,although it mightbe remarkedthat the clarityresults because the subtletiesof the problemhave been missed. Condillac, who was familiar with Berkeley and the Chesselden case by way of Voltaire'sElements, considered the Molyneuxproblem at some lengthin his firstwork, the Essais sur l'originedes connois- sances humaines (1746). At this stage of his work,Condillac was a faithfulLockean empiricist,admitting two sources of knowledgein sensationand reflection.The individualwill be able to reflecton that whichsensation had occasionedin him and will be able " se formerdes idees de differentesoperations de son ame." 36 In 1746, Condillac is unwillingto accept Locke's analysisof perceptionor Berkeley'stheory of visionbecause each involvesunconscious judgments which for Con- dillac are unempirical.37This stresson a rigorousempiricism, which will later become sensationalism,is characteristicof Condillac. The 93J. C. A. Franz,communicated to PhilosophicalTransactions by Sir Benj. C. Brodie (London,1841), I, 59-69,quoted from Preyer, Development of Intellect, 310-311. 34 F. M. A. Voltaire,Elements of Sir Isaac Newton'sPhilosophy, trans. J. Hanna (London,1738), 59-71. 35Ibid. 36Etienne Condillac, Essais sur l'originedes connoissanceshumaines in Oeuvres de Condillac,ed. G. LeRoy (Paris,1947), I, partI, section4, 6. 37 Ibid.,section 6, 54-56 deal withCondillac's criticisms of Lockeand Berkeley.

This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM 401 mostinteresting feature of Condillac'searly treatment of the Moly- neuxproblem is thathe accusesof bias thosewho findin the Ches- seldencase co firmationof their speculations. He writes:C Ceux qui observolentcet aveugle-n6au momentqu'on lui abaissoitles cata- ractes,esperoient de voir confirmerau sentimentpour lequel ils etoientprevenus."} 38 In his Treatiseon the Sensations(1754), a workin whichthe Molyneuxproblem is thelinch-pin of the whole, Condillac offers sev- eral interestingcrticisms of Locke. In the firstplace, Condillac pointsout that the Locke-Molyneuxcondition that the cube and globebe ofapproximately the same size is superfluous.Secondly, as- sumingthat they must be of the samesize seemsto entailthat sight withoutthe aid oftouch can givedifferent ideas of size. This contention,however, contradicts the Locke-Molyneux assumption that shape cannotbe diseriminatedby sightalone. Thirdly,Condillac criticizes Lockeas inconsistentin maintainingthat an eyewhich could discern position,size, and distancecould not discernshape. For Condillac, theeye alone could judge none of these; the upshot for him in 1754is a thoroughgongadherence to the Berkeleiantheory of vision. For him,"Berkeley was thefirst to thinkthat sight alone c ouldnot judge of thesethings (i.e., position,size, distance and shape)."3 Lastly, Locke is chastisedfor not recognizingthat " judgmentsh ave some partin all our sensations."y0 This pointis of someinterest because it showsthe general manner in whichCondillac reduces Locke's dual- ismof sensa-tionand reflectionto a sensationalismin whichreflection is onlytransformed sensation. Aftera fairlyfull summaryof the Chesseldencase, Condillac in Chapter6 ofPart III detailsthe precau- tionsnecessary if one is properlyto interrogatethe blind. In this chapter,Condillac shows more sophistication about the difficulties in- volvedin suchtest-cases than anyone had hithertodisplayed. Diderot'sLetter on theBlind for the use of thosewho would see (1749), referredto by authoritiesas the firstscientific study of the blind,4'studies the Molyneux problem as an issuebetween Locke and Condillac. His tendencyto side withLocke was the main factorin themodification of Condillac'sview from the Essais to the Treatise.42 38 Ibid.,59 39Etienne CondiHac, Treatie on theSensations, tr. Geraldine Carr (Los Angeles, 1930),Part II, Chapter4, section3, 171. 40Ibid. 41 Cf. PierreVley, whowas himselfa blindprofessor at Caen University,"A proposde la Lettresur les Aveugles,"Revue du Dix-It?eme Scte, I, (1913),412, 421-422,and the remarksof GabrielFarrell, one-time director of thePerkins Insti- tutionfor the Blind,quoted in A. M. Wilson,Diderot: The TestingYear, 1713- 1759 (New York,1957), 99. 42 Cf.Denis Diderot, Lettre sur les Aveugles,ed. RobertNiklaus (Geneva, 1951), editor'sintroduction, xlvi.

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His realcontribution to theMolyneux problem is, however, in hissug- gestionthat the blindlive in a differentworld from the sightedand thatquestioning them is a matterof infinite patience and carebefore an answercan be obtainedwhich is in anysense conclusive. Although one doesnot have to followDiderot in his suggestionthat because the ideasof the blind are different from the sighted so musttheir morality and religionbe different,it was undoubtedlyspeculation upon such a questionthat led Diderotto considerthat perhapsthe crucialcase mightbe that of a highlyintelligent and giftedblind person. He foundsuch an elite subjectin Nicholas Saunderson,43who is the mouthpiecefor Diderot's scepticism in theLetter. Diderot'sown answerto theMolyneux problem is that thefirst time the eyes of one born blind open to the light, he will see nothing at all; sometime will be necessaryfor his eye to pra;ctise sight; it willprac- tisealone and without the aid oftouch, and will eventually distinguish not onlycolours but the main outlines of objects.44 Contraryto mostFrench philosophy of the XVIIlth century,which was empiricistor sensationalist,45it is clearthat Diderot in thispas- sage,representing his consideredopinion on the Molyneuxproblem, has chosenthe rationalistoption, since there is no mutualeducation of the sensesenabling us to learnspatial form and it is not onlythe eyewhich experiments, but thebrain. 48 43 icholasSaunderson (1682-1739), Lucasian Professorof Mathematicsat Cambridge,lost his sightat one yearof age. Appendedto Saunderson'sElements of Algebra(Cambridge, 1740), I, l-xix,is "an accountof the author'slife and character."The factsrelative to thelife of Saundersonand examplesof hisabilities wereavailable to Diderotfrom this source. His accountof the death of Saunderson in theLetter on theBlind, however, is fictional. 44Denis Diderot," The Letteron the Blind," Diderot'sEarly Philosophical Works,tr. MargaretJourdain (Chicago, 1916), 131. 45There are threeother comments on theMolyneux problem in thesensationalist Frenchphilosophy of the XVIIIth centurywhich deserve mention. LaMettrie (1709-1751),one of themore extreme sensationalist philosophers of the period, con- cludedthat the Chesseldencase, whichhe knewthrough Voltaire's Elements, con- firmedLocke's position on theproblem. The titleof Ch. XV ofhis Traitede I'Ame, "Histoiresqui confirmentque toutesles ideesviennent des sens,"gives an accurate indicationof his viewpoint.Julien LaMettrie, Oeuvres Philosophiques (London, 1751), 186. A fullerand moreaccurate account of the Chesseldencase thanVol- tairehad providedis givenby GeorgesBuffon, " Histoirenaturelle de l'homme," OeuvresCompletes (Paris, 1846), Tome 4, Part 2, 138-139. Condorcetasserted that the Chesseldencase confirmedLocke's contention;" il fautque l'hommeap- prennea voircomme 'a marcher."M. J. A. Condorcet,Oeuvres, ed. O'Connor& Arago(Paris, 1847), II, 121. 46 This pointbecame clear to me onlyafter I had readthe excellent introduction to theLetter in OeuvresPhilosophiques de Diderot,ed. Paul Verniere(Paris, n.d.), esp. 76-77.

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V. LATER HISTORY OF THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM IN GREAT BRITAIN The Molyneuxquery in GreatBritain is closelytied to thehistory of the influenceof Berkeley'sNew Theoryof Visionand its com- panionpiece, the Theoryof VisionVindicated (1733).47 The first traceablemention of the Molyneuxproblem in Scotlandwas in Wil- liam Porterfield'sA Treatiseon theEye (1759), one of the standard workson visionin the firsthalf of the century. Porterfield,who deniedthe Berkeleian theory that judgments of distanceand orientation weremade by " customand experience,"and insteadasserted that such judgmentsoccurred by " an original,connate and immut- able Law, to whichour mindshave been subjectedfrom the Time theywere first united to our Bodies"1 48 gave his affirmativesolution to theMolyneux query in thefollowing words: ... theIdea whicha Blindman must needs form of a Globeby his Touch, willbe this,that it is a bodywhich is exactlyalike on all sides; forlet him rollit as oftenas he willbetween his Hands,he can findno mannerof Dif- ferencebetween the one Side and theother: But thisis thevery Idea which at firstSight such a Man will formof it by his Eyes, and consequentlyhe mustat firstsight know it to be a Globe,and nota Cube.49 We have met this position before,but Porterfieldexpresses it with clarity. Reid in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) takes the em- piriciststand that the blind man could not " discernthat this was a cube, that a sphere."50 Sir William Hamilton, who can write of Berkeley'stheory of vision " that nothingin the compassof inductive reasoningappears more satisfactory,"although demurring its value in the case of lower animals,5'nevertheless, in commentingon the passage fromReid quoted above, answersthe Molyneuxquery in the affirmative. His position,similar to that of Jurinand Leibniz,is that: A sphereand a cubewould certainly make different impressions on him;but it is probablethat he couldnot assign to each its name,though, in thispar-

47 An importantearly full-scale report of a blindand deafboy, James Mitchell, was made by Dugald Stewart,first published in Transactionsof theRoyal Society of Edinburgh(1815), Vol. VII, Part 1 and includedin The CollectedWorks of Dugald Stewart,ed. Sir Wm. Hamilton(Edinburgh, 1854), IV, 300-370. Stewart does not deal withthe Molyneuxproblem directly, but assertsthat the " result appears,on thewhole, as favourableas couldreasonably have beenexpected, to the Berkeleiantheory of vision."Stewart, Works, IV, 309. 48 Wm. Porterfield,Treatise on the Eye. The Mannerand Phaenomenaof Vi- sion (2 vols.; Edinburgh,1759), II, 414. 49 Ibid.,415. 0Thomas Reid, Works, ed. Wm. Hamilton(6th ed.; Edinburgh,1863), I, 136. 5' Hamiltonin Reid,Works, I, 182.

This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 404 JOHN W. DAVIS ticularcase, there is goodground for holding that the slightest consideration wouldenable a person,previously acquainted with these figures, and aware thatthe one was a cubeand the other a sphere,to connectthem with his anteriorexperience, and to discriminate them by name.52 The onlyway that these two quoted statements can be renderedcon- sistentis to assumethat all Reid meansby the Berkelelantheory is the contentionthat sight and touchhave no connectionexcept that formedby experience,rather than the moresweeping Berkeleian a s- sertionthat the questionwould be unintelligibleto the blindman whosesight was restored. AdamSmith, a faithfulBerkeleian in thetheory of vision,grants thatalthough there be " no resemblancebetween visible and tangible objects,"there " seemsto be someaffinity or correspondencebetween themsufficient to make each visible object fitter to representa certain precisetangible object than any other tangible object." 5 This affin- ityor correspondence,however, between the visibleand the tangible "could not alone,and withoutthe assistanceof observationand experience,teach us, by an effortof reason, to inferwhat was theprecise tangibleobject which each visibleone represented."54 The firstthoroughgoing examination of Berkeley's theory of vision thatreaches a negativeverdict concerning its mainpoints was thatof SamuelBailey in 1842.55Among his otheranti-Berkeley arguments, Bailey deniesthat the Chesseldencase supportsthe Berkeleiandoc- trineof the heterogeneity ofthe two senses. He furtherbelieves that the Home case of cataractoperation on JohnSalter,56 in whichthe boyasserted correctly after some thought ten minutes after the opera- tionthat a pieceof paper was round,"in fact,solved the problem pro- posed by Mr. Molyneuxto Mr. Locke."57 Balley then goes on to givethe standard affirmative answer to thequery: 52Ibid.,137. 53 AdamSmith, Essays on PhilosophicalSubjects (London, 1795), 227. 64 Ibid.,229. 55Samuel Bailey, A Reviewof Berkeley's Theory of Visiondesigned to showthe unsoundnessof thatcelebrated speculation (London, 1842). AlthoughMill doesnot treatthe Molyneuxproblem directly, his reviewof Baileyshould be notedat this point. See JohnStuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions(London, 1859), II, 84- 119. 56EverardHome, PhilosophicalTransactions of the Royal Society (London, 1807),I, 83-87. An adequateextract of Home's two cases is to be foundin Preyer, Developmentof theIntellect, 296-300. 57Bailey, Reviewof Berkeley,218. One can hardlyconsider the Home case of JohnSalter as conclusiveas Baileydoes, since the boy had sufficientsight despite the cataractsto distinguishcolors "' withtolerable accuracy.' Home in Preyer, Developmentof Intellect,297. It is thus difficultto knowhow muchvision the childhad beforethe operation.

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It is surprisingthat these two philosophers should have answered the ques- tionso absolutelyin the negative. If we admit,as Lockedoes ... thatthe eyenaturally distinguishes plane figures, it follows that it canconsequently perceiveangles and curves in all theirvariety. The touch can do thesame. Thereare, then, relations existing between lines, which both these senses are capableof perceiving. Th e identityof form,therefore, between a visible rightangle, and a tangibleright might be recognized,although these two objectshad never been simultaneously received.58 Baileythen quotes Diderot favorably and assertsthat the quickness of recognitionof form" in the case of a blindperson suddenly en- dowedwith sight, would doubtless vary with circumstances." '9 T. K. Abbotin Sightand Touch (1864) offersan instructivesug- gestionconcerning the Molyneux problem in thecourse of his detailed and destructivecriticism of Berkeley: Letthe reader reflect how much handling and consideration ofan unfamiliar formwould be necessary,ifthe eyes were shut, before we couldobtain any- thinglike an accurateidea of its visible appearance.60 Aftersuggesting that an affirmativeanswer is possibleto the query becauseof the difference in thedeliverances to sightof the cube from theglobe, Abbot goes on to suggest: ... ifthe blind are capable of acquiring the ideas in question,they will, on beingmade to see, be competenttoname correctly the globe and cube which theyhave previouslyfelt. Consequently,if upon being fairly examined theyappear incapable of doingso, it willfollow that the defect is notin sightbut in touch; not in their new sense, but in their old ideas.6' Monckin Space and Vision(1872) suggeststhat in attemptsto verifythe Molyneux query experimentally circles and squaresbe substitutedfor spheres and cubes since the visual appearancesof the formerwould vary less from different perspectives. Secondly, he suggeststhat neutralterms like 'alpha' and 'beta' be substitutedfor ' circle' and 'square' sinceit is "too oftenforgotten that different menmay employ the same terms with the same denotation, but with totallydifferent connotations," and this "may be the case withthe space-perceptionof theblind man and the seeingman." 62 Lastly,a triangleand a squareshould be usedrather than a circleand a square to eliminatethe fact that "the uniformityof the circularoutline wouldgive considerablescope forguessing if the patientwas at all quick."68 58Bailey, Review of Berkeley, 220. " Ibid. I ThomasK. Abbot,Sight and Touch:An Attemptto disprovethe received (or Berkeleian)Theory of Vision(London, 1864), 141. 61 Ibid., 142. 62 W. H. S. Monck,Space and Vision:An Attemptto deduceall ourknowledge of spacefrom the sense of sight(Dublin, 1872), 80. 6 Ibid.,81.

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VI. THE QUERY AND THE NATIVISM-EMPIRICISM CONTROVERSY The Molyneuxproblem of the XVIlIth centuryis the progenitor of the nativism-empiricismcontroversy of the latterhalf of the XlXth century.The nativism-empiricismcontroversy was concerned overwhether knowledge of space was innateor learned. The proxi- matesource of thedebate was Kant's doctrineof the a prioricharac- terof spatialintuition.04 T he debateover nativism and empiricism was inconclusive,as mostsuch debates are, since most sophisticated nativistscame to recognizethat the perceiver'sspatial organization was modifiedand developedin experience,and empiricistsrecognized thatsomething congenital was broughtby theperceiver in his organ- izationof space. So faras any precisioncan be broughtto theissues, they may be stateda la Berkeley.Berkeley had contendedthat the immediate objectsof vision are lightand colors,that visual data are arbitrarysigns whichsuggest to themind ' outness' byrepetition in thesame fashion in whichwords come to suggestthings by repetition,and thattactual data are indispensableas an auxiliaryaid to visualdata- a position maintainedby all empiricaltheories.65 As in theMolyneux problem, the empiricistsgave to experienceas muchfunction as possiblein spatialorganization, whereas the nativists tended to minimizethe role of experienceand maximizethe role of unmodifiedcongenital intui- tion. Ribothas pointedout thatthe debatemay be summedup in Berkeleianterms. He writes: Whatis thepeculiar object of sight? Thisvery simple question sums up thedebate. If wereply: color, we are empiricists. If wereply: colored extension,we cast our lot with the nativists. 06 Let us considerthe arguments of empiricismagainst nativism and vice versato see whetherthe substantive issues will throw some light upon the Molyneuxproblem. The main argumentsoffered by the empiricistsagainst the nati+vistswere, first, the logical argument that nativismintroduced an unnecessaryhypothesis, an innateintuition of space. Secondly,the empiricists contended that facts were burked in the nativristanalysis since nativists are compelledto grantthat " in the greatmajority of cases,these (original) sensations must be sup- plementedby veryprofound experiential knowledge." 67 Againstempiricism, nativism contended, first with a factualargu- ment,that evidence from the factthat animals could see depthupon 64AlthoughKant's namegave prestigeto manynativists, actually the contro- versywas overthe psychologicalgenesis of the idea of space,a purelyphenomenal question,and not a problemof a transcendentorder concering the ultimate origin of thenotion of space. On thispoint, see TheodoreRibot, German Psychology To- day (New York, 1886), 133 and J. von Kries in Helmholtz'sTreatise on Physio- logicalOptics, tr. James P. C. Southall(Optical Society of America, 1925), III, 635f. 65Ribot, German Psychology, 121. 66Ibid., 126-127. 6 Ibid., 130.

This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:02:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MOLYNEUX PROBLEM 407 seeinglight for the first time 68 implied that human beings could do the same; spatial perception,therefore, was innate. Secondly,the na- tivistmight argue that the empiricist'sargument is logicallyincom- plete. The empiricistexplains visual spatialperceptions ultimately in termsof tactualdata, i.e., we knowwhat we see by touch. The nativistthen asks: are notthese primitive tactual representations innate? The upshotof one of psychology'sdreariest chapters was that neitherthe empiricists nor the nativists had a clearfield. The controversyover nativism and empiricismis as inconclusiveas the controversyover the Molyneux problem, its XVIIIth centurycounterpart.

VII. OBSERVATIONS ON THE STUDY Threegeneral observations may be made on thepreceding study. Let us firstconsider certain methodological issues involved in the at- temptsat verifyingthe Molyneux problem experimentally. That the reportson thosewho have acquiredvision after operation for con- genitalcataract are not decisiveseems well-attested.The reports weremade by oculistsuntrained in avoidingleading and suggestive questions. The differencein the replies,dependent upon the pre- sumedintelligence of the patients, supports the contention that this is a factor. Furthermore,cataract cases are not usuallytotally blind; manyof the casesinvolved patients who were not blind at birth,but had visual experiencesof variousdegrees before the operation.For example,Parsons cites the evidencethat an intelligentcataracted blindperson is notentirely without visual experience. He mayapply pressureto thenasal sideof the eyeballproducing a brilliantdisplay of colorscalled the phosphenephenomenon, which is projectedin space.69 Repliesmust be carefullyevaluated because the verbal description is froma patientwith experience totally alien to theoculist, who may as a resultbe interpretingthe repliesin the lightof his ownexperi- ence. Thentoo, the patient's eyes are sensitive and inflamed after the operation,and as Leibnizrecognized, he maybe confusedat thetime as well as beingin considerablepain. As Carr says," the data are somewhatambiguous and indecisivein import."70 The mostauthori- tativerecent report concerning those who have acquiredvision late in lifeis byYoung. He writesin partsas follows: 68 See Bailey,Review of Berkeley,151. Cf. also Abbot,Sight and Touch,163- 173. For modernconfirmation, see VernonGrant, Psychological Optics (Chicago, 1938), 118. Grant,however, draws no conclusionsconcerning human vision. Mill, an avowedfollower of Berkeley'stheory of vision,recognized this as " the most seriousdifficulty which the theory of Berkeley has to face." Mill,Dissertations and Discussions,II, 110. 69Sir JohnH. Parsons,An Introductionto the Theoryof Perception(Cam- bridge,1927), 158. 70Harvey A. Carr,Introduction to Space Perception(New York,1935), 1415. The accounthere of the difficulties involved in experimentalverification ofthe issues is verymuch indebted to Carr.

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Duringthe presentcentury the operation(i.e., cataractremovel) has been doneoften enough for systematic and accuratereports to be collected.The patienton openinghis eyesfor the first time gets little or no enjoyment;in- deed he findsthe experiencepainful. He reportsonly a spinningmass of lightsand colours. He provesto be quite unable to pick out objectsby sight,to recognizewhat they are, or to namethem. He has no conceptionof a space withobjects in it, althoughhe knowsall about objectsand their namesby touch. . . . His brainhas notbeen trained in therules of seeing. ... For manyweeks and monthsafter beginning to see,the person can only withthe greatest difficulty distinguish between simple shapes, such as a triangleand a square.71 Such contemporaryevidence bears out the Leibnizian conceptionthat the patient will be confusedand unable to answerimmediately. An even strongerpoint against the conclusivenessof the experimental evidence in answeringthe Molyneux problem is mentionedby the opthalmologistMurray: ... manypeople with normal sight fail to recognizean objectin a bad light, or in unfamiliarsurroundings, or in unusualpositions.72 But that this evidencecan be used to answerthe Molyneuxprob- lem with a decisive negative seems doubtful. The reason is simply that the termsof the problemrequire an answerwithin a span of time too shortfor space perceptionto develop. If time is allowed forsuch space perceptionto develop,however, then the termsof the problem are changedradically. The answer,if an answermust be given,is to reject the problemas being unamenableto experimentaltest. Two more generalcomments are in order. The controversyover the Molyneuxproblem provides a forumfor the classic debate among the rationalists,the empiricists,and the sensationalists. Accordingto theiranswers to the problem,their positions can be identified,and in a more definitemanner than has hithertobeen possible. Finally,the problemillustrates a phenomenonwhich has occurredmore than once in the historyof ideas -the shift of a problem froma speculative philosophicalissue througha phase as a psychologicalproblem to an endingas a problemfor the physiologist. During its career,the problem undergoessuch changesin its termsof referencethat a definitive answer to the originalquestion cannot be provided. It is doubtful, forexample, if anyone who had taken up the rationalistor empiricist option would be unable to defendit on the basis of any facts or hy- potheses that mightbe alleged against it. This is not to despair of speculation,but to show the need forit as a stimulusto experiment and empiricalinquiry. Universityof WesternOntario. 71J. Z. Young,Doubt and Certaintyin Science(London, 1951), 61ff. (Italics mine). 72 MichaelMurray, " An Introductionto BishopBerkeley's 'Theory of Vision,"' BritishJournal of Opthalmology,28 (1944), 606.

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