Organizing and Participating in a Research Project Disclosures Introduction to This Series Today's Discussion
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News Kathy Elrick Clemson University, [email protected]
Clemson University TigerPrints All Dissertations Dissertations 12-2016 Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News Kathy Elrick Clemson University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations Recommended Citation Elrick, Kathy, "Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News" (2016). All Dissertations. 1847. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1847 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact [email protected]. IRONIC FEMINISM: RHETORICAL CRITIQUE IN SATIRICAL NEWS A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design by Kathy Elrick December 2016 Accepted by Dr. David Blakesley, Committee Chair Dr. Jeff Love Dr. Brandon Turner Dr. Victor J. Vitanza ABSTRACT Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News aims to offer another perspective and style toward feminist theories of public discourse through satire. This study develops a model of ironist feminism to approach limitations of hegemonic language for women and minorities in U.S. public discourse. The model is built upon irony as a mode of perspective, and as a function in language, to ferret out and address political norms in dominant language. In comedy and satire, irony subverts dominant language for a laugh; concepts of irony and its relation to comedy situate the study’s focus on rhetorical contributions in joke telling. How are jokes crafted? Who crafts them? What is the motivation behind crafting them? To expand upon these questions, the study analyzes examples of a select group of popular U.S. -
The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online
The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online ∗ Paul Ohm Fear of the powerful computer user, the “Superuser,” dominates debates about online conflict. He is a mythic figure: difficult to find, immune to technological constraints, and aware of legal loopholes. Policymakers, fearful of his power, too often overreact by passing overbroad, ambiguous laws intended to ensnare the Superuser but which are instead used against inculpable, ordinary users. This response is unwarranted because the Superuser is often a marginal figure whose power has been greatly exaggerated. The exaggerated focus on the Superuser reveals a pathological characteristic of the study of power, crime, and security online, which springs from a widely held fear of the Internet. Building on the social science fear literature, this Article challenges the conventional wisdom and ∗ Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to Tim Wu, Orin Kerr, Phil Weiser, Julie Cohen, Pierre Schlag, Brett Frischmann, Victor Fleischer, Miranda Fleischer, Viva Moffat, and Jean Camp for their helpful comments. Thanks also for suggestions and support from participants in the University of Colorado Law School Faculty Workshop, including Clare Huntington, Nestor Davidson, Scott Peppett, Mimi Wesson, Amy Schmitz, Sarah Krakoff, and Brad Bernthal; the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference; and the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. Thanks also to Todd Blair and Michael Beylkin for outstanding research assistance. 1327 1328 University of California, Davis [Vol. 41:1327 standard assumptions about the role of experts. Unlike dispassionate experts in other fields, computer experts are as susceptible as laypeople to exaggerate the power of the Superuser. -
Cognitive Biases Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Are Mental Shortcuts That Aid in Processing of Information, but Can Lead to Suboptimal Decisions
Cognitive Biases Cognitive biases and heuristics are mental shortcuts that aid in processing of information, but can lead to suboptimal decisions. List of Biases and Heuristics Bias/Effect Description Business Problem Category Advice Ambiguity bias Preference for known Need to We favor options that appear simple risks over unknown risks Act Fast or that have more complete information over more complex, ambiguous options. Anchoring Overreliance on initial Think of each Too Much We notice when something has information piece of Information changed. information as independently as possible, then review them collectively Anecdotal fallacy Overvaluing personal Not We find stories and patterns even in experience when Enough sparse data. compared to data Meaning Anthropomorphism Mistakenly imbuing things Not We find stories and patterns even in with human traits Enough sparse data. Meaning Appeal to novelty Belief that something new Need to In order to stay focused, we favor the is inherently superior to Act Fast immediate, relatable thing in front of status quo us over the delayed and distant. Appeal to probability Mistaking probability for Even the best Not We simplify probabilities and fallacy certainty laid plans can Enough numbers to make them easier to think fail, even when Meaning about. they are more likely than not to succeed Argument from Mistaken belief that a Some Not We fill in characteristics from fallacy fallacious argument arguments are Enough stereotypes, generalities, and prior implies that the better than Meaning histories -
So You Say: Demonstrated Facts V. Unsupported Assertions
So You Say: Demonstrated Facts v. Unsupported Assertions Prepared by: Toni Boone, Administrative Law Judge (retired) Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles and W. Michael Gillette, Associate Justice (retired) Oregon Supreme Court Shareholder: Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt Prepared for: 2017 National Association of Hearing Officials Professional Development Conference Copyright © 2017 Ipse Dixit Publications Wilsonville, Oregon So You Say: Demonstrated Facts v. Unsupported Assertions © 2017 Ipse Dixit Publications 2017 National Association of Hearing Officials Professional Development Conference Page 1 So You Say: Demonstrated Facts v. Unsupported Assertions Toni Boone, Administrative Law Judge (retired) W. Michael Gillette, Association Justice, Oregon Supreme Court (retired) I. Burdens of Proof A. “Burden of Proof” Defined: 1. Duty placed upon a party to a civil or criminal action to prove or disprove a disputed fact. 2. “Burden of Proof” is also used as a synonym for “Burden of Persuasion” which is the quantum of proof by which the party with the burden of proof must establish or refute a disputed fact. B. Preponderance of the Evidence Defined: 1. Evidence, as a whole, shows fact to be proved is more probable than not. 2. The existence of the fact at issue is more likely than not. 3. The greater weight of the credible evidence. 4. More evidence or more credible evidence than evidence offered in opposition to it. C. Clear and Convincing Evidence Defined: The existence of a particular fact is highly probable or reasonably certain. This standard may be used in some jurisdictions when the issue is whether a person was guilty of deceit or fraud—a matter that had to be proved at common law by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere preponderance. -
Appendix 1 a Great Big List of Fallacies
Why Brilliant People Believe Nonsense Appendix 1 A Great Big List of Fallacies To avoid falling for the "Intrinsic Value of Senseless Hard Work Fallacy" (see also "Reinventing the Wheel"), I began with Wikipedia's helpful divisions, list, and descriptions as a base (since Wikipedia articles aren't subject to copyright restrictions), but felt free to add new fallacies, and tweak a bit here and there if I felt further explanation was needed. If you don't understand a fallacy from the brief description below, consider Googling the name of the fallacy, or finding an article dedicated to the fallacy in Wikipedia. Consider the list representative rather than exhaustive. Informal fallacies These arguments are fallacious for reasons other than their structure or form (formal = the "form" of the argument). Thus, informal fallacies typically require an examination of the argument's content. • Argument from (personal) incredulity (aka - divine fallacy, appeal to common sense) – I cannot imagine how this could be true, therefore it must be false. • Argument from repetition (argumentum ad nauseam) – signifies that it has been discussed so extensively that nobody cares to discuss it anymore. • Argument from silence (argumentum e silentio) – the conclusion is based on the absence of evidence, rather than the existence of evidence. • Argument to moderation (false compromise, middle ground, fallacy of the mean, argumentum ad temperantiam) – assuming that the compromise between two positions is always correct. • Argumentum verbosium – See proof by verbosity, below. • (Shifting the) burden of proof (see – onus probandi) – I need not prove my claim, you must prove it is false. • Circular reasoning (circulus in demonstrando) – when the reasoner begins with (or assumes) what he or she is trying to end up with; sometimes called assuming the conclusion. -
Denying the Antecedent - Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
Denying the antecedent - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Help us provide free content to the world by • LearnLog more in /about create using Wikipediaaccount for research donating today ! • Article Discussion EditDenying this page History the antecedent From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Denying the antecedent is a formal fallacy, committed by reasoning in the form: If P , then Q . Navigation Not P . ● Main Page Therefore, not Q . ● Contents Arguments of this form are invalid (except in the rare cases where such an argument also ● Featured content instantiates some other, valid, form). Informally, this means that arguments of this form do ● Current events ● Random article not give good reason to establish their conclusions, even if their premises are true. Interaction The name denying the ● About Wikipedia antecedent derives from the premise "not P ", which denies the 9, 2008 ● Community portal "if" clause of the conditional premise.Lehman, v. on June ● Recent changes Carver One way into demonstrate archivedthe invalidity of this argument form is with a counterexample with ● Contact Wikipedia Cited true premises06-35176 but an obviously false conclusion. For example: ● Donate to No. If Queen Elizabeth is an American citizen, then she is a human being. Wikipedia ● Help Queen Elizabeth is not an American citizen. Therefore, Queen Elizabeth is not a human being. Search That argument is obviously bad, but arguments of the same form can sometimes seem superficially convincing, as in the following example imagined by Alan Turing in the article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence": “ If each man had a definite set of rules of conduct by which he regulated his life he would be no better than a machine. -
Cognitive Biases in Fitness to Practise Decision-Making
ADVICE ON BIASES IN FITNESS TO PRACTISE DECISION-MAKING IN ACCEPTED OUTCOME VERSUS PANEL MODELS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AUTHORITY Prepared by: LESLIE CUTHBERT Date: 31 March 2021 Contents I. Introduction ................................................................................................. 2 Background .................................................................................................. 2 Purpose of the advice.................................................................................... 3 Summary of conclusions ................................................................................ 4 Documents considered .................................................................................. 4 Technical terms and explanations ................................................................... 5 Disclaimer .................................................................................................... 5 II. How biases might affect the quality of decision-making in the AO model, as compared to the panel model .............................................................................. 6 Understanding cognitive biases in fitness to practise decision-making ............... 6 Individual Decision Maker (e.g. a Case Examiner) in AO model ......................... 8 Multiple Case Examiners .............................................................................. 17 Group Decision Maker in a Panel model of 3 or more members ....................... 22 III. Assessment of the impact of these biases, -
Accepted Manuscript1.0
Nonlinear World – Journal of Interdisciplinary Nature Published by GVP – Prof. V. Lakshmikantham Institute for Advanced Studies and GVP College of Engineering (A) About Journal: Nonlinear World is published in association with International Federation of Nonlinear Analysts (IFNA), which promotes collaboration among various disciplines in the world community of nonlinear analysts. The journal welcomes all experimental, computational and/or theoretical advances in nonlinear phenomena, in any discipline – especially those that further our ability to analyse and solve the nonlinear problems that confront our complex world. Nonlinear World will feature papers which demonstrate multidisciplinary nature, preferably those presented in such a way that other nonlinear analysts can at least grasp the main results, techniques, and their potential applications. In addition to survey papers of an expository nature, the contributions will be original papers demonstrating the relevance of nonlinear techniques. Manuscripts should be submitted to: Dr. J Vasundhara Devi, Associate Director, GVP-LIAS, GVP College of Engineering (A), Madhurawada, Visakhapatnam – 530048 Email: [email protected] Subscription Information 2017: Volume 1 (1 Issue) USA, India Online Registration at www.nonlinearworld.com will be made available soon. c Copyright 2017 GVP-Prof. V. Lakshmikantham Insitute of Advanced Studies ISSN 0942-5608 Printed in India by GVP – Prof. V. Lakshmikantham Institute for Advanced Studies, India Contributions should be prepared in accordance with the ‘‘ Instructions for Authors} 1 Nonlinear World Honorary Editors Dr. Chris Tsokos President of IFNA, Executive Director of USOP, Editor in Chief, GJMS, IJMSM, IJES, IJMSBF Dr. S K Sen Director, GVP-LIAS, India Editor in Chief Dr. J Vasundhara Devi Dept. of Mathematics, GVPCE(A) and Associate Director, GVP-LIAS, India Editorial Board Dr. -
Hume's Skepticism. Dennis F
University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1998 Hume's skepticism. Dennis F. Thompson University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Thompson, Dennis F., "Hume's skepticism." (1998). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2316. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2316 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUME'S SKEPTICISM A Dissertation Presented by DENNIS F. THOMPSON Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 1998 Philosophy Copyright by Dennis F. Thompson 1998 All Rights Reserved HUME'S SKEPTICISM A Dissertation Presented by DENNIS F. THOMPSON Approved as to style and content by: V-fl/vC- C . Vere C. Chappell, Chair This work is dedicated in loving memory to William Arthur Thompson (1947 - 1994) " "Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning . [A Treatise of Human Nature, I. IV. VI I] ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In acknowledging those who have made it possible for me to complete this dissertation I must express my deepest gratitude to my sister, Mary. Without her support and encouragement I would not have been able to pursue my undergraduate education and thus would not even have begun the process of writing this work. -
Covid-19 Vaccine Hesitancy
COVID-19 VACCINE HESITANCY IAP YOUNG PHYSICIAN LEADERS WEBINAR Biljana Gjoneska MD, PhD Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts INFORMATION DISORDER CONTENT FALSE DAMAGING INTENTION MISINFORMATION MALINFORMATION UN/INTENTIONALLY & DISINFORMATION INTENTIONALLY & IN/DELIBERATELY DELIBERATELY FALSE AND INACCURATE, INVALID, FALSE DAMAGING HARMFUL, DAMAGING, UNREALISTIC, FALSE (Some) Hate speech False Connections (Some) Harassment Misleading Content (Some) Leaks Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2018). Thinking about ‘information disorder’: formats of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information. Ireton, Cherilyn; Posetti, Julie. Journalism,‘fake news’& disinformation. Paris: Unesco, 43-54. COVID-19 VACCINE DENIERS ANTI-VAXXERS LIBERTARIANS NEW AGE GROUPS Q-ANON ADHERENTS Cognitive biases (unconscious) Confirmation bias Expectation bias Attentional bias ERRORS IN JUDGMENT Base rate error Appeal to probability Sunk cost fallacy Just world fallacy Ad hominem False dichotomy Ad nauseam Appeal to authority Post hoc ergo propter hoc Appeal to emotion Affirming the consequence Circular argument Denying the antecedent Appeal to the majority Cherry picking Appeal to ignorance Appeal to tradition ERRORS IN REASONING ERRORS IN ARGUMENTATION (unintentional) (intentional) Logical fallacies Argumentative errors PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES EPISTEMIC EXISTENTIAL SOCIAL being safe in understanding maintaining a one’s environment one’s environment positive image of oneself & inroup Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Current directions in psychological science, 26(6), 538-542. PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES PERSONALITY COGNITIVE WORLDVIEWS TRAITS STYLES DANGEROUS EMOTIONAL STABILITY INTUITIVE PLACE NEUROTICISM THINKING COMPETITIVE OPENNESS JUNGLE NARCISSISM Lantian A, Wood M, & Gjoneska B. (2020). Personality traits, cognitive styles, and worldviews associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories. In: M. Butter & P. Knight (eds). -
List of Fallacies
List of fallacies For specific popular misconceptions, see List of common if>). The following fallacies involve inferences whose misconceptions. correctness is not guaranteed by the behavior of those log- ical connectives, and hence, which are not logically guar- A fallacy is an incorrect argument in logic and rhetoric anteed to yield true conclusions. Types of propositional fallacies: which undermines an argument’s logical validity or more generally an argument’s logical soundness. Fallacies are either formal fallacies or informal fallacies. • Affirming a disjunct – concluding that one disjunct of a logical disjunction must be false because the These are commonly used styles of argument in convinc- other disjunct is true; A or B; A, therefore not B.[8] ing people, where the focus is on communication and re- sults rather than the correctness of the logic, and may be • Affirming the consequent – the antecedent in an in- used whether the point being advanced is correct or not. dicative conditional is claimed to be true because the consequent is true; if A, then B; B, therefore A.[8] 1 Formal fallacies • Denying the antecedent – the consequent in an indicative conditional is claimed to be false because the antecedent is false; if A, then B; not A, therefore Main article: Formal fallacy not B.[8] A formal fallacy is an error in logic that can be seen in the argument’s form.[1] All formal fallacies are specific types 1.2 Quantification fallacies of non sequiturs. A quantification fallacy is an error in logic where the • Appeal to probability – is a statement that takes quantifiers of the premises are in contradiction to the something for granted because it would probably be quantifier of the conclusion. -
Towards a Framework for Semantic Information
Towards a Framework for Semantic Information Simon D'Alfonso Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy The University of Melbourne September 2012 Produced on archival quality paper ii Contents Abstract ix Declaration xi Preface xiii Acknowledgements xv 1 An Introductory Overview of Information 1 1.1 What is Information? . 2 1.1.1 Data . 4 1.1.2 The Mathematical Theory of Communication . 8 1.1.3 Moving Beyond Data . 16 1.2 Philosophy and Information . 18 1.2.1 The Philosophy of Information . 19 1.3 Semantic Information and Environmental Information . 20 1.3.1 Gricean Meaning . 20 1.3.2 Semantic Information . 21 iii iv CONTENTS 1.3.3 Environmental Information . 27 1.4 The Alethic Nature of Semantic Information . 30 1.5 Conclusion . 44 2 Quantifying Semantic Information 45 2.1 Bar-Hillel and Carnap's Theory of Semantic Information . 47 2.1.1 Some Comments on the Theory of Classical Semantic Information . 50 2.1.2 The Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox and Paraconsistent Logic . 51 2.2 CSI and Truth . 54 2.2.1 Epistemic Utility . 54 2.2.2 CSI, Truth and Scoring Rules . 55 2.3 Floridi's Theory of Strongly Semantic Information . 56 2.3.1 Some Comments on Floridi's Theory . 61 2.4 Information Quantification via Truthlikeness . 62 2.4.1 The Basic Feature Approach to Truthlikeness . 63 2.4.2 The Tichy/Oddie Approach to Truthlikeness . 65 2.4.3 Truthlikeness Adequacy Conditions and Information Conditions . 78 2.4.4 Niiniluoto on Truthlikeness .