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Philosophy of Science: a Contemporary Introduction, Second Edition Philosophy of Science Praise for the first edition: “A first-rate, challenging text that emphasizes the philosophy in the philosophy of science. Rosenberg offers a superb introduction to the epistemological and meta- physical issues at stake in modern science.” Professor Martin Curd, Purdue University, Indiana “Philosophy students will like the way the issues in philosophy of science are con- nected to the basic concerns of epistemology and philosophy of language.” Professor Peter Kosso, Northern Arizona University “An engaging and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of science ...I was especially pleased to see the discussions of probability, the semantic view of theories, and science studies.” Peter Lipton, Cambridge University Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction introduces all the main themes in the philosophy of science, including the nature of causation, explanation, laws, theory, models, evidence, reductionism, probability, teleology, realism and instrumentalism. This substantially revised and updated second edition of a highly successful, accessible and user-friendly text will be of value to any student getting to grips with the nature, methods and justification of science. Alex Rosenberg includes new material on a number of subjects, including: • the theory of natural selection • Popper, Lakatos and Leibniz • feminist philosophy of science • logical positivism • the origins of science In addition, helpful features add greatly to the ease and clarity of this second edition: • overviews and chapter summaries • study questions and annotated further reading • a helpful glossary explaining key words and concepts Alex Rosenberg is R. Taylor Cole Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA. His eleven books in the philosophy of science include The Structure of Biological Science (1985) and Philosophy of Social Science (1995). In 1993 he won the Lakatos Prize in the Philosophy of Science. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series editor: Paul K. Moser Loyola University of Chicago This innovative, well-structured series is for students who have already done an introductory course in philosophy. Each book introduces a core general subject in contemporary philosophy and offers students an accessible but substantial transition from introductory to higher-level college work in that subject. The series is accessible to non-specialists and each book clearly motivates and expounds the problems and posi- tions introduced. An orientating chapter briefly introduces its topic and reminds readers of any crucial material they need to have retained from a typical introductory course. Considerable attention is given to explain- ing the central philosophical problems of a subject and the main com- peting solutions and arguments for those solutions. The primary aim is to educate students in the main problems, positions and arguments of contemporary philosophy rather than to convince students of a single position. Classical Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Christopher Shields Keith E. Yandell Epistemology Philosophy of Science Second Edition Second Edition Robert Audi Alex Rosenberg Ethics Social and Political Philosophy Harry Gensler John Christman Metaphysics Philosophy of Psychology Second Edition (forthcoming) Michael J. Loux José Luis Bermudez Philosophy of Art Continental Philosophy Noël Carroll (forthcoming) Andrew Cutrofello Philosophy of Language William G. Lycan Classical Modern Philosophy (forthcoming) Philosophy of Mind Jeffrey Tlumak Second Edition John Heil Philosophy of Science A contemporary introduction Second Edition Alex Rosenberg First published 2000 by Routledge Reprinted 2003 Second edition first published 2005 by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2000, 2005 Alex Rosenberg All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Rosenberg, Alexander, 1946– The philosophy of science : a contemporary introduction / [Alex Rosenberg].– 2nd ed. p. cm. – (Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Science–Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series. Q175.R5475 2005 501–dc22 2004021927 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0-203-08706-2 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-415-34316-X (hbk) ISBN 0-415-34317-8 (pbk) For Martha Ellen Reeves Contents Acknowledgments ix 1 Why philosophy of science? 1 Overview 1 1.1 The relationship between science and philosophy 2 1.2 Scientific questions and questions about science 6 1.3 Modern science as philosophy 8 1.4 Science and western civilization 13 Summary 18 Study questions 18 Suggested reading 19 2 Explanation, causation and laws 21 Overview 21 2.1 Logical positivism sets the agenda 22 2.2 Defining scientific explanation 25 2.3 Why do laws explain? 33 2.4 Counterexamples and the pragmatics of explanation 37 Summary 44 Study questions 45 Suggested reading 45 3 Scientific explanation and its discontents 48 Overview 48 3.1 Inexact laws and probabilities 49 3.2 Causation and teleology 56 3.3 From intelligibility to necessity 61 Summary 66 Study questions 67 Suggested reading 67 4 The structure and metaphysics of scientific theories 69 Overview 69 4.1 How do theories work? 70 4.2 Reduction, replacement and the progress of science 80 4.3 The problem of theoretical terms and the things they name 84 viii Contents 4.4 Theories and models 97 4.5 A case study: the theory of natural selection 103 Summary 107 Study questions 109 Suggested reading 109 5 The epistemology of scientific theorizing 112 Overview 112 5.1 A brief history of empiricism as science’s epistemology 113 5.2 The epistemology of scientific testing 116 5.3 Induction as a pseudo-problem: Popper’s gambit 120 5.4 Statistics and probability to the rescue? 125 5.5 Underdetermination 138 Summary 140 Study questions 142 Suggested reading 142 6 The challenge of history and post-positivism 145 Overview 145 6.1 A place for history? 146 6.2 No place for first philosophy? 156 6.3 Are scientific research programs rational? 163 Summary 167 Study questions 168 Suggested reading 169 7 The contested character of science and the fundamental questions of philosophy 170 Overview 170 7.1 From philosophy through history to post- modernism 171 7.2 Scientism, sexism and significant truths 179 7.3 Dealing with relativism: could the Earth really be flat? 184 Summary 191 Study questions 192 Suggested reading 192 Glossary 194 Bibliography 202 Index 206 Acknowledgments The first edition of this work began with the outrageous ambition of provid- ing a worthy successor to Carl G. Hempel’s splendid Philosophy of Natural Science, first published in 1966 and never yet improved upon. Browning’s Andrea Del Sarto tells us, “Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for.” My second ambition was more attainable. It was to show that the prob- lems of the philosophy of science are among the fundamental problems of philosophy, and that these problems emerge in our attempt to understand the nature of science. The success of the first edition has encouraged me to make a further effort to approach the clarity if not the concision of Carl Hempel’s exposition. The first edition’s reception among students and the general reader has also encouraged me to think that the second of my two objectives is actually attainable. My eventual recognition of the fact that the problems of the philosophy of science are just versions of the basic problems of epistemology and meta- physics is the result of three decades of education by the likes of Peter Achinstein, Nick Rescher, Adolph Grunbaum, Richard Braithwaite, John Earman, David Hull, Michael Ruse, Bas van Fraassen, Elliot Sober, Philip Kitcher, Lindley Darden, Dan Hausman, Carl Hoefer, Marc Lange, Paul Churchland, Pat Churchland, Nancy Cartwright, Jarrett Leplin, Arthur Fine, Paul Teller, Jan Cover, Paul Thompson, John Beatty, Ken Waters, Larry Hardin, Richard Boyd, Richard Jeffrey, Tom Kuhn, Don Campbell, David Lewis, John Watkins, John Mackie, Wesley Salmon, Merilee Salmon, Bill Newton-Smith, John Worrall, Joe Pitt, Peter Kosso, Larry Wright, Helen Longino, Elizabeth Anderson, Allison Wyle, Robert Brandon, Yuri Balashov, John Robertson, Harold Kincaid, just to name a few dozen. In writing the first edition of this book, I had had detailed comments from Martin Curd, Neven Sesardic, Jarrett Leplin, Carl Hoefer, and extra- ordinary help from Marc Lange. When I finished that edition I realized that I had not produced a book that did full justice to all their advice and admonition. Though in the second edition I may have more nearly approached a result that repays their help, I am under no illusion that further improvement is impossible. I must also thank a number of anonymous referees and several philo- sophers who have written published reviews of the first edition, all of whose criticisms and suggestions I have considered and mostly adopted in this new edition. Additionally, I have made a few changes in the text that reflect x Acknowledgments observations and corrections of its Chinese translator, Huang Jingji. I owe a debt as well to students (my own, including especially Samir Okasha, Fred- eric Bouchard, Stefan Linquist, Marion Hourdequin and Tamler Sommers) and those teachers in classes which have adopted the text, and written to me about its lacunae. A companion anthology to this textbook has been prepared by Yuri Bal- ashov and the present author: Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings.
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