“Thomas Kuhn.” in “The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”, Edward Zalta, Ed
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Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms
Vol. 29, No. 7, July 2020, pp. 1650–1657 DOI 10.1111/poms.13188 ISSN 1059-1478|EISSN 1937-5956|20|2907|1650 © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms Gopesh Anand Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 469 Wohlers Hall, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA, [email protected] Eric C. Larson Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 8 Wohlers Hall, 1206 S. Sixth, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA, [email protected] Joseph T. Mahoney* Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 140C Wohlers Hall, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA, [email protected] his study provides key arguments and contributions of Kuhn (1970) concerning paradigms, paradigm shifts, and sci- T entific revolutions. We provide interpretations of Kuhn’s (1970) key ideas and concepts, especially as they relate to business management research. We conclude by considering the practical implications of paradigms and paradigm shifts for contemporary business management researchers and suggest that ethical rules of conversation are at least as critical for the health of a scientific community as methodological rules (e.g., the rules of logical positivism) derived from the phi- losophy of science. Key words: Paradigms; paradigm shifts; scientific revolutions; normal science History: Received: February 2019; Accepted: March 2020 by Kalyan Singhal, after 3 revisions. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions the rich descriptions of the process of advancing this theory. SSR showed that science primarily advances Thomas S. -
Thomas Kuhn and Perspectival Realism a Thesis Presented to The
Thomas Kuhn and Perspectival Realism A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Ryan J. O'Loughlin April 2017 © 2017 Ryan J. O'Loughlin. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Thomas Kuhn and Perspectival Realism by RYAN J. O'LOUGHLIN has been approved for the Department of Philosophy and the College of Arts and Sciences by Philip Ehrlich Professor of Philosophy Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT O'LOUGHLIN, RYAN J., M.A., April 2017, Philosophy Thomas Kuhn and Perspectival Realism Director of Thesis: Philip Ehrlich In this paper I discuss Giere’s reading of Kuhn as affirming perspectival realism and I present evidence demonstrating that this reading of Kuhn is correct. I consider several scientific realist theses that Kuhn rejects and discuss whether and to what extent perspectival realism may be regarded as a scientific realist position. I suggest adding Kuhn’s account of incommensurability, understood in its later form, to Giere’s account of perspectival realism. I conclude by providing a definition of perspectival realism that incorporates Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis as well as the specific claims of scientific realism that are compatible with perspectival realism. Perspectival realism thus understood is, at most, a weak form of scientific realism. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract .............................................................................................................................. -
Popper and Kuhn: Where They Clash, How They Compliment Each Other, and Drawing Conclusions
Popper and Kuhn: Where they Clash, How They Compliment Each Other, and Drawing Conclusions It has been said that the epistemological premises of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper have every reason to negate one another. For the last half century, these men have had to withstand the onslaught of intellectual and ideological attacks for their claims of scientific development and evolution. Popper, a follower of Charles Pierce, developed his unique theory of falsification as a form of natural selection in the scientific sphere. Kuhn, a graduate student during Popper‟s time, formulated his own ideas about science as a social development defined by the presence or absence of a paradigm. Pat Hutcheon in her essay “Popper and Kuhn on the Evolution of Science” lays out an argument for the “promising complimentarity” the science community can gain from the comparison of these two men‟s claims. Hutcheon she is able to identify specific instances of similarity, undeniable differentiation, as well as areas of “promising complimentarity” between Popper and Kuhn. In an analysis of a 1965 debate between Popper and Kuhn sponsored by Imre Lakatos, M. G. Narasimhan outlines just how different the two philosophers are. Hutcheon and Narasimhan share an understanding of the contrasting views between Kuhn and Popper however, Hutcheon‟s argument for the agreeability of their theories is overlooked by Narasimhan and what undercuts his analysis. Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper contributed valuable insights about the “nature of science and the way in which scientific knowledge evolves (Hutcheon 1).” Generally speaking, a theory‟s “unfitness” and falsification, Popper‟s and Kuhn‟s ideas, respectively, share a common perspective on the growth of scientific knowledge. -
1 Carnap, Kuhn , and the History of Science J.C. Pinto De Oliveira IFCH
1 Carnap, Kuhn , and the history of science J.C. Pinto de Oliveira IFCH - Department of Philosophy State University of Campinas - Brazil [email protected] Abstract The purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel´s criticisms of my comments regarding the current revisionism of Carnap´s work and its relations to Kuhn. I begin by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article. I then discuss some aspects related to Carnap´s view of the history of science. First, I emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn´s conceptions and those of logical positivism that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history of science for the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including George Sarton whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn´s. In addition, I try to show that Carnap attributes little importance to history of science. He seldom refers to it and, when he does, he clearly defends (like Sarton) a Whig or an “old” historiography of science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. It is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold the view that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational. Keywords: Carnap, History of science, Kuhn, Logical positivism, New historiography of science, Philosophy of science, Revisionism, Sarton 1. Introduction In his article “Carnap and Kuhn: On the Relation between the Logic of Science and the History of Science”, published in 2011 in the Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Thomas Uebel responds to my criticism of what I call the revisionism of the logical positivist work, particularly its thesis regarding the compatibility or intimate relation between the philosophies of science of Carnap and Kuhn. -
1 Phil. 4400 Notes #1: the Problem of Induction I. Basic Concepts
Phil. 4400 Notes #1: The problem of induction I. Basic concepts: The problem of induction: • Philosophical problem concerning the justification of induction. • Due to David Hume (1748). Induction: A form of reasoning in which a) the premises say something about a certain group of objects (typically, observed objects) b) the conclusion generalizes from the premises: says the same thing about a wider class of objects, or about further objects of the same kind (typically, the unobserved objects of the same kind). • Examples: All observed ravens so far have been The sun has risen every day for the last 300 black. years. So (probably) all ravens are black. So (probably) the sun will rise tomorrow. Non-demonstrative (non-deductive) reasoning: • Reasoning that is not deductive. • A form of reasoning in which the premises are supposed to render the conclusion more probable (but not to entail the conclusion). Cogent vs. Valid & Confirm vs. Entail : ‘Cogent’ arguments have premises that confirm (render probable) their conclusions. ‘Valid’ arguments have premises that entail their conclusions. The importance of induction: • All scientific knowledge, and almost all knowledge depends on induction. • The problem had a great influence on Popper and other philosophers of science. Inductive skepticism: Philosophical thesis that induction provides no justification for ( no reason to believe) its conclusions. II. An argument for inductive skepticism 1. There are (at most) 3 kinds of knowledge/justified belief: a. Observations b. A priori knowledge c. Conclusions based on induction 2. All inductive reasoning presupposes the “Inductive Principle” (a.k.a. the “uniformity principle”): “The course of nature is uniform”, “The future will resemble the past”, “Unobserved objects will probably be similar to observed objects” 3. -
Kuhn's Philosophy of Science Liberal Arts Honors Program
Providence College DigitalCommons@Providence Spring 2013, Kuhn's Philosophy of Science Liberal Arts Honors Program Spring 2013 Syllabus: Kuhn's Philosophy of Science Joseph Torchia Providence College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/kuhn_2013 Part of the Philosophy Commons Torchia, Joseph, "Syllabus: Kuhn's Philosophy of Science" (2013). Spring 2013, Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. 2. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/kuhn_2013/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Honors Program at DigitalCommons@Providence. It has been accepted for inclusion in Spring 2013, Kuhn's Philosophy of Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Providence. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Providence College Department of Philosophy 1 "Let us then assume that crises are a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories and ask next how scientists respond to their existence. Part of the answer, as obvious as it is important, can be discovered by noting first what scientists never do when confronted by even severe and prolonged anomalies. Though they may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis. Once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place." Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Introductory Remarks Welcome to your Honors Colloquium "Kuhn's Philosophy of Science". The following pages provide important information regarding its organization and objectives, basic requirements, attendance policy, a thematic outline, and a tentative schedule of readings. -
The Darwinian Revolution As Evidence for Thomas Kuhn's
The Darwinian Revolution as Evidence for Thomas Kuhn’s Failure to Construct a Paradigm for the Philosophy of Science Kuhn’s goal in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is to propose his ideas as a paradigm for the philosophy of science. He disapproves of the “textbook model” of scientific history in which all discoveries follow the simplified pattern of observation, hypothesis, experimentation, and acceptance (Kuhn 1). Instead, Kuhn proposes an original examination of the process by which scientific ideas evolve. If Kuhn’s ideas are indeed a paradigm, they must possess the paradigmatic characteristics that he describes. One of these characteristics is explanatory power for all observations; Kuhn’s suggestion must describe accurately the form taken by all scientific revolutions. If a scientific revolution occurred that does not follow Kuhn’s structure, then the structure is flawed. In his essay titled “The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History,” John C. Greene attempts to fit the Darwinian Revolution to Kuhn’s ideas. However, he must contort his discussion of this scientific revolution to force it to conform to Kuhn’s suggestion. Because Kuhn’s structure fails to describe satisfactorily the form of the Darwinian Revolution, Kuhn has not formulated a paradigm for the philosophy of science. Kuhn’s ideas can be evaluated for paradigm status only if his field is a science; therefore we must establish a definition for science under which to examine Kuhn’s proposal. Perhaps the definition that most clearly applies to Kuhn’s field is Ernest Nagel’s: “the sciences seek to discover and to formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur” (Nagel 4). -
The Metaphysics Within Kuhn's Picture of Science by Justin Price
Words or Worlds: The Metaphysics within Kuhn’s Picture of Science By Justin Price A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Guelph, Ontario, Canada © Justin Price, May, 2013 ABSTRACT Words or Worlds: The Metaphysics within Kuhn’s Picture of Science Justin Price Advisor: University of Guelph, 2013 Professor A. Wayne This thesis project establishes that there is a metaphysical theory underlying Kuhn’s work, and that it plays an important role in justifying his arguments regarding scientific theory change. Chapter 1 explains how this metaphysical theory has led to what I will call the ‘world problem’ within The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It stems from the ambiguous use of the word ‘world’ and the problem is how one can account for either of its uses within Structure. In some cases it is used to refer to a single non- changing world and in other cases it is used to refer to a world that changes with a change in paradigms. In Chapter 2 it is argued that this problem has led to a dissonance between the critic responding to Kuhn’s work and the work itself, resulting in the critics’ arguments ‘talking past’ what is presented in Structure. This emphasizes the need for an adequate account of Kuhn’s metaphysical theory. Chapter 3 establishes that for Kuhn a metaphysical theory was vital to his continued work (especially regarding his response to the critics examined within Chapter 2) and how a robust account was lacking. Chapter 4 investigates what a more robust account would be by considering an inadequate solution and an adequate one. -
PHIL-2031: Philosophy of Science 1
PHIL-2031: Philosophy of Science 1 PHIL-2031: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Cuyahoga Community College Viewing: PHIL-2031 : Philosophy of Science Board of Trustees: March 2019 Academic Term: Fall 2021 Subject Code PHIL - Philosophy Course Number: 2031 Title: Philosophy of Science Catalog Description: Study of concept formation in science and examination of patterns of scientific investigation and method. Treatment of concepts such as observation, classification, causality, law of nature, explanation, and theory. Credit Hour(s): 3 Lecture Hour(s): 3 Requisites Prerequisite and Corequisite ENG-1010 College Composition I, or ENG-101H Honors College Composition I. Outcomes Course Outcome(s): Analyze and explain philosophy of science concepts and their relationship to scientific inquiry. Essential Learning Outcome Mapping: Critical/Creative Thinking: Analyze, evaluate, and synthesize information in order to consider problems/ideas and transform them in innovative or imaginative ways. Objective(s): 1. Evaluate the objectivity of observation claims. 2. Describe and appraise the logic of scientific classification. 3. Define and assess the concept of law of nature. 4. Critically analyze types of scientific explanation and criteria for their evaluation. Course Outcome(s): Apply philosophical conceptions and theory to a philosophical issue in science and successfully argue for a position taken on it. Essential Learning Outcome Mapping: Critical/Creative Thinking: Analyze, evaluate, and synthesize information in order to consider problems/ideas and transform them in innovative or imaginative ways. Information Literacy: Acquire, evaluate, and use information from credible sources in order to meet information needs for a specific research purpose. Written Communication: Demonstrate effective written communication for an intended audience that follows genre/disciplinary conventions that reflect clarity, organization, and editing skills. -
Five Decades of Structure: a Retrospective View*
Five Decades of Structure : A Retrospective View * Juan V. MAYORAL Received: 18.6.2012 Final version: 30.7.2012 BIBLID [0495-4548 (2012) 27: 75; pp. 261-280] ABSTRACT: This paper is an introduction to the special issue commemorating the 50th anniversary of the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. It introduces some main ideas of Structure , as its change in historical perspective for the interpretation of scientific progress, the role and nature of scientific communities, the incommensurability concept, or the new-world problem, and summarizes some philo- sophical reactions. After this introduction, the special issue includes papers by Alexander Bird, Paul Hoyningen-Huene and George Reisch on different aspects of Kuhn’s work. Keywords: Kuhn; structure; paradigms; normal science; scientific revolutions. RESUMEN: Este artículo es una introducción al número monográfico que conmemora el 50º aniversario de la publi- cación de La estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Thomas Kuhn. En la introducción se presentan algunas de las ideas principales del libro, como su cambio de perspectiva histórica para la interpretación del progre- so científico, el papel y naturaleza de las comunidades científicas, el concepto de inconmensurabilidad o el problema del cambio de mundo, y se resumen algunas reacciones filosóficas a las mismas. Tras la introduc- ción, el número monográfico está compuesto por artículos de Alexander Bird, Paul Hoyningen-Huene y George Reisch que versan sobre diversos aspectos de la obra de Kuhn. Palabras clave: Kuhn; estructura; paradigmas; ciencia normal; revoluciones científicas. 1. Introduction The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ranks high among the most significant books in twentieth-century philosophy of science. -
Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science Synthese Library
STUDIES IN THE METHODOLOGY AND FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE SYNTHESE LIBRARY MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE, AND ON THE MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES Editors: DONALD DAVIDSON~Princeton University J AAKKO HINTIKKA, University of Helsinki and Stanford University GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden WESLEY C. SALMON, Indiana University PATRICK SUPPES STUDIES IN THE METHODOLOGY AND FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE Selected Papers from 1951 to 1969 SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. ISBN 978-90-481-8320-3 ISBN 978-94-017-3173-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-3173-7 1969 All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1969 TO ERNEST NAGEL AND ALFRED TARSKI PREFACE The twenty-three papers collected in tbis volume represent an important part of my published work up to the date of this volume. I have not arranged the paper chronologically, but under four main headings. Part I contains five papers on methodology concerned with models and measurement in the sciences. This part also contains the first paper I published, 'A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities', in Portugaliae Mathematica in 1951. Part 11 also is concerned with methodology and ineludes six papers on probability and utility. It is not always easy to separate papers on probability and utility from papers on measurement, because of the elose connection between the two subjects, but Artieles 6 and 8, even though they have elose relations to measurement, seem more properly to belong in Part 11, because they are concerned with substantive questions about probability and utility. -
Kuhn and Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century
Kuhn and Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century Introduction Thomas Kuhn was undoubtedly the strongest influence on the philosophy of science in the last third of the twentieth century. Yet today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is unclear what his legacy really is. In the philosophy of science there is no characteristically Kuhnian school. This could be because we are all Kuhnians now. But it might also be because Kuhn’s thought, although revolutionary in its time, has since been superseded. In a sense both may be true. We are all Copernicans—yet almost everything Copernicus believed we now disbelieve. In this paper I shall examine the development of Kuhn’s thought in connection with changes in the philosophy of science during the second half of the twentieth century. Now that philosophy in general, philosophy of science in particular, is in a post-positivist era, we all share Kuhn’s rejection of positivism. But we do not, for the most part, share Kuhn’s belief in incommensurability, or his scepticism about truth and objective knowledge. Just as in Copernicus’ case, Kuhn initiated a revolution that went far beyond what he himself envisaged or even properly understood. Philosophy of science in the second half of the twentieth century Philosophy of science in the second half of the twentieth century underwent a curious apostasy and apparent reconversion. In the decades following the Second World War philosophy of science was still dominated by logical empiricism. Logical positivism, the most influential version of logical empiricism, was waning, but even so some of its central problems remained the concern of philosophers of science.