Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms

Home , Normal science, Paradigm shift, Thomas Kuhn

Gopesh Anand Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 469 Wohlers Hall, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA, [email protected]

Eric C. Larson Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 8 Wohlers Hall, 1206 S. Sixth, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA, [email protected]

Joseph T. Mahoney* Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 140C Wohlers Hall, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA, [email protected]

his study provides key arguments and contributions of Kuhn (1970) concerning paradigms, paradigm shifts, and sci- T entific revolutions. We provide interpretations of Kuhn’s (1970) key ideas and concepts, especially as they relate to business management research. We conclude by considering the practical implications of paradigms and paradigm shifts for contemporary business management researchers and suggest that ethical rules of conversation are at least as critical for the health of a scientific community as methodological rules (e.g., the rules of logical positivism) derived from the philosophy of science. Key words: Paradigms; paradigm shifts; scientific revolutions; normal science History: Received: February 2019; Accepted: March 2020 by Kalyan Singhal, after 3 revisions.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions the rich descriptions of the process of advancing this theory. SSR showed that science primarily advances Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1962/1970) The Structure of Scien- through shifts in theory and not by the accumulation — tific Revolutions (SSR) with over 100,000 Google Scho- of knowledge, which was commonly held prior to lar citations—is a landmark study devoted to the 1 publication of SSR (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). A history of science. Kuhn, as a self-described “practic- key insight from SSR was that contradictory theories ing historian of science” (1977: 3) emphasizes the criti- cannot be simply reduced to a unified (dialectical) cal role of paradigms, which are taken to be synthesis, but rather that the ideas of a successful “universally recognized scientific achievements that competing paradigm must displace ideas of the old for a time provide model problems and solutions to a paradigm. community of practitioners” (1970: viii). A paradigm In the next section, we describe Kuhn’s (1970) consists of the fundamental ideas, methods, language, notion of paradigms. Then, we consider Kuhn’s and theories that are accepted by the members of a (1970) thesis of paradigm shifts and scientific revolu- scientific community. A paradigm is critical to the tions, and provide an evaluation regarding SSR’s potential progress of science as “no natural history influence on our understanding of the scientific pro- can be interpreted in the absence of at least some cess. We conclude by considering the practical impli- implicit body of intertwined theoretical and method- cations of paradigms and paradigm shifts for modern ological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and business management researchers and suggest that – criticism” (Kuhn, 1970: 16 17) ethical rules of conversation are at least as critical for SSR emphasized the importance of the evolution of the health of a scientific community as methodologi- science (Bird 2000, Wray 2011). Thus, SSR brought cal rules (e.g., the rules of logical positivism) derived back historical insights that had been dropped with from the philosophy of science. the eminence of logical positivism and its focus on empirical evidence (Ayer 1959, Carnap 1937). SSR was not an historical account of science, but instead Paradigms and Normal Science pointed out how the textbook accounts of science Paradigms are a shared constellation of group com- highlighting received theory differ substantially from mitments along the spectrum from preferred 1650 Anand, Larson, and Mahoney: Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms Production and Operations Management 29(7), pp. 1650–1657, © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society 1651 analogies and metaphors, to shared exemplars, to concentrating the efforts of the community on a small heuristics, to ontological models, or accepted set of problems. Conversely, paradigms may also con- hypotheses of laws of nature, which influence what strain management scholars by limiting creativity, would be accepted as a warranted explanation and as especially in cases where the creative idea conflicts a puzzle solution. Paradigms influence the roster of with existing paradigms. collectively shared unsolved puzzles and the evalua- Scientific achievements are typically recounted, tion of the importance of each puzzle (Kuhn, 1970: though seldom in their original form, by both elemen- 174–191). Scientists addressing these puzzles abide by tary and advanced textbooks of the discipline. Man- the rules of their discipline, that is, they follow what agement journals serve as the historical record of Kuhn (1970) called the disciplinary matrix of the para- paradigms. Progress in management research depends digm, and the solutions to those puzzles are predeter- on correctly interpreting and citing the articles that mined, although requiring effort to be discovered or together make up those paradigms.2 Since scientists created. Such puzzles typically motivate theoretical are confined to the disciplinary matrix, it is difficult and empirical research in determining facts, matching for them to take a broad, abstract view of the accumu- of facts to theory, and articulating theory (1970: 34). lated knowledge. Instead, most knowledge is gained The matching of facts to theory encourages a disci- by incremental advances exemplified by testing dis- plinary search for greater precision of fundamental crete hypotheses. Scientists can, and often do, build a concepts, more-fine grained measurements of those career based on the incremental advances of normal concepts and their constructs, and replication of science. While a scientific discipline ostensibly cham- empirical results in different contexts. For those work- pions independent critical thinking, a scientist pursu- ing within a paradigmatic tradition, “a scientific com- ing innovative theory or methodologies at a level of munity is an immensely efficient instrument for scientific revolution may be met with sharp (and often solving the problems or puzzles that its paradigms personal) criticism rather than praise. Instead, scien- define” (1970: 166). Members of a scientific commu- tists are trained to learn the same fundamental mod- nity hold a shared set of beliefs that enable this effi- els of their mentors and to embrace a shared ciency. Paradigms related to the methodology and commitment to a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970).3 received theory afford management scholars the There are observable patterns to a successful para- accepted platforms to build their research. These plat- digm. Specifically, the success of a paradigm in nor- forms are the assumed facts that scholars do not need mal science, which is a highly cumulative enterprise, to corroborate each time they seek to develop or test a typically requires: (i) an enduring group of adherents; theory. While management research combines theo- and (ii) maintaining a sufficiently open mind to leave retical concepts with practical implications, para- all sorts of problems within the discipline to be digms help by providing frameworks to build on and resolved (Kuhn, 1970: 10). mechanisms of evolution connecting current research Kuhn states that: “examples which include law, to the accumulated knowledge base. theory, application, and instrumentation together— Paradigms are not merely acquired, codified rules provide models from which spring particular coher- that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and ent traditions of scientific research” (1970: 13). It is the steps by which they are obtained, but also shared characteristic to normal science to ask those questions intuitions by a community of scholars, which are that the paradigm is equipped to solve. Consequently, often tacitly communicated within the practice of “it is no criterion of goodness in a puzzle that its out- science (Kuhn, 1970: 191–198; Polanyi 1962). A para- come be intrinsically interesting or important” (Kuhn, digm creates clear boundaries for what makes up a 1970: 36). Instead, a contribution within normal given field or defines which theory is relevant. These science is typically evaluated by a scientific commu- boundaries enable scientists to harmonize the choice nity in terms of its adherence to its legitimate prob- of research questions, methods, and ultimately, the lems and standards within the accepted paradigm. direction of inquiry in their fields. A cogent shared Thus, a benefit of a paradigm is not in welcoming crit- schema leads to normal science, which can be defined icism or in openly promoting a scientific revolution, as “research firmly based upon one or more past sci- but rather in providing efficient communication entific achievements, achievements that some particu- among members of a scientific community. lar scientific community acknowledges for a time as Pre-paradigmatic time-periods, in contrast, typi- supplying the foundation for its further practice” cally involve struggles in communication among sci- (1970: 10). Normal science serves to corroborate the entists unable to take for granted a body of beliefs. existing paradigms, which are accepted by the scien- Kuhn notes that: “History suggests that the road to a tific community and the ideas that typically appear in firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous... textbooks. It enables scientists to pursue a level of In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for detail, otherwise not possible, by narrowly paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain Anand, Larson, and Mahoney: Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms 1652 Production and Operations Management 29(7), pp. 1650–1657, © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society to the development of a given science are likely to by the powers that be” (1970: 167). Challenging the seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gather- portrayal of scientific inquiry as evidence-based, ing is a far more random activity than the one that Kuhn suggests that often “believing is seeing,” in subsequent scientific development makes familiar” which research is “a strenuous and devoted attempt (1970: 15). Work to establish a paradigm occurs to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by through fits and starts, often without an attribution to professional education” (1970: 5). If the data are tor- those scientists pushing to understand the boundaries tured long enough, nature will confess. Despite the of the existing paradigm. While textbooks of different normative value of science as consisting of open- disciplines may summarize the accepted content of a minded evaluators of evidence, scientists often have a paradigm, those textbooks do not necessarily address tendency toward intolerance and resistance to new the messy process of argumentation and negotiation ideas (Barber, 1961; Beveridge, 1959; Kuhn, 1970: 24). that occurs before a paradigm gains acceptance. Thus, the normal science process often actively sup- Overall, Kuhn’s views regarding paradigms depart presses novelty, and the project whose outcome does substantially from the widely held logical positivist not lead to the anticipated result is presumed to view prevalent before SSR. Kuhn maintains that reflect “not on nature but on the scientist” (Kuhn, received theory typically seeks to make an established 1970: 35). There is clearly an incentive for scholars to discipline immune from attack and suggests that pro- follow the paradigms accepted in their field because gress of science requires the rejection of the old para- challenging the accepted norms is risky, takes time, digm rather than the simple assimilation of new and may be evaluated as deficient. The fact that the knowledge. The fact that the promotion of a new historical account of science is typically rewritten (by paradigm requires “a redefinition of the correspond- the powers that be) after a paradigm shift and empha- ing science” (Kuhn, 1970: 103) is the basis for Kuhn’s sizes the currently received paradigm means that stu- (1970) thesis describing scientific progress as episodic dents who simply read the textbooks are unaware of revolutionary events that conflict with the accepted the occurrence of the shift. Paradigm shifts therefore ideas of the discipline. may be an invisible process to all but the scholars involved firsthand. Paradigm Shifts and Scientific It should be noted that some contend that Kuhn’s Revolutions idea of “normal science” is misguided. Kuhn suggests that normal science is the most frequently Kuhn examines anomalies, or violations of expecta- occurring type of scientific work and that it is dis- tions, and “the emergence of crises that might be tinct from “revolutionary science.” For Kuhn (1970), induced by repeated failure to make an anomaly normal science concerns day-to-day systematic conform” (1970: ix). Anomalies are typically not hypothesis testing performed by scientists within an highlighted within normal science, and it is not established paradigmatic framework and using random that disciplines tend to focus on structural accepted methods. However, critics of normal dimensions of the paradigm4 , rather than on the science suggest that Kuhn’s (1970) ideas are a revolt processes of paradigm shifts. Indeed, textbooks of against the philosophy of logical positivism (Ayer, each discipline describe development of their scien- 1959), and a rejection of the scientific criterion that all tific inquiry as linear, which hides processes that theoretical ideas might be effectively tested (e.g., Sha- reside at the heart of scientific development (1970: pere, 1964). Watkin’s (1970) critique of Kuhn’s (1970) 140). The historical account of science generally normal science suggests that normal science is more places the current paradigm on a pedestal and may a test of the scientist than a test of theory. It also obfuscate the back-and-forth that occurs in the pro- might be that the advent of a new paradigm corre- cess of determining better explanations or solu- sponds to a well-elaborated theoretical explanation tions. The process of a paradigm shift may in fact rather than growing empirical evidence to counter be masked from the scholars in the field. Kuhn the existing paradigm (Watkins, 1970). While admit- notes that: “a concept of science drawn from [text- ting the existence of what Kuhn (1970) calls normal books] is no more likely to fit the enterprise that science, Popper (1970: 53) is quite disparaging of the produced them than an image of national culture endeavor, saying that normal scientists are “badly drawn from a tourist brochure ...” (1970: 1). Para- taught,’ “victim(s) of indoctrination,” and simply digm shifts are the transitions that taken together wish to be told what the facts are to know. Although constitute the “usual development pattern of Kuhn (1970) clearly made a careful distinction in mature science” (Kuhn, 1970: 12) describing normal and revolutionary science, Kuhn Kuhn remarks further that: “the member of a seems to capitulate to his many critics in this area mature scientific community is like the typical charac- and admits that “if a demarcation criterion exists” it ter of Orwell’s 1984, the victim of a history rewritten is not fruitful to “seek a sharp or decisive one” Anand, Larson, and Mahoney: Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms Production and Operations Management 29(7), pp. 1650–1657, © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society 1653

(1970a: 6). The reality is that the scientific endeavor is not always clear as each perspective builds its own benefits from testing of different contingencies, defin- case from its unique foundation. Therefore, “the com- ing the boundary conditions of a given paradigm, petition between paradigms is not the sort of battle and the replication of tests of existing paradigms. that can be resolved by proofs” (1970: 148), and “the While conventional wisdom stresses the pressures proponents of competing paradigms practice their toward conformity found in Kuhn (1970)—for exam- trades in different worlds” (1970: 150). Though the ple Daft and Lewin (1990) refer to a “normal science idea is to determine which of the competing para- straightjacket”—we emphasize that the strenuous digms is better than the other, the scholarly combat- efforts to achieve such paradigmatic conformity sow ants are not likely to agree on what the criteria are for the seeds of their own demise. Kuhn reminds us that making such an assessment. Moreover, proponents of “normal science ... often suppresses fundamental a paradigm tend to favor evaluation criteria that favor novelties because they are necessarily subversive of their preferred paradigm (McAllister, 1999: 41). its basic commitments. Nevertheless, so long as those Kuhn observes that a new paradigm gains its scien- commitments retain an element of the arbitrary, the tific status because it is more successful than the exist- very nature of normal research ensures that novelty ing paradigm in solving agreed-upon problems that shall not be suppressed for very long” (1970: 5). Kuhn the discipline finds acute. Kuhn cautions: “To be more provides a narrative of science where there are long successful, is not, however, to be either completely intervals of continuity, but the cumulative force of successful with a single problem or notably successful anomalies builds up to the point where there is dis- with any large number” (1970: 23), and “there are continuity and a gestalt switch, that is, a paradigm losses as well as gains in scientific revolutions and sci- shift (1970: 85). We can observe then a path-depen- entists tend to be peculiarly blind to the former” dent process that “leads the profession at last to a (1970: 167). The tradeoffs inherent in the process mean new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice that the new paradigm may seem to provide a better of science” (1970: 6). Such a paradigm shift typically explanation, but even the better solution may require requires a reconstruction of prior theory and the ree- compromise, failing to provide a full explanation of valuation of prior fact within the discipline. Scholars the observed phenomena. must wrangle with evidence that conflicts with A natural paradox exists between sticking to a para- widely accepted theory or requires new methods of digm and shifting the paradigm. Researchers can get explanation. Kuhn states: “The extraordinary epi- so bogged down in the conditions of the paradigm sodes in which [a] shift of professional commitments that they see any anomalies as undesirable. They may occurs are the ones known as scientific revolutions. attribute any anomalies to limitations in their own They are the tradition-shattering complements to the empirical observations and analysis methods rather tradition-bound activity of normal science” (1970: 6). than a refutation of the existing paradigm.5 In such cases, an older paradigm is replaced in whole Evaluation of success can also change with the or in part by an incompatible new paradigm (1970: advent of a new paradigm. Kuhn states: “The normal- 92). Scientific revolutions require the scholarly com- scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revo- munity to forgo its own commitments to paradigms lution is not only incompatible but often actually in- when anomalies defy those paradigms. The accumu- commensurable with that which has gone before” lation of anomalies causes a crisis or disequilibrium, (1970: 103). The new paradigm cannot be judged by which forces scholars to abandon what they assumed the same standards held by adherents of the conven- to be true and even what is sometimes foundational tional paradigm because there is no common stan- to their discipline. dard of measurement.6 Theory choice involves The evaluation of a new paradigm within a disci- historical, personal, subjective, and tacit dimensions pline vis-a-vis the conventional paradigm requires a (Polanyi, 1962). Therefore, Kuhn maintains that there comparative assessment of imperfect alternatives. is neither a neutral algorithm nor a systematic deci- Kuhn notes: “The decision to reject one paradigm is sion procedure for theory choice (1970: 200). Kuhn always simultaneously the decision to accept another, suggests that when a paradigm shift occurs, there are and the judgment leading to that decision involves “usually significant shifts in the criteria determining the comparison of both paradigms with nature and the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solu- with each other” (1970: 77). Kuhn suggests that such a tions” (1970: 109). Moreover, there is a new gestalt in comparative assessment is not fully made on logical which the scientist’s perception of the environment grounds. Indeed, “when paradigms enter, as they must be revised (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1970: 112). must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role Consider the following example. Concerning the is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own para- economic foundations of strategy and the canonical digm to argue in that paradigm’s defense” (1970: 94). problem of vertical integration, the neoclassical theory The basis of evaluating a given scientific contribution of the firm (Marshall, 1920) described the construct of Anand, Larson, and Mahoney: Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms 1654 Production and Operations Management 29(7), pp. 1650–1657, © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society the firm as a production function that transformed typically transitory. Kuhn states that: “To be accepted inputs into outputs based on available technology. as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its Similar to Kuhn’s (1970)’s notions of a paradigm competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, shift, it became apparent over time that too much explain all the facts with which it can be confronted” was being asked of the neoclassical theory of the (1970: 17–18). Not only is the favored paradigm firm. As Kuhn (1970) predicted, for a time the pro- unable to solve any given problem completely, it cess of normal science attempted to handle the puz- might be quite limited in the number of problems it zle of vertical integration within the existing can solve (Kuhn, 1970: 23). paradigm and thus efforts to use neoclassical theory A major critique of Kuhn (1970) concerns the idea in an all-purpose way persisted. However, over time of incommensurable schema.8 Popper (1970), Putnam it became widely recognized that the conventional (1981), and Davidson (1985) submit that Kuhn’s neoclassical paradigm led to fundamental confusion incommensurability position, in which different con- for explaining contractual innovations. The growing ceptual schemes are untranslatable or imperfectly dissatisfaction with the existing paradigm and the translatable, is incoherent. Unreflective acceptance of development of an alternative theory in transaction Kuhn’s (1970) incommensurability position might cost economics (Williamson, 1975) led to a compet- also prematurely suppress useful conversations ing paradigm and over time an observable paradigm within a field. Mahoney submits: “Kuhn’s incommen- shift.7 Consistent with Kuhn’s (1970) predictions, surability thesis has been used, in large measure, to convoluted interpretations of relational vertical con- legitimize intellectual vested interests. It is very easy tracting and full financial ownership via vertical inte- to claim incommensurability. It is an academic way of gration persisted until a competitive alternative, the saying ‘shut-up; I do not want to have a conversation transaction cost theory, emerged to explain and pre- with you; I am an expert in my field.’ As President dict vertical integration (Ketokivi & Mahoney, 2016; Harry Truman said: ‘An expert is someone who Mahoney, 2005; Williamson, 1985, Williamson, 1996). doesn’t want to learn anything new, because then he Since its inception, this theory has been widely used wouldn’t be an expert’ (McCloskey, 1990: 111). Con- by researchers to explain efficiency of transactions versational bridges can and should be built between and relationships in outsourcing of operations (Keto- contested terrains” (Mahoney, 1993: 186). It is a “dan- kivi & Mahoney, 2020) and information systems gerous dogma” to assume that groups of scientists are (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). unable to converse and critique the other group’s con- Some supporters maintain that paradigm shifts tributions because of the incommensurability of their provide an explanation for how science in practice work (Popper, 1970: 56). The progress of science changes over time, which elevates revolutionary depends on bridges of communication across compet- breakthroughs as distinctive from normal science. ing scholars and paradigms to enable paradigm shifts Others, however, suggest that change in science is and the wave of new knowledge that results from more nuanced than that, entailing a process filled crossing those contested terrains of change. While the with contention, requiring dialogue among compet- unique and different perspectives representing ing theorists, often better described as incremental incumbent and aspirant paradigms present an ele- rather than revolutionary in nature, depending lar- ment of challenge, competing scholars must work to gely on the subjective judgment of competing fac- understand the vocabulary, methods, and explanations, and often taking place in a politically charged tions of others to determine what paradigm(s) may environment that requires savvy and courage, beyond better fit the puzzle at hand. intellect, to achieve change (see, e.g., Hull, 2010). A new paradigm presents additional opportunities for researchers to use innovative methods for examin- Conclusion ing important phenomena. However, existing methods and common language that researchers share are Kuhn describes scientists as “addicts” devoting their critical, used extensively, and do not disappear com- “professional attention to demanding puzzles” (1970: pletely even as a result of a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 38). Incremental work based on both the old and new 1970). Having an established set of methods and regime must be undertaken simultaneously to enable observations remains imperative for inquiry. competition between old and new paradigms either Researchers must seek to understand and appreciate to reject incumbent theory or to adopt its alternative. their own adopted methodologies and those of others Kuhn notes that: “Competition between segments of in their field. Otherwise, researchers will each build the scientific community is the only historical process their own foundation, but not be able to agree on a that ever actually results in the rejection of one previ- common base (Kuhn, 1970). Researchers, in effect, ously accepted theory or in the adoption of another” should choose old, new, or hybrid methods to investi- (1970: 8). However, winning such a competition is gate the problems of their field. Anand, Larson, and Mahoney: Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms Production and Operations Management 29(7), pp. 1650–1657, © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society 1655

Paradigm shifts occur as either discoveries (e.g., As a final note, the health of a scientific field does novelties of fact) or inventions (e.g., novelties of the- not depend solely on methodological sophistication. ory), with the two cases being difficult to separate as The promise that though our sins be as scarlet, all facts are theory-laden (Kuhn, 1970; Van De Ven, methodology will make us pure is a false one. Ulti- 2007). One of the challenges during paradigm shifts is mately the health of our scientific communities also that it is not clear how the editorial teams at academic relies on communicative action (Habermas, 1987) and journals will evaluate the quality of research. There the ethical rules of conversation, such as: don’t lie, are usually substantial shifts in the criteria determin- give attention; do not shout; let other people talk, ing the legitimacy both of canonical problems and of explain yourself when asked, and do not resort to vio- proposed solutions when a paradigm shift occurs lence or conspiracy in the aid of our ideas (Habermas, (Kuhn, 1970: 109). 1987; Mahoney, 1993; McCloskey, 1985). Fruitful Kuhn (1970), however, neglects acknowledging the inquiry thrives in an environment of open and honest importance of argumentation in the process of transi- debate regarding the validity and usefulness of a tioning from one paradigm to another (Fuller, 1992). given paradigm and consequent paradigm shifts.9 Kuhn (1970) described the typical transition from Doctoral student programs, professional conferences, one paradigm to another in terms of the epistemo- and research journals have critical roles in highlight- logical and ontological criteria favored by (and typi- ing the importance of civility in discourse and in cally favoring) those holding the incumbent theory. encouraging diversity in methodologies and paradig- Toulmin (1970) provides insights concerning the pro- matic views (Drnevich et al. 2020). cess by which a paradigm shift occurs as a negotia- Rigidity about a paradigm or sophistication in tion among scientists holding competing methodology should not keep research from address- explanations for their observations. Scientists of ing real and practical problems. Researchers should opposing paradigms might have to acknowledge avoid becoming prisoners of their own paradigms. limitations of their own theories or accept that new Although it is instrumental for researchers to embrace observations require adjustments to their own one or two paradigms in their career, it remains beliefs. Transitioning from one paradigm to another important that a researcher avoid condemning other requires scientists to use the lens of alternative the- paradigms just for the sake of criticism. Researchers ory to evaluate the weaknesses of the incumbent the- should be open to the possibility that they are not ory (Feyerabend, 1970). Closely related, Fuller (1992: fully informed or that they do not fully understand 258) claims that Kuhn’s (1970) vision of science is the other paradigm. Researchers equipped with suffi- simply devoid of political concerns, in fact stating cient understanding or capabilities in alternative that Kuhn (1970) sought to “minimize the presence paradigms drive scientific progress. Paradigms of disagreement” by revering homogeneous commu- should propel scientific progress by providing com- nities of scientists who all agree with a given mon understanding of a discipline; they are not to be paradigm. In business management research, the used as motives for entrenchment that prevent shifts process of determining what theory will receive toward better theories. prominence depends on the scientist’s ability to argue the case for the paradigm and to communicate the suitability of the paradigm for explaining the Acknowledgments phenomena in question (Green, 2004). The determi- We thank the four anonymous reviewers and Editor Kalyan nation of what paradigm prevails cannot be a purely Singhal for their comments on an earlier version of the machine-like, objective assessment of the science. study. The usual disclaimer applies. Kuhn’s (1970) book has, through the discourse sur- rounding it for multiple decades now, catalyzed sub- Notes stantial discussion about science as process and the 1 scientific endeavor that we pursue. In one sense, Kuhn (1970: xi) notes that James B. Conant, then presi- Kuhn provided assurance to academics that we all dent of Harvard University, introduced Kuhn to the history of science—see, for example, Conant (1947). benefit from solving our “paradigmatic puzzles” Subsequently, Kuhn (1970) was particularly influenced by: (Fuller, 1992: 274), and a sense of optimism regarding Jean Piaget’s (1930) insights in psychology on (children’s) the sometimes modest phenomena that we examine. causal beliefs; Pierre Duhem (1904), Emile Meyerson At the same time, Kuhn’s (1970) arguments challenge (1930), Arthur O. Lovejoy (1936), Alexandre Koyre (1939), the collaborative ideal of critical rationalism (Fuller, and Herbert Butterfield (1949) on the history of scientific 1992: 274), in which scientists humbly submit their knowledge; Hans Reichenbach (1938), Carl Gustav Hem- own work to the objective testing and critique of pel (1952), and R. B. Braithwaite (1953) on concept forma- others, perhaps even those outside of their specific tion, the distinction between observational and theoretical paradigm. terms, scientific explanation, and prediction; Nelson Anand, Larson, and Mahoney: Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms 1656 Production and Operations Management 29(7), pp. 1650–1657, © 2020 Production and Operations Management Society

Goodman (1951) on methodological principles; Willard another (e.g., Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958). We thank an Quine (1953) on logic and the analytic tradition; Benjamin anonymous reviewer for bringing this idea to our atten- Whorf (1956) on the effect of language on worldview; tion. Kuhn maintained that it was impossible to define all Norwood Hanson (1958) on patterns of scientific discovery terms of one theory in the vocabulary of another theory, and the process of abduction; Michael Polanyi’s (1962) in which its original meaning in mathematics of “no com- concept of tacitness; and Karl Popper (1959) on prediction mon measure” becomes “no common language” (2000: and the criterion of falsifiability, albeit Kuhn is careful to 36). Furthermore, Kuhn considered incommensurability in distinguish Popper’s (1959) normative science criterion of terms of “methods, problem-field, and standards of solu- falsification from the historical view of science and the tion” (1970: 103). concept of anomalies (1970: 146–147). 7Singhal and Singhal (2012) provide a history and paradigm 2 It should be noted that in Kuhn’s view, “science is a cog- shifts in operations and supply-chain management, and nitive empirical investigation of nature that exhibits a Kumar et al. (2018) describe paradigm shifts at the interface unique sort of progress [that] takes the form of ever- of operations and information systems management. improving technical puzzle-solving ability, operating 8Sankey (1993) notes that Kuhn’s treatment of incommen- — — under strict though always tradition-bound standards surability divides into early and late positions. Originally, of success or failure” (Kuhn 2000: 2). Kuhn’s incommensurability construct involved semantical, 3 The inculcation of values toward scientific commitment observational, and methodological differences between coexists with the dark side of conformity. Weintraub paradigms in which proponents of incommensurable theo- noted within the economics discipline that, “an insidious ries are unable to communicate, and that there is no and subtle thought control pattern is asserted through rec- recourse to neutral experience or objective standards to ommendations and promotions, and in publications. And adjudicate between theories. In subsequent efforts, Kuhn so, we reap a sad harvest in homogeneous half-truths” restricted the construct of incommensurability to semantic (1985: 512). Long ago, William Stanley Jevons wrote about differences and to the indeterminacy of translation. the “noxious influence of authority,” stating that: “In mat- 9Bauer (2004) offers suggestions to mitigate dogmatism ters of philosophy and science, authority has ever been and fraud in modern science. We thank an anonymous the great opponent of truth. A despotic calm is usually reviewer for this suggestion. the triumph of error. In the republic of the sciences, sedi- tion and even anarchy are beneficial in the long run to the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (1879: 298). References 4Early criticisms of Kuhn’s thesis concerned the vagueness Ayer, A. J. 1959. Logical Positivism. The Free Press, New York, NY. in the concept of “paradigm” (Masterman, 1970; Shapere, Barber, B. 1961. Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery. 1964). Shapere submits that Kuhn’s paradigm “covers a Science 134(3479): 596–602. range of factors in scientific development including or Bauer, H. H. 2004. Science in the 21st century: Knowledge monop- somehow involving laws and theories, models, standards, olies and research cartels. J. Scientif. Expl. 18(4): 643–660. and methods (both theoretical and instrumental), vague Beveridge, W. I. B. 1959. The Art of Scientific Investigation. Random intuitions, [and] explicit or implicit metaphysical beliefs House, New York, NY. (or prejudices). In short, anything that allows science to Bird, A. 2000. Thomas Kuhn. Princeton University Press, accomplish anything can be a part of (or somehow Princeton, NJ. involved in) a paradigm” (1964: 385). Kuhn responded to Braithwaite, R. B. 1953. Scientific Explanation. Cambridge Univer- these critiques, noting: “in much of the book, the term sity Press, Cambridge, UK. ‘paradigm’ is used in two different senses. On the one Butterfield, H. 1949. 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