64-6768

B A YAND, Davoud Hermidas, 1932— PERSIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY.

The American University, Ph.D., 1964 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan t PERSIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY

by

Davoud Hermidas Bavand

Submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Relations

Graduate Dean:

August 1963 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY" The American University LIBRARY Washington, D.C. OCT 3 jgg.0

WASHING] ON. 0. C. ZoZ g PREFACE

The subject of this thesis is a study of Soviet politi­ cal strategy toward Persia. It deals with the development and employment of Soviet political, ideological, military, and economic forces in Persia since the beginning of the October

Revolution in Russia. It also deals with the role of Persia

in the strategic design of the Soviet southern flank in rela­ tion to the general strategic status of the Soviet Union in

the international scene.

In essence, the key to the Soviet political approach has been Russian national interests which, in their geopoli­ tical aspect, have not been too much different from the pat­ tern of Czarist foreign policy, at least up to the middle of the fifties, when the nature of international politics continued to preserve more or less its traditional features, or the Soviet Union maintained its status as a great power

rather than as a global power.

This study assumes that the Soviet Union, too, did

seek territorial gains. It also assumes that Soviet leaders iii are rational in seelcing such gains, that their actions are deeply responsive to changing events in Persia or outside of Persia as the Soviet Union attempts to diminish the possi­ bility of active resistance to the furthering of its politi­ cal cause in Persia.

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the distin­ guished and able committee who guided and directed my work at The American University, and particularly to Professor A.

Aziz Said, Associate Professor of International Relations, who served as chairman of my thesis committee. My thanks are expressed to the Library of Congress, and to various national and international officials who have provided essen­ tial information for the completion of this dissertation. INTRODUCTION

In perspective, international politics have been featured by two distinctive patterns of struggle: open and conscious struggle for power and security; latent and spontan­ eous struggle for preservation or maximization of value, either cultural and national or religious and ideological.

These two phases of international politics, though, have been different in perceptibility of their characters and the nature of their process, but they have been closely related together so that the advancement of the one has had a far-reaching ef­ fect upon the development of the other. Any extension of the political power has been accompanied by the spontaneous pene­ tration of the socio-cultural values of the dominant power, either in view of the fact that the superior logic of the vic­ torious nation has been regarded as its source of strength and, as such, having been imitated by the influenced or domi­ nated society or it has been rivaled as the positive response to the menace of the challenging power. This has been more conceivable in relations among those nations whose degree of V strength and nature of their values have been too apart from each other, such as relationship between modernized powers of the West and traditional societies of the East.

The institution of colonialism, though in form it has been used as an instrument for the extension of power and the establishment of material interests, has in essence evolved toward identification of the values of the West. As such, it not only has corroded the cultural pattern of traditional soci­ eties and consequently caused the inborn crisis of the value, but also showed them a way out of the danger of being swallowed up. For, if a backward nation had to maintain its national integrity, it would have to rival the strength of the dominant nations, and presumably could do so by adopting the features that give the ruling societies their strength. Therefore, cons­

cious attempts on the part of these nations towards moderniza­

tion and westernization have been directed not only toward re­

sponding to the very challenge of the western colonial powers, but also to solving their own plagued social crises. However,

the problem has become more complicated in view of the fact

that practical realization of the adopted values has been frus­

trated by the very action of the dominant powers, who naturally

found it detrimental to their interests in the area. vi

Consequently, the recent history of these countries has been plagued by two crises: an external crisis of power, which has been the inevitable effect of conflict and rivalry among the former colonial powers; and an internal crisis of value, which has been the outcome of the ineffectiveness of traditional factors in dealing with the problems on the one hand, and lack of opportunity or capacity in the actual realization of the newly adopted values on the other. Although, in view of the changed nature of power politics, the issues of power and domination have come under question, the crisis of value is still alive and will live with us for years to come.

In a word, colonialism - in the sense of its classical objec­ tives - is obsolete and outmoded; but its unintended effects upon the less developed societies are still alive and prob­ lematic.

This study analyzes the very challenge of the Russian power in Persia and its effect upon the process of social and political development in the country. The nature of the Rus­ sian challenge has been more striking than the threat of the other colonial powers on three grounds: First, in view of the geographical proximity, there has been a spontaneous process Vil of interaction between the two countries. As such, any poli­ tical change inside Russia has had a far-reaching effect upon the orientation of socio-political development in Persia.

Secondly, by being a backward kind of European colonial power, it had more primitive tendency for territorial aggrandizement than purely economic exploitation. Thirdly, cultural intimacy and economic ties between the northern provinces of Persia and

Russian Caucasus and Turkistan made the political destiny of

Persia closely tied to the progress of history to the north.

Therefore, Russia from the very beginning turned out to be a major factor in the development of the twofold crises of power

and value in Persia.

The first chapter, under the title of "Challenge of

Colonialism in Persia, 11 deals with these two phases of crises

in Persia. It considers how the Russian political menace re­

quired successive responses on the part of Persia. These re­

sponses which, in fact, were attempts at rivaling the politi­

cal values of the challenger, were at once as well a challenge

to the legitimacy of the tradition patterns of the society it­

self— particularly when they proved to be ineffective in main­

taining the very image of security and unity in the country.

It analyzes how the attentive drives toward modernization, * * * V 1 1 X westernization and nationalism were conscious efforts in sur­ viving the mei.nce of the western colonial powers. At the same time, how failure in actual materialization of these measures complicated the very crisis of the value.

It also deals with the crisis of power in Persia, name­ ly, the conflict and competition among the great powers towards the establishment of their political domination in Persia. It analyzes that, in view of such power conflict, Russia could not have an obtrusive freedom in the southward drive. Consequently, she was confronted with the challenge of the British power, who viewed the political domination of the Near East as a mortal threat to its colonial possessions in the Indian subcontinent.

At the same time, Persia's inability to influence the balance of power in this part of the world, either politically or mili­ tarily, made her alternately an area of conflict and an arena of compromise between the two rival powers. It was an area of conflict, whenever rivalry was specified to the regional inter­ ests; an arena of compromise, whenever it was necessary for them to patch up their difficulties outside Europe in order to main­ tain the balance of power in Europe.

The very effect of the Anglo-Russian competition in

Persia was two-fold. On the one hand, it provided certain ix limitations to the Russian expansionist drive toward the south. On the other hand, it brought about an opportunity

for Persia to play off one power against the other in order to maintain her relative state of independence in the interna­ tional scene. This pattern of power contest underwent a metamorphic change as the result of the Russian revolution. The October

Revolution, though temporarily, slackened the challenge of the

Russian power in Persia and also scaled down the crisis of power,— however, it strengthened the nature of challenge per se by virtue of its messianic rationale. To the effect that the Soviet Union, by dwelling on the internal socio-political crises and setting forth diagnoses for them, has been able to

influence and control the minds of the people and use them for

its political cause.

The rest of the chapters deal primarily with the Bolshe­ vik revolution and its strategic application in Soviet foreign policy. It also deals with the role of Persia in the strategic

design of the Soviet southern flank. Furthermore, it analyzes

the process of the Soviet political shifts and their effects

upon the internal political development of Persia.

In the early formative years after the October Revolution, the Soviet leaders put forward a revolutionary strategy that aimed at spurring the proletarian revolution in the West and liberatory movements in the East. In their revolutionary de­ sign, the Bolsheviks assigned a significant role to Persia, as the outlet of the revolution in the Orient. They ardently supported anti-British uprisings in Persia and did participate in the creation of the Soviet Republic of Gilan as a basis to­ ward furthering the cause of revolution in that country.

The Soviet Revolutionary strategy lost its impetus when the hope of the international revolution became dim, and the

October Revolution itself failed to spur the expected prole­ tarian revolution in Germany. Since the security of the Soviet

Union could no longer be depending upon the oncoming revolution, a switch from the revolutionary strategy to the defensive stra­ tegy became inevitable. Consequently, security of the Soviet fatherland became the supreme objective of the Bolshevik leaders. However, Soviet ability to bargain with the Great

Powers was severely limited by her internal weakness as well as the mistrust in which she was held. On the other hand, she was less handicapped in her dealing with the immediate neighbors, all of whom were extremely weak. Thus, in order to ensure the security of its southern flank, the Soviet Union found it prufent xi to court the neighboring countries of Persia, Turkey and

Afghanistan, and bring them into the orbit of its defensive strategy. This policy found expression in the Russo-Persian treaties of friendship of 1921 and neutrality of 1927. In short, the very rules of these treaties governed the Soviet-

Persian relationship up to the beginning of the Second World

War.

This situation underwent a radical change as the re­ sult of the Second World War. Germany's invasion of the Sovi­ et Union radically changed the strategic position of Persia, who, overnight, became a vital strategic factor in the war de­ sign of the Allied Powers. In fact, Persia was the only safe link in the supply chain which at that time could connect the

Western Allies with the Soviet Union, particularly when the north Russian route to Murmansk and Archangel was beginning to prove unduly hazardous to Allied convoys. Thus, in August,

1941, indifferent to Persian neutrality, the Anglo-Russian forces occupied Persian territory. Immediately after the occu­ pation of Persia, the Soviet Union hammered out the anti-Fascist strategy, of which the main feature was popular-front policy.

The Soviet Union's main objective here was to maintain tranquil­ lity in the rear of its Caucasus war front and also to facilitate the transportation of war materials to the various fronts. xii

Though the war-time occupation actually caused socio-politi­ cal crises in Persia, the Soviets were cautious not to do anything which might aggravate the situation there, a policy that was followed more or less also by the native Communist

Party.

With the change of events at the war fronts and the re­ moval of the German danger from the Caucasus area, Russia set forth a new design towards redistribution of interests among the Great Powers. Xn Persia, this thesis found its expression in the demand for parity of interests, particularly with regard to the oil concessions in the area. But lack of agreement on this issue, along with other difficulties which developed in the European Theater, gave birth to a latent friction among the

Allied Powers which came to the surface during the closing years of the war. The symptoms of this conflict first appeared in

Persia and caused a gradual switch from anti—Fascist strategy to anti-imperialist strategy, with its sharp edge of attack directed against Great Britain.

As the war drew toward its close and the split between the East and the West became more and more open, the Soviet

Union embarked on an offensive policy in Persia. Apparently encouraged by the facility with which the West had surrendered

Eastern Europe, Russia made a bold bid for the advancement of xx ii her political cause in Persia. The fulfillment of this task was assigned to the Communist Party of Persia. In October,

1945, former Tudeh members, acting under the new name of

Democrats and aided by the Soviet military forces, rebelled in the Persian province of Azerbaijan. In December, 1945, the creation of the "Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan" was announced in Tabriz. Concomitant with this, the "Autonomous

Kurdish People’s Republic" was proclaimed under Soviet auspi­ ces on December 15, 1945.

Although Soviet designs on Persia had suffered some setbacks as a result of Western countermeasures, Russia did not relent in her effort to frustrate Western plans and to exploit political difficulties arising between the West and

Persia. In fact, a Soviet political setback was followed by the waiting tactic which continued up to the time of Stalin's death. However, the Soviet political attitude toward Persia, dictated by the image of the two camps doctrine, maintained its anti-imperialistic features. Even in the case of the

Persian nationalist movement, although the Soviet Union sup­ ported the Persian cause in international circles, it still reserved its strong suspicion and mistrust.

Since the late fifties, as a result of drastic change in the nature of international politics-- rapid process of decolonization, emergence of the nuclear stalemate, and change in the balance of strategy between the East and West— the Soviet Union has set forth the strategy of neutrality as the guiding line of its diplomacy towards its border coun­ tries. Xn recent years, the Soviet leaders have made a bid to neutralize their southern neighboring countries of Persia and Turkey, an attempt that has been followed not only by the continual renouncement of erstwhile pronounced political aspi­ rations in these areas, but also by promises of massive econo­ mic aid in the case of withdrawal from the military blocs. In spite of the existing political restlessness in Persia, the

Soviet has been emphatic in this strategy and continually harps on this theme.

In short, this study assumes that Soviet political stra­ tegy towards Persia has been formed according to the nature of international politics at the time, the power status of the

Soviet Union with regard to the other challenging powers in the area, and Persian internal situation. Since national inter­ est has been the key to the Soviet political attitude with regard to Persia, it necessarily did not deviate too much from the pattern of Russia's traditional foreign policy. It merely XV adapted an ideological rationale for it. It also assumes that Soviet leaders are rational in seeking gains; that their strategies are deeply responsive to changing events in Persia or outside of Persia, as the Soviet Union attempts to diminish the possibility of active resistance to the fur­ thering of its political cause in Persia. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION THROUGH THE THIRTIES

CHAPTER PAGE

I. CHALLENGE OF COLONIALISM IN PERSIA...... 1

Challenge of the Russian Power ...... 6

Modernization ...... 8

Westernization ...... 10

Nationalism in Persia ...... 14

The Bolshevik Revolution and its Impact on Persia 18

II. PERSIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL

STRATEGY...... 26

Geopolitical Role of Persia in the East .... 26

The Role of the East in the Proletarian Revolution 34

Dialectic of Backwardness ...... 42

Nationality Policy ...... 50

III. SOVIET REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY IN PERSIA...... 60

Bolshevik anti-imperialist Propaganda in the

Near East 60

Curzon1s anti-Bolshevik Design in the Middle East 63

Soviet Military Engagement in Northern Persia . 69

Soviet Republic of Gilan ...... 71 xvii

CHAPTER PAGE

Separatist Movement in the Iranian Azerbaijan . 80

Institutions of Eastern Revolution ...... 84

The Baku Congress...... 90

IV. PERSIA IN THE DESIGN OF SOVIET DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 99

Eclipse in the Soviet Revolutionary Outlook . ._ 100

Soviet Twilight Diplomacy in Persia ...... 103

Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921 ...... 108

Soviet Policy of Neutrality ...... 115

PART TWO: FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO 1962

V. PERSIA IN THE DESIGN OF SOVIET WAR STRATEGY . . . 122

German Penetration in Persia ...... 123

Allied Occupation of Persia ...... 128

Soviet anti-Fascist Strategy ...... 138

VI. PERSIA IN THE DESIGN OF THE GREAT POWERS'

REDISTRIBUTION OF INTEREST...... 147

Soviet Territorial Desiderata in Europe .... 153

Soviet Demand for the Parity of Interests in the

Near East ...... 155

Anglo-American Redistribution of the Oil Interests

in the Middle E a s t ...... 160 xviii

CHAPTER PAGE

Soviet Oil Demand in Persia ...... * . 162

Soviet anti-Western Propaganda in Persia . . . 170

VII. SOVIET ANTI-IMPERIALIST S T R A T E G Y ...... 174

Rationale of the Two-camps Doctrine ...... 177

Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan ...... 181

The Persian Case in the United Nations .... 187

Soviet Setback in Per s i a...... 200

Soviet anti-American Diplomacy ...... 205

VIII. NATIONALISM IN THE DESIGN OP SOVIET TWO-CAMPS

DOCTRINE...... 212

Soviet Attitude toward the Persian Nationalist

Movement...... • ...... 213

Soviet non-interference Policy ...... 218

The Tudeh's Subversive Tactics ...... 222

IX. SOVIET NEUTRALITY STRATEGY IN PERSIA...... 229

Doctrinal Reevaluation of Bourgeoisie in the

Underdeveloped Countries 233

Three Camps or Peace Zone...... 237

Major Change in the Balance of Strategy between

the East and West ...... 242 xix

CHAPTER PAGE

Evolving Difficulties Within the Communist Camp 243

Economic Benefits of Neutrality Policy . . . • 245

Implication of the Soviet Neutrality Strategy

in P e r s i a ...... 247

CONCLUSION...... 257

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 282 I [

·• ' ' I

CHALLENGE OF COLONIALISM IN PERSIA

The synthetic process of the world civilization is the product of the dialectical relationship between the political and cultural entities. In its political aspect, interactions between the opposing forces have appeared in the form of

"challenge and response" relationship. Thus in the sphere of politics, any conscious attempt toward internal change could be termed partly as a response to the challenge of the exter­ nal forces. In short, there is direct relationship between the nature of challenge per se and the orientation of social and political development within the challenged societies.

Since survival is the main objective of any political communi­ ty, the quality of response should be strong enough to meet the threat of the challenge, otherwise, the challenged socie­ ties undergo the domination of the challenging ones.

Responses of nations to the threatening challenges usually appear in two different forms: negative and positive.

Negative response aims at nothing but the eradication of the sources of challenge or paralyzation of its effects. But positive response aims at adopting the rationale of the new challenge, or copying the superior logic of the challenger.

In historical perspective, human societies have been subject to the variety of challenges, either environmental and physical or superorganic, namely, the challenge of man self. In the realm of interactionism or man-milieu relation­ ship, some sociologists and historians have sought the gene­ sis of the early civilization in the response of man to the challenge of natural environment.^ In the sphere of trans­ organism, anthropologists have regarded the emergence of political centralism within the sedentary societies as a response to the perpetual challenges of nomadic hordes or barbaric tribes. Even some of the m o d e m scholars have at­ tributed such a thesis to the development of the hetero- 2 geneous empires in the m o d e m era.

In the Middle Ages, the emergence of the miniature security units, namely, feudalism, was an ipso facto response

^■See Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History (Londons Oxford University Press, 1947), I, Chapter V.

2Joseph Stalin in his book "Marxism and the National and colonial Question" maintained that'in Eastern Europe the formation of centralized states took place by the exigen­ cies of self-defence against the invasions of the Mongols, Turks and others." 3 to the challenge of anarchism which had developed as the re­ sult of the declining positions of the centralized powers.

With the emergence of the nation-state system and development of commerce and industry a new form of challenge, that is to say challenge of colonialism, dawned in interna­ tional relations. The challenging nations were necessarily advanced commercial and industrial societies, while the challenged nations were traditional and mostly agricultural ones. In this new pattern of power relationship those nations who were conscious to the realization of the new threat took attentive steps towards positive responses. They thus succeed­ ed not only in arming themselves with the same weapons as those of the challengers, but they were able in a timely read­ justment to survive the catastrophe of history. The whole policy of Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List was directed toward copying the industrial establishment that England had pioneered,— the European cameralists, too, were eager to pro­ mote in their own realms those trades, crafts, and manufac­ tures which had contributed to the wealth of their stronger neighbors. One of the most dramatic examples is the Russian tsar Peter the Great, whose entire life was devoted to a 4

feverish attempt to copy the mercantilist-absolutist pattern

of political economy he had studied in Western Europe. Peter became the hero of so-called “westemizers" in Russia, albeit a backward one, of the European family of nations, and saw

Russia's political survival in catching up with the West in political, social, and economic developments. The same line was followed by Lenin and Stalin in their designs of indus­ trialization.

In Asia the challenge of Western colonialism was not met with a unique pattern of response. Those nations such as the Japanese who were not oblivious to the nature of the chal­

lenge swiftly took steps toward modernization (industrializa­ tion) , as the sole alternative response to the threat of

Western colonialism. Others who were either unaware or only half aware of their danger failed to meet the uninvited chal­ lenge in a positive way. Consequently, they underwent the

Western domination in one way or another.

From the 16th Century on, the Persian political and social systems were shaped and moulded according to the nature of the new challenge which had threatened them from the West, namely, the challenge of the Ottoman Empire. The dynamic and 5 energetic empire of the Turks, baptized with the role of reli­ gious roessianism, appeared as a mortal threat to the Persian political survival. Since it had covered its political ambi­ tion within the legitimate cloak of religious protectionism, and sought domination of the Islamic world, Persians found it necessary to mobilize themselves with the same logic as the challenger. To this end. Shiism was reinforced and developed both as a rallying force in unifying the Persians and as a positive response in meeting the menace of the Sunni Ottoman power.

It is significant to note that essential Shiite doc­ trine demanded that the successors of the Prophet and the leader of a community combine in himself both religious and civil functions. It was Safavi implementation of this doc­ trine that made the national religion of Shiism the matrix 3 of a secular and political national consciousness. Commen­ ting on the rationale of this political device. Professor

Minorsky maintained:

One sometimes hears voices expressing regret at the breach in the Islamic community which resulted from the actions of Shah Ismail. But from the

3Toyribee, op. cit.. Vol. V, p. 3. 6

point of view of the Persian nation one could main­ tain the thesis that it is precisely this isolation which saved the Persians. From the west the Otto­ mans, from the east the Uzbegs, threatened Persia, penetrating farther and farther into it, and Persia would have ended by being submerged in these waves of Turkish assaults. The new religion with its ec­ static character helped to concentrate power, and, on the other hand, the new doctrine, which in itself had no connection with the Persian nationality, pro­ vided the platform upon which the Persian people could maintain its rights against absorption into an abstract Islam and, in practice, into the Turkish ocean.4

Thus, as the result of this bipolarization of the Is­ lamic world, the two powers fought for over three hundred years for political hegemony. At the end, both of them were exhausted and became prey to the challenge of the modernized

West.

At the beginning of the 19th Century, a new power threatened the political survival of Persia, namely, the challenge of the Russian empire. The nature of the new chal­ lenge was different from the former one. It was partly Euro­ pean in character and partly modernized in form. In a word, its challenge had an imperialistic tone of the West. Its

Vladimir Minorsky. "Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt,“ Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 195. . 7 expansionist tendencies had three major goals: (1) to exploit the economic potential of Asia; (2) to enhance the power and prestige of the Russian state both militarily and politically; and (3) in addition to these, to obtain badly needed warm water ports. A fourth motive has been suggested by Kluchevsky to explain the "continuous11 and "spontaneous colonization" of new regions by the Russian people: the desire for better 5 living conditions and freedom from government pressure*

Oblivious to the nature of the new challenge, Persians responded to the threat with the same methods as those of the 16th and 17th centuries which had been used against the

Ottoman Empire. Two successive wars in 1813 and 1826 could be good experiences for the realization of this fact— unfor­ tunately, the elite of the time were too naive in understan­ ding the character of the danger. Except for a single man, they were fully ignorant of the menace of the Russian expan­ sionist designs. Ever-increasing Russian aggressions, syn­ chronized with the British entrance in the arena of Persian politics, necessarily forced the Persians to respond to the

^Xenia Joukoff Eudin, Soviet Russia and the East (California: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 4. Anglo-Russian challenges in new ways. Though the quality of responses have been often weak, ill-prepared and late, they have made a deep impact upon the future political, social, and psychological developments in Persia. In short, they could be classified as attempts towards "modernization," 6 "westernization," and "nationalism."

One early positive measure in meeting the challenge of

Russian expansionism was an attempt toward modernization of the Iranian military system. As mentioned above, this attempt was not a collective realization on the part of the ruling elite, but only the desperate action of a single man, namely

Prince Abbas Hirza, the Persian military commander in the wars with Russia. He took positive steps in acquiring modern mili­ tary science and arms for defense preparations against the

Russians, who with their great military power, were constant­ ly progressing, through successive attacks, to the East and into the northern provinces of Persia. His first action was

6Though today modernization and westernization are two positive aspects of nationalism, nationalism per se is a very complex concept and is usually imbued with the trends of ata­ vism, traditionalism, and zenophobia in its negative form.

7Por detail see "Abbas Hirza," by Nasser Najmi, Teheran, 1947. the employment of the French military officers under General

Gardanne, as the partial fulfillment of the Franco-Persian

Alliance of 1803. These measures were followed by the engage­ ment of British military officers for the training of the

Persian army. Along this line, too, he sent a series of Per­ sian students to Europe for military and technical education.8

The death of Prince Abbas Mirja brought about a long pause in these activities. Revival of modernization took place in the second half of the 19th Century, tinder the leadership of an able grand-vazier, Amirnezam Frahanni (Amirkabir) . Under his leadership, modernization followed not only in military aspect but partly also in political and educational systems as well.

The employment of the Austrian, Italian and Swedish officers and educators could be regarded as part of his grand design as well.

Unfortunately, attempts toward modernization were bar­ red from two different directions: Externally, both Russia and Britain were deeply antagonistic toward any design for modernization of Iran. A strong, modernized Iranian army was

8Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, "The Background of the Con­ stitutional Movement in Azerbaijan," The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1960, p. 456. 10

regarded as a danger -to their interest in the East. Any action

toward this objective was necessarily prevented by them in ohe

way or another. In short, the cardinal points in both British 9 and Russian policies were to keep Persia weak, or in Sir Henry

Rawlinson's words make her ineffective to the fortunes of Great

Britain's Empire in the East.10 Internally, the despotic

Persian rulers, who were partly under the influence of the

Great Powers and partly apathetic in delegating their authority

to the reformist vaziers, ignorantly paralyzed the project of modernization in one way or smother. Since the Royal Court and

courtiers became instruments in the hands of the colonial powers and as such an obstacle to the realization of national

aspirations, a new movement became necessary. To this end,

"Westernization" turned out to be an alternative response to

the perpetual challenge of colonialism.11 It was hoped that,

^Philip K. Hitti, The Hew East in History, A 5000 Years Story (Hew York: Divan Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), p. 397.

l^George N. Curzon, M.P., Persia and the Persian Ques­ tion (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1892), p. 558. llMost of the scholars have used the two concepts of modernization and westernization interchangeably. In reality, there is an interactionist correspondents between them. Of course, such interaction is spontaneous and the process of long time development. But in non-Westem societies distinc­ tion has to be made between the adoption of the skill, techni- saiois|i4s!"3|sci§ieH?!«!8Sniniogga45is^§ioSoi5s^eisirn presuppositions. 11 by limiting the individual power of the monarch and increas­ ing the political role of the peoples1 representatives, not only might the instrumentality position of the court be curtail­ ed but the increasing interference of the colonial powers might be counteracted as well. A series of the national movements against the grant of concessions to the foreign powers and consequent Constitutional Revolution could be counted as parts of this design.

Unlike its European concept, westernization in Iran was not the gradual growth of the philosophy of individualism within the framework of natural rights and social contract.

On the contrary, it had a Rousseauian overtone of "general will"? it was employed as an attempt to safeguard the na­ tional interests against the abuses of despotic and foreign— dominated monarchs. Westernization in Iran had more of a nationalistic character rather than an enlightened feature of individual liberty. In its early stage of development, westernization combined two contradictory concepts, namely,

Persian national interest and Islamic community interest. The former aimed at safeguarding the Persian national interests against the actions of the corrupt and despotic rulers in the 12 short run, and colonial powers in the long run. The latter concentrated on the safety of the Islamic community against deviated rulers and foreign infidels. Since both of them found a common interest in the realization of a constitutional system, they necessarily joined hands.

The national boycott of tobacco and the following mass protestation against the grant of concessions to the foreign powers and the consequent assassination of the donor of the concessions, namely, Nasseredin-Shah could be attributed to the actions of the Islamic-minded reformers. In these at­ tempts the roles of the Shii's leader, Haji Hirza Hassan

Shirazi and Seyyd Jamaledin Afghan (Assadabadi) are worthy to be mentioned. The very actions of the religious leaders found appealing grounds among the masses and secular-minded national­ ists, and drew their massive support. The paradoxical charac­ ter of the movement, namely nationalistic-pan—Islamistic, could be revealed fran the letter of Seyyed Jamaledin to the

Shii's leader, Haji Hirza Hassan Shirazi. In his letter

Jamaledin, after picturing the pathetic situation of the

Islamic world, the responsibility of the religious leaders in defending the interests of Islam, and flagrant interference of the foreign powers in Persian affairs maintained: 13

• • . , but in addition to this he (Shah) hath sold to the foes of our faith the greater part of the Persian lands and the profits accruing therefrom, to wit the mines,12 the ways leading thereunto, the roads connec­ ting them with the frontiers of the country, the inns about to be built by the side of these extensive arter­ ies of communication which will ramify through all parts of the kingdom, and the gardens and field surroun­ ding them. • • • It means the complete handing over of the reins of government to the enemy of Islam, the en­ slaving of the people to the enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of the foreign foe. . Then he offered what was left to Russia as the price of her silence and acquiescence, namely the Murdab (la­ goon) of Rasht, the rivers of Tabaristan, and the roads from Anzali to Khurasan, with the houses, inns and fields appertaining thereto. In short this criminal has offered the provinces of the Persian land to auction amongst the powers, and is selling the realms of Islam and the abodes of Muhammad and his household (on whom be greeting and salutation) to foreigners. And thou, O proof, if thou wilt not arise to help this people, and wilt not unite them in purpose, and pluck them forth, by the power of the holy law, from the hands of this sinner, verily the realms of Islam will soon be under the control of foreigners who will rule therein as they please and do what they will. . .

12The concession granted to Baron Julius de Reuter in January, 1889, included the right of exploiting the mineral wealth of Persia, though this was ceded in the following year to the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation.

13This refers to the concessions made to Prince Dolgor- ousky in February, 1889.

14Edward G. Brown, M.A., M.B., F.B.A. The Persian Revolution ef 1905-1909 (Londom Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 17. 14

It was apparently this letter, said Professor Brown, which induced the great Mujtediid, Hajji Hirza Hassan of

Shiraz, to issue his fatwa declaring the use of tobacco to be unlawful until the obnoxious concession was withdrawn; it was his fatwa which gave to the popular resentment the sanc­ tion of religion, thus enabling it to triumph over the Shah and the foreign governments and concessionaires; and among the ulti­ mate results of all this were the violent deaths of Nasiru'd-

Din Shah and his grand vasier, Aminu's-Sultan.'1’5 In short, this movement paved the way for the later Constitutional Revo­ lution of 1906. In this revolution. Western-influenced nationalists succeeded in bringing about a secular constitu­ tion. Although the triumph of the constitutionalists was pos­ sible only with the support of the religious groups, their nationalistic logic found ascendancy over the thesis of pan-

Islamism. Except for a minor concession, they succeeded in establishing their secular point of view.

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 apparently opened a new chapter in Iranian political life. The Parliament

(Majlis) was regarded by many Iranians as a new center for ren­ dering positive responses to the critical issues which had

15Brown, op. cit., p. 22. 15 plagued the life of the nation. It was not only a rallying point of a new movement, but a battering-ram against the

Anglo-Russian avaricious designs in Iran.

The dawn of this hope did not last long. In the suc­ cessive year, 1907, Xran became subject to the special treaty between Russia and Britain. The division of Iran into spheres of influence shattered the hope of the constitutionalists.

This state of frustration was further complicated:! by ever- increasing Anglo-Russian interference in the operations of the

Majlis. An outstanding example in paralyzing the action of the Majlis was the Morgan Shuster incident. The employment of the American as the Iranian Treasurer-General became subject 16 to Russian threat and consequent occupation of northern Iran.

Following the Shuster incident, the Anglo-Russian governments demanded on February 12, 1912, that the Persian government formally accept the provisions of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 and agree to submit to various types of Anglo-Russian 17 supervision. When the Majlis responded negatively to this 18 demand, it faced its own dissolution.

16por detail see W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (Hew York; The Century Co., 1920). ^j.M. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia (London, 1922), p. 107. 18Joseph M. Upton, The History of Modern Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960T7 P- 3 9 • 16

Faced with such a state of political quandry, Iranians necessarily turned toward nationalism in an abstract form.

Failure in two successive attempts, namely, “modernization1* and ’’westernization, ** brought nationalism as the last ditch attempt against the galling challenge of colonial powers. Na­ tionalism in Iran adopted two distinctive features: In one aspect, it sought the support of a “third power" in eliminating the Anglo-Russian menace from Persia; in another aspect, it gave birth to an anti-Western sentiment which had been tainted by a strong religious bias. But the former feature found pre­ dominancy in the minds of Iranian nationalists. To this end,

Germany turned out to be the center of attention. Iranian nationalists regarded Germany as the most effective source of 19 help to save Persian independence and territorial integrity.

Not only did the Germans meet with a favorable reception in high government circles, but they succeeded also in organizing a separate national government in Kermanshah, and benefitted in Berlin from the active cooperation of one of the moat highly- 20 ly respected nationalist leaders.

19Upton, op. cit., p. 38. 20W. von Blucher, Zeitenwende in Iran; Erlebnisse and Beobachtunqen (Biberach an der Riss, 1949), pp. 15-124. 17

In early November, 1915, there were reasons for believ­

ing that a widespread revolt by pro-German Persians was ready

to be launched. Rapid Russian counteraction and subsequent

Anglo-Russian steps, plus German military reverses elsewhere, 21 served to at least drive underground “pro-German" support.

The German Government was well aware of the sullen

animosity that rarilded in Iranian hearts, and a host of propa­

gandists spread over Iran, urging people to strike for liber­

ty. The activities found rallying point in the Majlis, most

of the nationalist deputies making no secret of their desire

to throw Iran into the war on the Turko-German side. The Demo­

cratic party and the nationalist journals boldly proclaimed

that the day of revenge had come and that Iran roust declare

war on England and Russia and that all tame Iranians ought to 22 rush to arms to rid the country of the foreign intruders.

In the pursuit of this nationalistic feeling, Iranian nation­

alists engaged in a series of scattered military warfare

?libid.

22Nasrullah Saifpour Fatemi. Diplomatic History of Persia. 1917-1923 (New York: R.F. Moore Company, 1952), p. 26.

I 18 against the Anglo-Russian forces. In these events the role of the tribal peoples of the northern and southern areas of Iran were notanle. In February 1917, a great segment of the Iranian gendarmerie joined the forces under Turkish and German command in the Kermanshah area— other segments which had been incorpo­ rated into the Southern Persian Rifles staged a serious mutiny against their British officers. 23

Thus, in the critical years of 1914-1917, Iranian na­ tionalists were in a state of frustration. Militarily, their country had been occupied by the hostile powers; politically, fragmentation and disintegration had paralyzed any positive plan on the part of the nationalists; economically, bankruptcy had plagued the very life of the nation; psychologically, con­ fusion and bewilderment had rankled the minds of the people.

The only solution was sought in the victory of the Central

Powers. Thus, when the Russian Revolution of 1917 took place, it created feelings of both relief and encouragement. Relief, because it removed the very menace of the northern neighbor, at least for a time.— encouragement, because the Bolsheviks' tactical support of nationalism and anti-imperialist move­ ments was regarded as a further support in the anti-British

22Balfour, op. cit., p. 107. 19 struggle. Indeed, the Russian was in its influence almost a domestic event in Persia, the affairs of Persia being such a close and intimate relation to the stormy progress of history to the north. ^

The news of the revolutionary ferment in Russia had come to Teheran as fortunate and unexpected. Quickly, the possibility of freeing Persia from Tsarist Russia had become apparent. But the original Provisional Government wanted to continue the general Iranian policy of Czarist Russia, minus 25 its extremely aggressive features. The "Cadet" Government soon gave way to the Socialist Kerensky Regime, and one of

Kerensky's first acts was a disavowal of all imperialistic de- 26 signs, including most emphatically Persia. In JUly 1917, the Kerensky Government ordered the Russian commander in

Persia, General Baratoff, to halt his advance through Iran and announced the withdrawal of all Russian forces at the 27 earliest possible moment. This attitude of the Kerensky

24Alfred L.P. Dennis, The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1924), p. 133.

2^The Century. January 23, 1920, p. 322.

26Ibid.

27Fatemi, op. cit., p. 141 20

Government brought about a sympathetic feeling among Iranian nationalists toward the Socialist Revolutionary Government of Kerensky. Extraordinary scenes took place, with Russians and Persians fraternizing in the streets and forming revolu­ tionary joint-committees for the fraternal settlement of out-

f standing difficulties. Many demonstrations were arranged in which Persian, Armenian, and Russian soldiers took past; and speeches were made in honor of the Iranian revolutionists who had fallen but a few years before in their vain effort to re- 28 generate their fatherland.

This situation did not last long; the unstable edifice of Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshevik was not able to re­ sist the volcanic torrent of Bolshevism. The ill-fated Keren­ sky regime staggered to its doom, unable to either stay in the war or to withdraw from it. With their slogans of "All

Power to the Soviets" and "Peace, Land, and Bread," the Bol­ shevik leaders secured ascendancy in Russia and organized the new proletarian revolution.

At the Second Congress of Soviets, which adopted the

"Decree of Peace" on November 8, 1917, the day after the

28Ibid revolution, Lenin spoke on the need for review of treaties between Czarist Russia and other countries, and rejection

of all clauses 'Which provided for plundering and violence

against other nations. But all clauses where good neigh­ boring conditions and economic agreements were provided were not to be rejected. 29 This suggestion of Lenin was promptly seized upon by the exiled Persians in Berlin, who

forthwith wrote an appeal to the Stockholm International So­

cialist Congress, in which they recited their woes as victims

of "the greed 0 $ European imperialism" and, after a review of

recent history, demanded the repudiation of "all concessions,

conventions, and contracts wrested from the Persian Govern­ ment" by coercion. Tsarist Russia, they declared, was the

source of all their misfortunes; they therefore hailed the 30 Russian Revolutionary peoples as their friends. In the meantime, in an article on Persia, Izvestia pointed out that

the best way to oust England from Persia was by the denuncia- 31 tion of Tsarist rights in Persia. Following this theme,

Narimanov, "Lenin et Les Pays D*Orient," Lenine tel Q u 1il Fut Souvenirs de Contentporains (Hoscou; l'Institut du Marxisme—Leninisme, 1957), p. 193.

Splzvestia, December 30, 1917, pp. 1-2.

31-rhjd., December 19, 1917. 22

in an "Appeal to all the Muslims of Russia and the East" (De­ cember 5, 1917), Bolsheviks condemned Tsarist imperialism in

Persia and declared that "the treaty partitioning Persia is null and avoid. It likewise promised that "as soon as mili­ tary operations cease, the armed forces will be withdrawn

from Persia, and the Persians will be guaranteed the right of 32 free determination of their own destiny." Shortly afterward,

Trotsky, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, informed Assad

Khan Bahador, the Iranian Charge d'Affairs at Petrograd, that the Bolsheviks no longer considered the one-sided treaty of

1907 binding and were prepared to annul all special privileges which had been granted to the previous Russian Government by

Persia. It further proposed immediate negotiations for the evacuation of Imperial Russian troops from Persia, on condi- 33 tion that the Turks withdraw simultaneously. This was in line with the armistice agreement between the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks, concluded at Brest-Litovsk, wherein the

German representatives (influenced by the pro-German Persian statesmen, living in Berlin at that time)insisted on the

32ji. Narimanov, op. cit., p. 195.

33Jane, Degras (Tabrisky), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. (2 vols., London, 1951-52J p. «r alsoTzvestra, January 16, 1918, pp. 1-2. 23 evacuation o£ Persia and the insertion of the following clause in the Armistice Agreement with Russia:

Upon the basis of the principle of freedom, indepen­ dence and territorial inviolability of the neutral Persian state, the Turkish and the Russian commands are prepared to withdraw their troops from Persia* They will immediately enter into communication with the Per­ sian Government in order to regulate the details of the evacuation and the other necessary measures for the guaranteeing of the above mentioned principle.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk later confirmed (Article VII) the

"political and economic independence and the territorial integ- rity of both Persia and Afghanistan."35

These official declarations were supplemented by the ap­ pointment of Kari Bravin to Teheran as the unofficial repre­ sentative of the new regime. He arrived at Teheran on Janu­ ary 12, 1918, with the following message from Lenin to the

Persian Government:

The Workers and Peasants Government of Russia in­ structs comrade Bravin to engage in discussion with the Government of His Majesty, the Shah of Persia, with a view of the conclusion of trade and other friendly agreements the purpose of which is not only the buttressing of good neighborly relations in the interests of both nations but together with the people of Persia the joint fight against the most imperialistic government on earth, England, the in­ trigues of which have hitherto disturbed the

■^John W. Wheeler, Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956), p. 33.

35Ibid.. p. 43. 24

peaceful people of Persia and destroyed your great country. The Workers and Peasants Government is prepared to repair the injustice done by the former Government of the Russian Tsar by repudiating all Tsarist privileges and agreements that are contrary to the sovereignty of Persia. The future relations between Russia and Persia will be based upon free agreement and mutual respect among nations.

Bravin embarked immediately upon a campaign of revolu­ tionary propaganda which met with an attentive hearing on the part of Persian nationalists. Although the Persian Government thought it necessary to warn Bravin of the invidiousness of his procedure, it nevertheless lent a sufficiently tolerant ear to his declaration, inasmuch as it attacked imperialistic policy of any kind and more especially that of the British

Army of Occupation in Iran. In the meantime, many anti-

British meetings were arranged in Teheran; Bravin was the guest of honor in all these meetings, and as a result an agi­ tation against the pro-British politicians in Persia began.

Several anglophile Persian politicians were assassinated and many were forced to leave the capital. 37 A series of agita­ tions in favor of a republican regime were held at Tabriz

36patemi, op. cit., p.

37lbid. 25

and Teheran, in emulation of the Soviet government. 38

Thus, having encouraged by the Bolshevik support, Per­

sian nationalists engaged in a bitter anti-British operation.

Seizing upon this mood, at the Peace Conference in Paris, a group of Persians declared that the occupation of Persian territory by Allied troops was now no longer necessary, and that illegal and reactionary treaties should now be cancelled. 39

This attempt to rouse the Persian question in Paris was quick­

ly hushed by negotiations which were begun by the British at

Teheran in the Spring of 1919. These negotiations gave birth to the notorious Anglo-Persian Treaty. The news of such a treaty brought a vehement protest from the Persian people and

ignited a series of military uprisings in the northern provin­ ces of Mazandaran, Gilan and Azerbaijan.

As will be seen in later chapters, such nationalistic movements and anti-British uprisings paved the way for the

Bolsheviks in the application of their revolutionary strategy

in Persia in the three formative years after the October Re­ volution.

^^New York Times, May 6, 1917; March 30, 1919, section 2. 39 “Les aspirations nationales de la Perse" (Comite national d 1Etudes sociales et politicoes, 31, Mars, 1919), Paris, 1919; Current History. X, part 2, p. 75. II

PERSIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF

SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGY

In the Bolshevik revolutionary design, Persia was re­ garded as a fertile ground for cultivating an anti-imperial­ ist revolution, which with the support and backing of the

Soviet Union could be used as a spark for Oriental revolution.

Then, this so-called Eastern revolution was supposed to be linked, through intermediary of Soviet Russia, to the expected proletarian revolution of the West.^" On this ground, a unique role was assigned to Persia. Persia was to be the outlet of 2 the "Oriental Revolution." Elaborating on this point, K.

Troyanovsky wrote:

A political situation favorable to democracy in Persia has an extraordinary importance for the emancipation of the entire Orient. A propitious terrain for the outbreak of revolution has long been prepared. The imperialists of England, Russia, France and Germany have labored there. All that is

^-Stanley W. Page, Lenin and World Revolution {New York: New York University Press, 1959), p. 141.

^Aurelio Palmieri, La Politica Asiatica dei Bolsce- vichi (Bologna, 1924), p. 173. 27

needed is an impulse from the outside, an external aid, an initiative, and resolute decision. This impulse, this initiative, this resolution, can ccsne from our Russian revolutionaries through the inter­ mediary of the Russian Moslems.3

Thus, in the vision of Bolshevik leaders, Persia look­

ed like a fertile ground for sowing the needs of revolution.

It was the only channel through which they would he ahle to

communize all Asia. "If Persia is the door through which one

has to invade the citadel of the revolution of the Orient,

that is to say India, we must foment a Persian revolution.

The Persian uprising will be the signal for a series of revo­

lutions that are to spread through all Asia and part of Africa."

This radicalistic analogy had been founded upon two

grounds: (1) geopolitical and (2) ideological.

Prom a geopolitical standpoint, Persia by the virtue of

its geographical juxtaposition and political entanglement with

Russia had been deeply susceptible to any political change in­

side Russia. As mentioned before, the very nature of the

northern challenge had a determining effect in the process of

political development in Persia since the beginning of the

^Ibid. Also K. Troyanovsky, Vostok i, Revolvutsiva (Moscowj 1918), p. 47.

^Troyanovsky, op. cit.. p. 48.

I 28

nineteenth century. At the turn of the century, two political

incidents, namely, the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian

Revolution of 1905, made a greater impact upon the orientation

of social and political change in Pesaa.

The defeat of Tsarist Russia by Japan, an Asiatic power

and a comparative newcomer on the international scene, had a

tremendous impact upon Asia. On the one hand, it brought the

Russian prestige down to its nadir. On the other hand, it stir­

red up nationalist sentiments of the Oriental peoples. Pointing

to this fact, Lenin wrote in Vperyod (January 1, 1905); "A

progressive and advanced Asia has inflicted an irreparable blow 5 on a backward and reactionary Europe." This incident had a

far-reaching effect on the Persian nationalistic development.

Harping on this theme, M. Pavlovich wrote;

. . . Until the recent Russo-Japanese war Persia was be­ set by the fear of inevitable subjection to Russia. The shadow of the great Northern Empire day by day spread farther and farther over the land of the king of kings. It seemed as though nothing could save Persia from the fate of Khiva, Bukhara and Khokand. The Russo-Japanese war checked Russia's southward movement. Persia breath­ ed a sigh of relief, and found an opportunity for the expression of her own national aspirations.®

5I.V. Lenin, Voervod. January 1, 1905, pp. 1-2.

M. Pavlovich, “New Persia and Her Opponents, '* , Modern World (Sovremenny Mir), February, 1909, pp. 1-3 29

The following revolution of 1905 had a far-reaching effect upon the process of political changes in Asia. In

Persia, Turkey, China and India the era of national democra­ tic revolutions took its impetus, to a great extent, from 7 the Russian Revolution of 1905. But of all the countries adjacent to Tsarist Russia, Persia, for various reasons, ap­ pears to have been the first to experience the full impact of the Revolution of 1905. The appreciable number of Persian students in Russian universities, the traditionally close eco­ nomic contacts between Russian and Persian merchants, and the large Persian labor force in the Russian Transcaucasian area, especially in the oil center of Baku and in Tiflis, contribu­ ted greatly to the rapid dissemination in Persia of informa- Q tion about the events of 1905 in Russia. Furthermore, after the failure of their attempt in Russia, sane of the leaders of the revolution in Transcaucasus migrated to Persia, where they founded a newspaper and agitated for a liberal revo­ lution.9

^Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (translated from Russian by Max Eastman) (New York! Simon and Schuster, 1932), p. 36. ®Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1988 (Seattle: University of Washington Press,1959), p.19. ^See V. Tria, Kavkazskie Sotsial-demokraty v Persidskoi Revoliutsii (Paris, 1910)• 30

The cultural intimacy and intellectual ties between

Transcaucasia and, to a large degree, Haji Tarkhan (Astrak­ han) and Persian Azerbaijan and Gilan also contributed great­

ly to the development of liberation movements in Persia. In

the early twentieth century, many Persians and Muslims of

Soviet Azerbaijan were involved in common political activi­

ties. Ahmad Aqayof, the well-known nationalist extremist

from Qarabaq, founded the daily newspaper Efcshad, which had many incendiary articles and was much in demand,^ in the

Persian language. Caucasus Social Democrats played an impor­

tant role in the Persian constitutional revolution, supplying

arms, organizers, particularly to Azerbaijan and Gilan.

There were fifty Caucasian revolutionaries among the Gilan

volunteers who took power in Resht and captured Teheran.

In the Gilanian War Committee there were few of these revolu­

tionaries such as Valikov a Georgian, Sadeghov an Azerbai­

janian, and Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh and Aminzadeh, two Social

Democrats who had been sent to organize the revolutionary

^°Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, "The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan," The Middle East Jour­ nal. Autumn, 1960, p. 456. I 31 program.^ Later, Amin Rasulzadeh was sent to Teheran, where he was active in the Democratic Party and wrote for 12 the best newspaper of the time, Iran-Nou. In the Tabriz uprising the Caucasian volunteers also played a decisive role. According to Bor-Ramensky, "in the Tabriz uprising,

March 26, 1909, the Caucasian revolutionaries, bearing the red flag, marched at the head of a mass demonstration, but they were content to use the slogan, "Long live the consti- 13 tution. " Furthermore, the Ejtemaiyun Amiyyun (Social Demo­ crats) had a branch in Tabriz which included some of the most active revolutionary leaders. In the autumn of 1904, a special Social Democratic Muslim Party organization, known as

"Gummet" (Power) was created in the Baku for Muslim workers

■^Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hejdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan; Ya Dastan-e Mashrute-ye Iran (Eighteen Years of Azerbaijan History; or the Story of the Constitutional Movement in Iran), (6 vols. Teheran, 1939—41), p. 783.

^Rasulzadeh became later the leader of the Menshevik- type Mosavat Party, ruling the short-lived anti-Soviet Azer­ baijan Republic and was jailed when the Bolsheviks retook Azerbaijan. He was freed on the intervention of Stalin, who remembered their old collaboration in the Caucasus. He later fled, went to Turkey, and edited a Pan-Turk newspaper. He died in 1955.

13E. Bor-Ramensky, "K voprosu o roli bol'shevikov zakavkaz'ia v iranskoi revoliutsii, 1905-1911 godov," Istorik-Marksist, No. 11 (1940), p. 95. 32

laboring in the oil fields. From Baku this organization

spread rapidly to other localities throughout the Transcau-

casus. In 1905 an organization of Iranian revolutionaries 14 was created in Riflis. The result was that when these

Persian migratory laborers returned to their homeland, they

took with them revolutionary ideas, printed propaganda, and

weapons to incite strikes and disturbances there.^ In short,

the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909 fed direct­

ly upon the Russian Revolution of 1905. Thus, on the ground

of this geopolitical intimacy, the Russian Revolution of 1917

could not be ineffective in Persia. Pointing to this fact, K.

Troyanov sky wrote:

. . . The political conquest of Persia, thanks to its peculiar geographical situation and significance for the liberation movement in the East, is what we must accomplish first of all. This precious key to all other revolutions in the Orient must be in our hands.

14Spector, op. cit., p. 21. 15 According to official tsarist statistics, during the last decade of the nineteenth century from fifteen to thirty thousand migratory workers (otkhodniki) bearing passports crossed the border from Iranian Azerbaijan in search of employ­ ment in Russia. In the year 1905 alone, when Russian laborers were mobilized for service in the Russo-Japanese War, these migrants numbered sixty-two thousand. The above figures do not include those who slipped across the border without benefit of passport, or those who joined the trek from Gilan and the other northern provinces of Iran. According to Persian consul in St. Petersburg, by 1910 the number of Persian migratory workers crossing into Russia reached almost two hundred thousand per annum. 33

come what may. Persia must be ours! Persia must be­ long to the revolution!^-®

The Bolshevik leaders, with full knowledge of such tra­ ditional revolutionary intimacy between Caucasus and northern

Persia and also the existing anti-British feeling, and rein­ forced by their ideological interpretation of the role of colonies, semi-colonies in the proletarian revolution, took decisive measures to exploit the situation in favor of an anti-imperialist revolution in Persia.

From an ideological standpoint, the basic principles of the revolution in the East have been expounded by Lenin,

Stalin, and by the various resolutions of the Soviet govern­ ment and the Comintern, either in the decade preceding the

Russian Revolution or during the first five formative years of the Soviet regime. These principles deal with: (1) the role of colonies and semi-colonies in the proletarian revolution,

(2) the problem of historical development in these areas, and (3) the question of self determination.

It is instructive to study them in order to understand more thoroughly Bolshevik policies in the East in general, and in Iran in particular.

16Troyanovsky, op. cit., p. 48. 34

A. The Role of the East in the Proletarian Revolution

In the perspective of Communist history, Marx gave little thought to the colonial question, since it did not occur to him that the colonial or underdeveloped regions of the world would be called on to play any part in the over­ throw of capitalism. But he attributed to the very institu­ tion of colonialism an intermediary role in universalization of the cultural and social values of the advanced industrial

West. As such, he believed that capitalists while in the search for economic exploitation unknowingly would accultu- rate the oppressed colonial peoples to the new values and make them conscious of their own oppression* Along this line, Marx wrote:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. . . . In place of the old local seclusion and self-suffic­ iency, we have intercourse in every direction, uni­ versal interdependence of nations. And as in ma­ terial, so also in intellectual production.17 The bourgeoisie by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production by the immensely facilita­ ted means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. . . . I t compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt

17Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, The Communist Mani­ festo (Chicago: Henry Regenery Company, 1954), p. 20. 35

the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. Xn a word, it creates a world after its own image.*1-8

The awakening role of industrial civilization was fur­ ther elaborated by Otto Bauer and Karl Kenner. These two

Austrian Social Democrats realized that the progress of indus­ trial civilization promoted not only social consciousness, but

also nationalism by integrating the great masses into the cul­

tural community (Kulturgemeinschaft) of the nation. For the primitive ethnic groups of Central and Eastern Europe, and

later of the Orient, which had never, or which had not for centuries, participated in the making of history, the national

awakening— or, as Bauer called it, das Erwachen der geschicht—

slosen Volker— under the impact of mo d e m civilization meant at 19 the same time social awakening. But Bauer and Renner*s

interpretation of social or national awakening was an isolated

factor. They did not take up the complicated relationship be­

tween national awakening and proletarian revolution or

18Xbid., p. 22.

19Hans Kohn, "The Nationality Policy of the Soviet Union," Soviet Union and World Problems (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 93. 36 imperialism in general. This task was taken up by Lenin.

Lenin dexterously highlighted the relationship between the above-mentioned factors in his n Imperial ism, the Highest

Stage of Capitalism." He believed that the industrial coun­ tries, by investing capital in the underdeveloped regions, not only aggravate the living conditions of the exploited peoples and, by so doing, give birth to the growth of xeno­ phobia, but fehat they also provide the colonial peoples with the resources and training for the achievement of the national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom 20 and hence anti-imperialist struggle.

According to Leninism, by developing capitalism in backward nations, however, the West identifies its own values and the very logic of its own civilization to the oppressed peoples. To the nations thus drawn into the orbit of Western civilization for the first time, imperialism poses a profound problem: whatever their past history, their past culture, their established way of life, they are compelled to adjust to the imperialist world. The West, by trying to force its way of life onto foreign cultures, necessarily, menaces the

2®V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capi­ talism (Moscow, 1947), p. 76. very existence of these cultures and thus brings about a state of social instability in these areas. Even if no attempt is made to take political possession of backward areas, even if there is no danger of extinction to a back­ ward nation as a political unit, the rising tide of imperi­ alism is nevertheless a menace, so that "political imperialism" is but a marginal issue. Imperialism does not mean merely the seizure of colonies; that is only a by-product. The es­ sence of imperialism, to the Leninist, is the export of capi­ tal, and therefore of capitalism, a policy which is not only exploiting the labor of backward nations by the most m o d e m methods, but also corroding their entire pattern of culture, class structure, and way of life.

At the same time, by developing capitalism in under­ developed nations, however, the West is showing these na­ tions a way out of the danger of being swallowed up. For, if a backward nation is to maintain its national integrity, it will have to rival the strength of the dominant nations, and it can do so by adopting the features that give the rul­ ing societies their strength. For a Marxist, this prospec­ tive solution can mean only an admonition to the backward nations to develop capitalism for themselves, or more broadly. 3 8 to adopt the leading nation's superior modes of production.

Industrial civilization which is encroaching on traditional non-industrialist ways of life# promises to help other nations emancipate themselves from Western rule.

In Leninist revolutionary design, distinction has to be made between these two successive stages, namely, anti­ colonial or liberatory movement and the stage of bourgeois construction. On Leninist account, anti-colonial movements have to be supported by revolutionary socialists, not because, by that, they would be able to paralyze imperialist forces from the rear, but because they would be able to draw on their own side the auxiliary forces of the colonial peoples in battle 21 against imperialism. Thus, whenever and wherever such revo­ lution took place, Lenin - as in the cases of the Persian revo­ lution of 1906, the "Young Turk" revolution of 1908, the Chi­ nese revolution of 1912, - applauded them and defended them.

In 1908, an article by Lenin entitled "Explosive Material in

World Politics" found a new significance in the revolutionary movements in Persia, Turkey, India and China: "The conscious

European worker now has Asiatic comrades, and the number of

21V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, V (New York: Interna­ tional Publishers, 1935-38), p. 276. 39 22 these comrades will grow from hour to hour. " A few years later, when the Chinese revolution had been victorious, Lenin gave further credit to the role of the East in the proletari­ an revolution:

In Asia, everywhere the mighty democratic movement grows. . . . The bourgeoisie still moves with the people against the feudal reaction. Hundreds of mil­ lions of people are there awaking to life, to light, to freedom. What joy this world movement evokes in the hearts of all conscious workers, knowing that the path to collectivism lies through democracy— with what feeling of sympathy to young Asia are all honest demo­ crats filled! . . . All of young Asia, i.e., the hundreds of millions of toilers of Asia, have a trust­ worthy ally in the person of the proletariat of all the civilized countries. Now power on earth can stop his victory, which will liberate both the peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia.^

At the beginning of the October Revolution, Bolsheviks dexterously linked the question of colonial emancipation to that of national self-determination. In a word, they made colonial policy a logical corollary and a natural extension of national policy. Colonial emancipation, like all forms of national emancipation, belonged to the stage of the bourgeois revolution. It was no doubt ultimately significant as a neces- 24 sary prelude to the socialist world revolution.

22v.l. Lenin, Sochineniia (Works). 2d ed., 30 vols., xxvii (Moscow: Marx—Engels-Lenin Institute, 1926-32), p. 238. 23Lenin, op. pit., p. 395. 24gclward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917 1923 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953) , p. 231. 40

The role of the Bast in proletarian revolution found more ideological significance through the intermediary posi­ tion of Soviet Russia. In November, 1918, on the occasion of a Congress of Muslim Communists in Moscow, Stalin wrote in P ravda of a bridge which the Russian revolution had con­ structed between the "socialist West and the enslaved East,M the building of a "new revolutionary front against world im­ perialism. " Nobody, Stalin declared, could "bridge the gap between West and East as quickly as they could, since to them 25 were open the doors of Persia, Afghanistan, India and China."

On November 22, 1919, Lenin addressed the eighty-two delegates attending the opening session of the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organization of the peoples of the East. The time had come, he declared, for all the awakening peoples of the

East to take part in "deciding the fate of the entire world" and no longer to be the "mere object of imperialist enrichment."

To develop rapidly, he said, the revolutionary movement of the

East would have to tie itself directly to "the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic," whose backwardness, immense

25Richard Pipe, The Formation of Soviet Union. Commu­ nism and Nationalism. 1917-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 160. 41 extent, and position of link between Europe and Asia gave it the “entire burden" and "great honor" of serving as "the leader of the world struggle against imperialism,"

Xn short, in Bolshevik ideological design. Eastern revolution was regarded as an auxiliary force to the prole­ tarian revolution of the West through intermediary of the

Soviet Union, Because Oriental Revolutions aim at the destruc­ tion of the power of capitalist states, said Stalin, their imme­ diate aim coincides with that of the already-established Prole­ tarian state. Thus, while "cleavages, animosities, and con­ flicts between capitalist states" can be capitalized upon or ex­ ploited by the Proletarian State to its own advantage as "indi­ rect reserves" of the revolution, "the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries" constitutes "the direct reserves." If the great masses of Persians, Chinese, Indians,

Arabs and peoples of other countries could be mobilized and their effort coordinated with the action of the proletarian state, the prospect for world revolution would be much bright­ er indeed. Inevitably, the participation of colonial areas in the world struggle against capitalism must not only be con­ ceived as a tactical maneuver to help the proletariat, but it must lead also to the transformation of their own colonial societies. The authority of feudal chieftains, of supersti­

tious clergy, and of local wealthy traders, should be destroy­

ed, and the masses of the laboring people should be emancipa- 26 ted from every form of exploitation.

B. Dialectic of Backwardness

The second basic problem, which had been a matter of

controversy between the parties of the Second International

in the period before war, was that of "historical development

in colonial areas."

In order to develop the proletarian revolution and suc­

ceed in encircling imperialism, the Bolsheviks proposed a

policy of supporting the liberation movement of colonies, and

developed the scheme for a "united front" between the prole­

tarian revolution in advanced countries and the revolutionary—

liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies. The Left

Social-Democrats, on the contrary, developed the theory of

imperialism, and rejected the thesis that a united front be­

tween proletarian revolution and the movement for national

emancipation was possible, for the reason that these areas

26Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (London: Martin Lawrence Limited), p. 195. 43 had not yet entered the capitalist era in their historical development. 27 They insisted that, in addition to a general­

ly developed capitalism, certain specific preliminary condi­ tions such as a highly developed and numerous proletariat, a democratic state, a majority with developed managing ability

or one converted to socialism, etc., must be ripe before a 28 social transformation or "reorganization" can take place.

The Bolsheviks maintained that the Marxian theory, although presupposing the existence of a generally developed capitalism,

or the maturity of productive forces, for ushering in social­

ism, does not emphasize specific conditions for the socialist

revolution which, according to Marx, may be either hastened or

retarded by accidents. Or, at least, whenever and wherever

such revolution takes place, Marx would, as in the case of the 29 Paris Commune, defend it, applaud it, instead of condemning it. r The question of historical development was again revived

27V.I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin, Marxism and Revisionism (New York: International Publishers, 1946) , p. 45.

28See Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (Manchester: National Labor Press, 1919) , pp. 43—56.

29Leon Trotsky, Dictatorship vs. Democracy (New York: Workers' Party, 1922), p. 69. 44 i when the Bolsheviks became heir to the former Czarist colonial regions of Asia. Lenin's solution of the problem was founded on two hypothetical grounds: namely, doctrinesof "uneven de­ velopment" and "combined development." on the former ground, i Leninism asserted that backwardness is a crucial factor of change, and with this theorem it resurrected and buttressed the old Marxian contention that revolution was inevitable. It emphasized the very old Marxian notion that the exploited are the carriers of progressive consciousness. This doctrine suc­ ceeded in linking two broad social movements of our time that had often been thought unthinkable, namely, anti-colonialism or nationalism and Marxist socialism. Nationalism was linked with socialism in that the dialectics of backwardness served as a Marxist explanation and interpretation of the phenomenon of modem nationalism, which was thus fitted into historical materialism for the first time. Hence, in practice, anti­ colonialist movements among backward peoples were assigned a conspicuous role in the revolution. Which was still called

"proletarian", even though it had come to assume a very differ- ent character. 30

30Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 257-259. 45

The second hypothesis was the theory of combined develop­ ment, which, together with the theory of uneven development, constituted the dialectics of backwardness. To Lenin and to most of his followers, the backward nations appeared to be

shaken by a class struggle even more violent than anything taking place in a normal bourgeois society. For in backward societies not only did the proletariat struggle against the bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie itself was still fighting against autocracy,

feudal privilege, or other relics of precapitalist conditions.

According to the theory of combined development, two class

struggles went on at the same time; two revolutions had to be

fought simultaneously.

To express this in more general terms; all backward

societies, Lenin held, combined features characteristic of

different stages of development. Social phenomena, institu­

tions, modes of life, ideologies, classes, technological

features, belonging to different periods of the development

of capitalism in the West, are telescoped into one period in

the backward nations.

According to Leninist theory, such a telescoping of

non-contemporaneous features occurs when a backward society is drawn into the orbit of an advanced civilization. It is this encroachment of capitalism on peasant economies which, to Lenin, explains why both the most m o d e m types of indus­ trial capitalism and the most primitive agricultural methods 31 could exist in Russia — to give only one example.

Furthermore, “combined development” could take place only in those backward societies which have already been af­ fected by imperialism, so that the term "backwardness" -- when used in connection with the theory of imperialism — is restric­ ted to those societies which are already on the margin of Wes­ tern civilization, and excludes those unaffected by it.

Thus, on this ideological ground, Lenin believed that those backward areas which had been drawn into the orbit of

Western capitalism are both part of the West and not part of it, both with the stream of European history and outside of it.

Their revolutions, from the Russian Revolution on, are both

Western and anti-Western, proletarian and colonial. "World imperialism, " said Lenin, “must fall when the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited and oppressed workers within each country . . . unites with the revolutionary onslaught of

Lenin, "Backward Europe and Progressive Asia," Selected Works, Vol. 16 (New York, 1943), pp. 395-396. 47

hundreds of millions of men who up to now have been standing

outside of history, have been considered only as its object."32

Here, Lenin set forth an entirely new theory. The slo­

gans coined by Marx were no longer adequate to the new strate­

gy, and the best-known Marxist slogan, "Proletarians of all

countries, unite," was amended by the Second Congress of the

Communist International, at Lenin*s suggestion, to read "Prole­

tarians of all countries, and oppressed nations, unite.“ Said

Lenin, in proposing this new slogan, "Of course, from the point

of view of the Communist Manifesto, this is wrong. But the

Communist Manifesto was written under completely different condi­

tions; and from the point of view of the present political situ- 33 ation this is correct."

At the same congress, the Oriental Communists went fur­

ther in representing the role of the backward areas in the pro-

letarian revolution. They generally suggested that backward­

ness was not an isolated factor, but a part of the imperialist

system, generally speaking. Thus, on the basis of inseparable

relationship between backward East and advanced West, any

change within the colonial areas necessarily would make a

*^Meyer, op. cit., p. 272. ^^Protocol of the Second Congress of Communist Interna­ tional (Hamburg, 1921), p. 140. 48 profound repercussion in the advanced areas of the West. Along this line, Roy maintained that the success of world communism depended on the triumph of communism in the East. He pointed out (l)that world capitalism was drawing its main resources and most of its income from the colonies, and principally from

Asia; (2) that European capitalists could in an emergency give their entire surplus profit to the workers in order to attract them to their side and to destroy revolutionary tendencies in the colonies. In that case the capitalists would be in a posi­ tion to continue, with the aid of the proletariat, to exploit

Asia. Hence, unless the communist revolution triumphed in the

* 3 A East, the communist movement in the West would be powerless.

To Sultan Galiev and his disciple, Hanafi Muzafar, back­ wardness was an asset rather than liability. Sultan Galiev took up the Marxist idea of the revenge of the oppressed against their oppressors. The colonalized peoples have a better right to the title of the oppressed, than does the proletariat of the

West, for they are doubly oppressed - by their own feudal rulers and bourgeoisie and also by their foreign colonizers. From this postulate Sultan Galiev drew two direct conclusions:

^ I b i d ., p. 141 I J t

49

(1) The colonized peoples are all proletarians, even

if their industrial proletariat is numerically

small*

(2) Their movements for national liberation are so-

cialist in character and therefore progressive- 35

This was expressed by a disciple of Sultan Galiev, Hana-

fi Muzaffar, when he wrote:

The Mohammedan peoples are proletarian peoples, for they are the only people genuinely oppressed. They are more authentically proletarian than are the English or the French proletariat. One may therefore affirm that the national movements in the Mohammedan lands have the character of a true social revolution.3®

In fact, the pronouncements of the Eastern Marxists

were not squarely accepted, either by the Bolshevik authori­

ties, or by the Comintern. In practical terms, the task of

finding a solution fell upon Stalin, who was regarded as the

foremost party theorist in this field. Stalin solved this

complicated problem by stating that it was possible for a feu-

dalistic country to skip the capitalist phase and establish

socialism. But such a process should be carried out with

35a . Bennigsen, Sultan Galiev: The U._S.S ,R. and the Colonial Revolution, The Middle East in Transition (Mew York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 398-399. 50

great caution, and the tactics employed should be elastic.^7

Combining with the basic principle the necessary caution,

Moscow devised the following strategem: An underdeveloped area

that had undergone a revolution would obtain a new political

structure based on the institution of the Soviets and of the

Communist Party's monopoly of power. Economically, however,

such an area, while skipping the capitalist phase, would not

immediately become socialistic. Instead, it would pass through

a transitional period during which stress would be laid on the development of industry of the state, and on the promotion of

cooperatives. The working class would assert its hegemony

from the outset and leap directly from industrial backwardness

into socialism. 38

Cm Nationality Policy

The development of Lenin's nationality policy illustra­ ted still another aspect of Bolshevik tactics. It dramatized his determination to exploit and mobilize every possible source

of minority discontent in order to undermine the power of autoc­

racy, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the

3?Stalin, °E- cit.. p. 195.

Ibid., and also Stalin, Sochineniia. XXI, 55. party itself against the danger of disintegration into its na­ tionality components. The rising tide of nationalism, both among the Russian minorities and foreign-dominated nations, posed a difficult series of questions for the Russian Second

Democratic Labor Party, charged with the aim of organizing the proletariat of the entire Russian empire. As a class party, it cut across national lines; should the party modify its internal structure in order to adjust to the wave of nationalism that threatened to engulf the working-class masses of the Empire? What position should the party take toward the separatist strivings of the borderlands?

To a pragmatist like Lenin, the sole solution was the recognition of the fact and its utilization toward the desired political objectives. To this end, he maintained that national states are universally accepted forms of political organiza­ tion, revolution will take place within their bounds. As he put it, the proletarian revolution, even though it should not be a national revolution, would nevertheless take the form of

OQ a nation-wide revolution, and it would establish, at first.

39v.I. Lenin, "Aggressive Militarism and the Anti-mili­ tarist Tactics of Social Democracy," Selected Works. Vol. 4 (New York; 1935-38), p. 327. 52 40 a social regime within national bounds. Marxist strategy,

Lenin argued, should take all available forces into considera­ tion, including the force of nationalism. When translated into political strategy, therefore, its internationalism was 41 bound to take "national forms.“

Thus, talking into consideration the tactical advantage of such a thesis, the Second Congress of the Russian Social

Democratic Party declared itself in favor of the full right of self-determination for all nations, which - according to Lenin's definition - was tantamount to secession.

To Rosa Luxemburg and the Polish Social Democrats who faced the problem of combating native chauvinism in Poland,

Lenin's slogan seemed equivalent to a surrender to Polish bour­ geois nationalism, and an abandonment of working class unity.

Lenin's reply made it clear that the significance of the slogan of secession was largely tactical:

The right of self-determination (secession) is an ex­ ception from our general policy of centralism. This ex­ ception is absolutely necessary in view of Great Russian arch-reactionary nationalism, and the slightest renunci­ ation of this exception is opportunism— it is a simple- minded playing into the hands of Great Russian arch-re­ actionary nationalism.

40ibid., Vol. 14, p. 41. 41V.I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Rene­ gade Kautsky (New York, 1931), Chapter 7.

42Lenin, Sochineniva. op. cit., p. 90. 53

At the so-called August (1913) Conference of the Central

Committee and Leading Party Workers, the Bolsheviks summed up their nationality tactics in a Five-Point resolution; (1) they demanded a democratic republic with full equality of rights for

all nations and languages, school instruction in the local lang­ uage, and a wide measure of local self-government; (2) they re­ pudiated the Austrian principle of "cultural-national" autonomy

on a country-wide scale; (3) they rejected any division of working-class organization on national lines; (4) they support­

ed the right of all the oppressed nations of the Czarist Empire

to self-determination, which they defined as the right to se­

cede; (5) they pointed out that the right to take such steps

should not be confused with the expediency of such action. Whe­

ther the right should be exercised in any particular case had

to be decided by the party "from the point of view . . . of

the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for so-

cialism.• . • 43

While Points 1 and 4 of this program were designed to provide guidelines for Bolshevik agitation among the oppressed

^Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 31. 54 minorities# and Points 2 and 3 were intended to protect the party against the danger of national disintegration, it was

Point 5 which was to became of crucial significance after the

Bolshevik seizure of power, when the party at last confronted the problem of preserving the Czarist patrimony which it had inherited.

Stalin, in 1913, had, in a sense, anticipated the prob­ lem when he wrote:

The Transcaucasian Tartar as a nation may assemble, let us say in their Diet and, succumbing to the influ­ ence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the older order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-de­ termination they are fully entitled to do so. But will it be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tar­ tar nation? Can Social Democrats remain indifferent when the beys and Mullahs take the lead of the masses in solution of the national problem? Should not Social Democrats inter­ fere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way?44

A few months before the October Revolution, Stalin emphasized the tactical expediency of the theory of national secession.

The question of the rights of nations freely to secede, said

Stalin, must be settled by the party of the proletariat in 45 each particular case independently, according to circumstance.

44Stalin, op. cit., pp. 47-50

4 Ibid.', p. 65. i 55

When we recognize the rights of the oppressed peoples to secede, the rights to determine their political destiny, we do not thereby settle the question of whether particular nations should secede from the Russian state at a given moment. A people has a right to secede, but may or may not because that right, according to circumstances. Thus we are at liberty, said Stalin, to agrtate for or against secession, according to 4 the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution.

By 1918, when the borderlands began to secede under non-Bolshe­ vik auspices, the answer of Stalin was clear:

All this points to the necessity of interpreting the principles of self-determination as a right not of bour­ geoisie, but of the working masses of the given nation. The principle of self-determination must be an instru­ ment in the struggle for socialism and must be subordi­ nated to the principle of s o c i a l i s m . ^ 7

In other words, the proletariat of the borderlands had to be assisted in exercising their right of self-determination, against the bourgeoisie; self-determination was a right to unite, as veil as to secede, and the supreme test was the inter­ est of the toiling masses as interpreted by the Communist Party.

46 *

47Stalin, Sochineniia. XV, op. pit., pp. 31-32. 56

In the application of the theory of self-determination to the countries outside the Russian Qnpire, Bolsheviks rela­ tively adopted a different approach toward the problem. In general, they supported whole-heartedly any attempt toward national independence, colonial emancipation and rebellious movements as a part of their design towards the expected world revolution. In their diplomatic intercourse, Bolsheviks used this approach as a counter-offensive measure against the offen­ sive operations of the Entente Powers.

In his Declaration of Peace, promulgated on Hoveniber 8,

1917, Lenin expressed his desire for an immediate peace with­ out the seizure of foreign territory and the forcible annexa­ tion of foreign nationalities. Be also asked of the warring

Powers the immediate recognition of the right of self-determi­ nation of peoples, regardless of how developed or backward 48 they might be. Furthermore, he stated;

If a nation, contrary to its expressed desire— 'whe­ ther such desire is made manifest in the press, national assemblies, party relations, or in protests and uprising against national oppression— is not given the right to determine the form of its state life by free voting and completely free from the presence of troops of the

James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolu­ tion (California: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 59. 57

annexing or stronger state and without the least pres­ sure, then the adjoining of the nation by the stronger state is annexation, seizure by force and violence.

At Brest-Lit ovsk, also, the Bolshevik leaders employed the principle of self-determination as a tactic for stirring up the nationalist movements among the different nationalities under the domination of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Em­ pires, and also the oppressed and colonial nations under the yoke of the Entente Powers.

In their six tenets, which were presented by Joff, the

Bolshevik leaders insisted that ‘'nationalities not hitherto enjoyed political independence be allowed the right to decide by means of referendum whether they elected to be united to other nations or to acquire independence. The referendum to 50 be so arranged as to ensure complete freedom for voting."

They also insisted that "the colonial question be settled in confrmity with the self-determination principles."51

It was the great effect of this doctrine, which, in

a ^Andrew Rothstein, Peaceful Co-existence (New Yorks Harraondsworth, Middlesex, 1955), p. 5.

50John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk. the Forgotten Peace (Londons Macmillan & Co., 1956), p. 117.

51lbid., p. 118. 58 part, prompted President Wilson to promulgate his famous

Fourteen Points, in an attempt to counteract the Russian 52 revolutionary overture. hater, by clever analysis of

Wilson's war aims and of similar proposals made in liberal and moderate socialist circles within the countries partici­ pating in World War X, Lenin tried to show that the bourgeoisie would never be able or willing to comply with its own ideals of national self-determination. Radical execution of these ideas would contribute to the downfall of world capitalism; hence the national aspirations of, say, the Chinese people (directed against world imperialism), but also of the Poles (directed against Germany, Austria and Russia), and even of the Jews

(directed against the very principle of exploitation and op­ pression) were all seen as revolts against the existing social system, hence as revolutionary forces deserving support of the proletariat.

Thus, the Bolshevik overture of the right of self-deter­ mination of peoples was well received by the dominated nations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and also by the oppressed peoples of the East. This fact, plus the inclusion of Article

VII of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, which stated: "In view of

52lbid., P- 1 5 9 the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties obligate themselves to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial integrity of these States” (which, at the same time, was an official and legal abrogation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907][, was heralded in Persia as ushering in a new era of friendship between the two countries. Furthermore, the Persian nationalists hoped to release their country from the influence of the British with the help and backing of the Russians, or at least to play off Russia against Great Britain. And the

Soviet, in turn, were hopeful to stir up anti-British movement in Persia as a further step toward the execution of their revo­ lutionary strategy in Persia. Ill

SOVIET REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY IN PERSIA

Bolshevik efforts to promote revolution and unrest in

Persia began almost from the moment the Bolsheviks had seized power.

In an appeal to the Moslems of the East, December 7,

1917, Lenin and Stalin heralded the era of international revo­ lution and asked Persians, Turks and Arabs to rise up against the yoke of imperialism and throw off the shades of colonial­ ism:

. . . Moslems of the East, Persians, Turks, Arabs, and Hindus, all those for whose lives and property, liberty and land, the greedy robbers of Europe have bartered for centuries— all those whose countries the plunderers who started the war wish to divide! Throw off these ravishers and enslavers of your country. Now that all the world is aslame with wrath­ ful indignation against the imperialist plunderers, when every spark of revolt kindles into a mighty flame of revolution, when even the Indian Moslems, worn out and suffering under the foreign yoke, are starting a rebellion against their oppressors— now it is impos­ sible to be silent. Do not waste any time in throwing from your shoulders the age-long enslavers of your land. Do not permit them longer to rob you of your native homes.

^-Degras, op. cit., p 61

At the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in

Baku in Septeihber 1920, under the auspices of the Communist

International, Russia put forward the slogan of "liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples from the imperial­ ist yoke."

"Brothers, we summon you to a holy war," said Zinoviev,

“first of all against British Imperialism. We should create a Red Army in the East, to arm and organize uprising in the rear of the British, to poison the existence of every impudent

British officer who lords it over Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, 2 Mesopotamia, India and China."

On the third day of the Congress, Bela Kun stated:

"Peoples of the East, comrades, rise, revolt, and overthrow first the yoke of your native oppressors and exploiters, and 3 then break the shackles and bonds of the Western imperialists.

In fact, in the two years just after the October Revo­ lution, Soviet revolutionary strategy in Persia, by virtue of geographical separation (creation of the independent republics in the Caucasus) deep involvement in internal civil wars, was necessarily confined to a series of anti-imperialist propaganda.

^Stenographic record of the First Congress of the Peoples of the East.

. 3Ibid. 62

From a psychological point of view, these revolutionary pro­ nouncements, either on official or non-official levels, serv­ ed two purposes at once. On the one hand, they encouraged the

Persian nationalists in their anti-British movements. On the other hand, they pushed aside the strong sense of Russophobia which had rankled in the hearts of the Persians for many years.

In the following year, as the result of sudden change in the area of international politics, Soviet revolutionary strategy in Persia adopted a new rationale, more favorable to the Soviet bargaining position in world politics. Defeat of the White forces and reoccupation of Baku brought communism down to the

Persian borders and made it possible for the Soviet to give actual support to the revolutionary movements in Persia.

The year 1919, though it did little to enhance Soviet military power, saw a great forward movement in Soviet eastern policy. Xn the first place, the international balance of power had been completely changed by the downfall of the Central

Powers. The Soviet had no longer anything to fear from Germany or Turkey; on the other hand, the victorious Allies - and es­ pecially Britain - showed a disposition to divert a part of the vast resources released by the armistice to the waging of a campaign against Bolshevism. Apart from supplies furnished to 63

''White" Russian armies, British contingents in the Caucasus

and Central Asia made, in the first months of 1919, several

moves openly directed against the Soviet forces. Through

this British action, Persia and Afghanistan became in 1919

the theater of an all-but-declared war between Great Britain 4 and the Soviet.

In fact, Britain was chiefly worried about the rapid

spread and influence of Bolshevik revolutionary propaganda

in its colonies and sphere of influence where, it was feared,

such propaganda might create dissatisfaction, primarily in

India and among the nations of the Middle Bast. Especially

did Lord Curzon, whose political thinking was deeply rooted

in his Indian policy, strive to keep Persia and Afghanistan

free of any trace of Soviet influence, lest from those two

countries bordering on the Soviet Union a spark of communism 5 might ignite areas vital to British imperial interests.

Here, Persia was more vulnerable to the Bolshevik revo­

lutionary design and propaganda than any other countries in

the area. A century of hatred of Britain was fuel enough to

light such a fire, as the events of the last two years could

4Carr, op. cit.. p. 230.

^Moshe Leshem, "Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East," Middle East Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January, 1953), p. 2. I 66 provided ammunition for the opponents of the League in the

United States Senate, but also gave the Wilson administration 7 a basis for opposition to the treaty*

Le Temps (Paris) had denounced the agreement for giving

Britain exclusive power in Persia* Transmitting the indigna­ tion in the French capital, William McDonald, Paris correspon­ dent of The Nation, wrote: "The lesson of British aggression in Persia should be pondered in the United States. If there remain in America any shred of respect for the League of Na­ tions . . . the British agreement with Persia should be suffic- 9 ient to destroy it." In short, Curzon's political design not only could not wipe out the Bolshevik revolutionary program in Persia, but it also provided a sledge-hammer in Soviet hands for attac­ king British imperialistic policy in Persia. Reinforced fur­ ther by the increasing conflict between the Entente Powers and their controversy over the character of the treaty, the Bolshe­ viks took active measures in inciting an anti-British uprising.

7New York Times. August 19, 1919, p. 1.

®Le Temps (Paris), August 10, 1919, p. 1.

^Nation. September 13, 1919, pp. 1-3* also Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883-1921 (Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1956), p. 171. 67

The Soviet further retaliated the British action by a

note to the Persian Government on June 26, 1919, recapitulating

all the concessions which it, by way of contrast with imperi­

alist Britain, had made: the cancellation of Tsarist debts,

the renunciation of Tsarist concessions in Persia, the abandon­

ment of consular jurisdiction and the handing over to the

Persian Government of former Russian public property in Russia

and of the assets of the Russian Discount Bank."^ The signa­

ture of the Anglo-Persian Treaty on August 9, 1919 was follow­

ed three weeks later by a public declaration from Chicherin to

the workers and peasants of Persia, in which he reviewed the

different attitudes of the Soviet and British Governments over

the past two years toward Persian independence and Persian

rights and commented on the notorious treaty in the following

words:

At this moment, when the triumphant victor, the Bri­ tish vulture, tries to throw a net over the necks of the Persian peoples in order to enslave them completely, the Russian Workers * and Peasants1 Government solemnly declares that it does not recognize the Anglo-Persian Treaty which would make this enslavement possible. The toiling masses of Russia see in the toiling masses of Persia their own brothers and friends, as well as their comrades in the revolutionary struggle for the complete liberation of the toilers. The Russian Workers' and Peasants * Government treats as a slip of paper and con­ siders absolutely~illegal the shameful Anglo-Persian

*°Fischer, op. pit., p. 289. i 68

Treaty with which the (Persian) rulers have sold them­ selves and you to the British robbers,

Then, after singling out the character of the concessions and

the nature of Soviet generosity, the note ended with a passage which contained both notice of the approach of the Red A m y

and a promise of liberation:

The time of your liberation is near. . . . The time is near when the capitalist vultures will fall in all countries under the blows of their own arisen toilers. The powerful revolutionary movement of the Russian toiling masses, who have broken the chains imposed upon them by their own oppressors and exploiters, serves as the most powerful example for the toiling masses of other countries to follow* . . . Very soon our valiant revolutionary Red Army will be crossing Red Turkestan and will be approaching the boundaries of oppressed Persia. The Russian working masses extend to you, the oppress­ ed masses of Persia, their brotherly hands. The hour is near when we shall be able to carry out our task in the joint struggle with you against the oppressors, great and small, who have caused your endless suffering.

Following this note, the Bolsheviks set up in Persia an elaborate apparatus of propaganda to fan the nationalist fires.

Both communist and non-communist newspapers held a united front against the British imperialists— even the conservative papers

supported the Soviet anti-imperialist propaganda and published

Hxenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and East. 1920-1927 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 175.

12 Ibid.; also Degras, I, 161-64. Moscow news* The Bolsheviks took further steps toward materi­ alization of their revolutionary ambition by giving military and financial support to the anti-British Jangali movement in

Gilan, and consequent military occupation of the northern

Persian province of Gilan. Then, after the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, attempts were made towards crea­ tion of similar republics in Azerbaijan, Mazandaran and Khorasan.

Soviet military engagement in northern Persia was made possible by the collapse of free Azerbaijan, and the rout of the counter-revolutionary armies of General Denikin in southern

Russia. Beaten in the spring of 1920, the remnants of Denikin's forces fell back into Azerbaijan, and some ships of his flotilla anchored at Baku. The Red Army, pursuing the Whites, invaded

Azerbaijan in April and put an end to the independence of the

Republic. The remaining White forces embarked on ships at Baku and escaped to the Persian port of Enzeli, where they encamped under British protection. The Red flotilla on May 18 opened fire on British and White Russian vessels in the port and bom- 14 barded British land installations. Following this incident,

^Fatemi, op. cit., p. 170.

^George Lanczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918— 1948, A Study in Biq-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni versity Press, 1949), p. • 70

Soviet forces under Raskolnikov landed at Enzeli and took measures in reinforcing and extending the Jangali movement under Mirza Kuchek Khan.

The anti-British revolutionary movements led by Kuchek

Khan in Gilan and by Mohammad Khiabani in Persian Azerbaijan received considerable attention in the Soviet capital and were the subject of much comment. In the summer of 1919, the

Soviet public was told for the first time of the existence of the "Forest Brethren" (Jangali), a revolutionary anti-British movement in the Gilan province of northern Persia, headed by a group of men who had been in revolt against Teheran for several 16 years. Its chances of success were considered to be excel­ lent, despite the vagueness of its social program and its strong Islamic undertones• In Moscow, Kuchek Khan was said to 17 represent the middle class and "reformist clergy."

Eventually, contact was established through secret emis­ saries. In March, 1920, the Jangalis received a letter from a

Bolshevik commander in the Caucasus, informing them that the

i5For details see E.V., "Na Kaspii i v Persii (Beseda s tov. Raskolnikovym) ," Petroqradskaia Pravda. Mo. 155, July 15, 1920, p. 1.

1 ^Laqueur, op. cit., p. 29. 17For full detail of the Jangali*s anti-British opera­ tions see Major-General L.C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (Londons E. Arnold, 1920, pp. 190-210. 71

Bolsheviks would soon capture Baku. The letter was followed by the despatch of a special emissary. "In the night of May

17," wrote Ehsanullah, head of the Persian Revolutionary Coun­

cil, “a Russian comrade came to the forest and revealed that

in a few days the Bolsheviks would come to Enzeli." Thus, when, on May 18, the Russian troqpp landed at Enzeli, Kuchek

Khan met Raskolnikov. In this negotiation, a full agreement was reached between Kuchek Khan and Raskolnikov. A month

later, on June 5, when the Russian forces occupied Resht, the

capital of Gilan, the "Soviet Republic of Gilan" was immediate­

ly proclaimed. According to Raskolnikov, "The revolutionary government formed by Kuchek Khan was greeted with enthusiasm

not only by the poor, but also by the landowners and even by 18 some of the khans who had suffered under the British yoke."

Kuchek Khan immediately dispatched a telegram to Lenin

in which he expressed his faith in Soviet-Persian friendship

and the ideal of a Third International:

To Comrade Lenin, R.S.F.S.R.

We greet you and all your comrades at the time of your brilliant success achieved against the enemies

18Petrogradskaia Pravda, No. 155, July 15, 1920, p. 1. 72

of socialism. We, Persian revolutionaries, have for a long time cherished the same hope, fighting against the evil and the hated English and Persian oppressors. Now is fulfilled the long expected and happy act of the formation of the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic, which we proclaim before all the world. We consider it to be our duty to draw your attention to the fact that there are a number of criminals on Persian territory: Persian oppressors, English traders, and diplomats supported by English troops .As long as these enemies of the Persian people are in Persia, they will prove to be an obstacle to the introduction of our just system all over the country. In the name of humanity and the equality of all nations the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic asks you and all the socialists belonging to the Third International for help in liberating us and all weak and oppressed nations from the yoke of Persian and English oppressors. Bearing in mind the establish­ ment of brotherly union and full unanimity between us, we expect from the free Russian nation the assistance that may prove indispensable for the stabilization of the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic. Mindful that all nations liberated from the yoke of capitalism should be united into one brotherly union, we request you to in­ clude in this union the hearts of the Persian nation, liberated from a century-long, so that our holy revolu­ tion may be fulfilled till the end. We have a firm faith that all the world will be governed by one idedal system of the Third International. Representative of the Persian Socialist Soviet Repub­ lic proclaimed in the city of Resht: Mirza Kuchik.

Meanwhile, an exchange of messages took place between the Persian Revolutionary Council (headed by Ehsanullah Khan) and Trotsky, the latter stating in his message:

1 9 r. Abikh, "Natsionalnoe i revoliutsionnoe dxizhenie v Persii v 1919-1920 (Vospominaniia uchastnika dvizheniia Ekhsan Ully-Khana) , " Novyi Vostok (Moscow) , No. 29, 1930, pp. 106—7. 73

The news of the formation of the Persian Red Army has filled our hearts with job. During the last de­ cade and a half the toiling people of Persia have been struggling hard for their freedom. Xn the name of the workers' Red Array of Russia X express ray firm conviction that, under the guidance of your Revolu­ tionary War Council, Persia will conquer for itself the right to freedom, independence, and fraternal toil. Long live the free toiling people of Persia in the famil^of free nations of Asia and the whole world I • * •

The Gilan Republic had among its leaders a few veteran

Communists of Azerbaijan, such as Ja'afar Pishevari (Sultan- zadeh), and the old Tabriz revolutionary, Heidar Khan Orauoghli, who presided over the Iranian Communist delegation in the Con- 21 gress of the People of the East at Baku. Furthermore, several

Russians acted as advisers or as outright executives. Among them were Jacob Blumkin, famous for his assassination of the

German Ambassador in Moscow, and Commissar Abrahamov, who in­ stalled himself at Resht, ousted the Iranian Governor of the 22 city, and issued inflammatory proclamations to the populace.

Most of the Soviet newspapers welcomed the establishment of the revolutionary government of Gilan. Izyestia, in an

^Izvestiia (Moscow), No. 129, June 16, 1920, p. 1. 2^-See Ahmad Kasrawi, Tarikh-e- Hiidahsaleh-e- Azerbaijan (The eighteen years history of Azerbaijan)(Teheran: Institute of Amir-Kabir Press, 1954), p. 783. ^Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived (New York, 1945) , p. 110. 74 article written by A- Voznesensky, the head of the Eastern

Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, analyzed:

We do not conceal the fact that the composition of the new Government is far from Communistic ideas. At the present moment it unites those who have risen Tinder the slogans of "down with England" and "down with the Teheran Government which has sold itself to England." The cabinet consists of the democratic, petty bourgeois elements of northern Persia. 2 2

The Moscow wireless on June 10, commenting on the events in

Gilan, stated that the Persian revolution had been warmly greeted by the local population; that the British were hurried­ ly retreating to Baghdad; that they had abandoned Resht without fighting because the Indian troops were opposed to fighting against the revolutionaries; and that a considerable part of the Indian troops and a division of Persian Cossacks were al­ leged to have gone over to Kuchik Khan, who had advised Lenin to this effect.^

M. L. Veltman (M. Pavlovidh) , commenting on the reper­ cussion of the Gilan republic in the general design of Soviet

Eastern policy maintained:

It goes without saying that our active policy in the struggle against Britain's attempts to strangfe the

23Izvestiia (Moscow), No. 124, June 10, 1920, p. 1.

2^Moscow Wireless (Moscow), June 10, 1920, p. 1. 75

Soviet government could not be limited to such succes­ ses as the British evacuation of Enzeli or Resht. We could not possibly permit the routing of Kemal's Turkey, nor could we allow Britain to turn Dashnak Armenia and Menshevik Georgia into instruments for the realization of her imperialistic plans in the Cau- cases.2® Furthermore, Soviet military operations on the shores of the Caspian Sea have threatened Britain with the loss of the Persian cotton market and have under mined her position not only in Teheran but also in south­ ern Persia. Events in Bukhara have increased our influ­ ence in Afghanistan and could cause serious reverbera­ tions in India, where the situation has become increas­ ingly ominous for British interests.2®

Concomitant with the establishment of the revolutionary regime in Gilan, the Third International (Comintern) took deci­ sive measures in trimming off and stamping out the process of revolution in Persia, and giving a correct form acceptable to

Persian life and Persian psychology. Thus, it moved the embry­ onic Persian Communist Organization from Baku to Enzeli in 27 order to give more Persian character to the Party. The

2 5m.L. Veltman (M. Pavlovich) , Sovetskaia Rossiia .i kaoitalisticheskaia Angliia . . . 2d ed. (Moscow, 1925), pp. 3-5, 20-22.

2 6 Ibid.. pp. 25-26. 27 The Persian Communist Party (Adalet) was first organiz­ ed by Narimanov, Kafar—Zadeh and Heidar Khan Amo-Ugli in Baku immediately following the October Revolution and quickly spread throughout Turkestan, the Caucasus and into Persia. Upon the initiative of Turkestan Regional Committee, the first Adalet Party Congress summoned at Enzeli on July 23, 1920, at which time its name was changed to that of the Communist Party of Persia. 76

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Persia was reorgan­

ized under the leadership of a Persian member of the Baku Pre­

sidium, Heidar Khan Amo-Ugli, a veteran revolutionary who had

spent many years in the Baku oil fields and \riio became one of

the founders of the Communist Party of Persia. 28

In general, the Comintern favored a moderate approach

in the revolutionary operations of the Persian Communist Party

and the Gilan Republic. Prom the Comintern's viewpoint, the

revolutionary regime of Gilan had to be used as a means toward

indoctrination of the Persian masses and preparation of the so­

cial grounds for the future social revolution. Harping on this

theme, Zhizn Natsionalnostei (The Life of the Nationalities) wrote:

The significance of Kuchik Khan's activities lies not in his armed strength and his fight against the British, but rather in the point of a possible contact with him for the purpose of successful revolutionary propaganda in Persia. Kuchik Khan is important as a socialist agi­ tator not so much because he is a leader of a guerrilla war, but because he is a bearer of social slogans. His

2®Heidar Khan Amo-Ugli was originally a Caucasian Social Democrat who led the terrorists in Persia during the Persian Constitutional Revolution and is considered responsible for some of the major assassinations and assassination attempts in this period. Known for his intelligence and courage, he became a chief organizer of the Democratic Party during the Second Maj­ lis, and helped give the party its excellent organization and strength in the provinces. After sane years in Europe he join­ ed the Jangali Movement. He was killed in 1921 by opponents in this movement. 77

work, which is so closely connected with communism, although it is interpreted by the Persians in a different sense, represents a seed which, once it is carefully and skillfully cultivated, will produce a good harvest of revolutionary preparedness among the Persian masses. • . . 2 9

Unlike the Comintern's moderate approach, most of the

Persian communists favored an extreme revolutionary program in Gilan and insisted on sovietization of Persia as a whole.

This attitude well manifested at the Congress of the Persian

Communist Party held in Enzeli, on July 23, 1920. Here Persian delegates bitterly attacked British imperialistic policy in

Persia and denounced the traitorous government of Vossuq-ed-

Dowleh. And extreme factions, such as Ehsanullah Khan and

Haidar Khan, insisted on immediate distribution of lands among peasants and execution of other revolutionary measures. Others advocated a moderate policy in the line of the Comintern's de­ sign. Within this framework, Sultanzadeh proposed that the

Persian revolution should be modeled after the 1905 Revolution

rather than after the Bolshevik Pattern. Persia, he felt, was not yet ripe for the Soviet structure.^ Besides, some of the

2 9 Ips., "Zadachi i usloviia propagandy v Persii," Zhizn Natsionalnostei (Moscow) , No. 19, May 25, 1919, p. 2.

^^Communist Resht (Resht), September 29, 1920. 78

Communists from Baku, including Ordzhonikidze, were not in favor of pushing for agrarian revolution in Gilan in view of the general backwardness of the peasants,

A few weeks later at the Congress of the People of the

East, held in Baku in September 1920, the Persian delegates once more insisted on immediate application of the revolution­ ary program in Persia. Elaborating on this point, Heidar Khan

Amu-Oqli, head of the Persian delegates at the Congress, main­ tained:

Let us harbor no illusion. We must not deceive our­ selves. To wait for the collapse of the corrupt govern­ ments and imperialist powers is simply to betray the international Revolution. Our comrades in Russia must not wait, but must immediately give us support-**guns, rifles, ammunition. We will be able to take care o ^ both our own government and British invaders. . . .

At the Congress the extreme policyof the Persian left was bitterly criticized by the Comintern and was termed trai- 32 torous to the cause of the International. As will be seen later, this radical attitude of the Persian Communists came into conflict with those of nationalist elements within the

Republic, a schism that led eventually to the arrest and execu­ tion of Heidar Khan by Kuchik Khan.

31Spector, op. cit., p. 90.

3 2 A. Sultan-Zadeh, Persiia (I?ersia) (Moscow, 1925}, p. 86. 79

Simultaneously, at the Second Congress of the Communist

International, which was held in Moscow in July 26, 1920, the procedure of revolution in Persia was taken up along with the questions of national and colonial movements in the colonial and serai-colonial countries. Here, according to Sultan-Zadeh, the Persian representative at the Congress, some of the Commu­ nists, including Ordzhonikidze, opposed the application of a revolutionary agrarian program as being incompatible with the backward nature of Persian society.

Comrade Lenin listened attentively to the arguments but remarked that in backward countries like Persia, where the greater part of the land is concentrated in the hands of the landowners, the slogans of the agrari­ an revolution have a practical significance for the peasant millions.32

In the discussions which followed, Lenin was supported by Bukharin, Zinoviev, and others, and Sultan-Zadeh and Pavlo­ vich were asked to outline the theses that could be applied to

Persian conditions. Sultan-Zadeh concluded his account of what happened at the Second Congress of the Comintern insofar as the communist tactics in Persia were concerned with the following

remark:

32A . Sultan-Zadeh, Persiia (Persia)(Moscow, 1925), p. 8 6 .

33lbid., p. 87. 80

I immediately communicated to Persia, to the Cen­ tral Committee of the Iranian Communist Party, the opinions of our experienced comrades and also the decision of the Congress (i.e., the "theses on the National and Colonial questions" of the Second Con­ gress)^ But to our great regret, events developed soon after with such rapidity that the Persian revo­ lution, not being able to withstand the pressure by 3 3 the British and the Shah's trooops, suffered a defeat.

As liberators, along with their efforts to create the

Soviet Republic of Gilan, Soviet Russia made attempts to engi­

neer a replica of that regime in the province of Azerbaijan, where as in Gilan, Russia tried to exploit nationalist ele­ ments as an initial means for achieving her aim.

Early in 1920, a revolt, organized by Mohammed Khia- 34 bani, against the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 and the pro-

3 3 Ibid., p. 87.

O A Khiabani, formerly a deputy to the Majlis, had emigra­ ted to the Caucasus. In 1914, he returned to Tabriz, and start­ ed underground activity with the aim of liberating Iran from foreign influence. Various radical elements rallied around him. His work was interrupted by the Turkish invasion of Azer­ baijan during the war, which resulted in his temporary arrest and confinement in Kars. Released, he fc«turned to Tabriz and, after the end of war, gathered 800 armed partisans ready to strike.. His political organization was called the National Democratic Party. When in 1919 he opposed the Anglo-Persian Agreement, his forces, with the cooperation and assistance of Iranian gendarmerie, disarmed Government troops, he then jailed most of the officers except those who came to his side. Thus, struggling against the "reactionary" central government of Vossughe Dowleh, Khiabani and his National Democrats were, in fact, fight­ ing against the British influence in Iran. 8 1

British government of Teheran broke out in Tabriz, the capi­ tal of Iranian Azerbaijan.

As a result of Khiabani's victory., the province of

Azerbaijan was separated from the rest of Iran and assumed 35 the name of "Azadistan” (Land of Freedom). To Soviet

Russia, these developments were of great importance and inter­ est, especially since Soviet troops had simultaneously landed at Enzeli to join hands with Kuchik Khan. In order to capital­ ize on the situation, the Bolshevik forces operating in Gilan turned toward the town of Zanjan, ready to invade Iranian

Azerbaijan. At the moment, however, to the disappointment of

Soviet leaders, the Azerbaijan separatists did not prove co­

operative, and the National Democrats in Tabriz, instead of

joining hands with the Bolsheviks, declared that they disapprov­

ed the Soviet landing in Enzeli and, in a sudden upsurge of

^According to Ahmade Kasravi, Eighteen Years of Azerbai­ janian History, page 877, the adoption of the name of Azadistan for the province of Azerbaijan was for two reasons: (1) on the ground of the pioneering role which Azerbaijan had played in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-9? (2) since the Bak Mossawatists had chosen the name of Azerbaijan for their newly independent republic (Independent Republic of Azerbaijan) and desired a unity with the Iranian Azerbaijan, Khiabani adopted the new name in order to express his opposition to the Mossa- watist design. 82 patriotism, denounced the pact that had been concluded be- 36 tween the Russians and Kuchik Khan.

In a communique, Khiabani made it quite clear that, should the Bolsheviks decide to annex Iranian provinces,

Azerbaijan would declare war against them and would fight to 37 the last man. Azerbaijan would continue as an autonomous state within the constitution of Iran. Azerbaijan would con­ quer under the banner of social revolution and would lead 38 all other provinces of Iran.

At this time, the revolutionary government of Gilan made an attempt to extend its influence to the province of

Mazendaran as well* It established contact with the national­ ist leader of Mazendaran, Amir-Mouyed Savadkoohi, and asked his cooperation. Along with Kuchik*s efforts, the Russian comman­ der took steps to create a duplicate of the "Soviet Republic of

^Tajaddod (Tabriz) , July 23, 1920.

Toward the end of July a dramatic episode brought the Soviet troops into Iranian Azerbaijan; the remnant of the First Tartar Regiment of the Free Republic of Azerbaijan cross­ ed the border of Iranian Azerbaijan to find refuge from the Bolsheviks. Its commander. Colonel Safiev, became the guest of the Kurdish Khan of Maku. The Soviet troops, pursuing the Tar­ tars, crossed the Iranian border and entered into Iranian Azer­ baijan, an intrusion that brought anxiety in Teheran, where the Iranian Government protested this Soviet act of aggression. Eventually, after a series of exchanges of notes, the Russians evacuated Iranian Azerbaijan. ^Taioddod (Tabriz), July 23, 1920. . 83

Gilan" in Mazendaran. To this end he went into negotiation with Amir-Mouyed, and invited him to form a Soviet regime at

Mazendaran. But both Russian and Gilanian overtures were re­ jected by Amir-Mouyed; whose men attacked the Russian garrison at Babul. Eventually, open hostilities broke out between 39 Russian occupation forces and his troops.

Ismael Savadkoohi, Amir-Mouyed was a well-known na­ tionalist leader of Mazendaran. He was a well-educated Irani­ an patriot who fought for his country's independence against the Anglo-Russian influences. After a long-time military ca­ reer, he was elected from Mazendaran to the Second Majlis. In 1909, for a valuable service he did for the safety and preser­ vation of the constitutionalist troops, when they were subject to destruction in northern Persia, he was endowed with an honorific title of "Amir-Mouyed" (his recognized greatness) by the Iranian Majlis. In 1918, he was approached by an Austro- German mission under Baron Admont Comnpt (Kompt or Hompt) for a joint military expedition toward Afghanistan and India. Eventually an agreement reached between Amir-Mouyed and the Austro-German mission in the city of Sarri, the capital of Ma­ zendaran. According to this agreement, the Austro-German Powers agreed to provide an army of about 160,000 strong men out of their war-prisoners in Russia with full military equip­ ment. In contrast, Amir-Mouyed undertook to recruit a native force with the same number, which was to be armed by the Austro-German Powers. Then, it was supposed that the joint military force, under the leadership of Amir-Mouyed, after clearing Persia from the British occupational forces, was to invade India via Afghanistan. But the Austro-German mission in their way back to Russia were captured by the British gun­ boats in the. Caspian Sea. A few months later, the defeat of the Central Powers brought to an end any adventurous attack on India. In 1919, Amir-Mouyed opposed the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, and rebelled against the government of Vosoughe-Dowleh. At the same time, Raskalnikov, Soviet military commander, ap­ proached him for the creation of the Soviet Republic of 84

As will be seen later, with the inarch of events the symptoms of conflict appeared in the body of the revolu­ tionary regime. Owing to differences between the leftist radicals and moderate nationalists, a schism led eventually, in October, 1921, to the arrest and execution of Heidar Khan.

Thereupon, the Bolshevists, after quarreling with Kuchik Khan, and being defeated by his men, burned down a part of Resht.

They left the city and camped outside Enzeli, then proclaimed a general mobilization and unsuccessfully endeavored to con­ script all peasants between the ages of eighteen and forty- five.4 0

A. Institution of Eastern Revolution

Along with their revolutionary attempts, both Soviet

Russia and the Communist International took intensive measures toward creation of a series of institutions for training and coaching the actions of the Eastern revolutionaries*

^Mazendaran, but he rejected the Soviet overture. In 1920, he rejected similar proposals by the British agents who put forward a plan for the capture of Teheran through an ap­ parent military coup d'etat. He opposed the regime of Reza Khan. After a year of military fighting truce was concluded between them. But he was treated treacherously by Reza Khan, died in 1932 in Teheran.

40Fatemi, op. cit.. p. 239. The Soviet state, under the auspices of Stalin, Commis­

sar for Nationalities, created a "Communist University of the

Toilers of the East." A group of young Iranians from the northern! provinces were among the first students to be admitted 41 to this institution and trained as Communist propagandists.

The university opened branches in Russian Asia, notably in

Irkutsk and in Baku. The most important was the branch in

Tashkent, where the Soviet Turkestan Commission (Turkkommissia) 42 and Pan-Hindu Revolutionary Committee were also located.

^Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 127.

42The Soviet Union inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia a valuable legacy of Oriental scholarship conducted on traditional lines and concentrating mainly on ancient history, archaeology, classical literature, and philosophy. Russia's contacts with Persia, Turkey, and the Muhammedan world had stimulated an interest in Persian, Turkish, Arabic, and Is­ lamic studies. Her colonization of Central Asia and expan­ sion eastwards had promoted the study of Turkic language and Chinese and gave great scope to archaeologists. The principal centers of Oriental study before the Revolution of 1917 were: the Russian Archaeological Society, which was active in St. Petersburg and Moscow; The Department of History and Philoso­ phy in the Russian Academy of Science in St. Petersburg; the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg and the Lazarev Institute in Moscow. Two scholars of international reputation were asso­ ciated with the Russian Archaeological Society, V.R. Rosen (1849-1908), head of the Society's Eastern Department in St. Petersburg, and F.E. Korsh (1843—1915), president of the Socie­ ty's Eastern Commission in Moscow and professor of Persian in Lazarev Institute. The majority of Russian Orientalists who made their work after the Revolution of 1917 were taught by these two. Rosen's pupils included V.V. Bartold (1869-1930), 86

Apart from the university and its branches, numerous schools of oriental language were established, either autono­ mous or attached to other institutions of higher learning* In

1922, Novy Post published an impressive list of these schools, of which the most important were the "Institution of Oriental

Language of Moscow, "The Oriental Section of the Military Col­ lege in Moscow," the "Institute of the Classical Orient" at the

Moscow Museum, the "Institute of Living Oriental Languages" at 43 Tashkent. The U.S.S.R. "Scientific Association of Orienta­ lists, " which was a section of the Commissariat of Nationali­ ties, established branches in Teheran, Baku, Tiflis, and Irkutsk.

^ w h o was famed for his work on Islamic history and cul­ ture and on Turkestan, and I. Yu. Krachkovsky (1883-1951), who was to have immense influence on the coming generation of the Arabic scholars in the Soviet Union, mainly owing to his uni­ versal knowledge of m o d e m Arabic literature. The change-over from pre-revolutionary Oriental scholar­ ship to the present form of Oriental studies was part of a general process of Communization of academic studies. The Com­ munist Party first conducted its own studies of Eastern coun­ tries independently of so-called bourgeois scholars, who were not interfered with. It then assumed control of Oriental stu­ dies and began a systematic overhaul of them, starting with Is­ lamic studies, history, economics. Finally, Marxism-Leninism was introduced into other disciplines and enforced with great strictness. Soviet writings of the kind contained in this anal­ ysis follow a general pattern which changes with the gradual Communization of Oriental studies? much of their interest lies in the change of pattern and the causes underlying it.

^George Agabekov, The Russian Secret Terror (New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1931), p. 171. 87 The Teheran office was the first branch established on foreign soil, and the president of that branch, Tardov, was appointed Soviet Consul General at Isfahan. Raskolnikov, a member of the board of directors of the Association of Orien­ talists, was the first Soviet Minister to Afghanistan. Gri­ gori Isakovich Broido, another deputy commissar, headed the

Tashkent Soviet in 1917 and later became rector of the new

Communist University of the Toilers of the Bast. Nariman

Narimanov, a physician from Baku, held high offices in both

Stalin*s and Chicherin's Commissariats. Sultan Galiev, a

Tartar teacher from Kazan, was another of Stalin's chief 44 lieutenants.

The Russian Communists faced a difficult dilemma in their research for leading cadres in the East, and (as Stalin wrote) they had to put their trust in the few radicals avail- 45 able, despite their pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic background.

There were also native personalities in the Communist movement, such as Mustafa Subhi, one of the founders of the

Socialist Party in Turkey and a key figure in the attempts

44Ibid. 45_r ^JosefJosef Stalin,______Marxism and the National and_____ Colonial Question (London: Martin Lawrence Limited, 1936), p. 174 88

to organize Moslem Soviets and to direct Communist activities

in the Near East; Haidar Khan Amu-Ogli, a prominent Iranian

revolutionary who had been active in the Tabriz uprising ten

years earlier and who was involved in the ill-starred "Gilan

Republic"; and finally Efendiey, a Turkish officer and one of

the chief political advisers to Stalin on Hear Eastern affairs.

The first regular head of the Eastern Department of

the Comintern was Georgi Safarov. Among the early Comintern

officials dealing with Eastern affairs, there were two of more than average caliber, the Indian M.N. Roy and A, Sultan-

zadeh from Persia.

With regard to the concrete execution of revolutionary

propaganda, a body of prime importance was the Third Interna­

tional. Apart f results executive functions, the Comintern was

also a center of theoretical debates. As such it was a policy­ making organ second only to the Soviet government itself. Its theses and resolutions were fundamental in guiding all those who had to perform various revolutionary assignments in the

Middle East. The Comintern's Second Congress in 1926 devoted

considerable time to the formation of oriental policies. It made an important contribution to Marxist theory by confirming

4®Lagueur, op. cit., p. 11. 89 the doctrine that a backward country might skip the capitalist phase. During its earlier years of establishment, the Comin­ tern paid specific attention to the execution of revolution in the Orient— thus, it was the Comintern which took the ini­ tial steps for holding the Congress of Eastern Peoples at

Baku., 4 7

An immediate outgrowth of the Baku Congress was the es­ tablishment of a permanent Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East as an auxiliary for the Third Inter­ national. The first session of the Council for Propaganda and Action was held in October 1920, when a presidium was elected that included Pavlovich, Stasova, ESava, Narimanov, 48 Narbutabekov, and Sultan-Zadeh. The Council was soon broken up into three departments: (1 ) agitation and propaganda, (2 ) organization and control, (3) administration. The publication of a periodical Narody Vostoka (The Peoples of the East), in

Russian, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic was outlined, and plans were made to organize propaganda and establish contact with 49 various Eastern countries.

4 7 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 128.

4 8 T.R. Ryskulov, "Komintern i rabota na Vostoke," Zhizn Natsionalhostei. No. 96, December 15, 1920, pp. 1—2.

4 9 Ibid., p. 2 . 90

Furthermore, along with these activities the "League for the Liberation of Islam" was founded in Moscow. In order to expand its activities over a wide area, this League estab­ lished a sub-committee called the "Eastern Central Committee," with headquarters in Transcaucasia, for the purpose of super­ vising all revolutionary organizations in Persia, Anatolia, and India; a European Central Committee was also set up in

Berlin, in order to deal with the Communists in Eastern Europe, 50 the Balkans, and Egypt. But the trend of the Comintern's revolutionary operations in the East reached its zenith in

August 1920, when its president set forth the slogan of common

"Jahad" against the imperialism at the Congress of the East in Baku. Here, for the important role which this Congress played in the Soviet revolutionary design in the East, it would be useful to analyze its very revolutionary character.

B. The Baku Congress

In fact, the Comintern's revolutionary position had been subordinated to Soviet political expediency in interna­ tional politics. Therefore, any decisive switch in Soviet international political strategy necessarily had caused a

Fatemi, op. cit.. p. 170. I j

91

major turn-away in the Comintern's revolutionary operations

on the international scene. On this ground, the first con­

gress of the Communist International, held in 1919, took de­

cisive steps in devising ways and means for the successful

defense of the Bolshevik regime against counterrevolution

and foreign invasion. To this end, the Comintern set in ac­

tion a series of political and psychological warfare which

led to mutiny in April, 1919, among the French troops at

Odessa in the south and among the American forces at Archangel

in the north, followed by the early withdrawal of both French 51 and American occupation forces. Furthermore, the Comintern's

actions in raising pro«Russian agitation among the British

workers was one of the causes which forced the British govern­

ment to slow down its anti-Bolshevik operations.

The second congress of the Communist International,

which was held in July, 1920, concomitant with the foreign

withdrawal and the disintegration of domestic opposition, set

forward an offensive program favorable to the Soviet political

bargaining on the international scene. The sharp edge of this

offensive strategy was primarily aimed at the East, where a

favorable situation had been prepared for many years. On the

5^Spector, op. cit., p. 45. 92

one hand, through the existing nationalistic movements in

Persia, Turkey and Xndia, the Comintern could extend the

very cause of international revolution— and on the other hand,

by stimulating anti-British uprisings, they would force Bri­

tain to withdraw from the Soviet colonial periphery Thus,

the summons to Baku was in fact a summons to the Oriental

world to organize a counterattack against the foreign invaders

of Russia, in order to expel them frcm the lands adjacent to

the Soviet republics, including Turkey, Persia, Armenia, and

Afghanistan.

In early July, 1920, the Executive Committee of the

Communist International issued an appeal to the "enslaved peoples

of Persia, Armenia, and Turkey," inviting them to a congress in

Baku, to be held in September of the same year for the purpose

of discussing "together with you the question of how the forces

of the European proletariat can be united with your forces for

the struggle against the common enemy."

After enumerating the ills suffered by Persian, Armeni­

an, and Turkish workers from the domination of British, Itali­

an, and French capitalists, the appeal maintained the follow­

ing words to the peasants and workers of Persia:

Peasants and workers of Persia. The Teheran Kajar government and its hirelings— the provincial khans— - have plundered and exploited you for centuries. The 93

land was seized by the lackeys of the Teheran govern­ ment; they control this land; they are imposing taxes and levies on you at their discretion; and after hav­ ing drained the country of its vitality and reduced it to poverty and ruin, they sold Persia last year to the English capitalists for £2,000,000 sterling, so that the latter could form an array in Persia which will oppress you even more than heretofore, and so that this army should squeeze from you still heavier taxes and duties for the khans and the Teheran govern­ ment. They have sold to England the rich South Per­ sian oil resources, thereby facilitating the plundering of your country.

Then the appeal ended with these words:

Workers and Peasants of the Near East! If you or­ ganize yourselves, if you form your own workers' regime, if you arm yourselves and join the Russian workers1 and peasants* army, you will defeat the British, French, and American capitalists, you will liberate yourselves from your oppressors, you will secure freedom, you will be able to form a free world republic of working masses, and you will use the wealth of your own land in your own interests and in the interests of the international pro­ letariat, which will be glad to exchange your wealth against their own products, and will be glad to send you their help.

The congress held its sessions from September 1 to Sep­ tember 8 , 1920 and was attended by 1891 persons, representing various nationalities inhabiting the former Russian Empire as well as independent Near Eastern states. There were apparent­ ly three official languages— Russian, Azerbaijani-Turkish, and

^Izvestiia (Moscow), No. 144, July 3, 1920, p. 1. 94

Persian. The three official delegates of the Third Interna­ tional - Grigory Zinoviev, Comintern president who served as chairman, Karl Radek, secretary of the Comintern, and Bela

Kun - set the tone of the conference. Ostavsky was elected 54 secretary of the Congress.

Zinoviev highlighted the aim of the Congress as the

"awakening of the millions of peasants" in the Orient:

The Communist International turns to the peoples of the East and says to them: Brother, we summon you to a holy war, first of all against British Imperialism. From the moment when Soviet Russia managed to throw off the chains of capitalism and set up a classless state, China, India, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Armenia also can and must try their best to obtain a Soviet sys­ tem. We have to conduct our revolutionary activities on two simultaneous fronts. First, we have to launch a relentless struggle against the foreign imperialist. Secondly, it is our duty to educate the working masses of the East in hatred and hostility of the wealthy clas­ ses, no matter whether they be Russians, Jews, Germans, Turks, British or Frenchmen. A new page in the history of humanity has opened; the sun of communism will shine not only on proletarians of Europe, but on the working peasantry of the whole world.

He then switched his long speech to a passionate oratorical climax with the following outburst:

54Xenia Joukoff, op. cit.. p. 79.

^ P e r w i sezd narodov Vostoka. Baku. 1-8 sentiabria 1920 p. Stenograficheskie otchetv (The First Congress of the Peoples of the East. Baku. September 1-8, 1920 (Stenographic report). (Moscow, 1920), p. 35. 95

Comrades, you have heard during the last few years of a holy war. But you who have met for the first time in a Congress of the Peoples of the East must hear and now declare a true holy war against the Eng­ lish and French robber capitalists...Now we must kin­ dle a real holy war against the British and French capitalists. We must say that the hour has struck when the workers of the whole world are able to arouse tens and hundreds of millions of peasants, to create a Red Army in the East, to arm and organize uprising in the rear of the British, to poison the existence of every impudent British officer who lords it over Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, India and China.5 6

On the second day, Radek highlighted the anatomy of the

expected Oriental revolution, as well as the role Russian aid was to play in it. He first attacked the native exploiters:

"sultan's cliques, all sort of shahs, emirs and Khans," then

continued:

The Red East together with the workers of Europe will create a new culture under the banner of Communism. Rus­ sia will be the center and arsenal of the World Revolu­ tion. Now enemy will be dreadful to yoruicbody will stop the stream of workers and peasants of Persia, Turkey, and India, if they unite with Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia was encircled by enemies, but now she can produce weapons with which she will arm the Persian, Afghan, Arab, Indian, and Anatolian peasants, all oppressed, an^will lead them in a common struggle to a common victory.

On the third day of the Congress, the Hungarian Bela Kun

harped on the same theme as had Radek and exhorted all the

workers, toilers, and peasants of the East to rise, revolt, and

5 6 Ibid., p. 36.

Pervvi sezd narodov Vostoka, p. 70. 96 massacre their oppressors. He also presented a "thesis on the Soviet authorities in the East," which laid stress on the peasants* revolution and recommended the institution of the soviet as the only form of government to be promoted in the colonies, semi-colonies and backward regions. 58 Follow­ ing these principal declarations, many other delegates held the floor.

The Persian delegates at the Baku Congress represen­ ted mostly people of the northern provinces. Heidar Khan Amu-

Oqli, Alioff, Sultan-Zadeh, Lahuti, Zarrah, and Ehsanullah

Khan were the leaders of the Persian group which, according 59 to Bolshevik claims, numbered 192. Heidar Khan was elected to the Presidium and Sultan-Zadeh to the Council of Action and Propaganda.

Three of the Iranian delegates addressed the Congress at length. The first Iranian to address the Congress was

Heidar Khan, who in his speech attacked Great Britain and hail­ ed Bolshevik Russia as the liberator of the colonial nations:

5 8 Ibid., p. 76. 59 For detailed numbers of delegates from each Asian country, see "The Soviet Union and the Muslim World" by Ivar Spector, p. 52. I

97

Let us harbor no illusion. We must not deceive our­ selves. To wait for the collapse of the corrupt govern­ ments and imperialist powers is simply to betray the international Revolution. Our comrades in Russia roust not wait, but roust immediately give us support—guns, ri­ fles, ammunition, and tanks. We will be able to take care of both our own government and the British inva­ ders. The war against us is war against an idea. Out of Russia and out of the East, the most persecuted of all the civilized lands for many centuries, has emerged an attempt to apply an idea actually to a political institu­ tion.®^

After analyzing the concept of ideological warfare, and high­

lighting the tactical weapons of the imperialists, Heidar-Khan

concluded his speech with these words:

The World Revolution is at hand. Every colonial country has rejected the claim of the Anglo-American imperialists, and demands that its independence shall be recognized. Italian workers and peasants have re­ belled against the tyranny of their ruling class. French sailors have mutinied in Russian ports and de­ cided to fraternize with the proletariat army. Germa­ ny is on the verge of revolution. The days of the despots and reactionaries in central Europe and the Middle East are numbered. A great part of Asia is convulsed by new revolution, and the Soviet regime g£ northern Persia is planning for a march on Teheran.

On the fifth day, Heidar—Khan for the second time took

the floor. He stated that Persia, as the home of Zorasterian-

ism, the birthplace of a great civilization, and the living

center of Islamic activities, occupied a unique place in the

^Qcommunist Reshet (resht), September 29, 1920

6 1 Ibid., p. 2 . 98

Middle East. "Militarism and Imperialism," asserted Heidar-

Khan, "have always looked upon it with eyes of greed," and said in conclusion: "Persia can be a bulwark to the Commu- 62 nist world and a bond of union between Russia and the East."

In short, the Congress of the Peoples of the East, like other revolutionary conferences, was an attentive step on the part of the Third International toward indoctrination and regimentation of the Oriental peoples in their anti-imperi­ alist movements. But in reality, the Baku Congress was an ideo­ logical weapon in the Soviet hands, which it used in battling with Great Britain in the Middle East. Commenting on this point some three months later, the Red Army newspaper Krasnaya

Gazeta said:

Over Baku we waged a great struggle with England, which sought to deprive us of fuel. Now Baku is on our side and we have every opportunity to supply not only England but the whole Entente with a new kind of fuel, which in the very near future will generate a great deal of heat. Instead of oil, the gentlemen imperialists will feel the flame of revo­ lutionary conflagration in the East.

63 Krasnaya Gazeta (Moscow), December 10, 1920, p. 3. IV

PERSIA IN THE DESIGN OF SOVIET DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

In the early twenties, the Soviet revolutionary outlook

started to go into eclipse as the result of unpredictable

events which had taken place in Europe and other parts of the world. Consequently, the Russian leaders reached the conclu­

sion that an immediate revolution throughout the world was not

in the offing, and their security could no longer depend upon

the oncoming revolution. Commenting on this fact, Trotsky

stated in the Third Congress of the Communist International, held in June and July 1921:

Now for the first time we see and feel that we are not so immediately near to the goal, to the conquest of power, to the world revolution. At that time, in 1919, we said to ourselves: 'It is a question of months.' Now we say: 'It is perhaps a question of years.'-1-

Elaborating further on this point, Lenin stated:

The revolution will not come as quickly as we expect­ ed. History has proved this, and we must be able to take this as a fact; we must be able to reckon with the fact that the world socialist revolution cannot begin so easily in the advanced countries as the revolution began in Russia, the land in which the overwhelming majority of the population was quite indifferent to the conditions of life of the people in the outlying regions. In such a

1Protokoll des III. Koncrresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg, 1921), p. 90. xoo

country it was quite easy to start a revolution, as easy as lifting a feather. But it is wrong, absurd, without preparation to start a revolution in a coun­ try in which capitalism is developed, which has pro­ duced a democratic culture and has organized every man. We are only just approaching the painful peri­ od of the beginning of socialist revolution. That is why X think that history has shattered our hope that the German cannot and that we can get everything by shouting hurrah; this lesson, with the help of our Soviet organization, will very quickly sink into the minds of the masses all over Soviet Russia.

Thus, failing to bring about a proletarian revolution in the

West, and failing also to engineer an Oriental revolution as planned, the Soviet leaders began to concentrate their efforts more and more on the measures necessary for the preservation of the Sovialist citadel. The economic hazards of an indefi­ nitely prolonged interim period required Soviet Russia to enter into amicable trading relations with the capitalist world; the political hazards called for amicable political relations with some capitalist states as a reinsurance against the hostility of others. Consequently, in the early twenties, the Soviets went on the defensive, and peace overtures were

2 At the later stage of the Comintern’s Congress, Lenin registered his "final conclusion" in the following termss The development of international revolution which we predicted makes progress. But this progress is not in the straight line which we expected. It is plain at a glance that after the conclusion of the peace, however bad that was, we did not succeed in provoking a revolu­ tion in the other capitalist countries. . . . What is essential now is a fundamental preparation of the revo­ lution and a profound study of its concrete development in the principal capitalist countries. 101 again high on the agenda of their foreign policy.

The preservation of the Soviet fatherland (said Lenin) was the first duty of all revolutionaries. A disgraceful peace which preserved the Communist power to maneuver was infinitely preferable to 'dy­ ing in a beautiful pose/ sword in hand.

Here, the peace policies of the Soviet Union were multi­ ple - and complex. But they were based on the utilization, for

Soviet Russia's benefit, of the internal divisions and contra­ dictions within the capitalist order which Marxist-Leninist theory taught them to expect. The main lines of division which the Soviet government could hope to use were plain enough:

(1 ) the antagonism between the major powers arising out of the war and of the peace settlement? (2 ) the antagonism between im­ perialist powers and the colonial and semi-colonial peoples; and, finally, (3) the internal class conflicts within the capi- 4 talist countries. And besides, in this period, the work of the Comintern among the colonial and oriental peoples, and among the proletariat of the more advanced countries, became itself defensive in object— the aim being to prevent or frus­ trate an anti-Soviet coalition, rather than to provoke

3Lenin, Sochineniva, XXIX, op. cit., p. 327.

4Max Beloff, The Foreion Policy of Soviet Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 36. 102 5 immediate revolution.

But toward the realization of their security goal, the

Soviet’s ability to bargain with the great powers was severe­

ly limited by her internal weakness as well as the mistrust

in which she was held. On the other hand, she was less handi­ capped in her dealing with her immediate neighbors, all of whom, with the exception of Poland, were extremely weak.

This weakness of the neighboring countries, particularly in

Asia, was in fact an asset which seemed could be utilized for the Soviet security designs. Furthermore, Moscow authorities, / Qh / still hopeful of trading/the deepening anti-British feelings which had rankled in the hearts of the people in these coun­ tries, found it prudent to cease revolutionary policy and court the neighboring countries of Turkey, Persia, and Af- 6 ghanistan. In 1921, the Soviet embarked on a series of friendly negotiations with these countries towards the conclu­ sion of treaties beneficial to its security interest. But at

^Analyzing the defensive character of Russia in the twenties, Zinoviev, the Comintern’s president maintained: "The tactics of the united front were in reality at the begin­ ning (i.e. in 1921-22) an expression of our consciousness, first, that we have not yet a majority in the working class; secondly, that social democracy is still very strong; thirdly, that we occupy defensive positions and the enemy is attacking. . . , fourthly, that the decisive battles are still not yet on the immediate agenda. Hence we came to the slogan "To the Masses," and to the tactics of the united front. 103

this time the Soviet political position in Persia was highly

complicated by virtue of incompatability between its sup­

ports to the separatist movements in northern Persia and its

friendly gesture toward the regime of the Shah in Teheran.

In late 1920 and early 1921, the Soviet was weighing

between two possible moves in Persia: (1) the continuation

of the revolutionary strategy even at the expense of aliena­

tion of the Persian government; (2) reconciliation with the

regime of the Shah on certain conditions. In other words, was

it to uphold the authority of Kuchik Khan, who was no Communist,

but might be used against the British or against a hostile Per­

sian Government?1 Was it to encourage the small Persian Commu­

nist Party which held its first congress at Enzeli in July

1920 and proclaimed a "struggle against British imperialism,

against the Shah's government, and against all who support them?"

Or was it to woo the Persian Government, which was equally re­

sentful of support given to separatist and communist movements,

in the hope of making Soviet influence paramount in Teheran?

All these courses had their supporters, but they were incompat­

ible with one another, and the choice had to be made. In Per­

sia, the autumn of 1920 was a period of hesitation in Soviet

policy.^ i 7Carr, .op. cit., p. 243. 104

On the one hand, there were those who believed in the continuation of the revolutionary policy in Persia- Xn the case of difficulties in communizing Persia as a whole, they favored the establishment of a series of small satellite states in northern Persia- Their plan was designed to achieve several objectives at once. First, such states could be used as buffers against "imperialist aggression" or "imperialist en­ circlement. " Secondly, they could be used as jumping boards for propaganda and agitation; and finally, the ccmmunization of the neighboring states at a suitable time- Lenin for a while supported this line and weighed the plan of "sovietizing"

Khurasan but was quickly dissuaded- Other communists, particu­ larly in Baku and Moscow, while favoring sovietization of Per­ sia, urged military penetration into Persia, using Gilan as a 8 base.

In fact, the policy of this group was the revival of the Treaty of 1907 in a new form. To the effect that, while engaging in the creation of soviet states in northern Persia, they gave free hand to the British to establish their counter­ parts in the south- Actually, this policy echoed positively

8Louis Fischer, The Soviet in World Affairs (London; Jonathan Cape, 1930), pp. 428-29. 105

among the British political circles, who inclined to favor .

the continual stay of Red battalions in North Persia, Thus,

seizing upon this opportunity, Britain attempted the creation

of the Southern Persian Confederation as a protective chain

for her Indian interests. To this aim, Captain E. Noel, sent

to Persia early in 1921 to help form the above-mentioned con­

federation, revealed the nature of Downing Street policy in his letter of July 6 of that year to Sir Percy cox:

I was sent to Persia by the F.O. (Foreign Office— L.F.) in January when it looked as if the withdrawal of our troops would be followed by a Bolshevik armed incursion and the establishment of a Soviet which would free our hands to take action in the South. The forecast proved incorrect. Instead of advancing the Bolsheviks have retired. They consider it premature to force the sitation. Their policy is to hold Persia together and to prevent atgall costs our starting a Southern Federation. . . •

Following this line, Sir Percy Lorraine, the British Minister

in Teheran, accordingly hinted to Theodore Rothstein, the

Soviet envoy, that the Soviets and England divide Persia in­

to spheres of influence after the time-honored pre-revolu- 10 tionary practice. Rothstein ignored the offer.

On the other hand, there were other groups who favored

9 Ibid., p. 429.

1 0 Ibid., p. 430. 106 the adoption of a moderate and cautious policy toward Persia.

They believed that Soviet support to the separatist movements in northern Persia would not only alienate Persian national­ ists, but also would make fearful other Soviet neighbors in 11 Asia. Furthermore, they believed the attempted policy of satellization might throw Persia into British hands. Accor­ ding to Fischer, "The Soviet Government was in possession of information from Rothstein, Soviet envoy in Persia, which would have prevented it from supporting the cause of Red revo­ lution in the Shah's kingdom."

You may rest assured that any attempt on our part (wrote Rothstein) to start a revolution in any part of Persia would immediately throw it into the arms of the British who would be received as the saviors of the Fatherland.^-2

Lenin and Chicherin shared this view. Chicherin touch­ ed this point in his letter to Ehsanullah Khan, commander of the Armed Forces of the Gilan Republic, in which he, by impli­ cation, prohibited him from attempts to capture Teheran.

Such activity must (wrote Chicherin) , in view of the absence of serious preparatory work among the

^Hughston—Waston, From Lenin to Malenkov (New Yorks Fredrick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 129.

^-2Fischer, op. cit., p. 430. 107

masses for an historical situation of this kind, lead to exploits by adventurers such as Kuchik Khan, scheming feudal chiefs, heads of primitive tribes and British spies like Mr. Hawk.

Thus, in the autumn of 1920, the policy of rapproach- ment between Moscow and Teheran began to gain the upper hand.

A curb was put on the not very serious activities of the Per- 14 sian Communist Party. The central committee of the party was induced on October 22, 1920, to declare that revolution in Persia would be possible only When full bourgeois develop­ ment had been corrpleted; and this paved the way for an alli­ ance with the rising Persian bourgeoisie which might hope to oust and replace the foreign capitalist. 15 Immediately this policy was echoed by Chicherin in an article in Izvestia.

In Persia, the third anniversary of the October Revolution coincided with a radical alteration in the political attitude toward Soviet Russia. On Oc­ tober 22, 1920, the Central Committee of the Commu­ nist Party of Persia adopted the resolution that the revolution in Persia must still pass through the stage of the bourgeois revolution. And an end was thus put to the efforts to introduce the communist regime in Persia, efforts which had started with the local Soviet government in Gilan. On October 25, the ambassador of the Persian government, Mochaverol-

^ I b i d ., p. 431. ^According to the Year Book of the Comintern for 1923, there were in 1922 no more than two thousand Communists and So­ cialists in Persia, only one Camraunist newspaper, and altoge­ ther only twenty thousand Persians connected with trade—union organization. l^Reyue d\t Monde Husulman (Paris) , 1922, p. 105. 103

Memalek, left Baku for Moscow, and there began negoti­ ations for the conclusion of a treaty between the Rus­ sian and Persian governments.

Rationalizing this retreat, Soviet' leaders concluded that Sovi­

et interests did not require a Persian revolution. Commenting

on this issue, Karl Radek explained:

For the Soviet government it is completely unnecessary to create in Persia artificial Soviet republics. Its real interests in Persia consist in the fact that Per­ sia should not become a base for an attack on Baku. If the Persian government obligates itself to demand the withdrawal of the English forces, and England re­ jects this demand, in spite of the promise of Lloyd George, the Red forces will make their j^pearance in Persia not as conquerors but as allies.

In August, 1920, the Soviet Government notified Teheran that Leon Karakhan, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had been authorized to negotiate with the representatives of

the Persian Government for the conclusion of a new treaty.

After six months of negotiations, on February 26, 1921, the

first treaty between Soviet Russia and Persia was concluded.

Thus, relations between the two countries were put on a normal

footing.

In the treaty of February 26, 1921, the Soviet Govern­ ment declared its "immutable renunciation of the policy of

^Izvestia (Moscow), November 6 , 1921, p. 1.

17Karl Radek, Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskoi Rossii (Moscow, Petrograd, 1923), p. 74. 109

force with regard to Persia pursued by the Imperialist Govern­ ment of Russia," and "all treaties, conventions, and agree­ ments concluded by the Tsarist Government with Persia and ten­ ding to domination of the rights of the Persian people com- 18 pletely null and void." Furthermore, the Sovxets branded as

"criminal" the policy of the Government of Tsarist Russia, which, without the agreement of the peoples of Asia and tinder the guise of assuring the independence of these peoples, con­ cluded with other states of Europe treaties concerning the

East which had for their ultimate objectives its gradual seizure; the Soviets declared their refusal to take part in any measure whatsoever tending to weaken or violate the sover­ eignty of Persia and declared completely null and void all conventions and agreements concluded by the late government

of Russia with third powers for either the harm of Persia or concerning her in any respect.

The two Contracting Powers agreed "to accept and re­

spect the Russo-Persian frontiers, as drawn by the frontier commission in 1881." At the same time, the Soviet Government

renounced all claim to the Achouradeh Islands and to the other

l®League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 2620, Vol. 112 (1931), pp. 291-295. 110 islands on the Asterabad littoral, and restored to Persia the village of Firouzeh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia by virtue of the convention of 28 May 1893. The contracting par­ ties, acknowledging the principle of self-determination, ex­ pressed their desires to abstain fran any intervention in the internal affairs each of the other. Furthermore, the two High

Contracting Parties undertook:

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organizations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia. They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third party or any organiza­ tion, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other contracting party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other party.

(3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the terri­ tories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such a force would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of other contracting party. 1 9

In Article 6 , which has been regarded as an important measure beneficial to the Soviet security system, and Persia's

Achilles' Heel in her relations with the Soviet Union it was stated that:

19League of Nations, op. cit., p. 294. Ill

If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such a power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a step to such a menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops from Persian terri­ tory for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense. Russia under­ takes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed. 2 0

Moreover, they agreed that Russia should have the right to re­ quire the Persian Government to expel foreign subjects in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the 21 Persian Navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

The Soviet political circles called this treaty a vic­ tory for Bolshevik diplomacy. Chicherin termed the treaty as the success of Soviet diplomacy over the British imperialist 22 in the East. Izvestia stated that Russian interests in Per­

sia were more important after the conclusion of the treaty, because by signing the agreement Persia was oriented towards 23 Soviet Russia from the economic point of view. I. Levin

^^ibid., p. 295. ^Ibid.

22Iran (Teheran), August 26, 1921. ^Izvestia (Moscow) , July 16, 1921. 112

— in an article written in Revolvutsia jL Natsional "nosti— maintained that

The Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921, not only annulled all the success achieved by England, 1917-19, but it brought about a serious shift in the balance of power between English imperialism and Persia, After this trea­ ty there could be no talk of ratifying the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919.24

The Treaty of February 26, 1921, while it did not solve all difficulties, put Soviet-Persian relations in a new footing. In the following month, the Central Committee of the

Persian Communist Party, established safely in Baku, exhorted local party committees to struggle against both "English 25 colonialism" and the government of the Shah. But the "experi ments" of toying with indigeneous Persian Communism, or with such separatist movements as that of Kuchik Khan, which had been without a plan and without any consideration of local Og conditions and possibilities, were now abandoned in favor of consolidation of relations with the Persian Government. Such retreat from revolutionary policy echoed also by the Persian

2 4 I. Levin, "Sredne-Aziatskie sovetskie respubliki i. ikh mezhdunarodnoe znachenie,” Revolvutsia_i Natsional Jnosti, No. 12 December, 1934, p. 4.

25Revue du Monde Musulman (Paris), 1922, pp. 144-156.

26n q w Vostok (Moscow), 1922, p. 261 113

representative at the Third Congress of the Communist Interna­

tional, which met in Moscow June 22-July 12, 1921. Here, the

representative of the Persian Communist Party admitted that

. . . the conquest of power (in Persia) by the toilers may be delayed. It is closely connected with the world proletarian movement and, therefore, only after the vic­ tory of the social revolution in a number of European capitalist countries, can the Persian Communists, joint­ ly with the toiling masses, raise the question of the seizure of political authority, ^n d the creation of workers' and peasants' soviets.

Furthermore, in the wake of this change, the Eastern Section of 28 the Comintern ceased to exist in the spring of 1921.

In short, the substance of Soviet policy throughout the period after 1921 was to seek collaboration with national govern­ ments in Asia and to extend Soviet influence over those govern­ ments, but to pursue this policy as far as possible by gradual

and unobtrusive methods which would destroy or prejudice oppor­

tunities of profitable economic relations with the Western capi­

talist world. In fact, from the Soviet national standpoint,

the existence of the strong nationalistic regime in Persia,

2?Tretii Vsemirnyi Koncrress Kommunisticheskocro Interaat— sionala. Stenograficheskii otchet, p. 468. 28 This information is contained in Litvinov's reply to Lord Curzon's note alleging Soviet violation of the Anglo-Rus­ sian treaty. Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London, 1951), p. 259. 114 which played the role of buffer against British imperialistic

design, was more advantageous than a chaotic situation suscep­ tible to the imperialist plots and machinations. Commenting#

on this issue. N o w Vostok wrote:

Soviet direct interests are that Persia should be a strong centralized state capable of defending itself against any interference in its affairs by third parties and especially# of course, by England. Such a position would guarantee Soviet Russia against any utilization of Persian territory by English forces for an attack on Rus­ sia. In a strong central state power, resting on a sing­ le national army, will also be found a pledge of the com­ mercial development of Persia and of her transition from feudal to modern forms of economic and political exist­ ence. ^ 9

^Incidentally, in the twenties both Soviet Russia and Great Britain found common interests in the consolidation of the national regimes in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. On the British side, the failure of Curzon's policy in the estab­ lishment of British domination over Persia and Afghanistan re­ quired the revision of British foreign policy in these areas. Eventually, the thesis of the Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, in support of the national and anti-communist regimes as a barrier against Communist advancement, found ascendancy in the British Foreign Office. Thus, at this time, both Soviet Union and Great Britain were moving slowly and haltingly enough towards the recognition that an independent Persia and Afghanistan might serve as bar­ rier and deterrent, rather than as a bone of contention between them. This common interest found its expression in the Anglo- Soviet Economic Treaty of March 1921: . . . and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the inde­ pendent state of Afghanistan. The British Government 115

In the late twenties, the Soviet Union did not limit its security policy just to the support of the nationalist re­ gimes in its southern neighbors, but attempted to bring them into its defensive arrangements. To this aim, the Soviet Union took steps towards the conclusion of a series of treaties of guarantee and neutrality with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

And with a skillful utilization of the very concepts of neutrali­ ty and "non-aggression," the Soviets not only succeeded in exten­ ding and consolidating their defensive shield against the imperi­ alist encirclement, but also brought under perpetual legal scru­ tiny the political activities of their southern neighbors.^

Analysis of these agreements shows the Soviet Government build­ ing upon the stipulations of conventional neutrality the broad outlines of a non-aggression system. In addition to converting

Ogives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent. This policy of rapprochement, through the establishment of de­ tent, hinted once more by Chicherin at the Lausanne Conference of December 1922. Addressing Lord Curzon, Chicherin maintained: You are uneasy because our horsemen have reappeared on the heights of the Pamirs, and because you have no longer to deal with the half-witted Tsar who ceded the ridge of the Hindu Kush to you in 1895. But it is not war that we offer you, it is peace, based on the princi­ ples of partition wall between us. Thus, consolidation rather than advance had become the keynote of Soviet policy in the Middle East. 30of course the principles of such a system had already 116 the conception of neutral obligation from a passive one, such as marked nineteenth-century neutrality, to one of active and positive character, the Soviet Government insisted on giving and receiving specific guaarantees of non-aggression and non­ interference. Thus, there was constructed for Russia and her immediate neighbors a legal bulwark of treaty stipulations yielding at least the minimum basis of safety from unanticipa­ ted attacks of a military or political nature against their 31 territorial integrity or their institutions.

The purpose of these treaties from the Soviet point of view was of course to prevent the neighboring states from be­ coming the bases for a renewed interventionist struggle, and to provide legal grounds for objecting to any activities thought to be preparatory for such an effort. Although the reciprocity of preparation of such arrangements had been stressed, it must be pointed out that, since the Soviet Government never regarded the Communist International as an organization of the kind barred by the treaty provisions, the value of the treaties ©6 * 32 curred mainly to the Soviet Union.

^emerged. Its outlines were indeed visible in the first treaties which in 1921 had established conditions upon the Sovi­ et Union*s southern frontiers. 31M .W. Graham, The Soviet Security System (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Inter­ course and Education, 1929), pp. 343-425.

3 2 Beloff, op. cit., p. 358. 117

An attempt was made to carry the policy a step further at the unsuccessful Moscow Disarmament Conference in December

1922. This Conference drew up a multilateral non-aggression convention, infractions of which were to be countered by a policy of differential neutrality, on the part of the other signatories. This implied a modification of the law of neu­ trality in order to permit a measure of discrimination against an aggressor. The Soviets at this stage could not envisage more positive sanctions, because they still believed in the hostility of the entire Capitalist World to the Soviet Union, and hence in 33 the possibility of active political cooperation with it.

The second tier of treaties making up the Soviet security edifice was drawn up largely as a reply to the Geneva Protocol.

The new Soviet project was based on the idea of clearly stating the permanent attitude of two states toward each other in terms of explicit and indefeasible neutrality. It formed the complete counterpart to a system of non-aggression pure and simple, by furnishing guarantees of inaction in the event of aggression or hostility in some other quarter. In fact, at this time, from the Soviet political standpoint,neutrality was the anti­ thesis of collective security. The Soviet peace pacts were

33q raham, op. cit., p. 345. 118 3 in principle and purpose, the negation of the League Covenant.

The latter sought to generalize war by obligating all states to join forces against aggressors. The former sought to lo­ calize war by obligating each signatory to remain aloof from any conflict in which the other might be involved. For Moscow, the formula for peace was not the Wilsonian principle of "mak- ing any war everybody's business," but rather the injunction 35 of "keeping out of other people's wars." This policy, active neutrality, was the only one which could work, granted the ab- 3 sence of an impartial tribunal for the settlement of disputes.

As mentioned before, the first treaty to embody the neu­ trality provision was that with Persia of 26 February 1921.

This also added to the provisions, embodied in earlier treaties

(with the Baltic states), a specific understanding by both par­ ties to seek a specific settlement of all disputes arising be­ tween them. Similar obligations were embodied in the treaties with Afghanistan and Lithuania in 1926.

The fullest expression of the new security policy is to be found in the Soviet-Persian Treaty of October 1, 1927. This

■^Frederick L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917, Four Decades of Soviet Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 159. e Schuman, op. cit., p. 159.

36Beloff, pp. cit., p. 359. 119 embodied a mutual pledge of non-aggression; a pledge of neu­ trality in the event of an attack upon one of the parties by a third power; a pledge that neither power would join in agreements, alliances, boycotts or blockades directed against the other; an undertaking not to present the formation on the soil of either party of groups hostile to the Government of the other, or raising or supply of armed forces to be directed against it; and, finally, to pledge to the settlement of all 37 disputes by pacific means.

By this act Persia was brought into Soviet defense ar­ rangements along the European and Near and Middle East periphery of Russia. Accompanying the treaty, in two protocols the signa­ tories declared that they had "no international obligation what­ soever contrary to the said treaty and will not undertake such obligations during the whole duration of that treaty" and stat­ ed that Article 6 of the 1921 Persia-Russian Treaty continued 38 in full vigor.

In the early thirties, the Soviet crowned its security edifice by negotiating at the London Economic Conference of

1933 a "convention for the definition of aggression," signed

^League of Nationsj Treaty Series. No. 2620, vol. 112 (1931), pp. 292-95. 120 on July 6 by a group of seven of its immediate neighbors (Af­ ghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and

Turkey), another with the countries of the Little Entente,, 39 with Turkey participating, and a third with Lithuania. The definition of aggression in these treaties was as follows:

1. Declaration of war against another state; 2. Invasion by armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state; 3. An attack by armed land, naval or air forces, even without a declaration of war, upon the territory, naval vessels or aircraft of another state; 4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; 5. And to armed bands formed on the territory of a state and invading the territory of another state, or refusal, despite demands on the part of the state subjected to at­ tack, to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive the said bands of any aid and protection.

Peace was thus sought by legalistic formulae. The long armistice was, in fact, about to come to an end by virtue of a real, rather than imaginary, collapse of capi­ talism. But the political hazards of an indefinitely pro­ longed interim period required Soviet Russia to utilize, the weak neighboring countries for its defensive purposes.

39Alexander A. Troyanovsky, "Basic Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," The Soviet Union and World Problems (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 16.

40Troyanovsky, op. cit., p. 17. 121

With the rise of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union over­

night switched from the policy of political aloofness to the policy of the "collective security" and sought the maintenance of the status quo.

The Munich Pact in 1938 revived Soviet suspicion to­ wards the Western Powers. Moscow believed that it marked a plan to encourage Hitler's expansion toward the east, ultimate­

ly at the Russian expense, and a significant change in Soviet

foreign policy resulted. As a result of this change, Soviet abandoned the status quo policy and embarked on a policy of 41 territorial aggrandizement. Accordingly, Persia once more

came into the orbit of Russian territorial aspiration. In a

secret agreement with Nazi Germany, Molotov pegged out a

Soviet claim to an indefinite Soviet sphere "south of Batum 42 and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."

41Aleksander W. Rudzinski, "Soviet Peace Offensive," International Conciliation No. 490, April, 1953, p. 197. 42 See Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1948), pp. 258-59. V

PERSIA IN THE DESIGN OF SOVIET WAR STRATEGY

In the late thirties, Soviet relations with Persia started to be rather strained. This was partly due to the attempts on the part of the Persian Government to release itself from too much dependency upon the Soviet and British powers, both economically and politically.

Economically, Persia took decisive measures towards improving communication and industrialization. But, in order to remain independent of the Great Powers, Persia tried to receive aid and assistance from the smaller European countries, or those which had been traditionally cooperative in the pre­ servation of the Persian independence. Thus, along with the smaller European countries, Germany turned out to be a favor­ able source of supply. Germany was supplying Persia with more railway materials, machinery, and tools than any other nation..

Furthermore, as the result of the lapsing of the commercial treaty with the Soviet Union in June 1938, trade with the USSR greatly diminished, and Germany's proportion of Persian trade rose.

Thus, the industrial development of Persia, largely 123

under German auspices since 1936# had naturally brought into

the country a large number of German technicians to install

machinery and to instruct Persians in its use. They were to be found in ail important factories especially in electric

power stations, steel factories, and textile trade. Few Axis

subjects were stated to be employed in the arsenal at Salta-

nat-Abad (near Teheran), twenty in high positions in the rail­

way administration, five German engineers in broadcasting sta- 2 tions. According to Persian official sources, there were 3 nearly 600 Germans employed in the country. Consequently,

the Germans' increasing influence in Persia, and their control

of railways, airlines and a number of vital industries had

brought about anxiety both in Moscow and London.

In 1939, a sudden change took place in Soviet-Persian

relations. The Russian rapprochement with Germany ruled out

this fear for the time being. As long as the Soviet-German

^■"Increasing commercial relations with Germany was also partly due to the unwillingness of other g^tions in supplying Persia the needed materials. For instance, British Government granted Persia credits to the value of £5 million, but when the Persian Government found that the goods it wanted— steel rail, aircraft and weapons of war— were just what Britain could not prepare, it repudiated the credit."— Sir Reader Bullard, Bri­ tain and the Middle East (London: Hutchinson's University Li­ brary, 1951), p. 132. 2 0riente Mode mo , September 1941, p. 464. 3Journal de Teheran (Teheran), July 9, 1941, p. 1* 124

Non-Aggression Pact remained in force, there was little danger of a threat from Germany in the Middle East. On the contrary, the only danger was represented by the Allied military bases in the Middle East. Molotov, in his speech of August 1940, had commended Persia as well as Turkey for the recent revela­ tions about Allied designs on the Baku oil fields and had drawn the conclusion that it was necessary to intensify vigi- 4 lance on Russia's southern borders.

Following Molotov's speech, Russian troop concentra­ tions on the Persian frontier were reported and there were ru­ mors of requests for bases and military concessions in northern 5 Persia.

Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, radically changed the strategic position of Persia. With Great

Britain immediately extending the hand of friendship and alli­ ance to the Soviets, Persia overnight came into the limelight of the Allied war strategy. From the Soviet strategic stand­ point, Persia was the only sa£e link in the supply chain which

4 LUPi Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran (London: Routledge, 1941), p. 133.

^Ibid., p. 134. 125 at that time could connect Great Britain and the Allies with the Soviet Union, particularly when the north Russian route to Murmansk and Archangel was beginning to prove unduly hazar- g dous to Allied convoys. Furthermore, it seemed that the speedy penetration of the German army into Soviet territory transformed Persia into a potential rear base for the Soviet armed forces. The strategic position of Persia in the Near

East was further enhanced by the fact that it formed the Sovi­ et flank and the rear area of the British forces in the Middle

East as well as the road to India. The oil wells in the Per- 7 sian Gulf region also were of vital importance to the British.

On July 17, 1941, General Wavell telegraphed from India that it was essential to the defense of India that the Germans be removed from Persia at once, or there might be repetition of the crisis in Iraq. He thought it essential for the British 8 to join hands with Russia, through Persia. The Soviet Govern­ ment was ready to take military action, but only in conjunction 9 with Britain.

®T.H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Rus­ sia (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1952), p. 10. ^A.H. Hamzavi, Persia and the Powers (London: Hutchison Co., Ltd., 1946), pp. 3-4. ®Arnold Toynbee and Vemoica M. Toynbee, The* Interna­ tional- Triumph of the Axis (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 436. 9Ibid., p. 437. 126

How important Persia was in the Allied strategic de­ sign, and how important for Russia were the Anglo-American reinforcements through the Persian corridor could be realiz­ ed from a German study prepared for Hitler as early as the spring of 1942* It reads, in part, as follows:

In their endeavor to support Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States will make every effort during the coming weeks and months to increase ship­ ment of equipment, materials and troops to Russia as much as possible. In particular the supplies reaching Russia on the Basra-Iran route will go to the Russian Caucasus and southern fronts. All Britisher American war material which reaches Russia by way of Iran and Caucasus is extremely disadvantageous to our land of­ fensive. Every ton of supplies which the enemy manage to get through to the Near East means a continuous re­ inforcement of the enemy war potential, makes our own operations in the Caucasus more difficult, and streng­ thens the British position in the Near East and Egypt.

The importance of the Persian strategic position also echoed among the United States military circles. It appeared in a memorandum prepared for Harry Hopkins in the early and tenta­ tive stage of war:

The entrance of Russia into the war has given the Iranian theater urgent priority. The demands of the new theater are tremendous— 250,000 ship tons of rail­ road material in one project, more than the total shipments to the Middle East to date, requiring from 50 to 75 ships, with the distance so great that only three trips a yaar can be made. A big automotive

-^Fuehrer Conference on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1946), pp. 65-66. 127

project is superimposed on the railroad project. Di­ versions of material hitherto destined for Egypt are being made to the new theater.

Persian neutrality forced the Allies to provide some excuses for their military actions and these were found in the presence of nearly six hundred Germans in Persia. Xn reality, the existence of a small number of Germans in Persia could hardly be explained as a menace to Soviet security. Dr. Schulze-

Holthus, a German agent in Persia from March, 1941 until 1944, claimed the German position in Persia in 1941 was extremely 12 weak. Furthermore, as Churchill stated in The Grand Alli­ ance, the reasons for the occupation of Persia were not the

Berman danger as much as to capture the Persian oil fields, 13 and to control communications and secure a route to the USSR.

On August 17th, the two Governments requested Persia to expel the Axis political and commercial agents, who had been active for some years. The British suggested that they should

■^Memo, General Sidney Spalding for Harry Hopkins (n.d., but after 18 Sept. 1941). Iran 43/1, NADEF; also T.H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor, p. 12. 12Schulze-Holthus, Dav-Break in Iran (London: Staples Press Ltd., 1954), p. 7. ^2Winston L.S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance. Vol. Ill (New York: 1948-53), p. 481. 128 be replaced by British or neutral technicians.^

In response to the Allied memoranda, the Persian

Government insisted that its impartiality toward the belliger­

ents had been strictly enforced and that to expel the Germans would be tantamount to a violation of that neutrality. Further­ more, the Persian Government asserted that all Germans were

closely watched and that the Government had the situation well 15 under control, so that no danger from the Germans existed.

Persian authorities also offered to reduce their number, but not substantially and quickly.^*6

On August 25th, with indifference to Persia's neutrali­ ty, the Allied Powers invaded Persia. Simultaneous with this act of aggression, the Soviet took necessary measures in justi­

fying its action. In a lengthy note, which was broadcast by

Moscow Radio, the Soviet - after rehearsing the friendship which the Soviet Government claimed to have always shown toward Persia - maintained:

Recently, and especially since the treacherous at­ tack of Hitler's Germans on the U.S.S.R., an alien

3-4T h e Times Diplomatic Correspondent. August 25, 1941.

■^Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 168.

^Journal de Teheran (Teheran), July 9, 1941, p. 1; also New Zeitunq (Berlin), August 13, 1941. 129 activity of groups of Fascist German conspirators towards the U.S.S.R. and Persian territory has reach­ ed menacing proportions. German agents who have penetrated to iirportant and responsible positions in more than 50 Persian institutions are in every way endeavouring to create disturbances in Persia and . . . to upset the peaceful life of the people of Persia, to instigate Persia against the USSR, to drag Persia into war with the U.S.S.R. Agents of German Fascism such as Von Radanowitsch, Gamotta, Mayer .... and others, under cover of their work in different German firms . . . a t the present moment have reached the limits in their subversive work in organizing diver­ sion and terrorist groups intended for work in Soviet Azerbaijan, and, before all else, in the main Soviet oil district of Baku, and into Soviet Turkemanistan, on the one hand, and for preparing a military coup in Persia on the other. The chief of the German secret service in Teheran, Gamotta, together with his assis­ tant, Mayr . . . recently arrived from Iraq, are now occupied with this scheme. The group of German agents organized by them, under the direction of the German Embassy in Teheran, is organ­ izing in a number of frontier places in Persia armed groups intended for Baku and other most important Soviet border places, with a view to arranging arson and explo­ sion on the territory of the U.S.S.R. German agents have ammunition dumps at their disposal at different places in Persia. In particular, in the northern parts of Persia, in the neighborhood of ( • . . ), they have put in store more than 50 tons of explosives for their criminal purposes. The Soviet Government has therefore been forced to take the necessary steps to implement its rights in ac­ cordance with paragraph 6 of the 1921 Agreement, and to introduce troops on to the territory of Persia in self- defence. . . . The military measures now undertaken by the Soviet Government are directed exclusively against the danger produced by alien activity in Persia. As soon as that danger threatening the interests of Persia and the U.S.S.R. have been averted, the Soviet Government will, in accordance with the undertakings given in the Soviet-Persian Agreement of 1921, immediately withdraw its troops from the boundaries of Persia. ^

17rtlaat (Teheran), August 26, 1941. English text taken 130

By virtue of the occupation, Persia was divided into

two zones. The British zone included Baluchistan, Sistan,

a part of Kerman, Khuzistan, Arak, Qum, Kermanshah, Fars,

Luristan, Yezd and the western part of Kerman. The soviet

zone included Azerbaijan, Qazvin, Zanjan, Semenan, Shahroud,

Gorgan and Khorasan.

On August 30 the two Allies stated that they had no

designs on the independence and territorial integrity of Persia

and that their military actions had been made necessary by the

German menace and the non-cooperative attitude of the Persian

Government toward their proposals. This note demanded that the

following measures be taken by the Persian Government:

(1) The Persian Government must expel within one week

all German agents except those that had taken refuge in the

German Legation and certain indispensable technicians and fur­

nish a list of all Germans to the diplomatic representatives.

(2) The Persian Government must facilitate the trans­ port of Allied war material by road, rail, and air.

(3) The Persian Government must agree to remain neutral

and refrain from any hostile act against Britain or Russia.

**-7fram British Broadcasting Corporation: Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasting, part ii, no. 769 (26 August 1941). 131

The Soviet note requested the following concessions:

(a) Persia was asked to facilitate the task of the

Soviet Government in developing the oil resources at Kavir-

Khurian, as well as the fisheries on the Caspian.

(b) The Soviet Government agreed to continue payment of royalties of fisheries on the Caspian, as provided by the 18 treaty of October 19, 1927.

This note was followed by another note on September 6, in which they demanded the expulsion of German, Italian, Ru­ manian, and Hungarian Legations, and the cancellation of their codes, radio and pouch privileges. On September 9, the Persian

Government accepted the Allied terms. But the Allied demand was furhter increased by requesting the expulsion of the Bul­ garian Legation, and cancellation of the pouch and code privi­ leges of the Vichy French and Japanese Legations.

The occupation aroused in Persian minds memories of the

Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, for in both instances the

Russian zone was the north and the British in the south. In their hearts was fear of the irretrievable loss of their

•*-®For details of these notes see J.C. Hurwitz, Diploma­ cy of the Near and Middle Bast, vol. 2d (New York: Nostrand Company, Inc•, 1957)• 132 independence. 19 These anxieties was further reinforced by the strict preservation of the zones of occupation and Soviet sensitive reaction against entrance into its zone of occupa­ tion by other Allied powers, which by implication gave an underlying sense of power politics and division of interests between the former rivals. To dispel these anxieties, the

Soviets embarked on a series of promises and goodwill gestures toward the Persian Government and people, such as the follow­ ing declaration:

The Soviet Government, guided by its friendship for the Persian people and respect for the sovereignty of Persia. . . . The basis underlying all the treaties and agreements of the Soviet Government with the Per­ sian Government is the inviolable principles of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Persia. After elimination of the danger in question, the Soviet Government will undertake immediately to withdraw its troops from the confines of Persia. The Soviet Govern­ ment has no design on the territorial integrity and state independence of Persia. The military measures taken by the Soviet Government are directed solely and exclusively against the danger created by the hostile ac­ tivities of the Germans in Persia. As soon as this dan­ ger threatening the interests of Persia and of the USSR has been removed, the Soviet Government in discharge of its obligations under the Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921, will at once withdraw the Soviet troops from the confines of Persia.20

19 Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 232.

20The Times (London), August 26, 1941, p. 3. 133

Despite Soviet assurances of respect for the territorial integrity of Persia, the Persian peoples were pathologically afraid of the presence of Russian troops in Persia. In order to assuage those fears, and place the occupation on a legal footing, Britain and Russia concluded a treaty of alliance with

Persia in which the occupying Powers pledged "jointly and sever­ ally . . . to respect the territorial integrity, the sovereign­ ty and political independence of Persia" (Article 1) and to withdraw their forces from its territory "Not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied powers and Germa­ ny and her associates have been suspended" (Article 5). Further­ more, the Allied Powers jointly undertook to use their best en­ deavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Persian people against the privations and difficulties as a result of 21 the present war.

Persia at once severed diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy and later took similar steps toward Japan. A decla­ ration of war against Germany followed in September, 1943 and later one against Japan. In conformity with the Treaty of

2lGreat Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1942, Persia No. 1, Cmd. 6335. 134

Alliance, however, Persia took only a passive part in the war.

On the basis of contracts with the Soviets, Persian ammunition

factories and a canning factory were turned over to the ser- 22 vice of the Red Army.

After Pearl Harbor, an American force, known later as

the Persian Gulf Command, under Major General Donald H. Conolly, 23 established itself in Persia with headquarters at Teheran.

The Tri-Partite Treaty did not cover the American force, which

entered and remained in the country without benefit of treaty

arrangements. In fact, the presence of the American troops in

Persia brought up two questions for the Persian Government:

First, the reaction of the USSR toward the presence of the

American forces in Persia; secondly, the legal status of the

United States' forces in Persia, as concerned its relations

to the sovereign rights of Persia.

With regard to the first question, the Persian Government

22Arthur C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1946), p. 41. 23 For detail of the exchange of notes between the Per­ sian Government and the United States Government see Helen M. Davis, Constitution, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the year and Middle East (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1947), pp. 43-184. found it prudent to remove beforehand any ground for Soviet

pressure on Persia, Thus, on December 12th, 1942, the Persian

Government put an inquiry to the Soviet Government about the

above-mentioned issue. Doubtless it bespoke Persia's reluc­

tance to offend the powerful neighbor then in occupation of

its northern provinces. Persia wished to know whether the

Soviet Union would object to United States participation in 24 the operations of the Allied forces in the Corridor.

Before the Soviet Government could acquiesce in the

presence of American troops in Persia it desired to satisfy it­

self that American participation in Corridor operations did not

infringe or diminish any rights enjoyed by the Soviet Union

under the Tri-Partite Treaty. In response to a Soviet inquiry

as to American intentions. Minister Dreyfus informed Andrei

Smirnov, Soviet Ambassador at Teheran, that U.S. military units

were in Persia only to support the British military forces,

which still exercised full control over transport lines in the

south of Persia, "and bore responsibility for their safety."

The Russians cited the fact that, in the negotiations which were proceeding between the United States and Persia to

24jiotter, op. pit., p. 436. 136 regularize the presence of American troops in Persia, the

Americans had presented a draft agreement under which Persia would grant to the United States the same rights over communi­ cations as were enjoyed under the Tri-Partite Treaty by the 25 British and the Russians.

The United States tried again, explaining to the USSR on 16 June 1943 that American troops went to Persia at British request; that their task "under general British guidance" was to maintain control over transport facilities to the USSR; and that they were not in Persia to support the British "in any military sense." 26 The Soviet reply of 27 July asserted that general British guidance indicated that the American forces were "part of the British Persia-Xraq military district. It stated that the USSR would inform Persia that there was no

Soviet objection to the presence of American troops in Persia, providing no Soviet rights were altered thereby.

On the other hand, to clarify the status of American trocps, the Persian Government urged the United States to ad­ here to the Tri-Partite Treaty of January 1942. "Not consi­ dering it feasible to become a party to a Treaty of Alliance

25Ibid.. p. 437.

26Ibid., p. 438. 137 with Persia," observed former Secretary of State Hull, "we pro­ posed to the Persians a separate agreement to cover the presence 27 of our troops on their territory."

.Persia, however, sought wider assurances than the United

States was willing to give, so that no agreement of the class requested was ever reached. Still, at the time of the first meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Teheran, in the fall of 1943, the American Legation in Teheran drafted a declaration in which the United States associated itself, with the pledge of its two allies, to maintain the "Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia. 11 28 This dec­ laration, which was signed by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, recognized the assistance that Persia had given in the Allied war effort, promised economic aid, reaffirmed Persia's inde­ pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and reiter­ ated the Allies" adherence to the principles of the Atlantic

Charter.^

2^Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 42. 28 See The Department of State Bulletin, vol. IX, no. 233, Publication 2035 (Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 1943), p. 409.

2^Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Prijiceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 302-313. 138

A. Soviet Anti-Fascist Stratecrv

The Soviet occupation of northern Persia in August,

1941 marked the beginning of the U.S.S.R.*s over-all anti­ fascist strategy. Aimed at smashing the Axis Powers, this strategy was typified by an alliance on the political front between Communist and non-Communist parties.

In order to remove the danger of the German agents and their subversive activities from the early days of occupation, the Soviets embarked on a relentless pursuit of German and other anti-Soviet organizations in Persa. After the occupa­ tion of Persia, Britain and Russia promptly interned the ma­ jority of the German citizens residing in the country. Despite this drastic action, the apparatus of the German "Fifth Column" was not entirely destroyed. On the contrary, a few enterpri­ sing agents managed to revive their secret organizations and seriously hamper the Allied war effort in Persia. In their attentive design in paralyzing the Allied war efforts in Persia. Germans were hopeful, through utilization of the extant pro-German sentiment in Persia, to receive Persian col­ laboration in one way or another. In fact, there were many influential persons who constantly hoped for a German victory, or at least thought it expedient to reinsure against a German 30 invasion of Persia through the USSR. In January 1942

30George Kirk, "The Middle East in the War," Survey of 139 the German agents made contact with these groups. They organ­ ized together a movement called Milliyun-e-Iran {Nationalists of Iran), which included a Cabinet Minister/ three member of the Majlis, eleven generals, and other senior officers. Its object was to stir up revolts among the Kurds and other tribes in northern Persia, while in the south Major Berthold Schultze, who had escaped arrest in September 1941, was to incite the 31 t southern tribes. During 1942 a German agent, Mayer, went to Isfahan, and made plans wtth a General of the Persian Army for the cooperation of the southern tribes and for revolt when

German troops arrived on Persia's frontiers; final details were to be worked out after the fall of Stalingrad. Mayer also in­ tended to organize a putsch to depose the Shah, and to carry 32 out military operations behind the Allied lines.

The second phase began when on 30 March 1943 six German agents were dropped by parachute near Salt Lake (Daryache Namak),

^International Affairs. 1939-1946 (London: Institute of International Affairs, 1952), p. 156.

3~4>ress release from British Embassy, Teheran: Birming­ ham Post, March 15, 1945, p. 1.

h o w e v e r , when the German Army failed before Stalingrad and at al-Alamaen, Mayer's Persian collaborators at Isfahan took fright; and though he himself slipped away to Teheran, one of them in November led a British intelligence officer to Mayer's suitcase of files, which provided a ’"Who's Who*" of the Persian Fifth Column." Teheran Daily News, March 16, 1945. south of Teheran, and were conveyed to Teheran with money and arms for their accomplices. On 16 July three more Germans and a Persian were landed near Shiraz, joined Schultze, and established communication with Mayer in Teheran. The German plan was now to bring about an armed uprising against the

Persian Government, and to carry out sabotage on the Trans-

Xranian Railway in order to interfere with aid to Russia.

"Our aim, " the German agent Mayer telegraphed Berlin in August,

1943, "would thus be the creation of an independent and neigh­ boring war zone with the object of interrupting supplies and 33 keeping the occupying troops busy." But as the result of the Allied counter measures in August 1943, the Fifth Column was smashed, and concurrently, some 170 Persians were arrest­ ed on charges of collaborating with the Germans. The list in­ cluded a number of high ranking army officers, several editors 34 and deputies, as well as the members of the Xranina Millyun.

Aside from this anti-Nazi activity, Russia dealt a smashing blow to Iranian anti-communist organizations, such as the Dashnak, Mussavatists, and White Russian emigres.

Russia was highly sensitive to the operation of these

3^Teheran Daily News (Teheran) , March 16, 1945.

^4Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 197. organizations, particularly -when Armenians and other Soviet minorities had become the special subject of the German Ost- 35 politik. After the formation of the Ostruppen, or volun­ teer units, amidst the Russian war prisoners, the Soviet 36 Armenian prisoners formed the 812th Armenian Battalion.

The Armenian fighting groups or Azadamardagan (Battle for Free­ dom) were hopeful through collaboration with Nazi Germany to restore their national freedom. The Azadamardagans, who con­ sidered themselves an ultra-Dashnak, established contact with other Dashnak organizations including the Persian Dashnak. 37

Thus, Russians took effective measures towards destruction of these hotbeds of the German penetration. A number of political refugees from these organizations were terrorized or arrested.

Others mysteriously disappeared. This happened not only in the Russian zone of occupation but also in Teheran, although 37 the capital was in the so-called neutral zone.

35German policy towards Russia, the Slavic peoples, and territories eventually occupied by the Wehrmach. See Georg Fischer, Soviet Opposition to £»talin__ (Cambridge, Mas s.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 51. 36 See Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community, The His­ torical Development of_a Social and Ideological Conflict (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 402.

■^Among those who were thus spirited away in Teheran were Sami-Zadeh, an octogenarian, who in the early twenties had cooperated with Sir Henry Deterding in the latter's Cau­ casian oil enterprises. Lenczowski, loc. cit., p. 197. 142

The Soviets1 main purpose for these measures was to maintain tranquillity and calmness in Persia as much as possi­ ble. First of all, the Soviets did not want any interruption

in the transportation of the war materials. Secondly, any hind of disturbance, confusion and aggravation of the situa­ tion might have been exploited by the German agents, particu­ larly when the Persian nationalists,who were pathologically pro-German and indignant of Persia's occupation by the Allied

Powers, were prepared to blacken the water in favor of the

Germans. Thirdly, the creation of a state of rebellion and chaos in the rear of the Soviet war-front was not in the inter­ est of the Soviet Union.

Thus, in order to prevent the emergence of such a situ­ ation, the Soviet occupational forces in Persia avoided bring­ ing about any radical change in their areas of occupation.

This fact deterred Russia from pressing forward with the encour- 38 agement of separatism at that stage. Also, there was no evi­ dence of any immediate land reform in the north.

At the same time, in order to justify their military

Sydney Morrell, Spheres of Influence (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1946), p. 45. 143

occupation and also assuage the nationalists1 indignation, .

the Soviets made attempts to portray themselves as aaviors

of Persia and harbingers of peace and friendship. There were some declarations that the Red Army had come to Persia

to save the country from Nazi aggression. 39 Following this

line/, in January, 1943, the Provincial Committee of the

Center of the Azerbaijan Anti-Fascist Persian Organization is­

sued a directive to the Persian press, which after describing

the works of Fascism, stated:

Persians must recognize that every success of the Red Army and every victory of the Allies in Africa removed the threat of this terrible danger from them. Xt was the Red Army which had destroyed the Nazi hordes at Stalingrad. The October Revolution had saved Persia and now the Red Army had delivered their fatherland. The Persian people would never forget what they owed to Russia. ®

Furthermore, the Soviets frequently declared that they had no design on the territorial integrity and state of independence

of Persia. Commenting on this point, Stalin stated on Novem­ ber 6, 1941:

We have not, and cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of

^Lewis v. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 231.

^°Rahbar (Teheran), February 26, 1943, p. 1 144

foreign peoples— whether it be the peoples and terri­ tories of Europe or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Persia.

The vital need for preservation of internal tranquillity

forced the Communist Party of Persia (Tedeh) to avoid extremism and even avoid giving the impression that it might have revolu­ tionary aims. It did not call itself Communistic; it demanded neither the nationalization of private property nor the collec­ tivization of land. On the contrary, its platform included all the essential features of traditional liberalism, exactly as did the other Persian parties. The Tudeh demanded progres­ sive labor legislation, including social insurance, which would cover large groups of population, and even army officers; the elimination of reactionary elements from public life and the restitution of democratic parties; equality for minorities; reform of administration and of judicial system; disarming of nomad tribes and promotion of order and security; national industrialization; friendly relations with all of Persia's 42 neighbors; and the elimination of foreign interference.

41Joseph Stalin, War Speeches (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), p. 23.

42Rahbar (Teheran), June 25, 1943. 145

Thus, faithful to its claim of being a truly "National­ ist Party," Tudeh supported a "Freedom Front" coalition in

July 1943. Furthermore, during the earlier years of the war, the Tudeh did not attack religion or the Shah, but it did at­ tack "reactionaries" who were accused of collaboration with the Fascists. Generally, it supported the National Government of Persia as long as the latter cooperated with the Allies.

Moreover, in this period, the Tudeh steadfastly denied that any contact existed between it and Soviet authorities. For example, Rahbar asserted on May 7, 1943:

There seems to be an established opinion that the Tudeh Party is an organ of Soviet Communists . . . why conduct a one-sided policy? Why think that every Communist wants only the incorporation of other coun­ tries into the Soviet Union? The Tudeh works for the Iranian nation, for the maintenance of our own constitution, for the freedom of Iranian citizens. The Tudeh wants to introduce in Iran democratic principles such as they are in America. If our party publish pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets fight well against the Fascists. We are sure that the Soviet Government neither intends to introduce Bolshevik government in Iran nor to occupy Iran.43

But, as the war continued, and its outcome became more

and more favorable to the Russians, activities of the Tudeh

43Rahbar (Teheran), May 7, 1943. 146 party in Iran increased. It adopted an opposing tendency toward the Iranian government and the Western Allies, particularly when the relations between the Allied Powers started to deteriorate as the result of the Soviet attempt towards the redistribution of interests in the Middle East* VI

PERSIA IN THE DESIGN OP THE GREAT POWERS *

REDISTRIBUTION OP INTERESTS

With the change of events at the war fronts, and the removal of the German threat from the Caucasus area, Russia set forth a new design conducive to her security interest and beneficial to her great-power role in the international scene. The key to this new ambitious scheme was, in fact,

Soviet national interests which from now on turned out to be the core of all political arrangements which took place during the process of the war. In a word, with the hinge of the war fate, the main Allied task was not only destruction of the Nazi regime, which appeared in the theses of unconditional surrender and inseparable peace, but also attempts towards redistribution of interests between the great victorious powers through terri­ torial satisfaction and political contentment as a necessary step toward postwar realization of the Atlantic principles and collective security system. However, towards this objective, difficulties arose, due to the lack of agreement. about the di­ mensions and limitation of territorial desires and nature of 148 political ambitions, particularly on the Russian side* This was partly because political arrangements could not be based on a solid ground so far as they were subject to the changing logic of military operations. Furthermore, inconsistency be­ tween military fait accompli and political intention of the bargaining powers gave an ambiguous feature to the agreed treaties which later on became subject to different interpre- 1 tations according to their political expediency. Thus, be­ neath the apparent harmony which continued to rule over the

Allied dictation of postwar political rearrangements at Teheran and Yalta, there were growing conflicts which came to the sur­ face at the very rim of the war in Eastern Europe and the

Near East.

Of course, it would be naive to attribute all these dif­ ficulties to the enigmatic character of the Soviet foreign policy or Stalin's wartime calculations. His ambitions were expansive; but they were national rather than international,

Russian rather than revolutionary; and his greed as well as 2 his fears had a strong parochial element at their core.

^See Herbert Feis, Churchill,Roosevelt,Stalin; The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, N.J.; Prince­ ton, University Press', l^sT)", pp. 174-78. 2John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962T7 P- 40. 149

Furthermore, there was no question from the very change of the war course that Russia would emerge as one of the great powers of the world. There was no question that, even more than her prestige, Russia would increase her power and her possessions. There was no question that her main ambitions concerned not international Communist pretige, but primarily

Eastern Europe and her immediate territories in the Wear East.

Some of these had been revealed by Stalin himself long before

Yalta and Teheran and early in the war. This had appeared in the first Eden visit to Moscow only six months after the German attach. There Stalin demanded the Allies' recognition of his territorial interests in the areas which had been acquired under the Nazi-Soviet pact.

These, Stalin's early demands, received the sympathetic responses of the Western Allies during the progress of the war on three grounds: First of all. Western statesmen considered that the entire fate of the war depended on the readiness and ability of Russia to stand up to the German attack. A Western attitude which did not include the profession of a political sympathy for Russia could, they felt, bring discouragement to the Russian people— Russia's resistance might weaken; there might be something conparable to what had occurred in France. 150

Any words of warmth and support which could help to forestall or even to delay such an eventuality ought, it was felt, to 3 be given. Secondly, the Western Allies' procrastination in forming the Second Front, with the result that they were obli­ ged to sit by, month after month, in the European Theater, while the Russian armies absorbed almost the entire impact of the vast German war machine,— this gave the Allied statesmen a pervasive feeling of guilt and inadequacy. The inability to open a second front heightened, in 1942, the fears that Stalin might be led to abandon the war in some way or other. People in London and Washington were inclined to feel that the only measure available to them for decreasing this danger was the adoption of a reasonably sympathetic and encouraging attitude 4 towards Soviet postwar aspirations. Thirdly, to the Western

Allies, particularly President Roosevelt, satisfaction of

Soviet territorial desiderata was conceived as necessary for continual cooperation between the Three Big Powers and future realization of the Atlantic Charter. This concept also found

^George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Tinder Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 357.

4Ibid., p. 358. appeal among the British statesmen. They tended to take a pliant view of such Soviet wishes as seemed to them to be

reasonably grounded on security, history, or any other accept­

able basis. Churchill's view of the matter was expansively

disclosed at Teheran Conference on November 30th, at which

the talk of the three heads of state ranged over the question

of access to warm water ports. He remarked that it seemdd to him important that the nations who would govern the world

after the war should be satisfied and have no territorial or

other ambitions. If that question could be settled in a man­ ner agreeable to the Great Powers, he felt that the world might indeed remain at peace. So he appeared to regard Soviet proposals as to their Western frontiers unobjectionable. But,

as regarded other territorial questions, where it was thought

Soviet presence would be an unjustified intrusion— Western

Europe, the Middle East, and the African coast— the British 5 Government showed a front of resolute denial.

This was almost the frame of Stalin's design towards postwar redistribution of territorial and political interests between the Great Powers. From Stalin's point of view, the

very causes of the two world wars were neither accident nor

mistake, but lack of parity of interests between the Great

5Feis, pp. pit., p. 272. 152

Powers.** He believed military catastrophies might be avoided through redistribution of interests among the world powers 7 by agreement in accordance with their power status. On this ground, Stalin tried to show that satisfaction of Russia's territorial and political interests would be the key to the maintenance of international peace and security. But the main problem turned out to be the lack of agreement about the scope and dimension of the claimed territorial desires by the

Soviet Union. In a word, what has been conceived by Stalin as Russia's vital security interests were different from those which had been realized by the Western Allies. To Stalin, an ardent student of power politics, redistribution of the interests among the Great Powers had to be shaped on two basic grounds: (1) In those areas which have been regarded as the security interest of each of the Great Powers, it has to be free or at will in influencing the'shaping and development of their political affairs; (2) in areas which were centers of confrontation of interests between the Great Powers, there had to be parity of interest between them, either in the form

**Joseph V. Stalin, "The Results of the War and the New Postwar Tasks," The Soviet Union and World Peace (New York: Century Publishers, 1946), pp. 5-6. ^It would be wrong to think that the Second World War 153 of the spheres of influence or common participation in the en­ joyment of profits.

Eastern European countries were placed in the first cate­ gory. From Stalin's point of view, all those countries which were the Germans' satellites and their armies were used as auxiliary forces against the Soviet Union, or were used as jumping boards against it should have been earmarked as the areas of Soviet security interests. Therefore, the Soviets have to be free in coaching and influencing their political affairs.

Commenting on this fact, Stalin stated:

One cannot forget the fact that Germans carried out an invasion of the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Germans were able to carry out the invasion through these countries by reason of the fact that these countries had governments inimicable to the Soviet Union. One can ask, therefore, what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, in a desire to insure

7 was a casual occurrence or the result of mistakes of any particular statesmen, though mistakes undoubtedly were made. . . . The fact is, that the unevenness of development of the countries usually leads in time to violent disturbance of equi­ librium in the world politics, that group of countries which considers itself worse provided for than others with raw materi­ als and markets usually making attempts to alter the situation and repartition of the "spheres of influence" in its favor by armed force. The result is a splitting of the powers into two hostile camps and war between them. Perhaps military catastrophies might be avoided if it were possible for raw materials and markets to be periodically redistributed among the various countries with their economic importance, by agreement and peaceful settlement. J.V. Stalin, The Results of the War and the New Postwar Tasks, pp. 6-7. 154

its security for the future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose rela­ tions to the Soviet Union are loyal.®

Soviet methods towards realization of these objectives were not really complicated. There were two ways in which

Stalin could hope to get the things he wanted. One was to

seize them in the course of military operations and not let go; the other was to induce the Allies to promise that they

should be conceded to the Soviet Union in the future peace settlement. The first of these means depended on the course of military operations; the other depended directly on the 9 disposition of the Allied governments. But actually, even the first was something which the Allied governments had it 10 within their power to influence.

Qpravda (Moscow), March 13, 1946, p. 1.

®Kennan, op. cit., p. 350.

^®In fact, there were two ways to limit Russia's pros­ pective extension of power and the forceful Sovietization of large parts of Eastern, Central and Southern Europe. One was diplomatic, the other military; and though the two ways could not be altogether separate, circumstances dictated the differ­ ent emphasis. The military was to precede the Russians in Central and Eastern Europe, where and when this was still pos­ sible. Churchill tried to convince his American allies in vain about the military feasibility of small-scale Allied land­ ings in the Adriatic in 1942 and 1943; about the exploitation of the Allied advance through Italy in the direction of 155

Soviet immediate territories in the Middle East or other parts were placed in the second category, since these areas have been centers of confrontation of interests between the great Allied powers, the Soviet regarded the pari­ ty of interests a primary step toward the postwar cooperation.

Here, by the fact of the existing mutual interests, Soviet de­ mands were less than outright domination of the area which had been desired in its pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. At the same time, by the sheer fact of the strategic importance of the area, the Soviet regarded any unilateral domination of

Turkey and Persia as detrimental to its national interests.

Because Istanbul, Kars, and Tabriz looked, from the Russian standpoint, like daggers whose unsheathed points all touched the skin of Russia's soft under-belly. The wheat fields of the Ukraine, the ores and industries of the Donetz Basin, and the oil fields of the Caucasus were at this date the sources of Russia's vital energy. Thus, a future hostile naval or air attack from the south might be equally deadly, and the provi­ sion of less dangerously exposed centers of production in the

lO^rieste, Zagreb, Budapest, Vienna in 1944 and 1945. The political way flowed from the recognition that Russia had a principal share in the Allied victory but that this share should be reasonably defined before the end of the war. Here, too, Washington steadfastly refused to discuss such political particulars until the war was over and peacemaking took place. 156

Urals and in Western Siberia, even if practicable at all, must continue to lie along the southern border, or, in other words, continue to be in jeopardy.

On the other hand, any Soviet attempt in dominating this area would have been detrimental to the Western Allies' interests, particularly those of Great Britain. Britain's oil interests in northeastern Iraq and in southwest Persia were hardly better screened from the danger of a would-be Russian blow. If British and American aircraft might be in a position to bomb Baku from the bases in Iraq or still farther afield,

Russian tanks might be in a position to bear down from Qara- bagh to the river of Egypt, astride communications between the

Atlantic region on the one side and India, southeast Asia and

Australia on the other.

In short, on the ground of such a confrontation of inter­ ests, the Soviet attempted design toward redistribution of in­ terests in the Middle East was not answered positively by the

Western Allies. On the one hand, Soviet demands towards the revision of the Monteux Convention and establishment of its influence at the Straits was postponed to the future Peace

Conferences and direct negotiation with the Turkish 157 11 Government. On the other hand, the Soviet attempted efforts towards a new division of interests in Persia faced with dif­ ficulties for the following reasons: First of all, at this time (1943-45) Persia was still under the Allied military occu­ pation, and the Soviet was physically in control of the northern part of the country. However, the Soviet from the very begin­ ning tried to look towards this areas as its sphere of influ- 12 ence rather than a mere zone of occupation. Secondly, unlike the ambiguous nature of the Eastern European political arrange­ ments, the very character of the Allied military occupation and postwar status of Persia had been clearly defined through the

Tripartite Agreement of 1942, Teheran Conference of 1943, and finally the Yalta Treaty of 1945. Thirdly, those very

11See Official Documents, Texts of Selected Documents on U.j3 . Foreign Policy 1918-1952 (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1952), pp. 10-19.

^ I n fact, from the very beginning of the occupation of Persia, the Russians showed a strong sense of suspicion toward any intrusion in their zone of occupation by the Western Allies. Though Russian officers and officials had free access to the British occupied zone in southern Persia, they showed themselves very unwilling to allow British officers to enter their northern zone, even for the purpose of preparing its de­ fence in the event of a German break-through. This sensitivity toward external interference in northern Persia was further ex­ pressed, when Stalin rejected the following demand of Churchill: 158 so-called justifiable values which could be attributed to the

Soviet political design in the Eastern European theater/ such as the price of immense sacrifice, reward for the liberation of the area from the Hitlerite yoke, menace of the German 13 revival, and finally guilt complex and inadequacy on the

TO If you wish to withdraw the five or six Russian divisions from Persia for use on the battle-front we will take over the whole responsibility of keeping or­ der and maintaining and improving the supply route* I pledge that faith of Britain that we will not seek any rightful Russian interest during the war or at the end (Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 431 and 485 respec­ tively) . This assurance did not allay Soviet suspicions and Stalin re­ jected it. Again, in September 1941, when Averell Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook were in Moscow to investigate the Soviet Union's needs, Stalin asked Beaverbrook whether Great Britain could not send some of her troops to the Ukraine* When Beaver­ brook proposed a transfer of British troops from Persia via the Caucasus, Stalin, eternally distrustful and perhaps remem­ bering the British advance along the same line during the civil war in 1918-19, rejected the offer (George Von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, p* 317)• Furthermore, when in December 1942 the American troops entered into Persia in order to facilitate the movement of supplies to the USSR, the Soviet immediately put an inquiry to American intentions* In fact, the Soviet desired to satisfy itself that American participation in Corri­ dor operations did not infringe or diminish any rights enjoyed by the Soviet Union in northern Persia (Hotter, p. 437)• With the change of the war course and development of pa­ tent conflicts between the Allied Powers, the Soviet became more sensitive and suspicious towards any interference in its zone of occupation, not only by the Western Allies, but by the Persian Government.

l^These themes recalled most often by the Allied leaders* Commenting on this fact, Stalin maintained: 159 14 part of the Western Allies* could not be justified on Middle

Eastern stage and Persian frontier. On the contrary, Persia has been an ally in war and also her sacrifice to the cause of the peace has been highly appreciable.

Thus, as the result of these difficulties, Soviet neces­ sarily narrowed down its political ambitions to the demand of the parity of interest with two other Great Powers through sharing the exploitation of the oil resources of the Middle

East. It has been stated that at Teheran Stalin demanded the postwar development and distribution of Middle Eastern oil, 14 but the Allied Powers could not reach any agreement. Accor­ ding to Borsen-Zeitung, Stalin had ashed for a one-third share 15 in the Arabian Oil Company. Le Monde, reporting American sources, Stalin requested an annual allocation of 20 million 16 tone of the Middle Eastern oil for home consumption and export.

13A s a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost about 7,000,000 people. In other words, the Soviet Union has lost in men several times more than Britain and the United States together. It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion these sacri­ fices of the Soviet people which insured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union can­ not forget them (Pravda, March 13, 1946)•

14John Kimche, "Oil and Arab Nationalism," Journal of the Middle East Study No. 2, Spring 1947, p. 72. ^^Borsen-Zeitung (Berlin), March 25, 1944. Monde (Paris), January 30, 1945. 160 In the following year the issue of oil again came to the fore, when the Anglo-American powers took steps toward redistribu­ tion of the oil resources of the Middle East. This action prompted the Soviet Union to renew its demand on the basis of 17 equality of the Great Powers' privileges in the area.

Early in 1944, the United States launched an ambitious program towards exploitation of new oil fields in the Middle

East involving the drilling of wells in Arabia and the trans­ portation of the oil produced to Mediterranean ports through

American-built pipelines. The proposal aroused suspicious

British reaction, since the area had been traditionally British domain. Thus, the United States proposals led to counter-propo­ sals from Great Britain and the dispatch of a mission, headed

•*-^The Soviet oil position was relatively strong before the beginning of World War II. Production figures for 1938 credited the Soviet Union with 11% of European oil production for that year. Roumania had 18%, and of the remaining 5%, Germany had 1.5 and Poland 1.3. As the war progressed the oil reserves of the Middle East took on new significance. Rumor spread that the oil deposits in Saudi Arabia were the most ex­ tensive untapped reserves in the world. To the north and east lay the oil fields of Mesopotamia and Persia. Still farther north were the principal fields of European Russia. Secretary of the Interior Ickes, from his vantage point as United States Petroleum Administrator, launched an ambitious program invol­ ving the drilling of wells in Arabia and the transportation of the oil produced to Mediterranean ports through American-built pipelines. The proposal aroused particular interest because the oil fields of the Eastern Mediterranean; at that time domi­ nated by British capital and American oil concerns, were trying to secure a foothold in the area. 16X by Lord Beaverbrook, to discuss tbe entire problem with repre­ sentatives of the Washington Government. The upshot of this discussion was the "Agreement on Petroleum between the Govern­ ment of the United States of America and the Government of the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," signed

August 8 , 1944 by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius and Lord 18 Beaverbrook. Whatever the intention of the signers, the Anglo-

American Oil Agreement sounded like a proposal under which the two principal capitalist nations were to divide between them­ selves oil reserves that promised to be an extremely important 19 source of postwar economic and military power.

At the same time, the British and American interests were seeking additional concessions from the Persian Government.

Late in 1943, the Royal Dutch-Shell, followed early in 1944 by the (American) Socony Vacuum and Sinclair Companies, opened exploratory talks with Persia for oil concessions in the south­ ern provinces. The Persian Government in April 1944 employed

18Scott Nearing, The Soviet Union as A World Power (New York: Island Workshop Press, 1945), p. 60. 19 Textually, the agreement provided that "preparatory to the convocation of a world petroleum conference for the negoti­ ation of a multilateral agreement . . . the two governments a- gree that the development of petroleum resources for interna­ tional trade should be expanded in an orderly manner on a world-wide basis." 162

as petroleum consultants an American firm to frame a conces­

sionary formula that might be used in the projected contracts 20 with the oil companies.

The presence of the American geologists (A.A. Curtice

and Herbert Hoover, Jr.) was voiced with opposition by the

Communist Deputies in the Persian Majlis. During the parlia­

mentary debate in August, the Communist Deputy Radmanesh stat­

ed that, if Persia was to grant oil concessions to the Ameri­

cans, impartiality demanded the engagement of experts of another

nationality. In the same speech, Radmanesh went on record as 21 opposing, on behalf of his party, any foreign concessions.

The Persian nationalists, too, were opposed to grants of oil

to the foreign powers. They were afraid that an additional

oil concession to the British might bring Persia further under the politico-economic domination of Great Britain.

The engagement of Anglo-American exploratory discussion prompted the Soviet Union entering into the arena of competi­

tion and demanding parallel concessions. On September 15, be­

fore any agreements had yet been consummated, a Soviet mission, headed by Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Sergei I.

^Ofiurewitz, °E* cib» * P- 156.

O 1 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 241. Kavtaradze, arrived in Teheran. The Soviet diplomat proceed­ ed to demand an exclusive five-year exploratory concession em­ bracing the five northern provinces then under Russian occupa- tion. 22 Thus, by getting into competition with the Western Al­ lies, the Soviet tried not only to assert the rule of "Great

Povers1 equality of interest," but also through the establish­ ment of a foothold in northern Persia to influence the orienta­ tion of the political life of the country, and also to solve all the problems of its oil industry— the supply difficulties 23 a nd the oil bottleneck.

In response to the Soviet demand, the Persian Government immediately suspended oil discussions with all foreign repre­ sentatives, and announced that applications for oil concessions must wait until the end of the war. They gave September 2

(some days before the arrival of the Soviet emissary) as the date of the decision, but as this was not made known until after the Soviet application was received.

The decision appeared to the Russians to be directed

^Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 241.

^Heinrich Hassmann, Oil in the Soviet Union (Prince--' ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 141. 164 24 against them. Persia was accused of always siding with the

Western Powers, of being ready to grant them concessions at

all times, and to be seldom in an acquiescent mood toward 25 Russia. Furthermore, Mr. Kavtaradze announced that coopera­

tion between the Soviet authorities and Mr. Saed's government

had come to an end. The Soviet papers portrayed Saed as a

collaborator with Fascist and pro-Fascist elements. They also

accused the Persian Government of neglect for not punishing

the "harmful actions of certain evil-intentioned elements" who

had sabotaged the regular flow of Allied supplies to the Soviet

Union through Persia, and for not opposing the "intensification

of subversive work of pro-Fascist elements." The Premier him­

self was criticized for having rendered Persia's relations with the Allies "strained and ties."^

On October 24, Vice-Commissar Kavtaradze, in a press

conference held in the Soviet Embassy, appealed to the Persian public to bring pressure to bear on the Government, "for a 27 favorable solution of the dispute." He also stated that

24The Middle East, a, Political and Economic Survey (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,1950),p.284.

2 ^Hamzawi, op. cit., p. 32. 2®New York Times, October 23, 1944, p. 3.

^Ettlaat (Teheran) , October 24, 1944, p. 1* 165

the Persian Premier had not only declared his complete agree­

ment and justice of the Soviet claim, but had promised to as­

sist in a positive solution of the question; but made no refer­

ence to the fact that, hav ing apparently been welcomed to

Teheran for the unexceptionable purpose of reviving the Kavire

Khurian concession, he had subsequently claimed an exploratory 28 concession for an area extended at 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 square kilometers.

His argument, that if the Persian Government chose to grant a

concession to the Americans in southeast Persia, they should

give the Soviets a concession in the north, was an appeal to 29 the power-politics principle of compensations. It also re­

vealed that hew important was for Stalinist Russia recognition

of the Soviet power privileges and its parity status in south­

ern immediate territories. Walter Bedell Smith, former Ameri­

can Ambassador to Moscow, reports in his book. My Three Years

in Moscow, a talk with Stalin which deserves special attention:

. . . Stalin spoke then in detail on the Persian oil question, including a history of Soviet-Persian rela­ tions since the Treaty of Versailles. He emphasized how important it was for the Soviet Union to get a larger share in the exploitation of the world oil de­ posits and maintained that first Britain and then the

2 ®Hassmann, op. cit., p. 285.

2^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Hew York; 1948), p. 150. i 166

United States had laid obstacles in her way when she endeavored to obtain oil concession. You don’t understand our position as regards oil in Persia, said Stalin literally. The oil fields of Baku are our main source of raw material in this regard. They lie in the immediate vicinity of the Persian border and are very vulnerable.

In response to the appeal of Kavtaradze to the Persian public, the Tudeh staged a massive demonstration against the

Government of Saed. Along with this, Soviet forces paraded through the city with armored cars, trucks, motorcycles and machine guns. The Soviets immediately projected these as sup­ port of the public for the Soviet demand. In a note to the

United States Government, the Soviet authorities stated: "As can be seen frcm the events which followed in Persia, the hos­ tile attitude taken toward the U.S.S.R. by the former Prime

Minister, Mr. Saed, met with disapproval of many Persian poli­ tical leaders and wide circles of Persian public opinion.

The Tudeh and its affiliated papers, while harping on this theme, repeatedly enqphasized the idea, that the Soviet proposal would be the only panacea for postwar unemployment and economic crisis. They identified the interests of the Soviet Union with

^°Walter Bedell Smith, Meine deri Jahre in Moskau (Hamburg, 1950), p. 6 6 .

"^New York Times, December 28, 1944. 167 32 the welfare of Persian workers.

Having faced this political dilemma, the Persian

Government tried to get out of this deadlock through a legal 33 device* On December 2, 1944, the Majlis passed a law, pro­

posed by Dr* Mossadegh, that no Cabinet Minister could enter

into negotiation or grant oil concessions to foreigners with­

out the approval of the Majlis. The Soviets considered this

directed against them, and chose to regard it as an American and British maneuver to prevent the Soviet Union from obtain-

ing any oil concession. 34 Thus, this constituted the second

contributing cause of alleged Russian grievances against Persia.

Thereupon, Kavtaradze left Persia, saying that the law was a

great mistake and Persian-Soviet relations would suffer there­

by.

32Rahbar (Teheran), October 26, 1944.

33In reality, the Persian Government was afraid that the Russians might gain a generally preponderant position in Persia's northern provinces if a Soviet concession were granted on a government-to-govemment basis rather than a government-to-company basis. A.K.S. Lambton, "Iran," The Middle East, edited by Elizabeth Monroe (London: Royal Insti­ tute of International Affairs, 1948), p. 210.

34Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 241. 168

Meanwhile, both at Malta and at Yalta in February 1945, the related matters of oil concessions and withdrawal of troops were discussed. During the United States-British Confer­ ence at Malta, Mr. Stettinius made it clear that the United

States thought the Soviet Union should cease putting pressure on Persia for oil concessions at this time. Mr. Bden suggest­ ed, furthermore, that all three nations should begin troops removals as soon as the need for the supply line was over— per- haps by June. 35

A week later, Persia was discussed among the Big Three at the Crimea Conference at Yalta. At the Foreign Ministers' level on 8 February, Mr. Eden urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Persian matters. He said that, although it was not British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil concessions, he felt that the Allies should not press for concessions until troops were out of the country.

He proposed a withdrawal earlier than the six-month limit speci­ fied in the 1942 Treaty. Mr. Molotov stated that oil conces­ sions and troop removals had been two different matters; the idea of earlier troop withdrawal never had been put before the Soviet Government until then, and he would need time for

35Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians (New York: Doubleday, 1949) , p. 65. 169

study. Concerning oil concessions, he added that, since the4

situation was not acute, he recommended that it be left alone

to take its own course. 36 Stettinius pointed out that United

States oil companies had been negotiating for concessions but had now stepped, and he added that he supported the British proposal for earlier troop withdrawals. "Molotov replied

that he believed it might be advisable to limit the Persian

question to an exchange of views, and offered to send for his

Persian specialist; but Eden said he would like to think this

over and the meeting adjourned. A couple of days later:

We closed our foreign ministers1 conference with dis­ agreement on the Persian question. Eden and I favored the issuing of a document on Persia, and Molotov opposed it. Although we both explained that we attached great importance to the Persian question, he stated that it was impossible for him to go any further into the ques­ tion at this time.3®

Sherwood has summarized the Yalta proceeding with regard to

Persia: "On this one subject the Western Allies ran into a blank wall of disagreement. "39

3 6 Ibid., p. 194.

3 8 Ibid., p. 258.

39Richard W. Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case 1946 (Mew York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952), p. 2 1 . 170

Throughout 1945 this subject continued to crop up, al­ though it was not raised at the San Francisco Conference.

During the Conference, however, and following the armistice in Europe, Persia formally requested the three nations to be- 40 gin immediately the withdrawal of all troops. At Potsdam the matter was discussed again. There, “Stalin declined to set any date for mutual troop withdrawal, pointing out that 41 northern Persia was too near Baku." The Berlxn Protocol resulting from this meeting contained a separate section which still did not commit anyone to a full removal, and the issue was postponed to be considered at the meeting of the Council 42 of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

Inside Persia, Russian relations with the Western Allies became extremely cool, particularly after the Soviet failure in receiving oil concessions. By the end of 1944, Russia be­ gan to shift its campaign of vituperation from the Germans to the Western Allies. Soviet propaganda lost its passive

4®The New York Times. May 31, 1945, p. 1.

4**Thilip E. Mosely, “Face to Face with Russia, '* Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, No. 70 (July-August 1948) *, p. 29.

42Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 234. 171 feature and took a rather sharp and hostile attitude towards both internal bourgeois and external imperialism. Political activity moved to the international level and outside forces 42 began to exert greater influence on Persian politics. Con­ trol of political activity in the north tightened. By 1945, it was unsafe to profess allegiance to the rightist parties, or to edit and distribute any Nationalist Papers. Incurring the displeasure of Soviet Consuls or Red Army Commanders re­ sulted either in periods in jail or in expulsion from the 43 Soviet zone.

Along with the stepping up of the Soviet anti-Western propagandism, the Tudeh Party, too, embarked on a hostile poli­ cy toward the Persian Government. The Tudeh papers, after 1944, dwelt on two aspects of the Persian problem; they tried not only to strengthen the Communist Party of Persia and win the support of poverty-stricken people, but they also carried on a campaign to discredit the United States Government in Persia and to elaborate on the follies of the British authorities in 44 Teheran. The Tudeh papers, after 1944, attacked each suc­ cessive government of Persia as the "hirelings of the imperial­ ists, " "Fascists," and "enemies of people and democracy."

43Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 198. 44Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy (New York: Whitteer Books Inc., 1954), p. 211. 172

On December 16, 1944, the newspaper Rahbar wrote:

Our fight against the ruling class will be relent­ less and continue. We must destroy the corrup-ridden and tottering structure. Every Government which fights against our movement is Fascist and must be eliminated. Every group which hinders real cooperation between Per­ sia and the Soviet Union is the lackey of the black imperialism and the foe of the people of Persia. We have no illusion about the policy and plan of the present ruling class, They are the hold-over°the Reza Khan regime and the cronies of the imperialist embas­ sies. The masses of the people must unite and liqui­ date them.4 6

With the increase of political troubles along the rime of war, the relations among the Allied Powers deteriorated fur­ ther and further- Ryssia and the Communist parties all over the world initiated a hostile campaign against the Western Al­ lies. Xn Persia likewise, the Communist papers and propaganda machine embarked on a massive attack against the Western imper­ ialism. Mardom, in December, 1944 wrote:

With the approval of the American Government, Herbert Hoover— reactionary, grim hunger President— is persuad­ ing the American public to go all alone, and sign a separate peace with Germany. Hoover and Churchill, who for so long waged a separate war, now demand a separate peace.4 6

In another article, on November 16, 1944, Razm, talking about the postwar policy of the United States, stated:

46Rahbar (Teheran) , December 16, 1944, p. 1.

46Mardpm (Teheran), December 28, 1944, pp. 1-2. 173

It seemed incredible that the world might even be called upon to witness a repetition of those methods which had enabled Germany to plunge the world into blood and ruins. American postwar policy shaped by Hoover and his reactionary friends was against the Soviet Government and called to mind once more the dragon's teeth.4 7

Along this line, the Soviet papers also launched an

intensive attach against the Anglo-American activities in

Persia. The Americans and especially the British were accus­

ed of supporting the reactionary Persian Government. Vitupe­

ration that was formerly anti-Nazi was now shifted against

Russia's Allies.**8

This event, which marked the turning point in Soviet anti—Fascist strategy, was followed by a new political stra—

tegy, namely, anti-imperialist strategy. A program that continued with increased intensity throughout the last year

of war.

47Razm (Teheran), November 16, 1944, p. 1.

4®Richard N. Frye, Iran (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953), p. 84. VII

SOVIET ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRATEGY

As the war drew toward its close, the split between

the East and the West became more and more open. The very

design of the postwar status quo, which had been figured

out by the Great Powers during the progress of the war, re­

mained on paper. Cooperation between the super-Powers start­

ed to be shahen as each part found its political ambitions

frustrated by the devices and plots of other partners.

Stalin’s frustrated aim, in assertingthe claims of the Soviet

Union as a power to be tahen into consideration and actively

consulted on all matters throughout the globe on a parity with the United States as a global director, forced him to

return to the game of power politics and engage in political maneuvering against the Western Powers so far as his power potential permitted. The Western Powers, who had accepted

Russiab pretensions as a great power with all its privileges, but not potentially a dynamic global power to be shared with

in matters which traditionally and geographically had never been the sphere of the Russian influence, found the excessive

Soviet drive in Central Europe and the Middle East incompatible 175

with the pattern of the great Powers' coalition.^" They, too,

saw the resumption of power politics an inevitable result of

the emerging situation.

In the Western world, the Soviet attempted designs to­

ward insuring friendly government along its Western and South­

ern frontiers, was viewed in three different ways. Those who

believed that the Soviet foreign policy was not in essence

different from the pattern of Tsarist Russia insisted that the

Western nations resume their historical role in containing

Soviet Russia along its own natural borders. Quite naturally,

they were as fearful of Moscow’s drive for influence abroad

as were statesmen twenty-five years before or during the Cri­

mean War.^ The Soviet postwar policy was also alarming to a

^The Western Allies' reluctance* in permitting Soviet participation in the political arrangement of such areas could be found in the design for the surrender of Italy. The Western Powers1 one-sided decision on Italian affairs resulted in a sharp note from Stalin to Roosevelt and Churchill, which in part read as follows: . . . until now the matter stood as follows. The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agree­ ments between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate the situation any longer. (Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 172.

2An Interpretation of Current International Events by

I 176 second group, who believed in the necessity of Anglo-American-

Russian cooperation. To this group, however, each of the big three was guilty of following alarming unilateral policies in many of the most troubled areas of Europe, the Middle East and

Asia, The Soviet Union’s resumption of many Russian policies laid down before World War I constitutes a historical lag, but hardly cause for criticism by the Western Powers, who have 3 constantly sought similar aims in these areas. But to the third group, political controversies in different parts of the world had to be analyzed, each according to its own merit.

Thus, while they were ready to accept, even justify, Soviet ac­ tions in Eastern Europe on the grounds of security, heavy sac­ rifices, and other reasons, they were disdainful in approving

Soviet power drives in Persia and other parts of Asia.

Stalin1s behavior in Eastern Europe seemed to them all the more justified when it became known that Churchill and Anthony

Eden had agreed with Stalin in 1944 to give the U.S.S.R. a free hand in Bulgaria and Rumania in return for allowing

the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association, Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York) , Vol. XXV, No, 8 , Decem­ ber 7, 1945, p. 1,

^Vera Micheles Dean, "Is Russia Alone to be Blamed?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXV, No. 21, March 8 , 1946, pp. 1 -2 . 117

Britain a free hand in Greece, But Soviet political maneu­ vering in Persia dame as a shock to this group. To most of them the situation in Persia in March 1946 looked like an 4 open-and-shut case. The background was less complicated than the situation in Eastern Europe. Therefore, they insis­ ted on a firm stand against the soviet political drive in the

Middle East.^

Accordingly, the synthetic outcome of these three ap­ proaches turned out to be adoption of the "policy of contain­ ment" by the Western Powers as a response to the postwar exacerba­ ting challenge,. Of course, such policy did not intend to drive the Soviet back to its natural frontiers, but tried to keep the Soviet more or less along its newly-built Communist camp.

In short, the logical conclusion which could be derived from this policy was de facto recognition of two hostile blocs by the Western Powers.

On the Russian side, the emerging conflict between.the

East and West was termed as the collapse of the wartime co­ operation and inevitable reappearance of the Stalinist concept

4Thcmas W. Wilson, Jr., Cold War and Common Sense (New York: Graphic Society, 1962), p. 12.

^Ibid., p. 14. 178

of two hostile camps. A return to the concept of two hostile

camps was suggested as early as August 1945 by Mikhail Kalinin:

We cannot for one minute forget the basic fact that our country remains the one socialist state in the world. . . . The victory achieved does not mean that all dangers to our state structure and social order have disappeared. . . . In order that the danger of war may really disappear for^a long time it is necessary to consolidate our victory.

This ideo-political interpretation of international politics ne­

cessarily required a strategic change in the Soviet foreign poli

cy. Anti-Fascist strategy, the rationale of Great Powers'

coalition, gave way to anti-imperialist strategy, an inevitable

feature of two hostile camps idea. Soviet foreign policy re­

sumed both messianic and catastrophic features in a new form.

While the Soviet took a messianic mission toward the advance­ ment of the Communist cause in Europe and Asia, it carefully held in check the catastrophic tendencies. In a word, Soviet

anti-imperialist strategy has had both offensive and defensive,

limited and unlimited phases in objective. An advance has had a defensive rationale, not only because the politically dead

enemy is the only safe enemy, but also because it improves one's 7 defensive position in relation to the enemy's next onslaught.

Frederick C. Barghoorm, "The Soviet Union Between War and Cold War," Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science, May 1949, p. 4.

7Michael M. Karpovich, "Russian Imperialism and Communist 179

In Stalinists' views, by advancing as far as possible one de­

nies to the enemy as many assets as possible; the enemy would

occupy any temporary no man's land unless one anticipates him.

At the same time, by the acquisition of more areas one in fact

creates additional leeways to engage in retreat, if that should become necessary- In short, in the design of Soviet anti—im­

perialist strategy, by engineering a new crisis one, in fact,

cools off the previous one and forces the enemy to recognize it

as a fait accompli. Hurried establishment of the Kurdish Re­ public of Mahabad was an attempt on the part of the Soviet

Union in forcing the Persian Government to yield to the Soviets' previous oil demand. Or attentive design in engineering a new problem in Germany was partly an attempt toward cooling off

the Czechoslovakian issue.

Since the Soviet in the early postwar years was not ac­

tually and potentially (not ideologically) a dynamic global power, therefore, the application of anti-imperialist strategy was necessarily confined to the geographically adjacent zone

of interests of two rival camps. As such, Persia turned out to

be one of the centers of rivalry between the two opposing blocs.

^Aggression," Soviet Communist in World Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 189. 180

The split between East and West indeed first became obvious in Persia* It developed as the result of oil compe­ tition between the Allied Powers and the Soviet's failure in getting such a concession. From a policy of restraint, the

Allies now tended toward a policy of manipulation hardly condu- 8 cive to the political stability in Persia. The Russians began to look more closely at the Tudeh Party as a possible instru­ ment of policy, and soon it became identified both in public mind and in fact with Soviet policy in Persia. The instrumen­ tality role of the Tudeh seemed to be more ind^aensable when, in 1945, the Western Powers began to turn their attention to the situation that would arise in Persia after the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Persia. As mentioned before, in a series of conferences which held between the foreign ministers of the Allied Powers, attempts were made for reaching agree­ ment about the date of troop withdrawal from Persia. They failed to achieve any positive decision, due to the dilatory 9 tactics of the Soviet Union, since all these things looked

®Ii.P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran (1941- 1948)," The Middle East Journal, Vol. Ill, No. 1, January 1949, pp. 45-53. 9 See Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.. Roosevelt and the Rus­ sians (New York: Doubleday, 1949), pp. 65-149. 181 unfavorable to the Soviet Union, which had not yet satisfied its political ambition through insuring friendly government in Persia and establishing a foothold in the northern part of the country. It looked as if future balance of power would change heavily in favor of the Western Powers in this strategic part of the world. Thus, in order to influence the future political course in Persia and also strengthen its bar­ gaining position against the Western Powers and the Persian

Government, the Soviet tried to utilize three available ele­ ments in Persia, namely, its occupational forces, national minority, and the Communist Party. In a word, under the very conditions of its military occupation, the Soviet tried to utilize the separatist tendency among the national minorities through the instrumentality of the Tudeh Party.

The first Soviet experimentation in trying the will and power resistance of the Allied governments and the Persian state appeared in late summer 1945. In August, the Tudeh's armed partisans, protected by Soviet troops, captured several

Government buildings at Tabriz, and attempted to impose their rule upon the city and upon the adjacent area. Simultaneously, a manifesto demanding administrative and cultural autonomy for

Azerbaijan within the framework of the Persian states was I

I I 182

issued in the form of leaflets. Attempts of the Central Govern­

ment to intervene were fruitless. Yet, after a few weeks, the

situation seemed to calm down. The Tudeh evacuated the few

buildings it had taken. Communication between Teheran and Ta­

briz was restored and the local Government regained authority.

But, in reality, under this tranquil surface a new event was

taking form. The first Soviet trial showed signs of success

and the response of the Western Allies and the Persian Govem- 10 ment was not strong enough to change the Soviet design of mind.

Meanwhile, the Tudeh Party was dissolved in Azerbaijan

and its membership transferred to a Democratic Party of Azer- 11 baijan under the leadership of Jaafare Pishehvari. Galvaniz­

ed into new life, it began to agitate for provincial autonomy,

though not for independence. In November a revolt broke out

in the provincial centers outside Tabriz andcommunications with

^-^Lenczowski, op. pit., p. 287. •^There were two reasons for transformation of the Tudeh to the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan: First, Tudeh was a na­ tional party and apparently worked for the cause of the Persian society and nation. Thus, engagement in separatist activities was incompatible with its claim of being wholly a Persian Commu­ nist Party. Secondly, though Russia used the Tudeh Party for propagandism, they never trusted the Party. Instead, they put their hope on a few veteran Communists such as Jaafare Pisheh— vari, the head of the Kaveh Party, and a group of imported Communists from the Soviet Azerbaijan, such as Danishiyan. 183

Teheran were cut. Tabriz authorities tried to dispatch troops

to deal with the rebels but were denied exit from the city by

the Soviet Commander for a period of ten days, at the end of

which such dispatch would have failed and left Tabriz exposed

to an earlier fall. Delegates were elected to a Provincial

Assembly of an Autonomous Azerbaijan, which met in Tabriz on

12 December 1945, the day the city was entered and taken over by the rebels. A constitution was adopted and a government 12 with Pishevari as its first Premier was set up.

The ostensible cause of the rebellion was unsatisfied demand by the Azerbaijanis for "autonomy." The rebels, calling

themselves "Democrats," set up a "National Congress," though

they stated that they proposed to remain within the structure

of the Persian state.^ At first the Azerbaijan Democrats

sought only the following concessions from the Government in

Teheran: an increase of representation from Azerbaijan in the

Majlis, the introduction of the teaching of Turkish in the

schools, and reforms in the provincial government and taxation.

There was no indication that the Soviets, in the beginning, wanted Azerbaijan to secede from Persia. Rather they hoped to

12See Security Council, Official Records, First Year: First Series, Supplement No. JL, Documents No. 5 and 6 , pp. 52- 53. 184

use Azerbaijan as a lever or tool against the Central Govern- 14 ment. But the naive responses on the parts of the Persian

Government and the Western Allies encouraged the Soviets to

take further aggressive steps in Persia.

Although Government troops had previously been unsuccess­

ful in penetrating Azerbaijan, they were again dispatched but were turned back by the Red Army only a short distance from

Teheran on the road to Azerbaijan.1 5

The Persian Embassies at Washington and London protested the Soviet interferences. The United States made inquiries of

Moscow; and on November 25, Secretary Byrnes addressed a note to the Soviet and British Governments, asking that all forces be removed before January 1, 1946. At the same time he an­ nounced that orders were being issued for the removal of Ameri­ can troops prior to that date. The Soviets refused to withdraw before March 2, 1946 and because of their refusal the British declared that their forces would stay until the expiration of the Treaty period. The United States Government proposed to send a commission of its own to Azerbaijan to inquire into the

1 4Thomas, op, cit., p. 236.

1^Security Council, Official Records, First Year; First Series, Supplement No. 1, Documents No. j5 and _6 , pp. 53-54. 185 situation; but the diplomat sent from the State Department to join the commission failed to obtain a travel permit from the

Soviets and, after waiting for a time in Teheran, returned to 16 Washington. Furthermore, an atempt to see things at first hand by Colonel William T. Sexton, the American Military Atta- / u n / che in Teheran was/successful because the armed Democrats put him and. those who accompanied him under arrest and released them only with the understanding that they would return direct 17 ly to Teheran.

The Soviet Union replied on 26 November to the Iranian complaint with a categorical denial of each and all of the charges and declared that there had been no interference of any hind. The force of this denial, however, was weakened by the final statement; which read as follows:

. . . With regard to the fact that the Iranian Govern­ ment has deemed it necessary to dispatch armed forces to Azerbaijan for the purpose of maintaining security, since their arrival there at this juncture would cause disturb­ ances and bloodshed, and since in the event of the out­ break of disturbances the Soviet Government would, to maintain security in the areas Where her armed forces are

1 6 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Backeround Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations. H. Res. 206 (Wash., DC: Govt. Printing Office, 1950), pp. 21ff. 186

stationed, be constrained to complement her armed forces, which the Soviet Government does not wish to do, therefore, in view of the presence of the army and gendarmerie in those localities, the ar­ rival of supplementary Iranian forces is not con­ sidered advisable.

At the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Byrnes told Generalissimo Stalin he felt that, unless the Allies liv­ ed up to their commitments about evacuation, Iran "very likely would place its complaint before the forthcoming meeting of 19 the United Nations" and that, as a signatory of the Teheran

Declaration, the United States "would feel obliged to support

Iran's right to be heard." He pointed out that it would be difficult to explain how Iran was endangering the Sovier Union.

Stalin replied that no confidence could be placed in the Irani­ an Government and that the Baku oil fields, which lay so near the border, had to be protected from possible sabotage by

Iran. Furthermore, Mr. Byrnes remarked that he hoped no action would be taken in Iran "that would cause a difference between us. To this, the Generalissimo replied: We will do nothing 20 that will make you blush. " Mr. Bevin, seconded by Mr.

^Security Council Official Records, First Year: First Series, Supplement No. JL, pp. 55-56.

James, F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 118. 20 Ibid., p. 120. 187 Byrnes, proposed a Three-Power Commission of Inquiry to go to

Iran and look for a compromise through some form of decentrali­ zation. This proposal, too, failed to win Soviet acceptance.

"It is sufficient that views have been exchanged," Molotov re­ plied. "No decisions have been reached. The question was not on the agenda and there is no need to mention it in the commu­ nique. " "What is my next step's," Bevan asked. "You know that well, " Molotov replied.2^"

In spite of Stalin's pledge at the Conference that "the

Soviet Union had no designs, territorial or otherwise, against

Iran," in the very second day of the Moscow Conference the

Moscow Radio announced the birth of the Autonomous Republic of 22 Azerbaijan, newly proclaimed in Tabriz.

The Iranian Government at once charged that this rebel government owed its existence to the Russians and was supported

2 1 Ibid., p. 1 2 1 . 22 The Government of Azerbaijan announced that the autono­ mous state would be conducted on "democratic principles" but that it did not desire separation from Iran. It also issued a program that said that private property would be inviolable; that "traitors and reactionaries" would be formed from local militia groups; and that Turkish would be the official language of the state. It added that the Government would distribute to the peasants, Government-owned lands as well as the lands owned by reactionary landlords who ran away from Azerbaijan." The re­ bel regime proceeded to carry out a series of reforms. Banks were nationalized. A secret police and "people's army" were created as well as other trappings of a totalitarian state. (Ettelaat, December 14, 1945). 23 by Russian military forces. On January 19, Iran formally

charged Russia, before the Security Council of the United

Nations, with interference in her internal affairs. But the

Security Council was unable to act because Russia contended

that the dispute was not a matter which that body was compe­

tent to handle. The Russians simply announced that they would

ignore any questions they might be asked about Iran.^4 Soviet

delegate at the Council, Mr. Vishinsky talking about disturb­ ances in northern Iran, maintained:

. . . As for the disturbances in northern Iran, they merely represented "the aspirations of the popula­ tion . . . for national autonomy / . . . which is nothing unusual for a democratic state" and had no connection with the presence of Soviet troops. * Furthermore, Mr. Vishinsky said that certain activities in Iran might constitute a threat to the Soviet Union, but that, if they were dealt with on a bilateral basis, satisfactory solu­

tion might be found:

The anti-democratic and pogrom activity, hostile to the Soviet Union, on the part of the reactionary forces in Iran which are supported by certain influential Iran­ ian groups drawn from the ruling circles and the police

23Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope {Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 94.

2^For detail procedure of the Security Council, see Richard W. Van Wagenen.

25See Security Council, Official Records, First Year: First Series, Supplement No. JL, p. 18. 189

authorities, creates for the Azerbaijan Soviet Social­ ist Republic and for Balcu a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth. Such question, however, which affect the relations between two neighbouring States, the USSR and Iran, can and should be settled by means of bilateral negotiation.

The Security Council then agreed to let Russia and Iran settle the matter by direct negotiation. It was, of course, unlikely that Iran would be able to withstand Russian demands while Sovi- et troops were still occupying her territory. 28

The new Prime Minister of Iran, Qavam-el-Saltaneh, fol­ lowing the Security Council's recommendation, with a commission consisting largely of pro-Soviet persons, departed for Moscow, where he remained almost a month. During this period, he saw

Stalin twice and Molotov four times. The Soviet leaders formu­ lated the following proposals:

(1) Soviet troops would continue to stay in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period. (2) The Iranian Government would recognize the national autonomy of Azerbaijan. If the Iranian Government acquiesced in this request, the Soviet Government offered to take steps to arrange that: (a) The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, in relation to the Central Government, would bear the designation of Governor General. (b) Azerbaijan would have no Ministry of War or Minis­ try of Foreign Affairs. (c) Thirty per cent of the Azerbaijan revenue would be paid to the Iranian Government.

26ibid. 2 7 Ibid. 28 Truman, op. .cit-, P« 95. 190

(d) All correspondence with the Central Government would be in Persian. (3) The Soviet Government would abandon its demand for an oil concession. Instead, it proposed that an Iranian- Russian Joint Stock Company be set up with 51 per cent of the shares owned by the Soviet Union and 49 per cent by Iran. ^ 9 This Soviet proposal was rejected by the Iranian Premier.

While Qavam was in Moscow the deadline for the evacua­

tion of Allied troops came. The American troops had left be­

fore January 1 and the British were out by March 2, but from

the Soviets came only a declaration that the Red Army would

evacuate the province of Khurasan and a few other areas, but

would remain in Azerbaijan and the Caspian area until the

situation had been "clarified."

This was a gross violation of the agreements made. It

also meant that Iran would be required to negotiate with Russia 30 while a gun was at her head. Great Britain protested, the

United States protested, and Qavam protested, all to no avail.

Meanwhile, on the international scene, conflict between

the East and West became still sharper. The Moscow Foreign

Ministers Confemece ended without reaching any positive agree­ ment. The trace of power conflict was drawn into the scene of

the United Nations. The Soviet, in order to retaliate Anglo-

^ N e w York Times, March 2 0, 1946.

3 0 Truman, op. cit., p. 95. 191

American support of the Persian case, took up the question of

the British troops in Greece and Indonesia at the Security 31 Council. On 9 February, Generalissimo Stalin had announced

the new Five Year Plan, which placed the emphasis on rearma­ ment.^^ In the United States, Secretary Byrnes was indicating,

in his speeches, an increasing firmness toward the Soviet Union.

Mr. Byrnes ended his speech with these words: "All around us

there is suspicion and distrust, which in turn breeds suspicion

and distrust." This is the miasmic climate of opinion that breeds wars. 33 On 5 March, Winston Churchill made his very-

critical and outspoken remarks about the Soviet Union at Fulton,

Missouri. On 13 March, Stalin in an interview with the Pravda

correspondent called Churchill the replica of Hitler and a warmonger. 34 Following suit, the Soviet press began hammering

away at Churchill for his speech and at Truman for sponsoring

the speech. All these difficulties reached their zenith when

the Iranian issue once more came on the agenda of international

■^See Security Council, Official Records, First Year: First Series, No. J., 10th Meeting, p. 173. 32 Pravda (Moscow), February 9, 1946, p. 1.

•^Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXV, No. 21, March 8 , 1946, pp. 1-2.

^Pravda (Moscow) , March 13, 1946, p. 1. 192 politics, due to the Soviet hesitation in withdrawing its troops from Iran. The note which George Kennan, the American

Charge d'Affaires, delivered at the Kremlin on March 6 said in part:

. . . the decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with re­ gard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the dec­ laration regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, cannot remain indifferent . . . the Government of the United States, in the spirit of friendly association developed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the successful effort against a common enemy and as a fellow member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to proamote the international confi­ dence which is necessary for peaceful progress among the peoples of all nations. . . .35

There was no official reply to this note. The Russian press re­ ports, however, said that the State Department was "mistaken," that there were no Russian troop movements in Iran.

There naturally then arose the question of whether Iran

^^Note from the United States Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Government^ 6 March '±946, U.S. Congress, House,' Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations, H. Res. 206 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 21ff. 193 would struggle on with the bilateral negotiations or would re­ open its appeal to the United Nations. Apparently strong pressures were brought in favor of both courses of action.

Reports that the Soviet Ambassador strongly advised Iran against reopening are certainly credible. There are also indi­ cations that United States Ambassador Murray even went so far as to tell Qavam that if Iran did not carry through with its plan to appeal, the United States itself would demand in the forthcoming Security Council meeting that the case be reopened.

At this juncture, by the instruction of the Iranian Pre­ mier, Ambassador Ala appealed 15or the second time to the United

Nations. This time, he accused the Soviets of keeping their troops in Iran despite their March 2 deadline for withdrawal aid of continued interference "through the medium of Soviet agents, officials and armed forces." 3 7 At the United Nations, the Soviet method of bullying and pressuring their small neigh­ boring states received worldwide publicity. Because of the ac­ tions of the Russians in Iran, the Iranian Government received the sympathy of the other members of the United Nations who held a sincere desire for peace in international affairs. 38

^^James Reston, The New York Times, Mar. 17,1946, p. 1. 3^Security Council Official Records, First Year: First Series, Supplement'"No. 1, p. 4 j • » 38John A. Wilson, "The Near East," A Foreign Policy for 194

In spite of the Soviet attempts in preventing internationaliza­

tion of the Iranian case, the majority of the Council was in

no mood to follow this policy. Important political considera­

tions, and particularly a reluctance to submit to any delay,

predominated. 39 The general attitude seemed to be that, if

the political forces could be kept more or less in balance,

there would be a better chance for a successful outcome. Hence,

there was a strong inclination to use the Council as a counter- 40 weight on the side of Iran against the power of the USSR.

The Soviets procrastinated and through procedural devi­

ces tried to stop the hearing of the case and to keep the Irani­

an delegate from speaking. At one time the Soviet delegate,

Andrei Grom}3o, walked dramatically out of the conference room.

In short, the Russians sought to remove the Iranian question

from the U.N. agenda, claiming that it was an affair to be

solved by them and the Iranians alone.

38the United States. Ed. by Quincy Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 18.

39 Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 52.

40Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, "Voting and the Handling of Disputes in the Security Council, United Nations Studies: No. 5 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950), p. 92. 195

The Soviet Government did enter into direct contact

with the Government of Iran in the person of Qavam. Having

used such Soviet desire as his own tactical weapon# Qavam

asked that the complaint of the Government of Iran against

the Soviet Union be removed from the agenda of the United

Nations. The Council found it expedient# however, to take the view that the Soviet Government had promised uncondition­ ally to withdraw its troops on or before May 6 # 1946, and that the question of withdrawal was not connected with other ques­ tions, such as autonomy for Azerbaijan and the grant of an oil concession. Accordingly# the Council approved on April 4# a resolution introduced by Mr. Byrens postponing further proceed­ ings until May 6 , 1946# but keeping the questions in dispute on the agenda and calling for a report on May 6 from the two 41 Governments.

The Soviets had hoped to obtain concessions from the

Teheran Government as the price for evacuation of the Red Army# and Qavam led them to believe they would succeed. His first task was to conciliate the Russians and ensure the evacuation

of their troops. This he did by eliminating the anti-Soviet newspapers# by suppressing the rightist political parties# and

^Byrnes# op. cit., p. 44. 196 dismissing the hostile Majlis. 42 Furthermore, Qavam made three important concessions to Russia. First, on April 4, he conclu­ ded an agreement establishing a joint Soviet-Iranian Company for the exploitation of oil in the north. The agreement was to be valid for twenty-five years and was to be renewable.

Russia and Iran were to have 51 and 49 per cent of the stock, respectively. The agreement,moreover, acknowledged Soviet in­ terest in the welfare of Azerbaijan. Secondly, Qavam instruct­ ed the Iranian delegate in the United Nations to withdraw Iran's complaint from the Council's agenda.^ Thirdly, on August 2„

Qavam offered three portfolios in his Cabinet to the Commu­ nists. Thus, the Russians agreed to withdraw their forces by

May 6 , while Qavam promised that he would submit a proposal for a joint stock Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to the new Parliament, and would work for a satisfactory solution of the Azerbaijan problem.

In the meantime, while Qavam was malting successive friend­ ly gestures towards the Soviets, he tried to destroy the main

4 2 Elwell-Sutton, op. cit., p. 52.

43Despite formal Soviet concurrence and Secretary General Trygve Lie's support of these requests, the Security Council de­ cided, nevertheless, to continue consideration of the matter. 197

Soviet political instrument in Iran, namely, the Tudeh Party.

Thus, on June 29, 1946, he announced over the radio the forma­

tion of the Iranian Democrat Party, led by himself. This party

— whose rate of expansion was quite remarkable— declared itself

anxious to cooperate with the other "freedom-loving" parties,

and was somewhat cautiously welcomed by the Tudeh leaders.

Then, utilizing the very concept of the "united front" tactic,

Qavam succeeded in attracting a great segment of the Tudeh*s

membership into his party and thus causing a schism within

the party itself. Along this line, he embarked on tactical 44 procedures with the rebel government of Azerbaijan. Appar­

ently, in order to fulfill his part of the bargain, he announc­

ed on April 22 a 7-point program for the return of Azerbaijan

to the jurisdiction of the Iranian state. On April 28,

Pishehvari arrived in Teheran, and went into parley with the

Government of Teheran. Pishehvari insisted on three points

unacceptable to Qavam.4^

4 4 Elwe11-Sutton, op. cit., p. 57.

45These were: The distribution of state-owned land to the peasants; the appointment of Commander of the Azerbaijan Army and Gendarmerie by the Azerbaijan Government; the right of the Azerbaijan to appoint a Governor for the province. Kevhan (Teheran), May 2, 1946, p. 1.

I 198

On May 17, talks with Pishevari were renewed and in June, 46 1946, a 10-point agreement was finally concluded.

In the meantime, the Soviets were pressing the Iranian

Government for speedy ratification of the Oil Agreement. But

this depended upon the holding of the elections which were to begin on December 7, but Qavam made it clear that they would not be held unless the Government was in a position to super­ vise them all over the country, including Azerbaijan. The

Its provisions were: (1) The Azerbaijan Parliament will became a provincial council. (2) The provincial council will make four nominations for Provincial Governor General, and the Central Government’s Minister of Interior will appoint one of them. (3) The Azerbaijan Army will be incorporated into the Iranian Army with a commission arranging details. (4) Azerbaijan irregular soldiers will become part of the National Gendarmerie. (5) Using Azerbaijan labor, the Central Government will build railways between Mianeh and Tabriz. (6 ) The Teheran Government will assist in establishing a proposed Azerbaijan University. (7) Both Persian and Turkish will be recognized as the official language, and primary school instruction will be given in each. (8 ) The Government will pay for private lands confisca­ ted by the Azerbaijan regime for distribution to the peasants and will approve the distribution of the public land. (9) Election law will be revised to establish parlia­ mentary representation on a population basis. (The New York Times, June 15, 1946). 199

Soviets were in a quandry; in order to obtain an oil conces­

sion, agreement of the Majlis was necessary, and in order to

convene, a Parliament election would have to be held all over

the country, including Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan rebels de­

clared they would resist if Government troops crossed the border into their province, and they began to prepare defen­

ses. Furthermore, the Soviet Ambassador at Teheran, acting

under instructions from his Government, admonished that the movement of Government forces into this part of Iran might re­

sult in disturbances within that province in the Iranian bor­ der adjacent to Russia, and advised that the Government's plan be abandoned. ^

In spite of all these threats, on November 24, the Pre­ mier ordered the troops to march into Azerbaijan to supervise the parliamentary elections.

After crossing the Azerbaijan border, the Iranian Army encountered only weak and spasmodic resistance. According to

American correspondents who proceeded with the advancing Iran­ ian Army, the populace eagerly awaited the approach of Irani- an troops and greeted them as liberators. 48 Thus, after fully a year of separate existence, the Azerbaijan regime collapsed

^T he New York Times, December 7, 1946, p. 1.

The Middle'Eal€Sffo&rnal£5?ew S ^ elSl_fz? ? 5i W an' 1946' " 200

as soon as the army reached Tabriz, and Pishehvari and a

number of his associates escaped to the Soviet Union.

On October 22, 1947/ the newly elected Majlis refused

by an almost unanimous vote, with the exception of two, to jatify the Irano-Soviet Oil Agreement. What followed can be

described as a state of continuous tension between the Soviet

Union and Iran. On November 20, the Soviet Embassy, in a note

to Qavam, accused the Iranian Government of hostile activity

against Russia and hinted at the possibility of a rupture of

diplomatic relatipns.

In short, in an obvious contest for power and interest

between the East and West in Persia, the Soviet necessarily

chose a temporary setback in this part of the world. This was

partly due to the firm withstanding of the Western Powers

against the Soviet drive there. The Western resistance appear­

ed in two ways: Through diplomatic showdown; and through the

apparatus of the United Nations.

With regard to the former, the Western Powers made it

known to the Soviets that "they will not and cannot stand aloof

if force or threat of force is used contrary to purpose and 49 principles of the Charter." In his message to Generalissimo

49James P. Byrnes, "Address at the Overseas Press Club in New York, " New York Tames, February 28, 1946, p. 1. 201

Stalin/ Mr. Truman quietly expressed the United States posi­

tion with regard to the power contest in Persia. Though the

exact text of the message is still a state secret, thirteen

years later, during a series of lectures at Columbia Universi­

ty, Truman described the message as an "ultimatum" in which

he threatened to deploy United States naval and ground forces 50 in the Persian Gulf.

With regard to the latter, only in a certain limited

sense can it be said that the United Nations was the cause of

success in the Iranian dispute; but to say this is not to deny

that the United Nations may have been the decisive link in a

chain Of- causes. Commenting on this fact, Mr. Dulles maintain­

ed; ^ , _ Soviet withdrawal occurred under an influence far more persuasive than military force; namely, the force of world opinion.5 1

On the Soviet side, experience in the Iranian case before the

Security Council convinced the USSR that, in spite of its ef­

forts in drafting the Charter, the United Nations could be

5®Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., Cold War and Common Sense (New York: Graphic Society, 1962), p. 13.

5 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmil­ lan, 1950), p. 44.

i 1 202 52 used against it, as had been suggested by Stalin at Yalta.

Thus, having experienced the great influence exercised by the United States on United Nations' actions, Soviet attitude toward the organization was henceforth determined by the Sovi­ et policy towards the United States. The guiding principle in relation to the United Nations became to keep the United

Nations as weak as possible. A second Soviet tendency was to convince the rest of the members, particularly the Western

Powers, that there could be no solution of any major interna­ tional problem without Russian consent and that any solution attempted by the West without Soviet participation and against 5 Soviet opposition would mean inevitable trouble with the USSR.

This attitude toward the United Natians persuaded at least so far as the period in which Stalin was still alive.

Last but not least, Iran's own diplomatic strategy play­ ed a significant part in this political victory. The skillful diplomacy of Premier Qavam in handling the whole affair, either internally or externally, proved that the small powers - by having the freedom of action - could play much better game

^ 2A l e x a n d e r w. Rudzinski, "The Influence of the United Nations on Soviet Policy," International Organization. Vol. V, No. 2 (May 1951), p. 287.

53Ibid., p. 288. 203 than while in a strait jacket under the dictation and tutelage of other great powers. Iran, by virtue of her 150 years' ex­ perience of playing off one power against another, has been able to pass through the labyrinth of political gauntlet.

And Premier Qavam*s policy could not be isolated from this tradi- 5 4 tional pattern of Persian diplomacy. Commenting on Qavam*s adroit diplomacy, Thomas W. Wilson wrote: "The full story of

Qavam*s elaborate maneuvering— and the role of American and

British diplomacy— may not come to light for a long time. But when it does, someone may name an anti-Communist society in his honor.

In short, this victory was a decisive setback in Stalin's design toward establishing friendly governments in immediate territories and tightening the security belt around the Soviet territory. A few years later, Georgi Malenkov, commenting on this fact, maintained:

We now have a well-organized frontier line. The only break in this tier occurs in the Middle East. Here inde­ pendent Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan are in a position to

54

55Thcmas W. Wilson, Jr., Cold War and Common Sense (New York: Gigphic Society, 1962), p. 13. 204

resist and, if necessary, enter anti-Soviet coali­ tions. The first aim of Soviet policy in the Middle East is to put an end to this s i t u a t i o n .

Molotov charged that the Soviet Union was the victim of an

"anti-Soviet campaign" in which the Iranian case and the Se- curity Council were being used to advance an offensive. 57

As the "cold war" was intensified in the countries be­ hind the "Iron Curtain" Persia began to feel the effects.

Soviet policy after the setback in Azerbaijan was wrapped into the complications of the cold war. Bullying and threatening became the main themes of Soviet political strategy in Persia.

All these were aimed at preventing Persia from throwing her­

self into the hands of Anglo-American powers. But the result turned out to be contrariwise. It forced Persia to deviate

from her very pattern of traditional diplomacy. Persia had been accustomed to the policy of adroitly balancing opposing powers against each other, but the Kremlin's increasing bully­

ing forced her into open alliance with the West. The Soviets have continued to create tension and friction within the coun­ try, have perpetrated annoying border incidents and persisted

-^David J. Dallin, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Middle East Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 11 (November 1955), p. 2.

57Byrnes, op. cit.. p. 126. 205

in radio and press attacks upon the government. Most serious

of all was the constant attempt by the Soviets to build up a

case for armed intervention or threat of force on the basis

of the variously interpreted Soviet-Persian Treaty of Febru- 58 ary of 1921.

In the late forties, the sharp edge of the Soviet anti­

imperialist strategy shifted from Great Britain to the United

States, a trend which continued throughout the fifties. A

Soviet note of January 4, 1943, accused the Persian Government

of lending itself to American plans for converting Persia into

a military strategic base, and demanded that it should take

immediate steps "to eliminate the existing abnormal situation, "

which it considered incompatible with the state of good-neigh­

borly relations proclaimed in the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 59 1921. Furthermore, the Soviet constantly complained against

the presence of the Americans who were serving as advisors to

the army and gendarmerie and those who were active in Persia's 60 Seven Year Plan for economic rehabilitation and development.

58T. Cuyler Young, "The Race between Russia and Reform in Iran," Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review, No. 2. January 1950, p. 278.

^ T h e Middle East (London: Royal Institute of Interna- , tional Affairs, 1950), p. 386.

60Thomas and Frye, op. cit., p. 253. 206

In the spring of 1949, there were a number of incur­

sions made by Soviet troops across the northeastern frontier

of Persia in which several Persian soldiers were killed and

others captured. The Persian Government protested and on

April 15 threatened to declare the Treaty of 1921 null and 61 void. In the same month, Soviet Ambassador Sadchekov left

Persia for Moscow, and his departure was followed by the closing of the Soviet Consulates in Tabriz, Rezayeh, Maku and

Ardebil. At the same time, Russia ordered Persia to close her Consulate in Baku. Russia also deported some 150 Persian

National residents in the USSR— a time-honored Soviet device 62 for introducing her agents into Persia.

Persia reacted to this campaign in two ways. First, she attempted to retaliate by reviving an old claim for gold and currency which the Soviet Union had owed Persia since 1942.

She also demanded prompt payment of $10,000,000 in customs charges and more than $1,000,000 in railway charges which Rus­ sia had failed to pay Persia. Furthermore, the Government made an effort to put an end to foreign infiltration by expel­ ling some satellite nationals.

6lGeorge Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,19567, p. 186. t ®2The New York Times. March 23, 1949, p. 1. 207

Secondly, the Persian Government questioned the validi­ ty of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921. Persian official

circles argued that the United Nations Charter invalidated

the controversial Article 6 of the Treaty, and it was rumored that Persia might bring the question of Soviet pressure be­

fore the Security Council. This did not materialize. In­

stead, Persia's Ambassador in Washington, Hussein Ala, handed

over to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a detailed memorandum which contained pertinent documentation and appealed for United

States support. On March 23, 1949, Secretary Acheson made a public statement in which he declared the Soviet charges sta­ ting Persia was being transformed into an American military 63 base were "altogether false and demonstrably untrue." He declared that American interest in the security of the Middle

East, "particularly in Greece, Turkey, and Persia," had in no way been reduced by the negotiation of the North Atlantic

64- Treaty. Bevan echoed the same sentiments in the British 65 Parliament on the same day.

63The New York Times, March 23, 1949, p. 1. 64 . Ibid.

^5Keyhan (Teheran), March 24, 1949, pp. 1-3. 208

Meanwhile, Soviet pressure waa renewed. In May, 1950, the Soviet Union formally protested the presence of the Ameri­ can oil experts in the area close to the Soviet border. The

Soviets called to the attention of the Persian Government the alleged surveys by American oil men in the vicinity of the

Russia-Persian border. Persian denials of these surveys and of the talcing of aerial photographs near the Soviet frontier 66 were not accepted by the Soviet Union. In its second protest in June, Moscow also took the opportunity to re-emphasize its hostility to the presence of American military advisors in the

Army, and again hinted that the Soviet Union might invoice its

1921 Treaty with Persia, Article 6 of which permits Soviet inter ference in Persia in the event that the activities of the third party in Persia threatens the security of the Soviet Union. In

July, 1950, the Persian Government asserted that the term "third party" could refer only to counterrevolutionary White Russians.

This statement was probably based on Annex Two of the Treaty of 1921, which limits Article 6 to "preparations . . . for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics

66The International Studies Group of the Brookings Insti­ tution, The Security of the Middle East (Washington, D.C., 1950), p. 34. 209

allied to her, by the partisans of the regime which has been

overthrown or by its supporters among those foreign powers

which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers, 67 and Peasants, Republics."

In the summer of 1950, the Russo-Iranian relations took

a turn for the better. The Iranian Prime Minister, General

Razmara, made an attempt to iron out the animosities which had

rankled the two countries. By the end of July, foreigners were 68 barred from travel in the vicinity of the Soviet border.

In November, 1950, the Iranian Program Voice of America and 69 the BBC were discontinued from Radio Teheran. On November 4,

Iran concluded with Russia a $20,000,000 trade agreement, imple­

menting the Treaty of 1940 and thus considerably easing Iran's

economic position. The signing of the barter agreement with 70 Russia was welcomed by the Iranians, especially the merchants.

In the following months, the Soviets negotiated such

outstanding questions as the boundary dispute, the return of

the Iranian gold, and the release of Soviet—held Iranian

67 See Leacme of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 2620, Vol. 112 (1931), pp. 292-95. go Journal de Teheran (Teheran), July 28, 1950, p. 1.

69Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle - East (London, 1955), p. 408. 7^Ettelaat (Teheran), November 5, 1950, pp. 1-4. 210 border guards. In mid—December it was revealed that ten im­ portant Tudeh leaders, previously sentenced, had been releas­ ed from prison by some Iranian officers. There were rumors that it happened by the order of the Prime Minister as a further concession to Russia.

During the period under consideration, the Iranian communists conducted several peace campaigns. These peace campaigns contrasted sharply with the military policies and 71 collective security system of the United States. In Decem­ ber, 1950, over 500,000 Iranians signed the Stockholm peace 72 appeal which was sponsored by the "Partisans for Peace."

In the winter of 1950-51, the oil crisis overshadowed everything else in Iran. It had internal political and eco­ nomic ramifications as well as international importance. The

Soviet attitude toward this movement was not an isolated poli­ cy but was figured out in the line of its anti-imperialist

71Fredrick Barghoom, "The Ideological Weapon in Soviet Strategy," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, ed. by Charles Grove Haines (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 9. 72 The policy of seeking to paralyze America's nuclear capability by undermining the psychological basis for employ­ ing it took the form of a world-wide campaign in favor of out­ lawing the atomic bomb as a weapon belonging to a category of special horror. The principal tool: has been the "world Peace Movement." 211 strategy, an inevitable feature of two camps doctrine. In its official level, it was a policy of attempted impartiali­ ty, while on the unofficial level, through the intermediary of the Tudeh, it expressed its opposition one way or the other. VIII

NATIONALISM IN THE DESIGN OP

SOVIET TWO CAMPS DOCTRINE

In general. Stalinists' attitude towards the Iranian

nationalist movement could not be isolated from the dicho­

tomic interpretation of the world politics. Since in Stalin's

design of two camps doctrine there was no room for the third

line, third force, or unccmmitment, Iranian nationalism had

to be attributed to one of the existing camps. Hence, such

movement had not been sponsored by the Soviet Union or its

stalking horse, the Tudeh Party, therefore it was viewed as

a bourgeoisie uprising and subject to a careful analysis.

On the ground of its manichaestic attitude toward

international politics, Stalin took the unbending attitude of

denying that those bourgeoisie politicians and parties could not be truly inspired by a nationalism that was uncompromis­ ing towards the West. He definitely suspected them of betrg- ying national interest of their countries by serving the

general cause of capitalism and by seeking accommodation with

the Western "imperialist" bourgeoisie. Thus he believed that

Gandhi was merely an agent for Western imperialism. This

analogy was attributed more or less to other nationalist 213 1 leaders in Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, Stalinists believed that historical experience proved that the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and semi-colonial countries linked in innumerable ways with the feudal classes and with foreign imperialism, cannot lead a movement of national liberation to victory. The anti-imperialist revolution will triumph only through the alliance of the workers and peasants, directed by 2 communists. At the same time, Soviet theorists held that

India, as well as the countries of the Middle East, was still at the colonial stage of evolution, because its national bour­ geoisie had merely come to a compromise with the British imper­ ialists, for fear of the local proletariat. They said that national liberation depended upon social emancipation, and that politically separate countries could achieve independ— 3 ence only after having shaken off the yoke of foreign capital.

In the case of Iranian nationalist movement of 1951, the Soviets had a rather different analogy. They believed that the Iranian attempted drive toward nationalization of

^See Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistencer An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), p. 117. ^Soveskoe Vostokovedenie, Nos. 5 and 5, 1955.

3 p p k l a d y Akademii ^ . _ S . R . No. 3, 1950, p. 342. the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was in fact an external feature

of a latent conflict between the Anglo-American imperialists

for redistribution of oil interests in Iran. Soviet papers

held the opinion that it was an American plot for dislodging 4 the British oil company and replacing it by the America ones.

Since the United States was regarded as a leading and aggres­

sive imperialist with a war-mongering attitude toward the

Soviet Union, any bourgeoisie movement which ought to be ad­

vantageous to the American interest was to be opposed and para­

lyzed. Soviet theorists held that Great Britain was an old-

aged and dying imperialist which the world would sooner or

later witness her funeral, but the United States was a vigor­

ous and voracious imperialist which, lurking in ambush to

seize possessions of agonizing imperialists in the Middle

East and North Africa. Thus any change of the status quo in

the Middle East which would have caused further penetration

of the United States in the area was opposed bitterly by the

Soviet Union and the Communist parties.

This opinion was held also more or less by the British press and political circles. Both in parliament and in the

British press— voices sometimes very strong were heard

^pravda (Moscow) , March 10, 1951, p. 1. 215 declaring that the source of the trouble in Iran was the Ameri­ can oil companies who, in their lust for control, had instiga­ ted the Iranians to oust the British so that they could come in and take over; not only were private individuals mentioned, but even Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGee— an oil­ man himself— was pointed out as one of the arch villains in the Iranian oil drama•5

In reality, the United States attitude toward the Iran­ ian nationalist movement formed on three grounds: First, a small group in the American official circles held the opinion that by supporting a genuine nationalistic regime in Iran, the United States not only would be able to prevent Communist penetration in Iran, but would also be able to provide inter­ nal stability. This thesis which was called “active opposi­ tion to Russia," laid down by George V. Allen and resulted in support of the National Front as a possible nucleus of g resistance to Soviet infiltration. Added to this fact was the traditional American anti-colonial sentiment and liberal point of view which disposed Americans to at least a sympathetic

^Benjamin Shad ran, "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, " The Middle East Affairs, Vol. V, Nos. 6-7 (June-July,1954), p. 227.

^Elwell-Sutton, op. pit., p. 193. %

216

approach to the Iranian national aspiration. Secondly, without

any doubt the American companies did attempt in forcing the

British Government in letting them share in the exploitation

of oil in Iran. And, again, they had a strong voice in the

orientation of the American foreign policy towards the Iranian 7 crisis. At the very moment that they realized the Iranian nationalism was moving in a direction beyond the expected line,

they joined hands with Great Britain and worked for the des­

truction of the nationalist regime. Particularly, when they

could not possibly overlook the consequences to their own oil 8 interests in the areas from Iranian nationalization. Third­

ly, many American statesmen believed that, since the United

States was paying the bill for the security of the Middle East,

she had to have strong voices in these areas as the dominant

leading power. Commenting on this point, Henry F. Grady, the

former United States Ambassador in Iran wrote:

. . . British have realized our increasing interest in Iran as an incursion into territory which they feel

^For the role of the oil companies in the Iranian na­ tionalist movement see CIA by Colly. Q To be sure, there were a number of independent Ameri­ can oil concerns who indicated a readiness to exploit the situ­ ation in Iran and buy up quantities of oil at greatly reduced prices— at one time the offer was 50 per cent below current rates; but on the whole the American Government discouraged such attempts (Shwadran, p. 229)• 217

they should dominate. . . . X should hope that we would not reach a position of underwriting British policy which it achieve a disaster such as that which occurred in Iran. But we must recognize that the power, both financially and military, is ours, ■ and the British can only have that power through us. We need the support of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth in our efforts to stop Russian aggression, but we must assert leadership based upon our power and responsibilities. For a situation has been reached in the world where we not only do most of the fighting when the fighting is on, but also pay most of the bills for reconstruction. If we are to be in on the cash landing, we should also be in on the take-off• We ought to have some say about what we are buying— for all we want to purchase with our blood and treasure is a world at peace.^

In short, the role of the United States in the Iranian

oil crisis was, to say the least, difficult and uncomfortable,

perhaps even impossible. Basically, Washington had no well-

thought-out policy for dealing with the crisis, and perhaps

could not have had one, for the State Department, like the

British Foreign Office, apparently did not foresee the rapid

development. But as the actual consequences showed, the

United States not only retreated from its early thesis of "ac­

tive opposition to Russia," but also succeeded in getting a

major share in the Iranian oil and establishing its dominant

position in Iran. In a word, she came close to the Anglo-

Russian accusation against her.

9Henry F. Grady, "What Went Wrong in Iran?", The Saturday Evening Post, January 5, 1952, pp. 30, 56, 58. I 218 Thus, on this analogical ground, te Soviet Union inter­ preted anti-British movement in Iran as an American device for establishing its own dominant position in Iran both politi­ cally and economically. In March 1951, the Soviet press openly accused the United States of engineering Razmara's death, alleg­ edly to aid American oil corporations to dislodge the Anglo- 10 Iranian Oil Company. But, in spite of this anti-American propagandism in the Soviet press, Soviet official policy towards the Iranian oil crisis was one of impartiality. On the other hand, its unofficial policy, namely, through the intermediary of the Tudeh party was entirely subversive and antagonistic.

Throughout the crisis Russia seemed to play a waiting game. The Soviet attempted to convince Iran and the West that 11 the Soviet Union had no aggressive designs on that country.

The Russians in Iran were careful not to appear anywhere during 12 a crisis, but rather to show an official "lack of interest."

Although the Soviet press occasionally voiced support of Iran's struggle against foreign imperialism and her representatives in

^Pravda (Moscow), March 11, 1951, p. 1. ■L1C.E. Black, "The Role of Diplomacy in Soviet Imperial­ ism, " op. cit., p. 199.

"Ip George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 192. 219

the United Nations Security Council backed Iran on certain pro­

cedural issues, the official attitude was that of non-interven­

tion. The first step of Soviet diplomacy was to convince the

local Iranian Government that the Soviet Union had no intention 13 of sponsoring a Communist seizure of power. The Soviet plan

was to wait patiently and to be ready for the inevitable oppor-

tunity.4 . *4 . 1 4

Aside from their support of Iran in the United Nations

and the International Court of Justice, Russia acted openly

on two more occasions but disguised themselves skillfully, act­

ing merely in the manner of amicus curiae. One was at the time

Britain threatened to land paratroopers in Iran for the protec­

tion of the Abadan installations. With no doubt of referring

to Britain, the Soviet Union immediately warned that "any

landing by a foreign power in southern Iran would be a suffic—

i ent reason for a similar action in northern Iran by the Soviet 15 Union." At the same time, when the British cruiser Euryalus

was stationed in the Shat-el—Arab River, opposite to the dis­

puted oil refineries, the Soviets conducted petty maneuvers

•*-3The Economist, June 9, 1951, p. 136. 14E. Day Garm an, Soviet Imperialism; Russia's Drive toward World Domination (Washington: World Affairs Press, . 1950), p. 135. ^•SGrady, op. cit., p. 58. 220 in the Caspina as a "balancing action" to retaliate for the

British intervention- Though the Iranian Government protest­ ed to both the British and Russian operations in the Persian

Gulf and the Caspian Sea, however, Iranians were not as distur­ bed over the Caspian demonstration as they were over the

Persian Gulf action. They felt that Russia wanted to match the British threat- In fact, the Russian demonstrations were discontinued in deference to Iranian wishes while the cruiser

Euryalus remained on the Iraq side of the river- In reality, these Soviet political maneuverings were not ineffective in the character of the British strategic approach toward the

Iranian crisis- Commenting on this fact. Ambassador Grady wrote:

It is fortunate that the British yielded to vigor­ ous American pressure and did not land troops to pro­ tect their property and nationals in Abadan- This could easily have led to clash between British and Iranian troops. In turn, the Soviet Union might well have invaded Iran's northern provinces to protect Russia's interests under their interpretation of the 1921 Treaty.16

In spite of adopting an impartial attitude toward the

Iranian crisis, the Soviet Union did not hesitate in attacking

16Grady, I i

221

the Mossadegh regime on the ground of accommodation with the

American Government. The Soviet Union charged, in May, 1952,

that U.S. aid to Iran violated the 1921 Soviet-Xranian Treaty

and aided the aggressive plans of the United States against

the Soviet Union. The Soviet note declared that Iran's agree­

ment to accept U.S. military aid placed the Iranian Array under 17 the effective control of the United States. In reply, the

Iranian Government denied the charge that Iran would be conver­

ted into a military base against the U.S.S.R. by accepting such 18 aid. It was also announced in January, 1952 that aid under

the Point Four Program was to be expanded as a result of an

understanding reached on January 19 in an exchange of notes

| between Mossadegh and William E. Warne, the Director of Techni­

cal Cooperation in Iran, on behalf of the United States. The

Soviet criticism of the Mossadegh government was further in­

creased when he welcomed the trouble-shooting mission of

Averell Harriman. Radio Azerbaijan, stationed in the Soviet

Union, undertook a strong anti-government position in its

programs at the time of Harriman*s dispatch to Iran. It

warned Premier Mossadegh against yielding to the American "wolf

in sheep's clothing." The thesis expounded by the broadcasts

^Pravda (Moscow), May 23, 1952. \ . i *^®The Manchester Guardian, July 18, 1952, p. 7. 222 was that the Iranian people did not want to have Harriman inter- fere in their national aspirations. According to these radio programs the Iranian people had to decide on the matter concer­ ning aid.

Unlike the Soviet officially impartial policy, the Tudeh immediately after the oil nationalization embarked on a series of subversive activities against the Iranian Government. In

April 1951, the Tudeh Party in Abadan staged a riotous strike, which resulted in a number of deaths. The Tudeh agitators sup­ plied leaflets, accusing the Iranian Prime Minister of being 19 in the pay of the British secretly. This agitation which apparently was the result of the sudden withdrawal by the AICC of special allowances for workers, was arranged to paralyze the legal procedures of nationalization. The Iranian authorities, well aware of the British intention, feared that this situation would be taken as a pretext for military intervention by Bri­ tain. Therefore, the Iranian Army hurriedly restored order and brought the situation well under control. Speaking to Parlia­ ment, Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison stated that his

19Norman Kemp, Abadan, A First-Hand Account of the Persian Oil Crisis (London; Allen Wingate, 1953), p. 6. 223 Government would take action to protect British lives and prop­

erty, and the press reported movements of the British Navy in 20 the Persian Gulf.

There were firm rumors that Company was using disor­

ders to justify calling on British military. In an official press statement made by Dr. Ansari, head of the Information

Department of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April

16, "The original cause of incidents," he pointed out, “was 21 the action of the company."

The British disclaimed all responsibility and blamed

the whole affair on "Communist agitators." Much was made by

the British press of a visit to Abadan on April 22 by Colonel

Gouzinov, Third Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Teheran, 22 but the precise significance of it was not explained.

The Iranian press called it an Anglo-Russian coalition against

the Nationalist Regime of Iran. The Tudeh was attacked as being the hireling of the Company. In short, Tudeh eagerly

seized the opportunity to advance its cause in the face of

20Elwell-Sutton, op. pit., p. 194.

Journal de Teheran (Teheran), April 16, 1951. 22 Elwell-Sutton, op. pit., p. 195. 224

deteriorating relations between Iran and the West. The local

Communists worked to create such economic and political chaos

in Iran that the Government would collapse. At the same time,

they made attempts to deviate the Iranian Nationalist Move­ ment from its anti-British sentiments to that of anti-imper­

ialist movement with enphasis on the United States imperialists.

To this end, the Tudeh undertook the nationalization of oil in

Bahrein. Here, the Tudeh plan was to touch the American oil

interest in Banrein and consequently to change the oil dispute

from its government vis-a-vis company to government vis-a-vis

government, which included the United States Government.

On March 26, 1951, the Iranian Communists called for a

general strike in Iran*s oil region. During these disturbances

the Soviet Literary Gazette said that United States Ambassador

Grady was preparing a blood bath for Iran and turning that 23 state into another Greece.

Just as the Iranian Government regained control after

one strike, the Iranian Communists called another strike. It

appeared that the outlawed Tudeh Party wanted conflict and not 24 peaceful solution to the oil dispute. The local Communists

^Literatumaya Gazeta (Moscow), March 27, 1951, p. 1.

24"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Jour­ nal, Vol. V (Spring, 1951), p. 198. 225 helped to block reforms by the Government of Dr. Mossadegh.

The Tudeh, by agitating and manipulating propaganda, brought about confusion in Iran. On May Day, thirty thousand demon­ strators - members of the Tudeh Party, held a pro-Soviet rally in Teheran. It was an orderly meeting, but the dominant theme was ridicule of Mossadegh. The world peace movement of the 25 Communists was hailed.

Hence, the Tudeh began to have conflicts with Prime

Minister Mossadegh and his National Front followers; Communists and Nationalists began a battle in the streets. The Tudeh

Parjcy spurred agitation and unrest in order to paralyze the activities of the Government of Dr. Mossadegh. They used intimidation and labor agitation in the industrial centers of 20 Iran, where the Tudeh had strength.

On May 8, 1951, the Tudeh Party addressed an open letter to the Prime Minister in which were seven demands formulated as follows:

25

26"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Jour­ nal, Vol. V (Summer, 1951), p. 243. 226

3) Expulsion of the United States Military Mission to Iran; 2) Recognition of Communist China; 3) Legalization of the Tudeh Party; 4) Rejection of foreign arms aid; 5) Release of political prisoners; 6) An end to martial law in the southern oil fields; 7) Nationalization of the Bahrein oil fields where the American-owned Bahrein Petroleum Company was producing 10,000,000 barrels of oil a year.

In the following months, the Tudeh organized a number

of monster rallies and demonstrations which frequently ended

in armed clashes with police or with the nationalist suppor­

ters of Mossadegh. By the fall of 1951, Iran was in turmoil,

alternately threatened and cajoled by Russia, in open quarrel

with Britain, and at odds with the United States. Internally,

the members of the Tudeh Party and supporters of the Royal

Court were ganging up on the Nationalist Regime of Iran.

On November 2, 1951, the Tudeh organized a demonstra­

tion in Teheran. They hailed the Soviet Union and accused 27 Prime Minister Mossadegh of making deals with Americans.

The demonstration resulted in street fighting between the Commu­

nists and the members of the Toilers Party and as the result of police intervention over 200 were injured and fifteen lives were lost, including four policemen : and some newspapers laid

the blame on the Minister of the Interior, General Zahedi,

^The Manchester Guardian, November 3, 1951, p. 6 227 who, it was said, knew of the left-wing "Anti-imperialist" groups' plan for demonstrating, including its acquisition of 28 arms. On the following day, about five thousand leftists rioted in downtown Teheran. They shouted "Death to Mossadegh," and fought for several hours with the nationalists.

Prime Minister Mossadegh's Government was also attacked by the Baku radio and the so-called "Democrat" transmitter, located north of Azerbaijan, alleged that the Central Govern­ ment in Teheran was interfering in the elections. A call was issued to the people of Iran to rise against the government and again Kurdish tribesmen were urged to create an autonomous 29 republic.

The years 1951-52 marked a transitional stage in Soviet strategy, the main line being indicated at the 19th Congress . of the C.P.S.U. held in October, 1952. The keynote for the

Communist parties and of power was Stalin's brief farewell address, in which he urged them to adopt a national position within their respective countries, uniting all classes on the basis of specific grievances against the ruling groups. By

^SElwell-Sutton, op. cit., p. 196. ^Moshe Leshem, "Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East, " Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. IV (January, 1953), pp. 8ff• recalling the Leninist concept of the inevitability of inter­ capitalist wars, he singled out the possibility of conflict between Britain and the United States as well— Stalin loosen­ ed somewhat the rigid bipolarity formula, and permitted the 30 Communist parties broader tactical flexibility.

Following the clue, the Tudeh Party overnight switched from a policy of opposition and adopted a friendly gesture towards Nationalists and demanded a united front against the imperialists. Though in content the Tudeh continued its oppo­ sition toward the regime of Mossadegh, but in form it support­ ed the very slogan of united front, a trend which continued up to the end of the Mossadegh regime.

After Stalin's death, Soviet leaders further liberalized the Soviet foreign policy and adopted a new approach towards the underdeveloped countries of Asia and the Middle East.

30Bemard S. Morris, "Recent Shift in Communist Strategy, Political Chancre in Underdeveloped Countries; Nationalism and Communism, ed. by John H. Kautsky (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 295. IX

SOVIET NEUTRALITY- STRATEGY

After Stalin's death a far-reaching strategic change took shape in the course of Soviet foreign policy which was a far cry from Stalin's Manichaestic outlook on world poli­ tics. This was a second major shift in the line of Soviet postwar diplomacy. The first point of departure for the shift from the war-born "alliance" was the two camps' doc­ trine, promulgated at the founding meeting of the Cominform in September, 1947, according to which the Soviet Union and the people's democracies were locked in global conflict with the U.S. and its allies. This dichotomic image of world poli- 1 tics, reformulated by Zhdanov, became the Soviet working concept of international reality; that is, it was acted out in terms of actual foreign policy. Commenting on this fact, the Soviet document of 1948 stated:

The struggle of two camps now determines the fate of the whole world, the fate of mankind. This strug­ gle emerges more and more as the chief moving force

lThe concept of two camps doctrine enunciated by Stalin- as early as 1927. Twenty years later, it reappeared as the Soviet working concept of international reality. 230 of the development of our age toward Communism. Here lies the content of the political struggle of our time. ^

There was no geographical or political space between the two worlds, no room for neutralism, no possibility of a third force, no such thing as non-alignment. Political neu­ trality in' the cold war was just a right-wing device in the service of imperialism. The pretense of neutrality might be tolerated very grudgingly in a marginal case, such as Finland, but never admitted in principle. The Soviet document already quoted said:

The third force enunciated by the right-wing socia­ lists is in fact nothing other than a cover for the policy of defense of capitalism and fight against Com­ munism. In our epoch there is not, and cannot be, a third force. . . . Two forces, two camps, exist throughout the world.^

One of the political consequences of the confinement of Stalinist policy to the image of bipolarity was the atti­ tude taken in the Kremlin toward the liberatory movements in

Asia. Synchronized with the cold war itself, the most impor­ tant historical fact of the period following World War II was

2A. Stepanian, "Neodolimoe dvizheniie Kommunizmu," Voprosy Filosofi, No. 2 (1948), p. 84. ^Voprosy Filosofi, No. 2 (1948), p. 85. 231 t?ne surging nationalist movements in Asia. There was no way to square this fact with the logic of the Stalinist drive for total control and the two-world image associated with it.

For this would mean recognizing Asia as a "third force" or a space between the worlds. As mentioned before, Stalinist

Russia envisaged Mossadegh1s nationalist movement as well as other nationalist uprisings in Asia with great suspicion.

Soviet theorists held that national liberation depended upon social emancipation, and that politically separate countries could achieve independence only after having shaken blfif the yoke of foreign capital.^ In short, the newly won national independence was pronounced a fiction, a cunning imperialist device for continuing to exercise control over the countries without appearing to do so. According to the logic of the drive for control, they could not be considered liberated so long as they had not yet been incorporated into the Soviet 5 control-sphere.

^Dokladv Akademii S.S.R., No. 3, 1950.

^Robert C. Tucker, "The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy, " Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 229. 232

All these lost their rationale by the approach of the second shift in the line of Soviet foreign policy, particu­ larly towards underdeveloped nations of Asia and the Middle

East. This was partly due to the rapid process of decoloni­ zation within the capitalist camp, and partly due to the emer­ gence of "nuclear stalemate" and change in the balance of stra­ tegy between the East and the West. Last but not least, emer­ ging difficulties within the Communist camp and an increasing mood of incipient prosperity and embourgeoise self-satisfac­ tion in Russian society contributed to this change of outlook toward world politics.

Within the capitalist camp, the rapid process of de­ colonization brought about a new opportunity for Soviet politi­ cal maneuvering in the international scene. Actually, this opportunity was heralded by the Chinese early flexible and brilliant diplomacy in Asia. Synchronized with their trium­ phant diplomacy at Geneva, the Chinese set forth a new approach toward the new countries of Asia, which crystallized in the notions of Panch-Shilla and Bandung. This novel Chinese policy in Asia opened Soviet eyes to the verities of the new situation in Asia. Thus having realized the chance of success in this 233 part of the world, particularly when the very policy of contain­ ment had frozen political maneuvering in Europe, the Soviet em­ barked on a new strategy more flexible and promising then be­ fore. But realization of this objective required a drastic revision in the pattern of Stalinist foreign policy. It appear­ ed first in reevaluation of the Stalinist attitude toward under­ developed nations; second, in reinterpretation of the two camps doctrine; and, third, in an attentive drive toward scaling down the sovietization policy and encouraging the very process of neutralization in these areas.

With regard to the first question, the new Soviet -outlook called for a doctrinal re-evaluation of the bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries. This was illustrated in a discussion which took place between Soviet Orientalists in 1956. The dis­ cussion pointed out the errors committed in the Stalinist peri­ od as the result of his rigidly hopeless view of the bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries, and it defined a new outlook.

Dr. X.M. Reissner, an eminent Orientalist maintained that:

The thesis that a political split had taken place since 1925 between the conciliating (towards the West) and the remaining parts of national bourgeoisie, was not confirmed by actual events. It is necessary to revise this thesis of I.V. Stalin and some other dog­ mas, in particular the untrue definitiog of Gandhi as an agent and accomplice of imperialism.

6"Diskussiia ob ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh 234

In his opening words, V.V. Balabushevich - discussing the condi­ tion of the Soviet Oriental Studies regarding the problem of the contemporary Bast - noticed in particular that Soviet Orien­ talists had cotimitted many mistakes in the evaluation of eco­ nomic and political views of national bourgeoisie in the colo­ nial and dependent countries.

The acuteness of the antagonisms between imperialism and the bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent coun­ tries was underestimated. Gandhi's positive role in ^ the national-liberating movement was too often ignored.

Furthermore, Balabushevich concluded:

. . . Capitalism as a world system has outlived its age and follows, as a whole, a descending line. But it does not follow from this proposition that individual capitalist countries cannot develop. The bourgeoisie of India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, and other countries, which builds up its own national economy, strengthens and develops the State-capitalist sector, fulfills a progressive function. To deny it is equal to ignoring facts and overlooking new phenomena.

The meaning of these mistakes, couched in Marxist-

Leninist terminology, becomes clearer when expressed in the

m . language of practical politics. These past errors prevented

6pozitsiiakh natsional 'noi bruzhuazii v stranakh Vos- toka," Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie, No. 1 (1957), p. 174.

^Sovestskoe Vostokovedeniie, No. 1 (1957), p. 182.

8Ibid., p. 183 235

Soviet leaders from seeing the true democratic distribution of forces in Asian and Near Eastern countries, led them into wishful thinking and fruitless denial of the possibility of finding temporary partners among native bourgeois parties, and precluded any active Soviet foreign policy towards the under­ developed countries* Recalling these mistakes, E* Zhukov stated:

• • • National bourgeoisie is an organized force which has the most numerous trained personnel and which puts forward an independent political program. * * . At present the leading position in many former colonial and dependent countries, which have achiev­ ed independence, belongs to national bourgeoisie and its parties. Such is the situation in India, Egypt, Indonesia, and many other countries. . . . These are not socialist countries. The constitutional regime in these countries is not that of people's democracy but all Sorbs of forms of a bourgois state, from a parliamentary republic to a limited monarchy. It would be, however, the greatest mistake to minimize the world-historical significance of the process of decomposition of the colonial system only because this decomposition has brought in its wake non-soci­ alist sovereign states. . . . Whatever the form of national liberation is a blow to imperialism and, in consequence, necessarily does not strengthen but weaken the world capitalist system.9

This doctrinal revision of Stalinist attitude towards the underdeveloped nations found its expression in new Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East and other Asian countries. It

9E, Zhokov, "Raspad kolonial 'noi sistemy imperializma," Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 16 (Moscow)(August, 1956), pp. 42-43. 236 was outlined in many speeches which Bulganin and, especially,

Khrushchev made during their long visit to India, Burma, and

Afghanistan in November-rDecember, 1955.^ The main strategic themes which could be derived from this diplomatic mission were as follows: to show the very lack of avarice in Soviet newly-adopted attitudes towards the former colonial or semi­ colonial countries; (2) to exploit the follies of the Western powers in these areas and estrange them from the West; (3) to capitalize on anti-racialism which exists in some of these countries; (4) to promote the trend towards political neutrali­ ty; (5) to entice their aspirations to develop their own econo­ mies through industrialization, to seme extent by granting

Soviet loans and increasing mutual trade; (6) to project be­ fore their eyes the very logic of planning economy and the quick industrialization of the USSR as a model to copy, with a hopeful implication that local people will understand that only a socialist system could realize such achievements within 11 a short period of time.

■*-®See Pravda (Moscow), December 1, 1955, p. 1.

*L'LWladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Co-Existence; An Analu- sis of Soviet Fonaqn Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), p. 229. 237

At the same time, in order to make an ideological

justification about this change of policy, Soviet leaders

took steps toward reinterpretation of the two camps doc- 12 trine. Accordingly, in the 20th Congress of the Communist

Parties, Khrushchev boldly put forward the thesis of three

camps or peace zone. Xn a report, submitted on behalf of

12This was not an easy task. The image of two camps had been deeply engrained in the Soviet ideological concept that even after Stalin's death was still maintained with great zeal. The idea of the "third force" was rejected as a revisionist plot against Marxism-Leninism. In an editorial attack against Yugoslav thesis of the third force, Kommunist, in January 1957, wrote: Some people, who consider themselves communists, deny, strange as it might be, the fact of the co-exist­ ence in the world of two antagonistic camps. We have in view a series of statements in the Yugoslav press. It appears from these statements that the very concept of existence of two antagonistic camps, a socialist and an imperialist, "with clearly defined state frontiers," is declared to be incorrect for the alleged reason that the socialist forces have grown up even there where power does not belong to the working class. . . . From the denial of the fact that the world is split up into two antagonistic systems and consequently into the two camps, the conclusion has been deduced that the social­ ist states allegedly cannot make a distinction in their foreign policy between the socialist and the bourgeois states. This is a point of view alien to proletarian internationalism; it amounts in glossing over the antag­ onism between the social and political regimes of social­ ist and capitalist countries, one pours water for the mill of the reformists who fight Marxism-Leninism and the Communist movement. . . . It is impossible to erase by 238 the Party Central Committee/ he stated:

Comrades, between the 19th and the 20th Congres­ ses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union very important changes have taken place in international relations# • • . The forces of peace have been con­ siderably augmented by the emergence in the world arena of a group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as the principle of their foreign policy. • • • As a result, a vast zone of peace, including peace- loving states, both socialist and non-socialist, of Europe and Asia, has emerged in the world. This zone embraces vast areas inhabited by nearly 1,500,000,000 people, i.e., the majority of the population of our planet. . . .

Thus, the compulsion to dichotomize the image of the world was no longer operative. The two-world conception faded out, giving way to the picture of one world in which two rival systems of states, the socialist and capitalist, compete for a preponderance of world influence. This was no longer the Sta­ linist world of capitalist encirclement. On the contrary,

l^any arguments the fact that the two antagonistic world social systems and the two camps are a living reality of our day. The two camps, the socialist and the capitalist, do exist and wage a struggle with each other (I. Potelov, "Razvitiie sotsializma i pro- letarskii internatsionalizm". Kommunist, No. I. January, 1957, p. 25). 13 Pravda (Moscow), February 15, 1956, p. 1. 239 territories contiguous to the Soviet orbit were now seen as fields for the penetration of Soviet capital, Soviet know­ how, Soviet antis, and Soviet ideas. Moscow gave the new

Asia the political recognition which Stalin withheld. This new world of Soviet foreign policy was a world which did not exclude political neutrality, or third force, or the notion of an uncommitted nation. For countries outside the Soviet bloc, there were alternate roads to socialism, even a parlia­ mentary road.1**

This was a great change in the Soviet political out­ look toward world politics. The road had opened to a more flexible policy in regard to underdeveloped countries. The very concept of revolution slid away from the agenda of

Soviet foreign policy. The revolution might take place only under propitious circumstances: one might wait for it for years. Soviet leaders started to exploit the world trouble spotft less with the aim of obtaining limited victories for

Communism (though they would not disdain victories if they could get them cheap and without risk) • They have not hesi­ tated to sacrifice the Communist parties on the altar of

14Tucker, op. cit., p. 230. 240 friendship with the bourgeoisie regimes in newly developed coun­ tries* The support that Russia has given to the dictatorial and conservative governments in the Middle East not only rein­ forced them, but deprived the local Communist parties of all possibility of revolutionary action and finally by its recogni­ tion of pan-Arab ideology and Oriental nationalism, the Kremlin is at the same time abandoning the cause of their national minorities, a potential weapon which was used by Stalin for 15 the advancement of the Russian political cause in Persia*

In short, with dispelling of the spectres of revolutionary ac­ tion and military intervention, Soviet strategy in the Middle

East has been specified to two aspects: diplomatic and econo­ mic. That is, an attempt towards political neutralization of the area and the competition for the economic hegemony.

With regard to political neutralization, Soviet Union has adopted two tactical approaches: on the one hand, it is continually encouraging the uncommitted nations of the area in maintaining their neutral positions in world politics, and does not hesitate in granting them economic and technical aid and taking care of their national pride by demanding their

15A. Bennigsen, "The National Front in Communist Stra­ tegy in the Middle East, " Politique Etrange (Paris, 195__) , p. participation in international conferences either technical or non-technical• On the other hand, the Soviet has emphatic­ ally tried to persuade those Middle Eastern nations who have gone over to the West that their national interests are to be found in the road of non-commitment. As such, the Soviet not only has tried to show them the political and economic advan­ tages of neutrality, but also has attempted to indicate the hazard of one-sided commitment in the case of nuclear conflict.

Xn a word, wooing and bullying have been two peculiar features of Soviet foreign policy towards these countries. This policy has been applied particularly towards Soviet border nations such as Turkey and Persia.

The rationale of Soviet neutralization strategy has further increased as the result of two politico-strategic factors, namely, nuclear stalemate and drastic changefin the balance of strategy between the East and the West. On the one hand, the very logic of nuclear stalemate has prohibited Russia from engaging in direct revolutionary and military activities in her border countries in the Middle East. In a word, this prohibition has become more considerable, not only in the Euro­ pean theatre, but in those border areas which have been regard­ ed as the areas of conflict and power confrontation between the Soviet and the West. Xn the European theatre, a 242

combination of scientific, military, and political development

coupled with the containment of the U.S.S.R. in Europe have deprived the Soviet Union of the chance for further encroach- 16 ment in the West. But in the latter areas, increasing

imparity between the expected advantages and involving dangers has restricted Soviets of any direct commitment. On the con­ trary, establishment of a sort of detente, either through neu­ tralization or bufferization, has become the major aim of

Soviet foreign policy towards these areas.

Coupled with the rationale of stalemate, the policy of neutrality has found more appealing ground as the result of

large-scale change in the strategic balance between the Soviet

Union and the West. Rapid development of missilery systems and mobile stations have put an end to the early Western superior

strategic position which had been manifested in the military encirclement of the Soviet Union and geographical invulnera-

1 7 bility of the American continent. Thus, as the result of this change, areas adjacent to the Soviet territory lost their early strategic importance both in the Western and Soviet

■'■^Bernard S. Morris, "Recent Shift in Communist Strate­ gy, " Political Chancre in Underdeveloped Countries; Nationalism and Communism (ed. by John H. Kautsky) (New York; John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 294. 17 See Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1957) , ch. v. 243 political designs. Soviet was no longer obliged to emphasize its political maneuvering in the adjacent areas between the two blocs. On the contrary, Russia was able to involve mili­ tarily, economically, and politically in any spot of the globe.

In a word, the Soviet strategic position as a great power chang­ ed into a global power. This change made it possible for the

Soviet Union to jump over immediate territories and engage in the game of politics in different parts of the world, such as

Africa and Latin America. Thus, under the prevailing stiategic conditions, political neutralization not only has found more reasoning in the design of Soviet political strategy towards

Turkey and Persia, but it has also found more appealing ground among these countries themselves. Even within the Western camp itself some have advaocated decreasing military commitments in border countries of the Soviet Union as a means towards lessen— 18 ing the danger of conflict.

The third factor which has increased the effectiveness of political neutralization in the design of Soviet foreign policy towards border cpuntries in the Middle East has been

^■®The practical implication of this change could be seen in recent American attempts in scaling down its military commit­ ment in these areas through closing down its missile bases in Turkey and curtailing its military aids to Turkey and Persia. emerging difficulties within the Soviet bloc itself. Xn fact,

the Soviet Union has become the victim of its own success in

Asia and Europe. Along with these victories a heavy responsi­ bility has plagued the Soviet Union in keeping up the social

and economic standards of its satellite countries in Eastern

Europe. This responsibility has become more galling and

irritating under the very condition of competitive co-existence

in which each power is t r y i n g to identify the superiority of 19 its own system.

The first symptom of these growing difficulties appear­

ed in 1956, when mass revolution in Poland and Hungary tried

to break the rigid rule of Stalinism. It resulted in the scal­

ing down of collectivization and decreasing the rate of so­

cialization in Poland and other countries. The very thesis

of "different roads towards socialism" was, in fact, and admis­

sion of these difficulties. Thus, due to this fact, the Soviet has unconsciously become reluctant in furthering Communization

■^In fact, today imperialism in the form of direct satel- lization has lost its classic meaning. The very responsibility of the dominant powers in improving and developing the social and economic life of dominated nations has overweighed the the very image of exploitation and the concept of prestige. 245 of border areas such as Turkey and Persia, which themselves are aflame with their own economic problems. Such an attempt not only will not solve the growing difficulties within the

Soviet camps, but will add to the existing problems. This was hinted by Mr. Khrushchev in his discussion with Mr. Lipp- mann concerning the Persian situation. 20 But by choosing the road of neutralization, the Soviet has released itself from such possible burdens on the one hand, and has created a situ­ ation advantageous to the economic interests of itself and its satellites on the other. In fact, one of the reasons of post-

Stalinist change of political strategy towards underdeveloped countries was an attentive drive toward creation of economic opportunity for Soviet and Eastern European countries.

Growing industrialization behind the Iron Curtain was imposing a new pattern of trade. Traditionally, Russia and

East European countries had sold their primary products to

Western Europe and so had built up credits with which to cover the deficit that they had accumulated outside Europe. By 1953, however, these Eastern European countries found themselves with fewer primary products to sell at a time when they needed

20See Walter Lippraann, The Communist World and Ours (Boston; Little Brown and Company, 1961). 246 to import more and more raw materials for their factories.

Clearly, the answer was to find markets outside of Europe for the products of Soviet industry and thus to bridge the 21 export-import gap. So the new Soviet leaders set out, modestly at first, to launch an export drive directed at the

Middle East and Southeast Asia. From the outset this drive had a dual aim: in part, economic; in part, political, psy­ chological and cultural. After 1956, the Soviet - by engaging in Africa and other area - extended such policy in a larger dimension.

Thus, on the grounds of such political, strategic, eco­ nomic and psychological factors right after Stalin's death, the Soviet set forth the policy of neutralization as a cardinal guideline of its diplomacy towards the Middle Eastern coun­ tries, including Turkey and Persia. Moscow approached the

Turkish and the Persians with a pacifying suggestion. Xn

July 1953, Russia officially withdrew all claims to Turkish territory. In a note Moscow stated:

Xn the name of the maintenance of good neighborly relations and the strengthening of peace and security, the Governments of Armenia and Georgia consider it pos­ sible to renounce their territorial claims against Turkey.

21H.G. Martin, "The Soviet Union fehd the Middle East, " Middle East Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1956, p. 49. 247 Insofar as it concerns the question of the straits the Soviet Government has reconsidered its opinion in this matter and holds that it is possible to insiire the security of the U.S.S.R. from the side of the straits on conditions equal­ ly acceptable both for the U.S.S.R. and for Turkey. Thus the Soviet Government declares the Soviet Union does not have any territorial claim whatso- ever against Turkey. ^

A new approach in post-Stalinist Russian diplomacy to­ wards Persia was revealed on August 1953, when Soviet Premier

George M. Malenkov announced in his foreign policy statement to the Supreme Soviet that “on the initiative of the Soviet

Union, talks are being held with Persia concerning a settlement 23 of a number of frontier problems and mutual financial claims."

He also emphasized that “the Soviet Union has no territorial 24 claims on any state including any of her neighbors."

In the pursuance of her newly-adopted strategy, the

Soviet Union now offered to settle with Persia the outstanding financial and boundary questions. The timing of the latest

Soviet move brought about deep astonishment among Persian political circles, since, a few months before, when the financial

^ T h e Royal Institute of International Affairs. Documents on International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 277-78.

23 The New York Times, August 10, 1953, p. 1. 24 ^Ibid. 248 fortunes of the Mossadegh government had sunk to their nadir, the Soviets had turned a deaf ear to Persia's request for the return of eleven tons of gold the USSR had owed her since the war.

Free of illusions as to the real nature of the Soviet objectives, the new Persian government nevertheless followed up the Soviet offer and in the ensuing negotiations reached an agreement whereby Russia was to return to Persia the eleven tons of gold and the frontier was delimited in certain disputed districts. On December 2, 1954, a pact was finally signed in which the U.S.S.R. agreed to pay the World War II claims of 25 the Persian Government. In addition, the agreement provided for the setting up of a mixed Soviet-Persian commission to carry out the demarcation of their common border along its 26 entire length.

The Soviet settlement of Persia’s war claims on July 1,

1954 was a third conciliatory gesture by the Soviet Union to­ wards Persia within a week. The other conciliatory gestures were: the return to Persia of three hundred Persian nationals,

25 “Iran," The Atlantic, The Atlantic Report on the World Today, vol. 195 (April, 1955), p. 17. 26 Ettellaat (Teheran), December 2, 1954, p. 1. 249

held by the Soviet Union since the 1941-46 occupation of Azer­

baijan; and the return of the Iran-Soviet Oil Company instal­

lations, an inactive distribution network, at Pahlavi, Khuri- 27 an, and other northern Iranian cities.

While the Soviets were offering their good neighborly

policies-to the Zahedi Government, the Persian Communists

were under heavy pursuit by the Persian police. In the fall

of 1954, a major Communist network was discovered in the

Persian Army. The disclosure of this network, which involved

some six hundred officers, including a goodly number of colo­

nels, brought catastrophe to the Communists in Persia.

The annihilation of the Tudeh's secret organization,

and the execution of its leading members brought no reaction

whatever from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, in pursu­

ance of appeasement, on December 2, 1954, the Soviet Govern­

ment signed a pact about the above-mentioned issues. Further­

more, she agreed to return an additional 73 Persians who had been detained after illegally crossing the Soviet border. It

was also announced that the Shah of Iran would make a personal

visit to the Soviet Union during June and July 1956.

If this Soviet conciliatory approach was to be

^ T h e New York Times, July 2, 1954, p. 4. 250 interpreted solely as a move designed to counter any possible military alignment of Persia with the Western Powers, it fail­ ed entirely in its intent; for, in spite of the Soviet's friendly overtures, the Persian Government announced on Octo­ ber 11, 1955, that it had decided to accede to the defensive alliance signed by Turkey and Iraq in Baghdad on February 24, 28 1955, latterly known as the "Baghdad Pact."

In a speech on October 12, 1955, Mr. Molotov charged that the Baghdad Pact was an "aggressive military grouping" not interested in the consolidation of peace and international security. He said its aim was to preserve and reestablish the colonial dependence of the Middle East countries belonging to 29 it. "The accession of Iran to this military alignment,"

Moscow charged, "contradicts the good-neighborly relations be­ tween Iran and the Soviet Union and certain treaty obligations 30 of Iran." Following this theme, on December 30, 1955, Mr.

Khrushchev stated:

"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Jour­ nal, Vol. IX (Autumn, 1955), p. 43. 29 The Manchester Guardian (LondonI, Oct. 13, 1955, pp. 1-7. 30"Soviet Note Protesting Iran's Adherence to the Bagh­ dad Pact," Ettellaat (Teheran), October 12, 1955, p. 1. 251 . . . Before the ink had even dried on the joint com­ munique on the result of the Geneva conference, some of our partners in the conference had begun to involve new' countries in the aggressive Baghdad Pact. They drew in Iran and Turkey and are dragging in other states. . . . The governments of Iran and Turkey are hardly behaving reasonably when they link their fate to the aggressive Baghdad Pact and refuse to estab^jsh good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union.

Teheran denied the Soviet allegation in a memorandum of

October 17 and insisted that Iran's accession to the Pact,

"which is within the framework of the U.N. Charter and which

aims only to strengthen the basis of peace and security in the 32 Middle East and throughout the world, is fully natural."

But in spite of this drastic turn in Iran's foreign policy, Soviet direction was emphatic in pursuing its policy

of neutralization toward Iran. During February, 1956, both

Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Molotov urged friendly relations eith

Iran. The official Soviet policy was one of improving rela­

tions with Iran with a view to strengthening mutual confidence,

extending trade, and expanding contacts and cultural coppera-

txon. 33

3~*~Pravda (Moscow) , December 30, 1955, p. 1.

3^The Manchester Guardian (London), Oct. 18, 1955, p. 1.

33pravda (Moscow), February 15, 1956. 252

A formal statement proposing aid for Iranian develop­ ment and construction projects was issued by the Soviet Embas­

sy in Teheran on June 23, 1956* An appeal for close commercial

and social ties, without military or political strings between

the two adjoining countries, was made by the Soviet Union*

The Shah of Iran visited the Soviet Union during June

and July, 1956, But this visit did not have the results the

Soviets had expected. On February 26, 1957, the Soviets repor­ ted that the border dispute had been settled and the Joint Com­ mission had completed the transfer and acceptance of tracts of 34 land over a 1925-mile stretch.

On March 17, 1957, the Soviet Union gave a twin-engine

Ilyushin-14 transport plane to the Shah of Iran. This was

termed as a new friendly gesture toward the regime of the Shah.

The Russians had worked to clear up friction with Iran. Thus, on April 19, 1957, in Teheran, the Deputy Soviet Foreign Minis­ ter, Vasily V. Kuznestov, obtained a promise from Iran not to allow the West to establish atomic bases in Iran. He said the

Soviet Union had offered economic and technical assistance to

Iran, including the building of hydro-electric plants on the

Iranian—Soviet border and the establishment of a Moscow—

Teheran Airlines.

34"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. X (Autumn, 1957), pp. 179ff. Iran-confirmed its pledge to the Soviet Union not to permit the United States or any other foreign country to es­ tablish military bases in Iran. An agreement for the estab­ lishment of direct air' service from Teheran to Moscow was reached. The construction of hydro-electric power projects was turned down by the Iranians because the Soviet Union did not propose that Iran have an equal share in the building of the plants. Later, the U.S.S.R. and Iran agreed to the joint use, on a basis of equal rights, of the rivers Aras and Atrak along the Soviet-Iranian border.

In 1958, as the result of a major shift in the struc­ ture of the Baghdad Pact, and aggravation of the cold war in the Middle East, Iran ipso facto was drawn into the maelstrom of the East-West conflict. On July 14, 1958, a revolution broke out in Iraq, overthrowing the monarchy and bringing to power a group of young Army officers. Communists were accused 35 of playing the leading role in the revolution, which resulted in Iraq*s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. Iran as a member of the Pact was alarmed at the new situation and consequently

Soviet-Iranian relations took a turn for the worse. The

35 N.H. Mager and Jacques Katel, Conquest Without War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 138. 254

Soviet embarked on a massive propaganda program toward com­ plete breakdown of the crack-stricken Pact* Commenting on this issue, Khrushchev maintained:

The imperialist created the aggressive Baghdad Pact. Then the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine, direct­ ed against the national-liberation movement in the countries, was proclaimed. But what came of this? No pacts or doctrines can stay the struggle of the peoples for their liberation. In Iraq the people have overthrown the domination of the imperialists. .... The ruling circles of the U.S.A. and Great Britain hemmed and hawed but were compelled to recog­ nize the Republic of Iraq.3

At the same time. Radio Moscow stepped up its attack against the ruling circles in Iran and Turkey. It asked the people to overthrow the regime of the Shah and set free the country from the imperialist yoke. Following this line, on February

18, 1959, Khrushchev stated:

Whom then does the Shah of Iran really fear? He does not fear us, but he fears his own people. He is, it seems, not sure of the stability of his throne. And this is why he keeps his private capital not in Iran but in Britain. He is seriously worried by what happened in Iraq. As is known, the Baghdad Pact was named after the capital of Iraq, Baghdad. And when the people of Iraq rose up against the power of the rotten throne and of the Iraqi Government which had sold itself to the imperialists, then neither the Baghdad Pact nor the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine helped. The lesson to be learned from this is that neither a bi­ lateral nor even a quinquelateral treaty can save any rotten throne from its own people.37

3®Pravda (Moscow) , August 24, 1958, p. 1. 37Khrushchev speech at meeting of the Tula Oblast Party 255

This exchange of radio attacks continued for quite a number of months. With the cooling off of the situation, the Soviet re­

newed its friendly gestures towards the Iranian regime and pro­ mised massive Soviet aid in the case of Iran's withdrawal frcm

the CENTO Pact.

In the sixties, the Soviet - while in essence it has

continued its drive towards neutralization of Persia - has in

form adopted a "wait and see" policy. This has been due to

several factors: On the one hand, growing social and political unrest in Persia has made the Soviet believe that process of this change moves in a direction more favorable to the Soviet

Union. Secondly, as mentioned previously, the very drastic change in the strategic value of Soviet border countries has

forced the Western Powers to lessen their military commitment

in these areas. Therefore, one of the causes of Soviet griev­ ances against these countries, including Persia, is being blot­ ted out. Thirdly, practical experiences have made the Western \ Powers believe that neutral countries in the Middle East not

only have been able to bring about internal socio-political

37Committee and the Oblast Soviet; Moscow broadcast, February 18, 1959. Also Mager and Katel, op. cit., p.140. 256 stability but also have been able to create more effective barriers against Communist advancement than unstable commit­ ted countries of the area. Consequently, some political circles in the United States have voiced revision of the

American foreign policy towards these countries, particularly with regard to the foreign aid. In this case, the proposed memorandum of the Senate majority leader, Mansfield, is not­ able.

Accordingly, all these new developments have made the

Soviet adopt the "wait and see" policy towards its southern neighbors, including Persia. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In perspective, Soviet political strategy towards Persia has been shaped according to the logic of the moment, the nature of international politics, the power potentiality of the Soviet

Union with regard to the other challenging powers in the area, and, finally, Persia's internal situation. In essence, the key to the Soviet political approach has been Soviet national inter­ ests which, in their geopolitical aspect have not been too much different from the pattern of Tsarist foreign policy, at least up to the middle of the fifties when the nature of international politics continued to preserve its traditional feature in one way or another. Added to this factor has been the messianic element in the design of Soviet political strategy. To the extent that by dwelling on inborn crises of the native country and setting forth diagnoses of them, the Soviet Union has been able to provide a rearward route for the advancement of its * political objectives. Emphasis on rearward strategy has been stressed whenever the Soviet Union has been on the offensive position. Sometimes, such concentration has been so strong that many failed to distinguish between the Soviet foreign poli­ cy in a particular area and the policy of the native Communist party. By virtue of the dual Soviet strategy toward Persia,

which is primarily geopolitical and ideological, any major

shift in Soviet policy has had a far-reaching effect upon

the process of socio-political development in Persia, either

in positive or negative ways.

Early Soviet revolutionary strategy had an effective

impact upon the process of nationalism in Persia so that not

only Persian nationalists were able to resist the British at­

tempt to extending its influence in Persia, but they were also

able to force Great Britain to retreat from Curzon's policy in

establishing full-fledged British domination over Persia. The

first major shift from short-lived revolutionary strategy also,

in its turn, had a deep effect upon the process of socio-poli­

tical development in Persia. The Soviet over-all defensive

strategy or isolated policy brought about an opportunity for

Persia to develop its national strength both materially and

spiritually, an opportunity which had not occurred in the pre­

vious hundred and twenty years. Especially since such shift

was synchronized with similar change in the British political

strategy toward Persia, the inevitable result was a tacit agree­

ment between the two rival powers in avoiding interference in

Persian internal affairs. 259

The native leadership was not intelligent enough to utilize correctly such an historical opportunity. Instead of applying and institutionalizing each social force accor­ ding to its merit and traditional capacity, it kept some of these forces passive, some others intact, and the rest were used in a wrong direction for which they neither had the social ability nor the moral capacity to accept newly assigned respon­ sibilities. Tribal forces were subdued but economically and socially they were kept passive without any attempt in institu­ tionalizing their traditional merit as the source of militarism.

Peasant status was maintained intact without any attempt towards land distribution and consequent change in their socio-economic structure. In view of the fact that folk—Islam was so deeply entrenched in village life, disengagement of the "modernized" polity from the tradition-bound sectors had inevitably meant, in practice, that the government was alienated from ttebulk of the population. Urban classes became subject to moderni­ zation, but it followed a superficial line, so that - while it was able to change the form and behavior of society — it was not strong enough to change the very structure of the society.

Consequently, attentive steps towards disengagement of policy from traditionalism could not find reflection in political reality. 260

Furthermore/ attempted reforms were largely introduced

ad hoc. With the exception of xenophobic sentiments/ Persian nationalism was devoid of any ideological content that could provide integration and justification for the interwar reform.

There was no ideology within the context of which the Persian transformation could find direction. In view of that fact, that the new regime was not the outcome of a revolutionary movement and an ideological blueprint, it had more of an abili­ ty for imitation than a capacity for initiation. At the same time, since the reform movement was not strong enough to change the very back one of a soaial structure, it could not provide synthetic values out of a spontaneous process of interaction between individuals and their changed social en­ vironment. Consequently, it created an ideological vacuum and moral instability. Instead of curing the inborn crises of so­ ciety, which had started from the very beginning of the 19th century, it complicated and left a legacy of unsolved accumula­ ted problems, both culturally and nationally.

All these became further complicated, when the outbreak of the Second World War restored the Great Powers' intervention in Persian internal affairs. On the one hand, failure in resis­ ting the invading forces and the way in which the regime surren­ dered to the enemies brought about a feeling of shame and guilt 261

among the conscious segments of society. The whole image of

strength and pride, which had been indoctrinated by the dic­

tatorial regime overnight, evaporated, and Persians were rude­

ly .reminded that their continued existence as a nation depend­ ed not so much on themselves as upon the old conflict between

Russian and British interests in the Middle East. Persians

suddenly found themselves in a desperate state of frustration,

in which they had nothing to do except to condemn a regime which had deceived them for years. Added to this state of psychological quandry were the very effects of the war itself.

The complications of the war— occupation by the forces of three major powers; the monopolization by them of all vital transport

for the war effort; the loss of internal security; a disloca­ ted economy and spiraling inflation— all in all further highlighted the galling crises in society. The Allied occupa­ tion brought with it a return of constitutional government to

replace the dictatorial rule of the previous regime. Yet this

same occupation was an obstacle to the development of the Per­ sian constitutional institution. At the same time, the dicta­ torship had left the Persians so inexperienced and untrained

in self-discipline and self-government that these fresh aspira­ tions and energies could not be constructively directed. The

synthetic result of all these was a growing state of opportunism

in society in general. Political charlatanism, hoarding. 262 bribery, embezzlement and all features of demoralization and corruption became the logic of the time.

Amidst all these moral and material crises, the Soviet

Union set forth the very thesis of Marxism-Leninism as the best solution and diagnosis for the trouble-stricken Persian society. This feature of Soviet rearward strategy made a far- reaching effect upon the postwar orientation of the socio­ political development in Persia, a trend which up to the present time has been regarded as one of the extant alternative forces

in the political life of Persia. Communism not only could easily fill the existing ideological vacuum in Persia, but was able to provide a chewing value for different segments of the society. It provided deracinated intellectuals with an ideology through which to release their ambition, distress, ideals, envy and need for a synthetic world outlook; it gave a technic of struggle to nationalist movements— which in their

own right had little more than a grievance and a mystique; it carried itself with the posture of victory; and it offered a quick road to liberation from necessity and poverty. Thus, having translated all these slogans into social indoctrina­ tion and mass regimentation, Communists were successful in attracting great segments of the Persian society. Intellectuals, workers, peasants, low-paid civil servants, slum-dwellers, hoodlums, and opportunists all saw in Communism an outlet for the expression of their social grievances. It appealed to the misery of the poor and the idealism of the rich, the bitterness of those who failed and the guilt-feelings of those who succeeded, the ignorance of the mass and the learning of intellectuals. The Communist Party knew well that, in Persia, nationalism was a dynamic historical force and a powerful weapon which could be used against the West, against the monarchy and the ruling elite, but also against Communist Russia. There­ fore, the Tudeh did attempt to give an image of a nationalistic party and set out to appropriate nationalism to iself. This early Tudeh claim of being a nationalist party was conducive to the Soviet anti-Fascist strategy, namely, in keeping the rear of the Caucasian front in a state of tranquillity and pre­ serving the very safety of the supply route to Russia. In short, these political activities within the constitutional framework heralded the strengthening of the democratic trend which the Allied occupation had restored in Persia.

A new shift in the Soviet political strategy caused a major setback in the Tudeh's social and political advancements 264 in Persia. A switch from anti-Fascist to anti-imperialist strategy resulted in a new Soviet expansionist drive toward acquisition of economic and political interests in Persia, and the Tudeh's subsequent support of the Soviet demand for oil concessions and engineering separatist movements in Iranian

Azerbaijan and Kurdistan was incompatible with its nationalistic claim. The result of it was twofold. On the one hand, this incident dichotomized the Persian society into the left and right factions, a division which in the long run turned out to be detrimental to the Persian national interest, and an obstacle toward any constructive achievement in the international scene.

On the other hand, the Tudeh's subserviency to the Soviet po­ litical interest in Persia paved the way for restoration of the dictatorial power of the ruling elite and brought an end to the short-lived parliamentary system which had been reestablished after the outbreak of the war.

Out of this continual socio-political confusion and manichaestic atmosphere of right and left controversy, which was an internal reflection of the external cold war system, a new political movement started to take shape. It was a new link in the chain of nationalistic movements which had started at the very turn of the century, and as the previous ones, its 265

main objective was attentive struggle in asserting Persian

political and economic independence in international politics.

Nationalism in Persia and its particular offshoot, the

demand for oil nationalization, drew its strength from all

the Persian strata, since all of them wanted it, whether for

creditable or discreditable reasons. Xt was once again an

example of the extraordinary spiritual vitality in the Persian

people. In recent years, much of this force had gone into the

Tudeh Party; but since 1947, that channel of expression had

been proved inadequate, and a new one was needed. There were

strains of nationalist fervor, of religious fanaticism, of the

desperation of the "have-nots," all of which were present in

the Tudeh movement of the immediate postwar period, and all re­

appeared in the nationalist movement of the fifties. Xt is

this fact, perhaps, that has led many observers to suppose

that the power behind Mossadegh was the Tudeh Party and so,

ultimately, Russia. This would give a misleading picture.

Russia might benefit from, but certainly did not and could not

stimulate a movement that was fundamental to Persian history.

Particularly, at this,time, Soviet dichotomic outlook of world

politics would not let it have a trustful eye toward a move­

ment which was out of its control. It was this inflexible and

rigid attitude of Stalinist Russia toward bourgeoisie movements

i which forced the Persian nationalists to avoid dwelling on the existing conflict between the East and West for the reali­ zation of their national aspirations. First of all, any at­ tempt on the part of the Persian nationalists in putting their confidence in Soviet support seemed hazardous and unrealistic, because - in view of the world balance of strategy at that time - the Soviet immediate territories were the prime objec­ tive of the Russian power drive. Especially did the bitter memories of the Soviet expansionist tendency in 1946 reinforce this fact. Consequently, nationalists from the very beginning hesitated in playing off Russia against the West or holding common front with the Tudeh. On the contrary, they attempted through utilization of the Anglo-American conflict in the

Middle East tc achieve their national objectives. Especially their traditional image of the United States as a democratic, anti-colonialistic, and disinterested power in Persia made them believe that they would receive the American moral and material support in their struggle against the forces of Great Britain

This notion was further reinforced by the thesis of "active opposition to Russia," which had been laid down by the State

Department specialists on Middle Eastern affairs who looked toward nationalism as a possible nucleus of resistance to Soviet infiltration. 267

During the process of their movement, Persian national­ ists faced with two unpredictable predicaments which were the results of their miscalculation on the external front and shortcomings in internal strategy.

On the external front, Persia badly misunderstood the very character of Anglo-American conflict in Persia. First, they ever-estimated the rate of competition between the two

Western powers. Secondly, they failed in making a distinction between the American political pragmatism and moral pronounce­ ment in international politics. In a word, they were misled by anti-colonial doctrine which had been expressed now and then by the American statesmen on the Persian issue. Thirdly,

Persian nationalists failed to recognize the very dynamism of the American political system with regard to the great role which interest-articulative groups, such as oil companies, could play in the policy-making process of the United States, particularly when their interests are a matter of concern.

Finally, they were not able to realize that the main issue of

Anglo-American conflict was not necessarily over the nature of

British colonail activities in Persia, but it was the very fact that the United States wanted more say in the affairs of the area, since they believed that the power, both financially and materially, was theirs, and the British could have that power through them. 268

Thus, when the nationalist leaders confronted with a situation where Anglo-American powers were united against them, they had nothing to do but turn to the old habit of playing a game with the two leading antagonistic powers. As a last ditch attempt, they tried to dwell on the existing conflict between the Soviet Union arid the West, a policy which, at the beginning, they avoided following. Even here, they failed to make a distinction between the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the policy of the native Communist party. Instead of coming to terms with the Soviet Union, they started to flirt with the Tudeh Party, a policy which from the over-all point of view turned out to be detrimental to the interest of the movement. Added to these political miscalculation was a new shift in Soviet political strategy toward the West, which further complicated Persian political maneuvering on the international scene. As a part of their drive toward relaxation of international tensions, Stalins' successor had adopted a reconciliatory attitude toward the

West which prevented them from getting involved in a political game against the West in Persia.

Concomitant with these political misinterpretations in external policy, were shortcomings in the internal strategy of the movement. First, the very lack of a conceptual framework, 269 political philosophy, and ideological guideline deprived the movement of flexibility of action, both in its tactical and strategic aspects. As the result, nationalists were forced to be dependent upon the personality of their leaders and the very image of the launched slogans. And any tactical retreat on the part of the leaders or any change in the adopted formu­ la would have been regarded by the masses as the betrayal of the movement as a whole. In fact, oil nationalization was a means towards realization of the Persian economic and politi­ cal independence, but the lack of an ideological guideline made it an end in itself, and consequently, its failure was tantamount with the failure of the movement as a whole. This was the reason that when the changed situation required a tactical retreat from the adopted formula, the nationalist leaders found themselves at the dead end of the black alley, deprived of political maneuvering on the internal scene.

The second shortcoming in the internal strategy of the nationalists was their failure in establishing a well-organiz­ ed and well-disciplined protective force for the security of their movement. In fact, any revolutionary or semi—revolution­ ary movement in order to preserve its system, immune from the internal opposing forces and external intrigue and provoca­ tion, has to have a well-organized fighting force, either in 270 the form of a loyal military force, militia army, or any other

organized force. But Persian nationalists, instead of provi» ding such security units, relied on the support of disorganized masses, which - while it was necessary - was not enough. Conse­ quently, failure in providing such a protective force, along with blunders on external fronts, hand in hand with economic and financial difficulties, caused the downfall of the movement.

The downfall of the nationalist regime was another failure in the chain of recent history of nationalism which had started in the turn of the century. Xt was a great shock to the Persian people, a shock which was accompanied by cynical shrugs and loud cries of indignation, but many shouts were uttered only to dis­ guise disappointment and pain. Persians were once more remind­ ed of the hazard of too much dependence upon any great power for the realization of their national aspirations.

Since the regime of the Shah owed its very existence to the United States intervention and combined financial and mili­ tary support, it was forced to make a one-sided commitment to the West, a policy which meant abandonment of a traditional policy of neutrality. Many Persians who still thought and felt in the neutralist tradition deplored such complete commitment to the West. This was not so much because of fear of what 271

Soviet Russia might do by way of reaction; it was rather their

fear of becoming beholden to the United States that the nation

would lose its independence and freedom of action on the inter­

national scene. Thus, through such one-sided commitment, Persia

actually was drawn into the orbit of the interest of the United

States. As such, necessarily, the policy of status quo became

the prime objective of the United States in Persia. This was

incompatible with the political nature of the Persian society.

The United States tended to support in Persia the most conserv­

ative elements because they seemed to be safest in terms of preservation of the status quo. This has proven to be a grave miscalculation. For in Persia the choice was not between the

status quo and change, but between change under Communist auspi­

ces and change under nationalist direction. The whole purpose

of the Persian nationalist movement was not only patching up

dichotomic division of the society to the left and right and

creating a common national value, but also bringing about libe­

ration from domination and necessity, which actually the Commu­

nists had promised for years. The policy of status quo not only

froze the natural process of change in Persia, but proved to be

an ineffective method with regard to the volatile nature of

international politics. 272

Internal application of the status quo was an attempt toward peaceful change in Persia, but peaceful change required the cooperation of the ruling groups, which has but rarely been forthcoming. For social and economic change is bound to threaten the foundations of their power. On this ground, right after restoration of his power, the Shah set forth the thesis of positive nationalism as a new attempt toward peace­ ful change- Unlike'radical nationalists who believed that liberation from domination should be prerequisite to liberation from necessity, the new thesis claimed that liberation from po­ verty was to be a precondition for other kinds of liberations.

This publicized thesis was lauded with great fanfare as a new constructive and progressive movement in Persia. After nine years of full-fledged dictatorial rule and massive economic and financial supports, the result turned out to be economic bankruptcy, financial crisis, social confusion, and psycho­ logical quandry.

The causes of failure were neither in the design of change nor in the intentions of the leaders but in the very state of inconsistency between the nature of the system and the new character of international politics. In the sense that rapid change in the nature of world politics transformed the cold war from its world-wide dichotomic feature into the intra- 273 cold war, namely, raging conflict between the conscious seg­ ments of the society and ruling groups in underdeveloped coun­ tries and other socially troubled areas of the world.

Therefore, conflict and controversy between the great powers have been drawn into the crucible of internal crisis of each individual country. Wherever the rate of such internal conflict has been high, rivalry and controversy between the two hostile powers has been high too. In converse, wherever such internal gulf has been bridged and conflict has been ironed out, tension and rivalry between the great powers has been re­ laxed. In short, the cold war in a form of conflict and rivalry between the great hostile powers could find meaning wherever there is a very state of intra-cold war. For the moment that the state of intra-cold war ceased to exist in a particular area, the conflict and tension between the great powers would relax in that area. The reality of this situation has become more obvious when the danger of nuclear warfare has prevented the great powers from engaging in a direct military activity in these areas. Consequently, they have been forced to worh through the internal hostile factions for assertion of their power and influence. In this choice of taste, the United States more or less has come out in favor of the ruling elite and a strong supporter of the status quo. 274

Thus, such a state of intra-cold war is incompatible with the policy of status quo- Any attempt toward mainte­ nance of status quo or freezing the existing crisis maJce the system inoperative, non-productive, and unconstructive on the following grounds: First, since the ruling elite owed their survival to the continual support of one of the

Great Powers, it is necessarily restricted in its freedom of activities with regard to any action which might be termed detrimental to the interest of the supporting power, either in national or international scene. Therefore, such a state of subordination alienates the ruling elite from its people and creates an image of obsequiousness among the educated group of the society. Secondly, in view of the fact that the ruling elite does not have any solid basis among the people, it has to buy over support of certain groups in society, such as army officers or others in order to maintain its regime in power.

As such, it has not only to provide them with certain privi­ leges, but has also to give them free hand in satisfying their material desires through illegal ways. Consequently, corruption would be an ipso facto feature of the system. Thirdly, the ruling group in order to eradicate the sources of opposition usually involves itself in the game of politics against its own people, either through a divide and rule policy or other political devices. 275

On the other hand, people who have lost faith in the regime not only escape from performance of their social re­ sponsibilities but subvert or paralyze the very action of their government in one way or another. Consequently, the over-all result would be inoperativeness and ineffectiveness of the system as a whole. Nothing positive would come out, so far as the very state of intra-cold war continues to rule the life of the nation. And maintenance of the status quo through forceful preservation of an unpopular regime not only would not help it but would perpetuate it. Thus, so far as the existing gulf between people and government has not been bridged; so far as a common value has not been developed, the system as a whole cannot work out. It does not matter how broad-minded, how Western-minded, and how reform-minded a par­ ticular leader might be.

In view of this fact, Persia has been plagued by the very state of the intra-cold war. Accordingly, the existing regime has depended for its survival upon the continual support of the United States on the one hand, and upon the continual game of politics against its own people on the other. Though a policy of status quo could freeze the existing crisis for a decade, the essence of crisis remains aLive and susceptible to eruption at any possible opportunity. An early attempt toward the peaceful change was of no avail, by the very lack of coqpe-

rativeness of the ruling groups, since they realized that so­

cial and economic change was bound to threaten the foundation

of their power. Apparently, the solution was to be found in

appeal to alternative groups. But this could not materialize

on the following grounds: first, the United States, by dint

of its pluralistic political philosophy and social system, has been unwilling to support dedicated revolutionary minorities or

radicalistic reformists who have sought the road of non-commit­ ment. Dislike of revolutionary approach toward the solution of problems, along with its pragmatic nature in achieving immediate political cash value, have forced the United States to continue

its support of the existing physical power as the most agree­ able means toward the solution of problems. Secondly, a decade of full-fledged dictatorial power of the Shah deprived an op­ portunity for the development of alternative forces. Though the

National Front has been one of the most important and most accept­ able alternative forces in Persia, its leadership has been ex­ tremely weak in their strategic calculation and political maneu­ vering, so that they have not been able to establish a well- organized, well-disciplined power force to be reckoned as an inevitable alternative force. This shortcoming on the part of 277 the National Front1s leadership has made the United States , ;. i. r more willing to continue its support of the regime of the

Shah in one way or another. Consequently, a new reforma­ tory program has been set forth in order to save the regime of the Shah from burning political inferno. There is no doubt that the new reformatory measures are more radical than before? there is no doubt that the slogans launched seem more progressive than before; there is no doubt thdc adopted measures have a transcending effect upon the society in a positive way; there is no doubt that the land distribution will have an im­ pressive effect upon the structure of society, and in the long run will be beneficial for the interest of society as a whole; but none of these adopted measures is strong enough to bring about a solution to the inborn crisis of the system. How far this reformatory movement will be able to bridge the existing gulf betweenpeople and the government; how far it will be able to bring about a common value for society as a whole; and how able it will be to end the existing state of intra-cold war in

Persia is what the future has to show. The very fact is that the crisis is alive and growing, it has both internal and ex­ ternal repercussions. 278

Internally, the entrance of peasants as a new political force in the political limelight of Persia will have a far- reaching effect upon the trend of socio-political development in Persia. ‘ How far the Shah's regime will be able to mobilize the peasants' forces against the urban opposing groups depends upon the nature of reform per se and the rate of radicalism in the political outlook of the regime on the one hand, and its success in solving the immediate problem of transition in the rural societies on the other. In the long run, an awakened and conscious peasantry cannot be isolated from the very impact of the economic and financial problems of the country as a whole.

Failure in solving the extant socio-economic crises of the urban societies spontaneously will draw the peasants into the band wagon of the urban opposing groups and create a mighty force which hardly can be resisted. In a word, all these ap­ parent reformatory maneouvers have their own unwill drive, which not only strengthens the trend of social mobilization or political socialization in the erstwhile torpid life of the rural areas, but accelerates the very process of change, ei­ ther through violent revolution or through an overall reforma­ tory movement.

4 ' Externally, the existing state of intra-cold war has had a determining effect upon the character of Soviet politi­ cal strategy toward Persia. Though a policy of neutrality has been the main theme of the Soviet political strategy to­ ward Persia in recent years, nevertheless, the Soviet has been emphatic in capitalizing on the existing problems toward the advancement of its political objectives in Persia. On the one hand, the Soviets has continually attributed the very causes of the existing crises to the policy of one-sided commit­ ment on the part of the Persian Government, and intervension of the United States in the internal affairs of Persia. This at­ tentive Soviet propagandism is not too far freon the point of view of neutralist-minded nationalists who have sought the causes of the present crises in the archaic nature of the system as a whole and the very character of the status quo policy which has been set forth by the United States toward the preservation of the existing political regime in Persia. Justly or not, this has served to identify the United States with the Shah's regime, together with responsibility for what the regime has done, or failed to do. For this reason the United States is distrusted, if not indeed disliked, by all those who have come to distrust the Shah and oppose his policies. Thus, the Soviet 280

Union - well aware of the existing political mood in Persia -

has taken attentive steps in discrediting the United States

in Persia and also in disclosing the very disadvantage of

political commitment to the West. On the other hand, the

Soviet is viewing two alternative directions in the trend of

socio-political crises in Persia.

Xn one scheme of analysis, the Soviet believes that in­

capability of the Shah's regime in coping with the growing prob­

lems and inability of alternative forces in bringing about a

conclusive solution to the difficulties will make the Tudeh Party

an ipso facto successor to the power in Persia. In other words,

failure on the part of the Western-oriented forces will provide

a legitimate ground for the Communists' claim of being the sole power capable in setting Persia free from the exfeting crisis.

This has been the very reason that the Soviet statesmen have

stated that in Persia the tide of history is moving in favor of the socialist forces. In another scheme of analysis, they view the possible victory of the neutralist-minded nationalists as

still an advantage for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Because in view of the fact that Soviet immediate territories have lost their erstwhile strategic importance in the military design of the Great Powers, in the future they not only would be

automatically uncommitted in military sense, but they would be 281

able to play a tension-absorbing role in tbe case of severe

East-West conflicts. Moreover# possible neutralist regime would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to get into the competition with the Western Powers in this part of the world# both economically and politically. But all these ana­

lytical calculations have not prevented the Soviets from adopt­

ing friendly gestures toward the regime of the Shah and expres­

sing a desire for giving economic and technical aid, or even voicing support to its attempted reformatory measures.

In short# in view of the complicated nature of the cri­

sis itself'and unclarified power status of alternative forces, the Soviet Union has adopted a "wait and see" policy toward the existing situation in Persia. At the same time# this is not incompatible with the changed nature of international politics.

Because, by virtue of this metamorphic change# Soviet strategy toward Persia has lost some of its erstwhile features such as direct involvement toward territorial aggrandizement or commu- nization of the country. Since the Soviets - for realization of their political objectives - have to work out through the internal factional forces# they necessarily have to take into account the power position of such forces and reckon with the very logic of the moment. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Fray, Rickard. The Near East and the Great Powers. Cairibridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Graham, M.W. The Soviet Security System. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1929.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Doctrine. Glencoe, 111, 1953.

Groseclose, Elgin. Introduction to Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Gurian, Waldemar (ed.). The soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951.

Hass, William S. Iran. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946.

Hamzavi, A.H. Persia -and the Powers: . An Account of Diplomatic Relations, 1941-1946. London: Hutchinson, 1946.

Hitti, Philip K. The Near East in History, A 5000 Years Story. New York: Divan Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961.

Herling, A.K. The Soviet Slave Empire. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1951.

Hassmann, Heinrich. Oil in the Soviet Union. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953.

Hughston—Waston, From Lenin to Malenkov. New York; Fredrick A. Praeger, 1957.

Kasravi, Ahmad. Tarikhe Heidah-Saleh Azerbaijan; Ya Dastane Mashrutv. Iran (Eighteen Years of the Azerbaijanian History; or the Story of the Constitutional Movement in Iran). Teheran, 1939-41.

Kautsky, John H. Political Change in Underdeveloped Communi­ ties: Nationalism and Communism. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962. 292

Karpovich, Michael. "Russian Imperialism and Communist Aggres­ sion, " Soviet Conduct in World Affairs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.

Kautsky, Karl, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Manchester: The National Labor Press, n.d.

Kerman, George F. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.

Kemp, Norman. Abadan: A First-Hand Account of the Persian Oil Crisis. London: Allen Wingate, 1953.

Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.

Korobeinikov, I.I. Iran: Ekonomika i^ vneshniaia Torgovlva. Moscow, 1954.

Kohn, Hans. "The Nationalist Policy of the Soviet Union," Soviet Union and World Problems. London: Cambridge University Press, 1935.

Krasin, L.B. Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli. Moscow, 1928.

Kulski, Wladyslaw W. Peaceful Coexistence; An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959.

Lambton, A.N. Some of the Problems Facing Persia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948.

Laqueur, Walter Z. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. New York: Fredrick A. Peaeger, Publisher, 1959.

Lenczowski, George. Russia and the West in Iran, 1918—1948. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949.

______. The Middle East in World Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956.

Lenin,’ Vladmmir Ilyich. Collected Works. Vols. XX and XXI. London: Martin Lawrence, Ltd., 1929. Vol. XXIII, New York: International Publishers, 1945. 293

_____ • Sochineniva (Workers)• 30 vols. 3rd ed. Moscow: Partizdat TsK VKP(b), 1935.

_____ • Sochineniya (Works)• 35 vols. 4th ed. Moscow: Gosudar- stvermoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1941-1951.

_____ . Natsional'no-kolonial'nyl Vopros. Moscow: Partiinee Izdatelstvo, 1933.

Likppmann, Walter. The Communist World and Ours. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1961.

Lissitayn, 0.J. Iranian Oil, Foreign Investments and the Law. New Delhi: Foreign Affairs Report, 1953.

Lukacs, John. A History of the Cold War. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Fredrick. The Communist Manifesto. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954.

Mager, N.H. and Katel, Jacques. Conquest Without War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961.

Molotov, V.*M. Soviet Foreign Relations. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1940.

Millspaugh, Arthur C. Americans in Persia. Washington: The Brookings, Institute, 1946.

Meyer, Alfred G. Leninism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Morrell, Sydney. Spheres of Influence. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1957.

Moore, Harriet L. Soviet Far Eastern Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945.

Nakhai, M. L'Evolution de 1 'Iran. Brussels: J. Felix, 1938.

Narimanov, N. Lenin et les Pays d'Orient, Lenine tel Qu il fut Souvenirs de Contemporains■ - Moscow: L'Institut du Marx— isme-Leninisme, 1957. 294

Nearing, Scott. The soviet Union as a World Power. New York: Island Workshop Press, 1945.

Nicolson, Harold. Curzon: The Last Phase. 1919-1925. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939.

Pavlovich, M. (pseud, of Mikhail Veltman)'and Xranskii, S. Persiia v Berbe za Nezavisimost. Moscow; Nauchnaia Assot- siatsiia Vostokovedenia, 1925.

Palmieri, Aurelio. La Politica Asiatica dei Bolscevichi. Bologna, 1924. r

Pipe, Richard. The Formation of the Soviet Union, Caminunism and Nationalism. 1917-1923. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi­ ty Press, 1954.

Price, Philips M. War & Revolution in Asiatic Russia. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.

Radek, Karl. Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskoi Rossii. Moscow, Petrograd, 1923.

Rajput, A.B. Iran Today. New Delhi; Lion Press, 1953.

Rothstein, Andrew. Peaceful Coexistence. New York: Harraonds- Warth, Middlesex, 1955.

Sayer, Joel: Persian Gulf Command: Some Marvels on the Road to Kazvin. New York: Random House, 1945.

Schuman, Fredrick L. Russia Since 1917. Four Decades of Soviet Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957.

Shuster, William M. The Stranding of Persia. New York: The Century Company, 1920.

Spector, Ivar. The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1958. Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1959.

Stalin, Joseph. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. London: Martin Lawrence, 1936.

______. "The Result of the War and the New Postwar Tasks," The Soviet Union and the World Peace. New York: Century Publi­ shers, 1946. 295

______. Na Putvakh k Oktvabryu (On the Roads to October). Moscow-Peningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel1stvo (State Publishing House), 1925.

______. Problems of Leninism. 1th ed. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1940.

______. Sochineniva (Works). 13 vols. Moscow: Ogiz, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel*stvo Politicheskoi Literatury (State Publishing House for Political Literature), 1946.

Stettinius, Edward R. Jr. Roosevelt and the Russians. New York: Doubleday, 1949.

Sultan-Zadeh, A. Persiia. Moscow, 1925.

Sykes, Sir Percy M. A History of Persia. London: The MacMil­ lan Company, 1930.

Thomas, Lewis V. and Frye, Richard N. The United States and Turkey and Iran. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Toynbee, Arnold, and Toynbee, Veronica M. The International Triumph of the Axis. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History. London: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Tria, V. Kavkazskie Sotsial-demokraty v Persidskoi Revoliutsii. Paris, 1910.

Trotsky, Leon. The History of the Russian Revolution. New York: Simond Schufej:. 1932.

______. Dictatorship vs. Democracy. New York: Workers* Party, 1922.

Upton, Joseph M. The History of Mo d e m Iran. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Van Wagenen, Richard W. The Iranian Case. 1946. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952. 296

Wemadsky, George. A History of Russia. New York: New Home Library# 1944.

Veltman, M.L. (Pavlovich, M.). Sovetskaia Rossiia i. Kapitalisti- cheskaia Anqliia. 2d ed. Moscow, 1925.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W. Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace. London: MacMillan & Company, Ltd., 1956.

Wilson, Sir Arnold T. Persia. New York: Scribner, 1933.

Wilson, John A. The Near East, A Foreign Policy for the United States. Quincy Wright, editor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.

Wilson, Thomas W. Cold War and Common Sense. New York: Graphic Society, 1962.

Wolf, Bertram D. Three Who Made A Revolution. New York: The Dial Press, 1948.

Yeselson, Abraham. United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883-1921. New York: Rutgers University Press, 1956.

Zanguehneh, Azame*. Le Petrole en Perse. Paris: Domat—Mont— chrestien, 1933.

Zavriev, D.S. Torgovo-Politicheskv Kurs Persii. Tiflis: Sakh- niga, 1934.

_2. Periodicals in English and Russian

Ala, Hussein. "Soviet-Iranian Pact," Vital Speeches of the Day, 12; 408-10, April 15, 1946.

Abikh, R. "Natsionalnoe i revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Persii v 1919-1920 (Vospominaniiu unchastnika dvizheniia Ekhsan- Ully-Khana) , " N o w i Vos t ok (Moscow), No. 29, 1930.

Bennigsen, A. "The National Front in Communist Strategy in The Middle East," Politique Etrange (Paris), 195. 297

Bouscaren, Anthony T. "Soviet Policy in Iran," Current Histo­ ry, 22: 271-77, May, 1952.

“Chronology, 11 Middle Eastern Affairs, 1:207, June-July, 1950; 1:262, August-September 1950; l:381ff, December, 1950; 3:130, April, 1952; 3:258ff, August-September, 1952; 4:74, February, 1953.

"Council: What Price Soviet-Iranian Accords?" Newsweek, 27: 38-41, April 15, 1946.

Dallin, David J. "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, 6:337-44, November 6, 1955.

“Diskussiia ob ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh Pozitsiiakh natsional*noi bruzhuazii v stranakh Vostoka," Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniid, No. 1, 1957.

Elphinston, W.G. "Kurds and Kurdish Question," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 35:38-51, January, 1948.

Elwell-Sutton, L.P. "Political Parties in Iran," Middle East Journal, 3:45-61, January, 1949.

E.V. "Na Kaspii i v Persii (Beseda s tov. Raskolnikovym)," Petrogradshaia Pravda, No. 155, July 15, 1920.

Grady, Henry F. "What Went Wrong in Iran?" The Saturday Evening Post. January 5r 1952.

"How Iran Fights Communism," U.S.. News and World Report, 35: 42ff, October 9, 1953.

"Iran and Russia Answer U . N - Scholastic, 48:48, April 22, 1946

"Iran— Good Fishing for Russia, " XJ.SI. News and World Report. 30 22, April 6, 1951.

"Iran: Red Taking Over," Newsweek. 42:36-38, August, January 19, 1953.

Ips. "Zadachi i usloviia Propagandy v Persii," Zhizn Natsional nosteo (Mowcow), No. 19, May 25, 1919. 298

Lenczowski, George, "The Communist Movement in Iran," The Middle Bast Journal, 1:41-49, Winter, 1947.

Leshem, Moshe. "Soviet Propaganda to the Middle Bast," Middle East Affairs, Vol. XV, No. 1, January, 1953.

Levine, Issac Don. "The Anatomy of a Red Spy Ring," Life, 29: 172-174ff, November 21, 1955.

Levin, I. "Sredne-Aziatskie Sovetskie Respubliki i ikh mezhduna- rodnoe znachenie," Revolvutsia i Natsional1nosti. No. 12, December, 1934.

McCarthy, Mary M. "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia," The Uni­ versity of Buffalo Studies, June, 1946.

Martin, H.G. "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," Middle East Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 2, February, 1956.

Minorsky, Vladimir. "Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt," Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955.

Mullev, Edwin. "Behind the Scenes in Azerbaijan," The American Mercury, 62:696-703, June, 1946.

Micheles, Vera D. "Is Russia Alone to be Blamed?" Foreign Policy Bulletin. Vol. XXV, No. 21, March 8, 1946.

Peffer, Nathaniel. "Lenin and Course of Colonial Communism," The Yale Review. 45:17-30, September, 1955.

Pavlovich, M. "New Persia and Her Opponents, " The Modem World, February, 1909.

"Revolt Collapse in Teheran; Willlran Enter Russian Orbit?" Newsweek, 42:34, August 24, 1953.

Rudzinski, Alexander W. "The Influence of the United Nations on Soviet Policy," International Organization. Vol. V, No. 2, May, 1951.

______"Soviet Peace Offensive," International Concilia­ tion No. 490, April, 1953. 299

Ryskulev, T.R. "Komintem i rabota na Vestoke," Zhizn NatsionalnosteirNo. 96# December 15, 1920.

Shuadran, Benjamin. "The Anglo-Xranian Oil Dispute," The Middle East Affairs. Vol. V, Nos. 6-7. June-July, 1954.

"Stalin's Fiftb Column Ready if Iran Erupts," U.S. News and World Report, 33:38-39, September 12, 1956.

Stepanian, A. "Neodolimoe dvizheniie Kamraunizmo," Voprosy Filosofi, No. 2, 1948.

Taqizadeh, Seyyed Hassan. "The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan," The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1960.

Young, Culer T. "The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran," The Middle East Journal, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1948.

_____ . "The Race Between Russia and Reform in Iran," Foreign Affairs, An American Quarterly Review, No. 2, January, 1950.

. "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign Affairs, An Ameri­ can Quarterly Review. Vol. 40, No. 2, January 1962.

Zhukov, E. "Raspad Kolonial'noi sistemy imperializma," Partiinaia Zhizn. No. 16. August, 1956.

,3. Newspapers

Bank Molli Iran Bulletin (Teheran), January, 1950-December,1951.

Bersen-Zeitung (Berlin), March 25, 1944.

The Century. January 23, 1920.

Dani (Moscow), February ,1, 1930.

Dad (Teheran), January 9, 1952.

Ettelaat (Teheran), August 26, 1941; December 2, 1954.

Iran (Teheran), August 28, 1920. 300

Xzvestia (Moscow), December 30, 1917? June 10, 1920; July 3, 1920.

Journal de Teheran (Teheran), July 9, 1941.

Janoal (Resht), June, 1920. Kevhan (Teheran), March 12, 1949. Krasnaya Gazeta (Moscow) , December 10, 1920. The London Times, June 3, 1920. Mardom (Teheran), January 30, 1944; December 28, 1944. The Manchester Guardian, July 18, 1952; January 14, 1953. Moscow Wireless (Moscow), December, 1919. Le Monde (Paris), January 30, 1945. The Nation (New York) , September 13, 1919. New 2eitunc; (Berlin), August 13, 1941. The New York Times, September 13, 1935. Petrogradskaia Pravda, July 15; 1920. Pravda (Moscow), March 13, 1946; March 11, 1951. Razm (Teheran), November 16, 1944. Rahhar (Teheran), February 26, 1943; October 25, 1944. be Temps (Paris), August 10, 1919. Taiadod (Tabriz) , July 23, 1920,. 24.

Teheran Daily News (Teheran), March 16, 1945.

Tud (Moscow), July 15, 1944-Decenber, 1952.

Tass News Report (Moscow), January, 1955-December, 1956.