Persia in the Perspective of Soviet Political Strategy
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64-6768 B A Y AND, Davoud Hermidas, 1932— PERSIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY. The American University, Ph.D., 1964 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan t PERSIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY by Davoud Hermidas Bavand Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations Graduate Dean: August 1963 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY" The American University LIBRARY Washington, D.C. OCT 3 jgg.0 WASHING] ON. 0. C. ZoZ g PREFACE The subject of this thesis is a study of Soviet politi cal strategy toward Persia. It deals with the development and employment of Soviet political, ideological, military, and economic forces in Persia since the beginning of the October Revolution in Russia. It also deals with the role of Persia in the strategic design of the Soviet southern flank in rela tion to the general strategic status of the Soviet Union in the international scene. In essence, the key to the Soviet political approach has been Russian national interests which, in their geopoli tical aspect, have not been too much different from the pat tern of Czarist foreign policy, at least up to the middle of the fifties, when the nature of international politics continued to preserve more or less its traditional features, or the Soviet Union maintained its status as a great power rather than as a global power. This study assumes that the Soviet Union, too, did seek territorial gains. It also assumes that Soviet leaders iii are rational in seelcing such gains, that their actions are deeply responsive to changing events in Persia or outside of Persia as the Soviet Union attempts to diminish the possi bility of active resistance to the furthering of its politi cal cause in Persia. I wish to express my deep appreciation to the distin guished and able committee who guided and directed my work at The American University, and particularly to Professor A. Aziz Said, Associate Professor of International Relations, who served as chairman of my thesis committee. My thanks are expressed to the Library of Congress, and to various national and international officials who have provided essen tial information for the completion of this dissertation. INTRODUCTION In perspective, international politics have been featured by two distinctive patterns of struggle: open and conscious struggle for power and security; latent and spontan eous struggle for preservation or maximization of value, either cultural and national or religious and ideological. These two phases of international politics, though, have been different in perceptibility of their characters and the nature of their process, but they have been closely related together so that the advancement of the one has had a far-reaching ef fect upon the development of the other. Any extension of the political power has been accompanied by the spontaneous pene tration of the socio-cultural values of the dominant power, either in view of the fact that the superior logic of the vic torious nation has been regarded as its source of strength and, as such, having been imitated by the influenced or domi nated society or it has been rivaled as the positive response to the menace of the challenging power. This has been more conceivable in relations among those nations whose degree of V strength and nature of their values have been too apart from each other, such as relationship between modernized powers of the West and traditional societies of the East. The institution of colonialism, though in form it has been used as an instrument for the extension of power and the establishment of material interests, has in essence evolved toward identification of the values of the West. As such, it not only has corroded the cultural pattern of traditional soci eties and consequently caused the inborn crisis of the value, but also showed them a way out of the danger of being swallowed up. For, if a backward nation had to maintain its national integrity, it would have to rival the strength of the dominant nations, and presumably could do so by adopting the features that give the ruling societies their strength. Therefore, cons cious attempts on the part of these nations towards moderniza tion and westernization have been directed not only toward re sponding to the very challenge of the western colonial powers, but also to solving their own plagued social crises. However, the problem has become more complicated in view of the fact that practical realization of the adopted values has been frus trated by the very action of the dominant powers, who naturally found it detrimental to their interests in the area. vi Consequently, the recent history of these countries has been plagued by two crises: an external crisis of power, which has been the inevitable effect of conflict and rivalry among the former colonial powers; and an internal crisis of value, which has been the outcome of the ineffectiveness of traditional factors in dealing with the problems on the one hand, and lack of opportunity or capacity in the actual realization of the newly adopted values on the other. Although, in view of the changed nature of power politics, the issues of power and domination have come under question, the crisis of value is still alive and will live with us for years to come. In a word, colonialism - in the sense of its classical objec tives - is obsolete and outmoded; but its unintended effects upon the less developed societies are still alive and prob lematic. This study analyzes the very challenge of the Russian power in Persia and its effect upon the process of social and political development in the country. The nature of the Rus sian challenge has been more striking than the threat of the other colonial powers on three grounds: First, in view of the geographical proximity, there has been a spontaneous process Vil of interaction between the two countries. As such, any poli tical change inside Russia has had a far-reaching effect upon the orientation of socio-political development in Persia. Secondly, by being a backward kind of European colonial power, it had more primitive tendency for territorial aggrandizement than purely economic exploitation. Thirdly, cultural intimacy and economic ties between the northern provinces of Persia and Russian Caucasus and Turkistan made the political destiny of Persia closely tied to the progress of history to the north. Therefore, Russia from the very beginning turned out to be a major factor in the development of the twofold crises of power and value in Persia. The first chapter, under the title of "Challenge of Colonialism in Persia, 11 deals with these two phases of crises in Persia. It considers how the Russian political menace re quired successive responses on the part of Persia. These re sponses which, in fact, were attempts at rivaling the politi cal values of the challenger, were at once as well a challenge to the legitimacy of the tradition patterns of the society it self— particularly when they proved to be ineffective in main taining the very image of security and unity in the country. It analyzes how the attentive drives toward modernization, * * * V 1 1 X westernization and nationalism were conscious efforts in sur viving the mei.nce of the western colonial powers. At the same time, how failure in actual materialization of these measures complicated the very crisis of the value. It also deals with the crisis of power in Persia, name ly, the conflict and competition among the great powers towards the establishment of their political domination in Persia. It analyzes that, in view of such power conflict, Russia could not have an obtrusive freedom in the southward drive. Consequently, she was confronted with the challenge of the British power, who viewed the political domination of the Near East as a mortal threat to its colonial possessions in the Indian subcontinent. At the same time, Persia's inability to influence the balance of power in this part of the world, either politically or mili tarily, made her alternately an area of conflict and an arena of compromise between the two rival powers. It was an area of conflict, whenever rivalry was specified to the regional inter ests; an arena of compromise, whenever it was necessary for them to patch up their difficulties outside Europe in order to main tain the balance of power in Europe. The very effect of the Anglo-Russian competition in Persia was two-fold. On the one hand, it provided certain ix limitations to the Russian expansionist drive toward the south. On the other hand, it brought about an opportunity for Persia to play off one power against the other in order to maintain her relative state of independence in the interna tional scene. This pattern of power contest underwent a metamorphic change as the result of the Russian revolution. The October Revolution, though temporarily, slackened the challenge of the Russian power in Persia and also scaled down the crisis of power,— however, it strengthened the nature of challenge per se by virtue of its messianic rationale. To the effect that the Soviet Union, by dwelling on the internal socio-political crises and setting forth diagnoses for them, has been able to influence and control the minds of the people and use them for its political cause. The rest of the chapters deal primarily with the Bolshe vik revolution and its strategic application in Soviet foreign policy. It also deals with the role of Persia in the strategic design of the Soviet southern flank.