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Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | April 1, 2020

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OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS APRIL 1, 2020‒JUNE 30, 2020 ABOUT THIS REPORT A 2013 amendment to the Inspector General Act established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to the U.S. Congress on active overseas contingency operations. The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD Inspector General (IG) as the Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The DoS IG is the Associate IG. The USAID IG participates in oversight of the operation. The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OIR. The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to: • Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation. • Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and evaluations. • Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies. METHODOLOGY To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about OIR and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix B. CLASSIFIED APPENDIX This report normally includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Due to the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic, the Lead IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter. FOREWORD We are pleased to submit this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to the U.S. Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978. The United States launched OIR in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and to set the conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability. The strategy to defeat ISIS includes military operations, as well as support for local security forces, diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization programs. This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OIR, as well as the work of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote the U.S. Government’s policy goals in Iraq and Syria, during the period April 1 through June 30, 2020. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight agencies during the quarter. During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners issued 12 audit, evaluation, and inspection reports related to OIR. This report usually includes an appendix containing classified information about OIR. This quarter, due to the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic and related workforce health protection requirements, the Lead IG agencies did not produce the classified appendix. Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on Operation Inherent Resolve. Sean W. O’Donnell Stephen Akard Ann Calvaresi Barr Acting Inspector General Acting Inspector General Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of State U.S. Agency for International Development On the Cover (Top row): Volunteers in the United States made about 2,000 cloth masks and sent them to al-Asad Air Base, Iraq (DoD photo); a U.S. military working dog at al-Asad Air Base, Iraq (U.S. Army photo); Iraqi Staff Maj. Gen. Mohammed al-Shimary signs documents at Camp Manion in Taqaddum, Iraq (U.S. Marine Corps photo); U.S. Army soldiers during a night live-fire exercise (U.S. Army photo). (Bottom row): U.S. soldiers use Joint Light Tactical Vehicles to provide 360-degree security (U.S. Army photo). MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL I am pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on the status of OIR. This quarter, U.S. and Coalition forces had to contend with the complications and restrictions of the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic while continuing efforts to combat ISIS and develop Iraqi and Syrian partner forces. These efforts were taking place against a backdrop of continued uncertainty about how many U.S. forces will remain in Iraq and Syria, and for how long. Iraq’s parliament ended 5 months of political deadlock and approved a new government led by Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Iraqi intelligence chief since 2016. That approval allowed the U.S. and Iraqi governments to initiate talks in June to determine the future of their bilateral relationship. While the DoS said that the United States and Iraq made no firm commitments on the size of the U.S.-led Coalition force in Iraq, both sides agreed that ISIS remains a threat and that the Coalition continues to play an important role in addressing that threat. According to the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), Sean W. O’Donnell ISIS conducted its annual surge of attacks during Ramadan and exploited restrictions on security force operations due to COVID-19 in order to conduct more attacks. However, CJTF-OIR said that ISIS did not maintain its surge and assessed that ISIS is not resurging. Some researchers and analysts raised concerns that ISIS could exploit any reduction in pressure on the group, and they assessed that if underlying conditions such as ineffective governance, lack of economic opportunities, and sectarian tensions are not addressed, ISIS could make gains. Due to COVID-19, the Coalition provided much of its support and training to Iraqi and Syrian partner forces virtually. CJTF-OIR stated that partner forces in both Iraq and Syria continued to conduct counter-ISIS operations and those forces were more capable and better able to prevent ISIS from resurging than previously reported. Of growing concern in Syria is the increasing pressure from Russia and the Syrian regime on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to break from the United States. Since the October 2019 Turkish incursion into northeast Syria, the SDF has turned to Russia and the Syrian regime for protection against Turkish and Turkish-aligned forces. Also of concern are the large numbers of ISIS prisoners in ad hoc detention centers in Syria. Most remain there because their countries of origin are unwilling to repatriate them or bring them to justice. Riots erupted at one detention facility, and the SDF renewed calls for an international solution to the detainee crisis. CJTF-OIR described ISIS detainees across northeast Syria as “an enduring and ever-increasing risk to mission.” Similarly, the international community is struggling to provide services and security at IDP camps, and to make progress on repatriating the tens of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, and other nationals. The COVID-19 pandemic has slowed the delivery of services, according to the DoS and USAID, and there are ongoing concerns about the potential spread of COVID-19 in the camps. I look forward to working with my Lead IG colleagues to continue to report and provide oversight on OIR and related U.S. Government activity, as required by the IG Act, and in light of the limitations imposed by COVID-19. Sean W. O’Donnell Acting Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense U.S. soldiers use Joint Light Tactical Vehicles to provide 360-degree security at al-Asad Air Base, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo) CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................2 THE QUARTER IN REVIEW ...............................9 Major Developments ............................................ 11 Status of ISIS .................................................... 18 Status of ISIS in Iraq ......................................... 22 Status of ISIS in Syria ....................................... 26 Events in Iraq ........................................................ 29 Actions Against ISIS in Iraq .............................. 29 Partner Force Development ............................ 33 Role of Third Parties in Iraq ............................. 37 Diplomacy and Political Developments .......... 39 Stabilization ..................................................... 44 Humanitarian Assistance ................................ 46 Events in Syria ...................................................... 50 Status of OIR in Syria ....................................... 50 Actions Against ISIS in Syria ............................ 56 ISIS in Camps and Detention Facilities ............ 60 Partner Force Development ............................ 63 Role
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