Ruprecht Karls Universitat¨ Heidelberg Institut fur¨ Politikwissenschaft

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Sebastian Harnisch Zweitgutachter: Prof. Subatra K. Mitra, PhD

Magisterarbeit

Nuclear Safety and Security in India, Pakistan and Iran

Stefan Schilling

December 22, 2009

Adresse: Hermannstr. 21 79771 Klettgau Griessen Email: [email protected] Matrikelnummer: 2256840 2

Fur¨ meine Eltern Contents 3

Contents

1 Introduction 7 1.1 Research Questions ...... 9 1.2 Case selection ...... 11 1.3 Relevancy of the topic ...... 12 1.3.1 Practical relevancy ...... 13 1.3.2 Theoretical relevancy ...... 14 1.4 Challenges to the Analysis ...... 14 1.5 Structure of the thesis ...... 16

2 Nuclear Deterrence - a model for assessing safety and security? 17 2.1 Nuclear Deterrence Theory - empirically challenged ...... 19 2.2 Conclusion ...... 23

3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage 24 3.1 Definitions ...... 25 3.1.1 Defining Safety and Security ...... 25 3.1.2 Defining Risk ...... 26 3.1.3 Risks to Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material ...... 28 3.1.4 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Material - C3 I and MPC&A ...... 33 3.2 Organizational Performance Model ...... 36 3.3 Independent Variable: Civilian dominance and vulnerability ...... 37 3.4 Taking a performance based approach ...... 42 3.4.1 Normal Accident Theory ...... 44 3.5 Combining organization and performance ...... 46 3.6 Putting it together ...... 52 4 Contents

4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India 54 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization ...... 55 4.1.1 Who’s in Charge of India’s Nuclear Program? ...... 56 4.1.2 India’s Threat Environment ...... 62 4.1.3 India’s Assertive Organizational Bias ...... 64 4.2 India’s C3 I performance ...... 66 4.2.1 Command ...... 66 4.2.2 Control ...... 68 4.2.3 Communication ...... 70 4.2.4 Intelligence ...... 71 4.3 India’s MPC&A performance ...... 72 4.3.1 Material Protection ...... 72 4.3.2 Control and Accounting ...... 74 4.4 Risk assessment ...... 75

5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 78 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization ...... 79 5.1.1 Who’s in Charge of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program? ...... 79 5.1.2 Pakistan’s Threat Environment ...... 84 5.1.3 Pakistan’s Delegative Organizational Bias ...... 88 5.2 Pakistan’s C3 I performance ...... 90 5.2.1 Command ...... 90 5.2.2 Control ...... 91 5.2.3 Communication ...... 95 5.2.4 Intelligence ...... 96 5.3 Pakistan’s MPC&A performance ...... 96 5.3.1 Material Protection ...... 97 5.3.2 Control and Accounting ...... 99 5.4 Risk assessment ...... 100 Contents 5

6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran 102 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization ...... 104 6.1.1 Who’s in charge of Iran’s nuclear program? ...... 105 6.1.2 Threat environment ...... 111 6.1.3 Iran’s Delegative Organizational Bias ...... 116 6.2 Iran’s C3 I and MPC&A performance ...... 117 6.2.1 Prognosis of Iran’s potential C3 I structures ...... 117 6.2.2 Prognosis of Iran’s potential MPC&A structures ...... 120 6.3 Risk Assessment ...... 120

7 Conclusion 122 7.1 Empirical findings ...... 123 7.2 Theoretic Hurdles ...... 125

8 Appendix 128

9 Bibliography 128

10 Abbreviations and Acronyms 143 6 List of Tables

List of Figures

3.1 Spectrum of Nuclear Posture ...... 47 3.2 Assessing safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material - model of the method ...... 51

4.1 India’s higher Defense Hierarchy ...... 57 4.2 India’s Nuclear Control Authority ...... 59

5.1 Pakistan’s National Command Authority ...... 82

6.1 Iran’s higher defense structure ...... 107

8.1 Appendix A - Map of Nuclear Installations - India ...... 128

8.2 List of Indian nuclear facilities ...... 129 8.3 Appendix B - Map of Nuclear Installations - Pakistan ...... 130

List of Tables

3.1 Operationalized Indicators of C3 I and MPC&A ...... 35 3.2 Comparison between delegative and assertive systems with regards to nuclear weapons and facilities ...... 39 3.3 Command and control as a function of civilian dominance ...... 42 3.4 Comparison of arguments between High Reliability Organizational Theory and Normal Accident Theory ...... 43

10.1 List of Acronyms ...... 144 7

Chapter 1

Introduction

The explosion of a nuclear device by accident - mechanical or human - could be a disaster for the United States, for its allies, and for its enemies. If one of these devices accidentally exploded, I would hope that both sides had sufficient means of verification and control to prevent the accident from triggering a nuclear exchange. But we cannot be certain that this would be the case.1

Currently 440 nuclear reactors provide about 16% of global energy requirements. It would re- quire an additional 800 reactors only to keep nuclear powers position in the world’s energy portfolio.2 Yet, with fossil fuels diminishing, and energy consumption rising, more and more countries will seek to provide the energy for their citizens with nuclear reactors.3 Forty devel- oping countries have already expressed interest in their own nuclear programs.4 Some of these countries will inevitably, based on grounds of national prestige, technological prowess, or energy independence be tempted to acquire the technologies for establishing an indigenous fuel cycle. The technology to enrich uranium to reactor usable Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is essentially the same process as enriching uranium to Weapons Grade Uranium or High Enriched Uranium (HEU). Such dual use technology thus enables every country with its own fuel cycle to theoreti- cally produce the material necessary for nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and fissile material material pose several threats to human kind as well as the environment. The mushroom cloud

1John T. McNaughton Assistant Secretary of Defense, December 1962, quote from Sagan (1993) 2Elhefnawy (2008), P 37 3Elhefnawy (2008), P 36 4ibid. 8 1 Introduction

rising into the morning sky, the burning remnants and charcoaled corpses in the inner cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are burned into the collective human mind just like the collapsed and smoking roof of Chernobyl’s nuclear power reactor. While the one bears witness to the sheer devastating power of nuclear weapons, the other represents the inadequacy of safety features and the destruction and long term effects of nuclear accidents. As such, nuclear proliferation is not only spreading enrichment technology but also the inherent connected risks and dangers.

Nevertheless, recent years have seen a paradigm shift from the carelessness of the Cold War to a greater awareness of the numerous risks to nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities ranging from natural catastrophes over malfunctioning safety features to terrorist threats.5 It seems only logi- cal now that with more countries announcing interest in nuclear power, the risks are spreading. Countries, especially those with ambivalent ambitions towards nuclear power, working on own enrichment facilities raise grounds for suspicion in regards to both their true intentions and the security of these facilities. In a multipolar world, in which nuclear weapons are perceived to act as a deterrent to other states, nuclear weapons need to always be ready when intended to be used, and at the same time should never fail.6 This dilemma raises questions as to the safety and secu- rity of nuclear weapons and nuclear material as well.7 Yet, safety and security might or might not be a priority for nuclear states. Organizational structures and/or lack of resources might have an impact on a state’s priorities. Developing countries, specifically, might neither have the potential nor the resources to safeguard their facilities, material or weapons, nor the technology to secure such sites.

5These risks will be addressed more detailed in chapters 2 and 3, however, it seems important to define risk as well. While risk is a very controversial term in academia as will be seen in chapter 3.1.2, in the following paper it will be used as the product of product of probability and consequences (R = P × C). 6Feaver (1992), P 163 7The concerns and deliberations leading to these definitions will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 3, yet in an attempt of disclosure it is necessary to at least give a preliminary definition before going on. As such, security in the context of this essay will be used as the absence of risk to nuclear weapons and fissile material from nuclear war, inside job, terrorist attacks, proliferation and state failure. In contrast, safety can be defined as absence of risk from natural disaster, organizational or system failure 1.1 Research Questions 9

Until total disarmament takes place, the risks to nuclear weapons and subsequently to the popu- lation and the environment will continue to exist, manifesting itself in false warnings and close calls of accidents, or worse. But even if nuclear weapons should be abolished, it is worthwhile to address the safety and security of fissile material as well as of the nuclear facilities housing them.

1.1 Research Questions

The last decade has seen two opposing movements when it comes to nuclear weapons, while the western world as well as Russia make small steps towards nuclear disarmament, a few states were arming themselves with nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan in 1998, North Korea 2006). The safety and security of these nuclear weapons is a vital question. As Scott Sagan argued during a discussion with Kenneth Waltz at Columbia University:

In theory, any statesmen in any state should be strongly influenced by the fear that his or her cities could be destroyed by an adversary. But in reality, as opposed to theory, nuclear weapons are not controlled by states. They are not controlled by statesmen. They are managed by imperfect, normal human beings inside, imperfect normal organizations.8

While some scholars have attempted to assess the safety and/or security of nuclear weapons, among others Scott D. Sagan, and Nathan E. Busch, these efforts have been relatively empiri- cal in scope, primarily focusing on the performance of the organization managing the nuclear weapons.9

8Betts, Sagan and Waltz (2007), P 138 9Scott Sagan, basically developed the scholarly interest in the field with his seminal book The Limits of Safety, in which he assessed the nuclear weapons program of the United States, convincingly showed that the most resourceful nation in the world struggled massively from accidents and inadvertent incidents within its nuclear command and control system. He showed that malfunctions based on human failures, computer glitches, organizational culture 10 1 Introduction

While these two books have primarily focused on the performance of the systems analyzed, few - if any scholars, an exception might be Lewis Dunn or even Peter D. Feaver, have examined structural domestic factors influencing the performance of these organizations, independent of organization inherent processes. Lewis Dunn, while not directly assessing the safety and security but rather the potential use of nuclear weapons, argued that developing countries would be more prone to nuclear weapons use as their leaders might be more willing to accept high levels of damage, and are likely to lean toward preventive war.10 11 Peter D. Feaver on the other hand went a step further, arguing that security correlates highly with the nuclear posture of a country, which depends on the state of civil-military relations and time urgency in a NWS.12 Nevertheless, as Feaver does not show a causal link between security and nuclear posture, a theoretical gap exists. As such, this thesis attempts to fill this theoretical gap by providing a framework, which enables to analyze risks to nuclear weapons and fissile material by taking domestic factors into account. While applying Feaver’s approach in parts, it differs in so far as the explanans is not nuclear posture, but safety and security. Therefore, this paper argues that domestic factors such as the amount of civilian control over the nuclear program, as well as perception of external and internal threats to the state, influence the performance of the nuclear structure. In effect this thesis is taking a two pronged approach. First assessing the domestic factors influencing the nuclear safety and security structures in place, and then testing this linkage with a “performance-based” approach. The research questions in operation, correspond as follows:

and faulty SOP’s directing the wrongful behavior were causing these accidents. The approach of Nathan Busch’s No End in Sight; The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation on the other hand is two-fold. He takes a look at the protection from misusage of nuclear weapons and protection from proliferation and terrorist’s access to the material. Both these books were influential to the development of the method applied in this thesis and as such these approaches will be discussed in detail later. 10Dunn (1982) 11Interestingly, similar behavior has been detected in democratizing states, in regards to conventional wars. Mansfield and Snyder (2006) have shown that states tend to be more inclined to resort to violence during a democ- ratization process. 12Feaver (1992), P 164 1.2 Case selection 11

a) In how far is nuclear safety and security correlating theoretically with domestic factors?

b) Do the cases used show this correlation empirically?

c) How safe and secure are nuclear material and facilities as well as nuclear weapons in the different cases?

In order to answer the questions raised above it is necessary to ask a number of smaller research questions, which will provide some insight into the three specific cases.

1. Which organization is in control of the nuclear program?

2. What is the country’s perception of the external and internal threat environment?

3. What is the structure and prospect of the nuclear organization?

3. What safety and security features of the nuclear program are visible in each case?

4. How well do these structures and features perform?

The questions mentioned above are supposed to be a rough guideline of the paper. However, the cases differ and therefore sub questions will have to be applied in order to provide for a better assessment of the cases.

1.2 Case selection

Nuclear safety and security are an important feature for all nuclear countries, yet the classic NWS, namely the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France, have seem- ingly relative broad systems in place. Furthermore, as S. Sagan has shown in the case of the U.S., the state only developed certain safety and security features over time.13 Most recent nu- clear countries arguably lack both the relative wealth, as well as, the experience of the old NWS. Correspondingly, recent NWS are best suited to both the domestic factors shaping nuclear safety and security structures. Furthermore, due to their relatively fresh structures they are best suited

13Sagan (1993) 12 1 Introduction

to describe how these factors would describe states attempting or claiming to attempt nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities in order to foresee which structures they would most likely use.

For this matter the most useful and logical cases to probe the thesis theory are India and Pakistan. Due to the fact that they provide a similar background, in regards to history, regional proximity, a common history of violent conflict and some experience with nuclear weapons, these two coun- tries prove to be excellent cases for an examination of nuclear safety and security. After having examined the feasibility of these two cases, the theory will aid in providing a forecast of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran certainly poses an outlier case. However, Iran currently not a NWS, is claimed to have a breakout capability shortly, is an exemplary case for a proliferating state, pro- viding the necessary infrastructure of enrichment plants as well as the necessary strategic threat environment, to logically be interested in nuclear weapons. A successful analysis of the Iranian case will show if it is possible to foreshadow potential scenarios of nuclear safety and security of a proliferating state.

It is important to note that the most recent nuclear weapons state - North Korea (DPRK) - will not be part of this investigation. There are several reasons for this. First of all, one of the thesis’ main goals is to provide a method with which to assess newly proliferating states. Second, India and Pakistan are included in the examination because in contrast to North Korea, both have established nuclear command and control structures, which will be a crucial point in the further investigation. Finally and most importantly, this thesis does neither provide the time nor the space of an assessment of all NWS or proliferating states, and as such has been restricted, albeit reluctantly to the cases, which provide the best available information. Correspondingly the DPRK as well as Israel will not be part of the following analysis.

1.3 Relevancy of the topic

The following will quickly delve into some of the reasons why an assessment of safety and security in regards to nuclear weapons as well as fissile material is a relevant subject to discuss. 1.3 Relevancy of the topic 13

1.3.1 Practical relevancy

An assessment of safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear material is more relevant than ever. Remembering 9/11 and the interest by terrorist organizations in nuclear material, the fragile security situation in Pakistan as well as the sponsoring of terrorism by Iran it is evidently necessary to not exclude nuclear material from the examination.14 The attacks on the Army HQ in Rawalpindi on Oct 10th 2009, specifically increased fears of an inability by the state of Pak- istan to provide effective security of its nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities. Terrorism as well as international pressure on Pakistan could destabilize the country. As the Soviet case has shown, a destabilized country and military is not adequately equipped to provide safety and security for nuclear weapons and facilities.15 The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal also has the potential to pressure Pakistan to the point of the military changing its nuclear posture. This short view on some of the contemporary problems, will show increasing the risk of nuclear accidents.

Arguably the risks of nuclear technology in general and nuclear weapons in particular are to be considered dangerous by themselves and the case of Chernobyl has shown their destructiveness. Even nuclear plants in countries such as the UK, Canada and Germany - which are considered to have very strict safety measures and are completely under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards - are accident prone.16 Even though these countries are considered to have some of the world’s safest facilities, accidents occur all the time, which is an indication of the general danger of nuclear facilities.17

14please see Lavoy and Khan (2004) 15Busch (2004) 16Some recent examples: In May 2006, a fire broke out in a nuclear research facility near Ottawa. On June 28th 2007 a short circuit on one of two machine transformers caused a fire in the nuclear power plant Kruemmel in Germany. On Feb 4th 2008, another incident happened in the same plant 17Apart from nuclear facilities being accident-prone, nuclear facilities have another striking danger for humans and the environment. Enough research has been done on leukemia and other types of cancer occurring around nuclear facilities. A high correlation between nuclear facilities and leukemia has been proven since the 1990’s. For example, by McLaughlin et al. (1993) who conducted research on the higher risks of leukemia in children in Canada around nuclear facilities. Despite this correlation, there is little knowledge about the true medical conditions that 14 1 Introduction

Nuclear technology, as much as it might be praised for energy reasons, is not yet mastered by human kind and quintessentially still poses a danger to human health, safety and environment, apart from the obvious threat of nuclear warfare or nuclear terrorism.

1.3.2 Theoretical relevancy

As mentioned above little research has been done on how to assess a newly proliferating state or countries looking to increase their energy portfolio by adding nuclear power sources. Even though the IAEA has programs in place to help countries with the safety and security of nuclear facilities, these are not mandatory for the signatories. Furthermore, the IAEA is not allowed to assess nuclear weapons and in cases of countries illegally proliferating (every signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)) the IAEA only has rights to assess the probability of a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, the IAEA can only offer its help, it is not proactively acting. Therefore, a framework of analysis needs to be established by which to assess proliferating countries, point out problems and discrepancies to nuclear safety and security of their civilian and/or nuclear program. This thesis as such will try to establish a method, which would add value to the subject, as well as hopefully provide some form of analysis of use for scholars, public and security experts alike.

1.4 Challenges to the Analysis

However, it is obvious that an analysis of such a scholarly underdeveloped project is highly dif- ficult and shows some challenges. Thus, before establishing the framework and testing it on the three cases in question, it might be useful to address some of the challenges and difficulties aris- ing when examining any cases in regards to nuclear safety and security.

cause the disease. The latest research on this has been done by Schubauer-Berigan et al. (2007), who tried to find the causes of chronic lymphocytic leukemia in nuclear facility workers. 1.4 Challenges to the Analysis 15

First of all, limited data available on the subject, clearly inhibits the quality and scope of the analysis. This is partly due to the fact that governments and organizations in charge of nuclear weapons and/or nuclear facilities have a huge interest in keeping the documents that would show close calls of accidents, secret. Opening archives to research accidents with nuclear weapons is perceived to give an adversary too much information, and the international community even more reason to scrutinize security and safety policies, as well as their overall nuclear weapons programs.18 Writing about such security sensitive issues with a pragmatic or sometimes even normative stance, trying to influence behavior, always carries the risk of publicizing information that could be used against the purpose of the paper. A researcher is bound to a certain degree of self censure, weighing which information is viable and could be used against the object of reference. While this is a problem the author of this thesis will not face, due to his lack of such information, it is a critical point to bear in mind.19 Secondly, and connected to the first point, most data used in the analysis, was collected from ’open source’ material such as analyses by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the IAEA, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist or Arms Control Association as well as schol- arly articles, and as such is second hand analysis. While first hand sources are always to be used before second hand sources to inhibit bias, it must be noted, that without these second hand anal- yses, it would be highly impossible for a non-nuclear scientist to assess the data. This author, similar to most students of the field, has no formal experience and training in nuclear physics and as such, relies heavily upon data provided by authors. The same applies to languages. The author

18Even in Western countries most accidents occurring in nuclear facilities or at military facilities are not publi- cized. Clear indication of this can be seen in the procedures of Vattenfall in the case of the 2007 and 2008 nuclear power plant incidents in Germany. Arguably this is a civilian organization case, but organizational theory as we will see later, shows that state run facilities would not fare much better when it comes to publicizing information and learning from it. 19This does not mean that steps to gain more insightful data by the author have not been taken. On February 26th 2009, the author had the chance to interview three officials at the IAEA in Vienna. While these interviews were highly interesting and a great exercise in the method of interviewing, it was rather unsuccessful in regards to gaining valuable classified data. The information gained was already available in IAEA publications and the information needed was classified, and subsequently not open for discussion. 16 1 Introduction

has no formal language training in Farsi, nor in Urdu, and as such relies on translated statements, when using indigenous voices. This clearly inhibits the scope and quality of the thesis and is as such subject to bias.20 However, such endeavors also pose the advantage, that unlike most studies in Political Science they are truly interdisciplinary, combining technical data as well as political factors to bring more insight to an understudied field.

Third, the analysis is certainly challenged by its ’guess-stimating’ character. With not knowing the true intentions of Iran it would be highly speculative to assess a potential nuclear weapons program. This paper, however, will not try to answer the likelihood of a nuclear weapons pro- gram in Iran. Nevertheless, it seeks to provide answers to the question of which factors influence Iran’s nuclear program and in extension how safe and secure Iran’s nuclear weapons would be, should the country desire to procure them, and furthermore how safe is Iran’s indigenous nuclear fissile material.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis will be broadly structured in two parts. The first part will first discuss nuclear deter- rence trying to show that nuclear deterrence is not an adequate theory to assess nuclear security. Next, the third chapter will attempt to define threats to nuclear facilities and arsenals, as well as identify domestic and political factors determining whether the nuclear program would show an emphasis on nuclear safety and security. Thus, it will attempt to provide a theory that links domestic and strategic factors to nuclear safety and security. This approach will guide the second part of the thesis and consequently test the theory on two already established NWS. Subsequently, the thesis will seek to analyze the Iranian case and forecast how Iran’s nuclear safety and security system in regards to its nuclear facilities will look like and how a such a structure might look should Iran choose to develop nuclear weapons.

20Arguably there is most likely a western bias in this thesis, especially since it’s written by a western student of the field, using mostly western definitions as well as literature. 17

Chapter 2

Nuclear Deterrence - a model for assessing safety and security?

“We do not have to wonder whether they [nuclear weapon states] will take good care of their weapons. They have every incentive to do so.”1

An analysis of nuclear safety and security, be it for nuclear weapons or for fissile material is directly connected to the debate on nuclear proliferation. As the above statement shows, nuclear deterrence optimists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that for a NWS, nuclear safety and security is a must, as keeping these weapons safe and secure guarantees state survival. This approach based on the realist premise of states as black box claims that the state as unitary and rational actor will recognize security and safety of nuclear weapons as one of its prime concerns simply because its national survival depends on it.2

However, the last 50 years have shown that despite this claim national security of a NWS is not equal to safety and security of nuclear weapons.3 Therefore, a short discussion of nuclear deterrence and challenges to the theory is in order to show that nuclear deterrence theory is not a feasible lens to look at nuclear safety and security. Claims of positive effects of nuclear proliferation have existed for almost as long as nuclear weapons. A few weeks after the first nuclear bombs were dropped, inevitably leading to the surrender of Japan and thus ending the

1Waltz (1981), P 21 2Compare Busch (2004), P 4 3Sagan (1993) 18 2 Nuclear Deterrence - a model for assessing safety and security?

second World War, scholars began advocating the deterrent function of nuclear weapons.4 Such arguments grew voice-fully in the 1960’s and 1970’s.5 In the 1980’s, this position found a new supporter in Kenneth Waltz, who linked the debate closely to Neo-Realist theory.6 Proliferation optimists focused, from the beginning, on the positive impact of nuclear weapons on interna- tional stability. In contrast, John Herz, and others argued very early on that the sheer destructive power in combination with continuous mistrust would lead to a nuclear war.7 In summation, the traditional pessimists were arguing that, the “territorial separation of the superpowers, the absence of a previous legacy of hostility, the status-quo orientation of their leaderships, coupled with the simplicity of bipolar rivalry, [and not nuclear weapons] made for a uniquely benign se- curity environment with redundant sources of stability.”8

Interestingly Waltz’s point of departure was that of an anarchic self- help system’ in which the only way to prevent an attack on oneself is a credible deterrence.9 Deterrence, broadly defined

4Bernard Brodie’s The Absolute Weapon and William Borden’s There will be no time: The revolution in Strategy were among some of the first contributions to the nuclear deterrence debate, claiming nuclear weapons possessing stabilizing effects on international relations. see: Rajain (2005), P 60 5Busch (2004), P 3 6A profound discussion of proliferation optimists vs. pessimists is also provided by Rajagopalan (2005), P 26ff 7While sharing some of the initial assumptions of the realist argument, he concluded from the anarchic state of the international system the inevitable rise of a security dilemma’. Assuming nuclear weapons provide the possibility of destroying even the most advanced military power by breaking through national defenses, the logical consequence would be the destruction of the adversary in “preventive war” kill or perish’. The radical conclusion’ Hertz drew from this depiction of the nuclear security dilemma was that “nothing short of global rule can ultimately satisfy the security interest of any one power, and particularly any superpower.” seeWheeler (2008), P 498; While Herz argued that even if the actors show some degree of security dilemma sensibility - the ability to understand intentions and motives and show responsiveness - one would not have a guarantee whether the opponent is not motivated by interests that go beyond mere security nor if future decision makers will not reverse the course. For a deeper discussion on this please see Wheeler (2008) 8Karl (1996)P 92 9This anarchic self- help system allegedly makes it necessary for states as primordial actors to judge defensive actions on a rational choice model. Rational choice calculations will, so the theory, inhibit an aggressor state from attacking another state if the consequences of such an attack were too high to bear. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the cost of war, both due to the massive amount of casualties and the destruction of territory, 2.1 Nuclear Deterrence Theory - empirically challenged 19 as “preventing people from doing something by frightening them, particularly through threats of severe consequences.” 10 Quintessentially it can be argued that ’Mutual Assured Destruction’ (MAD) inhibited countries from beginning a nuclear war, as none of the adversaries would have survived. Waltz, even went so far as to argue that “More [Nuclear Weapons] may be Better.”11

2.1 Nuclear Deterrence Theory - empirically challenged

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and subsequently the end of the Cold War, proliferation optimists kept their position on the feasibility of their claim. They argued for example that despite the skirmishes of the 90’s and early 2000’s between India and Pakistan the overall decrease of cross- national violence between the two countries since 2002 and an increase in Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) is proof of the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons.12 However, Pakistan’s use of insurgents and small scale war, most evidently, in Kashmir, is not necessarily explained by nuclear deterrence theory.13 14 inevitably reducing the likelihood of war. compare: Waltz (1981) 10Busch (2004), P 3 11Waltz (1981); Due to critique from proliferation pessimists Waltz had to agree to some restrictions for his theory to be applicable. Countries need to have several preconditions to be able to successfully deter an opponent. According to Waltz, rational leaders will not engage in conflict if: first, their arsenal is not destroyed in a preemptive strikes, while the program is developed; second, both states have developed a sufficient strike force (and thus a capable second strike force); thirdly, nuclear arsenals must be prone to accidents and/or unauthorized use. Another requirement not explicitly mentioned is the need for functioning Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and Security Measures. 12Ganguly and Hagerty for example analyzed several violent conflicts between India and Pakistan since 1984. Their argument, was that Nuclear Deterrence Theory compared with Unipolarity Theory and Conventional Deter- rence Theory proves to be the best explanation for the absence of major war in South Asia since 1984. Compare: Ganguly and Hagerty (2005) 13For the use of insurgents in Kashmir see: Schofield and Tremblay (2008); Schofield (20080301); Goswami (2009); Nawaz (2008); Jones (2008) 14The tendency of Pakistan to engage in nuclear brinkmanship with means of low intensity warfare is logically taking into account the state of asymmetric military relationship between the two countries, but it certainly has shown tremendous escalatory effects due to the fact that India did not as expected refrain from engaging in the conflicts. It seems that in more than one situation Pakistani generals believed that nuclear deterrence would keep 20 2 Nuclear Deterrence - a model for assessing safety and security?

However, quite in contrast to the claim of nuclear deterrence having a stabilizing effect in South Asia, the case can be made that India was not being deterred by Pakistan, but by its leaders real- ization that it would gain more politically from restraint than from nuclear escalation.15 India’s perception has been that nuclear weapons deter only from nuclear - but not from conventional warfare.16 The reaction to the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai did not lead to a troop build- up at the border on the scale of the the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament. This might have more to do with the 2008 regime change in Islamabad, as well as, with the amount of western influ- ence and presence in the region, since 2001, than with nuclear deterrence.17 This was underlined by arguments made by Indian politicians during the Kargil crisis, the 2001-2002 border dispute and the Parakram exercise, which clearly dispute the perception that India was deterred.18 The change of India’s military to the so called ’Cold Start’ doctrine, raising the speed and ability of India’s forces to gain Pakistani strategic territory, further underlines the fact that India is not restrained by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.19 While the deterrence claim cannot be falsified in its entirety, it certainly is crippled. Small scale war is neither stability nor peace and might in fact make escalation more likely. Even from the most optimistic viewpoint countries in such a situation might just be able to keep problems from escalating to nuclear war. However, it might very well be possible that countries may perceive nuclear weapons as an opportunity to challenge their adversary on a different level of warfare as Pakistan exhibited. This nuclear brinkmanship

India from engaging in a conventional and nuclear war. For more information see Rajain (2005); Khan (2005) as well as Karnad (2005), P 202 15compare Karnad (2005), P 183ff 16Busch (2004), P 184 ff. 17This is further subscribed by a number of differences between the Cold War example and the South Asian dyadic relationship. In contrast to South Asia, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were clearly in a MAD situation, both countries knew very well their potential and arguably this mutual understanding of MAD got them to sign CBM’s. The South Asian case differs remarkably from the Cold War, as India did not suffer from the same predicaments as the United States. India did not develop its weapons in a hot superpower dilemma, it does not have to fulfill security treaty obligations towards external allies and finally has no huge inferiority gap towards Pakistan or China. compare Tellis (2001), P 262ff. and Brew (2005), P 213, 220 18Brew (2005), P 205 ff. and Kapur (2008), P 83 19Karnad (2005), P 192 2.1 Nuclear Deterrence Theory - empirically challenged 21

might lead to an increased risk of nuclear war, especially when taking into account the arguments of the new pessimism school of thought.

In a recent statement at Columbia University Kenneth Waltz argued that: “With nuclear weapons it’s been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation. Every country - whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain or countries that we distrust greatly, and for good reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution- behaves with such caution.”20 Such a hopeful statement does not take the developments of the last two decades into account.

With the end of the Cold War, violence by non-state actors increased significantly with a shift in quality, lethality and size of terrorist attacks.21 Despite already growing interest in biological, chemical and nuclear terrorism in the 1990’s, the threat perception grew drastically, in light of the 9/11 attacks. After gaining knowledge of Al Qaeda’s interest in nuclear weapons, it became evident that a lack of nuclear security both for nuclear weapons and fissile material poses an even more significant threat to nuclear material and weapons than anticipated.22 Whereas the realist claim to nuclear deterrence would argue that national agencies would develop safe, reli- able nuclear weapons, the same cannot be said for nuclear terrorists.23 However, most scholars and national security experts are of the opinion that a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD)24, would pose a bigger threat to the national security of Western countries.25 This threat evaluation

20Betts, Sagan and Waltz (2007), P 137 21The Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi Arabia, the attack on the USS Cole, the chemical attack on the Tokyo subway by Shoko Asahara’s Aum sect, are but some examples of this rise in fatal terrorist attacks. Interesting discussions of this new terrorism’ have been provided by Laqueur (1996); Sprinzak (1998); Lesser et al. (1999); Tucker (2001) 22Mueller (2007, 2008) 23compare Caravelli (2008); Levi (2008) 24RDD’s, commonly known as dirty bomb’ operate on the principle that conventional explosives are employed in order to disperse radioactive material. See: Magill et al. (2007) 25The freed radiology might not even be enough to kill anybody but it would be sufficient to cause numerous incurable injuries and used on a large scale could cause quite some disorder. Please see: Caravelli (2008), P 60. 22 2 Nuclear Deterrence - a model for assessing safety and security?

is based on the relatively easy access to fissile material on the black market. From 1993 through 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency documented 175 cases of nuclear theft, 18 of which involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the key ingredients to make a nuclear weapon. The global stockpile of highly enriched uranium is about 1,300, at the low end, to about 2,100 metric tons. More than 100 megatons of this is stored in particularly insecure Russian facilities.26

Nuclear technology is by now a relatively old technology with the global share of knowledge and technology reaching ever new heights with the spread of the Internet and exchange programs for scientists from all over the world. The process of globalization itself aids proliferation of nuclear knowledge and technology as the revelation about A.Q. Khan’s network have shown.27 The importance of the Taliban encroaching on Pakistani territory in the last few years and Ira- nian interest in nuclear enrichment, as well as, their connection to violent extremist Islamic organizations the fear of terrorist organizations gaining access to nuclear weapons cannot be un- derestimated. Yet, while some measures have been taken to curb illegal proliferation, in 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative placeda new emphasis on the matter of nuclear security. This process was also added by the IAEA’s advance in their nuclear security program and their involvement in adding the Additional Protocols (AP) to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agree- ments (CSA).

Further, the poisoning and death of Alexander Litvinenko in late 2006 shows, small amounts of nuclear material in this case Polonium- 210 could be used as chemical or biological agents, as it is extremely toxic if swallowed or ingested. Compare: Caravelli (2008), P 66 26The Nunn-Lugar legislation passed in 1992, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), can be seen as one the first steps in this direction by aiding to secure and dismantle former Soviet Union nuclear material and weapons. Today the CTR works out of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in order to protect national security by reducing present threats and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See: DTRA (2009); Caravelli (2008), P 32 Evidently this process had not begun early enough, as the same period saw a significant number of theft or diversion of fissile material from former Soviet Union nuclear installations, had been detected during the 1990’s. Please see Caravelli (2008) for a detailed list 27for a good examination of AQ Khan’s network see: Lunn et al. (2007) 2.2 Conclusion 23

These challenges cannot be addressed through a paradigm of nuclear deterrence, as many of the above threats cannot be analyzed through a macro- lens of state behavior. Terrorist attacks are not conducted by states, but by organizations or individuals, a theory bound on using the state as primary reference cannot account for such behavior, even if one argues that some of these terrorists are state sponsored. But threats of nuclear accidents, nuclear theft or nuclear terrorism are real and need to be addressed. While acknowledging “that nuclear weapons may well have made deliberate [nuclear] war less likely” Scott D. Sagan argued that “the complex and tightly coupled arsenal we have constructed has simultaneously made accidental war more likely.” 28 He provided a chilling account on the number and degree of accidents that could have led to a nuclear war, and thus proposed that new nuclear powers would not make the world safer due to the fact that the systems they would use to safeguard their arsenal would be “considerably less safe than those of current nuclear powers.”29

2.2 Conclusion

The last chapter looked at nuclear deterrence theory. However, as was seen, nuclear deterrence was an argumentative model to explain why NWS do not engage in nuclear warfare. The answer to the positivist- pessimist debate on nuclear deterrence and whether nuclear deterrence really works, remains open. What has been established in the last two decades, however, is a side argument to the nuclear deterrence debate, arguing that despite the functioning or dis- functioning of nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons are very accident prone. Be it through technical aspects, organizational failures or political incentives. The same can be said for nuclear material as well. Technical problems and security issues are infringing on the well established argument that a nuclear state would have every incentive to acquire a functioning safety and security system.

28Sagan (1993)P 26; emphasis added 29Sagan (1993), P 266 24 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

The last chapter showed that nuclear deterrence is not a visible lens to assess a state’s nuclear safety and security system. In order to do so, a theory needs to be enabled that can account for variations in state behavior and organization. This thesis is furthering the academic discourse on the issue by attempting to establish a theory by which to account for safety and security of nuclear weapons, fissile material as well as nuclear facilities by showing how domestic factors such as amount of civilian control and perception of threats influence its performance. As the theory attempts to explain not only current NWS nuclear safety and security performance but also to enable an assessment of possible future NWS, the variables applied need to be visible in cases where no nuclear weapons have been procured. Providing for domestic factors influencing nuclear safety and security is paramount to the assessment of future NWS, simply because one cannot assess the performance of a non-existent nuclear program. Subsequently the method ap- plied - if successful - will enable the researcher to establish sets of indicators that will not only work for these three cases, but will generally be applicable for every country that decides to go nuclear. Nevertheless, even countries without articulation of interest in nuclear weapons, or clear dislike of them face some of the difficulties and threats to nuclear material and facilities that NWS face. Thus, the model, will not only enable an analysis of NWS but also of states acquiring nuclear technology under the NPT’s guaranteed right for civilian use.

It must be noted, however, that safety and security cannot be measured quantitatively, as there is no ideal to test it against. As Feaver argues, traditional measurements of proliferation use arsenal size, foreign policy of the state and assessment of regional balances of power as indicators.1 This thesis is thus taking a two pronged approach. First assessing the domestic factors influencing the

1Feaver (1992), P 160 3.1 Definitions 25 nuclear safety and security structures in place, and then testing this linkage with a “performance- based” approach, trying to use indicators that will enable the researcher to give an assessment of the probability of certain events, based on the perceived performance of organizations involved in safety as well as security structures in the three cases. However, before going into detail on this method, it is inevitable to define a few important terms first, in order to establish clear indicators.

3.1 Definitions

3.1.1 Defining Safety and Security

As already mentioned the old debate on nuclear proliferation did not address safety nor security, but with the change of the paradigm, these new terms need refinement and definition, due to differences in language and cultures.2

Before going any further it must be noted that both pessimists and optimists share the overar- ching goal of national security. The means to this end, however, could not differ more sharply. While proliferation optimists argue that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing factor, proliferation pessimists argue that to provide national security, nuclear arsenals must be secure and safe from threats. Thus, we have two different dimensions of nuclear security. On the one hand, nuclear security can be understood as national security, secured by acquiring of nuclear weapons as de- terrent. On the other hand nuclear security describes solely to the means to achieve security from nuclear war or single-event incidents such as terrorist attacks. This thesis will use the latter meaning and therefore security in the context of this paper will be defined as the absence of risk to nuclear weapons and fissile material from nuclear war, inside job, terrorist attacks, prolifera-

2While the need for nuclear safety and security is paramount and applicable to all countries with some nuclear elements, the understanding of these terms and processes is not universal. Safety, Security as well as risk, might have straight forward colloquial use in the English language, but while nuclear safety and security ought to be universal terms, in most languages lack the differentiation between the two. For example: the German term Sicherheit applies to both safety and physical security. 26 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

tion and state failure.

Whereas security is heavily focused on the physical harm to the facilities or weapons, safety does not include this physical dimension. Safety may be jeapordized by physical events, but these are not intentionally caused. In fact, nuclear safety concerns itself with unintended consequences or outcomes of certain procedures or simply by failures. Nuclear safety can be defined as the absence of risk from natural disaster, organizational or system failure to the nuclear material or weapons.

3.1.2 Defining Risk

It becomes obvious in the above definitions that the term risk is central to safety and security. Almost as important is the term threat. It must be noted that while slightly differing in meaning Threat and risk will be used almost interchangeably in this thesis. A risk to nuclear weapons exists, when a nuclear security is threatened, be it through theft, terrorism or other reasons. When looking for a definition of risk, the colloquial use in the English language is somewhat similar to a situation involving exposure to danger’. While this might work for a everyday use of the term, it is not feasible for the following analysis.3

3Social scientists in contrast to physicists or chemists for example are not able to quantify risk in the same manner due to the uncertainty of the situation. In contrast the discussion of risk in the social sciences goes back to the early 20th century and spawned two different schools on the issue, those believing in probability and those following operationalism. Compare Holton (2004), P 22 et seqq. In natural sciences, the term risk is often con- sidered to be quantifiable due to the physical laws underlying the assessment. In contrast risk in social sciences is not as clearly defined, and risk is challenged by bias and operational difficulties. As Fischhoff argues creating a definition is a political act, and is always expressing the definers “values regarding the relative importance of different possible adverse consequences for a particular decision.” According to him this subjective risk “refers to non-expert perceptions of that research, embellished by whatever other considerations seize the public mind. This distinction is controversial in how it characterizes both the public and the experts.” compare: Fischhoff, Watson and Hope (1984), P 124; Further, scholars addressing risk are not exempt from problems that are all too common in participant observation or any other subjective data collection. “The act of measuring, thinking about, and seeking to understand and manage risk changes the risk. Risk definition depends on who defines [it].” from: Kelman (2003), 3.1 Definitions 27

In academic discourse several different independent variables for risk are often used: hazard, ele- ments at risk, vulnerability, value, probability, consequences, loss. Many contemporary scholars and experts addressing risk use some variation of the pseudo- mathematical form: Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence. As consequence organizations including nuclear power plants use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques to assess terrorist threats to nuclear instal- lations. While this technique can be useful in providing a preliminary glimpse at security of these facilities, it fails to acknowledge the adversaries capability to rational planning and adaptation.

The most useful definiton for this research seems to be Risk = Probability x Consequences.Probability accounts for the likelihood of the occurrence of the anticipated event. While the same limitations hold for probability as does for threat, meaning that a 1:3 million chance of dying in a plane crash does not recognize the fact that plane crashes are not deterministic and can be adhered to some degree by better technology, it is however common sense that the probability of dying in a plane crash is higher for a pilot than for a slum inhabitant in Jakarta. So probability is defined in terms of likelihood. Even though likelihood is usually assessed through probability calculations, this paper will not make absolute statements about the likelihood or probability of a nuclear accident. Based on the fact that a nuclear accident is possible we can attribute some risk to it and even develop relative measures in order to describe it. Further, based on the theory developed in this chapter it will be possible to allow for the prediction of some degree of variance between more probable events and less probable events.

Similar constraints affect Consequences as well, but while one can be uncertain about the like- lihood of a nuclear accident - if it will happen at all - the consequence can be described in very accurate terms. As seen above, the consequences range from nuclear war over theft of nuclear

P 6. However, King et al. argue that every qualitative research is inherently biased, making it the more important to be able to estimate this bias. Compare King, Keohane and Verba (1994) Therefore, while acknowledging the fact that this research is biased simply due to the facts mentioned in the introduction, it is possible to evaluate the existing data. 28 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

material and usage of a dirty bomb’ to an nuclear accident killing or injuring people.4 5

Using the formula R = P × C holds some additional advantages over most other formulas, as it is a relatively broad qualitative definition of risk, it enables to account for subjective bias and ambiguity in the attributes, while still addressing all possible threats to nuclear weapons and fis- sile material, without neglecting a certain risk at the benefit of another.

3.1.3 Risks to Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material

Nuclear weapons must meet a number of requirements to fulfill the role of deterrent. These requirements apply even if one does not agree with the practicability of nuclear deterrence or argues that nuclear deterrence is only working under the construct that both adversaries agree to the same perception of events. Even in the latter case nuclear weapons are supposed to function in this framework. As such, nuclear weapons are supposed to:

1 always function as directed and never when not directed. (Always/never dilemma)

4Even though the consequence of the impact of a nuclear bomb or a dirty bomb on a city center can be quantified using physical knowledge, this will not be of concern for this paper. For this attempt it will suffice to know that unforeseen damage and destruction would be the cause of such action and as such not be of interest to any nation. 5The dismissal of other factors, such as hazard; elements at risk; as well as vulnerability is due to the fact that most of these measures are ambiguous and multicausal. For example: Vulnerability depends on size, intelligence and network structure of an attacking force. see Louis Anthony Cox (2008), P 1745 ff.; It seems important to note that some authors attempt to make an important restriction in regards to the fact that risk is a condition of individuals - and as such risk does not apply to such organizations, companies or in our case nuclear weapons. (compareHolton (2004), P 24) However, it could be argued that in light of the 2008 financial crisis, this limitation does not prove valuable to the discourse - with companies and organizations failing and as consequence being dissolved. It becomes apparent that high risk investment can prove severe for any organization and company, disregarding whether an individual or a group within the organization made the decision. Further, the failure of a military organization in combat will in most cases affect both the individuals as well as the organization as seen with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The only difference is that the organization might not be affected as directly as the individual who is subject to unemployment or death. However, political strategy changes or budget cuts will inevitably affect a military organization indirectly and as such affect the whole organization. 3.1 Definitions 29

2 retain fool-proof safety from accidents and accidental launches.

3 provide a perfect system of accountability of nuclear and strategic materials.

4 provide a system to prevent unauthorized access to the site, tampering or use of strategic materials.

5 assure retaliatory second-strike capability that the adversary must perceive as credible, and consequently reduce the incentive to strike first during crisis.6

These requirements lie in different dimensions, for one a political-strategic dimension. The fifth criteria, namely the second strike capability is clearly addressing an adversary. Yet, to make a second strike capability work and to have an adversary perceive the threat of a second strike as imminent, the first four requirements must be in place. The technical aspect of these require- ments are clear, yet to make these requirements stick, an organization behind the whole structure needs to accept these requirements as priority. Without going into detail on the organizational capacity involved in nuclear safety and security these requirements pose several threats and dif- ficulties to nuclear safety and security.

Usually when thinking of nuclear weapons and fissile material, one thinks of Hiroshima, Na- gasaki and Chernobyl or nuclear terrorism. Nevertheless, these are extremes, which do not nec- essarily encompass the whole range of possible risks to both nuclear weapons and fissile material. In regards to nuclear weapons one can argue that they generally face these three threats:

- Accidental use

- Inadvertent use due to a mistake in the system or any programs.

- Unauthorized use, either by fragments of the state or by non-state actors.7

6Khan (2005), P 169 7compare Busch (2004) 30 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

As nuclear war is not the only risk involving nuclear weapons or fissile material, this is a rather useful differentiation. Not every nuclear incident, involving nuclear weapons will deterministi- cally automatically cause a nuclear war. However, no nuclear incident is worth risking, due to the possible impact on human life. In order to establish a framework these three terms need to be defined. Nathan Busch clarifies them as follows: “The use of a nuclear weapon would be considered accidental if “everyone is surprised” by its use. [even the organization in charge of securing the weapon] Unauthorized use on the other hand, “refers to the deliberate use by people who have access to the weapon, but who lack legitimately to order its use” [...] Both accidental and unauthorized use must be distinguished from “inadvertent” use of a nuclear weapon, where the use is intentional and ordered by the people who have legitimate authority to order its use, but the order is based on misinformation.8

As with the requirements of nuclear weapons, these risks are spanning the afore mentioned three dimensions. While technical and organizational issues are overlapping to some degree, the over- arching reason for these risks is a political-strategic dimension, as without the perceived need for nuclear weapons these issues would not arise. Yet, the political strategic aspect is even more visible when looking at unauthorized usage of nuclear weapons. Unauthorized use through per- sonnel with access to the weapons as well as outsiders is only possible in a somewhat defected case of state affairs. Only if the monopoly of violence is not held by the state, but is in the hands of either state forces without the necessary government control, or by non state forces unautho- rized access is even possible. Thus, in order to incorporate the threat to nuclear weapons and fissile material by terrorists, it is necessary to broaden the concept of unauthorized use to include both inside and outside threats. Therefore, this paper will define unathorized use as deliberate but illegitimate use or proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material, both by personnel with access to the system, as well as outsiders with forced access.

8Busch (2004), P 6 3.1 Definitions 31

While the political dimension applies to inadvertent and accidental use as well, it is not as pro- nounced and not the primary aspect at play. Inadvertent use happens generally speaking, when a certain sequence of events is begun, based on false information. For example an accident in a Russian ICBM launch site might be interpreted by the U.S. early warning system as ICBM launch and attack on U.S. soil. Other scenarios could involve software mistakes.9 Thus, a mis- perception of information based on a software or system failure triggers an alarm which leads the system to act in the ways intended for such warnings. In short: inadvertent use can be defined as deliberate use of nuclear weapons and/or fissile material based on misperception. Further, while unauthorized use clearly address concerns to physical security; inadvertentas well as accidental use, as used by Busch and adopted in this paper, are threats to safety as both are caused by human and/or technological failures, based on safety issues.

Safety and security concerns nuclear weapons, but also fissile material as exemplified above. When it comes to fissile material, this threat differentiation is not as easily applied and needs some conceptual stretching. Dangers range from natural disasters, over organizational failure to terrorist threats, proliferation and state failure. These dangers to fissile material can also be differentiated by the above mentioned risk distinction. Accidental use, for example, applies to misuse in reactors of all ranges. However, this threat does not apply to the same extent to the stocks of fissile material stored in NWS and other countries for possible future use in reactors, nuclear weapons, enrichment and so on. Inadvertent use is less of a danger of nuclear material, as nuclear material will seldomly be shipped or transported without consent. No computer or human failure can cause illegal proliferation. In contrast, proliferation of nuclear material would fall into the category of unauthorized use of nuclear material. In addition, nuclear terrorism as a whole can be ascribed to unauthorized use.10 Yet, nuclear terrorism covers a wide array of

9For a detailed description of similar scenarios please see Sagan (1993) 10It is important to note, that this paper is not arguing that nuclear terrorism does not happen in advanced co- hesive states with no clear control of the state monopoly, quite on the contrary, smuggle of nuclear material occurs everywhere, and terrorist groups might have a pronounced interest to apply an RDD in a western country. However, as mentioned above nuclear material smuggle was increased immensely after the state failure of the Soviet Union, leading to the conclusion that a loss or infringement of state capacity to fulfill it’s monopoly on violence is directly 32 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

fields.11 Risks to nuclear material could also be structured in two categories: safety issues and security issues. Safety related issues include:

- inadequate regulatory oversight,

- inadequate operator training due to over-stretching of capabilities,

- inadequate protection of spent fuel storage pools due to accumulating too much spent fuel,

- common mode failures and impacts on grid stability due to possible attacks on power grids,

- impacts of natural disasters.12

Security- related issues:

- National security issues affecting power system infrastructure (failure of 3G’s)13

- Missile material diversion from nuclear power plant

- Terrorist attack, seizure or takeover of a nuclear power plant

- Airplane attacks on nuclear power plants

- Military takeover of nuclear power sites

- Foreign military attacks on nuclear power plants 14

connected to the capacity of other actors to access nuclear material. 11In order to make the threat to terrorism a bit less opaque, this paper will use a common typology of nuclear terrorism. According to this, nuclear terrorism includes these eight scenarios. [1] Making or stealing a nuclear or radiological weapon for detonation. [2] Making or stealing a nuclear or radiological weapon for blackmail. [3] Sabotaging a nuclear plant for radioactive release. [4] Attacking a nuclear weapons site to spread alarm. [5] Attacking a nuclear plant to spread alarm. [6] Holding a nuclear plant for blackmail. [7] Stealing or sabotaging “things nuclear” for demonstration purposes. [8] Attacking a transporter of nuclear weapons or material. See: Busch (2004), P 12; 12Braun (2008), P 299 ff. 133G’s commonly refers to the primary means of securing nuclear facilities: Guards, Gates and Guns 14Braun (2008), P 313 ff. 3.1 Definitions 33

Such a differentiation proves valuable for an assessment of Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), as it gives a clear indication of which measures will affect which risk. Regardless, threats to either nuclear weapons or fissile material have the potential of grave con- sequences. In a nuclear stalemate, a nuclear accident or inadvertent launch can have the potential to trigger nuclear war, even though incidents like this have been successfully averted during the Cold War due to ample time to verify incoming data.15 In a regional nuclear stalemate with lit- tle to no time to verify data, however, an accidental nuclear explosion or launch could prove fatal.

3.1.4 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Material - C3 I and MPC&A

Nuclear security in a strategic context, especially in the cases selected for this study, it is easy to focus exclusively on nuclear weapons. But in light of 9/11, interest by some terrorist groups in nuclear material, the fragile security situation in Pakistan as well as the sponsoring of terrorism by Iran, it is evidently necessary to include nuclear material in the examination.16

Further, as in most cases nuclear weapons programs are highly secretive. As already mentioned, one of the ways to circumvent this problem of secrecy and thus low availability of information is to take a look at the organizations in charge of nuclear weapons. In the case of India, until re- cently the civilian and military nuclear programs were in the hand of a civilian agency. The same is nominally true for the Iranian case. In Pakistan the nuclear weapons as well as the civilian program are in control of the Pakistani Army. Thus, one way of addressing the safety and secu- rity of nuclear weapons, is to look at the safety and security of nuclear facilities and/or nuclear fissile material.

Many elements comprise functioning or disfunctioning safety and security systems. Various components such as Guns, Guards, Gates commonly referred as 3G’s, motion detectors, early

15see Sagan (1993) 16For more information on Al-Qaeda’s connections to Pakistani nuclear scientists see Mowatt-Larsen (2009), P 2ff. 34 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

warning systems as well as the launch authority are all parts of a system of Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3 I).17 While some of the same threats apply to fissile material and to nuclear weapons, these threats are mostly focused on safety and do not share the same inherent necessities as C3 I. Thus, in regards to fissile material one speaks often of Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A). Since MPC&A generally addresses the threats of theft, proliferation, sabotage or terrorist attacks to nuclear materials it subsumes the safety and security of nuclear facilities. MPC&A as such helps prevent a rapid spread of nuclear weapons to aspiring nuclear states due to the inability to deal with stolen material. Furthermore it helps to prevent nuclear terrorism.18 While C3 I and MPC&A are defined, operationalizing these two is more complicated. However, since this paper is using a performance based approach, it is possible to address this by assess- ing how the organizations or the country in charge perform in these matters. Table 10 lists the indicators used to assess the performance of the organization. For example, in order to safeguard nuclear material and weapons from accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use the organization would most likely add additional safety features. For nuclear weapons this include Electromag- netic pulse interruption (EMP), Permissive action links (PAL’s) or two man rule. For nuclear facilities or storage sites this could mean adding more guards. In both cases the preferred mea- sure of states is adding redundancy. In order to protect itself against decapitation a nation needs to build highly survivable nuclear delivery systems and decentralize the command and control system and nuclear delivery systems by spreading them across the country, to make a first strike unlikely.

Despite the fact that there are some parallels between unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and fissile material protection, unauthorized use does not apply in the same way to fissile material.

17More commonly today is the term C3 ISR, standing for: Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Yet, due to the poor Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems in place in the three cases this paper will keep using the term C3 I 18Busch (2004), P 3, P 12ff. 3.1 Definitions 35

Table 3.1: Operationalized Indicators of C3 I and MPC&A Accidental Unauthorized Inadvertent MPC&A

- Nuclear posture -Clearly estab- - nuclear posture - adequate account- lished chain of ing measures command - Continuous target - personnel moni- - adequate intelli- - adequate security lock-on toring gence systems and monitoring -Integrated safety - PAL or two man - early warning sys- - detection systems devices (IHE, rule tems Fire-resistant pits) - means of deacti- - politically stable - Confidence build- -intelligence vation country ing measures - integrated secu- - well trained mili- rity features tary forces (most data from Busch (2004), P 14ff.; own design)

For example, a functioning minimum deterrence, launch on warning (LOW) posture does not call for many nuclear warheads, which reflects on the quantity of fissile material produced. It does however - to a certain extent - reflect the quality of fissile material. Nevertheless, the safety and security of fissile material will be highly dependent on the measures taken to guarantee MPC&A.

Naturally, bigger amounts of higher enriched fissile material need more protection than smaller amounts and lower enriched. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the more fissile material or fissile material producing facilities a state has obtained, the higher the need for a reliable MPC&A system.19

19Low enriched uranium (LEU) is hardly of use to terrorists, despite in a Radiological Dispersion Device - dirty bomb - and the effects of a dirty bomb with LEU will be a lot smaller than the effects of a nuclear warhead or highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the hands of terrorists 36 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

3.2 Organizational Performance Model

This research faces the problem of assessing the nuclear safety and security of a newly prolifer- ating state. How safe and secure are nuclear weapons? How safe and secure is nuclear material? From a logical standpoint, these questions can only be answered once the threat environment has been analyzed. Being capable of destroying the adversary many times over, has certainly a higher threat potential than a minimum credible deterrence. A country facing frequent earth- quakes, however, will have different demands for safety of nuclear facilities than one that does not. Judging from this common-sensical approach, it should be possible to get a first glimpse of safety and security by examining these threat environments or the vulnerabilities of the nuclear system.

Demanding the military to safeguard nuclear weapons, however, puts new strains on military organizations, because this task is not natural to militaries. To cope with the added difficulty, militaries tend to establish SOP’s for the handling of nuclear weapons. Civilian organizations often copy certain elements of military organizations and vice versa.20 Adaption, innovation and organizational learning become a major factor in both warfare and nuclear security. Looking at doctrine and SOPs as the most visible signs of organizational behavior prooves a valuable source of information to examine the ability of an organization to tackle certain tasks. Despite the obvious practicability of applying organizational theory to the military as a ’total in-

20SOP’s help organizations to deal with complex but fairly regular situations in a precise and well trained manner. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 can be seen as the execution of these SOPs. The quick and decisive execution of the SOP’s by the militaries involved ended the conflict within about 6 weeks. In contrast, Operation Iraqi Freedom and especially the years 2005-2006 clearly show the problems of applying ill- suited SOP’s to to differing circumstances. For more information on military and civilian organization and innovation see Shahady (2008) Militaries as such describe pretty well to the understanding of an organization as a systematized body of people with a particular purpose. The purpose of a military organization in the broadest sense is “management of violence” with various different means of applying this violence. Compare: Huntington (1957) Naturally management of violence involves a hierarchical institution with clear Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which can only be achieved through continuous training in the application of violence. However, when it comes to nuclear weapons the military is facing new challenges. 3.3 Independent Variable: Civilian dominance and vulnerability 37 stitution’, examining organizational behavior is also an useful tool to analyze safety and security of civilian- administered nuclear use. Therefore, it makes sense to take a look at the organization in charge of the nuclear application in focus. The adoption of Sagan’s approach will thus not only be fruitful to the examination of nuclear ar- senals and their safety, but the lens of organizational theory will also prove valuable to look at the safety of nuclear weapons from unauthorized and inadvertent use, as well as the safety of fissile material and nuclear facilities. Fully acknowledging the fact that the threat of a nuclear weapon accidentally detonating is remarkably different from the threat of the same being inadvertently launched, the outcome in both cases is essentially the same and could lead to a nuclear war, if the accidental detonation is not recognized as such, but perceived as a preemptive strike. Granted, a non-intended detonation might not necessarily cause a nuclear war, however, it certainly will cause destruction and the loss of life and has the potential for a nuclear war. While not subject to detonation on the scale of a nuclear weapon, loss or theft of fissile material or a terrorist attack on a fissile material storage or transport is a threat. A nuclear detonation caused by an accident or an RDD, not necessarily triggers a nuclear retaliation strike by a possible adversary, but with misinformation this option is not out of the way. Thus, looking at the structure of the systems used in the respective countries will enables us to assess the probability of the above incidents.

3.3 Independent Variable: Civilian dominance and vulnera- bility

Any assessment of the safety and security of nuclear weapons, fissile material and nuclear facili- ties will have to take the organization administering them into account. However, as a first cut it is important to assess the structural situation as well as organizational bias. Focusing on who holds power over nuclear material will provide a view at the organization behind the weapon or the ma- terial. Power in this respect can also elude to nominal control over safety and security guidelines.

Peter D. Feaver introduced an approach based on an assertive/ delegative typology of nuclear 38 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

posture21 as his dependent variable, and Civil-Military-Relations as well as Time Urgency as independent variables.22 At the heart of this typology is the question whether the nuclear arsenal is more prone to accidental or unwanted use, or decapitation.23 Feaver’s proffers two independent variables, two hypothesis: First, the more stable civil-military relations, the more delegative the command and control system; the more volatile the civil- military relations, the more assertive the command and control system.24 Second, the greater the time-urgency, the more likely the command and control system will be delegative.25

Nonetheless, the above described independent variables are flawed. First of all, Feaver’s ap- proach is restricted to nuclear weapons, and as such too limited for our purpose. Second, while the variable time urgency is defined as the “degree to which leaders of the new nuclear state require that the arsenal be ready for immediate and rapid use”, the variable civil- military rela- tions lacks such a coherent definition. Underlying his concept of stable civil military relations (CMR) is a bias towards civilian control over a strong autonomous military. While this suits

21For a quick overview: nuclear postures can take on these technical aspects.

- Nuclear devices (cores) are kept separate from warhead components and not co-located.

- Nuclear device and warhead are not assembled but are co-located for rapid assembly.

- Nuclear warheads are assembled but not mated with the missile frame or aircraft.

- Nuclear warhead is mated with the missile frame but not co-located with delivery meansmobile launch vehicles/transportererector launcher.

- All components are co-located to be rapidly mated. See: Khan (2005), P170

22Feaver (1992), P 164 23Accidental and unwanted use have already been defined above. Decapitation, according to Feaver, can be defined as the “successful first strike, rendering the defender’s arsenal unusable either b/c the attack destroys the delivery systems or because the attack disrupts command and control that retaliation becomes infeasible.”Feaver (1992), P 164. Decapitation is useful in assessing the fears and strategic goals of a country, yet for the assessment of nuclear safety and security it is a secondary issue. 24Feaver (1992), P 178 ff 25Feaver (1992), P 180 3.3 Independent Variable: Civilian dominance and vulnerability 39

Table 3.2: Comparison between delegative and assertive systems with regards to nuclear weapons and facilities DELEGATIVE ASSERTIVE Relatively high autonomy Minimal autonomy to given to military/ out- military/ strong govern- sourcing of security and ment control. safety features Measures used to assure Minimal - Limited to ad- Extensive - Wide use of obedience ministrative measures. administrative and physi- cal use-control measures De facto reliance upon Military obedience to military obedience to civilians enforced by civilians specific measures. Custody and stockpile ar- Operators given custody Weapons not assembled. rangements and allowed to deploy at If Assembled, kept sep- relatively high states of arate from delivery sys- readiness. tem If collocated, some physical measures to sep- arate control of posses- sion from ability to use Measures to civilian facil- partially or completely high level of administra- ities. outsourced to military or tive and physical safety private contractors and security features, per- haps dispersed installa- tions. Protects against Decapitation Accidental, inadvertent and unauthorized use Failure mode Fail deadly Fail impotent or fail safe (Author’s design, some features by Feaver (1992), P 171 ) 40 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

his theory well, few states except the United States fit this description. It becomes evident that the threshold between volatile CMR, stable CMR and ouright military dominance is not well defined. Civilian control as defined by Croissant and Kuhn¨ is a state of Civil-Military-Relations, in which exclusively civilian authorities make political decisions. These decisions are delegated to the military, which will implement these within their professional domain according to the political guidelines.26 According to this, the extrem case described by Feaver of civilian control but strong military autonomy, cannot be described as stable CMR.

To widen the concept to safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material, it becomes apparant that swapping the variable Civil-Military- Relations with civilian dominance over nu- clear assets offers the advantage of including nuclear material as well as shedding military auton- omy bias. CMR indicates how safe and secure a certain system is. However, by looking strictly at civilian dominance over the nuclear assets, which includes proper control of all forces included in the process, it is possible to see what the organizational bias of the certain organization (be it military or civilian) is.27 In this respect one can rephrase Feaver’s hypothesis, arguing that a system of civilian dominance over nuclear assets (disregarding regime type) would tend to be more assertive, while a non-civilian- dominated system (or one with autonomous non-political veto-players, such as the military,i.e. an infringement on the state monopoly on violence) would tend to be more delegative in its command and control structures. A similar problem of bias towards nuclear weapons is apparent with the variable time urgency, which relates to the prox- imity to the adversary as well as the threat environment. Closer proximity means higher time urgency, calling for a more delegative system. In other words, the closer and the higher the threat the greater the vulnerability. It is important to note here that the threat environment is vis-a-vis` a foreign opponent, whom is perceived to be a significant threat to the state itself, causing it to reply to the threat of decapitation by advancing its nuclear posture.

In comparison, a country with a lower external threat, but high internal threat to its nuclear sys-

26Croissant and Kuhn¨ (2007), P 10 27Closely related to this is the monopoly of violence in a given state 3.3 Independent Variable: Civilian dominance and vulnerability 41

tem, be it through terrorists or an insurgency, would most likely - in an ideal case - tend to focus on nuclear safety and security of its nuclear weapons and/or nuclear facilities.28 Therefore, one can conclude, that the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear material is dependent on the perception of threats. Thus, the independent variables are the civilian dominance over nuclear capabilities and the level of external or internal threat

Table 3.3 attempts to widen Feaver’s approach to incorporate civilian facilities, laying out in greater detail the characteristics of delegative and assertive systems in comparison in regards to nuclear weapons and civilian facilities. It is important to note that the dichotomy between del- egative and assertive systems is an ideal one, and neither desirable nor in reality achievable.29

When applying the changes made to Feaver’s approach one can construct a four- field matrix (Table 3.3) to evaluate the outcome of the two variables civilian dominance and vulnerability in a non-dichotomous view.

This method should allow for a first assessment of nuclear safety and security, giving us an in- sight into a) the threat environment, be it internal or external and b) the dominance over the nuclear command system. This should allow the researcher to give an assessment whether the system tends to be more delegative or more assertive and thus more prone to accidents, inadver- tent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. However, the expectation of delegative or assertive nuclear posture is a static view, and cannot give us an insight into the organization as such and

28The thesis is using internal threat as antagonistic to external threat. As no threat would not have effects on national security thus triggering no change of nuclear posture and subsequently no increase of risks of accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. 29Few countries have a straightforward delegative or assertive system, in reality mixed systems are more likely as can be seen in squares 2 and 3. Also, from a logical standpoint one could argue that newly proliferating states would usually tend to use an assertive system,and as time advances they would gradually change towards a more relaxed posture, privatizing civilian nuclear facilities and outsourcing safety and security as well as leaving more control to the military SOP. However,this is a logical argument, which has to be empirically tested. 42 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

Table 3.3: Command and control as a function of civilian dominance No Civilian dominance Civilian dominance (military or other) external threat 1) Most delegative 2) Peacetime: assertive Crisis: delegative (high risk of accidental, (medium risk of acciden- unauthorized and inadver- tal, low inadvertent and tent use) unauthorized) internal threat 3) Uncertain 4) Most assertive (high accidental, unautho- (low accidental, low inad- rized, low inadvertent) vertent and unauthorized ) (Following Feaver’s design but with changed indicators. compare Feaver (1992), P 182)

its interests or how they deal with security. Sagan argues that in order to examine accidents or the misuse of nuclear weapons, it is important to see how probable accidents involving nuclear weapons really are. So far we have established a method giving us an insight into the strategic environment, telling us who is in charge and what the system is most vulnerable to. With the help of Sagan’s approach it is possible to look into the black box of the organization to assess the expected performance of the organization. To apply organizational theory to the command and control structure of nuclear weapons seems to be a fairly logical step, as nuclear weapons are handled by the military.

3.4 Taking a performance based approach

Organizations dealing with lethal or dangerous technology are commonly referred to as High reli- ability organization (HRO). Assessing such organizations is different from organizations dealing with non-dangerous assets insofar as they have a higher risk of accidents due to the nature of the product they are handling and its consequences in an accident. HRO theory seeks to exam- ine such organizations, assuming that accidents can be prevented through an intelligent design 3.4 Taking a performance based approach 43

Table 3.4: Comparison of arguments between High Reliability Organizational Theory and Nor- mal Accident Theory High Reliability Theory Normal Accident Theory

Org. leaders and pol. elites place a high Safety and reliability take a backseat priority on safety and reliability b/c of Conflicting interests of the orga- nization Redundancy permits backup or over- Redundancy increases complexity and lapping units to compensate for failures opaqueness, encourages risk taking Errors are reduced through decentral- decentralization/ centralization ization, strong organizational culture dilemma restricts effectiveness, and continuous operations and training and training cannot anticipate all situations. Organizational learning takes place Denial of responsibility, fault reporting through a trial-and-error process, sup- and reconstruction of history cripples plemented by anticipation and simula- learning efforts. tion (data from Sagan (1993), P 46; own design) and management. HRO theory emphasizes elites and their management of organizations.30 It assumes 4 characteristics that allegedly help achieve high levels of security and safety. These are laid out in Table 3.4.

HRO theory argue that an organization in charge of nuclear weapons has every incentive to keep nuclear weapons safe, even when on highest alert, simply because safety is a priority. The same applies to nuclear material. Such an organization has an interest in keeping facilities and

30HRO’s have been analyzed for example by a group of scholars at UC Berkeley. They identified the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) air-traffic control, The Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s electrical power system and the peacetime flight operations of two US Navy aircraft carriers. see Sagan (1993), P 15 ff. 44 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

weapons safe, providing constant training, duplicating agencies to add redundancy, thus building dual systems checking on each other, as well as decentralizing and establishing a culture of safety and security in order to reduce risks.31 It stands to debate, however, if an organization in charge of nuclear weapons in a very delegative system (high external threat and strong veto players) is really focusing on safety as a priority. Incidents like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Thule, or Palomares, bath this hypothesis in a dark light questioning HRO theories basic claims that accidents can be prevented by organizations adhering to the above mentioned assumptions.

3.4.1 Normal Accident Theory

The puzzles that HRO theory failed to explain, normal accident picks up, trying to give a more realistic assessment of nuclear safety and security.32 Normal accident theory has a much more pessimistic outlook, assuming that accidents are the normal result or even an integral character- istic of any high risk system33

The normal accident view is highly structural in its approach. Perrow argues that “serious ac- cidents are inevitable, no matter how hard we try to avoid them.” 34 Sagan also argues that a high emphasis is put on political action, it thus focuses “attention on interaction of conflicting

31Sagan (1993), P19ff. 32Normal accident theory is based on Charles Perrow’s book Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Tech- nology first edition in 1984, second edition in 1999. By examining the accident at Three Mile Island and other incidents, he established a framework of analysis which helps analyze accidents in petrochemical plants, marine aircraft and even mines and exotic accidents regarding DNA. In his conclusions he states: “My recommendations must be judged wrong if the science of risk assessment [High Reliability Organization] as currently practiced is correct. Current risk assessment theory suggests that what I worry about most (nuclear power and weapons) has done almost no harm to people while what I would leave to minor corrections (fissile fuel plants, auto safety and mining) has done a great deal of harm. See: Perrow (1999), P 304. Shortly after the publication the incidents at Chernobyl, Bhopal and the Challenger Space Shuttle accident proved the theory to be valid in explaining tendencies in HRO’s 33Sagan (1993), P 28 ff. 34Perrow (1999), P 3 3.4 Taking a performance based approach 45

interests in groups.”35

In general, normal accident theory examines two variables: interactive complexity and tight cou- pling. Complex interactions are “those of unfamiliar, unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible.” 36 Complex interactions often include feedback loops or branching, which allow failures to jump across subsystems. Tight coupled systems in contrast are processes that are very time dependent, invariant in the process, and show little slack. Usually safety devices are part of the system, e.g. emergency halts in case of mal- function.37

Normal accident theory can be summarized as follows.

- Accidents are normal and inevitable. They occur because of a variety of combinations, which are hardly foreseeable.

- Complex interactions and tight coupling make combinations almost limitless.

- Safety is not always a priority or it competes with other objectives.

- Redundancy and a culture of reliability can exacerbate the effects or will not be able to change the situation.

- Faulty reporting, incentives to not analyze or blaming inferior members of the organization (lowest in the food chain) all inhibit learning efforts.

- Conflicting interests of management, on different levels or in the organization as a whole, flaws the system. Groupthink might exacerbate this.

In the following it will become apparent why normal accident theory poses a better framework for the assessment of nuclear weapons and fissile material safety and security than HRO theory.

35Sagan (1993), P 32 36Perrow (1999), P 78 37Sagan (1993), P34 46 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

3.5 Combining organization and performance

In the above section it was tried to establish two frameworks. On the one hand, revising Feaver’s approach helps the researcher to establish a point of origin from which to start assessing the performance of the organization in charge of nuclear weapons and facilities and accounting for a delegative or an assertive bias of the organization. Depending on the bias, it is possible to explain whether the organization focuses on national security, with nuclear weapons as a deterrent, not focusing on safety and security, or whether the opposite is the case. It helps to give a first indication of what to expect. However, as few states choose a primary delegative or assertive system, the actual performance of the organizations in charge of nuclear safety and security must be assessed. Table 3.3 attempts to make a minor assessment for each of the four squares on what outcome could be expected from a system based on the initial factors. Following this logic, it can be expected that the higher the external threat, the more delegative and vulnerable to accidents, inadvertent and/or unauthorized use the system. Likewise the higher the internal threat, the more assertive the system. Therefore, it can be concluded that the more hurried an actor perceives his strategic situation the more rapid and escalating the nuclear posture, which in relation means the higher the risk of accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use. In contrast a country facing a higher level of internal threat will most likely tend to secure its weapons more by hiding, not mating or weaponizing them and using more physical protection systems. Figure 3.1 illustrates the problem in regards to nuclear weapons and the nuclear posture applied in a country.

Figure 3.1 shows that a more rapid nuclear posture also increases the risks of accidental, unau- thorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Complexity in this example refers to the commu- nication between the actors involved in a nuclear launch. Tight coupling, however, corresponds to the time available to decide on a nuclear launch. Thus, even when the system is complex, due to a highly coordinated and delegative command system, revolving around the need for a reliable second strike capability, this does not increase the risk to the system, as long as the system moves slowly enough to make correct decisions. It follows that for demated nuclear postures the risk of all three possible kinds of misuse are relatively low, due to the fact that warheads are stored apart from the delivery systems. Responding to a first strike requires a credible LOW posture in which 3.5 Combining organization and performance 47

Figure 3.1: Spectrum of Nuclear Posture

(taken from Kumar, 2006)

weapons are mated, weaponized and deployed for immediate launch after incoming warnings have been verified. Logically, such a posture requires tightly knit and highly complex system. Operations must be automatized, with no room for failure or hesistancy. In doing so, military structures (usually the ones controlling the weapons) as Sagan has shown tend to make their sys- tem more tightly knit and more complex, adding to the risk of accidents happening. In effect this is making it impossible for a single person to understand the whole system, due to its complexity. A more complex command structure does not necessarily make the system more safe. It might secure the state’s interest but at the same time it is risking the weapons safety. Following Nor- mal Accident Theory, such a system would be very prone to risks, involving accidents occurring due to false handling of ballistic missiles, unauthorized use due to readiness and easy access of nuclear weapons and inadvertent use due to false information of the early warning system could all cause an accident or a nuclear launch. This shows that the more rapid the nuclear posture the more delegative the system and the higher are risks of accidental, unauthorized of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Vice versa, the more relaxed the nuclear posture, the more assertive the system. The nuclear system is more safe and secure from accidental, unauthorized and inadver- tent use, however it is thus more prone to fail dead and to preemptive strikes. However, a very assertive system of nuclear weapons and nuclear material can only be truly safe and secure when the system in place is not too complex and tightly coupled. 48 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

Some significant restrictions apply to organizations as such, when following normal accident theory. First, regarding the rationality of leadership, rational organization seems to not have simple consistent preference functions.38 Internal conflict spanning over several levels of the organization makes HRO’s highly accident prone. Further, intrinsic problems to group decision are described by research on the dangers of groupthink.39 The “garbage can model” of organizations points out three characteristics of organizations lim- iting management effectiveness: a) organizations “operate on basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences” 40 b): Organizations tend to become so complex that their members do not understand the inherent processes. c) Participants come and go (fluid participation). Fi- nally, d) conflicting interests tend to have strong implications for safety. HRO theory assumes that safety has to be a priority of the management but as the case of the Cuban missile crisis indicates, several interests like upcoming elections, economical concerns have an impact on not making safety and security the first priority.41 Arguably, this can be interpreted as an argument for the reluctance of organizations in very delegative systems to make safety a priority.

38Sagan (1993) 39The effects of groupthink have been widely studied in Psychology but not nearly as much in Political Science. An important breakthrough in this field has been done by Irving Janis in his book Victims of Groupthink, 1972. He argued that the denial of a possible attack by Japanese warships despite enough indicators can be explained by groupthink.Groupthink occurs when members of the decision making group are or feel pressured by a consensus thus not making use or not voicing their “mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment”. See: Janis (1972), P 9. One could argue that this might be true for organizations that are collegial in style but not for hierarchical organizations like the ones in charge of nuclear weapons, as in the military. Unfortunately similar effects have been seen in the more hierarchical settings of the US Army. Interesting work in this respect has been done on the effects of groupthink in the US Army by Major Phillip M. Johnson analyzing Effects on Groupthink on Tactical Decision-Making Johnson (2000) Even though this is based on a tactical level it can be assumed that this holds even more for strategic command levels. The later would be the level where decisions about structural design would be made and this would definitely affect Arms Control, since strategic command levels would tend to be even less monolithic than tactical level. It is thus highly likely that any organization whether hierarchical or collegial in structural design follows similar problems of groupthink and therefore we could assume that this is the case with almost any organization. 40Sagan (1993), P 29 41Sagan (1993), P 256 3.5 Combining organization and performance 49

Secondly, the benefits of redundancy are ill-praised with regards to safety and security of nuclear HRO’s. By adding redundancy to the system the system will inevitably become more complex and thus inherently more unstable. Individual human mistakes or system failures are not inter- dependent, but independent from each other.42 Individual members of the group are not able to grasp the system as a whole. As Sagan argues, “in complex systems, independence in theory (or in design) is not necessarily independence in fact. As long as there is some possibility of unplanned interactions between the components leading to common-mode errors, however, there will be inherent limits to the effectiveness of redundancy as a solution to reliability problems.”43 Furthermore, when adding redundancy an organization is always adding new political units with interests of their own. Apart from these technical aspects of redundancy, there are a number of problems caused by human interaction. Threats to security are often addressed by raising the number of security personnel. As an unintended consequence this might in fact, raise the pos- sibility of insider threats. “The janitor or maintenance man, who feels he has just been slighted may represent a vulnerability just as deadly as a compromised guard.”44 Likewise redundancy might cause social shirking.45 In addition redundancy can cause a higher degree of risk taking, by overcompensating and thus believing a procedure to be safer or more secure.46 As Carroll puts it “Redundancy is in part a persuasive argument addressed to policy makers who allocate funds, plant employees who must be motivated to do their jobs as well as possible, a public that needs reassurance in order to continue working and spending, and terrorists themselves, who

42Sagan (1993), P 39 43Sagan (2004), P 937 44Westrum (2004), P 959, Interestingly, the late 80’s early 90’s several saw several criminal incidents surrounding individuals with high level security clearances in the U.S. navy’s nuclear command and control structure were made public involving alcohol, drugs and psychiatric problems. Abrams (1991) draws a grave picture for the nuclear command and control structure discussing the security implications of substance abuse and psychiatric disorders even in situations of a two man rule or PAL’s that are supposed to inhibit unauthorized use. 45Sagan shows that in the case of crime there exists an 0.15 reduction of reliability per added bystander. He further addresses the issue in military units. Compare: Sagan (2004), P 939ff; also see Ghaffarzadegan (2008) 46Sagan (2004), P 943 50 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

may choose to attack a less formidable target.”47

Another problem of HRO theory involves the structure of the system at hand. HRO optimists and normal accidents proponents agree that military structures are the safest environment for high-risk technology, however, this poses some problems when it comes to decentralization. De- centralization, in contrast to HRO theory’s suggestion, does not make for a safer environment, but will automatically make more complex- and time-dependent decisions. Centralization, on the other hand, will create more tightly coupled systems. In the case of nuclear weapons, decision- making is supposed to be decentralized in order to be able to make quick decisions in case of a nuclear attack possible. But to achieve this, the system has to be very tightly coupled. This complex and tightly coupled structure increases the risk of accidents substantially. The same holds true for nuclear facilities, e.g. in the case of Chernobyl decentralization caused a decrease in overview, thus making it impossible to see all components of the whole system.

Thirdly, HRO theory claims that learning and training establishes a culture of reliability. Un- fortunately, high-risk system’s learning is often disturbed, prolonged or even prohibited. As the case of the first few months after the Chernobyl crisis have shown, analyzing the causes of an ac- cident has political implications.48 Strong political implications lead the direction for learning or inhibit further questioning of failures because of strong incentives against exposing serious fail- ures.49 A major restriction to organizational learning, is the fact that soldiers and officers as well as civilians in hierarchical organizations are educated in a system of clear hierarchies and rules, often leading to false loyalty to the organization, which could result in not reporting misconduct

47Carroll (2004), P 956 48Rhodes (2007) 49In the process of his analysis Sagan discovered four more characteristics that were coherent in the analysis of the Command and Control Structures of the U.S. nuclear weapons. The four characteristics he unearthed for the U.S. nuclear command and control structure are even more pessimistic than normal accident theory suggests. He argues that military structures tend to hide history of accidents. Besides the official goal of the organization lies a subsequent under-life to the institutions primary goal. Because of this superior officers tend to hide behavior in order to not contradict the institution. See: Sagan (1993), P 254 3.5 Combining organization and performance 51

Figure 3.2: Assessing safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material - model of the method

(own design) or failures.50 Functional theory would argue that any organization begins to implement certain functions regarded as secondary or even controversial to the organization. Self-preservation, or autopoesis as Luhmann calls it,m, will become a primary goal of any organization.51

A learning organizational culture is further called into question by the fact that military structures and similar organizations are often characterized by extreme high personnel mobility. Short- term positions and constant recruitment are the standard, not the exception, which weakens long- term stability and safety. Furthermore, civilian organizations often outsource components of their safety and security training, or even contract their whole security establishment, which further divides the expertise into subcomponents.52

50Interesting research in this field has been done by Pershing (2006) on hazing in military insitutions. 51Luhmann (2006) 52Westrum (2004), P 959 52 3 Theoretical Framework - Setting the stage

Regarding the fourth characteristic of HRO theory, it must be noted that anticipation and research must play a greater role in nuclear safety and security. However, few anticipation is really based on thorough research. Further, trial- and- error assessment is not free from political or organiza- tional bias either. The few incidents in the field often lead to wrong risk assessment that seldom involve realistic moves by a determined opponent.53

3.6 Putting it together

As it was shown above, normal accident theory provides a valuable background to the analysis of accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that there are some parallels between unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and fissile material protection, it does not quite apply the same way to fissile material. Nevertheless, safety and security of fissile material will be highly dependent on the measures taken to guarantee material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A).

Figure 3.2 outlines the method and path of causality in its entirety. First, the assessment of civil- ian dominance and threat environment will provide a glimpse at the organizational bias, which provides for an initial assessment of the organization’s safety and security interests. The inde- pendent variables civilian dominance and threat environment explain whether the organization or the state in charge of nuclear weapons and fissile material will be oriented towards a deterrence function of nuclear weapons with the military holding sway over the arsenal, asking for a more delegative system. Should the organization be threatened from the interior, and the civilians dominance over the nuclear arsenal and program (both civilian and military) is not threatened by any veto player, we expect the organization to hold more interest in securing and safeguarding the material and weapons, with a more assertive system of control.

Once this general bias of the organization has been established, it is possible to look at the

53Westrum (2004), P 959ff and Louis Anthony Cox (2008) 3.6 Putting it together 53 intervening variables by taking aperformance- based approach in assessing C3 I and MPC&A structures with normal accident theory in mind. By looking at India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear programs and their structures, it becomes possible to assess whether the independent variables are necessary or significant indicators, allowing us to assess nations on the basis of the domi- nance of the civilians and the threat environment. Should this not be the case, however, it will be possible to at least give some indicator on how nuclear command and control structures are built and expected to perform based on our intervening variables.

Should the test of the method be successful, it is possible to assess Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program using the same indicators, allowing a preliminary test on a contemporary proliferation case.

In essence this approach - if successful - forms a basis from which to examine nuclear prolif- erating countries and generate insights into the possible risks to nuclear material and nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, even when a state is not interested in nuclear weapons, but attempting to build their own fuel cycle, this allows for a general assessment of potential risks to nuclear facilities from technological or human failures, terrorist attacks as well as natural catastrophes. 54 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

Chapter 4

Safety and Security in the Republic of India

India tested its first nuclear device in a “peaceful explosion” in 1974, yet it wasn’t until the May 1998 tests that India manifested itself as a nuclear weapons state. Following Waltz’s argument, one should expect that India shares an inherent interest to safeguard its weapons with other NWS, however, many authors speak of a “lack of safety cultures” in South Asia at large.1 ‘Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani analyst and nuclear physicist, argued that for both India and Pakistan “safety has never been an overriding concern in driving cars and buses, in the disposal of toxic wastes, in the construction of buildings, and so forth. Why should we assume that it would be any different when it comes to building bombs?”2 India agreed under as part of the U.S.-Indo nuclear deal to the 2005 separation plan to to put eight civilian reactors under safeguards, in addition to the six already under safeguards.3 Even though India refused to join the NPT, sign neither the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) nor the Additional Protocols (AP), India is a member of the IAEA. Further, the IAEA and India have been cooperating on the field of nuclear safety and security. In 2002, India joined the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), in 2003 it conducted training courses with the IAEA in Security for Nuclear Installations. India agreed to conduct regular international training courses in India under the IAEA on issues related to physical security of radioactive materials.4 From an Indian perspective, apart from fuel delivery by the Nuclear Suppliers group (NSG), the

1Busch (2004), P 199 2Rajagopalan (2005), P 222 3India agreed to divide its nuclear program into a military and a civilian program. In a deal with the country’s building these six reactors, they were already under safeguards, further the fuel was provided by the country de- veloping the facility. All in all two thirds and thus 65 percent of Indias power generating reactors are under IAEA safeguards. for more information please see of IAEA (2009) 4see Basrur, Rajesh in Blechman (2009b), P 14 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization 55

gains for India from agreeing to the U.S.-Indo nuclear deal, are mostly symbolic.5 The seeming institutionalizing of India’s right to secure itself, acceptance by the superpowers, and the disman- tling of discriminatory arrangements on control of nuclear arms are all having positive effects on India.6

Regardless of the implications of the agreements with the IAEA or the United States, strategic and tactical changes take years to implement and even operational changes in the military take time. Thus, it is questionable how advanced India’s nuclear program is, and especially what the status quo of safety and security of India’s nuclear program is. This chapter will address these issues. In order to follow the method outlined above, this chapter will first look for an organiza- tional bias, which will provide a first assessment of what to expect in regards to nuclear safety and security. Following this, the performance of this organization in respect to C3 I and MPC&A will be examined. The chapter will then be concluded by a risk assessment for nuclear weapons and fissile material.

4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization

To correctly assess the organization’s outlook and bias, and subsequently its influence on nuclear safety and security, it is important to take a preliminary look at the driving force behind the de-

5The argument first published by Henry Sokolski that India’s indigenous uranium resources are nearing an end, and that the U.S.- India nuclear deal would thus help India in its quest for nuclear weapons has been seriously challenged by Ashley Tellis in a Carnegie Endowment publication: Atoms for War?. She argues convincingly that despite the fact that “India has the indigenous reserves of natural uranium necessary to create the largest possible nuclear arsenal it may desire and, consequently, the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation initiative will not materially contribute toward New Delhi’s strategic capacities in any consequential way either directly or by freeing up its internal resources.” Tellis (2006), P 37 6see Basrur, Rajesh in Blechman (2009b), P 10. For a discussion of the agreements effect on India’s nuclear program, please see Glaser and Mian (2008), P 168 ff., Kumar and Ramana (2008); Nautiyal (2008); Mian et al. (2006) 56 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

velopment of a nuclear program and of nuclear weapons and the organization in charge. This is as important to the process as taking India’s threat perception into account.7

4.1.1 Who’s in Charge of India’s Nuclear Program?

India’s nuclear program has traditionally been in the hands of the civilians and strongly con- trolled by New Delhi. The political supremacy was never challenged in India, partly because of the public’s broad support for the Indian Civil Service, the Congress party and quintessentially the political system.8 Cohen argues that “the structure of the Indian civil-military relationship is fundamentally sound becausefor most Indians [civilian and military] - the legitimacy of the political system remains high.”9

While the political system enjoyed broad support, the military has been met with distrust and residual suspicion, partly because it was closer attributed to the colonial power than the indige- nous Congress party. “Hence [political leaders] are reluctant to let armed forces expand their functions, roles and powers beyond a limited extend.”10 Figure 4.1 shows that the military is unlike in many other countries extremely separated from strategic decision making. The black- marked boxes are those exclusively military, while they report to the Secretary of Defense, they are not part of the Ministry of Defense. In fact, interests, requests or recommendations of the service chiefs are filtered by civil servants in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the overall bu- reaucracy, and thus always influenced by civilians before reaching the political decision-making

7It is important to note, that this paper will not discuss the historical or traditional heritage of nuclear weapons in neither case, nor will it go into details of civil-military relationships in India, as there are numerous articles and books dedicated to the issue. It does however focus on specific points important to the assessment of the organization in charge of the nuclear program and as such will point out several arguments the author finds worth mentioning in this context. 8It seems important to note that the Congress party under Nehru was identified with the political system for the first few decades after partition. 9Cohen (1990), P 227 10Blechman (2009b), P 6 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization 57 realm.This is especially important as budget and promotion decisions are made by the civilian staff of the MoD, enabling full positive control of the military.11

Figure 4.1: India’s higher Defense Hierarchy

(graphic designed by Tellis (2001), P 285)

Such a blockade of military leaders in strategic decision making, may seem odd in a country with nuclear weapons, but is no surprise when taking India’s foreign policy traditions into account. Jawaharal Nehru, while being committed to the defense of India, saw military spending and as such the procurement of a military as a ’necessary evil’.12 While necessary for the defense of the Indian nation, it was at odds with the belief about India’s role in the world. The most influential Indian school of thought - ’Nehruvians’ extended this thought to nuclear weapons, and perceive them to be a ’necessary evil’ intended as political resistance to an unequal global system. In

11Material control both regarding individual officers and the organization are two of the best measures to effec- tively control and sanction military organizations. see Tellis (2001), P 285ff for the Indian case 12Ganguly (1997) 58 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

contrast to the ever growing school of hyper-realists, they argue that nuclear weapons are at heart a political instrument, symbolizing prestige, technological prowess and political development.13 Indeed, it is interesting to note hat the widely circulated argument that ’India’s bomb had many fathers’, while being true, also shows that none of these fathers was connected to the military. The “Congress [party] conceived it, the United Front nurtured it, and the BJP delivered it.” 14 This is important, as the interests of many of these fathers might have been different, yet they all had few strategic interests in the weapon. This is one of the reasons, why Indira Ghandi was able to call the 1974 tests a peaceful detonation. In contrast to western understanding the nuclear tests were not primarily of strategic nature with a deterrent function, but rather had much more political implications. Without the reminder of India as a state calling for disarmament and the idea of nuclear weapons as solely of political use in an unstable world, it is simply inconceiv- able why India waited 24 years before backing its first detonation up with going nuclear.15 And even the discussions surrounding the 1998 tests, speak of India’s rational decision that a nuclear weapon combined with its landmass and the soon largest population on earth would factor in the attempt to gain a seat in the Security Council.16

In light of this, it comes as no surprise that, the “armed forces are [...] separated from the locus of national security decision making, they are even further removed from the nuclear weapons program.”17 While it can be argued that the military has some influence on strategic decision making through the weapons system acquisition process, they are mostly out of the loop.18 As Figure 4.2 shows in detail, the military is excluded from the Nuclear Command Authority, which only includes the Political Council and the Executive Council. Even the MoD has no connection to the program. The military, while not being in the decision making process of the NCA, is at

13Kraig (2003), P 7 14originally from A. S. Prakash, All Were Party to the Nuclear Gatecrash,” The Pioneer (Chandigarh), May 25, 1998. quoted from Kumar (2006), P 11 15India has always been a staunch vocal supporter of disarmament and non-proliferation, albeit refusing to sign the NPT. Please compare Basrur, Rajesh in Blechman (2009b) 16Wagner (2005), P 1 and Sridharan (2005), P 106 ff 17Tellis (2001), P286 18Davis (2009) 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization 59 least present with the Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee (CCSOSC) as advisor to the executive council. The order to launch a nuclear missile would thus go from the Prime Minister (PM) as the sole entity to authorize it over the executive council to the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). However, in a crisis situation the launch command can bypass the executive council and the Prime Minister can give orders directly to the SFC.19

Figure 4.2: India’s Nuclear Control Authority

(graphic from Kumar (2006), P 26)

While, the PM is the sole authorizing body for nuclear weapons use, he is influenced by a number of what Tellis calls complexes: the nuclear enclave involving the Atomic energy establishment,

19compare Kumar (2006), P 24 and Busch (2004), P196 60 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

the defense and development organizations and lastly India’s space program. The most impor- tant of these is certainly the first, which is centered around the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). According to Tellis, these organizations are suggesting more research, continued tests and refusing a moratorium on fissile material production. The defense and development agencies sing to similar tunes, calling for continued tests and the further development of delivery systems. The last complex, while not directly connected to the program, is, however, aiding the process by developing solid fuel rocket systems, which could be used as delivery systems for nuclear weapons.20 As for civilian atomic energy, India has called for the development of more reactors to bring its total nuclear energy production up to 10,000MW by 2030.21 These agencies men- tioned above, and political elites involved in the strategic field, influence the political parties and especially the prime minister for a more hardline nuclear posture in line with the ’hyper-realist’ school of thought. “However, actual policy choices are dominated by the autonomous interests of the Prime Minister in office, who while talking to the enclaves, the political elites and various parties have generally been acutely sensitive to the impact of nuclear issue on economic devel- opment and foreign relations precisely because these variables most affect the living conditions of the larger populace, and by extension the political survival of politicians.”22 What can be deemed certain from the above deliberations is that India’s civil-military relations clearly amounts to a state of civil- military partnership23 Despite some rural conflict zones and separatist activities in Kashmir, the state’s monopoly on physical violence is almost completely intact. Further, no extra- constitutional veto players oppose the government.24 Further, even nuclear expertise be it for weapons systems or for nuclear reactors is largely con- fined to the scientists involved in these programs. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) are traditionally in control of the

20Tellis (2001), P 91 ff 21Kumar and Ramana (2008) 22Tellis (2001), P 106 23This type of civil-military relations is characterized by civilian supremacy, strong civil institutions and civil society, distinguished military professionalism, which includes economic subservience. compare: Siddiqa (2007); Mani (2007) 24Stiftung (2008a) 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization 61 establishment, research and testing of nuclear warheads until now.25 According to India’s nuclear posture, in case of a crisis the DAE would hand the warheads over to the military, which would then be mounted to the delivery systems. The separation plan under the U.S.- India nuclear clear changed some of these facts by separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and putting the civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, drawing a clear distinction between civilian- power producing and military- strategic facilities.26 Even though the situation has changed, it is still evident that civilians maintain control of the nuclear weapons.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Indian nuclear program is clearly dominated and struc- tured by civilian interests, which would show the Indian system to be assertive. The reason for this is the role that the Indian political elite ascribes to nuclear weapons. And it further explains why India’s 1999 and 2003 nuclear posture review came to the conclusion that India was best served by gaining a credible minimal deterrence posture based on a no- first- use policy. It further explains why India took so long to develop adequate organizational procedures and the relative absence of dedicated command and control architecture.27 The nuclear posture India argued for contains the following arguments:

- building maintaining credible minimum deterrent

- posture of no-first-use

- retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian political leadership through NCA

- non use of nuclear weapons against non-NWS

- in the event of major attack against India or Indian forces by biological, or chemical WMD India will retain the option of retaliation with nuclear weapons

- continuance of controls of export of nuclear and missile related materials and technology.28

25Kumar (2006), P 28 26Glaser and Mian (2008), P 168 ff. 27Kraig (2003), P 8 28Salik (2004), P 188 62 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

In essence, India never thought of nuclear weapons as a weapon, but as a political message to be heard globally and regionally, it did not see any need to first incorporate the military in the process and second to develop SOP’s to apply this weapon. This clearly points towards an assertive nuclear system.

4.1.2 India’s Threat Environment

Chapter two already discussed the South Asian nuclear stalemate briefly, therefore this chapter will touch upon India’s strategic environment, focusing on India’s perception of its threat envi- ronment.

Basrur has identified four main themes in India’s security concerns: “[P]rotection of the nation’s security from external threats, internal consolidation of national identity, achievement of bal- anced economic growth, and creation of a stable democratic polity.29 Strategically, this includes three broad concerns. The first threat to India’s security clearly emanates from China.30 Despite a border dispute, China was not seen as detrimental to India’s security until the 1964 nuclear tests in China. The border dispute has not been resolved so far. The rivalry between both states, the clear nuclear superiority of China vis-a-vis` India does not convince of peaceful intentions between both countries, despite warming relations between the two nations over the last decade, and a loss of the once unrestrained support of China to Pakistan. The second threat is Pakistan, with which India fought four wars since partition (1947-48, 1965, 1971, 1999). Over the last six decades India has distrusted Pakistan, seeing it as a reckless, adventuristic state capable of nuclear blackmail and brinkmanship, essentially making it an “untrustable partner.” 31 Pakistan’s unstable civil military relations are making India hesitant to follow through on agreements with Pakistan, due to a fear of repercussions during the next coup. The third threat are numerous insurgencies on Indian heartland within the last decades and an ongoing Pakistan supported in- surgency within the Indian controlled part of Kashmir.

29Basrur in Blechman (2009b), P 1 30Please see Dittmer (2005) for more details. 31Krepon (2001), P 16ff 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization 63

With such a daunting external threat scenario, we should assume that India would logically follow a delegative system of control over its nuclear weapons.32 However, the opposite is true. Inter- estingly not the actual threat scenario but the perceived threat scenario is essential to a countries reactions towards these threats.

“In contrast with the Second World War and the Cold War, the [external] security threats faced by India have been of limited proportions. The territorial disputes with Pakistan and China do have tremendous symbolic importance, but they are hardly matters of national survival or of an all-or-nothing character.”33

The wars with India as well as with China were not existential wars, and neither the wars of 1947 and 1962 nor the Kargil crisis in 1998, were fought on the undisputed territory of either coun- tries.34 Despite clear indications of Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir insurgency, India’s Army fought a very restricted counterinsurgency campaign against Kashmiri insurgents, not in- volving Pakistan militarily. This fits Kraig’s argument that “[t]he principal security challenge

32Michael Desch argued that countries such as India with dual external and internal threats (as we will see in the next section) but primarily involved in internal fighting would establish volatile civil-military relations, with the military engaging in politics. However, this was never the case in India, the Indian military, unlike their Pakistani counterparts, were not involved in politics at all and were restricted to purely military functions. A great article on the difference between India’s and Pakistan’s Army has been provided by Staniland’s comparative study of India and Pakistan, asserting on the example of India, that although India faced numerous internal threats (while exter- nally threatened by China and Pakistan), and despite the military’s internal counterinsurgency deployment, civilian control was at no time endangered. Instead he argues that organizational military culture is a better explanation for explanation. The positive indoctrination was even going so far as to develop a military completely averse to intervention in politics. During the brief period of martial law under Indira Ghandi, the military refused to be used against political rivals of Ghandi. For more information see Staniland (2008) 33see Basrur in Blechman (2009b), P 6 34Arguably some Indian troops were advancing into Pakistani territory in 1965 and definitely “invaded” East Pakistan in 1971, yet these were wars limited both in terms of economic costs and casualties. In fact, India lost more troops and civilians to internal insurgencies than in all of these wars combined. Compare: Goswami (2009); Staniland (2008) 64 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

to India has historically been and remains the imposition and maintenance of internal order.”35 Thus, it can be concluded that despite the external threat environment of facing nuclear weapons in China and Pakistan, India has been primarily concerned with fighting insurgencies on its own territory, be it in Nagaland, the Sikh rebellion or in Kashmir. In light of this, it comes as no sur- prise that the nuclear posture of India so far was more concerned with a minimal deterrence and the political aspect of the weapon was stressed by Indian politicians above the military meaning.

Nevertheless calls for greater nuclear flexibility in the military are getting louder, the military as a whole is still restricted by civilian command.36 In fact, the top military brass still seem to follow Nehru’s logic of foreign affairs, and the military itself proposed the doctrine of Cold Start, which according to military sources is calling for the need to “build up forces that allow limited appli- cation of finely calibrated military pressure underneath the nuclear umbrella.”37 While focusing on internal threats to India’s stability, the Indian Army in part shifted strategy “from defensive to proactive, offensive responses to terrorism.”38 Air power as well as advanced ground fighting vehicles are supposed to deliver tactical success against Pakistan, without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines, which would thus allow a rollback or prevent Pakistani paramilitary offensives in Kashmir.39

4.1.3 India’s Assertive Organizational Bias

India’s organizational bias towards nuclear weapons and material can be placed in field 4 of ta- ble 3.3, making it a highly assertive system. One could therefore suspect that such an assertive system is not as accident prone as a delegative system. India clearly fits the attributes described to assertive systems in table 3.3. The military has little autonomy in general and no direct way

35Kraig (2003), P 19 36Tellis (2001)Chapter 2 37Kraig (2003), P 26 38Gen. (ret.) V. R. Raghavan, Indian Army quoted from Ferguson (2006), P 22ff; According to Raghavan this could include “punitive military actions such as air strikes against terrorist infrastructure and military forays to take out terrorist bases in Pakistani territory.” 39Kraig (2003), P 30 4.1 An assessment of India’s nuclear organization 65

of influencing the politics since it is not a official member of the NCA. It has, however, some leeway through the decision on weapons procurement, even though this is mitigated by civilian control in the MoD. Thus, civilians clearly enforce obedience with full budget and material con- trol over the organization and its members. Further, the branches are separated, which enables inter- service rivalry as checks and balances on the armed forces. As for custody and stockpile ar- rangements, the weapons remain unassembled, plus the material and the delivery means are kept in separate locations. This represents a simple but effective measure against accidental, inadver- tent and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, but provides for a risk of decapitation. Civilian facilities to a degree cooperate with the IAEA, which at least on paper argues for clear goals and ways of securing and safeguarding the civilian facilities, which hopefully will have a certain spillover effect on the security of nuclear weapons. India’s perception of its weapons, as a polit- ical tool, and not a tool of coercion or military might fits well with an assertive system, focused on security and safety threats as opposed to primarily deterrence and a quick reaction to an attack in the case of nuclear weapons. While an “assertive command and control systems can increase the dangers of pre-emption by creating an incentive for the adversary to conduct a decapitating first strike early in the crisis”, a delegative system is more prone to accidental unauthorized or inadvertent use.40Therefore, should India really go through with developing mobile systems, this would greatly exacerbate current regional problems as well as problems of control.41

However, with the above examination we only concluded what to expect from India’s nuclear command and control system and from its safety and security structures with regard to nuclear facilities. The next step is to see whether the available data on India’s case shows this assessment to be correct. Accordingly, the paper will evaluate the performance of C3 I and MPC&A and investigate whether the organizational bias has an effect on nuclear safety and security.

40Rajagopalan (2005), P 228 41Rajagopalan (2005), P 221 66 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

4.2 India’s C3 I performance

As argued above India has a rather assertive system in place. However, a performance test should be undertaken to see if the organization is performing as expected from its nuclear posture. Be- fore looking at India’s performance in regards to nuclear material this section will look at C3 I of nuclear weapons first. On the first glance it seems as if India, does not perform to well in regards to nuclear safety and security of nuclear weapons. The nuclear situation in South Asia has been called a “ramshackle deterrence” by some Indian scholars.42 India has had quite some accidents in its nuclear facilities and has been known for flaws in its military technology. One of the reasons for this is the fact that India relied heavily on indigenous technologies. As in the case of the nuclear weapon, India takes great pride in having developed their own defense tech- nologies. But “frequent accidents, substandard designs, poor maintenance and unsafe operations have been characteristic for Indian military and even civilian technologies.43

4.2.1 Command

As shown in figure 4.2 the command structure is highly assertive with no independent channels and almost no autonomy to the military. In fact the military is not able to use its bureaucratic weight with the civilians. Further, despite an interest in mobile launching systems, which would increase the risk of inadvertent and unauthorized as well as accidental launch of a nuclear mis- sile, the civilian strategic community thus far has not decided to upgrade its posture. “India’s command and control arrangements reflect the shortcomings of its nuclear development, plan- ning, decision-making, and doctrine. Although there has been recent progress to operationalize nuclear capabilities, current command and control measures are embedded in a system of very complex political and bureaucratic structures. India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in- volves elaborate arrangements among many high-level political figures, raising questions about

42Busch (2004), P 199 43Busch (2004), P 199 4.2 India’s C3 I performance 67

the efficacy of the system to produce timely decisions. ”44 Yet, especially because of these per- ceived shortcomings, it is obvious that the Indian command system through its assertive character is inherently safer than a delegative system. “The typical security perspective would consider a delay in response as losing the advantage in terms of responding to the threat. However, a de- lay in response is critical to safety, security and avoiding accidental exchange or misperceptions of actions.” 45 A delay in response means a system of more complex interactions but does not include tight coupling. This is clearly adding safety to the system. As mentioned before, Sagan’s analysis of the U.S. case has clearly shown that mobile delegative systems such as the U.S. system increase the risk of inadvertent use through computer failures or unclear satellite signals, of accidental use through the high lethality of a mated system and of unauthorized use, due to the accessibility to the weapons of “several dozen military commanders.”46 for more detail. “Dispersed forces are seen to require more a delegative command and control system because of ’connectivity’ problems. As forces are dispersed in remote areas, they are likely to be away from secure communications, and thus not easily accessible to the NCA or vice versa.”47

Thus, we can conclude that in regards to the command system, India has taken clear steps to provide for a safer and more secure system. However, as it seems from the above assessment and the fact that India needed 5 years to come up with an adequate system of command and control that this step was not deliberate and occurred more likely due to consensus on the strategic ability of nuclear weapons and on the contrary a lack of political pressure to mount a more delegative system.48 It must not be forgotten, however, that an assertive command and control system can in fact increase the danger of decapitation of the nuclear system, due to its character as being only used in a LAA posture.49

44Davis (2009), P 4 45Khan (2005), P 171 46Granted, the number of commanders in charge will be smaller than in the U.S. case due to the significantly smaller size of the arsenal, yet the same problem will occur. See: Rajagopalan (2005), P 225 47Rajagopalan (2005), P 221 48compare Davis (2009), P 3 49see Rajagopalan (2005), P 228 68 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

4.2.2 Control

With regards to India’s control system, it is evident that the assertive system, based on LAA, provides civilians with adequate time to decide in case of a nuclear attack. This is helping to reduce risks of accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. However, until the separation plan the nuclear weapons were stored entirely by civilians, giving the military no possibility to train or maintain the weapons. This can be regarded as safeguarding act in peace, but during a situation of heightened tensions, lack of expertise on maintenance can in- crease the risk of inadvertent use. However, the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine called for a nuclear triad of air- sea and land based nuclear forces and a minimal deterrence. This kind of posture would demonstrate Indian restraint while providing a deterrence capability vis-a-vis` both China and Pakistan.”50 Air Force Commodore Jasjit Singh has for a while been calling for a quicker response time in nuclear weapons delivery. While maintaining a Launch after Attack posture (LAA) he suggests immediate retaliation “with adequate power to inflict an unacceptable level of punishment and destruction on the aggressor.” 51 These strikes are, according to Singh, sup- posed to be launched within 30 minutes after the attack during heightened state of affairs and within two hours in regular case of no heightened tensions.52 Such a delayed but assured de- struction’ posture still provides India with time to think about a retaliatory attack, but it cals for more complex and tightly coupled system. time to think about a retaliatory strike, increasing the risk of accidents in the system.53

50Salik (2004), P 194 51Kraig (2003), P 4; for a great overview of possible nuclear postures in regards to India and its implications please see Tellis (2001)Chapter 2 52ibid. 53This tendency is mirrored in Indian defense aquisition. Over the next years, India is expected to spend $2 billion a year on the strategic forces infrastructure. Until now India has heavily relied on Aircraft as delivery means.Current aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons in the Indian arsenal are the Mirage 2000H, jaguar IS, Mig 27, Sukhoi Su-30MKI. Newer platforms will be available with the expansion of the Indian Airforce. Yet, recent years have seen a remarkable advance in ballistic missiles.The Prithvi 1 with a range of 150km is deployable. The medium range Agni I (970km), the Agni II (2000km) are both claimed to be inducted. Development of Agni II (3000km) and a cruise missile, which have been tested, shows apprehensions for an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability. Successful tests of the Dhanush and Prithvi III proof the development of India’s sea-based defense 4.2 India’s C3 I performance 69

When it comes to physical control of nuclear weapons India has stepped up efforts to provide enhanced security for its facilities. Dual-use facilities like the research reactors CIRUS and DHRUVA, used by military and civilians alike are safeguarded by the military. The paramilitary Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) as well as the Border Security Force assists the mili- tary in its efforts to provide security for storage and construction facilities. However, physical security efforts are relying to a great degree on 3G’s This might prove adequate for small nuclear arsenals in a de-mated state, but becomes highly problematic in a unstable state or in regards to infringements on the state monopoly on violence by terrorist groups. As such, the current physical protection system in place is highly inadequate.54 India has some technology like portal monitors and motion sensors in place for this matter, nevertheless it can only be hoped that the U.S.- India deal as well as aid by the IAEA provide some kind of spillover effect on the safety and security of nuclear weapons.55

It must be noted however, that in the current state of storage, terrorist organization could only acquire nuclear material but not assembled warheads or the delivery system. The obvious an- swer to such a threat is to increase guards. Yet, as chapter three noted, increasing guards adds redundancy, which might in fact increase the possibility of common-mode errors, such as social shirking. Also with an increase in personnel involved in the nuclear command and control system the possibility of insider threat increases significantly.56 part. In November 2006, India also ran tests on its early missile warning and missile defense capabilities. Missiles intercepting a Prithvi Missile simulating an attack on Indian territory have also been tested. for more information seeEditor (2007), P 74-78 and Basrur in Blechman (2009b), P 11 54“Four Pakistani pan-Islamic organizations, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkut- ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), which are active in India, have joined Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF), which formed in 1998.” All of these terrorist groups have safe havens in Pakistan and Pakistani goverment official as well as the military helped create and nourish these groups. compare Ferguson (2006), P 20; Also see Malik (2004), P 180 55Enhancing security features might require portal monitors, scanners, barriers and so on, which might in fact decrease safety due to stricter procedures and affects the accessibility of the facility. for a more detailed description of such problems please see Khan (2005), P 170ff and Khan (2009); Khripunov (2005) 56seeSagan (2004); Ferguson (2006); Sagan (1993) 70 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

With regard to actual control of the missiles, the current Agni and Prithvi generation are liquid fuel based missile systems. These cannot be stored due to the fact that they cannot be de-fueled once weaponized and fueled. Further, the navigation system is most probable still inertial, lead- ing to the problem that in the case of a launch the missiles path cannot be altered and the missile itself cannot be destroyed. This clearly increases the risk to accidental, unauthorized and inad- vertent use.57

4.2.3 Communication

Communication in a delegative system is one of the most crucial components to security and safety of nuclear weapons.58 As India has a rather assertive system in place this does not pose such a great risk to safety and security. However, India’s NCA, with all its benefits on effective control of the armed forces and its deliberate delayed posture, is highly effective on the strategic level, but lacks the corresponding operational and tactical modes. For example, the communi- cation problems are exacerbated by the fact that India’s Commander in Chief of the Strategic Forces Command (C -in C SFC) has no own delivery means, relying respectively on the nuclear delivery means developed for the three branches of India’s Armed Forces. Unfortunately they all developed own intelligence and communications structures around their nuclear capabilities, making a homogenized functioning C3 I impossible.59 While a single command line from the PM to the C -in C SFC decreases the risk of unauthorized use considerably, it in fact increase risks to accidental and inadvertent use. This would be greatly magnified by a decision to upgrade India’s nuclear system to a LOW posture. “Local commanders who detect an incoming attack will have little time to react and poor threat interpretation could make them assume the worst. They will certainly not have time to consult the NCA for a decision.”60

57Compare Nicolli and Johnston (2009) 58As Sagan has shown communication glitches such as faulty conducters or computer chips can cause a signifi- cant amount of false warnings, which increased the risk of inadvertent use in a highly responsive system. 59seeKumar (2006) 60Rajagopalan (2005), P 224 4.2 India’s C3 I performance 71

4.2.4 Intelligence

India’s Intelligence system so far has not been a model for its kind. Some scholars have com- mented on a lack of “robust early warning and threat assessment systems in place to detect and respond to missile attacks.”61 The Brassstacks maneuver as well as the 1999 Kargil crisis are proof of the lax military intelligence system. Indian intelligence services did not detect detect Pakistani military forces on the Indian controlled side of the Line of Control in Kashmir for months.62 Such failures are driving acquisitions in Signal intelligence. India confirmed to have aquired the Israeli ‘GREEN PINE’ radar system, and further invested in imaging satellites and geosyn- chronous satellites. However, the detection capability of these systems is greatly inhibited. For one, the flight time of a missile can be as low as 300 seconds if the ballistic missile is launched with a depressed trajectory. This leaves only 200 seconds for identification and response.63 Sec- ond, similar restrictions apply to imaging and geosynchronous satellites. Sun flares, clouds in high altitudes (sometimes of up to 10km above ground) are decreasing the early warning capabil- ity of geosynchronous satellites. Imaging satellites which cannot be locked, are only providing still images, which can give images of the build up of facilities but are giving few clues about mobile launchers or even show a launch. “The earliest that a missile on a depressed trajectory could be detected [with a geosynchronous satellite] might be about half a minute to a minute after launch, provided India [...] had the appropriate infrared sensors on early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit.” 64 It is obvious that such a short time span even when adequately iden- tified a minute after launch does neither give enough time for a responsive decision nor barely for missile defense measures. Furthermore, as Sagan has shown convincingly, computer glitches

61Rajagopalan (2005), P 221 62Ganguly and Hagerty (2005); Busch (2004) 63Radar systems similar to GREEN PINE, like PAVE PAW or PATRIOT need, due to their restrictive view below three degrees to the horizon, about 110 seconds after launch to safely identify a ballistic missile. Compare Mian, Rajaraman and Ramana (2003), P 124 64Mian, Rajaraman and Ramana (2003), P 131 72 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

were often the cause for false warnings. As such, even the Indian system is relatively restricted when it comes to adequate early warning system. Currently the only safeguarding factor against inadvertent use is India’s LAA posture, focusing on delayed but assured destruction. This gives India enough time to assess a perceived nuclear attack.

The current Indian intelligence system provides for little risk of inadvertent use due to mis- information or false warnings. It also increases the safety of the nuclear weapons itself, since accidental and unauthorized use are less likely if the system is less tightly coupled. This is clearly the case, as their is adequate time to consider possible options between warning, attack and re- taliatory strike. While this resembles a less than perfect defensive capability, it does however, decrease the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.

4.3 India’s MPC&A performance

After having examined the risks of accidents or inadvertent and unauthorized usage of nuclear weapons this section will try to examine the risks to nuclear fissile material. In order to do so, it will be useful to examine the safety and security of the nuclear reactors in general, which will be followed by a gross examination of the Indian MPC&A structures in place. For an list of Indian nuclear installations please see 8.2 and 8.1 in the Appendix. This chapter will try to discern the performance of India’s MPC&A structures. It must be noted that in regards to nuclear security, especially against nuclear terrorism, many of the same difficul- ties arise as with nuclear weapons. However, while the means to secure them might be similar, threats differ slightly.

4.3.1 Material Protection

The MPC&A system in India seems to be dependent on institutional design, instead of proce- dural designs. Protection of the fissile material is largely based on physical protection. Thus, India’s nuclear facilities and its material is physically secured by the CISF and the BSF basing 4.3 India’s MPC&A performance 73

their protective system on the 3G’s.65 This indicates the continued interest of Indian politicians to keep the nuclear system under a tight watch, outsourcing is only permitted to other govern- ment agencies providing security, independent from the DAE. However, a system based on 3G’s does not prove adequate in states with some breach of the state’s monopoly on violence such a system is highly risky. Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that India installed portal monitors, movements detectors, intrusion alarms and magnetic cards and is claimed to use special forces as backup in order to protect their reactors. Reports speak even of the development of a fingerprint system to secure access.66 There seem to be doubts about adequate performance testings and ratings of Indian physical protection systems.

Such risks could increase as New Delhi proposed to develop 11,000 MWe by 2010 and 29,000 MWe by 2020.67 Increase in production capability and reactors, needs to be followed by consid- erable increase in technical and security personnel. However, more personnel, especially as India is procuring different designs of nuclear reactor, could amount to inadequate operator training due to due to over-stretching of capabilities. Thus, it could complicate management and increase vulnerabilities to various modes of attack.68 Furthermore, personnel as Sagan has shown, in- crease the risk of insider threat. Risks such as the above are likely due to over-stretching of the personnel at the sites, especially at huge hubs of plants.

Reactor safety itself is also a concern. All nine Indian nuclear power plants in operation in 1996 have been ranked among the 50 least reliable reactors in the world.69 This has changed some- what. While some reactors are relatively safe, such as the CANDU design(Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor), which includes safety features such as two thermo- hydraulic loops, an un-

65The BSF, was appointed to create a battalion with special skills pertaining to nuclear, biological and chemical threats. It has been reported as well that the DAE and CISF undertook several security drills in the past. See: Ferguson (2006), P 24 66Busch (2004), P 216 67Ferguson (2006), P 3 68Ferguson (2006), P3 69Busch (2004) 74 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

derground spent fuel pool, or double-domed containment structure, other designs such as the Russian VVER-1000 reactor do not show such safety features. Further, India currently develops a fast breeder reactor which are by themselves very accident prone to core disruptive accidents (CDA) or other accidents. In many countries fast breeder reactor types have been suspended due to safety concerns (e.g. the SNR-300 reactor in Kalkar, Germany).70 Inadequate regula- tory oversight has been widely noticed. India’s Atomic Energy Regulation Board has identified over 130 safety issues, but instead of addressing the issues, the DAE forbid the Atomic Energy Regulation Board access to the nuclear facilities in 2003.71 Several incidents occurred in re- gards to India’s nuclear reactors. In 1995, huge amounts of cooling water drained from a storage block containing uranium fuel rods. In 1991 the Dhruva reactor worked for almost a month on a malfunctioning emergency cooling system.72 Another problem facing India’s nuclear material protection, is the inadequate protection of spent fuel storage pools due to accumulating too much spent fuel. Evidently the the pool at Tarapur-1 was initially designed to store at most 72 tons of spent fuel. But according to the International Nuclear Safety Center, this pool contains more than twice that amount.73 Radioactivity in such pools can climb very high, why it is relatively safe from nuclear theft, yet a nuclear attack would have devastating effects.

4.3.2 Control and Accounting

When it comes to Material Control and Accounting (MPC&A) there’s evidence that India does not have a working system in place that would overview the flow of material, provide access for taking samples or even have designated measurement points.74 These systems are needed to provide accurate accounting and quality control of the fissile material. For example India’s

70For more information on such accidents please see Ferguson (2006), Mian et al. (2006), P 118ff and Kumar and Ramana (2008), P 88ff 71Busch (2004) 72Busch (2004), P200 73Spent fuel pools are tanks filled with water in which you discharged nuclear fuel is stored, before being repro- cessed or transferred to dry storage casks. See: Ferguson (2006), P 10. 74Busch (2004), P218 4.4 Risk assessment 75

reliance on bulk processing of Plutonium, can “increase the risk of diversion of this bomb-usable material.”75 Such a diversion can be circumvented by keeping Plutonium embedded in spent fuel, which as in the case of the spent fuel pools a highly effective radiological barrier against nuclear theft.

Several incidents in India show that despite some influx in technology Indian fissile material ac- counting is still disconcerting.The Bhabba Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the control agency for distribution of fissile material for civilian purposes, has managed to loose count of x-ray us- able fissile material. This incident is not the first of its kind. In the year 2000, for example two Indian men were arrested for attempted smuggle of fifty-seven pounds of uranium that was un- accounted for. The material, which was issued to a hospital as X-ray material, was unaccounted for by the BARC after closure of the hospital.76

4.4 Risk assessment

India’s domestic structure of civil-military relations and subsequently its threat perception prove to be directly linked to its C3 I system. The strong civilian control of the nuclear arsenal as well as the strong civil authority over the military are successful in removing the military from the decision-making process as well as until recently from the nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Com- mand Authority highlights political supremacy. Further, the threat environment is focused on internal threats. Despite disputes with China and open hostility towards Pakistan, these threats do not convince the strategic community of the need to change the nuclear posture to a more delegative stance. As nuclear weapons are seen as a political tool, there is little need to milita- rize them, by weaponizing or even deploying them. The C3 I system thus mirrors this assertive system. Strong control by the government, no outsourcing of security establishments provide for relative low levels of risk from accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use. However, this security is not paramount. In fact as the above assessment has shown, India’s C3 I system is

75Ferguson (2006), P 4 76Busch (2004), P 220 76 4 Safety and Security in the Republic of India

safeguarded from these risks to its nuclear weapons due to its demated posture.

However, small changes in the system to a more delegative approach, like using mobile launch pads, or reframing its posture, would increase risks to C3 I significantly. The reliance of 3G’s for physical protection is inadequate in any system but does not provide enough security against attacks on a mated and weaponized weapons. Despite claims that the nuclear assets are safe from terrorist access, the structure does not prove convincing in regard to its general safety. Risks of accidents and inadvertent use are until now relatively low due to the disassembled state of the nuclear weapons, but India’s discussion on changing its posture are worrying in this respect. In the case of a change in posture the risk of accidents, unauthorized use and inadvertent use will increase exponentially due to the assembled state and thus easier launch, which is exacerbated by the inadequate early warning system and the reliance on solid fuel ballistic missiles.“The imme- diate task is to put in place effective command, control, communication, and intelligence systems in South Asia. India and Pakistan on their own may eventually evolve indigenous systems, but backward technology in this important component of the nuclear deterrence infrastructure may generate numerous risks of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In making their weapons safe” 77 India’s co-operation with the IAEA as well as the U.S. on nuclear issues, will probably bring more sophisticated intelligence and control technology to India. With such sys- tems in place the reluctance to change the current LAA posture India’s weapons would be fairly safe and secure from accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use.

However, there seems to be no direct link between an assertive system and MPC&A. Loose safety standards, despite international agreements, and few security features provide for the pos- sibility of accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear material. While risks from major accidents are mitigated through IAEA safeguards, risks of spread of radioactivity through faulty storage of spent fuel or design failures are likely. Insider threats and social shirking are but two of the examples of how the available features increase the risk of unauthorized use, nuclear theft or

77Rais (2005), P169 4.4 Risk assessment 77 nuclear terrorism. This is exacerbated by lax structures of control and accounting, making In- dia’s nuclear material and facilities very accident prone and increases the risk to safety of these facilities.

Arguably the agreements with the IAEA and the U.S. Indo will most likely bring further tech- nology and most important expertise on safeguarding nuclear facilities and material as well as knowledge about securing these facilities to India, which in effect will probably have a spill-over effect on safety and security of India’s strategic nuclear program. Therefore, the coming years will be interesting to see how much impact these nuclear agreements will have on safety and se- curity of India’s nuclear program. Hopefully the IAEA and U.S. support will make tremendous changes in this respect. 78 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Chapter 5

Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Pakistan’s nuclear program began in earnest in co-operation with the United States under the Atoms for Peace program, with the development of a research reactor. The first nuclear power plant, a PHWR of the CANDU design with 125MWe (KANUPP), began operation in 1972. An- other 300MWe power plant, the Chasma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP I), was designed by China at Chasma and began operating in 2001. CHASNUPP II, a second 325MWe reactor of Chinese design is about to be completed at Chasma.1 Due to energy shortages and supply deficits Pakistan plans to extend the role of nuclear power in its energy portfolio and thus signed a contract with the Chinese for the construction of two 340MWe reactors in April 2009 (CHAS- NUPP III and CHASNUPP IV). With regard to Pakistan’s nuclear reactors it is important to note that currently only 2.4% of Pakistan’s electricity is produced by nuclear power plants.2 But it is highly unlikely that due to a lack of resources and budget that more nuclear power plants can be built than the ones already in construction at Chasma.3 Stephenson argues that even if Pakistan is able to increase nuclear powers share in the energy portfolio, “it will not be likely to constitute a significant contribution to the overall mix.4

The fact that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear reactors, while at the same time terrorists are stepping up the amount and level of attacks makes it clear that nuclear security in Pakistan is at

1Mian et al. (2006), P 120ff 2Only the Canadian KANUPP reactor and the Chinese CHASNUPP I reactor are currently producing energy. Two research reactors near Rawalpindi are also in operation, however they are not producing energy. Compare: Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 15 3See beginning of this chapter 4Stephenson and Tynan (2008), P 7 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization 79 risk.5 Reports of Ali Asif Zaradari’s government failing and lacking support, only one year after taking over the presidency from General Musharraf, are not reassuring in this respect.6 As Michael Krepon argues: “Pakistan’s domestic cohesion is being stressed by several separate but mutually reinforcing factors, including the strains generated by prolonged military rule, the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the difficulties generated by being an ally of the Bush administration in its war on terror.”7 All these factors are not supporting General Zafar Ali’s claim that the Pakistani nuclear assets are safe and secure.8 The following chapter will try to examine the risks for nuclear safety and security in Pakistan. As with the Indian case the analysis will begin with an assessment of the organization in charge of nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities, followed by a test of the performance of this organization in regards to C3 I and MPC&A structures.

5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization

5.1.1 Who’s in Charge of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program?

Pakistan’s civil-military relations were fragile from the start. While being carved out of the same entity as India, Pakistan faced numerous problems. According to Stephen Cohen Pakistan pos- sesed great assets upon its birth in 1947. It boasted a “strong bureaucratic and legal tradition”; an “unthreatening military”; a “powerful uniting figure”in Jinnah; and an “important strategic position”.9 But, despite these assets Pakistan was also burdened with a number of disadvantages,

5The Oct. 2009 attacks on the General Headquarter of the Army (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, the suicide attack on the Kamra airbase in Dec 2007, the August 2008 attack on an armament complex in the Wah cantonment as well as the insurgency in the FATA are just some examples of Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation. for more information please see: Gregory (2009), P 3 6Shanker and Sanger (2009) 7Krepon (2009), P 47 8According to Ali, the real danger to South Asia would be the integration of more sophisticated weapon systems, which would bring upon a arms race between India and Pakistan. Compare: Ali (2007) 9Cohen (2004), P 40 80 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

which challenged its territory, its sovereignty and its legitimacy.10 This was made worse by the fact that of the 1’400 people strong Indian Civil Service, only 80 followed to Pakistan, making adequate coping with these problems almost impossible.

These challenges led to a reliance on the military as the only organization capable of providing basic needs. In contrast to India, neither the civil service nor the politicians were able to under- mine the autonomy of the military and in effect even helped the military to increase its power. By 1985, the military had first assumed direct power under General Ayub Khan, and until 2008, Pakistan had seen three more military dictatorships.11 This reliance has manifested itself in the political system. The BTI country report 2008 exemplifies that: “No elected civil government since 1988 has succeeded in serving out the whole of its electoral term, due to the strong posi- tion of veto actors (i.e., military, bureaucracy, wealthy land owners and tribal leaders). Despite these reservations, there is a functioning and flourishing civil society in Pakistan, especially in the cities.”12 During the last six decades, the military has managed to institutionalize itself in power, through a number of changes to the constitution.13 An important aspect has been the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) under Musharraf.14 With vast control of the political, social

10Cohen (2004), P 42 ff also seeGregory and Revill (20080301), These structural impediments were magnified by the consequences the new state of Pakistan faced as a product of partition: mass migration, which changed the power balance in the West Wing; ineffective leadership in the Muslim league as the newly migrated politicians did not have a power base in the provinces; as well as ethnic cleansing on both sides of the border are only some of the problems the young state had to deal with. See: Cohen (2004), P 41 11for more information please see Cohen (2004); Haqqani (2005); Siddiqa (2007) 12Stiftung (2008b), P 6 13This institutionalized character of the military is not only visible through the 8th amendment to the constitu- tion, which included Article 58 (2) b. This article is famous in Pakistan as it allows the president to dissolve the government, become supreme commander of the armed forces and appoint the heads of the services and the chair- man of the Joint Staff Services Committee. In the 1990’s article 58 (2) b was used to oust both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from power. See: Siddiqa (2007) for more details. 14The National Security Council is comprised of the President (chairman), the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, the Chief Ministers of the Provinces, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of Staff of the Pakistan 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization 81 and economic life it is not surprising that the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan is practically administered by the military. While the civilian leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began the nuclear weapons program as an answer to India’s invasion in East Pakistan (today Bangladesh), the mil- itary quickly took the reigns over the nuclear program.15 The military’s entrenchment is clearly visible in the set up of the National Command Authority (NCA) of Pakistan, which “formulates national nuclear strategy, is in charge of the development of all nuclear armed forces and is re- sponsible for nuclear target planning - personnel decisions, also decision making body on nuclear disarmament and arms control, export controls and ensure security of the nuclear installations, including nuclear material stored there.”16 Unlike in India, where the military is not part of the NCA, Pakistan’s National Command Authority is basically staked by the military as figure 5.1 shows.17

The positioning of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee (C-JCSC), the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Chief of Navy Staff (CNS) as well as the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) in both committees is remarkable. Additionally, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) enjoys traditionally more power than the chairman of JCSC or even the Ministry of Defense.18

Army, Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force. Its functions are consultation to the government on national security, sovereignty, defense, security of the state and crisis management. The establishment of the NSC is generally seen as institutionalizing the military’s power in domestic and foreign politics. Compare: Siddiqa (2007), P 18 15Nevertheless it has to be noted that unlike western nuclear states the Pakistani military, due to being so en- trenched in the executive of Pakistan, was also the leading force behind the nuclear research and still controls the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Compare: Khan (2009), P 12 16Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 11; The role of the NCA was institutionalized in Dec 2007, by then President Musharraf in the National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007 which thus gave it legal basis. 17The Employment Control Committee, is a quasi “politico-military committee” comprised of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (usually always a Army General), the service chiefs and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, interior as well as finance. The Development Control Committee is a “military-scientific” committee and comprised of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, service chiefs the head of strategic organizations and scientists. See: Salik (2004), P 196 18Siddiqa (2007), P61-62 82 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Figure 5.1: Pakistan’s National Command Authority

19

( Red boxes indicate positions of the military - Graphic from Salik (2004), P 26) - As of Nov 2008, the President has ceded his responsibility within the NCA to the Prime Minister 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization 83

This dominance of the Army is further visible through the fact that the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which works as the Secretariat of the NCA is located within the GHQ, and headed by an ret. Lt. Gen of the Army.20 An important restraint to the graphic is that as of Nov. 29th 2009 President Zardari has ceded chairmanship of the NCA to Prime Minister Syed Yousouf Raza Gilani. 21 The role of civilians in the NCA is prohibited by the fact that the PM is not the final author- ity to launch a nuclear strike, as “this requires consensus within the NCA”22 Larsen accurately notes that: “The bifurcation of civilian and military roles seems to have been left deliberately ambiguous under the NCA; certain responsibilities that nominally have been given to the civilian leadership may be carried out by the military. [...] For example, the Pakistan civilian leadership, especially if a more extreme government assumed power, might issue orders or make statements concerning the status and control of nuclear forces, contradicting those made by the Pakistani military commander-in-chief.”23

This dominance of the military clearly translates into the perception of nuclear weapons. It comes as no surprise that the strategic dialogue about nuclear weapons in Pakistan has always been dominated by the military and especially by the strategic focus of the military. Unlike in India, Pakistani nuclear weapons are not a matter of dispute between civilians and military, as a retired Pakistani Brigadier General has commented: “There’s only one thing in Pakistan on which everyone agrees, and that’s nuclear weapons.”24 While India poses an emphasis on “nuclear” aspect in nuclear weapons, Pakistan is clearly focusing on the “weapons”. However, nuclear weapons are perceived to be a strategic instrument, not a tactical one, and therefore guarantee

20Basically the SPD is taking care of day to day business of the NCA, reporting directly to the Prime Minister and President. The personnel is entirely comprised of about fifty officers within the GHQ. Compare: Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 11; His functions include “formulating Islamabad’s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons.”Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 8 21Shanker and Sanger (2009) 22Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 8 23Mowatt-Larsen (2009), P 4 24quoted from Davis (2009), P 3 84 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

deterrence and not dominance in warfare. This explains why nuclear parity is not a necessary goal for Pakistan to achieve, as the perception of nuclear weapons as deterrence instrument does not precipitate the need for a nuclear arms race.25

Unlike in India however the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is not dependent on an ideological discourse. Pakistan does not use nuclear weapons as a political tool to follow global or even regional ambitions, and as such they cannot be defined through ideological or political goals, but instead are elucidated in clear realist terms of defense vis-a-vis` India.26

5.1.2 Pakistan’s Threat Environment

Pakistan’s threat environment is rather simple: “Pakistan’s nuclear policy guidelines are security driven and are specific to the perception of threats that emanate from India. Its nuclear capability is solely for the purpose of deterrence of aggression and defence of sovereignty.”27 Pakistan’s strategic emphasis is and has always been focused on India.28 Yet, in recent years, the feeling of Indian encirclement even increased, due to India’s growing involvement in Afghanistan.29 As reaction on the Kargil crisis, as well as, the 2001-2002 border dispute, India began the devel- opment of the Cold Start doctrine, which calls for quick but decisive actions against Pakistan without crossing its nuclear red lines.30 The build up and acquisition of new fighter planes and

25Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 9 26please compare Blechman (2009a), P 9 ff 27Khan (2008), P 1 28It is important to note that Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan has been for the same cause, gaining strategic depth against India and diminishing Afghanistan’s close ties to India. compare Khan (2007) After 9/11 this notion of strategic depth has changed and is no longer relevant in the Pakistani security calculus, due to the lack of envisioning such a strategy in a western occupied country. compare Blechman (2009a), P10 ff 29India opened two consulates in Afghanistan close to the Pakistani border in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistan believes these to be a means of running covert operations inside Pakistan and thus fueling the insurgency, both in Baluchistan and the FATA. please see Fair (2008), P 209 ff 30Increase of armored and mechanized troops in India are regarded as clear indication of plans against Pakistan. compare Khan (2007), P 9 Logically armored divisions are not of any use against China, as the “terrain that borders China would make maneuver warfare nearly impossible.” see Blechman (2009a), P16 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization 85 the development of a deep sea navy is also seen negatively in Pakistan. Peter Lavoy argued that by improving conventional military capabilities India would achieve technical superiority” in In- telligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) as well as precision targeting, which in effect could provide India with “the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan.”31 Retired General Feroz Hassan Khan sums Pakistan strategic choices up:

“Weak states, like Pakistan, confronting threats to their existence, have several fun- damental options to survive. They can ’bandwagon’ by accepting another’s domi- nance and appease the powers making threats against it. Alternatively, they can seek to balance ’internally’ by relying on their own military capabilities or ’externally’ by relying on the military capabilities of allies. A third possibility is to involve inter- national institutions like the UN and World Bank to help alleviate security concerns and resolve conflicts.”32

Yet, Pakistan’s chance of external balancing has deteriorated significantly. Since the 1971 war, Pakistan has learned to not rely on allies. Further, the sanctions under the Pressler Amendment and recently the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal, are spreading fears in Pakistan of closer U.S. - In- dian partnership and a renewed disengagement of the U.S. with Pakistan.33 This is exacerbated by recent discussions in the U.S. about possible military operations to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a terrorist attack or a state failure. Reportedly, President Musharraf ordered “that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal be redeployed to ’at least six secret new locations” with the begin of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.34

31Lavoy (2008)P 158 32Blechman (2009a), P 4 33Naturally the U.S.-Indo nuclear deal is perceived as highly discriminatory. While Pakistan is feeling the full weight of the NPT, India has been lifted of the repercussions of not signing the NPT, and is basically enjoying full member status. Further, as mentioned above Pakistan is clearly perceiving this to be an aid to India’s strategic nuclear program. 34Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 9; Even though the U.S. is still supplying Pakistan with massive military and recently civilian aid, demands on a greater engagement of Pakistan in the FATA and the border region to Afghanistan, have further sidelined Pakistan and have deteriorated Pakistani trust in unreliable allies. Further, U.S. drone strikes on 86 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

As reaction on the 1971 military defeat, Pakistan turned eastwards and sought strategic part- nership with China, which is resembled by the acquisition of Chinese weaponry, nuclear power plants as well as ballistic missile technology. Yet, in recent years, while still being a major Pak- istani ally, China has warmed up to India, thus not engaging as verbally in the Indo-Pakistan conflict as before. China seems to strive simply to keep “Pakistan strong and confident enough to remain independent of Indian domination and willing to challenge Indian moves in the South Asian region.” 35 Thus, it is obvious that Pakistan is feeling externally threatened by India and increasingly aware of its solitary status.36

However, Pakistan is also clearly threatened by an internal insurgency. The BTI sums Pakistan’s internal problematic up as follows: “The two best-functioning institutions in Pakistan, the army and the civilian administration, have been able to maintain law and order, with the glaring ex- ceptions of a) the civil war-like conditions in Karachi, which began in the mid- 1980s and have earned the city the title of “the Beirut of South Asia”; b) the rising insurgencies in Balochistan, further accelerated by the killing of wellknown tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006; and c) the (tribal) Pashtun areas along the border with Afghanistan. However, a lack of law and order in tribal areas is a problem that all Pakistani governments have had to deal with.”37 Thus, Pakistan is similarly affected by external threat and internal threat as India. However, Pakistan’s elite perception is focused on the external threat, not the insurgency. Strategy in Afghanistan is always made with India in mind, and thus the military is only reluctantly agreeing to support the U.S. in its fight against the Taliban.

For this reason and the fact that Pakistan cannot rely on external balancing in relation to the U.S. as its erstwhile ally and military contributor, Pakistan’s nuclear posture is a logical reaction to these foreign policy impediments. As internal balancing is not a coherent strategy vis-a-vis` In-

Al-Qaeda targets inside Pakistan have injured the partnership to quite some degree. Compare Mayer (2009) 35Blechman (2009a), P 21, also see Krepon (2001), P 11 36Blechman (2009a), P 16 37Stiftung (2008b), P 6 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization 87

dia’s conventional and nuclear superiority, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are seen as a way to deter India from fighting war against Pakistan. As such, a non-defined minimum deterrence posture with very low nuclear thresholds is best suited for Pakistan’s situation. Not defining its posture serves to keep India in the dark about its posture and capabilities. This is further underscored by the fact that Pakistan does not have the economic capacity to match India’s conventional or even nuclear capabilities. As Michael Quinlain argued, “Pakistan’s rejection of no-first- use seems merely a natural refusal to lighten or simplify a stronger adversary’s assessment of risk; it im- plies the retention of an option, not a positive policy of first use as a preferred course.”38 Lack of transparency denies India appropriate reaction to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and thus keeps India guessing about Pakistan’s second strike capability.39 As General Durrani has argued: “by defining we will fail to deter a conventional attack.”40 Another Brigadier General claims that: “Pakistan is mindful of India’s conventional advantage. Given this, it makes perfect sense for Pakistan to reject the no-first-use doctrine.”41 Pakistan’s sole publication regarding its nuclear posture has been its nuclear threshold, defined as the four nuclear scenarios by General Ahmed Kidwai, Chairman of the SPD, under which Pakistan would attack India, if the latter:

- attacks or conquers a large part of its territory

- destroys a large part of its land or air forces

- proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan

- pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large subversion in Pakistan 42

Even though Pakistan has not disclosed its nuclear targeting plans, it is reasonable to suggest that with its ISR and strategic inferiority it will most likely assume a countervalue strategy directed

38Michael Quinlain in Blechman (2009a), P 5 39Pakistan is carefully trying to avoid CBM’s, due to the fact that such procedural agreements would undermine the purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear red lines, it does reject a first- use policy against non-NWS. Granted, since Pakistan is caught in a dyadic conflict, few thought is given to possible non-nuclear adversaries threatening Pakistan. For details see: Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 9ff 40Kraig (2003), P 37 41Davis (2009), P 4 42for a closer examination see Kumar (2006), P19 and Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 9 88 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

at denying Indian victory in a war through deliberate attacke of population centers.43 Such a nuclear posture, especially with such a low nuclear threshold enables Pakistan to keep fostering the insurgency in Kashmir and keep working for the “balkanisation of the Indian union” by providing clandestine support to insurgent groups within India.44

5.1.3 Pakistan’s Delegative Organizational Bias

As we have seen, Pakistan’s nuclear posture is strongly tied to India’s as its main adversary. In the case of an Indian change of nuclear posture it is just fair to assume Pakistan will be following suit. Peter Lavoy argues that Pakistan’s nuclear policy depends on five dimensions.

- an effective conventional fighting force and the demonstrated resolve to employ it against a wide range of conventional and sub-conventional threats;

- a minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine and force posture;

- an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to provide for an assured second strike;

- a survivable strategic force capable of withstanding sabotage, conventional military at- tacks, and at least one enemy nuclear strike; and

- a robust strategic command and control apparatus designed to ensure tight negative use control during peacetime and prompt operational readiness (positive control) at times of crisis and war.45

The last three dimensions in general and a prompt operational readiness in particular, suggest the development of a quick response system, which calls for a change in nuclear posture. In regards to Pakistan’s size and India’s military superiority a LAA posture would therefore not be sufficient

43Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 10 44Kraig (2003), P 20 45Lavoy gives an excellent overview of the meaning to each of the above dimensions. Please see Lavoy (2008) for more detail. 5.1 Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear organization 89 for Pakistani causes. To provide for a force that will be able to react to a Indian conventional strike, Pakistan needs to build up a rapid reaction nuclear posture, most probably a LOW, which subject to the close proximity missile range will ask for a highly sophisticated early warning system. As obvious from the above discussion, Pakistan’s nuclear organization has a more delegative approach than India. While the nuclear weapons are still in a disassembled state46, the nuclear posture, especially the idea of a neccessary rapid reaction calls for mobile launchers or a highly dispersed arsenal. When comparing Pakistan’s command and control organization, in regards to nuclear weapons to Table 3.3 it becomes apparent that it certainly can be defined as delegative system. The military has not only high but almost complete control of the nuclear arsenal. From development to operational readiness the military has been the sole coordinator of the nuclear program. With regard to the strategic command within the NCA, it is obvious that the military in general and the Army in particular, has clear dominance about decisions regarding deployment, acquisition of weaponry etc. While not outsourcing any security issues to external organization the military is in charge of the control of nuclear facilities at large. Obedience to civilian deci- sions can be overruled due to the fact that the SPD as a primary military agency maintains the day to day management of the NCA. Further, even though Pakistan’s current arsenal is allegedly de-mated, the nuclear posture suggests a very high state of alert to credibly deter India.47

46Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 9 47Arguably as the Pakistani Army has been in government for the majority of Pakistan’s existence it could be argued that the Army can not be seen as distinct from the government. A point that is certainly relevant in regards to its influence over politics, not only in the NCA or through the NSC as mentioned above, but also through other means such as the military’s intelligence arm Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) funding Islamist parties to outplay secular parties. 60million rupees were distributed by Lt. General Asad Durrani to 20 anti Bhutto politicians. Both General Beg and General Durrani defended this method before the Supreme Court with dealing in the national interest. Compare: Haqqani (2005), P219 However, as the military’s function is clearly codified in Article 245 of the 1973 Constitution, limiting its role to securing the frontiers against external threat and assisting in national emergencies or natural disasters on the request of civilian authorities, it is fairly obvious that the self perceived role of the Army as guardian of the state cannot be justification for its political influence. see the Constitution of Pakistan The Constitution of the Islamic Reublic of Pakistan (2008) Further, Musharraf ceded government control to the civilians and as such current Pakistani nuclear organization must be assessed with the historical precedents in 90 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

5.2 Pakistan’s C3 I performance

According to the preliminary Pakistan follows a delegative system of nuclear organization, and subsequently should not place too much emphasis on nuclear safety and security. As Busch ar- gued, “limited resources and rudimentary technology will cause a nuclear system to be unreliable at best, unsafe at worst.” 48 This is certainly the case for Pakistan, as Pakistan does not have the economic performance and to provide the budget for a reliable nuclear safety and security sys- tem. However, the Pakistani Army argues to have taken the necessary measure to ensure nuclear safety and security, and thus has diminished the risk for accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and/or nuclear facilities.49 As both are administered by the military, we can assess both risks to nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities by examining the military. The following section will thus take a look at Pakistan’s C3 I performance in regards to accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

5.2.1 Command

As shown above in Figure 5.1 the Nuclear Command structure, is a three-tiered system, com- prised of the NCA, the SPD and the Strategic Forces Command.50 The military, which is clearly dominating the nuclear organization, is claiming to be highly reliable and in fact most scholars as well as politicians claim this to be the case. As U.S. President Obama has argued: “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We’ve got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation.”51

While the nuclear posture is not publicized the command structure is clearly demonstrated. The military’s dominance enables a direct unquestioned chain of command. Kerr argues that “Pak-

hindsight but must be based on the present environment. 48Busch (2004), P 199 49Mowatt-Larsen (2009), P 2 50Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 8 51Barrack, Obama April 29, 2009, in Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 1 5.2 Pakistan’s C3 I performance 91 istan demonstrated considerable learning” as it refined its command and control mechanisms from the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) at the top to implementing technical and procedu- ral steps to ensure safety, security and use control for deployed nuclear assets.” In fact according to the military the command is not questioned and unauthorized use is prevented by the use of an authenticating code system, two person rule and PAL system in place, thus diminishing the risk of inadvertent use, and/or unauthorized use of the nuclear weapons.52 Yet, as the command authority is divided unto several officers, a number of risks of unauthorized use arise. A “Dr. Strangelove” moment could appear during a period of high tensions with India. This threat could be exacerbated due to a lack in ISR technology and communication capability. However, due to the importance of Pakistan’s command system for a functioning second strike capability based on the delegative bias of its nuclear system and the nature of the threat, it comes to no surprise that command and control was a priority for the Musharraf government.53 A prob- lem of the current system, however, is its need on complexity and timely fashioned processes. As long as Pakistan is not upping the ante by developing a LOW posture, the nuclear weapons seem rather safe from unauthorized use, as the system is complex but is not time constrained. In peacetime, when weapons are stored in a demated state, it takes a while for a command to be executed and weapons to be launched. The command system thus far seems to have been established to decrease the threats of inadvertent and unauthorized use, simply because reliable second strike capability is a must, but the decision for this strike is not automatic. Should Pak- istan change its posture in effect decreasing the time available for a launch decision this will change considerably.

5.2.2 Control

In regards to launch control it can be assessed that, Pakistan put its launch authority into the hands of several people, thus making effective control against inadvertent use tough to main- tain.54 Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are only safe as long as there is enough time between

52Gregory (2009), P 2 53Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 5 54Busch (2004), P 206 92 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

command to assemble the weapons and mate the warhead with the delivery means. However, Lt. Gen Kidwai argued that the weapons “will be ready when required, at the shortest notice; [but] the Pakistani doctrine is not endorsing a US-USSR model with weapons on hair trigger alert.”55 While this does not necessarily call for a LOW posture it certainly speeds up the process, imply- ing possible mobile launch systems to be used. Clearly mobile systems are obviously more prone to accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use than launch systems based in heavy guarded fa- cilities. For one because commanders on the ground in charge of a mobile launch system might not have the necessary strategic foresight to judge correctly, yet they do have the capability to launch a weapon. As with India, the currently deployable ballistic missile systems are mostly on liquid fuel basis, which are highly susceptible to accidents. Further, they are mostly fitted with an inertial guidance system, which once fired can neither be destroyed nor its course altered, making it a highly unreliable navigation system.56

Nuclear weapons are also endangered by their sheer design. The two currently deplyable ura- nium warheads are based on an implosion design with a solid core of about 15-20kg of HEU.57 Pakistan is clearly interested in plutonium based warheads, as the plutonium production sites,

55Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 9 56Pakistani delivery systems are manyfold. Pakistan is using ballistic missile systems from several countries in practically unaltered form. DPRK’s liquid fuel Nodong and Taepodong missiles are being developed as the Hatf-V (Ghauri I) and Hatf - VI (Ghauri III) respectively. Further, missiles such as the shortranged Hatf-III (Ghaznavi) and Hatf-IV (Shaheen), both liquid fueled with an approximate range of about 450km have been fielded and the Babur cruise missile has been tested. Nevertheless even short range missiles are sufficient to hit any target in northern India, including New Delhi. Further, nuclear weapons can be delivered, using retrofitted F-16’s, Mirage II and V and Chinese A 5’s. a contract for delivery of 36 additional F-16’s and mid life upgrade of the mid aged F16A/B model already in Pakistani service has been signed in 2006. Yet, due to Pakistani’s air inferiority it might not use it’s only means of air defense in the attempt to destroy Indian cities, given both India’s vast superior Radar system, it’s superiority in air attack vehicles and its interest in ground based missile and air defense systems. Compare Gopalaswamy (2009) 57Estimates of warheads differ, between 70-90 and 40-60. However, it is estimated that Pakistan possesses about 1300- 1500kg of HEU and about 90kg of Plutonium, while annually developing the capability for 5-6nuclear weapons (100kg HEU) see Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 3 5.2 Pakistan’s C3 I performance 93 at Kushab are being enlarged.58 This poses several problems as Plutonium based nuclear war- heads, while being more destructive are also more accident-prone . Unfortunately there are, as with any military weaponry, only estimates of what the weapon and warhead consists of. While the Pakistani military has argued to have PAL’s in place, it is highly unlikely that the weapons and warheads are secured other safety features, e.g. High Explosives (IHE) or Fire Resistant Pits.

With regard to physical control of nuclear weapons, the last few years have seen some tremen- dous change. A few years ago, the physical protection of the nuclear weapons relied solely on 3G’s, lacking a personnel reliability program, appropriate vetting and necessary technological measures.59 According to several sources it seems certain that Pakistan’s nuclear physical pro- tection of its 6 storage sites for weapons components has been greatly improved. It is based on four practices, copied from U.S. experience

1 physical security based on 3G’s with concentric tiers of armed forces and guard personnel as well as technology such as intrusion detectors, sensors, computer system and night vision devices.60

2 Personnel reliability programs, with 1000 staff of Army, ISI and other intelligence services involved in screening and vetting of the 70’000 personnel strong nuclear complex.61

3 technical and procedural safeguards, based on PAL’s, two man rule and a 10’000 staff strong Army unit responsible for security and counter espionage.63

58The 40-50 MWe Khushab plutonium production reactor has been in service since 1998. Kushab II, destined to replace Kushab I is finished, and Kushab II is currently under construction. See Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 8 and Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 3-4 59Busch (2004), P 202 60Approximately $100million have been spent by the Bush administration for this purpose, including the delivery of above mentioned systems as well as helicopters. compare Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 12ff and Gregory (2009), P 2ff 61Measures include restriction to Punjabis, test of individual and his family on grounds of religious affiliations.62 and Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 12 63ibid. 94 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

4 deception and secrecy based on clandestine low visible transports as well as dummy loca- tions 64 65

However, as already mentioned the attacks on the GHQ in Rawalpindi in Oct, 2009, the attacks on one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites in the Wah cantonement as well as sev- eral other terrorist attacks, of which the last was an attack on the ISI Headquarter on Nov 13th 2009, killing 20 people, question these security and safety measures.66 Clearly those attacks failed or were defended, but the fact that they occurred makes a couple of problems obvious. These attacks showed a high level of information about the movement, and security details of Army, ISI and police forces. This suggests inside help. Further, the terrorist attacks have reached a new level of sophistication and lethality, unknown before, enabling them to escape from such attacks.67 Seemingly despite considerable modernization of security and safety features, the nuclear weapons are far from secure. Thus, it can be concluded that there are challenges and problems in both launch control and physical control of nuclear weapons. While the launch con- trol problems are mostly of technical nature, lacking necessary safety features and relying on unsafe designs and construction, the physical protection system is mostly affected by personnel problems and the insider problem. This makes for high risks of accidents due to technical dif- ficulties as well as a high risk of unauthorized and inadvertent use due to terrorist infiltration, theft or attack. These problems will be highly exacerbated by an expansion of the nuclear pro- gram. More material and more facilities will increase vulnerabilities and more possibilities for common-mode errors to take place.

64Mowatt-Larsen (2009), P 4ff 65Seymour Hersh proclaimed that the Obama administration has gained the acceptance of the Pakistani military that U.S. units would provide ”added security for the Pakistani arsenal in the case of a crisis”. See: Hersh (2009), P 2; However, this claim was disputed by Admiral Mullen. Compare: Ahmed (2009), P 2 66The attacks on the GHQ on Oct 17th were a 22 hour stand-off in which terrorists dressed in Army uniforms. In another event that day a Pakistani General was gunned down in downtown Islamabad. See: Hersh (2009), P 1 67for more information see: Gregory (2009), P 3 5.2 Pakistan’s C3 I performance 95

5.2.3 Communication

Pakistan’s delegative system is concerned with nuclear weapons as strategic means of ensuring deterrence and therefore need a reliable communication system. However, this came only af- ter considerable learning during the last decade. On April 10, 1988, an explosion of the Ojheri ammunition depot showed not only the sensitivity for accidents, but also the fallacies of the Pak- istani communication system. The incident caused heat seeking missiles, rockets and projectiles in population centers in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Presumably, except General Zia ul Haq and the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) yet allegedly no in the ranks of the military knew of the de- pot, due to its secretive usage of funneling weapons to the Afghan rebels. Luckily, the close by Kahuta facility (one of Pakistan’s main nuclear facilities) has not been hit, even though it was close by. Rumors in Pakistan spoke even of a failed preemptive Indian attack on the Kahuta facility.68 Since then the Pakistani nuclear system has taken on a very delegative character. It follows, that Pakistan’s system is better equipped to follow through with a nuclear strike due to clear communicative lines between the NCA the SPD and the Strategic Forces Command. This is clearly enhanced by the fact that much of the actors and institutions involved in the process are centered within or around the GHQ in Rawalpindi and thus have quicker reaction times and closer links to each other. But this has not only advantages. The close chain of communica- tion poses another risk, however, emblematic of assertive systems. As most actors are centered around the GHQ, this is also greatly increasing the risk of a disruption of the nuclear command chain, with means of a preemptive strike. Furthermore, it is important to note, that even though the communicative system is highly com- plex, the system is not tightly coupled, due to the disassembled posture. Nevertheless, should the nuclear posture be increased the risk for inadvertent problems within the chain of command could increase.

68Busch (2004), P 201 ff. 96 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

5.2.4 Intelligence

Pakistan’s Intelligence system is famed for its lack of ISR capabilities. Especially so, since the failure of Pakistan’s intelligence system in 1999, to pick up on U.S. cruise missiles, traversing Pakistan in an attempt to hit Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan. Despite the U.S. proclaiming their attack and asking for over-flight permission, the Pakistani intelligence systems did not pick up on the cruise missiles fired into Afghanistan.69

The high reliance on Chinese models and the close co-operation with the Chinese government in these fields of research does not provide for much assurance in the Pakistani system either. Sev- eral defense blogs discussed the possibility of a Chinese- Pakistani project of a satellite based guidance system for their ballistic missile systems, which could help Pakistan to step away from their inertial guidance systems. Unfortunately those sources are questionable due to their spec- ulative character.70 The risk of accidental use might be low as long as Pakistan keeps its disas- sembled posture. But the flaws in the intelligence system provide a grim picture for the risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that Musharraf claimed that “our strategic weapons program came under formalized institutional control and thorough oversight, duly ap- proved by my government” 71

5.3 Pakistan’s MPC&A performance

After having examined the risks of accidents or inadvertent and unauthorized usage of nuclear weapons this section will try to examine the risks to nuclear fissile material. In order to do so,

69Rajagopalan (2005), P 221 70Agreements and contracts with the U.S. however provide Pakistan with a couple of material with ISR capability such as the P-3 aircraft, configured with the E-2C HAWKEYE airborne early warning electronics suite. This comes in a package with attack helicopters, howitzers and anti tank missiles. see: Smith (2007), it is important to note that such equipment is better for conventional warfare and ill-equipped as early warning system in a nuclear attack. 71Ali (2007), P 15 5.3 Pakistan’s MPC&A performance 97

it will be useful to examine the safety and security of the nuclear reactors in general. For an overview of civilian nuclear installations please see ?? in the Appendix.

5.3.1 Material Protection

Pakistani sources claim that in order to prevent theft or attack of nuclear material, nuclear facili- ties employ a range of protection measures, including highly trained security forces, site access control, employee screening, and co-ordination with local and national security authorities.72 This claim seems to be valid, as the above examination has shown that Pakistan has in fact es- tablished a varied number of incentives and programs to meet security needs.73 The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) works in close collaboration with the IAEA to provide security and safety for these facilities.74 In 2006, The PNRA established a five year plan to meet further security needs.75 This was important, as in 2004 the full spectrum of the A.Q. Khan affair of became known. The smuggling of nuclear material and structures to Iran, Libya and North Korea called for an assessment of Pakistani claims to the security of fissile material.76 Further, national and regional coordination centers for nuclear installations have been established, reduc- ing the arrival time in case of an accident substantially.77

It seems, Pakistan has done a lot to provide for material protection, by establishing institutions and cooperation with the IAEA.78 Despite these advances, Pakistani officials acknowelged in

72Ali (2007), P 11 73see four factors of nuclear security above 74All of the above mentioned facilities (see ??) are in fact under safeguards of the IAEA. The power reactors KANUPP and CHASNUPP I are inspected every three months and the research reactors annually, see Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 15 75The plan focused on monitoring, of radioactive sources, localization and safeguarding of orphan nuclear mate- rial. see Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 15ff 76Busch (2004), P220 77Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009) 78Pakistan announced the implementation of a “National Security Action Plan” with IAEA assistance, and joined a U.S. Russian led Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism. Compare: Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 15; In order to safeguard its NPP’s accordingly Pakistan paid 500’000 US$ to fund a IAEA nuclear security co-operation. See: 98 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

2007 that “Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.”79 This, is as im- portant as the continuing need for physical protection of the facilities and better training of per- sonnel, to provide more security for nuclear material storage sites and nuclear facilities from terrorism.

Further, lax architecture and design standards go hand in hand. For example CHASNUPP I, as well as its successors under construction, are build in a known earthquake prone region, on the banks of the River Indus.80 An accident at this site could cause millions of casualties. On top of this, the power plant was build after the model of the Chinese Qinshan model, which has proved to be accident prone due to design failures.81 One does not even need to go as far and imagine a terrorist attack on such a reactor, an earthquake might be sufficient, to release radioactivity and cause a nuclear disaster.

It is obvious from the above examination of nuclear weapons security, that the rate of terrorist attacks and the sophistication of these have increased significantly.82 Threats, such as terrorists gaining access to HEU, usable to build a makeshift RDD pose a realistic risk. Also in discussion are possible attacks on nuclear transports.83 However, as discussed in section 5.2.2, a number

Thranert¨ and Wagner (2009), P 15 for more detail. In Sept 2007, Pakistan also joined the U.S. and Russian co- operative to Combat Nuclear terrorism. 79Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 15 80Busch (2004), P 201 81Busch (2004) 82It is important to note that fears of nuclear terrorism are not grounded on terrorists using high tech weaponry to attack nuclear facilities. Further, it is absurd to suggest that the Pakistani state will fail and hand over govern- ment control to the Taliban. see Blechman (2009a), P 13; Pakistani sources themselves claim that: “Despite such speculative scenario building among policy and security analysts, there is little public evidence to suggest that the safety or the security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations or its nuclear command and control mechanism was ever in jeopardy from internal political instability or Islamists or terrorists forces inside Pakistan or nearby in Afghanistan, either during the American War against Terrorism in Afghanistan or during the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military standoff’ Ali (2007), P 14 83This claim is disputed by Abdul Mannan, who provides a hypothetical case study of a sabotage on radioactive consignments during transportation within the city of Karachi and Lahore and the possible consequences. He con- 5.3 Pakistan’s MPC&A performance 99 of problems occur in regards to the security of nuclear weapons, that are applying to nuclear reactors and fissile material storage sites as well. Insider jobs, close proximity of the facilities to Taliban strongholds, and increased violence and lethality of terrorist attacks raise suspicion about security of reactors and storage sites as well.

The above assessment can be concluded by saying that Pakistan seemingly has made material control and thus safety and security from accidents and nuclear terrorism a priority. However, numerous problems remain, from lack of safety design standards to problems regarding nuclear security from terrorist attacks.

5.3.2 Control and Accounting

In 2004 Nathan Bush claimed that when it comes to Material Control and Accounting (MPC&A) there’s evidence that neither India nor Pakistan have a working system in place that would overview the flow of material, provide access for taking samples even have designated mea- surement points.84 Arguably Pakistan used to lack access to such systems, which are needed to provide accurate accounting and quality control of the fissile material, and thus relied on Chinese C&A equipment.

However, at a talk at the Henry L. Stimson Center in June 2007, General Zia spoke of Pakistan’s fissile materials and provided this statement “Security of radioactive sources is ensured through periodic physical verification and regulatory inspections.”85 This is further underlined by several laws passed and programs set up by the Pakistani government in recent years. In 2004, after the disclosing of A.Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, Pakistan adopted a number of export laws in- cludes that the controls around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities in Pakistan are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack and any modified diversion would be detected in early stages. Therefore, fabrication of a RDD and WMD is not very attractive to a terrorist group in general and specifically within the context of Pakistan. see Mannan (2007) 84Busch (2004), P 218 85Ali (2007), 13 100 5 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

tended to monitor export of goods, technology and equipment used in the production of nuclear weapons and biological weapons. For this purpose, control lists based on the Missile technology control regime (MTCR) as well as the Australian Group (AG) and the NSG were being devel- oped. Arguably the “export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are in- tended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.”86 87

However, as David Albright has shown periodically, Pakistani government organizations are in- volved to a high degree in illegal importing of technology needed for enrichment or weapons technology. His works often underline “the notion that elaborate, state-directed illicit nuclear procurement programs are at the root of most efforts by nuclear smuggling networks to circum- vent the export laws of nuclear technology supplier nations, and that targeting these state-directed efforts is key to stopping illicit nuclear trade.”88 For this purpose Pakistan’s nuclear program re- lies heavily on domestic and foreign companies willing to assist in smuggling of such material.89 As such, we can assert, that despite numerous activities to curb illegal exporting, problems exist in regards to nuclear accounting and control. And despite grave and strict export laws, Pak- istani companies, aligned to the nuclear program, are consistently involved in smuggling. Such proliferation activites could generally be regarded as unauthorized use of nuclear material.

5.4 Risk assessment

Pakistan’s civil-military relations and its threat perception would suggest Pakistan to be in field 1 of Figure 3.3 providing a very high level of autonomy to the military in regards to strategic

86Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 15 87According to Burns the U.S. also provided export control assistance to Pakistan. The above mentioned NCA Ordinance also implemented measures to prevent the spread of nuclear related materials and expertise. Compare: Kerr and Nikitin (2009), P 15ff 88Albright, Brannnan and Scheel (2009b), P 2 89Albright, Brannnan and Scheel (2009b,a) 5.4 Risk assessment 101

decision-making and the nuclear command. This should, according to the theory, make a show a delegative system, which is characterized through the low priority of safety and security. Yet, despite the fact that external threats are driving the nuclear program, the internal threat is taken seriously enough to do make safety and security a priority. Pakistan provides a delegative sys- tem, with complex procedures and clear SOPs, it is remarkable that Pakistan does not provide too much risk for accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, except a not insignificant risk by terrorists. The fact that Pakistan decided to maintain its demated posture provides for a lack of tightly coupling. This is clearly one of the factors behind Pakistan’s rel- atively wide array of nuclear safety and security features. However, Pakistan has also chosen to link itself to the international community in regards to nuclear weapons and material safety and security. Several agreements with the IAEA as well as other members of the international community provide for a wide net of bilateral and multilateral accords for safety and security from theft and/or proliferation. It must be noted, that while this thesis did not address the issue of neither leverage nor linkage, the fact that Pakistan relies heavily on western countries i.e. the United States and is positioned in the limelight of current western attention, could certainly be another important factor for Pakistan prioritizing safety and security.

With regard to MPC&A, it must be added that Pakistan’s system of MPC&A seems even more secure than India’s strongly correlating with its C3 I system. Various agreements provide and external support attribute to Pakistan’s safety. and This is not to suggest that India might have more risk, but could be attributed to the fact that India shares less media and academic attention than Pakistan.

Subsequently, it becomes evident that, while domestic perception and structures influence the nu- clear program insofar to increase risks of accidental, unauthorized and inadvertent use, it seems that international involvement have reversed such a trend. This is not to suggest that Pakistan does not face remarkable risks to its nuclear program, be it from terrorist attacks, inside jobs or natural catastrophes. Nevertheless the risk assessment does not suggest Pakistan to be lacking control over the safety and security of its nuclear weapons and material. Should Pakistan decide 102 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

to up the ante, however, by changing its nuclear posture to a more dispersed deployment and rapid launch capability, the currently mediate levels of risk would increase significantly, due to the system being more complex and tightly coupled.

Chapter 6

Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

After the Indian, as well as, the Pakistani case have been examined, and came up with contradict- ing results, the third case of this analysis will be analyzed. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) basically inherited its nuclear program in 1979 from the Shah’s program. It was developed in 1957, when Iran signed a deal with the United States under the Atoms for Peace project.1 2 Di- rectly after the revolution of 1979, the nuclear program was halted by Ayatollah Khomeini, due to his believe that nuclear program contradicted the basic tenets of Islam.3 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the two uncompleted plants at Bushehr, constructed by the German Kraftwerke Union until construction was halted in 1979, was destroyed by Iraqi attacks. However, the pro- gram was restarted in the mid-1980’s. In the 1990’s Russia and China began cooperation with Iran in an effort to support its nuclear program. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy agreed to a deal worth US$ 800million to complete one reactor at Bushehr.4

In 2002 the International community began paying attention to Iran’s nuclear program, after the National Council of Resistance in Iran, published the existence of two undeclared nuclear facil- ities at Natanz and at Arak. Both are of critical concern, as the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz is key for the enrichment of uranium. Important to note, the technology to enrich uranium to LEU or weapons grade level HEU is essentially the same, and as such could enable Iran to the-

1Bahgat (2009), P 308 2For a detailed discussion of Iran and its political system please see: Green, Wehrey and Wolf (2008) 3ibid. 4Chubin (2006); Bahgat (2009) 103

oretically produce nuclear weapons.5 6 The discussions about the Iranian nuclear program have not ebbed and have reached a preliminary climax during 2006-2007, when the U.S. and Israel openly discussed bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities in an pre-emptive strike.7 Further, evidence for a nuclear weapons program have been published recently. Iran obviously was researching on the construction of a neutron initiator, as documents published at ISIS show.8

It is often pointed out that Iran has expansive oil and especially gas resources and as such has no need to build a nuclear program at all.9 However, it is obvious that the aggressive rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, the hostile situation between Israel and Iran as well as Iran’s sup- port of terrorism against Israel, are not convincing the international community of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. In September 2009, the IRI has informed the IAEA of the construction of an undeclared nuclear facility at Qom in the mountains of Iran.10 11 As of March 2009 the IAEA states that Iran allegedly has produced a total of 1,010 kg of LEU hexafluoride, which is claimed to be sufficient for a nuclear weapon breakout capability12 It is important to note these materials

5Caravelli (2008), P 94 6For a historical overview, please see Bahgat (2009) or Chubin (2006). 7Sagan (2006) These ideas have come up again in March 2009, when David Albright argued that Israel has concluded Iran having crossed the threshold to a nuclear breakout capability. At the same time, Israel obviously asked the U.S. for an air corridor through Iraq and the delivery of bunker breaking weaponry to strike the facilities. Please see: Israel asks U.S. for arms, air corridor to attack Iran (2009)Albright, Brannnan and Shire (2009), P 1; However, the U.S. has declined both requests. 8Albright (2009c), P 4ff 9A number of reasons dispute this. Iran does not have the capability to refine oil and therefore imports most of its petroleum for domestic use. Iran also argues that other major oil and gas producers such as Canada or Russia rely heavily on nuclear energy to meet its energy needs. Due to a lack of other resources, Iran is dependent on oil for national revenue. Iran thus argues that most of the oil production will be consumed domestically, due to an expected increase in population growth in the next few decades. Please compare: Bahgat (2009), P 323 10Evans (2009); Crail (2009) 11Iran is using what David Albright calls the “Subsidiary Arrangement loophole”, which is a reference to Article 42 of Iran’s safeguards agreement, and the subsidiary arrangement, which allows Iran to wait with declaration until 180 days before the“ introduction of nuclear material into a facility”. See: Albright et al. (2009) 12Albright and Shire (2009a); Albright et al. (2009) 104 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

are like the declared nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.13

Much attention by scholars and security experts has been devoted to the question of Iran’s interest in nuclear weapons.14 Many scholars have weighed in on the subject, and yet there has been no conclusion so far.15 As this thesis is focusing on nuclear safety and security structures in place in Iran, it is important to know whether Iran will develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the discussion is of secondary concern to such an endeveaor. Regardless of Iran’s interest in nuclear weapons, it is obvious that Iran will most likely not curb its nuclear enrichment program, due to both domestic and energy resource considerations.16 Further, Iran has researched on integrating nuclear warheads into the Shahab-3 missile and has done research on explosives control set, which clearly indicates research and development (R&D) efforts on delivery means for nuclear devices.17 Accordingly, this thesis argues that with Iran’s technological knowledge , expertise and equipment - therefore a theoretical capacity to produce nuclear weapons - nuclear safety and security should be of dire concern to both the IRI and the international community. As U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair argued: Although we do not know whether Iran currently develops nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them.”18 Regardless of the actual production of nuclear weapons, Iran does produce fissile material and as such should naturally be concerned with adequate MPC&A procedures.

6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization

Iran’s foreign policy is often contradictory and seemingly irrational, and it is no surprise that many nations regard Iran as a “rogue state”. However, a recent RAND paper indicates that:

13ibid. 14for an example see: Knepper (2008); Sagan (2006) 15Oliver Schmidt has taken Sagan’s approach of taking security, domestic and internatiol concerns into consid- eration to look at Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but could not come up with a clear answer, as a nuclear option could provide clear benefits but also grave dangers for Iran. Compare: Schmidt (2008), P 76 ff 16Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 2 17Albright (2009b) 18Albright and Shire (2009b), P 5 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization 105

“Tehran’s strategic motivations reveals that its behavior, while frequently masked by ideology and bravado, is more deeply informed by a realpolitik strategy that defines normal” state behavior. Certainly, Iran is prone to miscalculation, brinksmanship, and belligerence. But its new activism is also vulnerable to certain lia- bilities and buffers inherent in Iran’s unique political culture and also present in the regional system it is trying to influence.”19

As Takeyh has shown, the IRI’s behavior is often based on an inherent factionalism in the seem- ingly monolithic state structure of Iran: “Unlike many of its regional counterparts, the theocracy developed institutions with their own mindset and sense of autonomy. The factionalism of the state would find an organizational expression as the ministries, Revolutionary Guards, seminar- ies, and elected bodies spoke in diverse voices - and often at cross- purposes with each other.”20 These ministries and agencies, especially the strong Revolutionary Guards,often contradict each other when it comes to foreign policy. This is further exacerbated by a factionalism within the agencies themselves.21 Such factionalism complicates foreign as well as domestic policy, and has blurred the difference between the regular military (the Artesh) and the Islamic Revolution- ary Guard Corps (IRGC) or also known as the Pasdaran. Often these factions use foreign policy issues in the bureaucratic infighting, to outmaneuver their opponents.22

6.1.1 Who’s in charge of Iran’s nuclear program?

As with the Pakistani and Indian case, the assessment of the strategic threat environment as well as the civil-military relations of a state will give us an insight into who will most likely control the nuclear weapons. Especially in light of the above mentioned factionalism it will be important

19Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 38 20Takeyh (2009), P 31 21Wehrey et al. divided the IRI’s bureaucracy losely into: Traditional Conservatives, Reformist Cluster (Khatami and others), Pragmatic Conservatives (former chief nuclear negotiator and chairman of the Supreme National Secu- rity Council (SNSC) Larijani) and New Conservatives or Radicals (Ahmadinejad and followers) for more informa- tion on these different factions please see Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 14ff and Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 26ff 22Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P xiv 106 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

to make these institutional and ideological fault lines visible in order to assess the organization who would most likely be in charge should Iran develop nuclear weapons.

The IRI’s security establishment contains a number of agencies and ministries with overlapping and redundant organizational functions. In the spirit of a theocracy the Commander-in-chief, is the Supreme Leader and not the President of the state. While the President is nominally the chair- man of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) he does not wield much constitutional power over the defense establishment.23 Interesting to note, among the President, the SNSC is comprised of the defense and foreign ministers, representatives of the Supreme Leader, as well as the commander of the Revolutionary Guard.24 Despite the fact, that the SNSC is presiding over three distinct but redundant systems, it cannot be seen as “regulator” or “arbiter” between these agencies. More less, the ministries have full range of motion for a bureaucratic game around resources and budget.25 Figure 6.1 shows the set up of Iran’s security establishment. As such, the SNSC nominally coordinates the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. (MoD)26 Es- pecially the MoD and the MoI have overlapping responsibilities. While the Artesh, are clearly outward oriented and professionally declined towards political influence, the Pasdaran are in- ward and outward oriented, and such share responsibilities with the Artesh as well as to the Law Enforcement Forces and the regular police forces. Since 2007, the IRGC is comprised not only of its 120’000 men, but also includes the Basij Militia forces. Most scholars agree, that should Iran decide to develop nuclear weapons, the Pasdaran would most likely gain control over the nuclear weapons.27 This has several reasons. First, traditionally

23Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 9-10 24ibid. 25Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 14 and Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 30 26The MoD was developed as a reaction to problems of battlefield coordination between the regular forces and the Padaran during the Iran-Iraq war. It is also important to note that the IRGC had its own minstry up until 1989, when in an effort to reduce the IRGC’s autonomy the MoD was created. See Ward (2009) and Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 8ff 27please see: Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009); Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization 107

Figure 6.1: Iran’s higher defense structure

(Graphic from Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 9) the Artesh has been a remnant of the Shah and have while being a relatively professional force, not been engrained with the Islamic spirit of the revolution.28 As such, Khomeini naturally set up redundant agencies with overlapping responsibilities to oversee the armed forces.29 Second, dur- ing the last decade, especially since the 2005 election, Iran has seen a resurgence of the hardliners and radicals, trying to reconnect the IRI to the Hidden Iman, while trying to restore the religious zeal in the armed forces. Clearly this is favoring the Pasdaran over the regular armed forces. Third, many of the key ministries, as well as, many parliamentary seats have been recently occu- pied with former IRGC officers.“Of 152 new members elected to the Majles in February 2004, 91 had IRGC backgrounds, and a further 34 former IRGC offcers now hold senior-level posts in the government.”30 Evidently the nuclear rhetoric increased significantly after 2005, with an in- flux of former members of the Pasdaran in politics.This dominance, though factionalized, clearly provides the IRGC with certain bureaucratic powers vis-a-vis` other agencies and even within

Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009); Bahgat (2009); Betts, Sagan and Waltz (2007) 28compare Ward (2009) 29Ward (2009), P 230 30Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 77 108 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

the ministries.31 Fourth, the IRGC has traditionally been endowed with better and more mod- ern weapons system than the Artesh. Not surprisingly the IRGC currently controls the strategic missile forces as well as the chemical weaponry in the IRI’s inventory.32 Fifth, the nuclear in- stallations are currently protected and secured by the IRGC, and not the military.33 Finally, as has become evident in recent years, the IRGC’s involvement in both economics and politics, has increased its potential to further own policy goals. They held considerable power over nuclear research and development and used its economic power and quasi budgetary independence to further favored weapons acquisition programs, even in opposition to the regular armed forces or the Supreme Leader.34 Arguably, because of the strong position of the Pasdaran, and its increas- ing involvement in politics it is possible that the Supreme Leader would choose to divert power from the Pasdaran.

A number of alternative scenarios are possible, should the Supreme Leader aspire to curb the bureaucratic political and economic power of the IRGC. First scenario, the full nuclear com- mand and control will be given to the Artesh. Second scenario, co-control between Artesh and Pasdaran. Third possible scenario could be an attempt to create a new organization in charge of command of nuclear weapons. All three of these scenarios would attempt to take power from the Pasdaran, trying to keep the nuclear control from the agency presiding over the paramilitary operations domestically and support for terrorism abroad.

However, these scenarios seem rather unlikely, seeing the amount of power the Pasdaran yield in domestic politics. With high amount of leeway within bureaucratic politics and increasing influence of the hard-liners within the government, it seems unlikely the Pasdaran would agree to sharing of power or even the set up of new organizations. Such a praetorian position could be strengthened through relative loss of power of the Supreme Leader vis-a-vis` the President. Even though the Supreme Leader still holds relative control over the security establishment through

31Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 30 32Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 46, 75 33Betts, Sagan and Waltz (2007), P 141 34ibid. also see: Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 66 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization 109 representatives in most agencies and ministry, the informal influx of former and current members of the IRGC fraternity, as well as their domestic economic growth show a significant increase in autonomy which likely will affect the power dynamics in the IRI.35 Difference of policy, is also visible in regards to the nuclear program, even though there is agreement on the need for a nuclear program. However, as Bahgat noted: “On almost all domestic and foreign policy issues, Iran spoke with more than one voice. Nuclear power, however, is one of the few exceptions. The right to develop nuclear power is a matter of national pride, where the population is largely united behind the regime.36 37

Nevertheless, differing opinions in approach are widely observed. For example, while hard-liners or radicals oppose dialogue with the United States and argue for a strong position of Iran, former chief nuclear negotiator and representative at the SNSC, Larijani noted: “We may be sure that the Americans are our enemy. Working with enemies is part of the world of politics. I believe that a

35The IRGC’s increasing power and thus challenge to “official” foreign policy has been widely noted through terrorist attacks against Israeli and American embassies in the past. In recent years, the arrest of several British soldiers and seamen in early 2007 by Pasdaran naval forces as well as the closure of the Imam Khomeini Airport in May 2004, due to the IRGC claiming the contract with a Turkisk consortium being illegal on grounds of national security, are just some of the indicators for rising influence and autonomy in foreign policy by the IRGC. The bureaucratic infighting and the IRGC’s interest in foreign policy was also visible in Afghanistan, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was backing the government in Kabul, but the MOIS as well as the IRGC was backing and supporting rural warlords. Compare: Ward (2009), P 324 and Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 28ff; Khatami’s spokesman seemed well aware of this, when he issued the statement that “[m]inority groups [...] interfere in foreign policy” in reaction to the Karine A incident, when Iranian arms destined for the Palestinan Authority were intercepted by Israel. Please see: Takeyh (2009), P 213 for more information. 36Bahgat (2009), P323 37The IRGC’s strong support, in form of the hardliners - among them President Ahmadinejad - driving the rhetoric of the inalienable right of Iran to nuclear power has clearly influenced Iranians. A recent poll by USIP and other organizations showed that 91 percent of Iranians were in favor of the nuclear program saying it was important for Iran. Yet, Iranians seemingly focus on domestic issues, with 89 percent claiming the nuclear program was important for Iran’s economy. The survey was conducted in Fall 2006, in co-operation with an Iranian organization. More details please see: Fair and Shellman (2008) 110 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

strategy of curbing and reducing disruptions and normalizing relations is itself beneficial.”38 The differences in practice are even more obvious. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) holds nominal control about the nuclear program, yet the Physics Research Center (PHRC) being in charge of R&D efforts over the nuclear program. The PHRC as well as subsequent institutions such as the Organization for Planning of Special Supply, as well as the ’Field of Expansion and Deployment of Advanced Technologies’ - both involved in research on nuclear weapons systems - are located within Iran’s Ministry of Defense.39 As Albright states the AEOI is seemingly only responsible for developing a fuel cycle, and thus focuses only on nuclear rectors and the Natanz enrichment facility. footnoteibid. Interesting to note the underground enrichment facility constructed at Qom will most likely not be under AEOI control, as it is constructed on a mili- tary facility, supporting the claim that this facility is intended to clandestinely upgrade LEU to weapons grade level.40

It is evident, that an assessment of the Iran’s civil-military relations, as well as, a prognosis on who would be in control over a nuclear program is difficult to make. While it seems rather clear, that in the case of development of nuclear weapons in Iran, the IRGC would hold nominal control over the weapons, the fact remains that this is not a homogenous organization. First of, all the nuclear program as such is split between different agencies, the AEOI as well as the MoD and subsequently the IRGC, thus complicating a clear assessment of the organizations bias. The above mentioned bureaucratic rivalry within the security establishment provides difficulties for a coherent command and control regime. This is compounded by the fact that the IRGC itself is not a homogenous actor and split between the realists and the hardliners in its ideological and political outlook. Both factors do not bode well for a nuclear program and would inevitably cause problems in regards to nuclear safety and security, ranging from effective control, over lack of communication to intelligence problems.

38Takeyh (2009), P 241 39see Albright (2009a), P 2 40Albright and Shire (2009b), P 3 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization 111

6.1.2 Threat environment

“A central tenet of the militant’s perspective is that enemies are always lurking about and plotting to subvert the theocratic state.41 The threats can be summarized as internal, external and ideo- logical in outlook. This is exacerbated by the fact that Iran is unable to “translate its geopolitical assets into political advantage. As a non Arab Shiite state, Iran lacks a natural constituency, either regionally or in the wider Muslim world.”42

It is important to note that the IRI, inherited an equivocal legacy. As a recent RAND article posits: “While a fear of outside plots is inherent in most revolutionary regimes, [...] this suspi- cion is especially pronounced in Iran. This is partly due to the very real conspiracy by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service in 1953 to overthrow Iran’s first elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, and reinstall the Shah.”43 This his- tory of manipulation by foreign powers, is a constant in Iran’s history and even today Iranians see themselves as subject of foreign involvement.44 As such, even internal conflict is viewed with a lens on foreign involvement. Directly after the 1979 revolution, the Supreme Leader Khomeini had to worry about different factions of political rivals. Ethnic and religious dissent inside Iran, by Kurds, Azeris, Arbas, Baluch, as well as, several political groups were challenging the legit- imacy of the Islamic State.45 The IRGC was instrumental in curbing the threat to the Islamic revolution, engaging violently with the MOIS and other agencies to subdue separatist movement and political rivals.46

With regards to genuine foreign threats, most scholars agree that Iran is threatened by Pakistan, Iraq, Israel and of course the United States. In regards to Pakistan, even though Iran and Pakistan

41Takeyh (2009), P 238 42Chubin (2006), P 15 43Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 15 44also see: Knepper (2008) 45Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 16 46This Kurdish insurgency was even fought on foreign soil as obvious with the Mykonos Affair in 1992. Please compare: Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 16 112 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

were supporting different sides in Afghanistan prior to the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, few open disputes have manifested itself between the two states. Iran is clearly concerned about the Sunni majority in Pakistan, fundamentalist Sunnis gaining power in Islamabad and of course Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.47 But, the relationship between the two countries seldom has been hostile.

Israel, on the other hand, is clearly threatening Iran. Khomeini proclaimed Israel as its sworn enemy. Since the early days of the IRI, the IRGC has supported terrorist activities against Israel through proxies such as Hizbullah and Hamas. This opposition is visible today, with Ahmadine- jad calling for the destruction of Israel and has further heated the discussion through refusing to accept the Holocaust.48 Israel in return as mentioned above has been discussing to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel has already done so in 1981 with Iraq’s Osirak reactor and obviously destroyed a Syrian reactor in October 2007, which clearly send the message to Iran that Israel will use a pre-emptive strike if necessary.49 However, despite the open rhetoric battles and threats of an Israeli first strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, there is few indication of Iran following through with its claims. As Ray Takeyh argued: “A careful examination of the clerical leaders’ rhetoric on the nuclear issue reveals that the need to deter Israel is seldom mentioned.”50 He further argues, that “Israel may be an ideological affront and a civilizational challenge, but it is not an existential threat mandating provision of nuclear weapons.”51 This is further underlined by Bahgat who argues that there are no bilateral issues fueling the tensions directly, despite what the rhetoric might suggest.52 Iran seems confident that terrorism and proxy war is sufficient to deter Israel. This view is supported by the Arab view of the recent Gaza war in Dec 2008 and the Israeli- Hizbullah war in 2006, which showed the fallibilities of Israels conventional strategy against and irregular opponent and was celebrated as victory in Iran.53

47see Bahgat (2009), P 313 48Bahgat (2009), P 315 49Russell (2008), P 521 50Takeyh (2009), P 246 51Takeyh (2004) 52Bahgat (2009) 53Takeyh (2009), P 246 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization 113

As the above mentioned survey has found out: “Iranian impressions of Israel do not drive support for the country’s nuclear efforts. On the other hand, negative beliefs about the United States do appear to predict this support.”54 While the U.S. has been perceived as a threat to the young state since 1979, this was further increased due to U.S. actions in the last three decades. Incidents such as the accidental shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988, as well as direct military contact during Operation Desert One or the Tanker War have fueled this fear of U.S. attack.55 But no incident has fueled fear such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As Mohsen Reza’i, the former head of the IRGC has said: “Any action in Iraq is a prelude to one against Iran.”56 Journalist Hamid Reza Jalayi’pur argued: “I think the sound of the cruise missiles in Iraq were heard in Iran very well.” 57 While lacking the “axis of evil” rhetoric of former President G.W. Bush, President Obama is not decreasing this fear in Iran. President Obama, continued to connect the need for a U.S. missile shield with the ballistic missile threat posed by Iran.58 Wehrey et al argued that “Tehran’s perception of external threats has spurred or helped legitimate increasingly repressive internal policies. The first half of 2007 saw an intensified crackdown on liberal social mores, the arrest of visiting Western academics, and widespread accusations that the United States is attempting to foment a velvet revolution inside Iran using Western think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and international academic conferences as covers.”59 Such thinking might even be behind the crackdown on reformists after the 2009 election.60

Iran’s concern about Iraq as well as Afghanistan, until 2001 and 2003 the two most dangerous

54Even though Iranians see Israel not driving support, it is nevertheless seen by 83 per cent of interviewees as having a negative influence and was listed as the most negatively in the region. See: Fair and Shellman (2008), P 546, 553 55Takeyh (2009), P 294ff 56Takeyh (2009), P 217 57ibid. 58Baker and Kulish (2009) 59Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 21 60Fear of “Soft Subversion” of “psychological warfare” techniques applied by the United States to achieve a velvet revolution have been in the Iranian mind for a while but were once again underlined by U.S. actions. For example the “Iran Freedom Support Act” of 2006 attributed US$10 million to support Iranian opposition. seeHouse Report 109-417 - IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT (2006) 114 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

regimes to Iran have been dissolved by the U.S. invasion in these countries. Iran is careful to be involved in the politics regarding the development of both countries. In Iraq this happens partly with clandestine operations and support for the Shia community in Iraq. “Tehran’s threat percep- tion of Iraq and its resulting policies toward that country are inextricably linked with concerns of regime survival and legitimacy.”61

A third perceived threat to the IRI is emanating from Iraq, which is less a violent attack on the regime but more less one on its ideological legitimacy. Iran is clearly trying to achieve influence over other Shi’ite Arabs in the region, and since the crackdown of Saddam Hussein on the Iraqi Shi’ite city of Najaf, Iran and its Supreme leaders could pose itself as the ideological center for Shi’ite religious followers. However, since 2003 Najaf and subsequently the Grand Ayatolla Ali al-Sistani pose a threat to this ideological claim.62 Iran’s legitimacy as center of Shi’ites across the Middle East is thus seriously challenged.

Regardless of the seriousness of the above mentioned threats, none of these dictate the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, one has t take Iranian experience into account in this respect. The Iranian nuclear program was resurrected during the Iran- Iraq war. Disastrous use of chemical agents and ballistic missiles, have engrained the need for deterrence through WMD in the Iranian strategic mind. As Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, said in 1988:

“With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the [Iran Iraq] war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violation and all the aggressions which are committed in the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacterial, and radiological weapons.” 63

61Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 32 62Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 19ff 63Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar (2002), P 256 6.1 An assessment of Iran’s nuclear organization 115

While Iran sees its ballistic missiles as a potent deterrent vis-a-vis` U.S. air supremacy by target- ing U.S. allies in the region, it realized during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Desert Storm that chemical and biological weapons are not sufficient to deter U.S military power.64 65 The lack of accuracy and small payloads makes such ballistic missiles ineffective and further suggests the use of WMD warheads in order to effectively deter any adversary.66

Despite the above mentioned R&D efforts on nuclear weapons in Iran, a strategic interest for nuclear weapons is also visible in the Iranian defense discourse: “Through the effective imple- mentation of nuclear deterrence, governments will attain the stage of security measures and trust building that we have baptized as the international security regime. [...] [G]overnments that ac- cept voluntarily to be among the have-nots would expose themselves to uncertainty and enjoy no guarantee or support for their survival.” 67 Another member of the Iranian armed forces argued, shortly after the U.S. invasion in Iraq, that: “In today’s wars, the most important instruments of military power are nuclear, chemical and electronic. The first two because of the damage to generations and the residue in international communities, have limited application.” 68 From the above deliberations, it is evident, that Iran’s defense structure is defensive in nature. For one, nuclear weapons are discussed as a deterrent, as such a strategic weapon to deter an adversary from attacking Iran.69 Second in view of a current lack of means to deter adversaries, namely the United States, Iran’s hard-liners are trying to inject the Islamic revolutions fighting spirit into its citizens, which is visible through the integration of the Basij auxiliary force into the

64Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 52 65Iran’s inventory of ballistic missiles includes perhaps 250 to 300 SCUD B and longer-range SCUD C missiles with ranges from 190 to 310 miles and an undetermined number of Shahab-3 missiles with an 800mile range and powerful warhead. Following tests of modified Shahab-3 missiles in late 2004, Iranian officials claimed to have extended the missile’s range to 1’200 miles. Compare: Ward (2009), P 316; Also see: Ben-David (2008) 66Ward (2009), P 319 67from: Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 71 68from: Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 75 69It must be noted that without a broader discourse analysis in Farsi and a lack of second hand sources con- tributing to the discussion it is, however, rather difficult to assess the correct posture of a possible nuclear weapons program 116 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

regular IRGC and the rhetoric accompanying it.70 This suggests that Iran’s leaders are consid- ering defending their country against an invasion, just as in the Iran-Iraq war, with human wave assaults. But even in the case of non-violent intervention the Basij and the IRGC are influen- tial. “In the next decade, our problem will be the cultural onslaught and the Basij must block its progress[...]instead of creating military bases, our policy today is to create cultural societies.” 71

This suggests that, even should Iran decide to develop nuclear weapons as an deterrent against foreign aggression, the Iranian state or to be more precise its agencies will out of a bureaucratic self- interest not withdraw from its irregular and terrorist methods to transplant its ideology in the region and deter regional opponents from challenging Iran.

6.1.3 Iran’s Delegative Organizational Bias

It has been discussed so far, that Iran seemingly does have both strategic as well as political reasons to develop nuclear weapons.72 However, going nuclear is a political decision. Should Iran decide to develop nuclear weapons the current status of Iran’s strategic environment, its domestic considerations as well as the restrictions on a transparent defense structure suggest that Iran would likely show a delegative system of nuclear organization. In reference to Table 3.3 it can be assessed that, while no assessment of the stockpile arrangement can be made due to Iran not having developed nuclear weapons yet, Iran’s nuclear program would be delegative in style.

70This rhetoric includes the above mentioned revival of the orientation towards the Hidden Iman, as much as ideological outreach projects, to implant the the “concepts of velayat-e faghih, glorication of Ashura, and the value of martyrdom” into the population. Such programs are using summer camps, auxiliary training as well as IRGC and Basij officers being formally embedded in Iran’s education system. Compare: Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 36ff 71Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, Nafisi and Bohandy (2009), P 28 72Oliver Schmidt argued, that “[t]here are several arguments, which would suggest that it is in Iran’s interest to develop nuclear weapons for security, domestic political, and prestigious reasons. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran could deter an U.S. or Israeli attack, it would further improve Iran’s regional and international power and prestige as the second Islamic nation with nuclear weapons and the tenth nuclear armed state in the world. This prestige and power could be utilised to gain public support on the domestic level.” see: Schmidt (2008), P 77 6.2 Iran’s C3 I and MPC&A performance 117

First, relatively high autonomy is placed on the military. In fact the R&D projects on systems relevant for the production of nuclear weapons, such as the above mentioned neutron initiator as well as the project on nuclear warhead adjustment for the Shahab-3 ballistic missile have been directed by the MoD and the military. Second, physical control of nuclear facilities is provided by the IRGC and the new Qom enrichment facility has been build on a military base, as such indicating military’s power. Further, the IRGC has allegedly been using own funds form their economic enterprises for acquisition of material for the nuclear program. Finally, this clearly indicates that civilians are limited in their power over the military, and their ability to ensure obedience. The fact that the facilities are widely dispersed throughout the country, often built underground (as the enrichment facilities in Natanz or Qom), indicate that Iran’s biggest concern is keeping its program safe from decapitation, through pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities.

6.2 Iran’s C3 I and MPC&A performance

As seen above, Iran would most likely have a delegative system in place, should it decide to produce nuclear weapons. In theory, Iran’s system should thus not be too focused on nuclear safety and security. However, due to the fact that Iran currently has no nuclear weapons as well as only four research reactors an assessment of the performance of C3 I and MPC&A structures is almost impossible. Yet, there are a number of facts that could help to assess the performance of such systems. Therefore, this section will try to analyze these facts in order to give a glimpse into inherent risks and dangers to the system, should Iran choose to develop nuclear weapons and increase its nuclear portfolio, but not decide to change the organizational structure.

6.2.1 Prognosis of Iran’s potential C3 I structures

Should Iran develop nuclear weapons, this could pose several problems for risk of accidental, inadvertent and unauthorized use. With regard to a Command system, it is likely that a Nuclear Command Authority would most likely be connected to the SNSC with the Supreme Leader having the final vote on the use of the nuclear weapon. The SNSC’s would thus institutionally 118 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

enshrine the Pasdaran’s involvement in the process, giving them even more autonomy over the weapons system. Much relies on the nuclear posture Iran would take, and if the IRI would be confident with a breakout capability or decide to go fully nuclear. In the later case the control of the IRGC and the strategic discussion could indicate the interest in a relatively rapid nuclear posture.

The Pasdaran are already in control of physical security of nuclear facilities as such it is logi- cal that they would also gain control of weapons storage sites. It is likely that, ran would most likely rely on a system of 3G’s for physical security, this would be exacerbated by Iran’s lack of technology and adequate equipment, due to sanctions in place.73 In the case of regime cri- sis, such a system is of high risk of melting away. Even the IRGC, as the most ideologically charged security agency, is not free from factionalism, which would clearly exacerbate the risk of run-off. Another factor has best been described by Scott Sagan: “[I]t is not the professional military but the Revolutionary Guard Corps guarding the development sites whose own financial units have often been those used to purchase different parts of the program. These are the same individuals running the arms supply operations to terrorist organizations that Iran supports. To have your nuclear guardians and your terrorist supporter organization be one and the same is a recipe fordisaster.”74 This increases the risk for insider threats significantly. Furthermore in the case of a physical attack on nuclear facilities, common mode errors could occur, as different organizations might react in different unforeseen ways or might rely on social shirking in case of unclear command and SOP structures. Such a system would greatly enhance the possibility of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons or access to them.

Further, due to the great degree of factionalism within the IRGC and the unclear organizational structure of the nuclear program at large, Iran needs a clear communicative net, allowing the

73The above mentioned 2007 arrest of the British sailors, could be either a deliberate step by the IRGC or it could have been a technical cause.This is just a speculation, but it could also indicate the lack of reliable systems, with the IRGC patrol boat not being equipped with adequate or any GPS systems. 74Betts, Sagan and Waltz (2007), P 141 6.2 Iran’s C3 I and MPC&A performance 119

different agencies to connect with each other in a timely fashion, to ensure positive control of nuclear weapons in a situation of crisis.75 As an Iranian thinker on the subject argued: “the con- trol of nuclear weapons on the battlefield requires that under the necessary conditions one must have rapid and reliable communications, and one must also use modern, rehearsed and swift methods.”76 Currently due to bureaucratic rivalry between the ministries and the agencies, such a clear chain of command with clearly established communication links does not exist and would be very hard to implement. This clearly increases the risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

In regards to accidents there is few information available, but Iran’s safety record in weapons construction has not been the best. As Albright has shown, lax safety standards at Iran’s chemi- cal weapons storage site, caused an accident in which hundreds of workers died.77 As the IRGC is greatly involved in the weapons construction and storage, this does not spread confidence in their capability to provide safety for the system. Risks of accidents are also enhanced by the use of weapons systems based on the SCUD, these systems are prone to accidents as they are based on a liquid fuel design for boost.78

As with the lack of technology to provide physical security, Iran seemingly lacks signal intelli- gence technology for intelligence gathering and early-warning.79 Without such systems, the risk for inadvertent use could skyrocket as Iran would not possess the capacity or capability to dis- tinguish between a nuclear attack and a nuclear accident. Depending on the posture Iran would apply to its system, the risk could increase even more.

75Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 75-76 76from Wehrey, Thaler, Bensahel, Cragin, Green, Kaye, Oweidat and Li (2009), P 74; Interesting to note is the wording of battlefield, which could indicate a Iranian discussion about the use of tactical weapons against an adversary 77Albright in Busch (2004), P 277 78For more information on accident scenarios see: Nicolli and Johnston (2009) 79This seems to be a characteristic in the greater Middle East. According to the sources, Israel was able to surprise Syria in its dawn raid on the nuclear reactor, prompting no Syrian intercepting response. Compare: Specter and Cohen (2008) 120 6 Safety and Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran

6.2.2 Prognosis of Iran’s potential MPC&A structures

Arguably no facility is safe from accidents, but as the reactors are not on the electrical grid and also not releasing much waste, no major accidents can be expected. Further, the nuclear material is under IAEA safeguards which provides some check on accounting. The enrichment sites are also relatively safe, a these “sites cannot have massive meltdowns like nuclear reactors, [nevertheless] they can still cause serious environmental and health risks.80 It must be noted that, as the IAEA is not publishing safety concerns in regards to its signatories it is unknown if there are considerable safety issues in Iranian facilities.81 Yet, there is concern for sale or proliferation of material to outsiders or even terrorists. The IRGC is so closely connected to the Iranian nuclear program, and at the same time is in charge of clandestine operations and support of terrorism abroad, that with taking into account the fault-lines within the IRGC, insider-outsider cooperation cannot fully be disregarded. This way, information about R&D of nuclear weapons, as well as fissile material could reach outsiders, if no adequate control and accounting system is put in place. Further, the protests and subsequently the backlash of security forces after the 2009 election do not send assuring signals about the stability of the regime. A regime crisis could pose significant dangers to the nuclear facilities as well as research done on nuclear weapons.82

6.3 Risk Assessment

Iran’s nuclear system is relatively safe, however, this has not much to do with Iran’s priority on nuclear safety and security, but more with the fact that currently Iran constructed only enrichment facilities as well as research reactors, of which one (Arak) is under construction. Therefore, few can be said about the performance of Iran’s nuclear safety and security system. It is highly likely, though, that the factionalism and bureaucratic quarrels, emblematic of Iran’s political sphere, would most likely play a crucial role in the performance of Iran’s C3 I structures. For one, the nuclear organization is split between the AEOI in charge of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the PHRC

80Busch (2004), P 277 81ibid. 82Busch (2004), P 278 6.3 Risk Assessment 121 which is part of the Ministry of Defense in charge of R&D efforts. Further, the physical security is provided by the IRGC, which currently increases its domestic power and allegedly has used own capital to acquire arms and dual-use equipment. Such a diffuse and uncoordinated organi- zation does not provide much hope for a reliable safety and security system, neither with regards to nuclear weapons nor to fissile material. Iran’s threat perception is exacerbating these effects. The variety of ideological, internal as well as external threats, will probably force Iran to follow its current defensive structure. Iran will subsequently keep on supporting terrorism against Israel and other smaller Arab countries. Factions within Iran, will most likely keep the rhetoric against Israel hostile, in an attempt to rally Arab public support and undermine Arab leaders power. And third, it will seek to deter the United States from interfering with Iranian policy, by pursuing a WMD deterrent, and threatening a quagmire should the U.S. invade. This diverse foreign policy seems to suggest that Iran’s actions are irrational, and lack cohesion. While the later is true, the former is not. The factionalized system provides few checks and balances, in contrast only restricts dominance by one factions.

For C3 I and MPC&A performance, such a system does not bode well either. Iran’s faces a num- ber of challenges. Lack of expertise, technical knowledge and equipment will only exacerbate the problems accumulated through insufficiencies of clear control structures. Further, the insuf- ficiency of reliable early warning systems, in combination with lax safety and security standards based on institutional rather than procedural design would make Iran highly prone to risks of ac- cidents, unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Similar assessment can be made for the MPC&A structures, should Iran pursue the goal of building more nuclear power plants and increase its fissile material stock.

It is evident from the above assessment that an Iranian C3 I and MPC&A system would directly mirror the lack of coordination within the Iranian government, and thus contribute to risk to nuclear weapons and fissile material safety and security. 122 7 Conclusion

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis set out to establish factors influencing new nuclear weapons states in their perfor- mance to safeguard their nuclear weapons, material and facilities. It looked at domestic factors and states’ perception of their respective threat environment in order to explain how these factors influence the performance of NWS’ nuclear safety and security structures. The analysis followed three main research questions:

a) In how far is nuclear safety and security correlating theoretically with domestic factors?

b) Do the cases used show this correlation empirically?

c) How safe and secure are nuclear material and facilities as well as nuclear weapons in the different cases?

It can be concluded, that theoretically NWS perception of their threats correlate with the per- formance of their nuclear safety and security structures. The thesis has shown that nuclear per- formance relies on immaterial factors such as civilian dominance and internal or external threat. Nuclear organizations, with a high degree of civilian dominance and internal or low external threat environment, tend to be more assertive, in their nuclear posture, and as such tend to focus more on the safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material. The thesis as such pro- vided two hypothesis made: First, the higher the level of civilian dominance, the more assertive (focused on security) the organization will be. Second, the higher the perception of the external threat, the more delegative (focused on deterrence the organization will be. Normal Accident theory was used to establish this linkage.

A more delegative system, with a high degree of external threat and military dominance, would inevitably be interested in a) their weapons always function when directed, but never when not 7.1 Empirical findings 123 directed, b) a credible second-strike force c) a system to enable quick decisive retaliation. Such a structure is leaning towards mobile forces, and a rapid nuclear posture. Consequently, as figure 3.1 has shown increases the risk of tightly coupled systems and a high degree of complexity, which according to Normal Accident Theory is increasing risks for inadvertent, accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors. It is evident that such a theoretical linkage between institutional (degree of civilian dominance) and structural (threat environment) factors, exist vis-a-` vis performance exists.

7.1 Empirical findings

After theoretically establishing this linkage it was possible to analyze whether the three cases, India, Pakistan and Iran, would show features of this linkage. India’s nuclear organization suggests, this link to exist. India provides an assertive system, even though there are discussions within India about whether a more delegative system would suit India better. Nevertheless, the Indian system is clearly assertive, and as such it could be expected that India perceives safety and security as a top priority. However, not necessarily perceiving safety and security as a priority, India’s performance especially in regards to C3 I did suggest a connection between the domestic perception and its performance. While the assessment of its performance showed a number of disconcerting facts in India’s nuclear system - such as insuffi- ciency in the physical security system at its facilities or a lack of a clear chain of communication - it is evident that India does not neglect C3 I. Proof of this can be seen in the acquisition of early warning radars as well as other intelligence measures, connected with the remaining focus on delayed response. This makes India’s nuclear weapons relative safe from accidents, as well as from unauthorized or inadvertent use through terrorist attacks or theft. With regards to MPC%A however, a linkage to institutional or structural factors could not be concluded. India’s nuclear material and reactor safety is disconcerting so far. Loose safety standards, especially in regards to spent fuel and reactor safety despite international agreements, provide for the possibility of accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear material. However, India has done considerable steps 124 7 Conclusion

to provide for physical security of its nuclear facilities. Further, risks from major accidents are mitigated through IAEA safeguards. It can only be hoped that the IAEA- India 2009 Safeguards agreement will enhance the necessary safety and security features at those sites.

Pakistan’s C3 I system in contrast, did not mirror its delegative organizational bias and as such is not theory-conform. Even though the military dominates both the discourse about the strate- gic applicability of nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Command Authority, it was not evident that the actual safety and security system followed this delegative style. But international fear of nuclear terrorism or theft in Pakistan remains high, and possibly international pressure could have affected Pakistani priorities of its indigenous safety and security standards.1 A number of agreements with the IAEA or other nuclear states as well as laws on security and safety coun- teracted the delegative system, to provide security and safety from theft, proliferation, attacks and so on. Much has been done in Pakistan to provide for security against attacks or insider problems. However, the risks of accidents of nuclear reactors has not been addressed. Pakistan’s two currently constructed reactors at Chasma are based on a allegedly unsafe Chinese design, and built in a known earthquake prone area.

In summation, it can be concluded that both countries, have made remarkable advances in re- gards to their physical security features, including vetting processes etc., however, at the expense of safety features. It is important to note though, that the current safety and security of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, relies heavily on the demated state of their arsenal. Disassembled storage of nuclear weapons naturally minimizes the risks for accidental, unauthorized and inad- vertent use. However, both countries’ foreign policy and strategic elites, discuss a change of their posture. Should this be the case, both countries’ risks of accidental, inadvertent and unauthorized use would increase significantly. The assessment of Iran, was somewhat inconclusive. For one, Iran’s nuclear program is rela-

1Pakistan’s system is remarkably safer than when Nathan Busch assessed it in 2004. Possibly the international pressure heightened, after the revelations about the A.Q. Khan network in 2004, and the re-rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2006. 7.2 Theoretic Hurdles 125

tively young and a nuclear weapons program could not be attested definitely so far. However, the assessment of the nuclear organization and the civilian dominance attempts to provide a prelim- inary answer that Iran’s program would most likely be delegative in character. Even though, the nuclear program is split between the civilian AEOI, the military, particularly the IRGC, domi- nate the R&D as well as strategic discussion through the MoD. However, as these organizations are factionalized themselves it is hard to assess how its C3 I would in fact look like. The most reasonable scenario is that the IRGC is increasing its power and thus its influence over potential nuclear weapons. At the same time bureaucratic politics and internal factionalism could possibly provide some kind of check on the IRGC’s autonomy. In regards to MPC&A there’s is currently not much concern in regards to safety, as Iran does not have any reactors on the grid and the facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Yet, the fact that the IRGX is simultaneously nurturing terrorists and providing security for nuclear facilities is disturbing to say the least. Nuclear theft or insider jobs as well as deliberate proliferation of fissile material to terrorist groups are only some of the concerns to security in this respect.

7.2 Theoretic Hurdles

While the link between institutional and structural factors on the one side and performance of the nuclear organization on the other side and the risks emanating from this, have been theoretically established, the case studies have shown some significant problems within the theory.

First, it became evident that not the threat environment but the perception of this environment is responsible for the outcome of the countries’ nuclear organizational bias. India and Pakistan both share similar threats. Both had and still have public unrest, insurgencies on their territory and clearly defined external threats. Yet, Indian elites chose to focus on the internal threats, arguing that nuclear weapons are a “necessary evil” in the current global world order. Nuclear weapons are a political and not strategic tool. This is in line with India’s perception of military power as a whole. Pakistan on the other hand, even though it is arguably dealing with bigger internal threats than India, has traditionally been focused on the external threat from India. Interestingly, it could 126 7 Conclusion

be possible that regime type has an influence on nuclear safety and security after all. India’s elites are primarily concerned with re-election and as such are more inclined to focus on issues threatening the economic growth or political stability of their constituency.2 An authoritarian regime, such as Musharraf’s until 2008, is less concerned with re-election.3

Second, during the case studies it became evident, that not only civilian dominance but also elites perception of the role of military power plays a crucial role in the organizational outlook. The Indian nuclear organization is influenced mostly by Nehruvians which are inclined to resist in- crease of defense spending and thus restrict the role of military vis-a-vis` economic growth. As such, nuclear weapons are understood as political tool, lacking military applicability. Pakistan, and as far as the thesis could show, Iran are much more focused on defense and thus rely more on military power to increase gains. This is mirrored by the respective dominance of the military in politics. However, more research needs to be done in this respect as the causal factors are yet unclear.

Further, Pakistan’s C3 I system suggests that international pressure and presence, as well as, media attention influence a country’s priorities. While Pakistan’s military, up until arguably 2007, did not focus on the insurgency in the FATA but on India’s growing conventional capa- bilities, western attention was focusing on the possibility of nuclear theft or attack in Pakistan. Therefore, a renewed attempt at linking performance with structural factors needs to account for western linkage and leverage.

Fourth, the discussion about nuclear weapons in general and nuclear safety and security in par- ticular suggests the strategic and scholarly community being caught in an American strategic

2Constituency demands and delivery of basic goods are hindering politicians to go down such an alley. This clearly restricts India’s capability to have a massive defense budget. 3Arguably the insurgency was threatening the regime, but as the ISI and the Pakistani Army was so dependent on the Islamic fundamentalist parties, the regime seems to have coped with appeasement rather than direct military action. compareHaqqani (2005) 7.2 Theoretic Hurdles 127

mindset, which does not discuss lack of neither technological advancement nor resources. While Tellis has shown that India does not lack uranium for building a massive deterrence capability, India “ simply does not have the luxury of giving in to the temptation of adopting a nuclear doc- trine that requires a large deterrent force.” 4 Logically, these countries are also restricted by a small budget in respect to safety and security features.

Finally, MPC&A does not necessarily correlate with the above mentioned factors. In the Pak- istani case MPC&A performance is closely linked to safety and security of nuclear weapons as the overall program is mostly in the hands of the military and all reactors on the grid as well as research reactors are under IAEA safeguards. In the Indian case however, while much has been done to provide security, there is much concern about the safety of fissile material and reactors than about the nuclear weapons. As such, MPC&A and reactor safety might be worth discussing exclusively as different factors seem to influence its structures.

These restrictions have some consequences for the theory. Obviously there is a correlation be- tween civilian dominance and threat environment vis-a-vis` nuclear safety and security. However, this link is not entirely clear, and obviously the theory does not provide for a number of inter- vening variables. While the theory showed a correlation between civilian dominance and threat environment vis-a-vis` nuclear safety and security, it failed to acknowledge the influence of other factors. On the other hand, the thesis succeeded in providing some insight into the actual safety and security standards of the three cases, being able to conclude that recent years have seen much change to the better, yet the system is far from perfect, and risks remain.

4Basrur in Blechman (2009b), P 6 128 9 Bibliography

Chapter 8

Appendix

Figure 8.1: Appendix A - Map of Nuclear Installations - India

Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities

Kota 220 MW PHWR–safeguarded; Nangal 220 MW PHWR–safeguarded; Heavy water production facility–unsafeguarded 235 MW PHWR (under construction)–unsafeguarded; 235 MW PHWR (under construction)–unsafeguarded; heavy water production facility–unsafeguarded Pakistan China Pokharan Nuclear test site Narora 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded; Baroda 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded Heavy water production plant–unsafeguarded

Hazira Meghalaya Heavy water production plant–unsafeguarded Uranium mine and deposits1 New Delhi

Kakrapar Nepal 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded; 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded

Tarapur Two 160 MW BWRs–safeguarded; Two 500 MW PHWRs (under construction)–unsafeguarded; fuel fabrication facility–unsafeguarded; Bangladesh Prefre reprocessing facility–unsafeguarded Calcutta Saha Institute Of Nuclear Physics Trombay Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC): 1 MW research reactor–unsafeguarded; Jaduguda 40 MW research reactor–unsafeguarded; Uranium mining and milling site 30 kW research reactor–unsafeguarded; 100 MW research reactor–unsafeguarded; uranium conversion facility (UF6)–unsafeguarded; fuel fabrication facility–unsafeguarded; Thalcher zirconium production pilot-plant; Heavy water production facility–unsafeguarded heavy water pilot-plant–unsafeguarded; pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant–unsafeguarded2; reprocesing facility–unsafeguarded Indore Centre for Advanced Technology: laser development site3

Bombay Manuguru Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Heavy water production facility–unsafeguarded

Kaiga Hyperabad 235 MW PHWR (under construction)–unsafeguarded; Nuclear Fuel Complex:uranium purification site 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded (UO2)–unsafeguarded; fuel fabrication facility–unsafeguarded

Thal-Vaishet Heavy water production plant–unsafeguarded Kalpakkam 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded; 235 MW PHWR–unsafeguarded; Rattehalli Indira Gandi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR); Uranium enrichment plant–unsafeguarded4 50 MW FBR–unsafeguarded; reprocessing plant–unsafeguarded; Reactor Research Center; Tuticorin 30 kW research reactor–unsafeguarded; 5 Heavy water production plant–unsafeguarded reprocessing facility–unsafeguarded

Sources: CNS Databases

Chapter 9 129

Figure 8.2: List of Indian nuclear facilities 130 9 Bibliography

Figure 8.3: Appendix B - Map of Nuclear Installations - Pakistan

Selected Pakistani Nuclear Facilities

Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) 10 MW research reactor–safeguarded; 27 kW research reactor–safeguarded; Center for Nuclear Studies experimental-scale reprocessing facility (running?)–unsafeguarded1; small-scale reprocessing facility–unsafeguarded2

Khushab 40 MW PHWR under construction–unsafeguarded Wah 5 (may be site of tritium production facility) Potential nuclear weapons assembly site3 China

Qabul Khel Future uranium mining site Golra Sharif Chashma Uranium enrichment facility (under 4 300 MW PWR under construction?)–unsafeguarded construction–will be safeguarded; Afghanistan partially built reprocessing plant

Kahuta Kundian Uranium enrichment plant–unsafeguarded; Fuel fabrication Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories facility–unsafeguarded

Iran Pakistan Mianwali Uranium exploration site Sihala India Pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant- unsafeguarded7

Chagai Hills Possible nuclear test site6

Karachi Lahore 137 MW PHWR–safeguarded; Uranium mining site heavy water upgrading plant; Karachi Nuclear Power Training Center

Multan Heavy water production facility–unsafeguarded

Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium hexaflouride (UF6) conversion plant–unsafeguarded; uranium milling site; uranium mining site Sources: CNS databases BIBLIOGRAPHY 131 Bibliography

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Chapter 10

Abbreviations and Acronyms 144 10 Abbreviations and Acronyms

Table 10.1: List of Acronyms 3Gs Guns, Guards und Gates ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile AG Australian Group IRI Islamic Republic of Iran AP Additional Protocols IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Artesh Iranian armed forces ISIS Institute of Science and International Security BARC Bhabba Atomic Research Centre (India) ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India) KANUPP KANUPP Nuclear Power Plant (Pakistan) C3 I Command, Control, Communication and Intel- LAA Launch after attack (Posture) ligence C in C SFC Commander in Chief of the Strategic Forces LEU Low Enriched Uranium Command CANDU Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor LOW Launch on Warning (Posture) CAS Chief of Air Staff (Pakistan) MAD Mutual Assured Destruction CBM Confidence Building Measures MoD Ministry of Defense (India, Pakistan) CCSOSC Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee (Pak- MoD Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logis- istan) tics (Iran) CDA Core disruptive accidents MOI Ministry of Interior (Iran) CHASNUPP I Chasma nuclear power plant (Pakistan) MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Iran) CIRUS Canada India Research U.S. MPC&A Material Protection, Control and Accounting CISF Central Industrial Security Force (India) MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime CMR Civil-military relations NCA Nuclear Command Authority (India) CNS Chief of Naval Staff (Pakistan) NCA National Command Authority (Pakistan) COAS Chief of Army Staff (Pakistan) NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nu- NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group clear Materials CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements NWS Nuclear Weapons States CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction Program PAL Permissive action link DAE Department of Atomic Energy (India) Pasdaran see IRGC DHRUVA Dhruva Nakshatra, Indian mythological prince PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor blessed with eternity DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea PM Prime Minister DRDO Defense Research and Development Organiza- PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment tion (India) EMP Electromagnetic pulse interruption PWR Pressurized Water Reactor GHQ GHQ General Headquarter of the Pakistani R&D Research and Development Army, Rawalpindi, Pakistan HEU High Enriched Uranium RDD Radiological Dispersion Device HRO High Reliability Organization SFC Strategic Forces Command IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency SNSC Supreme National Security Council (Iran) SOP Standard operating procedure SPD Strategic Plans Division (Pakistan) SSAC State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction