PYRRHONISM : IS THE SKEPTIC REALLY HAPPY?

ATARAXIA AND EUDAIMONIA IN ANCI ENT PYRRHONISM: IS THE SKEPTIC REALLY HAPPY? Mark L. McPherran

The ancient Pyrrhonists are notorious for having distinguished themselves from their philosophical rivals by declaring their freedom from all theoretical commitments. Unlike those who do make such commitments, Pyrrhonists are Skeptics who merely inquire into the merits of various positions without themselves taking one) Thus, Skeptics never assent to non-evident claims as to how things really are (Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes 1.13-24, 197), but rather, on all such matters they suspend judgment (Ë1tox1Í; PH 1.8). Moreover, Skeptics report that there exists no craft-knowledge (xexvii) of how to live a happy life, such as the Dogmatic schools pretend to offer, and so there appear to be no teachers of it, not even Skeptical teachers (PH 3.239-279; Adversus Mathematicos 11.216-257). Skepticism is, instead, simply an ability (8vvawy that allows its possessor to bring about the sorts of oppositions between appearances and judgments that lead to suspen- sion on the issues at stake (PH 1.8-10).2 So in one sense, there are no views, beliefs, doctrines, or dogmas that can be used to characterize this sort of skepticism without violating its own claims to theoretical purity. Despite this self-effacing advertisement, Pyrrhonism was tied by definition and practice to a method that had at least a kind of theoret- ical backing. Like their Hellenistic brethren, the Pyrrhonists were moral naturalists, thinking that since they possessed an accurate Copyrigbt 0 1990 Mark L. McPherran. From the paper read February 9, 1989, at Clark University lIS part of tbe 11th Annual Boston Area Colloqaiwn in Ancient Philosophy. 1. Here and below I shall use 'Skeptic' and 'Pyrrhonist interchangably. - 2. On this, now see William 1988, pp. 547-588. appraisal of human nature, and a methodology uniquely sensitive to it, they could deliver what no other school could: genuine human happiness. Some of their theory of the "humanly natural" is explicit in the texts of Sextus Empiricus and elsewhere, although much is left unsaid. But we need not find this silence terribly disingenuous. Pyrrhonists were, after all, competing for adherents in the same soul- healing business as their opposition, and so any theory ventured would subject them to the kind of eristic harassment they preferred to dish out to others. And as we shall see, it would be inaccurate on the Pyrrhonists' own account to think that they can have no views or the- ories at all; for Skeptics avow that they are able to report how things, even theoretical things, appear to them and are able to reason about them without thereby Dogmatizing (i.e., without assenting to these reports or laying claim to a 'tEXV11 of life; PH 1.4, 13-24; 2.10). Some views of human nature, then, may appear persuasive to Skeptics, and so will be action-guiding for them in their promulgation of Skepticism.3 It is the intent of this paper to identify and explore some of these views, chiefly as they are represented to us by Sextus Empiricus. Among other things, I hope to show that what we find at the root of the Pyrrhonian enterprise is a perceptive and not obviously false understanding of the desiderative aspects of human nature. I. Sextus on Ataraxia and Eudaimonia From the beginning, Pyrrhonism was shaped by an overriding practical and moral concern for human welfare.4 This concern seems to have been particularly well-exemplified by Sextus himself, who as a physician promoted physical well-being and then, as a Skeptic, pro- moted psychic well-being. Skeptics, he says, are philanthropists who desire to cure us of the mental ills we inflict upon ourselves (and oth- ers) by virtue of our own Dogmatism (PH 3.280-1). The aim (TE홢o홢;), then, of the Pyrrhonian life style (å'Y홢O"f1Í) is "happiness," is eu8ocv- uovux(M 11.140-161), and in this Pyrrhonism was completely undis- tinctive, non-doctrinaire, and so, uncontroversial. "Happiness" was the generic aim of every self-respecting philosophical system of the 3. This is my all-too-brief reply to the criticism that the Skeptic is a Dogmatist in both content and practice, since he must have a firm commitment to the view that (1) eu5홢xi|iov{a is (itapatia, and that (2) the most efficient way to achieve it is by the method of broxi1 taught by Skeptical teachers; Annas 1985, p. 19; Sedley 1983, pp. 11-13; and Nussbaum forthcoming. On non-assertion, see, Stough 1984 and Frede 1987a. 4. See Hiley 1987.