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Or Not to Be(Lieve)? (Skepticism & Inner Peace)

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Or Not to Be(Lieve)? (Skepticism & Inner Peace) To Be(lieve) or Not to Be(lieve)? (skepticism & inner peace) 1. Ataraxia: Happiness in Skepticism: The ancient philosophers believed that there was happiness in wisdom. If we pursued truth, we would be happy. In their pursuit of Truth and Happiness, the ancient skeptics (e.g., Pyrrho of Elis, ~300 BC ; Sextus Empiricus, ~200 AD) noticed that, for pretty much any issue, a good argument could be presented for BOTH sides. Famously, the skeptic Carneades gave a public speech commending justice and our understanding of it, only to give, the very next day, a speech refuting everything he’d said the day before! (Antithesis) The result is that we have no rational basis for believing one side rather than the other, since both are equally well-supported. (Equipollence) Therefore, we must remain agnostic, suspending belief. (Epoché) The result was interesting: By suspending belief, they achieved a state of inner peace and tranquility! (Ataraxia) It was their very dissatisfaction during their quest for happiness and truth which led the first skeptics to discover the true way to happiness. Sextus Empiricus tells a story: Indeed, what happened to the Skeptic is just like what is told of Apelles the painter. For it is said that once upon a time, when he was painting a horse and wished to depict the horse’s froth, he failed so completely that he gave up and threw his sponge at the picture – the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints from his brush – and that in striking the picture the sponge produced the desired effect. So, too, the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving the anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they suspended judgment. But then, by chance as it were, when they were suspending judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body. We might think that those who seek TRUTH will achieve peace, but consider: Those who have beliefs and convictions about what is good, what they ought to be doing, and so on will constantly be troubled—whether by doubt and uncertainty; or disappointment that they LACK the good things or failed to DO what they ought to have done; or by fear that they’ll LOSE the good things once they have them. By contrast, those who have no attachments or commitments will enjoy permanent freedom from disturbance. For instance, imagine how angry Democrats get when they watch the news. Have their strong beliefs led to a state of calm? Clearly not. In fact, think of ANY time you or someone you know has gotten extremely mad, upset, or depressed—likely, this was the product of some strongly held belief being challenged or undermined (whether it be political, religious, moral, or even factual). The belief that your lover loves you is not a very fun one to discover to be false. Belief in objective moral duty is always a bummer, because we inevitably fall short of it and feel guilt, etc. If you strongly believe that having arms is a good thing, you’ll be pretty upset when they’re cut off. But, a thorough skeptic even suspends judgement about whether it is bad to be in physical pain! You may also find this short lecture on happiness and ancient skepticism helpful. This idea is also reminiscent of the Buddhist belief that non-attachment leads to inner peace. 2. Truth Leads to Happiness: Others disagree. First, surely we cannot ENTIRELY refrain from forming beliefs. If I don’t have any beliefs about what will nourish me, I will starve to death. If I don’t have any beliefs about the dangers of traffic, what’s to stop be from stepping in front of a bus? According to legend, Pyrrho would have died quickly, had his disciples not followed him around to prevent him from stepping off of cliffs, and so on. Furthermore, even the thoroughgoing skeptic seems to assert at least a FEW things: e.g., that we should suspend judgement, that this suspension leads to happiness, and so on—not to mention, beliefs about how things SEEM to be. Augustine suggests that there are so many things that are both true and certain, that not believing them would be madness, and not wisdom! (e.g., that we exist) [Note that Sextus Empiricus claims that the skeptic can go through life eating bread and not rocks, and not walking off of cliffs, etc., by just sort of “going along with” appearances and internal desires, but without ever forming any beliefs about the truth or appropriateness of what one is doing. Is this possible?] But most of us go much further, even. We place strong belief in all sorts of things. Thomas Reid suggests that to abandon common sense by suspending judgement is nonsense (“if this is wisdom, let me be deluded with the vulgar!”). Saint Augustine notes that we clearly LOVE truth. For instance, even liars hate being lied to—demonstrating that we all value truth. Even when we cling to falsehoods, our unwillingness to admit that we were wrong only further confirms our love of truth—we DON’T LIKE being wrong. (So, weirdly, our love of truth is sometimes the very thing that biases us to believe false things.) Augustine also points out that, without belief, we will not be moved one way or the other. Our excitements, our passions, our convictions, etc. – all of these go away. But these are what make us human! Therefore, the skeptics “rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquility.” He even goes so far as to say that happiness CANNOT be achieved without belief: “there are truths that, although they do not seem to be so, must be believed for anyone to be able to reach the happy life (which is eternal).” (Enchiridion) And elsewhere, “the happy life … is nothing else but joy in the truth” (Confessions) His religious conviction is that belief in God is required to achieve true and perfect happiness (namely, in the afterlife). His main point here is not specific to his religion, however. For, Augustine thinks that true peace comes from knowing how one OUGHT to be, or act, and then DOING those things. When we come to know truth, we discover the right sorts of REASONS by which we can regulate our actions. In short, true peace comes from bringing our actions into accord with reason, or knowledge. He writes, “The peace of … the rational soul [is] the harmony of knowledge and action.” (City of God) [Note that even the skeptic is doing this, in a sense. The skeptic claims to have discovered, by reasoning, that DISBELIEF is the route to happiness. Then, they strive to attain this peace, or happiness, by bringing their actions in accord with this goal, or reason; namely, by practicing a life of suspending belief. Augustine is essentially saying the same thing here. Though, of course, he disagrees about the details.] Skepticism Leads to Misery? Furthermore, clearly not everyone finds tranquility through disbelief. Hume certainly didn’t. For, as he put it, “Skeptical doubt … is a malady … [This] wretched condition … reduces me almost to despair, and … strikes me with melancholy … I am … frightened and confounded … I … begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness …” (Treatise, I.IV.2,7) 4. Conclusion: So, how should we live? Will becoming skeptics make our lives better or worse? What kind of person will you strive to be once you leave my course? Here are my own thoughts: (1) It seems to me that we can’t be TOTAL skeptics. That’s unlivable. But, at the same time, we clearly shouldn’t believe EVERYTHING we’re told. Even Augustine, an anti- skeptic, commends his student for his hesitation to believe without question at one point, calling this carefulness “the greatest safeguard of tranquility”. And finally, once we DO adopt a set of beliefs, we should not begin dismissing our opponents without hearing them out. Hume recommended to us a “tincture of Pyrrhonism” to cure and protect against such dogmatism. Some intellectual humility will likely make us kinder and more receptive to our opponents, won’t it? Is the best life somewhere in the middle between skepticism and dogmatism? (2) Perhaps some knowledge will turn out to be of great consequence—even greater than ‘bread will nourish me’. For instance, most people think that one’s beliefs about, e.g., theism, have radical (eternal) consequences. Is this something we should consider? (3) The skeptic’s main criticism of belief is that strong beliefs lead to disappointment, outrage, and being disturbed. But are these things to be avoided? If we never become outraged, isn’t this just complacence? Maybe we SHOULD be disturbed and outraged by, e.g., the fact that 13,000 children die every day by starving to death? Or by the fact that billions of animals suffer the brutal conditions of factory farms every year? Should personal happiness be our primary concern or goal in life? Or are there other things we should pursue as well; e.g., justice? (4) I think I agree that suspending judgement with respect to certain things causes less stress. To see that, I just think about how much less stressful life was before I paid any attention to politics, or studied ethics, or philosophy. But, that’s also really selfish. You have to live IN the world. You can’t just be a passive, outside observer. For instance, if you see injustice, you can’t just say “I’m not bothered. I suspend judgement about this,” and walk away.
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