DOCSLIB.ORG

Radar in Submarines

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Appendix A: The Skinner Report at Swanage (1940) Transcribed from the original in RSRE TRE 4/4/457 Preliminary Reports on Tests on Ships using 10cm Waves - November, December 1940 by H. W. B. Skinner The following tests were performed at Swanage by Members of TRE, and subsequently by Members of the Signal School, Portsmouth, who were temporarily attached here. The apparatus used was the GEC E.1198 Magnetron (9.1cm) as transmitter, and a crystal mixer with 4Smc IF. The transmitter power was nominally SkW, but the exact amount radiated is not exactly known. Transmitting and receiving aerials were placed at the foci of paraboloidal mirrors, 3ft in diameter, giving a gain of about 500. These were mounted so that their axes could be pointed towards the ship, manually or otherwise. In a few experiments, flat cylindrical-parabolic mirrors with an aperture of 6ft x 9in were used. The gain of these mirrors is about 250. We thought that the flat beam (narrow in a horizontal plane but about ±15° in a vertical plane) might be suitable for use on a ship, rolling in a rough sea. The alternative would be a complex system of gyro­ stabilization. Three sets of radio-apparatus were used - A and B, of which B was an almost exact copy of A. Apparatus C was also very similar, the main difference being that it was better engineered. The performances of the three sets of apparatus were not quite identical. This is unfortunately inevitable in the present early state of development of 10cm apparatus. TEST 1. 7th November, 1940. Apparatus A - Site Leeson House (250ft) Sea fairly calm. The Tit/ark, a boat of 92 tons and steel construction was foIlowed end-on to 7 nautical miles (signal approximately 3 times noise). The boat began to return towards the apparatus. Signals very clear, though fluctuating, the whole time. TEST 2. 11th November, 1940. Apparatus B - Site Leesoll House (250ft) Sea fairly calm. Submarine (U-class, the Usk) was seen up to about 7\12 nautical miles. Strong signals up to 6 nautical miles. These figures apply to the stern-on view. The broadside-on view seemed to give signals about twice as strong. Horizontal polarization of the source seemed slightly preferable to vertical polarization. Between 4 and 41;2 miles, the submarine dived and the signal disappeared. On coming to the surface, the signal re-appeared at a time when at most the periscope and conning-tower were visible. Signals at extreme range are always rather fluctuating, and at extreme range were liable to disappear for rather long intervals. 274 The Skinner Report at Swanage (1940) 275 TEST 3. 8th December, 1940. Apparatus C - Site Leeson House (250ft) Sea fairly smooth. Titlark followed end-on to 12 nautical miles (signal equal to noise). It seems probable that in the interval between Tests 1 and 3, some slight improvement in the apparatus had been effected. TEST 4. 15th December, 1940. Apparatus B - Site Leeson House (250ft) Sea fairly calm. Titlark followed end-on to 9 miles, but seen as strong echo at 10 miles when turning. From this it seems that Apparatus B was somewhat less sensitive than Apparatus C, but probably about the same as Apparatus A. TEST 5. 16th December, 1940. Apparatus B - Site Peveril Point (60ft) Sea calm. Titlark followed end-on to 5 nautical miles; seen turning at 6.3 miles. Signals otherwise similar to those in the previous tests. TEST 6. 17th December, 1940. Apparatus B - Site near Swanage Pier (20ft). Sea fairly calm. Titlark followed end-on 3.5 nautical miles. TEST 7. 18th December, 1940. Apparatus B - Site near Swanage Pier (20ft). Sea fairly calm. The flat paraboloids were substituted for the circular mirrors. The Titlark was followed end-on to about 3 nautical miles. The decrease in range is due to the lower gain of the flat parabolic mirrors. * * * It is characteristic of ship-detection that the signal strength decreases very rapidly with range near the extreme range. This is much more marked than for an aeroplane signal, as would be expected theoretically. For a ship we may have a very clear echo at a certain range, but at a range of Ih or 1 mile greater, the ship may be practically invisible. This applies especially to observations from low altitudes. This fact makes it doubtful if a considerable increase of range can be obtained by increased transmitter power. On the other hand somewhat increased ranges would probably be obtained by the use of wavelengths even shorter than 9cm. It would appear probable that the Usk gives somewhat weaker signals than the Titlark, though not very much weaker. The range obtained for the Titlark from different heights could very likely be reproduced for the Usk, with a maximum range difference of not more than about Ih mile. H. W. B. SKINNER TRE 4/4/457 20th December, 1940 HWBS/MT This is the report referred to in History jj, para.3S2, note (2). (See Chap.1, ref.4.) Appendix B: Radar in Convoy Protection (1942) The paper which follows dated 4 October 1942 gives a good idea of the situation prevailing at that date - just eighteen months after type 271 first went to sea for the Orchis trials - as well as quoting reports of some of the actions in which radar played a significant role. It was addressed to all 171 seagoing ships then in the Western Approaches Command - 57 destroyers, 23 sloops, 9 frigates, 9 coastguard cutters, 67 corvettes and 6 others, as well as many shore authorities. Drafted initially by Lieutenant A. ,. B. Naish, RNVR, Command RDF Officer, it was signed by the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Percy Noble. There is a copy in ADM 220/78. Annotations in square brackets by the present author. From ... THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WESTERN APPROACHES Date ... 4th October, 1942 No.W.A.689/506 RDF IN CONVOY PROTECfION POLICY When the capabilities of Asdics became known to the enemy, U-boats adopted the policy of surface attack by night. This policy was immediately successful, and it soon became apparent that a means of detecting U-boats on the surface at night was a vital necessity. 2. RDF was introduced into the Western Approaches solely for this purpose. 3. In view of the varied uses to which RDF is now put, it is perhaps useful to stress that the detection of U-boats at night is the factor on which RDF policy in this Command must be based. 4. While experiments were in progress to adapt the then existing sets for A/S use, Signal School, with remarkable speed, produced type 271. It was immediately recognised that this was the answer to the surface U-boat, and the RDF policy of obtaining the maximum information of U-boats at night became identified with the policy of fitting the maximum number of RDF sets type 271. 5. The structural limitations of fitting type 271, involving compensation for top weight and in certain cases the removal of the director, are well known, but it is significant that these losses are accepted most willingly by those who have had most experience with type 271 in action against U-boats. 6. When type 271 was first used at sea, large numbers of breakdowns occurred, and even those sets which were in working order were frequently operating below the maximum efficiency. The electrical and structural weaknesses responsible for many of the early breakdowns have now been corrected, but the most important factor in the increased reliability of type 271 has been the appointment of experienced RDF officers to escort groups. It is now clear that type 271 can be made to work at sea, but it is also clear that occasional breakdown will continue to occur. The presence in the escort group of an experienced RDF 276 Radar in Convoy Protection (1942) 277 officer, equipped with an adequate supply of spare components, is an essential part of the present RDF policy. 7. It has seemed necessary to stress the technical side of the group RDF officer's work, as there are so far very few ratings capable of dealing with RDF defects, and this places the maintenance of RDF equipment in a rather different category from the maintenance of the rest of the ship's armament. 8. While a glance at the classified shipping losses is sufficient to show that RDF policy must be based on the U-boat, air warning cannot be neglected. The problem here is rather different. While it is most desirable that every escort should be fitted with type 271 to produce the most effective A/S screen, it is not essential for every ship to be fitted for air warning, and the remarkable success of H/F D /F has led, in certain ships, to the replacement of the air warning set by H/F D/F. While unable to compete with type 271 in the matter of U-boat detection, the air warning sets (types 286, 290 and 291) are designed to combine air and surface warning and in ships not fitted with type 271 they give valuable information of surface vessels and U-boats at close range. Until type 242 interrogators are fitted to type 271 the air warning sets provide the only means of identifying friendly ships and aircraft by IFF, and of making use of the shore RDF beacons. [Radar beacons were set up ashore for navigational use principally for aircraft but responded to ships' 1.5m radar. Harvester with type 286M got a response from St John's, Newfoundland, out to the limit of the range scale, 60 miles, with a bearing accuracy of ±5°.
Recommended publications
  • Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 29

    Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 29

    ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 29 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright 2003: Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 2003 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Typeset by Creative Associates 115 Magdalen Road Oxford OX4 1RS Printed by Advance Book Printing Unit 9 Northmoor Park Church Road Northmoor OX29 5UH 3 CONTENTS BATTLE OF BRITAIN DAY. Address by Dr Alfred Price at the 5 AGM held on 12th June 2002 WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE LUFTWAFFE’S ‘TIP 24 AND RUN’ BOMBING ATTACKS, MARCH 1942-JUNE 1943? A winning British Two Air Forces Award paper by Sqn Ldr Chris Goss SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SIXTEENTH 52 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CLUB ON 12th JUNE 2002 ON THE GROUND BUT ON THE AIR by Charles Mitchell 55 ST-OMER APPEAL UPDATE by Air Cdre Peter Dye 59 LIFE IN THE SHADOWS by Sqn Ldr Stanley Booker 62 THE MUNICIPAL LIAISON SCHEME by Wg Cdr C G Jefford 76 BOOK REVIEWS. 80 4 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Vice-President Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KCB CBE AFC Committee Chairman Air Vice-Marshal
  • The Effectiveness of Canada's Navy on Escort Duty

    The Effectiveness of Canada's Navy on Escort Duty

    Munich Personal RePEc Archive The Effectiveness of Canada’s Navy on Escort Duty Skogstad, Karl Lakehead University 16 January 2015 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61467/ MPRA Paper No. 61467, posted 20 Jan 2015 09:32 UTC The Effectiveness of Canada’s Navy on Escort Duty Karl Skogstad1 January 2015 Abstract This paper examines the potential costs a country faces when it fails to develop domestic arms manufacturing. I examine these costs using the historical example of Canada’s decision to not develop domestic naval shipbuilding capacity prior to World War II. Canada’s primary naval responsibility during the war was to escort convoys be- tween the United Kingdom and North America. However its lack of advanced domestic shipbuilding capacity and congestion at Allied shipyards, meant that Canada could not obtain the relatively advanced destroyer class vessels necessary for convoy duty. Instead it had to rely on less advanced corvette class vessels, which were simple enough to be manufactured domestically. Using a unique data set, created for this project, I match convoy movements to German U-boat locations in order to examine the escort compo- sition and the number of merchant ships lost when an engagement occurred. Using this data I find that destroyers were 2.14 more effective than corvettes at preventing the loss of a merchant ship. Then, by constructing a counterfactual scenario, I find that developing a domestic ship building industry in Canada would have netted the Allies a benefit of 28.7 million 1940 Canadian dollars. JEL classification: N42, F51, F52, H56, H57 Keywords: Canadian Navy, World War II, Convoys, Domestic Arms industries.
  • Épaves De Anse † - Yacht Britannique De 10 Mètres Coulé Lors D' Un Incendie

    Épaves De Anse † - Yacht Britannique De 10 Mètres Coulé Lors D' Un Incendie

    Cherbourg AF 66 († 24 juin 1944) - Barge a r mée allemande de 47 mètres, coulée lors d' une attaque des alliés. Épave retournée sur un fond de 38 mètres, pour la parti e avant. Épave, c o mp l étement aplatie, reposant sur un fond de 30 mètres, pour la partie arrière. Alabama († 19 juin 1864) - Tr o i s-mâ ts barque américain de 70 mètres, coulé lors d' un c o mb a t naval. Épave disloquée reposant sur un fond de 58 mètres. Site historique : plongée interdite. Armor († 2 janvier 1916) - Bateau à vapeur français de 42 mètres, coulé après avoir talonné une roche. Astrée († 23 janvier 1915) - Cargo français de 106 mètres, coulé suite à un échouage devant Omonville CAP DE LA HAGUE : TERRE DE NAUFRAGES Biville la Rogue. Épave très disloquée reposant sur un fond rocheux de 11 mètres. Balidar († 14 septembre 1943) - Remorqueur allemand de 24 mètres, coulé par l’aviation alliée. Épave en bon état reposant à plat sur un fond de 48 mètres. Bosco († 29 novembre 1919) - Trois-mâts hollandais de 43 mètres ayant talonné la Becchue sous A uderville. Breakaway of Yare ( 17 août 1973) Au large du Cap de la Hague, en Normandie, près de 150 épaves de Anse † - Yacht britannique de 10 mètres coulé lors d' un incendie. Campeador († 25 juillet 1891) - Tr o i s-mâ ts barque à vapeur espagnol de 69 mètres, coulé après son échouage sur la roche de la Lisée. Épave posée à plat sur un fond de 42 mètres. la période contemporaine (naufrages postérieurs à 1850) jonchent les Capel († 26 décembre 1944) - Frégate britannique de 88 mètres, coulée par le sous-marin allemand U 486.
  • The Navy Is Here!

    The Navy Is Here!

    CONTACT ! The Newsletter of the former RAF Defford Reunion Association, now merged with the DEFFORD AIRFIELD HERITAGE GROUP in partnership with THE NATIONAL TRUST, CROOME http://deffordairfieldheritagegroup.wordpress.com Editor: Bob Shaw Distribution: Ann Sterry Number 124, February 2019 THE NAVY IS HERE! Photo: Geoff Shaw Royal Navy Corsair comes in fast and low. There were at least four Corsairs at Defford from 1944, for trials with the Royal Naval section at Defford. In this edition of ‘Contact!’ we tell the story of Lt Cdr ‘Loopy’ Dunworth DSC, who was Officer Commanding the Naval Section at Defford 1951-1953. A popular and eccentric figure, he stayed on at Defford as a test pilot with Boulton Paul (see ‘Contact!’ no. 123, January 2019), at Defford after leaving the Navy. .2. Lt Cdr Geoffrey “Loopy” Dunworth DSC OC Naval Section, RAF Defford 1951-53. BPA Pilot 1953-1961 By Les Whitehouse, with additional material from Dennis Williams and overall editing by the editor Born in Manchester 5/8/1921 Geoff Dunworth qualified as a Research Chemist for ICI but in Sept 1940 he volunteered to be aircrew with the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy, as an Observer. From RNAS Arbroath, he was posted to 817 Squadron aboard HMS Victorious, August 1941, which was part of the replacements for aircraft losses over Petsamo and Kirkenes, Norway in July. Escort of the Arctic convoys to Archangel (Operation Dervish) and then the escort of HMS Argus returning from Murmansk followed. Victorious launched air attacks, on targets in Norway, through to October 1941. L/A Geoff Dunworth along with gunner L/A Davies were teamed up with S/L Raymond.
  • Master Narrative Ours Is the Epic Story of the Royal Navy, Its Impact on Britain and the World from Its Origins in 625 A.D

    Master Narrative Ours Is the Epic Story of the Royal Navy, Its Impact on Britain and the World from Its Origins in 625 A.D

    NMRN Master Narrative Ours is the epic story of the Royal Navy, its impact on Britain and the world from its origins in 625 A.D. to the present day. We will tell this emotionally-coloured and nuanced story, one of triumph and achievement as well as failure and muddle, through four key themes:- People. We tell the story of the Royal Navy’s people. We examine the qualities that distinguish people serving at sea: courage, loyalty and sacrifice but also incidents of ignorance, cruelty and cowardice. We trace the changes from the amateur ‘soldiers at sea’, through the professionalization of officers and then ships’ companies, onto the ‘citizen sailors’ who fought the World Wars and finally to today’s small, elite force of men and women. We highlight the change as people are rewarded in war with personal profit and prize money but then dispensed with in peace, to the different kind of recognition given to salaried public servants. Increasingly the people’s story becomes one of highly trained specialists, often serving in branches with strong corporate identities: the Royal Marines, the Submarine Service and the Fleet Air Arm. We will examine these identities and the Royal Navy’s unique camaraderie, characterised by simultaneous loyalties to ship, trade, branch, service and comrades. Purpose. We tell the story of the Royal Navy’s roles in the past, and explain its purpose today. Using examples of what the service did and continues to do, we show how for centuries it was the pre-eminent agent of first the British Crown and then of state policy throughout the world.
  • North Hill in World War II Minehead, Somerset SCHOOLS RESOURCE PACK for Key Stages 2 & 3

    North Hill in World War II Minehead, Somerset SCHOOLS RESOURCE PACK for Key Stages 2 & 3

    BACKGROUND READING AND TEACHER SUPPORT & PREPARATION North Hill in World War II Minehead, Somerset SCHOOLS RESOURCE PACK for Key Stages 2 & 3 SECTION 1 – NORTH HILL BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR 2 P1 -3 SECTION 2 – TANKS IN WORLD WAR 2 P4-5 SECTION 3 – TANK TRAINING IN WORLD WAR 2 P6-9 SECTION 4 – RADAR IN WORLD WAR 2, NORTH HILL RADAR STATION P10-13 SOURCES, VISUALS AND LINKS – TANK BACKGROUND READING AND TASKS P14-15 TEACHER SUPPORT AND PREPARATION P16 -20 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND READING SECTION 1 – NORTH HILL BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR 2 WORLD WAR 2, 1939 -45 On September 1st 1939 Nazi Germany invaded Poland, two days later the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, declared war on Germany. Britain joined with France and Poland, followed by the countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth. This group came to be known as ‘the Allies’. In 1941 they were joined by America and Canada, whose armies came to Minehead to train. Britain was badly-equipped for war and there was an urgent need for military training. Existing facilities were outdated and land for tank training was in short supply. North Hill became one of five major new tank training grounds in the country. NORTH HILL AS A MILITARY SITE During the Iron Age (700 BC – 43 AD), and the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I North Hill was considered an important military site. A beacon was set up above Selworthy in 1555, and in the late 1800s a large military training camp was established. The area continued as a training ground right up to the First World War.
  • At Southwick Park When I Arrived So We Got Hold of Some Recently Built Some Excellent New Tees Narrows to Allow and Started Scarifying and Rapid Cor- on the Course

    At Southwick Park When I Arrived So We Got Hold of Some Recently Built Some Excellent New Tees Narrows to Allow and Started Scarifying and Rapid Cor- on the Course

    Scott MacCallum travelled to Portsmouth to see at first hand Southwick Park Naval Recreational Base's excellent new Course Management Centre Ship shape at Southwicmunrl/k Right: Rear Admiral J. Chadwick C.B. chats with Southwick Park's Head Greenkeeper Nick Beadle (centre) at the grand opening Below: A commemorative plaque marks the auspicious occasion It was a marvellous pal golf club. The opening was carried soon as I arrived. Surprised to see occasion. The sort of out by Rear Admiral J. Chadwick C.B everything closed up I entered by the thing the Royal Navy does so well. watched by several other high ranking side door to find Head Greenkeeper Pomp, ceremony, precision timing and Royal Navy Officers. Nick Beadle delivering a fine off break a decorated dignitary to say a few well They also marked the end of an era which assistant Simon Berry could chosen words and seal the moment during which the gieenkeeping team only edge onto the back door of the with a well propelled bottle of cham- had operated from three less than sat- main facility which, in the rules of the pagne or, as on this occasion, a neatly isfactory buildings spread out over the game, meant he was out caught snipped ribbon. golf course, a situation which did much behind. But this wasn't the launch of a new to test the team's survival instincts and I hasten to add that, in the interests frigate, nor was it the passing out little to extend the life of machinery. of safety and damage limitation, a soft parade for the season's new officer The new facility includes all that ball was in use.
  • The Channel Dash April 26

    The Channel Dash April 26

    The Channel Dash April 26 On the night of February 11, 1942, two German battleships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, along with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen left anchor at Brest, France. This was be the beginning of the “Channel Dash” (Operation Thunderbolt-Cerberus) of February The Prinz Eugen 11-13 in which these three ships, despite pursuit by the British Royal Navy and Air Force (RAF), returned intact to Germany via the English Channel. The Dash was ordered by German leader Adolf Hitler—against the advice of his admirals, who believed his plan meant certain destruction for these ships. Yet Hitler expressed the following opinion: “The ships must leave port in daytime as we are dependent on the element of surprise…I don’t think the British capable of making and carrying out lightning decisions.” This time, Hitler was correct. How did the German ships end up in Brest, France? And why was it necessary for them to even make a Channel dash? Germany and Great Britain had been at war since 1939. By the summer of 1940, the seemingly unstoppable Germans had overrun much of the western portion of continental Europe. This included part of France, allowing them use of the port of Brest on the lower end of the English Channel for their surface ships and submarines. The Royal Navy attempted to blockade the Atlantic coast ports, but its resources were stretched thin. The British had been watching German vessels at Brest carefully. In fact, these three ships had been undergoing repairs there for much of 1941.
  • Coastal Command in the Second World War

    Coastal Command in the Second World War

    AIR POWER REVIEW VOL 21 NO 1 COASTAL COMMAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR By Professor John Buckley Biography: John Buckley is Professor of Military History at the University of Wolverhampton, UK. His books include The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945 (1995), Air Power in the Age of Total War (1999) and Monty’s Men: The British Army 1944-5 (2013). His history of the RAF (co-authored with Paul Beaver) will be published by Oxford University Press in 2018. Abstract: From 1939 to 1945 RAF Coastal Command played a crucial role in maintaining Britain’s maritime communications, thus securing the United Kingdom’s ability to wage war against the Axis powers in Europe. Its primary role was in confronting the German U-boat menace, particularly in the 1940-41 period when Britain came closest to losing the Battle of the Atlantic and with it the war. The importance of air power in the war against the U-boat was amply demonstrated when the closing of the Mid-Atlantic Air Gap in 1943 by Coastal Command aircraft effectively brought victory in the Atlantic campaign. Coastal Command also played a vital role in combating the German surface navy and, in the later stages of the war, in attacking Germany’s maritime links with Scandinavia. Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors concerned, not necessarily the MOD. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form without prior permission in writing from the Editor. 178 COASTAL COMMAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR introduction n March 2004, almost sixty years after the end of the Second World War, RAF ICoastal Command finally received its first national monument which was unveiled at Westminster Abbey as a tribute to the many casualties endured by the Command during the War.
  • 1 Introduction

    1 Introduction

    Notes 1 Introduction 1. Donald Macintyre, Narvik (London: Evans, 1959), p. 15. 2. See Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally: Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). 3. Reflections of the C-in-C Navy on the Outbreak of War, 3 September 1939, The Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–45 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 37–38. 4. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 10 October 1939, in ibid. p. 47. 5. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 8 December 1939, Minutes of a Conference with Herr Hauglin and Herr Quisling on 11 December 1939 and Report of the C-in-C Navy, 12 December 1939 in ibid. pp. 63–67. 6. MGFA, Nichols Bohemia, n 172/14, H. W. Schmidt to Admiral Bohemia, 31 January 1955 cited by Francois Kersaudy, Norway, 1940 (London: Arrow, 1990), p. 42. 7. See Andrew Lambert, ‘Seapower 1939–40: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (1994), pp. 86–108. 8. For the importance of Swedish iron ore see Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1981). 9. Churchill, The Second World War, I, p. 463. 10. See Richard Wiggan, Hunt the Altmark (London: Hale, 1982). 11. TMI, Tome XV, Déposition de l’amiral Raeder, 17 May 1946 cited by Kersaudy, p. 44. 12. Kersaudy, p. 81. 13. Johannes Andenæs, Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin, Norway and the Second World War (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1966), p.
  • Neogene-Quaternary Slow Coastal Uplift of Western Europe Through The

    Neogene-Quaternary Slow Coastal Uplift of Western Europe Through The

    Neogene-Quaternary slow coastal uplift of Western Europe through the perspective of sequences of strandlines from the Cotentin Peninsula (Normandy, France) Kevin Pedoja, J. Jara-Muñoz, G. de Gelder, J. Robertson, M. Meschis, D. Fernandez-Blanco, M. Nexer, Y. Poprawski, Olivier Dugué, Bernard Delcaillau, et al. To cite this version: Kevin Pedoja, J. Jara-Muñoz, G. de Gelder, J. Robertson, M. Meschis, et al.. Neogene-Quaternary slow coastal uplift of Western Europe through the perspective of sequences of strandlines from the Cotentin Peninsula (Normandy, France). Geomorphology, Elsevier, 2018, 303, pp.338 - 356. 10.1016/j.geomorph.2017.11.021. hal-01696478 HAL Id: hal-01696478 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01696478 Submitted on 7 Mar 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT Neogene - Quaternary slow coastal uplift of Western Europe through the perspective of sequences of strandlines from the Cotentin Peninsula (Normandy, France) K. Pedoja1,2,3, J. Jara-Muñoz4, G. De Gelder5, J. Robertson6, M. Meschis6, D. Fernandez-Blanco5, M . Nexer1,2,3, Y. Poprawski7, O. Dugué1,2,3, B. Delcaillau1,2,3, P. Bessin8, M. Benabdelouahed9,10, C.Authemayou9,10, L.Husson11,12,13, V.Regard14,15,16, D.
  • We Envy No Man on Earth Because We Fly. the Australian Fleet Air

    We Envy No Man on Earth Because We Fly. the Australian Fleet Air

    We Envy No Man On Earth Because We Fly. The Australian Fleet Air Arm: A Comparative Operational Study. This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Murdoch University 2016 Sharron Lee Spargo BA (Hons) Murdoch University I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution. …………………………………………………………………………….. Abstract This thesis examines a small component of the Australian Navy, the Fleet Air Arm. Naval aviators have been contributing to Australian military history since 1914 but they remain relatively unheard of in the wider community and in some instances, in Australian military circles. Aviation within the maritime environment was, and remains, a versatile weapon in any modern navy but the struggle to initiate an aviation branch within the Royal Australian Navy was a protracted one. Finally coming into existence in 1947, the Australian Fleet Air Arm operated from the largest of all naval vessels in the post battle ship era; aircraft carriers. HMAS Albatross, Sydney, Vengeance and Melbourne carried, operated and fully maintained various fixed-wing aircraft and the naval personnel needed for operational deployments until 1982. These deployments included contributions to national and multinational combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. With the Australian government’s decision not to replace the last of the aging aircraft carriers, HMAS Melbourne, in 1982, the survival of the Australian Fleet Air Arm, and its highly trained personnel, was in grave doubt. This was a major turning point for Australian Naval Aviation; these versatile flyers and the maintenance and technical crews who supported them retrained on rotary aircraft, or helicopters, and adapted to flight operations utilising small compact ships.