Terrorism (2) Box: RAC Box 2
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Collection: Cannistraro, Vincent: Files Folder Title: Terrorism (2) Box: RAC Box 2 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name CANNISTRARO, VINCENT: FILES Withdrawer CAS 3/22/2011 File Folder TERRORISM (2) FOIA Ml0-339 Box Number GUNN 39 ID Doc Type Document Description Noof Doc Date Restrictions Pages 107732 PUBLICATION TERRORISM REVIEW 33 5/6/1985 Bl B3 PAR 8/29/2000 F95-023/2 #14; PAR 8/8/2013 M10-339 #107732 107733 SUMMARY RE FOUR STUDIES 13 4/23/1985 Bl B3 D 8/29/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #15 107734 MEMO RE UPDATE 3 5/8/1985 Bl B3 D 8/29/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #16 107735 NSC PROFILE SHEET 1 ND Bl R 6/21/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #17 107736 MEMO NICHOLAS PLAIT TO MCFARLANE RE 1 4/26/1985 Bl REQUEST R 5/31/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #18 107737 REPORT ON PROGRESS 2 ND Bl PAR 5/31/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #19 107738 MEMO CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE 2 12/31/1984 Bl REQUEST PAR 5/31/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #20 107739 LEITER GLENN HAMMOND AND PETER BAHNSEN 2 12/5/1984 Bl TO ROVERT OAKLEY RE RECOMMENDATIONS Freedom of Information Act• [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose Information complied for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In donor's deed of gift. WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name CANNISTRARO, VINCENT: FILES Withdrawer CAS 3/22/2011 File Folder TERRORISM (2) FOIA Ml0-339 Box Number GUNN 39 ID DocType Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 107740 CHART REPROGRAM SUMMARY 1 ND Bl 107741 MEMO OAKLEY TI SPIERS RE FUNDING 1 12/21/1984 Bl R 5/27/2005 NLSF95-023/2 #23 107742 CABLE 22224 7Z APR 85 3 4/22/1985 Bl D 8/29/2000 NLSF95-023/2 #24 107743 CHART RE ORGARNIZATIONAL TREE 1 ND Bl R 7/10/2001 NLSF95-023/2 #25 Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)J 8-1 National security classlfled Information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ 8-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIAJ 8-3 Release would vlolate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIAJ 8-4 Release would dlsclose trade secrets or confldentlal or financial Information ((b)(4) of the FOIAJ 8-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy ((b)(6) of the FOIAJ 8-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes ((b)(7) of the FOIAJ 8-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(S) of the FOIAJ 8-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAJ C. Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In donor's deed of gift. r·-;~~D=ir:ec:to:ra:te~o~f-------lntelligence -:~-----:--------- " I Terrorism ReviewO . I 6 May 1985 ~ .I I ~- ~ GI TR 85-009 6 May /985 Q:,::r,• ;\ SSi IED IN PARf Copy 008 P~~~i,J~liD , '33tf']D113 ~ ev______ ,~~ARA DATE_fl£.it3 ~ - Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Unauthorized Disclosure Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control NOFORN(Nfl Not releasable to foreign nationals Abbre•iations NOCONTRACT (-:-.IC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants PROPIN (PR) Caution- proprietary information involved ORCON(OCI Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator REL... This information has been authorized for release to ... FGI Foreign government information w~ WN INTEL- Intelligence sources or methods involved All material on this page is Unclassified. i.t- .•,· Terrorism Review• I ,_..... .......,_.. .... .. 6 May 1985 Focus-Prospects for Palestinian TerrorismD DI/OGI '---------------' 7 Highlights Dl/OGI '-------------' ·-·· -·------ - - - --- ----- -------- - - --- - --- - ~ --- 13 The LARF Enigma• ._____ _...J Dl/OGI 17 .__ ___JI Dl/OGI 19 Peru: The Continuing Sendero Luminoso ChallengcO I ~~Ll . 23 The Terrorism Diary for JunQ Dl/OGI ·----- - .. ·· - - -------------- - ---- ---------- 27 Chronology of Terrorism-I 985 ._________ Dl/OGI This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor ;t. .. , ' Terrorism ReYiew '~--~ 6 May 1985 Prospects for Palestinian Terrorism / Focus ~----~ Palestinian terrorists were responsible for about 30 percent of the international terrorist incidents of Middle East origin we recorded during the past year: • Terrorist operations inside Israel and the ·occupied territories increased significantly over the level observed in 1983, with virtually every Palestinian group claiming credit for at least one attack. • Terrorist attacks by Syrian-sponsored Palestinian groups in Europe also were up; Jordanian interests were the primary target. • Intra-Palestinian conflicts, particularly the split within the PLO, continued to generate sporadic terrorist violence. Palestinian terrorism involving these targets is unlikely to subside in the near term. I I US facilities and personnel have not been til.rgeted by any PLO group, whether pro- or anti-Arafat, in recent years. Two Palestinian groups outside the PLO-the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal Group and the Iraq-based 15 May Organization-did ttack US interests in 1984 and continue to pose a dangerous threat. anti-American operations wou e a 1 e y ac or m any '--d-,-e-c7is...,.io- n-;-b-y-A:--r-a"""f,-at_o_r--'anti-Arafat groups to expand their terrorist operations in an effort to force the international community to deal with their grievances j ~----' Fatab's Restraint The supporters of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat continue to adhere to the PLO's decadelong ban on international terrorism, although they still carry out attacks against civilian and military targets in Israel and the occupied territories. Palestinians refer to these attacks as the "armed struggle to liberate the homeland" and do not consider them to be terrorism. Virtually all Arab nations endorse the so-called armed struggle.I I Palestinian groups launched more than 50 attacks in Israel or the occupied territories in 1984. Fatah or other pro-Arafat cells inside the occupied territories probably were responsible for at least some of these attacks. In most cases, however, we have been unable to determine the exact perpetrators. Sometimes, several Palestinian groups claim responsibility for the same incident in an effort to demonstrate their dedication to the anti-Zionist cause and their continued capability to operate inside Israeli territory. At times the true perpetrators will not claim responsibility, so as not to reveal their operational infrastructure or prompt" Israeli reprisals against their bases outside Israel.I I ~5--009 6 May 1985 - -· ~- .•,· The assassinations last December of two PLO officials-Ismail Darwish in Rome and Fahd al-Qawasmeh in Amman- almost certainly conducted by Syrian-backed Palestinian opponents of Arafat, raised the R()ssibility of retaliatory attacks by Fatah against radical Palestinian targets in Europe.I Arafat's abilitv and willingness to restrain additional Fatah terrorism may be limited. r Syrian-Based PLO Groups All the anti-Arafat PLO groups are based in Syria or Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon. From these locations they can infiltrate teams into Israel or the West Bank, either directly or through Jordan, and provide support to terrorist cells already in place. We believe that most of the Palestinian terrorist incidents in Israeli-controlled territory were the work o.f these radical Palestinians . .__I- ---' The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) claimed credit for two of the most notable attacks. The first was a grenade attack in a Jerusalem store last February that wounded 21. Then, in April, three D FLP terrorists attacked shoppers on a crowded street in Jerusalem with automatic weapons and handgrenades. Forty-eight persons were wounded before the terrorists were overpowered~ I 2 ~t -·, . ' Most of the Palestinian attacks against Israel were like the February incident small bombs or grenades left in places where Israeli civilians congregate. In the last year there was also a resurgence of a type of attack common before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon: Katyusha rockets fired at Israeli border settlements. At least IO such attacks occurred in the last 12 months. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Struggle Front (PSF) claimed credit for some of them.I I The Palestine National Sahation Front Until March 1985, the Syrian-based Palestinians were divided into two loose coalitions: the Democratic Alliance composed of the PFLP, the DFLP, the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party; and the National Alliance composed of Abu Musa's Fatah splinter group, the PFLP-General Command, the PSF, and Saiqa.