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march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Anwar al-`Awlaqi: Profile of a

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Anwar al-`Awlaqi: Profile of a Jihadi Radicalizer Jihadi Radicalizer By Christopher Heffelfinger By Christopher Heffelfinger

Reports 5 The Taliban Arrest Wave in Pakistan: Reasserting Strategic Depth? By Thomas Ruttig 7 Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network By Raheel Khan 10 Insight into a Suicide Bomber Training Camp in Waziristan By S.H. Tajik 13 Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan By Sajjan M. Gohel 17 The Nexus Between Salafism and Jihadism in the Netherlands By Beatrice de Graaf 22 Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Courts By Huma Yusuf

26 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

mam anwar al-àwlaqi was the subject of an extensive manhunt. In thrust into the media spotlight late December, it was reported that he following news of his involvement may have been killed in a missile strike with Major Nidal Malik Hasan, in Yemen’s Shabwa Province, but he Ithe gunman in the November 5, 2009 survived. shootings that killed 12 U.S. soldiers and a doctor at the Fort Hood Army base in Al-Àwlaqi has already served to Texas.1 Before the shootings, al-Àwlaqi radicalize a sizable number of young About the CTC Sentinel was only a concern to a select few in the Muslims, including Americans and U.S. law enforcement community. Now, The Combating Terrorism Center is an other English-speaking Muslims who however, al-Àwlaqi is an open enemy of independent educational and research aspired to learn more about jihad and the United States. Indeed, Umar Farouk institution based in the Department of Social its permissibility according to Sharià Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian man who Sciences at the United States Military Academy, (Islamic law). He has translated and attempted to blow up a Northwest West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses discussed famous Arabic-language tracts Airlines flight as it landed in Detroit the Center’s global network of scholars and on jihad in his lectures and articles, as on Christmas Day, was reportedly one practitioners to understand and confront well as hadith stories and other matters of al-Àwlaqi’s students.2 Al-Àwlaqi, contemporary threats posed by terrorism and of faith and doctrine. He has been able to currently believed to be in Yemen, is now other forms of political violence. connect across cultures; the American- born al-Àwlaqi received his higher 1 Mark Schone and Rehab el-Buri, “Fort Hood: Hasan education in the United States after The views expressed in this report are those of Asked Awlaki if it Was Okay to Kill American Soldiers,” spending his formative teenage years in 3 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, ABC News, December 23, 2009. his native Yemen. Moreover, while al- the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 2 “U.S. Preacher Says Backs Failed Plane Bombing: Re- port,” Reuters, February 3, 2010. 3 Tom Sharpe, “Radical Imam Traces Roots to New Mexi-

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Àwlaqi’s online videos have inspired Background on Anwar al-Àwlaqi Witnesses told FBI agents investigating a number of mostly self-formed jihadist Anwar al-Àwlaqi was born in Las al-Àwlaqi’s ties to the hijackers that groups in the years following 9/11, he was Cruces, New Mexico in 1971.6 His father he had a close relationship with the also connected to the well-established Nasir, who hailed from the Àwlaq two and frequently attended closed Salafist network in the Washington, tribe that dominated much of Shabwa door meetings with them.15 Some of D.C. area.4 Al-Àwlaqi served as imam Province in eastern Yemen, came to the investigating agents remained at the popular Dar al-Hijrah mosque in the United States to pursue a degree suspicious of al-Àwlaqi’s alleged non- Falls Church, Virginia, where, during in agricultural economics.7 He would involvement in the 9/11 plot given this his tenure, two of the 9/11 hijackers eventually become agricultural minister relationship, but he was never charged prayed in 2001, as did Major Hasan.5 in Yemen.8 Anwar al-Àwlaqi spent his in connection with the attack.16 early years in the United States, but Despite the increased media focus returned with his father to their native In early 2001, al-Àwlaqi moved to recently, al-Àwlaqi’s role in furthering Yemen where he spent his teenage northern Virginia, taking a position as the global jihad has not yet been years. In 1991, he returned to the United imam at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque, one adequately understood. What makes States to seek an engineering degree of the largest in the area. The mosque al-Àwlaqi unique is his role in the at Colorado State University.9 After was also a place of worship for al-Hazmi radicalization process, serving as graduation, he became a leader at a local and another 9/11 hijacker, Hani Hanjour the critical link that takes dedicated mosque in Fort Collins, Colorado, and (al-Hazmi moved from San Diego to students of Salafi-jihadi ideology from soon afterward at an Islamic center in northern Virginia around the same time an inspirational to an operational mode. San Diego, where he worked toward a as al-Àwlaqi). Board members of the Accordingly, al-Àwlaqi’s greatest master’s degree in education.10 Dar al-Hijrah mosque said they hired significance lies in his ability to al-Àwlaqi because he was popular function as a motivational speaker for In 1996, Anwar al-Àwlaqi led San with Muslim youth. During his time jihad, demonstrating a proven talent to Diego’s Masjid al-Ribat al-Islami, and in northern Virginia, al-Àwlaqi also drive believers into action. Far beyond served as imam there for four years.11 served as a Muslim chaplain at George his eventual survival, capture or death, In 1998 and 1999, he served as vice Washington University.17 al-Àwlaqi will have a lasting impact president for a charity founded by on jihadist activism. Like many other the influential Yemeni Islamist figure In 2002, al-Àwlaqi left the United jihadist ideologues whose output has Àbd al-Majid al-Zindani, who the States for the United Kingdom, where been hindered by the duress of combat, U.S. government labeled a “specially he went on a lecture tour over the his videos continue to find a wide designated global terrorist” in 2004.12 course of several months, giving audience online. Martyrdom would only Federal prosecutors have described numerous talks that attracted Muslim amplify his popularity. that charity, the Charitable Society for youth in particular.18 Before moving Social Welfare, Inc., as a front used to Yemen in early 2004, al-Àwlaqi to finance al-Qaìda and Usama bin returned briefly to northern Virginia Ladin.13 During his years in San Diego, around the end of 2003 where he met al-Àwlaqi also came into contact with with the now-imprisoned radical Ali Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, al-Timimi,19 and allegedly discussed co,” New Mexican, November 14, 2009. two of the 9/11 hijackers, when they recruiting young Muslims for jihadist 14 20 4 Until about 2004, Salafist activism thrived in the north- attended Masjid al-Rabat al-Islami. campaigns abroad. Al-Àwlaqi also ern Virginia suburbs outside Washington. Scores of ed- had connections to other prominent ucational institutions, non-profits and outreach groups 6 Michelle Shephard, “The Powerful Online Voice of Ji- militant Salafists, including Ùmar provided ideological instruction and spiritual guidance had,” Toronto Star, October 18, 2009. Àbd al-Rahman (the imprisoned “blind 21 to the area’s Muslims, many with ties to universities in 7 Schmidt. shaykh”). In mid-2006, al-Àwlaqi was Saudi Arabia that have been bastions of Salafist activism. 8 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Cleric Linked to Fort Hood At- Aside from a small number of other communities, such tack Grew More Radicalized in Yemen,” Washington unlikely that al-Àwlaqi was aware of the 9/11 plot be- as those in East Orange, New Jersey, some communities Post, December 10, 2009. forehand. in Michigan and perhaps Richardson, Texas, northern 9 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki,” BBC, January 3, 2010. 15 Ibid. Virginia was the largest of the Salafist communities in 10 Ibid. Despite his lack of formal religious credentials, 16 Ibid. the United States. It was the center of national Salafist Anwar al-Àwlaqi is considered charismatic, which ex- 17 Brian Handwerk and Zain Habboo, “Attack on Amer- organizational efforts given its proximity to Washing- plains his success in the mosque. ica: An Islamic Scholar’s Perspective—Part 1,” National ton, D.C.—this network of organizations dated back to 11 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki.” Geographic News, September 28, 2001. the late 1960s. 12 Al-Zindani is one of the most influential Islamist fig- 18 Raghavan. 5 A third 9/11 hijacker attended his lectures in San Diego. ures in Yemen. He is president of al-Iman University 19 Ali al-Timimi was the spiritual mentor of the Virginia U.S. law enforcement officials, however, do not believe in Sanaà and has extensive ties to Saudi Salafist insti- Paintball Group, and he is currently serving a life sen- that al-Àwlaqi played an operational role in his con- tutions and their leaders. Al-Zindani is also a leader of tence for inciting his followers to jihad. tact with any of those militants. For details, see Philip al-Islah, Yemen’s largest opposition party. The United 20 Schmidt. Sherwell and Alex Spillius, “Fort Hood Shooting: Texas States labeled him a “Specially Designated Global Ter- 21 U.S. officials claim that al-Àwlaqi met with a close Army Killer Linked to September 11 Terrorists,” Tele- rorist” in 2004. associate of Ùmar Àbd al-Rahman. Al-Rahman is cur- graph, November 7, 2009; Susan Schmidt, “Imam From 13 Schmidt. rently imprisoned in the United States for his role in the Va. Mosque Now Thought to Have Aided Al-Qaeda,” 14 Ibid. While the two did speak to al-Àwlaqi and at- 1993 World Trade Center bombing. For details, see Jo- Washington Post, February 27, 2008. tended his lectures, U.S. law enforcement officials find it seph Rhee and Mark Schone, “How Anwar Awlaki Got

2 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 arrested by Yemeni authorities (roughly period of waiting. It is not a discussion Many of al-Àwlaqi’s lectures, mostly on two years after he resettled in Yemen of politics, jihad or the “tyranny” of the religion, are available on YouTube. They with his wife and children) and detained United States, but a speech typical of an discuss the importance of Ramadan, for 18 months.22 Al-Àwlaqi said he was imam at virtually any mosque providing the lives of the prophets, paradise, and repeatedly interrogated during that exegesis of scripture on the nature of the stories of the Prophet Muhammad’s time by agents from the FBI regarding soul as described by the Qur’an—what companions. Yet his lectures also veer his ties to the 9/11 hijackers.23 the believer can expect upon death and into the topics of prototypical Salafist what will come of the “evildoer.” discourse. Beginning around 2004- Al-Àwlaqi himself may have been 2005, al-Àwlaqi neglected to temper further radicalized by his time in His more prominent contributions have his message against militancy and Yemen’s prisons. If nothing else, it played an important role in radicalizing spoke openly of a war between Muslims reinforced his existing jihadist beliefs. Muslims to take part in jihad. In his Although he previously showed an well-known discussion of “Constants “The importance of al- affinity for Salafi-jihadism and support on the Path of Jihad,” al-Àwlaqi for Muslim resistance in Palestine, discussed the issue of “Is tarbiyyah a Àwlaqi’s role in the global he began making increasingly public prerequisite of Jihad Fi Sabilillah?” (“Is jihad lies in his ability to calls for violent struggle after his education/instruction a prerequisite for incarceration and interrogations waging jihad for the sake of Allah?”). radicalize Muslim youth in Yemen.24 After this period, his In this talk, he dispelled the conception through his English- popularity continued to increase, as did that extensive religious instruction is his calls for jihad against the West. necessary before partaking in jihad, and language writings and instead made the argument that jihad is online presence.” Al-Àwlaqi’s Popular Propaganda required in Islam, as is fasting, prayer The importance of al-Àwlaqi’s role and other religious obligations. After in the global jihad lies in his ability to invoking the ayah (2:216)—“Fighting is radicalize Muslim youth through his prescribed upon you, and you dislike and the United States, seeing the latter English-language writings and online it. But it may happen that you dislike as an oppressor and working against presence. Until November 2009, Anwar a thing which is good for you, and it the will of Allah. Among the videos of al-Àwlaqi had a Facebook page with may happen that you love a thing which his lectures posted online are talks on 4,800 fans and a popular blog. Both is bad for you. And Allah knows and the importance of fulfilling jihad and its were taken offline after his endorsement you know not”—al-Àwlaqi asked his legitimacy in Islam, along with examples of Nidal Hasan as a hero for the Ft. Hood audience, of the mujahidin and how they lived. shootings. On these outlets, al-Àwlaqi One of his most popular lectures is a six- was presented as a scholar, imam and If someone starts practicing Islam, part series explaining the late al-Qaìda daì (one who calls people to Islam). He or someone reverts to Islam, strategist Yusuf al-Ùyayri’s “Thawabit answered questions on various aspects would we tell them that they have àla Darb al-Jihad” (Constants on the of belief and provided inspirational to have tarbiyya before they start Path of Jihad). That lecture seems to words on faith, particularly to the fasting?...There is no difference in accompany another of al-Àwlaqi’s youth audience. Many of his teachings this matter and jihad fi sabil Allah. works, “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad,” reflected that persona; Facebook fans, The instruction for siyam [fasting] quite well. for example, discussed inspirational and jihad is no different. points on faith made by al-Àwlaqi in Significantly, in both of these popular his audio lectures and how he brought Al-Àwlaqi’s discussion of “Constants works on jihad, al-Àwlaqi borrows Muslim youth closer to Islam, even on the Path of Jihad” and his other heavily from the works of well-known as their modern environment seemed contributions provide legal justification jihadist ideologues. This is no doubt part estranged from it. for Muslims to join in jihad against the of their popularity. Yusuf al-Ùyayri is United States. considered to have been one of the most In “The Journey of the Soul” audio lecture, effective al-Qaìda jihadist thinkers for example, al-Àwlaqi discussed the After hearing al-Àwlaqi’s lectures, and a veteran fighter who died while period of waiting (al-Ihtidhar) between the fluid interchange between Arabic waging jihad against the Saudi regime. death and the afterlife. In the eight- terms and English discourse is Moreover, “44 Ways of Supporting minute talk, he provided explanation immediately evident. In a consistently Jihad” is clearly taken from Muhammad of various Qur’anic verses dealing with calm and measured demeanor, al- bin Ahmad al-Salim’s famous “39 Ways the subject, the processes of the angel of Àwlaqi provides many terms, such as to Serve and Participate in Jihad,” with death and what one can expect in this tarbiyya, in the original Arabic without much of it identical or paraphrased. providing translation, clearly intending Such deference to earlier Salafist texts Away,” ABC News, November 30, 2009. his discussions for a Muslim audience is not uncommon in jihadist ideologue 22 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki.” educated on key Islamic terms in their circles, but al-Àwlaqi fails to provide 23 Ibid. original language. This imbues the any mention of al-Salim’s text anywhere 24 Raghavan. Many fervent Salafists openly advocate talks with a feel of authenticity, which in his own, which is indeed surprising militancy against the West yet do not partake in physi- has proven a draw for many of his considering the text is so clearly inspired cal violence. followers. by al-Salim’s well-known tract.

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Al-Àwlaqi’s Role in the Global Jihad Some observers have commented that a Minnesota Somali man, Mohamoud Anwar al-Àwlaqi’s threat is not merely al-Àwlaqi’s popularity among some Hassan, who in November 2008 gave as an operational planner or recruiter, Western Muslims is his fluency in up a university education to enlist in as has frequently been mentioned in the English. Yet it is not simply his ability al-Shabab training camps in Somalia.27 storm of Western press coverage, but to speak English well; instead, it is his He too had listened to audio lectures by as a motivational speaker, whereby he adept skill at moving between fluent Anwar al-Àwlaqi.28 Al-Àwlaqi was can mobilize thousands toward jihad. English and Arabic, quoting the Qur’an again instrumental in the radicalization His strength is to connect with a young and hadith in flawless Arabic. This of those involved in Canada’s largest audience and impress upon them the gives him the credibility needed to terrorist plot, the so-called “Toronto necessity of joining the struggle. Indeed, influence a serious Muslim audience. 18” who planned a large-scale attack both “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad” Until the last few years, he was able to against the Canadian government and and “Constants on the Path of Jihad” move seamlessly between the Arab and targets in Toronto. His videos were are ideological rather than strategic or Western worlds. played at a training camp the group held tactical works that provide evidence six months prior to their arrests.29 from early Islamic sources to legitimize Moreover, part of what makes al- jihad for a devout and studious English- Àwlaqi so remarkable is that he served Al-Àwlaqi has been a critical figure in language audience. Muslim communities in the United Salafi-jihadi radicalization, particularly States as a prayer leader and spiritual for the audience of English-speaking Moreover, al-Àwlaqi is a charismatic guide for years. He was part of a large Muslims. He is one of a number of clerics speaker. He is distinct from most of the community of Salafist activists in spreading radical messages on internet other Salafi daìs available online in that northern Virginia. While U.S. federal forums, through media distribution he received no formal Islamic higher law enforcement was unable to build outlets online, and previously in education. To many, this is a clear mark a strong enough case to arrest him in lectures at Islamic centers. Among against him (and is perhaps reflected in the immediate years after 9/11, they did this group of Salafist preachers and his heavy borrowing of others’ texts), ideologues there is a circle of militant but for his target audience of Western “Al-Àwlaqi can relate Salafists advocating violent jihad as Muslims it seems to have helped forge the necessary means of establishing a common ground and connection. culturally to a Western an Islamic state and improving the Al-Àwlaqi can relate culturally to audience, while bringing status of Muslims worldwide. Sadly, a Western audience, while bringing al-Àwlaqi will certainly not be the last religious authenticity at the same time. religious authenticity at the Western cleric to promote such views, same time.” and the United States and European Another strength al-Àwlaqi governments must come to understand demonstrates is his ability to speak the critical role ideology plays in jihadist about international politics with more militancy before it can be mitigated or clarity and authority when compared to against another northern Virginia imam reversed. Usama bin Ladin or Ayman al-Zawahiri. with a similar background and who ran For example, al-Àwlaqi stated: in the same circles, Ali al-Timimi. Al- Christopher Heffelfinger is a Washington Timimi, born in Washington, D.C., but D.C.-based writer and analyst on terrorism, Political strength, diplomacy around educated in his teenage years in Saudi Islam and ideology, and the Middle the world now is revolving around Arabia, was the spiritual mentor of East. Mr. Heffelfinger is author of the the central idea, which is fighting the Virginia Paintball Group, and he forthcoming Radical Islam in America: Islamic terrorism. EU meets to talk is currently serving a life sentence Salafism’s Journey from Arabia to the about Islamic terrorists, NATO for inciting his followers to jihad. In West (Potomac Books). He is also a member meets to talk about the challenge essence, both he and al-Àwlaqi have of the CTC Sentinel’s Editorial Board. of Islamic terrorists, the US is committed the same offense, but the mobilizing its political force to fight latter was never brought to justice. the Islamic threat. On the political level the world is united in fighting Conclusion Islam. There is no exception on the Al-Àwlaqi’s connections to jihadists political level.25 are remarkable. Not only was he in contact with some of the 9/11 hijackers, English-speaking al-Qaìda members do along with Ali al-Timimi, but his not seem to have nearly the same sway. propaganda influenced a large number The American al-Qaìda spokesman of recent jihadist plots. One of those Adam Gadahn, for example, fails to convicted in the Fort Dix plot in New resonate with Western Muslims in the Jersey, Shain Duka, raved about al- same way, perhaps because he lacks Àwlaqi’s talks.26 Al-Àwlaqi was authenticity as a convert to Islam. also a figure in the radicalization of 27 Andrea Elliott, “A Call to Jihad, Answered in Ameri- ca,” New York Times, July 12, 2009. 25 See www.forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/shaykh- 26 Scott Shane, “Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires 28 Ibid. anwar-al-awlaki-constants-jihad-693. Terror,” New York Times, November 18, 2009. 29 Shephard.

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The Taliban Arrest Wave Muhammad Yunos. According to Pakistan-controlled channels. This media reports, yet denied by sources article contends that the arrests may be in Pakistan: Reasserting close to the Taliban, a number of other an attempt by the Pakistani government Strategic Depth? prominent leaders have also been to regain control over the Afghan arrested, including former Kandahar Taliban’s political agenda and, in a By Thomas Ruttig governor Mullah Muhammad Hassan broader sense, over the “reconciliation” Rahmani, former Herat and Kabul process announced by Afghan President in less than a month, Pakistan’s corps commander Mullah Abdul Ra’uf, Hamid Karzai. authorities have arrested a number of and former Guantanamo Bay detainee Afghan Taliban leaders. Most of the and Taliban commander in southern Suspicious Arrests arrests have taken place in Karachi and Afghanistan Mullah Abdul Qayum The string of arrests raises questions on in the North-West Frontier Province Zaker. Moreover, on February 28 whether they will affect Afghan Taliban (NWFP). The first in the chain of Pakistani security officials announced operations in the long-term. Without arrests was Mullah Abdul Ghani that Mullah Omar’s close adviser, a doubt, Mullah Baradar’s arrest is a Baradar, the Afghan Taliban’s second- Seyyed Tayyeb Agha, was arrested serious blow to the Afghan Taliban; it in-command behind Mullah Omar, in Karachi,5 and on March 4 Taliban hampers their military operations at who was apprehended on February finance minister and reportedly Mullah a time when they are under pressure 11, 2010.1 Baradar took control as the Omar’s son-in-law Agha Jan Mo’tassem in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Afghan Taliban’s military leader after was also apprehended in Karachi.6 Nevertheless, the Taliban have proved the arrest of former Taliban Defense adept at substituting even high-ranking Minister Mullah Obaidullah in early The wave of arrests follows years of leaders quickly and without losing much 2007.2 Before his recent arrest, Baradar meager results in capturing Afghan operational effectiveness. Neither the also led the Taliban’s second-highest Taliban leaders in Pakistan. The arrests arrest of Obaidullah nor the killings in authority, the Leadership Council, or have been perceived in the United States 2006 and 2007 of Akhtar Muhammad rahbari shura. as a veritable about-face in Pakistan’s Usmani and Mullah Dadullah have counterterrorism policy. U.S. Special slowed their pace. In contrast, the Baradar’s arrest was followed by Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban movement has grown in strength the capture of the Taliban’s shadow Richard Holbrooke, for example, called from year to year, and the organization governors for Afghanistan’s Kunduz the arrests “another high-water mark for is operating in more areas than ever and Baghlan provinces—Mullah Abdul Pakistani and American collaboration.”7 before. Salam and Mullah Mir Muhammad—in Bruce Riedel, who led the Barack addition to former Taliban acting Prime Obama administration’s policy review The more critical question is why Minister Maulawi Kabir3 and former on both countries in spring 2009, called Pakistan’s authorities have decided Zabul Province shadow governor and the arrest of Baradar a “sea change in to move against these militants— head of “the commission”4 Maulawi Pakistani behavior.”8 or publicized previous arrests—at this time. All of the Afghan Taliban 1 Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, “Secret Joint Raid A closer look, however, reveals that the militants recently arrested in Pakistan Captures Taliban’s Top Commander,” New York Times, arrests may not represent a clear change were apprehended under suspicious February 15, 2010. On Mullah Baradar’s background, in Pakistan’s policy toward the Afghan circumstances. Maulawi Kabir’s see Ron Moreau, “America’s New Nightmare,” News- Taliban. All of those recently arrested whereabouts, for example, had been week, July 25, 2009; Thomas Ruttig, “How ‘Neo’ Were were seeking political negotiations with known for some time. A German the ‘Neo-Taleban’?” The Afghanistan Analysts Network, the Afghan government, circumventing journalist described how UN officials March 5, 2010. were easily able to locate Kabir in the 2 Mullah Obaidullah’s current status is unclear. He was third edition of the code-of-conduct for Taliban fighters Pakistani town of Nowshera in the reported arrested (or put under house arrest) in Febru- issued in the name of Mullah Omar in mid-2009. On the NWFP last year where he occupied a ary-March 2007 and in February 2008 again. Then, he “commission,” also see Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: posh house and was driving a large SUV 9 was reportedly exchanged for the abducted designated Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency. Causes, Actors with diplomatic license plates. The Pakistani ambassador to Kabul in May 2008. For de- and Approaches to Talks,” The Afghanistan Analysts same journalist reported a temporary tails, see Shahnawaz Khan, “Security Agencies Arrest Network, July 2009. arrest of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Mullah Obaidullah Again,” Daily Times, February 25, 5 Rezaul H. Laskar, “Afghan Taliban Leader Agha Jan military leader of the semi-autonomous 10 2008; Aamer Khan, “Ex-Taliban Minister Swapped for Arrested in Karachi,” Outlook India, March 4, 2010. Haqqani network, in Pakistan. Envoy,” Pajhwok Afghan News, May 20, 2008; Jona- 6 Anand Gopal, “Half of Afghanistan Taliban Leader- than S. Landay, “Why Hasn’t the U.S. Gone After Mullah ship Arrested in Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor, There are also the cases of Maulawi Omar in Pakistan?” McClatchy Newspapers, November February 24, 2010; Deb Riechmann and Munir Ahmad, Muhammad Yunos and Abdul Ahad 16, 2008. “Pakistani Officials: Nearly 15 Top Taliban Held,” Asso- Jehangirwal, along with Seyyed Tayyeb 3 Some observers believe that Maulawi Kabir is a mem- ciated Press, February 25, 2010; “Pakistan: Key Taliban Agha, Mullah Omar’s “aides-de-camp.” ber of the rahbari shura under the nom-de-guerre of Mul- Leader ‘Held in Karachi,’” AKI News Agency, March 4, lah Qaher. 2010; Personal interviews, anonymous contacts, Kabul, 9 Willi Germund, “Rentable Verhaftungen,” St. Galler 4 “The commission” was a Taliban body that traveled Afghanistan, March 2010. Tagblatt, March 2, 2010; Christoph Reuter, “Some Birds through various provinces to question the Afghan popu- 7 Chris Allbritton, “Holbrooke Hails Pakistan-U.S. Col- with One Stone,” The Afghanistan Analysts Network, lation about the behavior of local Taliban commanders. laboration on Taliban,” Reuters, February 18, 2010. undated. This happened after the publication of the layha, the 8 Ibid.; Mazzetti et al. 10 Ibid.

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Sources close to the Taliban confirm that During 2007 and 2008, there was a Taliban actions. Although Pakistan has Yunos has been in Pakistani custody relatively strong current within the officially dropped its “strategic depth” since September or October 2009 and Kandahari mainstream of the Afghan policy, a future conflict with India Jehangirwal for almost a year, but their Taliban that recognized they would remains its number one security concern. arrests only became known recently.11 not be able to achieve victory—defined As a result, establishing a friendly or as reestablishing the Islamic Emirate even clientele government in Kabul still The timing of the arrests and of Afghanistan—by military means, ranks high on Pakistan’s agenda, and announcements suggest that Pakistan or that it would at least be too costly the Afghan Taliban are considered a is detaining Afghan Taliban elements in terms of human lives. Similar to core element of this strategy. who are seeking political negotiations the United States and NATO forces in independent of official Pakistani Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban also Although the Afghan Taliban depend channels. All of the recently arrested suffer from a civilian casualty problem on Pakistani support—in the form of militants fit into this category. that has cost them support from the local safe havens, logistical and possibly population.15 These elements, labeled financial support, and the ability to Arrested Militants Seeking Peace Deals with “pious Taliban” by some Afghans, move unhindered in parts of Pakistan Afghan Government consider suicide attacks that cause high and over the border with Afghanistan— One strong theory of why Pakistan has numbers of Afghan civilian casualties their current leaders were never mere moved against these militants at the as “un-Islamic” and reacted to them by puppets in the hands of the ISI. Mullah present time is due to what has been issuing the layha (code of conduct for Baradar—who belongs to the same dubbed “talk about talks”—the decision Taliban fighters) that provides for care tribe as President Hamid Karzai, the over whether the Afghan government concerning civilians during attacks.16 Popalzai—seems to have circumvented and its international supporters should These “pious Taliban” also may Pakistan-controlled channels by relying negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. This have had a role—by providing inside on shared “blood links” to establish debate has heated up since the “Mecca information—in the killing of Mullah links to Karzai family members in an talks” in the fall of 2008, when the Dadullah in 2007, who was the most effort to discuss “reconciliation.”18 Saudi government invited an Afghan notorious proponent of the Taliban’s Indeed, according to one of Karzai’s delegation composed of government hardcore terrorist tendencies. Dadullah advisers, the president was “very members, parliamentarians and former copied the methods of Abu Mus`ab angry” at Baradar’s arrest because the Taliban leaders for a reception to al-Zarqawi, and it is believed that the Taliban leader had been “given a green break the fast during the holy month of Afghan Taliban’s Quetta shura decided light” to participate in a peace jirga that Ramadan.12 The latest incident occurred that Dadullah was out of control. Karzai is hosting in April.19 Therefore, after a press leak about a Dubai meeting the arrests can be viewed as a warning between UN Afghanistan Envoy Kai This Taliban current also had been to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar Eide and Taliban “commanders” discussing the usefulness of a political himself that “he also can be drawn out of supposedly sent by Mullah Baradar solution that would involve the Afghan his hiding place” in case his supporters in January 2010.13 For the first time, government and possibly its foreign do not follow Pakistan’s agenda.20 Afghan President Hamid Karzai drafted allies. Baradar, Kabir, Yunos and a policy document for reconciliation and Mo’tassem17 all belong to the Taliban Separately, the arrests also prove that reintegration that found support and faction considering talks with the Afghan Afghan Taliban leaders use sanctuaries funding at the international Afghanistan government. Their arrests suggest that inside Pakistan, a fact that Islamabad conference held in London in January Pakistan’s military wants to resume full consistently denies. Yet Pakistan’s 2010. Afghan parliamentarians, some control over any future reconciliation military chief, General Ashfaq Parvez leaders of Hizb-i-Islami and two Islamic talks between the Afghan government Kayani, recently tacitly admitted this scholars close to the Afghan Taliban and the Taliban. Although the reports fact by offering to NATO that Pakistan from Pakistan met in the Maldives at on Saudi, Dubai and Maldives contacts would be willing to open communication the same time.14 were likely overblown, it appears that channels with the Taliban on all levels.21 Pakistan wanted to put a stop even to A high-ranking official in Islamabad’s 11 Personal interview, sources close to the Taliban, the slightest inclination of independent foreign office was even blunter: “We March 2010. have considerable influence on the 12 According to unconfirmed rumors, Mullah Omar’s 2010; Personal interviews, participants of the Maldives Taliban and will play our role in 22 adviser, Tayyeb Agha, also had attended the meeting. meeting, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2010. securing peace in Afghanistan.” The 13 The Afghan Taliban and the United Nations later de- 15 In general, the United Nations stated that the Tali- nied that the meeting had ever taken place. For details, ban accounted for 67% of all civilian deaths in 2009. 18 Personal interviews, former Taliban and Afghan gov- see Dexter Filkins, “U.N. Mission Head in Afghanistan For details, see “Over 2,400 Civilian Deaths in 2009 – ernment officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, February-March Met With Taliban Envoys,” New York Times, January 29, UNAMA,” IRIN, January 13, 2010. 2010. 2010; “Afghan Taliban Deny Peace Talks With UN’s Kai 16 Personal interviews, former Taliban members and 19 “Aide: Karzai ‘Very Angry’ at Taliban Boss’ Arrest,” Eide,” BBC, January 30, 2010. Afghans close to the insurgency, 2008-2009. Also see Associated Press, March 16, 2010. 14 Julian Borger, “UN in Secret Peace Talks with Tali- Ruttig, “The Other Side.” 20 Hamed, “Aya nasl-e jadidi dar rah ast?” Hasht-e Sobh ban,” Guardian, January 28, 2010; John Simpson, “Peace 17 Mo’tassem headed the Taliban’s political commission, [Kabul], March 6, 2010. Scheme Mooted for Taliban,” BBC, January 21, 2010; responsible for pursuing talks during the “thaw period” 21 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan is Said to Pursue Role in U.S.- Zubair Babakarkhel, “Delegations Formed to Try Bro- after Mullah Dadullah’s death. Mo’tassem was removed Afghan Talks,” New York Times, February 9, 2010. ker Afghan Peace,” Pajhwok Afghan News, February 2, from this position in early 2009. 22 Willi Germund, “Pakistan lässt Taliban-Chef

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New York Times even called the arrests a number of strategically significant cities, “strategic coup for Pakistan” because it Untangling the Punjabi such as the garrison city of Rawalpindi, restores control over the Taliban, draws Taliban Network Lahore, Multan and Gujranwala. applause from the United States and Moreover, the country’s civil and even releases U.S. money.23 By Raheel Khan military recruits are drawn mainly from the province. Any destabilization Conclusion since 2006, pakistan has been victim to of Punjab Province would have dire For Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban remain rising terrorist violence from a nexus of ramifications for Pakistan and would a card to be played after an expected militant factions consisting of al-Qa`ida, also endanger international coalition departure of most Western troops from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and operations in Afghanistan.6 Afghanistan. The arrests epitomize fighters from Punjab-based militant the ISI’s strategic manipulation of groups.1 All three entities share a The threat has become increasingly its assets in Afghanistan and might common, violent Islamist ideology, and serious. In September 2008, alleged result in the emergence of an entirely they have solidified bonds in response to militants of Punjabi origin were new Taliban leadership that would Pakistan limiting its operations against interrogated in the wake of the al- replace the founders’ generation.24 The Indian-administered Kashmir, while Qa`ida-linked Marriott Hotel bombing new leadership would be composed at the same time expanding operations in Islamabad that killed more than 50 of unknown and likely younger, more against Pakistani Taliban factions in its people.7 On March 3, 2009, Punjabi radical newcomers trained in Pakistani northwest.2 These factors have caused militants attacked the visiting Sri madrasas. These militants would be less previously disparate groups to join Lankan cricket team in the Punjab in touch with Afghanistan’s realities together against a common enemy, the capital city of Lahore, killing eight than the older Taliban generation that Pakistani government, which is allied people.8 On March 30, 2009, a police participated in the anti-Soviet war, and with the United States and NATO in training center just outside Lahore they would be more prone to listening the “war on terrorism.” As a result of was attacked and eight people killed.9 to Pakistan’s military and intelligence these developments, Punjab Province The unprecedented assault on the services. They would, in effect, be the itself is increasingly at risk. Punjabi military’s General Headquarters (GHQ) real “neo-Taliban.” Pakistan’s “strategic militants have established cells across in the garrison city of Rawalpindi depth” strategy, which has officially the province, and according to security on October 10, 2009 displayed the been discarded, is very much alive. officials are running their own training growing sophistication and intent of the facilities in southern Punjab.3 The March network.10 Finally, on October 15, 2009, For Afghanistan, however, the arrests 12, 2010 twin suicide blasts that killed at three teams of militants launched a have at least temporarily closed the least 45 people in a high security area of coordinated assault in Lahore, attacking window of opportunity for direct talks Lahore underscored this concern.4 the regional headquarters of the Federal with the Afghan Taliban leadership. As Investigation Agency, the Manawan a result, the fighting in Afghanistan will Punjab Province is Pakistan’s most Police Training School, and the Elite continue and President Karzai’s peace critical region. Geographically, it is Police Academy; the combined assault jirga announced for mid-spring may run Pakistan’s heartland and the country’s killed more than 30 people.11 Attacks aground before it even begins. most populated province.5 It contains a have continued into 2010.

Thomas Ruttig is a Co-Director and Senior 1 The Punjabi Taliban comprise members from a num- This nexus of militants has evolved Analyst of The Afghanistan Analysts ber of Punjab-based groups that were formerly focused significantly since it first emerged Network (AAN), an independent think- on Indian-administered Kashmir or on sectarian attacks in 2006-2007. Although the tank based in Kabul and Berlin. Since against the Shi`a community in Pakistan. The Pun- sophistication and intensity of their 1983, he has spent 10 years in Afghanistan, jabi Taliban include members from Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, among other assignments as head of the UN Jaysh-i-Muhammad and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan— million people live in Punjab Province. Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) fighters from other Punjab-based groups may- bein 6 Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Eric office in Kabul in 2000-2001 under the volved as well. For more details, see Issam Ahmed, “Why Schmitt, “United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Popu- Taliban regime. He speaks Pashtu and Pakistan’s Old Jehadis Pose New Threat—At Home and lous Heart,” New York Times, April 13, 2009. Dari. in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 7 The suspected militants were alleged members of 2009; Kachan Lakshman, “Heartland Trauma,” Kashmir Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam. For Herald, February 7, 2010; Raza Khan and Ayesha Nasir, details, see Amir Mir, “South Punjab Threat,” The News “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pakistan Fears Shift International, October 25, 2009. For the al-Qa`ida-link, auffliegen,”Salzburger Nachrichten, February 17, 2010. in Control,” Washington Times, October 21, 2009. see “Pakistan al-Qaeda Leaders ‘Dead,’” BBC, January 9, 23 Carlotta Gall and Souad Mekhennet, “Arrest of Tali- 2 Pakistan’s northwest consists of the Federally Admin- 2009. ban Chief May Be Crucial for Pakistanis,” New York istered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province. 8 Ibid. Also see “‘Cricket Attacker’ Held in Lahore,” Times, February 16, 2010. 3 Alex Rodriguez, “Taliban Taps the Punjab Heartland,” BBC, June 17, 2009. 24 Similarly, immediately before the Afghan presidential Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2009. 9 “Siege at Pakistan Police Academy,” BBC, March 30, elections of August 2009, the author received reports 4 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for 2009. that the ISI had pressured Taliban commanders to go the attack. For details, see “At Least 37 Killed in Pakistan 10 “Six Soldiers, Four Assailants Killed in Attack on fight inside Afghanistan or otherwise be handed over Bombings,” CNN, March 12, 2010; “TTP Claim Lahore GHQ,” Dawn, October 10, 2009. to the United States and sent to the detention facility at Bombings; 39 Dead,” Geo TV, March 12, 2010. 11 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Guantanamo Bay. 5 According to 1998 census numbers, approximately 72 Links,” New York Times, October 15, 2009.

7 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 operations reached new levels in 2009, Based on rough estimates, more than This fact was revealed in October 2009, the higher frequency of attacks also 5,000 individuals from the seminaries in after Pakistani security forces arrested shed more clarity on the network. This southern and northern Punjab Province Iqbal and Gul Muhammad, purportedly article will revisit the formation of the joined terrorist training camps in North two high-ranking Punjabi Taliban Punjabi Taliban network and show and South Waziristan in the wake members. According to a journalist for how its disparate militant groups are of the military operation against Lal Pakistan’s Dawn, coordinating operations.12 Masjid.19 Fighters now part of this loose collaboration among Taliban factions The two, who were in charge of Merging the Agendas in Pakistan’s northwest and formerly militancy in Punjab, officials claim, From 2001-2006, militancy in Pakistan Kashmir- or sectarian-focused militants served as the link between Taliban’s was largely divided into two different in the east and northeast are now main leadership in Waziristan and agendas. In the country’s northwest referred to as the “Punjabi Taliban.”20 the increasingly threatening Punjabi region, Taliban factions focused on Restrained from continuing activities Taliban network, a grouping of fighting international and Afghan forces in Indian-held Kashmir, members of sectarian and Kashmir focused in Afghanistan, and other Western Punjab-based militant groups joined militant groups responsible for targets in Pakistan. To the east, Punjab- forces with the TTP and al-Qaìda to the Taliban hits in Punjab and the based militant groups such as Lashkar- undertake joint operations in Pakistan. federal capital.24 i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba and Jaysh- As described by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, i-Muhammad focused their attacks on an Islamabad-based analyst, Punjab Similarly, “Dr. Usman,” the alias of Indian forces in the disputed region has been turned into a “factory where the militant who was arrested during of Kashmir or on Shià Muslims in suicide bombers are produced. Punjab the October 2009 attack on Pakistan’s Pakistan.13 has become a major recruiting ground GHQ, was also reportedly a member of and hub for the planning of terrorist the TTP’s shura.25 In 2006-2007, however, this dynamic attacks, and it’s a human resource for was altered in response to Pakistan the fighting in Afghanistan.”21 Joint Operations ceasing support for militancy in Indian- Al-Qaìda, the TTP and the Punjabi administered Kashmir.14 In response, Moreover, there is evidence that Taliban network have cooperated many Kashmir-focused militants joined during this period al-Qaìda operatives to strike targets deep inside Punjab forces with Taliban factions in Pakistan escalated efforts to engage Punjabi Province.26 U.S. and Pakistani and Afghanistan.15 The two agendas militants and draw them into their fight authorities believe that the bombing have partly merged, and this became against Pakistani security forces. Senior of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in especially evident after the Pakistan al-Qaìda stalwarts such as Shaykh September 2008 and the deadly attack government’s military operations Ìsa al-Masri reportedly recruited on Sri Lanka’s cricket team in Lahore against Islamic hardliners at the Lal Punjabi and Kashmiri jihadists into in March 2009 were examples of Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad in the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaìda, combined operations.27 The deployment mid-2007.16 The mosque was operated engaging recruits from Lashkar-i- of seasoned operative Dr. Usman, who by Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Tayyiba, Jaysh-i-Muhammad and has links to al-Qaìda, to lead the attack Rashid Ghazi, both strong supporters Harkat-ul-Mujahidin.22 on the GHQ in Rawalpindi in October of the Taliban and allied Islamist 2009 was a demonstration of power by movements.17 The Punjab-based militant The cooperation among the groups has this coalition, which many thought was groups—particularly Lashkar-i-Jhangvi developed to the point that leaders of the weakened by military offensives in the and Jaysh-i-Muhammad—were also Punjabi Taliban network are represented Swat Valley.28 associated with Lal Masjid, and some of in the TTP’s 40-member shura (council).23 their members turned against the state Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s interior 18 after the siege. 19 Mir, “South Punjab Threat.” minister, warned in the Financial Times 20 Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistani Extremists in Punjab in June 2009 that a Swat-like situation Seen as Rising Threat,” Los Angeles Times, August 22, could emerge in southern Punjab if 12 Ibid. 2009. For one of the first articles that discussed the Pun- terrorists fleeing military operations 13 Rodriguez, “Taliban Taps the Punjab Heartland.” jabi Taliban, see Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi and U.S. drone strikes take shelter in 14 Regardless of whether Pakistan has ceased all support Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). southern Punjab under the protection for operations in India or Indian-administered Kashmir, 21 Ibid. of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Jaysh-i- 29 it has certainly reduced its support dramatically. 22 Bill Roggio, “Senior Al Qaeda Leader Leaves Paki- Muhammad. In the wake of the latest 15 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan’s Militants Ready for stan, Directs Iraq Operations from Syria,” The Long More,” Asia Times Online, March 5, 2009. War Journal, August 21, 2009. For an in-depth profile of tured,” Dawn, October 23, 2009. 16 Aoun Sahi, “Ulterior Motives,” The News International, Shaykh Ìsa al-Masri and his role in violence in Pakistan, 24 Ibid. October 25, 2009; Tavernise et al. see Erich Marquardt and Abdul Hameed Bakier, “An 25 Ibid. 17 Bill Roggio, “Red Mosque Leader Abdul Rasheed Ideological and Operational Threat: Abu Àmr/Shaykh 26 Tavernise et al.; “Pakistan al-Qaeda Leaders ‘Dead.’” Ghazi Killed During Assault,” The Long War Journal, Ìsa,” CTC Sentinel 1:8 (2008). 27 Ibid. July 10, 2007. 23 The TTP shura is a 40-member umbrella council of 28 “‘Dr. Usman’: Last Desperate Act,” Daily Times, Oc- 18 Personal interview, Tahir Khan, editor at News Net- top militant commanders that coordinates and super- tober 13, 2009. work International and correspondent for BBC, Islam- vises TTP operations in Pakistan. For more details, see 29 Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Puts Southern Provinces abad, Pakistan, March 12, 2010. Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Top Guns of Punjabi Taliban Cap- on Alert as Taliban Threat Grows,” Financial Times, June

8 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 military offensive in South Waziristan at responsible for attacks in Punjab.36 It organization provide money, sanctuary, the end of 2009, it is believed that some is also thought that the two had a role training facilities and suicide bombers, middle and lower rank militants may in most of the major attacks in Punjab, while Punjabi Taliban factions provide have shifted to southern Punjab, while including the three coordinated attacks logistical support in Punjabi cities, the core leadership is strongly believed in Lahore and the one on the GHQ in including target identification and to be hiding in North Waziristan.30 October.37 managing and assisting suicide bombers Indeed, the deadly alliance has increased from the northwest.43 the number of attacks in Punjab, and it These attacks clearly displayed the appears that Punjabi militant leaders are increased strategic, operational and The nexus reportedly share each others’ exercising control over Taliban fighters tactical level of collaboration among seminaries, sanctuaries, training who fled the military operations in the the groups.38 In December 2009, it facilities and jihadist cadres to conduct northwest.31 is believed that the deadly alliance terrorist activities across Pakistan.44 targeted Pakistan’s main intelligence South Asia analyst Bruce Riedel Following the well-planned attack on agency, the ISI, with a car bomb in explained, “These groups are fighting the Pakistan Army’s GHQ, the army Multan, killing 12 people including for recruits from the same Punjabi admitted the scale of the threat it faces security personnel.39 Similarly, the busy families and clans that the Pakistani from this nexus, whose ranks include Moon market in Lahore was targeted by army recruits from for its officer soldiers from the Pakistan military.32 Dr. this same network as well, resulting in corps.”45 Military operations in FATA— Usman, for example, the sole surviving the deaths of 49 civilians.40 Militants particularly the October 2009 military attacker on the GHQ, was a former army bombed a high-profile military mosque offensive in South Waziristan—and medical corps soldier from Kahuta, in Rawalpindi in December 2009, drone attacks on Taliban safe houses a town in the heartland of Punjab killing senior military officers and their have dispossessed the militants from Province.33 After leaving the army, Dr. families, including a major-general, their land and destroyed their physical Usman first joined Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, brigadier, and many officers; a total of infrastructure. This may be one reason and then later Jaysh-i-Muhammad.34 40 people died in that attack, including why the battlefield has shifted to From there, he became a member of the 17 children.41 Punjab. TTP and remained a close associate of Ilyas Kashmiri, the chief of al-Qaìda’s Additionally, the nexus has started As stated by Pakistani defense analyst paramilitary operations in Pakistan.35 violent attacks in Pakistan- Lieutenant-General (retired) Talat administered Kashmir. From June 2009 Masood, “the increasing cooperation The case of Iqbal and Gul Muhammad to January 2010, 20 people have been among the three groups is a serious also revealed the connections between killed and 125 injured—mostly security threat to Pakistan but the Pakistan army Punjabi militant groups and Pakistani personnel—in five terrorist attacks in and the intelligence agencies are aware Taliban fighters in the northwest. Pakistan-administered Kashmir.42 The of it.”46 While the political government Authorities believe that Iqbal and attacks have included suicide bombings. is playing down the threat, Pakistan’s Gul Muhammad, who were captured It is ironic that the same militants who army accepts that these militants in October 2009, were in charge of previously focused their operations on have joined forces and claims that the militancy in Punjab, serving as the link Indian-administered Kashmir are now military is fully cognizant of this new between the central TTP leadership in targeting their own side of the border. development.47 It remains to be seen, Waziristan and the Punjabi Taliban however, whether Pakistan’s security Conclusion forces will be able to turn back the tide 26, 2009; Tavernise et al. Al-Qaìda, the TTP and the Punjabi of jihadist violence sweeping across the 30 Personal interview, Khan. Taliban network are driven by a country. 31 Perlez; Khan et al., “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Grow- shared Islamist ideology. Nevertheless, ing, Pakistan Fears Shift in Control.” authorities believe that the relationship Raheel Khan anchors a live 50-minute 32 Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Army Facing Threat from largely remains tactical. The Pashtun current affairs Pashtu program from Punjabi, al-Qaeda and Taliban Militants,” Guardian, Oc- Taliban and the Arab-led al-Qaìda Pakistan Television Peshawar Centre with tober 12, 2009. focus on the Federally Administered Tribal 33 Ibid. 36 Sajjad Syed. Areas and Afghanistan. He is a freelance 34 Amir Mir, “Punjabi Taliban Avenge Qari Zafar’s 37 Ibid. journalist with expertise on militancy in Death,” The News International, March 9, 2010. 38 Alex Rodriguez, “Militants Attack 3 Police Sites in La- the Pashtun belt. He heads the private 35 Ilyas Kashmiri was thought to have died in a U.S. hore, Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2009. media and research company Stratcom drone strike in South Waziristan in September 2009. It 39 “12 Die in Attack on ISI Offices in Multan,” The News Private Limited. appears, however, that he survived the strike and is still International, December 9, 2009. active. For other details, see Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering 40 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban Expand Terror Cam- 43 Tavernise et al. the Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters,” Foreign paign in Pakistan’s Punjab,” Thaindian News, December 44 Mir, “South Punjab Threat.” Policy, October 11, 2009; Alex Rodriguez and Zulfiqar 9, 2009. 45 Khan et al., “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pak- Ali, “Pakistani Al Qaeda Leader Killed in U.S. Strike,” 41 Pamela Constable and Shaiq Hussain, “At Least 40 istan Fears Shift in Control.” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2009; “Ilyas Kashmiri People Killed in Pakistan Attack,” Washington Post, De- 46 Raheel Khan, “Al-Qaeda-TTP and Punjabi Taliban Alive, Lays Out Future Terror Strategy,” Daily Times, Oc- cember 5, 2009. Forge Strong Connections,” CentralAsiaOnline.com, tober 15, 2009; Eli Lake, “‘Dead’ al-Qaeda Terrorist Sur- 42 Zafar Iqbal, “Taliban Reach Kashmir,” GroundReport. March 1, 2010. faces for Media,” Washington Times, October 15, 2009. com, January 19, 2010. 47 Ibid.

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Insight into a Suicide operated in Charbagh and Peochar in travel to the camp to retrieve them. Swat; Galjo and Ferozkhel in Orakzai Such efforts are not resisted by the Bomber Training Camp in Agency; and Chinaari and Mohammad camp operators if the children leave at Waziristan Ghat in Mohmand Agency.3 their own volition.10 Therefore, whether to stay at the camp or return to family By S.H. Tajik The training facilities themselves largely depends on the will of the suicide are usually established in abandoned bomber. Life at the camp, however, is since the overthrow of the Taliban schools, or in houses offered by locals.4 incredibly absorbing. Trainees who are regime in Afghanistan in 2001, In some camps, such as at the Nawazkot pulled out of the camp by their families Pakistan has been increasingly victim facility, paintings depicting paradise often flee their homes to return to the to suicide bombings. In the past are drawn on the walls, such as images camp. One would-be suicide bomber three years, attacks have escalated of flowing rivers of milk with fairies admitted, “Yes, I felt attracted to life in dramatically, especially after the Lal walking along in lush green valleys.5 the camp as I felt happy over there with Masjid (Red Mosque) operation in 2007.1 my fellows. There was good food, pocket Today, suicide bombings are a frequent The training camps are generally money, good friends and vehicles for occurrence in Pakistan’s northwest, located in areas where the government driving.”11 and they have spread to previously has little oversight or control, which stable parts of the country, including in reduces the need for camp security. At During the winter months, training Punjab Province. night, however, a senior trainee guards is minimal due to severe weather in the camp, and no one is allowed to leave the mountains. The camps are also This article provides an in-depth look at the camp after night prayers (isha’).6 vacated in response to government how Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers The locations themselves are switched military operations, at which time the train for their operations at camps in regularly for security reasons. members melt into the general civilian South Waziristan Agency. It draws population.12 The average number of heavily from information acquired from Inside the camp, adults and minors are trainees in a camp ranges from 30-35, Pakistani police interrogations and generally segregated and trained in but this can vary.13 interviews with suspected militants. different areas of the facility; however, The article includes information on this is dependent on various conditions.7 Within the camp, Pashtu is the working general camp characteristics, why The age of suicide bombers range from language, although Urdu may be spoken. individuals join the camps, the daily seven to 40.8 Large suicide training The Taliban leadership provides all routine of the trainees, the rituals camps operate in two categories: junior expenses associated with the camp. carried out before an attack and finally and senior camps. Senior camps usually Trainees are occasionally provided 500 post-attack activities. accommodate trainees from 16 years of to 1,000 rupees for their expenses when age and older, while the junior camps they visit their homes.14 This serves as General Camp Characteristics accommodate trainees from seven years pocket money on a demand basis. Before the ongoing military operations in of age to 15.9 All the camp participants the Swat Valley and in South Waziristan are not necessarily tasked on suicide The first camp to specialize in training Agency, suicide bomber training camps missions, and they are allowed to quit suicide bombers was the Kotkai camp. were active in various parts of the their training. As is often the case, family It was closed after Qari Hussain, a Federally Administered Tribal Areas members do not approve of their kin’s senior Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (FATA) and in Malakand Division participation, and they occasionally operative known as the “Trainer of of the North-West Frontier Province Suicide Bombers,” was deposed from 2 (NWFP). In FATA, the camps have been 3 Omar Waraich, “Taliban Running School for Suicide his leadership role as the head of the 15 located in North and South Waziristan, Bombers,” Independent, July 29, 2009. suicide bomber brigade in 2007. Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. 4 Pakistan Police interrogation report, subject Ishaq The most prominent camps operated in Mehsud, Islamabad, Pakistan, June 2008; Pakistan Po- 10 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. the following areas of South Waziristan: lice interrogation report, subject Abid Mehsud, Islam- 11 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. Kotkai, Nawazkot, Deeley, Karama, abad, Pakistan, July 2008; Pakistan Police interrogation 12 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008; Abid Mehsud, July 2008. Kazha Pangha, Barwand, Karikot, Ladha report, subject Hameedullah Mehsud, Islamabad, Paki- 13 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. and Tangay. Newer training camps stan, August 2008; Pakistan Police interrogation report, 14 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. subject Mir Janan, Islamabad, Pakistan, September 15 Ibid. Baitullah Mehsud removed him from command 1 The Lal Masjid siege occurred in July 2007 when Paki- 2008; Pakistan Police interrogation report, subject Ait- when Qari Hussain’s followers attacked the residence of stani security forces engaged jihadist militants holed up ezaz Shah, Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan, January 2008; Pir Amiruddin Shah, the government’s political agent in the mosque complex. The operation is viewed as the Pakistan Police interrogation report, subject Hasnain in Khyber Agency, in May 2007. The brazen attack catalyst that turned formerly Kashmir- and sectarian- Gul (also known as Ali Punjabi), Rawalpindi, Pakistan, killed seven guests and six family members, a violation focused militants against the Pakistani government. August 2009. of Pashtun ethics since women and guests were among 2 Operation Rah-e-Rast (Path to Righteousness) in Swat 5 This information was drawn from Geo TV news re- the dead. More importantly, Qari Hussain never sought began in May 2009. Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Sal- porting in 2009. Baitullah’s approval to conduct the attack. Although vation) in South Waziristan began in October 2009. For 6 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. Qari Hussain was reported killed in January 2010, it ap- details, see Sameer Lalwani, “The Pakistan Military’s 7 Ibid. pears that he is still alive. For details on Qari Hussain and Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009,” CTC Sentinel 8 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. his 2007 conflict with Baitullah Mehsud, see the follow- 3:1 (2010). 9 Ibid. ing reports: Abid Mehsud, July 2008; Behroz Khan and

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Wali Muhammad was put in command Landa Bazaar Hyderabad. I was sick of Walid, whose outnumbered army fought of the brigade and the camps were life and wanted to get rid of it. I escaped bravely against the enemies of Islam. shifted to Deeley and Karama in South Hyderabad in 2006 and went straight to Waziristan.16 Qari Hussain instead of home.”22 Ishaq, Instructors tell stories of past suicide an 18-year-old would-be suicide bomber bombers who have appeared in dreams Since the October 2009 Pakistan belonging to the Mehsud tribe in South saying that they are now in paradise.27 military operation in South Waziristan, Waziristan, dropped out of school early Camp members are also shown videos all of the suicide camps in the Mehsud- and was lured into a suicide training of previous bombers planning their dominated areas of the agency have camp because it operated in his village operations; they are not, however, been closed. of Kotkai.23 shown the scene after a suicide blast, likely due to fear that the images of Recruitment Motivations There are a number of motivations carnage will demoralize the recruits.28 Statistically, it is estimated that more that cause individuals to join suicide than 90% of suicide bombers who join bomber training camps. Recruits are The bombers are radicalized to such the training camps in Waziristan are primarily motivated by atrocities an extent that they compete over the Pashtun.17 Moreover, according to against Muslims. The main theme in chance to launch an attack. One would- an unpublished internal report from the camp lectures is revenge. Ishaq be bomber admitted, “Yes, the suicide Pakistan’s Special Investigation Group explained that instructors call attention bombers ask the amir persistently to in 2009, approximately 70% of suicide to the helplessness of Muslims whose give them an opportunity as soon as attacks are conducted by fighters from daughters and sisters are dishonored possible. They are always anxious to be the Mehsud tribe.18 Non-Pashtuns also by non-Muslims in Afghanistan and launched.”29 The more a trainee pushes join the camp, such as Aitezaz Shah, Iraq.24 According to Abid, the camp to conduct an attack, the sooner they who was arrested due to his alleged role leaders incite the audience when they are provided with an opportunity. One in the assassination of former Prime narrate stories about Muslim women example is suicide bomber Ismail, who Minister Benazir Bhutto.19 According languishing in the prisons of infidels.25 was sent to attack the police training to would-be suicide bomber Ishaq, school at Sargodha in 2007 only two the main explanation for the high Instructors consistently emphasize weeks after his induction at the camp.30 prevalence of suicide terrorism among the religious permissibility of suicide Some recruits prefer to carry out attacks the Mehsud is because the training attacks against non-Muslims and even in Afghanistan. This was the case with camps are located in areas inhabited their Muslim allies. According to this Abid, who wanted to carry out a suicide by the tribe.20 Additionally, pockets of logic, Pakistan’s security forces are attack against Americans at Birmal, civilians in Mehsud-dominated areas working for the United States and they Afghanistan. of Waziristan eulogize the bombers for hinder jihadist activities; therefore, their courage, which incites more youth suicide bombings against them are Camp trainees are told that a suicide to join the camps. permissible. As stated by one would-be bomber wins paradise for giving up his suicide bomber, “The instructor, Maulvi life for Allah, and enters the afterlife Most suicide bombers are recruited Rahimullah used to tell us that suicide the moment the explosives detonate. from kinship or friendship networks.21 attacks on the army, security forces and Once in paradise, the suicide bomber Other factors that draw individuals to even all government employees was has the opportunity to recommend 70 the camps include: curiosity, proximity permissible under the injunctions of people for paradise and Allah honors of the camps to civilian residential Islam.”26 that recommendation. The bombers communities, unemployment or under- are told that they are superior to other employment, poor academic options, Qari Hussain, known for his anti-Shi`a jihadists because they have no worldly boredom and lack of entertainment. beliefs, also motivated camp members ambitions such as status, money and Abid, a 16-year-old Mehsud from South by arguing that the Shi`a are kafirs esteem. While other jihadists can Waziristan, identified boredom and his (infidels) and therefore can be killed. survive after an attack on the enemy, uncle’s behavior for his reason in joining According to the camp instructors, the fidai (suicide bomber) faces certain a suicide bomber training camp: “I was innocent civilians killed in suicide death—the supreme sacrifice for Allah. working with my uncle in his shop at attacks are martyrs, and therefore there As a result, there is a sense of pride is no need to be concerned about their among the bombers as they refer to non- David Montero, “Pakistan’s Taliban Fight Each Other,” fate. Instructors justify these teachings suicide bombers as “common mujahids,” Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 2007. with references to the Qur’an and and they are not allowed to interact or 31 16 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. hadith. They use decrees by religious socialize with them. 17 Ibid.; Abid Mehsud, July 2008; Mir Janan, September scholars, and cite the precedent of the 2008; Hameedullah Mehsud, August 2008. famous commander and companion of 27 Aitezaz Shah, January 2008; Ishaq Mehsud, June 18 The Mehsud are a Pashtun tribe. the Prophet Muhammad, Khalid bin 2008; Abid Mehsud, July 2008; Mir Janan, September 19 Aitezaz Shah, January 2008. 2008; Hameedullah Mehsud, August 2008. 20 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. 22 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. 28 Ibid. 21 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia, PA: 23 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. 29 Ibid. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Scott Atran, 24 Ibid. 30 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?” Perspectives on Ter- 25 Ibid. 31 Aitezaz Shah, January 2008; Ishaq Mehsud, June rorism 2:5 (2008). 26 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. 2008; Abid Mehsud, July 2008; Mir Janan, September

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The Camp Schedule Throughout the training period, the The rahbar’s duty is to take the bomber to Information on the daily schedule instructors make emotional speeches a predetermined target either a few days within the training camps has been designed to influence the trainees. before the attack, or on the actual day. acquired from interviews with Qari Hussain, in particular, apparently He helps the bomber become acquainted multiple detainees. The camp members mesmerized his listeners and was able with the area and remains in contact wake before sunrise to offer special to bring them to tears.38 The same with the high command directly to night vigils (tahajjud) followed by the emotional ambience is repeated during inform them about the success or failure recitation of the Qur’an until morning the concluding prayers (du`a). The two of the attack. On the day of the attack, prayers (fajr).32 After breakfast, most most famous books used at the camps for the rahbar decides the most opportune trainees receive driver’s education, religious lessons are Islam aur fidai hamlay time for the bombing. Due to the rahbar’s and they practice vehicle maneuvers. (Islam and Suicide Attacks), written by crucial role in the operation, obedience Experienced driving instructors teach Mufti Abdul Bashar Qasmi, and Fazail- and loyalty to the rahbar is inculcated in them how to handle motorcycles and e-Jihad (Virtues of Jihad), written by the camp. A suicide bomber, however, cars in preparation for vehicle-borne Maulana Masood Azhar. The religious reserves the right to disobey the rahbar (VBIED) suicide attacks.33 At the Kotkai instructors are all local, and local guest if he changes the venue of the attack, training camp, six station wagons were speakers also deliver lectures. The amir attempts to hand him over to another available for this purpose.34 of the camp hires a local maulvi (religious handler, or asks him to attack an leader) for translation of the Qur’an and impossible target or one that will result During the morning session, some other lessons. in too few casualties. A normal target trainees stay at the camp for services should result in the deaths of at least 10 that include cleaning the camp, Rituals and Preparation Before an Attack people, with the exception of VIP targets preparing lunch and buying utilities. Before an attack is executed, only the when the number of dead is irrelevant.40 Lunch is typically served around mid- head of the Pakistani Taliban, the head day followed by the noon prayers (zuhr). of the training camp, the rahbar (guide) The rahbar does not strictly monitor Afterward, the trainees split into two and the fidai know the target. The other the suicide bomber in the days before groups and study the Qur’an. A new members of the training camp are not the attack. The bomber can roam recruit is typically paired with a more informed about the target beforehand. around with the hosts (who provide a senior member to help teach him the Some suicide bombers leave behind safe house) in the target city until the prayers. The trainees then depart again notes that are delivered to their families moment he leaves for the attack. The for outdoor driving lessons after having upon their deaths. Some record “video bomber is provided with a code word tea with cookies.35 In the summer months, wills” before their departure, which for the final attack time. While the code they usually take a nap after lunch are released by the Taliban after the word can change, until recently it has before assembling for afternoon prayers mission is accomplished. Usually, been “marriage.”41 In the assassination (asar), which are usually followed by suicide bombers visit their families for of Benazir Bhutto, the code word was lessons from Maulana Masood Azhar’s one final meeting before departing on “the meal is ready.”42 Fazail-e-Jihad (The Virtues of Jihad) for their mission.39 Abid, for example, met more than an hour. The evening prayers his family before his failed attack on To boost the morale of the bombers (maghrib) are offered together followed by President Pervez Musharraf, but did before an attack, they are instructed a wazifa during which the trainees recite not tell them about the operation. to recite Ayat-ul-Kursi or a verse from Astaghfirullah, Alhamdulillah, Allah o Akbar Surah e Yaseen (chapter from the and Allah Allah 100 times each.36 The When a suicide bomber begins on the Qur’an).43 The verse is Wa jaalna mim wazifa is followed by dinner where the mission, his campmates say farewell baina aideehim saddan wa min khlfahum saddan trainees have informal conversations by embracing him and requesting that fa aghshainahum fahum la ubsaroon (And we with each other. During the training he recommend them for paradise. The have put a barrier before them, and routine, they are shown jihadist videos bomber is instructed to bathe and wear a barrier behind them, and we have on a DVD player.37 Afterward, they go clean new clothes, and he shaves his covered them up, so that they cannot straight to sleep after night prayers pubic hair. The purpose of the bomber see). By reciting this verse, the bombers (isha’) and no activity is allowed after the wearing new or clean clothes is to avoid believe they are invulnerable to law final prayers. suspicion and to have uninterrupted enforcement detection. They receive access to the target location. The bomber explicit directions from the amir of the recites Qur’anic verses, and continues camp and rahbar not to surrender at the recitation until the actual blast. any cost and to trigger the explosives if The rahbar instructs the bomber on the arrest is imminent or if they are about 2008; Hameedullah Mehsud, August 2008. proper timing of the blast in advance, to be intercepted. 32 Ibid. and the bomber begins preparations 33 Ibid. ahead of time. When conducting the attack, the 34 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. suicide vest is worn under the bomber’s 35 Aitezaz Shah, January 2008; Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008; Abid Mehsud, July 2008; Mir Janan, September 40 Ibid. 2008; Hameedullah Mehsud, August 2008. 41 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008; Abid Mehsud, July 2008. 36 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 42 Hasnain Gul, August 2009. 37 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 43 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008; Abid Mehsud, July 2008.

12 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 garments, typically under a waistcoat so families of the bombers rejoice over the it is properly concealed. The orange color martyrdom mission, and some mothers Iran’s Ambiguous Role in detonation cord connects the explosives wear new black dresses to greet local Afghanistan vest or jacket to the striker sleeve, women after the death of their son. One which is adhered to the bomber’s left- bomber, however, explained that while By Sajjan M. Gohel hand wrist with duct tape. On reaching the mother of the bomber is typically the target, the ring of the striker sleeve sad, they cannot overtly express their iran is playing a pivotal role in is pulled with the right hand and the true feelings due to threats from the Afghanistan’s post-Taliban development. blast occurs. There is no evidence of any Taliban. It is a large source of foreign direct intoxicant administered to the suicide investment, and provides assistance bombers before the attack. Also, contrary to the general public’s in critical national infrastructure, perception, the Taliban do not regularly road construction, distribution of Since suicide bombers often either abort pay compensation to the families of energy supplies, and agricultural and their missions or are arrested before suicide bombers after an attack.47 Any communications development. Iran they can detonate their explosives, they posthumous compensation package is also shares ethnic, linguistic and have been able to narrate their pre- largely a myth. In some cases, when religious links with millions of Afghan attack emotions. The bombers’ felt no the parents of a bomber are extremely Shià. This is particularly true with fear of death or consequence before the destitute, they are given a small amount Afghanistan’s Shià-minority Hazara attack. Some bombers, however, were of financial assistance. community, which resides in the central anxious about missing the target, such and northern regions of the country. As as detonating their explosives early or Conclusion a result of these positive connections, too late (for example, after a convoy has The suicide bomber training camps in Iran has been viewed as a potential already passed). Before the attack, they South Waziristan have been shuttered stabilizing force in Afghanistan, with would feel pride that Allah had chosen as a result of Pakistan’s October 2009 its interests largely aligned with those them for such a great mission. Thoughts military operation. Yet insight into of the Western mission: concern about of their family did not enter their mind. how the Waziristan camps functioned the Taliban insurgency, resistance to al- They experienced no abnormal physical helps to provide context for how and Qaìda and weakening the opium trade reactions such as sweating, dry mouth, why individuals choose to use their restlessness, heart palpitations, or body as an explosive device. Moreover, Paradoxically, Iranian-made armaments abnormal movements of the body. although the South Waziristan camps have been discovered in the hands of Breathing remained normal. There were have been closed, they may have been Afghan Taliban fighters, raising concern no speech abnormalities, nor did they relocated elsewhere. Continuing to deny and questions about Tehran’s overall appear to be in a hurry.44 militants safe haven to train and plan strategy in Afghanistan. An August for attacks is essential to reducing their 2009 report authored by General Post-Mission Activities operational capabilities in Pakistan and Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander At the completion of a successful in the region. of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, cited mission, the Taliban leaders do not Iran’s “ambiguous role” in the country, always inform the other trainees about Dr. S.H. Tajik completed his master’s stating that Iran is providing aid to the the real location of the suicide blast. degree in criminal justice administration Afghan government while at the same They also sometimes give them false and criminology from the London School time allowing weapons to pass into information about where the attack of Economics and Political Science. He the hands of the Taliban.1 U.S. Defense occurred.45 When an attack occurs has also received diplomas in Crisis Secretary Robert Gates has also accused in Afghanistan, however, the leaders Management from the Swedish National Tehran of playing a “double game” in inform the recruits of this fact. Defence College, and Risk, Crisis & Disaster Afghanistan.2 This “ambiguous” role Management from Leicester University. has created confusion over Iran’s true After an attack takes place, the amir of Dr. Tajik has 14 years of law enforcement intentions toward its neighbor. the Pakistani Taliban and the amir of experience on three continents: Europe the training camp visit the family of (Kosovo), Africa (Rwanda and Liberia) 1 Stanley A. McChrystal, “COMISAF’S Initial Assess- the suicide bomber, provided that the and Asia (Pakistan). He has worked with ment, Secretary of Defense Memorandum June 2009, 46 family is in Waziristan or accessible. the United Nations for more than five years Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Although the other trainees at the in various conflict zones. He is currently Assessment,” Headquarters, International Security As- camp feel loss for their former friend, completing a book on suicide terrorism in sistance Force, Afghanistan, August 30, 2009. General they are consoled by the notion that Pakistan. McChrystal’s exact words were, “Iran plays an ambigu- the bomber has reached paradise. No ous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assis- specific funeral rituals or celebrations tance and political support to GIRoA while the Iranian are offered at the camp for those who Qods Force is reportedly training fighters for certain go on suicide missions. They are, Taliban groups and providing other forms of military as- however, remembered in prayers. The sistance to insurgents. Iran’s current policies and actions do not pose a short-term threat to the mission, but Iran 44 Ibid. has the capability to threaten the mission in the future.” 45 Mir Janan, September 2008. 2 Mark Thompson, “U.S. Forces Get New Protection in 46 Abid Mehsud, July 2008. 47 Ishaq Mehsud, June 2008. Afghanistan,” Time Magazine, October 28, 2009.

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This article attempts to explain did not dominate the Hazarjat region in The Taliban regime in Afghanistan Iran’s paradoxical relationship with central Afghanistan, the stronghold of was highly antagonistic to Iran, and Afghanistan by providing the history the Shià community and where Iran’s Tehran viewed it as a security threat. of Iran’s pre-9/11 relations with the leverage was highest.5 In August 1998, the Taliban captured country, examining its actions after the Mazar-i-Sharif, the interim capital of fall of the Taliban in 2001, and assessing In 1992, following the Soviet withdrawal the Northern Alliance. In addition to Iran’s overall goals in Afghanistan. It from Afghanistan, the United Nations killing hundreds of Shià Muslims, the finds that while the theocratic Shià sponsored a conference for a political Taliban stormed the Iranian Consulate Muslim state of Iran should have little in resolution to transfer power to Afghan in the city and killed eight Iranian common with the Sunni fundamentalist Interim Government (AIG) President diplomats and an Iranian journalist, Taliban militia, elements within the Sebghatullah Mojaddadi and his and held 50 other Iranian nationals Iranian military or government may successor Burhanuddin Rabbani of captive. Tehran was incensed by the be willing to assist Taliban fighters Jamaat-i-Islami.6 To consolidate his killings and dispatched 200,000 for a number of short-term interests. power base, however, Rabbani, an troops to the border as the government Although Iran does not want a hostile ethnic Tajik, resorted to pitting one decided whether or not to invade. War Sunni regime to take power on its eastern ethnic group against the other including was averted when the Taliban, after the border, elements within its security the Shià political faction Hizb-i- threat from Iran and under pressure forces may want to retain the capability Wahdat (Party of Unity), led by Abdul from the United Nations, returned the to escalate tensions in Afghanistan Ali Mazari.7 Interestingly, the Iranian bodies of the murdered diplomats and in response to Western pressure on clerical leadership supported Rabbani sent the remaining Iranian captives either Iran’s ongoing nuclear program against the Shià Hizb-i-Wahdat and home. The killings and the capture or its clandestine activities in Iraq and provided Rabbani’s government with of Iranians were seen in Tehran as a Lebanon. Moreover, Iran appears most food and resources. Tehran’s apparent national humiliation and perhaps a clear interested in carving out influence in logic was that by supporting Rabbani, its reminder of Tehran’s failed policies in Afghanistan’s western Herat Province strategic interests in newly independent Afghanistan.13 at the expense of heightened Taliban Central Asian states would be protected violence elsewhere in the country. by a Tajik-dominated government in Post-Taliban Afghanistan Kabul.8 During the period of reformist Iranian Tehran’s Pre-9/11 Afghan Dynamics President Mohammad Khatami, To understand Iran’s role in Afghanistan A three-year war with Rabbani’s Iranian opposition to the Taliban today, it is necessary to examine government exhausted Hizb-i-Wahdat’s and its al-Qaìda ally was such that its actions during the 1979 Soviet military strength and resources.9 As Tehran cooperated with Washington invasion and subsequent occupation a result of Tehran’s failure to support during Operation Enduring Freedom of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion his party, Mazari made a fatal move by providing vital intelligence created a conundrum for Iran’s supreme by agreeing to a peace deal with the support to the U.S. war effort.14 That leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini emerging Taliban.10 As a consequence, level of cooperation, however, has was obligated to speak against the the Taliban forced Hizb-i-Wahdat to somewhat dissipated and become more invasion of an Islamic country by surrender its arms and relinquish its antagonistic. “godless communists,” yet he could territory to members of the Taliban. not afford to directly antagonize the Mazari and several members of Hizb-i- Although the Iranian government Soviet Union. The start of the invasion Wahdat’s leadership were taken hostage has positive ties with Kabul and has coincided with the U.S. Embassy hostage and murdered in March 1995.11 In 1996, supported a number of economic crisis in Tehran that irreversibly the Taliban eventually overthrew the projects in the country, it appears damaged U.S.-Iran relations.3 As Iran Rabbani government.12 This enabled the to be maintaining leverage over the became increasingly isolated during the Taliban to gain a foothold within central direction of the country by offering hostage crisis, it began to tilt in favor of Afghanistan, which they would not some support to the Afghan Taliban. the Soviet Union to counter the growing relinquish until the U.S.-led invasion in Evidence has emerged that the Iranian U.S. influence with the Arab-Afghan 2001. Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), mujahidin. As a result, although Tehran through its special Quds Force, has condemned the Soviet occupation 5 Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An provided weapons, explosives, roadside and demanded it withdraw its forces, Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (New bombs, and other forms of support the clerical regime was careful not to York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). to elements of the Afghan Taliban. allow its policy to damage its otherwise 6 Hafizullah Emadi, “The Hazaras and Their Role in The Through 2009, British military forces 4 amiable relations with Moscow. At the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan,” have intercepted shipments of Iranian- same time, the Soviet occupying forces Central Asian Survey 16:3 (1997): p. 381. made arms in Helmand Province, which 7 Ibid. have included Russian-made SA-14 3 Mohsen Milani, “The Hostage Crisis,” in Encyclopae- 8 Ibid. “Gremlin” man-portable, low-altitude 15 dia Iranica, Vol. VII (New York: Columbia University, 9 Ibid., p. 383. surface-to-air missiles. Iranian-made 2004), pp. 525-535. 10 Ibid. 4 Adam Tarock, “The Politics of the Pipeline: The Iran 11 Ibid., pp. 383-384. 13 Tarock, p. 801. and Afghanistan Conflict,” Third World Quarterly 20:4 12 Mohsen Milani, “Iran’s Policy Towards Afghanistan,” 14 “Iran and the West: After 9/11,” BBC, August 3, 2009. (1999): p. 805. Middle East Journal 60:2 (2006): pp. 242-243. 15 Michael Smith, “Missile Threat to British Troops,”

14 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 rocket-propelled grenades have been that the explosive force is concentrated conducted by British, American and found by U.S. troops in villages where in the direction of the designated target Afghan forces.28 Afghanistan is the the Taliban sought sanctuary, carrying rather than blasting in all directions world’s largest producer of opium, and markings such as “82 mm h-e lot 02 and therefore weakening the impact.21 Helmand is where much of the country’s slash 87.”16 Although these markings Unlike ordinary mines that can cause poppy crop is grown; the proceeds from are copies of U.S. military ordinances, minor damage to military vehicles, a the drug trade help bankroll the Taliban, the lot numbers are fabricated and do Dragon can completely destroy it. The especially when it comes to purchasing not exist in the United States.17 Taliban have credited Iranian-supplied weapons and explosive materials.29 weapons as being responsible for It is conceivable that much of the successful attacks against NATO forces While identifying the alleged role of the weaponry smuggled across the Iran- in southern Afghanistan.22 Quds Force in supporting elements of Afghanistan border to the Taliban has the Taliban insurgency, McChrystal’s been primarily through arms dealers and Connections between Iran and the report also mentioned that Tehran’s other criminal elements seeking profit or Taliban are also drawn from discoveries strategy and actions do not adversely opium. Individuals within the Taliban, made by the Afghan authorities. harm the U.S.-led coalition’s Afghan however, have themselves identified In March 2009, Afghan security assignment in the short-term.30 two routes for their access to Iranian forces found a cache of Iranian-made McChrystal does believe, however, weaponry, which has been corroborated explosives near the Bakhshabad Dam in that Iran is capable of threatening the by British officials. First, there are Farah Province, a $2.2 million coalition- mission in the long-term.31 Ironically, Iranian businessmen who sell arms to sponsored project set to boost power and just as Tehran ignored the situation to the Taliban, and then smuggle them into water supply in the area.23 Mohammad its own detriment in the 1990s, it stands Afghanistan. Second, there are those Yunus Rassouli, the deputy governor of to lose a great deal again if there were within Tehran’s state apparatus who Farah Province, alleged, “Our reports a resurrection of a Taliban-led order in allegedly “donate” weapons.18 In regard indicate that the Iranian government is Afghanistan. to the latter, it is not clear whether this trying to prevent the construction of the is a directive from the central leadership Bakhshabad Dam. They will do whatever Reasons Behind Iran’s Policy in Tehran or instead decisions made is necessary.”24 In September 2009, If it is true that elements within the by certain elements within the IRGC. Afghan police found explosives-packed Iranian government are providing Regardless, Iranian-made weapons are jerrycans—which they thought came weapons to Taliban fighters, then in high demand among Taliban fighters. from Iran—during a search of Taliban Tehran is playing a dangerous double A Kalashnikov rifle made in Iran, for fighters traveling on the Bagram-Kabul game in Afghanistan. By covertly example, costs $200-300 more than one highway.25 assisting the Taliban, they are hoping made in another country because the to achieve two strategic objectives. Iranian models are also capable of firing Furthermore, Afghan border police grenades up to 300 meters.19 have intercepted consignments of anti- First, by providing the Taliban weapons tank mines and mortars bound for to battle NATO troops, Tehran is Another concern in Afghanistan has Afghan Taliban fighting NATO forces.26 presuming that with the Taliban been the discovery of AK-47s, C4 plastic More alarming is that Iranian weapons preoccupied, it will leave Herat alone explosives, mortars and advanced are being discovered in provinces such and not disturb the “economic sphere” armor piercing explosives, known as as Helmand, which is seen as the key that Iran is developing in the province. Explosively-Formed Penetrators (EFPs), battleground between the Taliban and One of Iran’s main objectives is to create a shaped charge used with deadly NATO forces. In May 2009, following 20 effect by insurgents in Iraq. EFPs, an operation to clear Taliban fighters 28 Operation Moshtarak is designed to clear central Hel- which appear to come from Iran, have from the town of Marja, coalition mand of the Taliban and set the conditions for the Af- earned the nickname in Afghanistan as forces found 44 bricks of Iranian-made ghan government to introduce increased security, stabil- “Dragons” because they are shaped so explosives and dozens of Iranian-made ity, development, rule of law, freedom of movement and 27 mortars. Marja developed international reconstruction in the area. Moshtarak means “together” Times, March 1, 2009; Alastair Leithead, “Iranian Influ- significance in 2010 following the in Dari. The name is designed to signal that the Afghan ence in Afghanistan,” BBC, June 11, 2007. initiation of “Operation Moshtarak,” army is now playing an equal role in fighting the Tali- 16 Lara Logan, “Cooperation Rises Between Iran and a counterinsurgency operation jointly ban. The assault on the town of Marja is the biggest test Taliban,” CBS News, October 7, 2009. so far for Afghan forces. The town’s population is about 17 Ibid. 21 Clark, “Assignment.” 80,000 people, of whom up to 2,000 are thought to be 18 Kate Clark, “Taliban Claim Weapons Supplied by 22 Clark, “Taliban Claim Weapons Supplied by Iran.” Taliban. For details, see “Operation MOSHTARAK Be- Iran,” Daily Telegraph, September 14, 2008; Kate Clark, 23 “Tehran Accused of Complicity in Growing Weapons gins,” British Ministry of Defense, February 13, 2010. “Assignment,” BBC, September 18, 2008. Trade,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 20, 29 “Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat 19 Ibid. 2009. of Afghan Opium,” United Nations Office on Drugs and 20 Significantly, the appearance of EFPs in Iraq has also 24 Ibid. Crime (UNODC), October 2009. been blamed on Iran. For details on the EFPs in Afghani- 25 Chris Zambelis, “Is Iran Supporting the Insurgency in 30 According to McChrystal, “Iran’s current policies and stan, see David Hambling, “‘Deliberate Slip’ Reveals Afghanistan?” Terrorism Monitor 7:33 (2009). actions do not pose a short-term threat to the mission, Afghan Superbombs,” Wired, January 28, 2009; Greg 26 Ben Farmer, “Iranian Weapons Getting Through to but Iran has the capability to threaten the mission in the Bruno, “Iran and the Future of Afghanistan,” Council on Taliban,” Daily Telegraph, June 8, 2009. future.” Foreign Relations, March 30, 2009. 27 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

15 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 an economic sphere of influence in Karzai made Ismail Khan minister of Kabul, which has become increasingly Afghanistan, with the ultimate goal of water and energy.38 A small industrial dependent on Iranian aid and becoming a powerful strategic focal point city has been reconstructed, making it infrastructure development, is reluctant for the transport and shipment of goods the industrial heartland of the country.39 to openly criticize elements within Iran and services linking the Persian Gulf, Following the completion of a highway on allegations of supplying the Taliban Central Asia and the Far East.32 Iran from its border with Afghanistan, with weapons, especially considering also projects influence in Afghanistan Tehran financed an extension linking that corrupt elements within the Afghan through economic initiatives and various Herat to Afghanistan’s remote northern government itself have been doing the religious programs. The bulk of Iranian provinces. In 2009, a plethora of same for economic gain.43 investment is in the Herat region and Iranian-built schools, health clinics involves infrastructure projects, road and business centers around Herat Iranian influence in Afghanistan is and bridge construction, education, were connected to the Iranian interior inevitable and some of it is constructive. agriculture, power generation, and due to an $80 million railroad project.40 Yet it is also duplicitous, paradoxical telecommunications projects. Iran has Herat’s bazaars are filled with Iranian and potentially destabilizing to the helped rebuild Afghanistan’s radio products, and the presence of the IRGC region. As a consequence, Tehran is in and television infrastructure, and has through the Iranian Consulate is openly danger of conceding reverse strategic increased its own radio and television visible.41 In addition, hundreds of trucks depth to the same forces it occasionally programs in Dari.33 cross from Iran to Herat and vice-versa and tacitly assists. Yet, until the clerical on a daily basis.42 regime accepts that support by elements It is in the Herat region that Iran’s of the IRGC toward the Taliban will influence in Afghanistan is most visible. Second, it is plausible that the clerical have a detrimental impact on Iran itself, Until 1857, Herat was considered an regime wants to retain the capability its “ambiguous” policy will continue in “integral part” of Iran and served as the to weaken stability in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. capital of the Persian Empire in the early reaction to Western pressure on its 15th century.34 When the British repelled nuclear program or its clandestine Dr. Sajjan Gohel is Director for Iranian advances toward Herat, Iran and activities in Iraq and Lebanon. International Security at the Asia-Pacific the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Moreover, while Tehran wants a stable, Foundation, an independent intelligence Paris in 1857. Although Iran abandoned friendly Afghanistan, it clearly wants to and security think-tank. He received his its historic claim on Herat, it reserved limit U.S. influence in the country. To Ph.D. in International History from the the right, under Article VII of the treaty, achieve these aims, Iran may be covertly London School of Economics and Political to send forces into Afghanistan “if its providing weapons and explosives to the Science (LSE). His doctoral thesis, entitled frontier is violated.”35 Since then, Iran Afghan Taliban to ensure that the West “The Evolution of Egyptian Radical has occasionally sought to keep Herat becomes preoccupied on other fronts. Ideological Thought from Hasan al-Banna as a buffer zone. For a few years, Ismail to Ayman al-Zawahiri,” is in the process Khan, the Tajik governor of Herat, Assessment of being published. Dr. Gohel’s primary helped Iran realize that goal.36 Today, strategic cooperation between research interests include: the security Iran and the West should be theoretically challenges in South Asia, the Middle East Today, Herat is one of the most possible because they have converging and the Horn of Africa and the connection stable and prosperous regions in interests and common aversions in with the West; radical ideological thought Afghanistan.37 It also benefited from Afghanistan, such as the re-emergence both present and historical; and the role the fact that Afghan President Hamid of al-Qa`ida fighters, the Taliban and that New Media plays in transnational narco-traffickers. Indeed, Western terrorism. 32 Milani, “Iran’s Policy Towards Afghanistan.” capitals and Tehran could coalesce 33 “Iran Exports $10m to Afghanistan,” BBC Monitoring around stabilizing Afghanistan. Service, October 1, 2002. Nevertheless, Tehran is seeking to 34 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Amir Kabir Ya Ghahra- influence Afghanistan’s domestic and man-e Mobareze Ba Astemar (Tehran: Farahnai Press, foreign policy while at the same time 1927), p. 377. limiting the role Western states play in 35 J.C. Hurewitz ed., The Middle East and North Africa in the region. World Politics: European Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Ha- ven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 341-343. 36 In September 1995, Ismail Khan fled to Mashhad, 38 Abubakar Siddique, “Proposed Afghan Cabinet Iran, after the fall of Herat to the Taliban, but he returned Stocked With Familiar Faces,” Radio Free Europe, De- with rearmed fighters within a few months. In 1997, he cember 21, 2009. was captured and imprisoned by the Taliban in one of 39 Motlagh. the clashes. After spending three years in captivity, he es- 40 Ibid. caped and fled a third time to Iran. Since then, Khan, who 41 Personal interview, Afghan diplomat, November 27, is now minister of water and energy in Afghanistan, has 2009. developed and built upon close relations with the clerical 42 Gulshan Dietl, “War, Peace and the Warlords: The regime in Tehran. Case of Ismail Khan of Herat in Afghanistan,” Alter- 37 Jason Motlagh, “Iran’s Spending Spree in Afghani- natives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 3:2-3 stan,” Time Magazine, May 20, 2009. (2004): p. 52. 43 Clark, “Assignment.”

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The Nexus Between provide insight on this community, it in 1986 (led since the mid-1990s by the is necessary to rely on reports by the Egyptian imam Mahmoud Shershaby), Salafism and Jihadism in Netherlands’ National Coordinator thereby laying the foundations of the the Netherlands for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and the Salafist infrastructure in the Netherlands AIVD, newspaper clippings and the as a whole.8 Three years later, another By Beatrice de Graaf extensive field work of anthropologists Saudi private missionary organization and social scientists who carried out with headquarters in Riyadh, al- immediately after the 9/11 attacks, CNN research projects among Salafist youths Waqf, initiated the establishment of displayed images from the Dutch city of in the Netherlands in recent years.6 the foundation al-Waqf al-Islami in Ede where groups of youth of Moroccan Based on this information, this article Eindhoven. The al-Fourqaan mosque in descent gleefully cheered and shouted will explain why Salafism7 gained Eindhoven, led by the Sudanese imam over the apparent blow dealt to the popularity in the Netherlands, and then Eisha Bersham, became the center of United States. Two years later, Shaykh examine the three stages through which this foundation’s activities. In 1990, Fawaz Jneid, a well-known imam from it has passed since the 9/11 attacks on also with Saudi support, the Foundation a Salafist mosque in the Netherlands, the United States. Sounna was created in The Hague (in cursed president George W. Bush, Ariel 1998 renamed as the Foundation As- Sharon, Dutch parliamentarian Hirsi 1986-2001: The Creation of a Salafist Soennah/Centrum Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Ali and filmmaker Theo van Gogh and Infrastructure in the Netherlands Taymia), led by the Syrian imam Fawaz begged Allah “to destroy the enemies of The Saudi non-governmental Jneid and preacher Jamal Ahajjaj (Abu Islam.”1 Another imam refused to shake missionary organization al-Haramain Ismail), who both play an important part hands with a Dutch female minister, was responsible for the creation of the in the dissemination of Salafism in the and a third advised his followers to El Tawheed Foundation in Amsterdam Netherlands.9 The Foundation ISOOK10 throw homosexuals from the roof.2 On in Tilburg (led by the Syrian imam November 2, 2004, two months after field study of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands Ahmed Salaam) was created in 2000, Fawaz had cursed Theo van Gogh, is soon to be published, however: Ineke Roex, Sjef van through indirect assistance from Saudi a young Dutch Muslim, Mohammed Stiphout and Jean Tillie, Salafisme in Nederland. Aard, Arabia. Salam is considered a highly Bouyeri, murdered and slaughtered omvang en dreiging (Amsterdam: IMES, 2010). Another educated cleric, who has published Van Gogh, quoting passages from the good overview is “Salafisme in Nederland: Een voorbi- many religious works; Fawaz Jneid and 3 medieval Salafist cleric Ibn Taymiyya. jgaand fenomeen of een blijvende factor van belang?” Mahmoud Shershaby are said to be his These incidents, and especially the Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism pupils. terrorist attack committed by Bouyeri, (NCTb), 2008. Also see Martijn de Koning, Zoeken naar brought the Salafist movement to een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van Other organizations came into existence the center of Dutch public outrage jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Amsterdam: Bert as well, such as the Foundation for and debate, and prompted the Dutch Bakker, 2008). Islamic Youths in Breda, founded Intelligence and Security Service 6 Most notably, Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant and in March 1990, or the al-Haramain (AIVD) to warn against the damaging Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en Humanitarian Aid Amsterdam (which influence of Salafist ideology on the democratische moslims in Nederland (Amsterdam: Amster- was dissolved in 2006). The Salafist 4 Dutch Muslim community. dam University Press, 2006) and De Koning, Zoeken naar movement, however, was still a minor een ‘zuivere’ islam. current within the Muslim community An authoritative or exhaustive history 7 Salafism is not a unified movement, as it displays in the Netherlands during this time of the emergence of Salafism in the various currents, historical trajectories and genealogies. period, according to an AIVD report 11 Netherlands does not exist, nor has Many Salafists are non-violent, and various strains are from 1998. the Salafist population in the country apolitical. Moreover, it is often used as a normative self- 5 been mapped out meticulously. To descriptor, used by religious factions to claim religious The above-mentioned foundations and and political legitimacy, than as an objectifying term. mosques in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, 1 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh,” NRC Salafists claim adherence to the first three generations The Hague and Tilburg constitute the Handelsblad, October 31, 2006. of exemplary followers of the Prophet Muhammad. As most prominent Salafist hubs in the 2 Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, “Laveren tussen de wet Quintan Wiktorowicz has described in his seminal text Netherlands, drawing some 1,500 (As- en Allah,” NRC Handelsblad, September 19, 2005. from 2006, Salafists are united around the strict adher- Soennah) or even 2,000 visitors (al- 3 Ibid. ence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God, or Fourqaan) each Friday (of a population 4 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- monotheism), the rejection of innovations (bid`a) of the of about 850,000 Muslims in the 12 isme in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser- Islamic creed and practice, the condemnation of polythe- Netherlands). In comparison with other vice, 2007; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ism (shirk) and all other forms of venerating humans or ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Nederland,” Dutch objects. Salafists maintain that theirs is the only- legiti 8 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; De Koning, Zoeken Intelligence and Security Service, December 2009. mate interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna. To them, naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, pp. 373-377. 5 Salafism is a relatively new phenomenon in the Neth- Islamic pluralism, let alone subjective individual inter- 9 Ibid. erlands. As a movement, it is very closed to the outside pretation without being an accepted authority, does not 10 ISOOK stands for the Islamitische Stichting voor Op- world. Therefore, the author does not pretend to give exist. For an overview of Salafism, see Roel Meijer ed., voeding en Overdracht van Kennis (Islamic Foundation an in-depth analysis, but presents this article as a well- Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: for Education and Dissemination of Knowledge). informed snapshot of the present situation, taken in- Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 1-32; Quintan Wiktorow- 11 “De politieke islam in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence stead from a security studies’ point of view, rather than icz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,”Studies in Conflict and Security Service, 1998. a theological or anthropological one. The first in-depth and Terrorism 29:3 (2006): pp. 207-239. 12 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”

17 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 countries such as the United Kingdom, and the jihadi/takfiri Salafists (or Salafi- Dutch defenders of national security, Germany or France, these Salafist jihadists).16 Western liberalism and secularization. groups became more popular and rooted within the Muslim communities than Selefies, as they label themselves, are the Therefore, after years of benign neglect, other related radical Islamist currents most apolitical, pious group, and claim Moroccans, Turks and other immigrants such as Hizb al-Tahrir (Hizb ut-Tahrir) to be non-violent. Their main preacher were now framed as “Muslims” and or Takfir wal-Hijra.13 is Abdillah Bouchta, a Salafist teacher were held responsible for jihadist from Tilburg. The second group includes attacks elsewhere. The consequence of The Salafist mosques also mobilize more politically-oriented Salafists who this application of religious frames of a multinational crowd of visitors. are non-violent as well, but engage more identity in mainstream Dutch discourse Muslims from the Maghreb, the Horn in local and international politics. This was that youth with Moroccan parents, of Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, strand develops its mobilizing power but born and raised in the Netherlands, Turkey, the Middle East and Dutch through central nodes within the Muslim embraced this stigmatization and fell converts are among the attendants.14 community, most of them financed back on this new collective, post-ethnic Although the Salafist movement in or inspired by Saudi organizations.17 Muslim identity. They adopted the general consists of Saudi, Egyptian A third, very marginal strand can be same set of mechanisms that can be or Syrian members, Dutch Moroccans described as the jihadi/takfiri branch of found within other youth cultures: they constitute the predominant group, Salafism, according to De Koning, and appropriated a negative identity that in particular Muslim youth of comprises a small number of Muslims, frightened and provoked the mainstream Moroccan descent (40% of the Dutch especially those connected to the former population by incorporating violent Moroccan population is under 30).15 Hofstad Group.18 and dangerous symbols and discourses The Moroccan community was also in their group identity.20 They adopted responsible for the establishment These groups differ, for example, symbols and discourses from the Salafi- of the As-Soennah and al-Fourqaan regarding the status of Islamic clerics, jihadi movement since this provided mosques. attitudes toward parliamentary them with the tools to transform democracy and the desirability of the themselves into superior and militant 2001-2002: Salafism as Empowerment resurrection of a caliphate.19 Although human beings with direct access to the In the Netherlands, Salafi-jihadism is a the first two branches of Salafism “Truth.”21 latecomer compared to the other Salafist are non-violent, they nevertheless communities in Europe, where political imported theological doctrines on From 2002-2003 onward, a small refugees from the Middle East and the war against infidels, the search number of these alienated second- veterans from the wars in Afghanistan, for a pure Islam and the tools for a generation immigrants of Moroccan Bosnia and Chechnya imported militant radical form of Muslim empowerment descent entered the path of violent experiences to the West as early as to the Netherlands. These radical radicalization. Among them were the the late 1980s, such as in France and ideas grew in popularity within the members of the so-called “Hofstad in the United Kingdom. From the late Muslim community after 2001, when Group.” 1990s, but especially after 9/11, these the so-called “Fortuyn-revolt” in the Salafist groups extended their religious Netherlands gained momentum and 2002-2004: Salafism as a Hotbed for infrastructure in the Netherlands: started to attack “Muslim immigration.” Homegrown Jihadism22 they built new mosques, websites and The charismatic right-wing politician In late 2001 to early 2002, the AIVD informal networks. Martijn de Koning Pim Fortuyn and his effervescent began monitoring Salafist centers, such discerns three groups among them: populist party entered the political as the al-Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven “Selefies,” politically involved Salafists stage in August 2001 and linked Islam, that was suspected of recruiting young immigration, integration and terrorism Muslims for the international jihad.23 In 13 Hizb al-Tahrir is a very hierarchical organization, but together, discursively framing them into 2002, two Dutch Moroccans were killed lacks infrastructure and cadre in the Netherlands. This a security issue, which of course made in Kashmir, Khalid el-Hasnoui and can be explained by the absence of a large immigrant an impression immediately after 9/11. Ahmed el-Bakiouli, both supposedly community from Pakistan or India in the Netherlands. The Salafist movement in particular The first activities of radical Salafist and jihadist groups became the focus of political and 20 Martijn de Koning, “Een wekelijks portie burger- in the Netherlands were initiated by immigrants from public attention, since the Salafists— schap 8 – Wat meer radicalisering graag,” February Algeria, Morocco or Syria, all countries where Hizb with their emphasis on purity, hatred 22, 2010, available at www.religionresearch.org/mar- al-Tahrir is less active. Immigration history and coinci- against “infidels” and revulsion against tijn/2010/02/22/een-wekelijks-portie-burgerschap-8- dence played a part in this. supposedly low moral standards in the wat-meer-radicalisering-graag. 14 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” West—posed the mirror image to the 21 De Koning, “Changing Worldviews,” pp. 404-423. 15 Ten percent of the immigrant population is Moroccan 22 This paragraph is partly based on the chapter “The (approximately 345,000 in 2009), whereas the Turkish 16 Martijn de Koning, “Changing Worldviews and Van Gogh Murder: A New Threat from Homegrown minority stands at 11%. See the Centraal Bureau voor Friendship: An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Terrorism in The Netherlands,” to be published in the de Statistiek located at http://statline.cbs.nl; V. van den Female Salafis in the Netherlands,” in Meijer, Global forthcoming book, Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Rein- Maagdenberg, “Jaarrapport Integratie,” in Onderzoek ver- Salafism, pp. 408-410. ares, Leader-led Jihad (New York: Columbia University richt in opdracht van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 17 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” Press, 2010). (SCP) (Rotterdam: Instituut voor Sociologisch-Econo- 18 De Koning, “Changing Worldviews,” p. 410. 23 “OM: moskee Eindhoven werft strijders,” NRC Han- misch Onderzoek, 2004), pp. 13-14. 19 Buijs et al. delsblad, May 3, 2003.

18 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 recruited in the al-Fourqaan mosque.24 to the notice of the AIVD in January Akhnikh even bragged about contacts Months later, 13 individuals were 2003, when he took the train to Berlin, with Maulana Masood Azhar, the arrested for terrorist activities, some bound for Chechnya, to join local founder of Jaysh-i-Muhammad, which of whom were regular visitors of al- jihadists in their fight against Russian they later downplayed in court—but no Fourqaan.25 forces together with his friend Khalid evidence of concrete preparations was (or Hussam, who was 17-years-old), found.38 Beginning in December 2001, the but they were arrested and put back on AIVD also monitored the radical a train to the Netherlands.31 After his Then, on the early morning of November Salafist El Tawheed mosque in the return, Azzouz’s status rose; he started 2, 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year- north of Amsterdam for suspicion of his own Islamic book company and old Dutch Moroccan, born and raised in Egyptian and Saudi influences, since began only associating with Moroccan Amsterdam, awaited publicist Theo van the mosque had financial relations to a youth.32 Gogh in an Amsterdam street, shot him Saudi non-governmental organization, off his bicycle and slaughtered him with al-Haramain International.26 In the Ismail Akhnikh was another Hofstad a ritual knife in the street in front of summer of 2002, the service identified Group member with international many witnesses.39 Under the new Dutch a group of Muslim youth, who met in aspirations. Akhnikh, born in anti-terrorism laws passed in August and around the mosque and gathered Amsterdam in 1982 from Moroccan 2004, Bouyeri was arrested and tried around Redouan al-Issar (also named immigrants, regularly attended the El for murder with “terrorist intent.”40 “Abu Khaled” or “the Shaykh”) who Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam where On July 26, 2005, he received a life had ties to radical Muslims in Spain and he became acquainted with Azzouz and sentence, without parole—unusually Belgium.27 Abu Khaled was an illegal helped to form the Hofstad Group in the harsh in Dutch judicial history.41 immigrant from Syria, a former member fall of 2002.33 In the summer of 2003, of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and he traveled with Azzouz to Barcelona Bouyeri’s action took the security a Takfir wal-Hijra adherent who came to meet with Abdeladim Akoudad for services by surprise. From 2002, to the Netherlands in 1995.28 For a guidance and instructions.34 Abdeladim the AIVD had monitored a group of number of radical Muslims, he became Akoudad (or “Naoufel”), a Moroccan jihadist radicals with whom Bouyeri a mentor.29 living in Spain, was suspected by was acquainted, a network the service the Moroccan security services of internally dubbed as the “Hofstad He inspired, among others, 17-year-old involvement in the Casablanca attacks Group” since it operated in the nation’s high school student Samir Azzouz, of of May 16, 2003.35 capital, Amsterdam (Hofstad translates Moroccan origin but born and raised in as “capital city”).42 Its core members the Netherlands.30 Samir Azzouz came After temporary arrests in October were under surveillance, but Bouyeri 2003, Akhnikh, Azzouz and Jason did not belong to them. He did not take 24 Siem Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam Walters further developed their skills as part in the foreign trips some of the in Nederland (Amsterdam: Veen, 2004), p. 63. jihadists and urged other Muslims to go members made and was not considered a 36 25 Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder; “Annual Report abroad to wage jihad. Akhnikh went to 2002,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2003; Pakistan that year, as did “Zakaria T.” “Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tussen and Walters (who even went twice, in 2004, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005. 37 salafistische missie. Radicaliseringsprocessen en isla- July and December 2003). Walters and 38 Ibid. mistisch terrorisme,” Dutch Intelligence and Security 39 A highly informative account of the assassination of Service, June 2004. dam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2007). Van Gogh and the development of the Hofstad Group can 26 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “De omstreden El 31 Ibid. be found in: Albert Benschop, “Jihad in the Netherlands. Tawheed-Moskee,” NOVA broadcast, November 9, 32 Ibid. Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold,” available at 2004. According to NOVA, Saudi businessman Aqeel 33 “Verdict in the Hofstad-case,” Court of Rotterdam, www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php. Alaqeel financed the El Tawheed mosque with 1.3- mil The Hague, March 10, 2006. Also see Emerson Ver- 40 See the verdict against Bouyeri, Court of Amsterdam, lion euros. Al-Haramain was blacklisted as an al-Qa`ida maat, De Hofstadgroep. Portret van een radicaal-islamitisch July 26, 2005. charity, but the accusations were not substantiated and netwerk (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2005), pp. 55-77. 41 In the Netherlands, life sentences are rare. Bouyeri the mosque continued to operate. Thanks to Dennis de 34 Ibid. was the 28th person to receive such a sentence since 1945, Widt for these references. 35 Petter Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Reli- war criminals included. Capital felonies, such as murder, 27 “Letter to Parliament,” Netherlands’ ministers of the giously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name usually result in sentences of 10-15 years. The new terror- interior and justice, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, of Global Jihad? (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research ism law, however, states that if there is a terrorist motive No. 5319045, November 10, 2004, pp. 20-24. Establishment, 2005), pp. 17-19. for a crime, the sentence can be increased by half. Impris- 28 Ibid. 36 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken onments ordinarily in excess of 15 years can be upgraded 29 “Feitenrelaas,” attachment to the “Letter to Parlia- tegen Nadir A. etc.,” National Prosecutor’s Office (Lan- to life imprisonment, as was the case with Bouyeri. ment,” Netherlands’ ministers of the interior and justice, delijk Parket), Amsterdam, February 6, 2005, pp. 7, 13. 42 Description of this case is based, among others, on the Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, No. 29854, Novem- 37 “Dutch Radical Islamic Group Planned Euro 2004 requisitory of the National Prosecution in the Hofstad ber 10, 2004. Attack in Portugal,” Agence France-Presse, November Group case. See “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie,” 30 For an account of this story, see “Samir A. First En- 15, 2004; “Dutch Islamists Planned Barroso Attack,” Re- part I, National Prosecutor’s Office, January 23, 2006 emy of the State,” KRO Reporter, October 1, 2006. The uters, November 15, 2004; “Letter to Parliament,” Neth- and part II, January 25, 2006; District Court of Rotter- documentary includes interviews with Azzouz and his erlands’ minister of justice, November 10, 2004, Han- dam, verdict in the Hofstad Group case, March 10, 2006; wife. Also see Eric Vrijsen, “Van Samir A tot Marad J,” delingen van de Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005. Also see “The ‘Hofstadgroep,’” working paper, Transnational Elsevier, December 1, 2005; Arjan Erkel, Samir (Amster- the parliamentary debate on this report on November 11, Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, April 2008.

19 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 main actor in the Dutch jihadist scene.43 O Hirshi Ali.” “I deem thee lost, O Finally, it is argued that Bouyeri acted Bouyeri’s radical texts calling for unbelieving fundamentalist.”46 in line with Fawaz Jneid’s malediction violent jihad, disseminated under the of Theo van Gogh and Hirsi Ali.53 name “Abu Zubair,” were only noticed These two texts showed that Bouyeri’s after the police and the AIVD stepped attack was the outcome of an ideological After these connections became public, up their investigation into the Hofstad turn to violent jihad that evolved from the whole Salafist movement was put on Group after the murder of Van Gogh on the Hofstad Group, since Bouyeri wrote trial in the eyes of the Dutch population. November 2, 2004.44 these texts in spiritual support for The members of the Hofstad Group had this network.47 In one of Bouyeri’s last been visitors of the As-Soennah and El After the attack, it became clear that writings, an “Open Letter to the Dutch Tawheed mosques in The Hague and Bouyeri sought legitimacy for his Population” dated August 12, 2004 Amsterdam.54 The al-Fourqaan mosque atrocity in religious arguments. With (which he left on a USB-stick for other in Eindhoven was accused of recruitment him, he had a farewell letter titled Hofstad Group members to disseminate activities and radical Salafist imams had “Drenched in Blood.” This versed text within “the umma”),48 he announced on many occasions lashed out against the read as an incitement to holy war and attacks against Dutch public places, Netherlands, homosexuals and liberal was signed Saifu Deen al-Muwahhied. justifying them due to the support of intellectuals such as Hirsi Ali or Theo van According to Ruud Peters, a Dutch Islam the Dutch government for the United Gogh.55 In the perception of large parts expert and witness for the prosecution, States and Israel. His argument echoed of the Dutch population, the November this alias was a combination of two a fatwa announced by dissident Saudi attack showed that every orthodox Arabic terms—“sword of religion” Shaykh Hamud Ibn `Uqla al-Shu’aybi, Muslim could be a potential terrorist,56 (Saif al-Din) and “confessor of Tawhid” legitimizing the September 11 attacks.49 and opinion polls said that 80% of the (al-Muwahhid).45 In the “open letter,” A translation of this fatwa was found population wanted “tougher policies Bouyeri directly threatened Dutch- on computers of other Hofstad Group against immigrants.”57 Jihadist terrorism Somali liberal politician Hirsi Ali, and members.50 became a public nightmare. In 2005, the blamed politicians for allowing Jewish Dutch population listed it as the most influences in politics. According to Bouyeri and the Hofstad Group drew important issue facing the country.58 Norwegian researcher Petter Nesser, inspiration from several Salafist the conclusion of the letter shows “the sources. They took the principle of al- 2004-2010: Salafist Resilience Against essence of ‘al-Qaidaism,’” by foreseeing wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) Jihadists the defeat of the enemy on the individual, from the Salafist cleric Abu Muhammad After the murder of Van Gogh and local, regional and global levels in order al-Maqdisi, which dictates that true the public outrage that followed suit, of priority: jihadists should isolate themselves from a process of reorientation seemed to the non-Muslim world and hate those set in within the Salafist movement And like a great prophet once said: who threaten Islam.51 From the London- in the Netherlands, partly due to the “I deem thee lost, O Pharaoh.” based Salafist imam Abu Hamza al- increased monitoring and control (17:102) And so we want to use Masri, they took the principle of takfir activities conducted against them similar words and send these (declaring fellow Muslims infidels).52

before us, so that the heavens and keling van Mohammed Bouyeri. Deskundigenrapport the stars will gather this news and 46 Nesser, p. 25. opgesteld op verzoek van het Openbaar Ministerie voor spread it over the corners of the 47 “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie.” de Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam,” May 2005; universe like a tidal wave. “I deem 48 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken R. Peters, “Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald thee lost, O America.” “I deem tegen Nadir A. etc.,” pp. 31-32. door Mohammed B,” attachment to the report mentioned thee lost, O Europe.” “I deem thee 49 A biography of this shaykh is available on a web- above. lost, O Holland.” “I deem thee lost, site called “Marokko Community,” in which references 53 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh.” to the September 11 fatwa are found. For the biography, 54 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” 43 The Review Committee on the Intelligence and Secu- see “Sheikh Hamoud bin Uqla as-Shu’aybi: De leven- 55 Ibid. rity Services officially established in March 2008 that sloop van een groot geleerde,” July 24, 2008, available at 56 Ron Eyerman, The Assassination of Theo van Gogh. this had been a serious intelligence failure, as evidence www.forums.marokko.nl/showthread.php?t=2092457. From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma (Durham/London: surfaced prior to the attack that Bouyeri was at least affil- Al-Shu’aybi’s fatwa in English can be found at www. Duke University Press, 2008), p. 11. In reality, research iated with Dutch jihadist groups. See “Toezichtsrapport tawhed.net/a.php?a=hmodUkla. revealed that probably less than 2 % of the Dutch Muslim inzake de afwegingsprocessen van de AIVD met betrek- 50 “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie.” population of Amsterdam was susceptible for “radical- king tot Mohammed B.,” Commissie van Toezicht betref- 51 Al-Maqdisi has revolutionized this theme in Salafi- ization.” See Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, Processen fende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD), jihadism. For details, see Joas Wagemakers, “A Purist van radicalisering: Waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims March 2008. Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maq- radicaal worden (Amsterdam: IMES, 2006). 44 Siem Eikelenboom, Niet bang om te sterven: Dertig jaar disi,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36:2 (2009): 57 Justin Sparks, “Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret terrorisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, pp. 287-297; Joas Wagemakers, “Framing the ‘Threat Service,” Times, November 14, 2004. 2007), pp. 23-27; “Repliek van de officier van justitie in to Islam’: al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in Salafi Discourse,” Arab 58 “Kwantitatief onderzoek risicobeleving terrorisme de strafzaken tegen Nadir A. etc.,” National Prosecutor’s Studies Quarterly 30:4 (2008): pp. 1-22; Joas Wagemak- 2008,” Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counter- Office (Landelijk Parket), Amsterdam, February 6, 2005, ers, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: A Counter-Terrorism terrorism & Netherlands’ Government Information Ser- pp. 4-5, 9-10, 17-23. Asset?” CTC Sentinel 1:6 (2008): pp. 7-9. vice, September 2008, p. 5. Fear of terrorism was men- 45 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken 52 De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 374; See tioned spontaneously by 40% of the respondents. The tegen Nadir A. etc.,” pp. 4-5. also R. Peters, “De religieuze en ideologische ontwik- economy ranked second with 25%.

20 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 by the security services and local real danger and an aberration from Islam Muslims meet on the internet or during authorities. In February 2005, Minister since they ignite fitna (chaos and sedition) sermons of traveling youth preachers, for Immigration and Integration Rita within the Muslim community itself.65 and they translate and exchange jihadist Verdonk, for example, declared three texts.72 Radicalization has remained imams from the al-Fourqaan mosque In 2007, the AIVD signaled that more marginal, however, and should be viewed in Eindhoven as unwanted aliens, and unity had been achieved among the more as part of a radical Islamist youth started procedures to expel them from different Salafist branches, among counterculture and a way of expressing the country.59 These more repressive which the strand of political, non-violent identity within the Dutch context. measures were flanked by other central Salafism was gaining the upper hand.66 Moreover, the service noticed that Dutch and local deradicalization programs, The NCTb underlined this estimate and Moroccan Muslims increasingly found directed against so-called “hotbeds of identified trends of moderation and ways of articulating their grievances radicalization.”60 adaptation to the outside world. The and frustrations through democratic and increasing resilience against jihadist- activist channels. The anti-Islam movies of Consequently, due to these forms of thinking within the Salafist movement right-wing parliamentarian Geert Wilders external pressure, Muslim resilience was supported by a decreasing fear (Fitna, 2008) and the politician/publicist against jihadism increased.61 of homegrown terrorism within the Ehsan Jami (An Interview with Mohammed, Immediately after the murder of Van broader Dutch society that felt more 2008) attracted a weaker response from Gogh, various Salafist leaders warned at ease since there had been no further the Muslim community than anticipated. their followers against interpreting jihadist attacks since November 2004 Additionally, the Israeli bombing of Gaza radical texts without consulting and no other substantial homegrown in December 2008 to January 2009 led clerics.62 In 2005, it was revealed that networks uncovered.67 to a number of non-violent initiatives. the Amsterdam imam Fawaz had urged Within the Dutch Salafist milieu, the some young Muslim women that were In its 2008 annual report (published AIVD therefore noted a “self-cleansing under the influence of the Hofstad Group in April 2009), the AIVD concluded power” and an increased resilience against to report to the police.63 As a result of that “the terrorist threat increasingly (violent) radical tendencies within the their statements, the case against the emanates from transnational and Muslim community.73 Hofstad Group in 2005-2006 became local networks with an international stronger. Moreover, in 2006 the Islamic orientation, but less from local- Conclusion Foundation for Culture and Welfare in autonomous networks.”68 Activities After 2001, the orthodox Salafist creed Tilburg, headed by the apolitical Selefie of “homegrown” radicals and their gained popularity because it offered imam Bouchta, published a booklet in networks had been effectively alienated Dutch youth of Moroccan which it condemned suicide attacks, disrupted.69 In December 2009, the descent a critical perspective of warned against preachers of hate and level of security alertness regarding their own society. It enabled them to accused Salafists who turned to violence terrorism was therefore lowered from identify with the umma and suffering of of sinful aberrations.64 “substantial” to “restricted” since Muslims elsewhere (in Iraq, Chechnya terrorist attacks against the Netherlands or Palestine), whose plight, in their Indeed, Salafist leaders such as Fawaz no longer seemed imminent.70 view, mirrored their own discriminated realized that jihadist activities such position in the Netherlands. Salafism as the murder of Van Gogh could Radicalization of Moroccan youth is provided youths who felt caught only backfire against Muslims in the still taking place, according to the between their traditionalist parents Netherlands. His warnings against AIVD, certainly if compared to the and the modern, secularized Dutch the takfiri-ideology of Bouyeri and the Turkish community.71 These young society a clear set of beliefs and a means other members of the Hofstad Group of (re)gaining pride and self-esteem.74 were, however, not only inspired by 65 To these clerics, takfir can only be pronounced by strategic musings; to some Salafist qualified religious authorities under special and restrict- as Diyanet and Milli Görüs and the impact of Turkish clerics, individual takfiri-activities are a ed circumstances. See Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi nationalism. In its annual report in 2007, the AIVD did, Salafis or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the however, signal that some youths were trying to shirk 59 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “Ook tweede Eind- Study of Islamist Militancy,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, away from their tight community and were radicalizing hovense imam terecht uitgezet,” Algemeen Nederlands pp. 244-266. on their own account, through the internet. No news Persbureau, October 10, 2007. 66 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- of violent activism perpetrated by radical Islamist or 60 “Lokale en justitiële aanpak van radicalisme en isme in Nederland.” Salafist Turkish youths has yet come to light. See “An- radicalisering,” Kamerstukken 2004–2006 29754 No. 67 “The ‘Hofstadgroep,’” p. 16; “Annual Report 2006,” nual Report 2007,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser- 5; “Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007-2011,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2007, p. 33. vice, 2008. Netherlands’ Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Rela- 68 “Annual Report 2008,” Dutch Intelligence and Secu- 72 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” tions, August 2007. rity Service, 2009, pp. 20-22. 73 “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ontwik- 61 “Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tus- 69 Ibid. kelingen van het salafisme in Nederland.” Also see A. sen salafistische missie. Radicaliseringsprocessen en is- 70 “Letter to Parliament with the Eleventh Counterter- Olgun, “Nuance keert terug in Nederland,” NRC Handels- lamistisch terrorisme.” rorism Progress Report,” Netherlands’ National Coordi- blad, February 13, 2008; “Bijna 3000 digitale knuffels 62 De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 372. nator for Counterterrorism, December 15, 2009. voor PVV-voorman Wilders,” Metro, January 30, 2008; 63 Alberts et al. 71 Regarding the Turkish community, social resilience Bas Heijne, “Waarom ik Geert Wilders dankbaar ben,” 64 “Folderen in strijd tegen aanslagen,” Brabants Dag- against radicalization is traditionally higher because of NRC Handelsblad, January 26, 2008. blad, June 10, 2006. the moderating influence of Islamist organizations such 74 Buijs et al., pp. 228-231.

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Only a tiny group among them went a In sum, the Salafist movement in the step further, embracing the lifestyle Netherlands is still controversial. Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism and symbols of jihadists abroad as the The strand of political Salafism Courts only answer to their perceived sense of remains responsible for anti-Western, injustice and insecurity, and even put isolationist and radical opinions; By Huma Yusuf them into practice in the Netherlands.75 however, as stated by De Koning, The members of the Hofstad Group political Salafists and apolitical Selefies in the wake of the November 2008 legitimized their terrorist intentions with hold a different view on violence and terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Pakistani thoughts they took from notable Salafi- attitudes toward “infidels” compared President Asif Ali Zardari stated, jihadi clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri to the jihadists. Salafist criticism of the “Pakistan is committed to the pursuit, or Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. war in Afghanistan or the exploitation arrest, trial and punishment of anyone of women in Western media and society involved in these heinous attacks.”1 This still does not solidify a causal should not be equated to terrorism, Zardari’s emphasis on prosecuting relationship. Salafist mosques did but could be viewed as the voice of a accused terrorists in legal courts indeed function as an ideological hotbed group of highly critical and religious renewed interest in Pakistan’s anti- for potential radicals. The al-Fourqaan citizens that are searching for a self- terrorism court (ATC) infrastructure, mosque in Eindhoven was identified conscious position within Dutch a parallel legal system established in as a playground for jihadist recruiters. society.78 Moreover, both the NCTb and 1997 under the Anti-Terrorism Act to The members of the Hofstad Group, the AIVD signal a trend of adaptation dispense quick justice for those charged however, were not passive victims of and moderation (inspired by external with terrorist activities. Almost a year Salafist “hatemongers” from abroad. pressure from Dutch security services later, an ATC in Rawalpindi indicted On the contrary, militant Muslims such and local authorities as well as from seven men for providing weapons and as Samir Azzouz, Jason Walters or the Saudi regime) of Salafist excesses training to the Mumbai terrorists.2 The Mohammed Bouyeri were actively seeking and a growing resilience and resistance trial is still in process, and in January jihadist guidance once they had embarked against the seeds of violent jihadism.79 2010 an ATC judge in Rawalpindi on their course of radicalization. At some rejected petitions seeking the acquittal point, they even stopped visiting their Dr. Beatrice de Graaf is an associate of six of the seven who stand accused.3 Salafist mosques because it did not offer professor at the Centre for Terrorism them instructions to wage jihad in the and Counterterrorism at the Campus The Although the involvement of Pakistani Netherlands. They therefore constructed Hague (Leiden University). She is currently militants in the Mumbai attacks placed their own brand of umma-oriented carrying out a research project on the making the spotlight on ATCs, the government’s jihadism through texts and principles of National Security measures in Western decision to conduct military operations they found on the internet. countries. Her monograph Theater van de against Pakistani Taliban fighters angst was published in January 2010 and will in Swat in May 2009 and in South Indeed, the AIVD defined Salafism appear in English later this year under the Waziristan Agency in October 2009 as “anti-integrative, anti-democratic title, Counterterrorism as Performance: forced the government to revisit the and isolationist” in 2007 and again in The Battle Against Terrorism in the ATC infrastructure.4 As hundreds 2009.76 This definition, however, cannot Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the of militants either surrendered or be equated with terrorism. Salafism United States Compared. She supervises were arrested during the operations, is not a sliding scale from passive a database on terrorism research located at questions have risen about how they orthodoxy into violent orthopraxy. www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu. The author should be dealt with according to the On the contrary, from 2005 onward, wishes to thank Daniël Meijer and Ineke Roex law. Salafist imams, including Fawaz Jneid, for their assistance in writing this article. have tried to put a brake on overly This article will explain why the ATCs enthusiastic jihadist emotions among have become especially relevant due to Muslim youth by steering them into Pakistan’s recent military operations in more apolitical and especially non- its northwest, provide the history of the violent action modes and sometimes country’s anti-terrorism legal policies even reported them to the police.77 and finally express significant concerns about the ATCs and the country’s overall 75 Kees van den Bos, Annermarie Loseman and Bertjan anti-terrorism judicial infrastructure. Doosje, Waarom jongeren radicaliseren en sympathie krijgen voor terrorisme: Onrechtvaardigheid, onzekerheid en be- 1 Asif Ali Zardari, “The Terrorists Want to Destroy Paki- dreigde groepen (The Hague: WODC, 2009). stan, Too,” New York Times, December 8, 2008. 76 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- 2 “Seven Indicted for Planning, Aiding Mumbai Attack,” isme in Nederland”; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele Dawn, November 25, 2009. trends en ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Neder- 3 “Pakistan Court Refuses to Acquit Mumbai Suspects,” land.” Also see Hans Moors and Menno Jacobs, Aan de Agence France-Presse, January 6, 2010. hand van de imam. Integratie en participatie van orthodoxe 78 De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 378. 4 “Pakistan: The Swat Offensive Update,” Stratfor, May moslims in Tilburg-Noord (Tilburg: IVA beleidsonderzoek 79 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “Weerstand en 22, 2009; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Assessing the Progress en advies, 2009). tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ontwikkelingen van het of Pakistan’s South Waziristan Offensive,” CTC Sentinel 77 Buijs et al.; Alberts et al. salafisme in Nederland.” 2:12 (2009).

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ATC’s Re-Enter the Spotlight were declared proclaimed offenders by authorities also established new ATCs At the start of Pakistan’s recent an ATC and currently face charges of in the region, bringing the total number military operations in the northwest, it murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, of special courts in Peshawar and was unclear under what law suspected attacking government installations, Malakand Division to 11.14 militants should be prosecuted. The treason, and terrorism.9 government had not clarified whether These measures acknowledged that military operations against militants As the number of suspects in custody— the current ATC infrastructure, were constitutionally categorized as especially at the three interrogation particularly in the North-West Frontier law enforcement actions or operations centers in Fizagat, Khwazakhela and Province (NWFP), is ill-equipped to deal “in aid of civil power” under Article Malakand in the Swat Valley—soared, justly with the hundreds of suspected 245 of the constitution.5 In the latter human rights groups began to question militants awaiting trial.15 Indeed, case, the detainees’ fundamental rights the transparency of interrogation and since their inception in 1997, ATCs would be suspended for the duration detention procedures and the credibility have failed to fulfill their mandate, of the operation. Moreover, their trials of due process for arrested militants. as described by then Prime Minister would be conducted under the Action Reports that more than 250 bodies had Nawaz Sharif, to “impart timely and in Aid of Civil Power Ordinance (1998) been dumped on the streets of Swat inexpensive justice.”16 Riddled with that authorizes the establishment of also raised concerns about extrajudicial the same problems faced by the regular mobile military courts. The Supreme killings of terrorism suspects by the justice system—inadequate funding, Court, however, had previously ruled military.10 understaffing, trial delays, and that military courts should be replaced corruption—ATCs cannot be relied on with regular session courts.6 For that To ensure that terrorism suspects to ensure that suspected terrorists are reason, in October 2009 the Interior were dealt with justly and expediently, served justice. Ministry clarified that all militants the Supreme Court in August 2009 taken into custody during military announced the formation of special The Anti-Terrorism Act in Context operations and security sweeps in Swat, committees to monitor the ATCs One of the problems ATCs face in South Waziristan, and in other tribal and ensure the quick disposal of dispensing swift and credible justice is agencies such as Bajaur and Khyber anti-terrorism cases.11 Moreover, in that they have always been perceived would be tried under the amended Anti- November the government issued the as discriminatory. The Anti-Terrorism Terrorism Act in ATCs.7 Anti-Terrorism Amendment Ordinance Act (1997) is an extension of the (2009), which included new clauses to Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act To underscore that terrorists and facilitate the framing of charges against (1975), which was passed by Zulfikar Ali Pakistani Taliban supporters would be hundreds of alleged militants. As per Bhutto’s government to contend with answerable to the law, ATCs declared the latest amendment, “extrajudicial opposition and nationalist movements known militants as “proclaimed confessions” recorded by security in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Anti- offenders”—fugitives from the law—as personnel are admissible as evidence terrorism mechanisms have thus been soon as local courts resumed functioning in ATCs, the remand period is extended historically understood as means to in the wake of the military operation in from 30 to 90 days, and the burden of suppress dissent.17 Swat. In August 2009, a Swat-based proof has shifted to the accused.12 ATC identified the area’s Taliban chief In 1997, Sharif’s government Maulana Fazlullah and six of his aides By a special presidential order, the promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act as proclaimed offenders and ordered amended act was also extended to the after years of communal and sectarian that they appear in court within a week Provincially Administered Tribal Areas violence contributed to political or face judgment in absentia.8 Similarly, (PATA), which include Malakand instability. The act established special in January 2010 Taliban spokesman Division where Swat is located.13 The courts and gave the police wide-ranging Muslim Khan and 23 other militants powers to arrest and detain suspects. who the government had in detention 9 “Muslim Khan, 23 Others Declared POs,” Dawn, Janu- The following year, in its judgment ary 31, 2010. in the Mehram Ali v. Pakistan case, the 5 Ahmer Soofi, “The Legal Challenge,” Dawn, October 3, 10 Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Pakistan Army Supreme Court declared 12 key sections 2009. Said to be Linked to Swat Killings,” New York Times, Sep- 6 See Liaquat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan. In its 1999 tember 14, 2009. situated, with the approval of the President, so directs.” judgment on the Liaquat Hussain case, the Supreme 11 “Special Committees to Monitor Anti-Terrorism 14 Personal interview, Colonel Waheed Hamid, Inter- Court directed that civilians cannot be tried by military Courts,” Daily Times, August 4, 2009. Services Public Relations, Islamabad, Pakistan, Febru- courts; that special courts cannot perform parallel func- 12 Khalid Kheshgi, “Anti-Terror Ordinance May Be Ex- ary 2010. tions to regular courts; and that the Action in Aid of Civil tended to Malakand,” The News International, November 15 Ibid. According to the Inter-Services Public Relations, Power Ordinance (1998) does not extend to the creation 6, 2009. the exact number of detainees awaiting trial has not been of courts. For more information on this case, see Shabana 13 “Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2009 determined because suspected militants are constantly Fayyaz, “Responding to Terrorism: Pakistan’s Anti-Ter- Extended to PATA of NWFP,” Associated Press of being transferred between ATCs, and from the settled rorism Laws,” Perspectives on Terrorism 2:6 (2008). Pakistan, November 17, 2009. The order reads: “Under areas of the North-West Frontier Province to the Feder- 7 “Militants to Get Fair Trial, Says Rehman Malik,” Article 247 of the Constitution, no Act of Parliament or ally Administered Tribal Areas. Dawn, October 28, 2009. Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Ad- 16 “Anti-Terrorism Act Promulgated,” Dawn, November 8 “Anti-Terrorism Court Declares Fazlullah a Fugitive,” ministered Tribal Area (PATA) or any part thereof un- 29, 1997. Indian Express, August 19, 2009. less the Governor of Province, in which the Tribal Area is 17 Fayyaz.

23 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 of the law unconstitutional and called complain that they are working in the government to ensure the counsel’s for amendments.18 the poorest conditions—they have no security.29 offices, stationery, legal resources such Since then, the Anti-Terrorism Act as an archive of judgments, or clerical Judicial or Political Expediency? has been amended in 1998, three staff.24 Many of these problems stem Beyond the impact security concerns times in 1999, once in 2001, twice in from the fact that the government has have on ATC verdicts, a long history 2002, and once in 2004, 2005, 2007, not allotted enough funds for the ATC of political victimization through anti- and 2009. These amendments were infrastructure, a problem that plagues terrorism cases continues to undermine usually to increase the range of crimes the Pakistani legal system at large. the credibility of convictions. covered by the act.19 In addition to Moreover, since they work for a parallel According to Judge Syed Hasan Shah terrorist activities, the act covers arms system, state prosecutors employed Bukhari of Karachi’s ATC I, until a trafficking, kidnapping, hijacking, by ATCs cannot even utilize the scant democratic government was elected extortion, sectarian violence, targeted resources available to the regular in February 2008, most ATCs were political killings, and until last year session courts. As a result, ATCs issuing convictions on the authorities’ gang rape.20 have failed to deliver on their primary instructions, rather than on the basis of mandate—quick justice.25 transparent trials.30 Significant Dockets and Security Concerns The variety of cases covered by the ATC trials are also delayed due to The fact that ATCs are vulnerable to Anti-Terrorism Act contributes to the security concerns. In cases where political influence is exemplified by current backlog in ATCs nationwide. suspects are accused of heinous crimes, several famous cases. For example, in For example, in the southern port in-camera trials are conducted in jail. November 1999 a case was registered city of Karachi, which has largely Arranging logistics for such hearings can against the recently deposed Prime escaped the wave of terrorist attacks lead to prolonged delays.26 Additionally, Minister Nawaz Sharif in the Karachi that plagued the northern and western complainants and witnesses often refuse ATC, and he was eventually sentenced parts of Pakistan in 2009, there are 35 to testify against the accused. Since to life imprisonment for conspiracy suspected Pakistani Taliban militants extensive militant networks support to hijack a flight that was carrying awaiting trial in the ATCs.21 However, most terrorism suspects, witnesses fear General Pervez Musharraf from Sri 56, 54, and 89 cases, respectively, are being targeted during ATC trials.27 Lanka to Pakistan.31 In December 1999, pending in ATC I, ATC II, and ATC Musharraf introduced amendments III—the three special courts in the city— Separately, personal security concerns to the Anti-Terrorism Act, extending making it unlikely that the 35 suspected on the part of judges, state prosecutors, offenses cognizable by the ATC and Pakistani Taliban militants will be tried and defense counsels frequently lead creating a new ATC in Karachi. The this year.22 to the postponement of hearings. In crimes that Sharif was accused of January 2010, for example, Khwaja committing were not previously In fact, ATCs nationwide have been Sultan—the defense counsel for Zakiur cognizable before ATCs, and without facing significant dockets since 2001.23 Rehman Lakhvi, who is accused of the amendments would have been filed These are worsened by the fact that the plotting the 2008 Mumbai attacks— in regular courts.32 By turning to the courts are severely understaffed and petitioned the Rawalpindi ATC to ATCs, Musharraf successfully sidelined lack basic resources. The post of the transfer Lakhvi’s case to an ATC in his political rival. judge for Karachi’s ATC II, for example, Lahore citing security concerns. In has been vacant for more than six his petition, he claimed that he feared Similarly, former Baluchistan chief months. For their part, state prosecutors Indian intelligence officials would minister and President of the Baluchistan target him during his long commute

18 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of anti- to Adiala Jail, where Lakhvi is being 29 “LHC Refuses to Transfer Lakhvi’s Trial,” The Nation, 28 terrorism laws in Pakistan, see Charles Kennedy, “The tried. The Lahore High Court refused January 23, 2010. Creation and Development of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism to transfer Lakhvi’s trial, but has asked 30 Personal interview, Syed Hasan Shah Bukhari, judge, Regime,” in Satu Limaye et al. eds., Religious Radicalism Anti-Terrorism Court I, Karachi, Pakistan, February and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center 24 Personal interview, Buriro. 2010. for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 387-412. 25 Kennedy, p. 15. According to the amended Anti-Ter- 31 On November 10, 1999, Lieutenant-Colonel Atiq-uz- 19 Ibid. rorism Act, cases should be investigated within seven Zaman Kiyani submitted a written complaint to the SHO 20 “Rangers in Karachi to Get More Powers,” Dawn, days, and subsequently disposed within seven days. Airport Police Station, Karachi, alleging that Nawaz January 5, 2010. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Moreover, ATCs should only be assigned one case to dis- Sharif had conspired to hijack Flight PK-805, thereby Rangers, a paramilitary force, were authorized to detain pose of at a time. eliminating then COAS Pervez Musharraf. Karachi’s anyone suspected of violent activities for 90 days with- 26 Personal interview, Mobashir Ahmed Mirza, special ATC I convicted Sharif of the charges of hijacking and out charges. public prosecutor, Anti-Terrorism Court III, Karachi, terrorism under Section 402 PPC and Section 7(ii) of the 21 Personal interview, Irfan Bahadur, deputy superin- Pakistan, February 2010. Mirza describes, for example, Anti-Terrorism Act. He was sentenced to life impris- tendent, Special Investigation Unit, Karachi, Pakistan, how state prosecutors ask the court to arrange transport onment and fined Rs. 500,000. The Sindh High Court February 24, 2010. for them from their offices to the Karachi Central Jail. upheld the ATC’s decision. While serving his sentence, 22 Personal interview, Muhammad Khan Buriro, spe- Days may pass before the car requisition is granted. Sharif entered into a deal with Musharraf and agreed to cial public prosecutor, Anti-Terrorism Court I, Karachi, 27 Personal interview, Buriro. remain abroad for 10 years and desist from political ac- Pakistan, February 2010. 28 “Lakhvi’s Counsel Fears Attempt on Life,” Dawn, tivities. 23 Kennedy, p. 15. January 14, 2010. 32 Kennedy, pp. 398-401.

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National Party Sardar Akhtar Mengal the right to be tried in a public place, from where most known militants hail. was declared a proclaimed offender with a full defense, as well as the right Even if militants who claim FATA for taking army personnel hostage by to be presumed innocent until proven residency are arrested in the settled Karachi’s ATC V in June 2006.33 He otherwise. parts of the NWFP, they cannot legally was then arrested during a rally in be tried by ATCs and instead have to November 2006, a day before General For these reasons, Peshawar High be transported to their tribal agency to Musharraf was due to visit Baluchistan. Court advocate Ghulam Nabi challenged face justice under the Frontier Crimes According to Amnesty International and the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Regulation.40 Although the government the Asian Human Rights Commission, Ordinance 2009 under Article 199 of wants to try all militants in the ATCs, Mengal, who is a champion of the the constitution in December 2009, in the few situations where charges Baluch nationalist movement, was declaring that it violated basic human have been framed against FATA-based illegally detained until his release in rights.37 terrorism suspects in ATCs, their May 2008, when all charges against him defense counsel has succeeded in having were dropped by the provincial Sindh Conclusion the charges dropped on the basis that government.34 Although the Anti-Terrorism Act residents of the tribal belt are subject to is flawed, observers in Pakistan are judgment under the FCR.41 Human Rights Violations currently concerned about shortcomings Mengal’s case illustrates how trials in the state’s anti-terrorism mechanisms If, as President Zardari stated, in ATCs can lead to human rights that allow known militants to go free the Pakistan government is truly violations. Indeed, as soon as the Anti- without facing charges in ATCs. For committed to punishing militants, the Terrorism Act was passed in 1997, example, the decision to pursue a case authorities must assess the credibility human rights groups such as Amnesty against a terrorism suspect is left to the and capabilities of the anti-terrorism International rejected the formation of discretion of the apprehending security infrastructure. Funneling hundreds of special courts.35 officials. There is currently no system suspected militants through the parallel in place to determine on what basis courts will require the drafting of clear There continues to be concern that law some detainees are freed, while others detention and interrogation protocols, enforcement personnel resort more are charged with terrorist activities.38 financial investment, inter-provincial frequently to torture and extrajudicial coordination, and appropriate human executions if given wide-ranging Terrorism suspects who remain in resource allocation. In their current powers. In particular, by placing time detention are transferred into the care incarnations, ATCs—even if they deliver limits on the investigation process, of joint investigation teams, comprising convictions—cannot offer legal recourse ATCs can make investigating officials officials of the Inter-Services against militant activity in Pakistan. prone to falsifying evidence and using Intelligence (ISI), Federal Investigation coercive methods with suspects. A Agency, Intelligence Bureau, and Huma Yusuf is the Features Editor of Dawn. 2009 amendment to the Anti-Terrorism police. These teams then determine com, the website of Pakistan’s leading Act, which permits “extrajudicial whether local police officials should English-language daily. Ms. Yusuf holds an confessions” to be used as evidence, frame charges against the suspect, who MSc. in Comparative Media Studies from has been seen in some quarters as an would then be tried in the nearest ATC. MIT and a BA from Harvard University. invitation for investigators to torture During this process, terrorism suspects She is the recipient of the All Pakistan suspects.36 are often transferred between locations Newspapers Society “Best Column” Award and interrogation cells. Investigating (2007-2008) and the Prix Lorenzo Natali The courts themselves are perceived as intelligence officials and police for Human Rights Journalism (2006). She lacking independence, as judges are held personnel have to gather evidence writes on terrorism and security, women’s accountable to the executive. Moreover, without having access to the area in rights, and media trends. ATCs deny terrorism suspects the right which the suspect was first arrested. to equality before the law, as procedures As a result, the charges they frame are differ significantly from regular courts. often based on eyewitness accounts of 40 According to Article 247 of the constitution, no act Terrorism suspects are also denied military personnel. For this reason, it is of parliament applies to FATA. Instead, a unique set of expected that most suspected militants laws drafted by the British in 1848 and known as the 33 “ATC Declares Mengal Proclaimed Offender,” Dawn, who were apprehended in recent Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) are enforced. As per June 11, 2006. Mengal’s private security guards detained military operations and are due to face the FCR, the doctrine of collective responsibility, where- two army personnel at his private home after they tried trial in ATCs will be acquitted or face by an entire tribe is punished for crimes committed on 39 to tail Mengal as he dropped his children off at school. mild sentences. its territory, applies. A federally appointed political agent 34 Peter Tatchell, “Pakistan’s Nelson Mandela,” Guard- is also empowered to arrest individuals without specify- ian, March 28, 2008; Latif Baloch and Ishaq Tanoli, Moreover, the Anti-Terrorism Act does ing charges; detain members of a suspect or absconder’s “Mengal Freed; Worried About Missing Workers,” not technically apply to residents of the tribe; or blockade the absconder’s village. The FCR has Dawn, May 9, 2008. Federally Administered Tribal Areas, been criticized for violating human rights, and in August 35 “Legalizing the Impermissible: The New Anti-Terror- 2009 the Pakistani government made some amendments ism Law,” Amnesty International, October 1, 1997. 37 “Anti-Terrorism Law Challenged in PHC,” Daily to the regulations. For more information, see Syed Irfan 36 Personal interview, Iqbal Haider, co-chairperson of Times, December 24, 2009. Raza, “Amendments to Frontier Crime Regulation Ap- the Pakistan Human Rights Commission, Karachi, Paki- 38 Personal interview, Hamid. proved,” Dawn, August 13, 2009. stan, February 2010. 39 Personal interview, Haider. 41 Personal interview, Hamid.

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Siddiqui guilty of trying to kill U.S. said that it will extend its deadline for Recent Highlights in servicemen in Afghanistan. Siddiqui, a French captive Pierre Camatte until Terrorist Activity Pakistani neuroscientist trained at the February 20. In exchange for Camatte’s Massachusetts Institute of Technology in release, AQIM is demanding that the February 1, 2010 (IRAQ): A female the United States, was accused of trying French and Mali governments release suicide bomber targeted Shià pilgrims to gun down a group of U.S. servicemen four AQIM militants held in Mali. – AFP, in Baghdad, killing at least 41 people. at an Afghan police station in July 2008. February 5 Approximately 12 children were among After being found guilty, she said, “This the dead. – Independent, February 2; Voice of is a verdict from Israel, not America. February 6, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni America, February 3 The anger should be directed where it authorities announced that they recently belongs.” – AFP, February 4 arrested a man in Sanaà who threatened to February 1, 2010 (SOMALIA): According blow up foreign embassies and assassinate to the Wall Street Journal, the Somali militant February 4, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Yemeni leaders. The announcement did group al-Shabab released a statement Afghan authorities arrested a district not state whether the man was a member announcing that it is aligned with al- administrator in northern Badghis of al-Qaìda. – AFP, February 6 Qaìda. Al-Shabab also announced that Province for leaking information it has allied with Kamboni, a smaller on Afghan and international troop February 8, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani insurgent group based in the southern movements to Taliban fighters. The authorities arrested six suspected Taliban town of Ras Kamboni and led by Hassan administrator, identified as Aminullah, militants who were allegedly about to Turki. – BBC, February 1; Wall Street Journal, was in charge of Bala Murghab district in attack the five-star Pearl Continental hotel February 2 Badghis. – Wall Street Journal, February 9 in Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province. The six suspected militants were armed February 2, 2010 (UNITED STATES): February 4, 2010 (INDIA): India’s home with a suicide vest and 26 hand grenades, U.S. Director of National Intelligence minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, and they were supposedly hoping to kill Dennis C. Blair told a Senate panel that al- said that the 10 Pakistani terrorists who Americans. – AP, February 9 Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacked Mumbai in November 2008 has emerged as the “foremost concern” could have been guided by an Indian February 8, 2010 (YEMEN): Said Ali al- for U.S. intelligence agencies. – Los Angeles handler. Authorities do not have the Shihri, the deputy leader of al-Qaìda Times, February 3 handler in custody, nor do they know in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the individual’s identity. – Times of India, purportedly released a new audio February 2, 2010 (YEMEN): In an interview February 4 statement calling on Muslims in the with al-Jazira, Yemeni-American cleric region to attack the United States and Anwar al-Àwlaqi admitted that Umar February 5, 2010 (IRAQ): A car bomb its allies. During the speech, al-Shihri Farouk Abdulmutallab “is one of my ripped through a group of Shià pilgrims praised Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s students” and that the two “were in in Karbala, killing 10 people. Shortly after, “glorious invasion,” referring to the failed correspondence.” He also said, however, a suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated Christmas Day bombing attempt against that he “did not give [Abdulmutallab] explosives at the first blast site, killing a U.S. airliner near Detroit. Al-Shihri a fatwa in regards to this operation,” another 22 people. – Los Angeles Times, is a former inmate at the U.S. detention referring to the failed Christmas Day February 5 facility at Guantanamo Bay. – BBC, February bombing plot of a U.S. airliner near 8; Washington Post, February 8 Detroit. – Washington Post, February 6 February 5, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide bombers killed 25 people in February 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): The February 3, 2010 (IRAQ): A bomb on Karachi, located in Pakistan’s Sindh Pakistani Taliban reportedly confirmed a motorcycle exploded near Karbala, Province. The first bomber rammed an that their leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, killing at least 20 Shià pilgrims. – Voice explosives-laden motorbike into a bus died from injuries sustained in a U.S. of America, February 3 carrying Shià on one of the city’s busiest drone missile strike in January. – Los roads, killing 12 people. Two hours Angeles Times, February 10 February 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide later, the second bomber detonated his bomber killed at least seven people, explosives at the entrance to the casualty February 10, 2010 (ISRAEL): Palestinian including three U.S. military personnel, department at Jinnah Hospital, where security forces said they recently arrested in Lower Dir District of the North-West families of the victims hurt in the first a suspected cell of al-Qaìda sympathizers Frontier Province. According to Agence blast had gathered; 13 people died in the in the West Bank. According to a France-Presse, “It appears to be the first second blast. According to a senior police Palestinian security official, “They time American soldiers have been killed official, “The perpetrators knew Jinnah considered themselves part of Al-Qaeda in such an attack in Pakistan.” Three Hospital was the nearest to the site of but did not have any contacts with Al- Pakistani schoolgirls also died in the the first attack and ensured a follow-up Qaeda leaders abroad.” The men were blast. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed attack when they saw significant numbers apparently carrying out military training, credit for the operation. – Christian Science of people gathered there.” – AFP, February but had not yet chosen a target to attack. Monitor, February 3; BBC, February 4 5; RIA Novosti, February 6 – AFP, February 10

February 4, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A February 5, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- February 10, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A jury in a U.S. federal court found Aafia Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) suicide bomber attacked a police patrol

26 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 vehicle in Khyber Agency of the Federally February 13, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): February 18, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide Administered Tribal Areas, killing 18 U.S. soldiers began a major operation bomber detonated his explosives near people. At least seven of the dead were against the Taliban stronghold of Marja the government headquarters in Ramadi, police. – AFP, February 11 in Helmand Province. – CBS News, the capital of Anbar Province. At least February 13 13 people were killed. – New York Times, February 10, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): February 18 Philippine police announced that they February 13, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A recently arrested Sukri Hassan Itauris, suicide bomber on a motorcycle attacked a February 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Officials an alleged Abu Sayyaf Group militant joint U.S.-Afghan foot patrol in Kandahar announced that two senior Afghan involved in the kidnappings of 20 Province, wounding six U.S. soldiers and Taliban leaders were recently arrested tourists, including three Americans, five civilians. – New York Times, February 15 in Pakistan. Afghan officials identified from a Philippine resort in 2001. He was the arrested men as Mullah Abdul Salam arrested in Basilan Province. – Philippine February 13, 2010 (INDIA): A bomb and Mullah Mir Mohammed, the Afghan Star, February 10 ripped through a bakery in a neighborhood Taliban’s shadow governors for Kunduz popular with foreign tourists in the and Baghlan provinces respectively. February 11, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A western city of Pune. The explosion killed – New York Times, February 18 suicide bomber detonated his explosives at least 12 people. – New York Times, February at a joint Afghan-U.S. military base 13; AFP, February 20 February 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A bomb in Pathan district of Paktia Province, ripped through a mosque in Khyber wounding five U.S. soldiers. The bomber February 14, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Agency of the Federally Administered was wearing an Afghan border police unmanned aerial drone killed seven Tribal Areas, killing at least 29 people. uniform, and the Taliban later claimed militants in North Waziristan Agency of – AP, February 18 that the bomber was in fact a Taliban the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. fighter who also served as a police officer. The drone targeted a compound near Mir February 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. – New York Times, February 12 Ali. – Reuters, February 14; AFP, February 14 unmanned aerial drone killed at least four militants in North Waziristan Agency of February 11, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two February 15, 2010 (AUSTRALIA): A judge the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. suicide bombers detonated their explosives in Australia sentenced five Sydney men – AFP, February 18 outside a police training center in Bannu to 23 to 28 years in prison for conspiring District of the North-West Frontier to commit terrorist acts. The men were February 18, 2010 (MALI): Malian Province, killing at least 15 people. – AFP, stockpiling chemicals to make explosives. authorities reportedly released four February 11; New York Times, February 11 – Australian Broadcasting Corporation, February Islamist prisoners in an apparent deal 15; Reuters, February 15 with al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb, February 11, 2010 (INDIA): Three gunmen which is holding French national Pierre shot dead a lawyer representing Fahim February 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Camatte hostage. – Reuters, February 20 Ansari, who is accused of involvement officials announced that the Afghan in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Taliban’s second-in-command, Mullah February 19, 2010 (YEMEN): The U.S. The lawyer, Shahid Azmi, was killed in Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured last government has approved $150 million in Mumbai. – CNN, February 12 week in Karachi. He was arrested in a military assistance to Yemen, which will joint U.S.-Pakistani intelligence raid. pay for military equipment and training February 11, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemen’s – AP, February 15; Christian Science Monitor, for Yemeni forces. – AP, February 22 president announced that a cease-fire has February 16 been achieved with the country’s northern February 21, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): rebels. According to the Associated Press, February 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Philippine soldiers killed six Abu Sayyaf “After years of sporadic fighting with the unmanned aerial drone killed at least three Group militants on Jolo Island. One of the [northern] militants, Yemen has come militants in North Waziristan Agency of dead, Albader Parad, was a top al-Qaìda- under international pressure to quickly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. linked militant. – AP, February 20 draw a close to the war and free up – AFP, February 15 resources to confront a separate threat February 22, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda from an al-Qaida offshoot that has set up February 17, 2010 (CANADA): Said second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri operations there over the past year.” – AP, Namouh, a Moroccan-born man from purportedly released a new audiotape February 11 Quebec who plotted international terrorist criticizing Turkey. The recording said, attacks with a group tied to al-Qaìda, was “The Turkish troops will carry out the February 12, 2010 (IRAQ): The leader of sentenced to life in prison by a Canadian same operations in Afghanistan that the the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Ùmar al- judge. – Canadian Press, February 17 Jews are carrying out in Palestine, so how Baghdadi, threatened the upcoming March would the pious, free Turkish Muslim 7 elections in Iraq, warning that “[we] February 17, 2010 (LEBANON): Lebanon people accept such a crime against Islam have decided to prevent the elections by indicted 11 suspected militants with and the Muslims?” – CNN, February 22 all legitimate means possible, primarily plotting terrorist attacks and monitoring by military means.” – AFP, February 12 the movements of United Nations February 22, 2010 (UNITED STATES): peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. – AP, Najibullah Zazi, accused of planning a February 17 terrorist attack on New York City, pleaded

27 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3

guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of February 25, 2010 (UNITED STATES): CTC Sentinel Staff mass destruction, conspiracy to commit Two co-defendants of Najibullah Zazi murder in a foreign country and providing pleaded not guilty to conspiring in a Editor-in-Chief material support to al-Qaìda. – Reuters, plot to execute terrorist attacks in New Erich Marquardt February 22 York City. The men, Adis Medunjanin Senior Editor, CTC and Zarein Ahmedzay, were charged February 22, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A with conspiracy to use weapons of mass Editorial Board suicide bomber assassinated Hajji Zaman destruction, conspiracy to commit murder COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Ghamsharik, a prominent Afghan warlord, in a foreign country and receiving al- Department Head near Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province. The Qaìda training. – Reuters, February 25 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Taliban denied responsibility. According to the New York Times, Ghamsharik was February 25, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. “accused of helping Osama bin Laden The Afghan flag was raised over Marja as Deputy Department Head escape from the Americans at Tora Bora,” part of a major coalition offensive in the Department of Social Sciences (West Point) and he had “so many enemies that his region that began on February 13. Marja assassination…came as no particular is located in Helmand Province. – CNN, LTC Reid Sawyer surprise.” A number of civilians were February 26 Director, CTC also killed in the blast. – New York Times, February 22 February 26, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Christopher Heffelfinger Taliban fighters launched a coordinated FBI Fellow, CTC February 22, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani assault on Kabul, killing at least 16 officials announced the arrest of Afghan people. As part of the attack, three suicide Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Kabir, bombers attacked the Park Residence who served on the Taliban’s Council of Hotel and the Aria Guesthouse nearby, Ministers. – CNN, February 22 and it appears that Indians were targeted. Contact An Italian diplomat, a French filmmaker Combating Terrorism Center February 22, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A and at least six Indians were among the U.S. Military Academy suicide bomber targeted a security force dead. – Bloomberg, February 26; Times, 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall convoy, killing eight people in Pakistan’s February 27 West Point, NY 10996 Swat Valley. – Reuters, February 22; CNN, Phone: (845) 667-6383 February 22 February 27, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A Email: [email protected] suicide bomber from the Pakistani Taliban Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ February 23, 2010 (INDONESIA): detonated a car laden with explosives Indonesian police arrested four suspected at the gate of the main police station in * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 militants in a major raid on a terrorist Karak, located in the North-West Frontier training camp in remote Aceh Province. Province. Four people were killed. – Voice More than 50 militants were using the of America, February 27; Dawn, February camp, and police “strongly” suspect that 28 the men belong to Jemaah Islamiya. Most of the militants escaped into the jungle. February 28, 2010 (GLOBAL): A support – AFP, February 23 posthumous video message appeared on The Combating Terrorism Center would jihadist websites from Humam Khalil Abu like to express its gratitude to its financial February 23, 2010 (MALI): Malian Mulal al-Balawi, the al-Qaìda double supporters, for without their support and authorities announced that al-Qaìda agent who killed seven CIA operatives shared vision of the Center products like in the Islamic Maghreb released French and a Jordanian spy on December 30, the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If national Pierre Camatte. The move comes 2009. In the video, al-Balawi said, “We you are interested in learning more about after Malian authorities released four planned for something but got a bigger how to support the Combating Terrorism Islamist prisoners on February 18, in gift, a gift from Allah, who brought us, Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. an apparent trade for Camatte’s release. through His accompaniment, a valuable edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at – BBC, February 23 prey: Americans, and from the CIA. West Point’s Association of Graduates at That’s when I became certain that the best 845-446-1553. February 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A way to teach Jordanian intelligence and suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone the CIA a lesson is with the martyrdom strike killed at least 13 militants in North belt.” – AP, February 28 Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Pakistani intelligence officials later identified one of the dead as Mohammed Qari Zafar, a The views expressed in this report are those of Pakistani Taliban commander wanted in the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the deadly bombing of the U.S. Consulate the Department of the Army, or any other agency in Karachi. – Voice of America, February 24; of the U.S. Government. New York Times, February 24; AP, February 26