PAKISTAN, TERRORISM and ISLAM Muhammad Imtiaz Zafar *

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PAKISTAN, TERRORISM and ISLAM Muhammad Imtiaz Zafar * PAKISTAN, TERRORISM AND ISLAM Muhammad Imtiaz Zafar * Abstract: Post nine eleven scenario resulted into all loss most dominantly for Pakistan as she became most terror-hit nation in the world. The National Internal Security Policy document (Dawn: February 24, 2014) says 48994 people were killed in 13721 incidents of suicide bombing, bomb blasts, target killing etc. from 2001 to November 2013. This toll is more than Iraq and Afghanistan in these years. Apart from the human loss worth billions of dollars properties and infrastructure of the country were damaged. Pakistan, although is titled to be Islamic Republic, with dominant majority (97%) of Muslims even then, almost 3975 citizens were victimized every year by their fellow Muslim terrorists. How and why this happened? Almost ten persons lost their lives every day. The killers are members of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan Afghanistan had been battle field of Russian and US backed and sponsored forces for ten years between 1979 and 1989. Mujahidin designated defeated Soviet Forces and forced them to withdraw from the occupation of Afghanistan. US left Afghanistan putting her in the lurch. It became a no man’s land and victim of the greed of neighboring countries. At least seven groups of Mujahidin, which played crucial role in the resistance against Russian onslaught, namely Jamiat Islami, Hizb Islami (Hikmat Yar), Hizb Islami (Khalis), Itihad Islami, The Afghan National Front, Harkat Inqilab Islami, Mahaz Milli Islami were involved in the tug of war for occupation and political rule of the country (Rais, 1994: 178-186). This drama continued for about five years. A small group of Madrasa students emerged in Eastern province of Afghanistan – Kandahar to mend law and order position in their surroundings. Their successes encouraged them to formally organize them in a warring group - the Taliban. Taliban is meant to be students of religious school. They were formally acknowledged by Pakistan as a power group in 1994 and Government of Pakistan pledged to co-operate with them rather * Associate Professor and Deputy Director General, Da‘wah Academy International Islamic University Islamabad Pakistan 27 Jihāt al-Islām Vol.8 (January - June 2015) No.2 helped them to establish their hold (Rashid, 2002: 17-30). This initiative of Pakistan was followed by a number of Muslim countries of Middle-East. Mujahidin groups and factions of foreign countries scattered in Afghanistan either were won over or forced to ally with this emerging power. All of the left behind arms and ammunition automatically came in their hands. It induced the Taliban to expand their control in the important cities and towns. They took over the control of Kabul in September 1996. They defeated almost all of big armies and groups headed by significant commanders like Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud and Rashid Dostum by1997. Taliban were controlling 90% of the country in 1998 (Marsdon, 1999: 69-80). Apart from local leaders all foreign commanders including Saudi billionaire Usama bin Ladin joined Taliban and surrendered to the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omer, titled Amir-ul-Mominin. Taliban after conquering Afghanistan were able to restore law and order position in the country. They administered the affairs in very rough and harsh way in the wake of their own understanding of the teachings of Shariah. A number of decrees were issued by Amir al Mominin Mullah Muhammad Omer in this regard to be followed by people. The Taliban imposed Islamic code for women, of their own understanding, demanding full veiling and barring them from work outside the home, and closing girl’s schools. A directorate of Amar bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkar was established to execute measure for moral reforms and forbidding from the evils. It has been reported that 225 women were punished for not observing the rules of Islamic dress and hijab (Marsdon, 1999:76). Taliban banned poppy cultivation in July 2000. US and UN acknowledged in March 2001 that price of opium rose tenfold due to the enforcement of rigorous ban by Taliban. Such positive steps started winning hearts of international community and a number of states recognized political rule of Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The scenario totally changed after 9/11 incident. US waged crusade against Afghan administration when Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden and other members of Alqaeda to them. All kind of weapons of mass destruction, like diasy cutters – second to atomic arsenal, were used to compel Talibans to obey American dictates. US involved NATO forces in her war against terrorism in the wake of UN resolution. It caused total destruction of life in Afghanistan. Mujahidin had to flee to tribal areas of Pakistan for safety. Yesterdays Mujahidin re-designated as 28 PAKISTAN, TERRORISM AND ISLAM terrorist. Besides, at least three million Afghans migrated to Pakistan. These ex-Mujahidin and young refugees fertilized the yield of new energetic battalions of Pakistani Taliban. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ‘Silent Operation’ on Red Mosque Islamabad by Pakistan Army in 2007 is most bloody incident in the history of the State with gruesome consequences. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan was established after the operation. It is an umbrella organization of various Islamist militant groups based in FATA( Federally Administered Tribal Areas) along the Afghan border in Pakistan. About 13 militant groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud to form the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in December 2007. The objectives behind the establishment of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan were resistance against the Pakistani state, enforcement of Shariah and to unite against NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. Khaled Ahmed in his analysis ‘what really happened at Lal Masjid, wrote “British journalist Owen Bennett-Jones in his lengthy study Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto refers to one of the assassins of Benazir Bhutto named Husnain Gul who joined the gang of her killers because of Lal Masjid. Husnain Gul was a madrassa student who in 2005 had received small-arms training at a camp in North-West Pakistan. The Joint Investigation Team report says that when he was arrested he had a hand grenade and clothes belonging to his friend, Bilal. In his confession, Gul described how a friend of his had been killed when Musharraf ordered an assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. The attack on the jihadis who had seized the mosque was a turning point in modern Pakistani history, persuading many Islamists that the Pakistani state was not their friend but an enemy that must be attacked. Gul decided to avenge his friend's death and persuaded his cousin, Muhammad Rafaqat, to join him. (Ahmed: 2009)1 Although the TTP was organized in 2007 but its roots were sowed in 2002 when Pakistan military entered first time in the tribal areas. BBC reported that in July 2002 the Pakistani troops, for the first time in 55 years, entered the Tirah Valley in Khyber tribal agency. Soon they were in Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and later in South Waziristan. This was made possible after long negotiations with various tribes, who reluctantly agreed 29 Jihāt al-Islām Vol.8 (January - June 2015) No.2 to allow the military's presence on the assurance that it would bring in funds and development work. But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishandling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen.(Abbas: 2004)2" The TTP is not directly affiliated with the Afghan Taliban movement led by Mullah Omar, due to the differences in strategic goals and interests. The Afghan Taliban, with the alleged support of Pakistani Taliban, operate against international coalition and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan but are strictly opposed to targeting the Pakistani state. TTP is not a centralized organization. Its structure is a loose network of dispersed constituent groups that vary in size and in levels of coordination. The factions of the TTP are limited to their local areas of influence and often lack the ability to expand their operations beyond that territory. A number of significant groups are known with the reference to their areas of activities and their leaders. The biggest number of Taliban is active in South Waziristan. They belong to Baitullah Mahsud, Moulvi Nazir, Tahir Yaldiuv and Abdullah Mahsud groups and their number has been counted about 30,000. Second largest number of Taliban live in North Waziristan and are recognized as Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Baitullah Mahsud and Siraj Haqqani groups. Two main groups of Hakimullah, Hussain Ali and Abid Hussain’s (Shia) are concentrated in Orakzai Agency. Qari Hussain of Kurram Agency leads the most fatal and brutal group having biggest contingent of suicide bombers. Khyber Agency is the nearest agency to Peshawar- the capital of KPK. Baitullah (Rahman group), Lashkar Islam Ansarul Islam and Amar bil Marof and Nahi anil Munkar groups are very active in this area. Omar Khalid organized a group in Mehmand Agency after Red Mosque episode in Islamabad. He leads about 5000 Taliban. Moulana Fakir Muhammad, Zia ur Rehman command their groups apart from Zarqawi and Al-Zawahiri groups of foreign origin in Bajur Agency. It has been reported that about 120,000 Taliban have been active under the command of different leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan (Aqeel, 2009: 75-82). It has been repeatedly narrated that around 60 small and large groups are active against the state.
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