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Operation Palliser: the British Military Intervention Into OPERATION PALLISER: THE BRITISH MILITARY INTERVENTION INTO SIERRA LEONE, A CASE OF A SUCCESSFUL USE OF WESTERN MILITARY INTERDICTION IN A SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN CIVIL WAR THESIS Presented to the Graduate Council of Texas State University-San Marcos in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of ARTS by Patrick J. Evoe, B.S. San Marcos, Texas December 2008 OPERATION PALLISER: THE BRITISH MILITARY INTERVENTION INTO SIERRA LEONE, A CASE OF A SUCCESSFUL USE OF WESTERN MILITARY INTERDICTION IN A SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN CIVIL WAR Committee Members Approved: _______________________________ Robert Gorman, Chair _______________________________ Ed Mihalkanin _______________________________ James Pohl Approved: __________________________________ J. Michael Willoughby Dean of the Graduate College COPYRIGHT by Patrick J. Evoe 2008 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the faculty at Texas State University-San Marcos for their guidance and encouragement throughout my graduate studies. Through their direction, the professors from the History and Political Science departments in the Liberal Arts College have opened my eyes and mind to the world. Dr. Dunn from the Center for International Studies and Dr. Gorman from the Political Science department have particularly been of help throughout this process. Most importantly I want to thank my parents who have unconditionally supported every one of my life’s pursuits. They have been the most important role models in my life, leading by example; always inspiring me with their love, devotion, and drive. Without their support, my life’s accomplishments would not have been possible. They have taught me to put my heart and soul into everything I set out to do. Finally, to my running coach Gilbert Tuhabonye, whose amazing story of survival of the genocide in Burundi and Rwanda brought my attention and interest to the tragic recent history of sub-Saharan Africa. His passion and forgiveness serve not only as an inspiration for our daily lives, but provide hope that the human tragedies from Africa can give rise to human triumphs. This manuscript was submitted on November 21, 2008. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................... vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................1 II. INTERVENTION IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES...........................................8 Complexities of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention...................8 Problems with United Nations Chapter VI Peacekeeping .........................11 Professional Western Militaries: a Tool for Humanitarian Intervention ...14 Private Military Companies .......................................................................17 III. SIERRA LEONE IN THE CONTEXT OF AFRICAN CONFLICTS ............21 Sierra Leone as a Resource War ................................................................24 Sierra Leone as a Regional Conflict ..........................................................26 Non-state Actors ........................................................................................28 True Cost of the War: Civilians.................................................................31 IV. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SIERRA LEONE AND ITS WAR ...............33 Background and History ............................................................................33 Post-independence Corruption and Decline of the State ...........................36 Diamonds ...................................................................................................39 The RUF, its Origin, and the Start of the War...........................................43 International Involvement and Military Governments ..............................45 On the Offensive: Executive Outcomes and Kamajors .............................46 Elections and New Peace Process..............................................................49 Renewed Violence .....................................................................................50 The Sandline Affair....................................................................................51 Operation No Living Thing .......................................................................54 Lomé and the United Nations ....................................................................55 UNAMSIL in Crisis...................................................................................56 v V. BRITISH INTERVENTION.............................................................................60 Operation Palliser.......................................................................................60 Operation Basilica and the Continuing IMATT – Sierra Leone................68 Operation Khukri .......................................................................................71 Operation Barras ........................................................................................74 Ending the Conflict....................................................................................77 Operation Silkman .....................................................................................78 Nation-building, Aid, and Long-Term Involvement..................................80 Operation Vela...........................................................................................82 VI. ANALYSIS OF BRITISH ACTIONS ............................................................84 Failures of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL......................................................84 Decision to Intervene: Blair’s ‘Ethical Foreign Policy’ ............................87 Decision to Intervene: The Case of Sierra Leone ......................................90 UNAMSIL and British Tensions ...............................................................93 Short-term Factors .....................................................................................95 Psychological Impact.....................................................................95 Rapid Reaction...............................................................................97 Tactical Advantages and Force Multipliers .................................100 Long-term Factors....................................................................................102 VII. APPLYING LESSONS TO WESTERN INTERVENTIONS.....................104 VIII. CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................................112 Problems with Peacekeeping and the International Community.............115 Productive Future Research Avenues ......................................................116 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................118 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 5/8GR – 5 Gorkha Rifles and 8 Gorkha Rifles AFRC – Armed Forces Ruling Council APC – Armored Personnel Carrier APC – All People’s Congress ARG – Amphibious Ready Group BMATT – British Military Advisory Training Team CDF – Civilian Defense Force DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation DFID – Department for International Development ECOMOG – Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States EO – Executive Outcomes EU – European Union FCO – Foreign Commonwealth Office Ghanbatt – Ghanaian Battalion IMATT – International Military Advisory Training Team IndBatt – Indian Battalion JTFHQ – Joint Task Force Headquarters KenBatt – Kenyan Battalion NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia NGO – Nongovernmental Organization NiBatt – Nigerian Battalion MoD – Ministry of Defense OLRT – Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team PMC – Private Military Company vii RAF – Royal Air Force RFA – Royal Fleet Auxiliary RN – Royal Navy RM – Royal Marines RUF – Revolutionary United Front SLA – Sierra Leone Army SAS – Special Air Service SLST - Sierra Leone Selection Trust STTTS – Short Term Training Teams UK – United Kingdom ULIMO – United Liberation Movement of Liberia UN – United Nations UNAMSIL – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNOMSIL – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone US – United States viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION “The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier.” – Tony Blair1 By the spring of 2000, the civil war in Sierra Leone had been underway for nearly a decade. The conflict was plagued by extreme violence and human rights abuses, ineffective regional and international intervention, and unproductive peace processes. Under a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate, an international peacekeeping force was tasked with enforcing the tenuous Lomé Peace Accords of 1999 between the elected government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh. Even with a sizable UN peacekeeping force and a Nigerian led Economic Community of African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) force numbering 6,000, containing the RUF and enforcing the almost nonexistent peace proved nearly impossible for the international forces. Clashes with rebels had exacted high casualties among the Nigerians. The final display of peacekeeping ineffectiveness occurred over a period of several days in early
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