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Keith Frankish
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Προγραμμα Διαλεξεων
Dennett's Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning ∗
Dual-System Theories and the Personal– Subpersonal Distinction ∗ Keith Frankish
Illusionism As the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness
The Contemporary Relevance of Kant's Transcendental Psychology
Illusionism As a Theory of Consciousness*
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Is Realism About Consciousness Compatible with a Scientifically Respectable World View? a Response to Keith Frankish’S ‘Illusionism As a Theory of Consciousness’
Debunking Arguments for Illusionism About Consciousness∗
Delusions of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, 52-64, 2016 Also in Illusionism, Ed
The Illusion of Conscious Experience
Physicalism, Russellian Monism & Advaita Vedānta
The Hard Problem of Consciousness: 300 Years on David Chalmers Explaining Consciousness
A Conversation with Professor Keith Frankish, January 24, 2017 Participants Summary Two Theses of Illusionism
Panpsychism-Richard-Gault
Social Science
Explaining the Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness
Top View
Illusionism's Discontent Katalin Balog Keith Frankish
Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning Keith Frankish* the Open University and the University of Crete
Social Science
Illusionism and Givenness: Comments on Frankish*
Comments on Keith Frankish's “Qualia: the Real Thing?” for Consciousness Online
Explanatory Profiles of Models of Consciousness
PHI 202 Philosophy of Mind Autumn 2011-12
The Duality of Mind: an Historical Perspective ∗ Keith Frankish and Jonathan St B T Evans
The Anti-Zombie Argument
62 Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey (Eds.) the Cambridge
Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Issues
Daniel C. Dennett Welcome to Strong Illusionism
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Great Philosophers: Daniel Dennett
A Theoretical Computer Science Perspective on Consciousness1
The Case Against Dual Process Theory
Not Disillusioned: Reply to Commentators*
Imagination and Phenomenal Experience Blake Austin Myers University of Missouri-St
David J. Chalmers the Meta-Problem of Consciousness
THE ANTI-ZOMBIE ARGUMENT Keith Frankish
Schwitzgebel January 31, 2020 Inflate Explode, P. 1 Inflate and Explode
Editorial Introduction