DOCSLIB.ORG
Explore
Sign Up
Log In
Upload
Search
Home
» Tags
» Hierarchy of beliefs
Hierarchy of beliefs
On Games of Strategic Experimentation Dinah Rosenberg, Antoine Salomon, Nicolas Vieille
Hierarchies of Ambiguous Beliefs∗
How Three Beginning Social Studies Teachers Enact Personal Practical Theories
Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law
Interim Correlated Rationalizability
Three Essays in Mechanism Design
Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games
Robust Mechanism Design∗
Selectionfree Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous
Forward Guidance Without Common Knowledge*
Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies
Epistemic Game Theory∗
HIERARCHIES of BELIEF and INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 11 (·),T Is a Type Ti in a Type Space T Which Generates Ri
Transpersonal Understanding Through Social Roles, and Emergence of Cooperation
An Investigation of the Interaction of Beliefs and Behaviors in the Classroom
Essays on Conflict Economics Elise Critoph
A Theory of Collusion with Partial Mutual Understanding
Interim Correlated Rationalizability
Top View
A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability in Infinite-Horizon Games
Beyond Belief Is an Inclusive Conversation About Recovery and Addiction
Essays in Information Economics
Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments
Christian List Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes
Global Games: Theory and Applications Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs
A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application To
Game Theory Lecture Notes
Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability
A Belief-Based Theory for Private Information Games1
Higher Orders of Rationality and the Structure of Games
Bayesian Model of Behaviour in Economic Games
An Unrefinable Folk Theorem
Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games—An Unrefinable Folk Theorem Author(S): JONATHAN WEINSTEIN and MUHAMET YILDIZ Source: the Review of Economic Studies, Vol
Hierarchies of Beliefs for Compact Possibility Models
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability∗
Towards a New Keynesian Theory of the Price Level∗
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules
Game Theory Models of Pricing
Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
The Hierarchical Approach to Modeling Knowledge and Common Knowledge*
Periodic Strategies II: Generalizations and Extensions
Common Knowledge As a Barrier to Negotiation
Dynamic Belief Elicitation
Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
Economics 2010A Game Theory Section Notes
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules
Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability 1
Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability
Macroeconomic Analysis Without the Rational Expectations Hypothesis
Surveying and Selling: Belief and Surplus Extraction in Auctions
Download Preview (PDF, 470.27
Revising Knowledge: a Hierarchical Approach'
Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs
Higher Orders of Rationality and the Structure of Games Francesco Cerigioni Fabrizio Germano Pedro Rey-Biel Peio Zuazo-Garin
Transpersonal Understanding Through Social Roles, And
Friederike Mengel, Elias Tsakas, Alexander Vostroknutov Awareness
Displaying Abstracts
Origins of Epistemic Game Theory! Adam Brandenburger! Version 09-29-09! What Is a Game?
Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination
Interim Correlated Rationalizability1
Bayesian Games
14.126 Lecture 9: Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium