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Drew Fudenberg
Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics and Cooperation in the Centipede Game
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies
Network Markets and Consumer Coordination
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting Or with Incomplete Information
THE HUMAN SIDE of MECHANISM DESIGN a Tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
Economics 286: Game Theory 1 Overview
1. Introduction
Coalitional Rationalizability*
Collusion in Markets with Syndication∗
Agency Revisited Working Paper
Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: a Unification of The
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
Supplementary Information For
SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* Philippe Aghion Drew Fudenberg Richard Holden Takashi Kunimoto O
Course Syllabus
Top View
Game Theory: Syllabus
Viable Nash Equilibria: Formation and Defection 1
Learning and Equilibrium in Games Drew Fudenberg Marshall Lectures Cambridge University October 2009
Stochastic Representatitve Agent
Which Misperceptions Persist?
Collusion in Markets with Syndication
A Network Approach to Public Goods Matthew Elliott
Intensive Lecture Series: Game Theory I Date and Time: February 6
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium
Decision Makers As Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learning By
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: an Introduction and Overview
The Rationality of Preference Construction (And the Irrationality of Rational Choice)
The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 1
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships*
A Model of Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game
The Human Side of Mechanism Design: a Tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
Supplement to "Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games"
Evaluating and Extending Theories of Choice Under Risk∗
Learning Dynamics with Social Comparisons and Limited Memory
Minimax Regret and Strategic
Player-Compatible Equilibrium∗
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
Stochastic Representative Agent Jose Apesteguia Miguel A
Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies∗
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control
Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?: the Ordinary Versus the Extraordinary
Information Design: a Unified Perspective†
Fuzzy Game Theory: a Novel Perspective Vahid Behravesh*, S.M.R
January 29, 2021 Drew Fudenberg Contact Information: Phone: (617)
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (Counterfactual Regret Minimization を用いたト レーディングカードゲームの戦略計算)
Jean Tirole's Nobel Prize in Economics
Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups$
Deploying Affect-Inspired Mechanisms to Enhance Agent Decision
Openness and the (Inverted) Aggregate Demand Logic
Economics 286: Game Theory 1 Overview
A Critique Herbert Gintis May 20, 2004 1 Introduction
Game Theory, On-Line Prediction and Boosting
Playing Games with the Law
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
Title: Strategies and Games : Theory and Practice Author: Dutta, Prajit K
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays
The Future of Economics and Economics Education – Insights from Machine Learning
Paul Milgrom Nobel Bio
Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions
Jean Tirole's Nobel Prize in Economics: the Rigorous Foundations of Post-Chicago Antitrust Economics
EUI WORKING PAPERS Access European Open Author(S)
Econ 205 Microeconomics 2007 Syl 10/29/07 11:35 AM
Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests
Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics"
Are People Probabilistically Challenged? Alex Stein Brooklyn Law School
Decision Theory Entscheidungstheorie
Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games∗
PIER Working Paper 16-012
Navigating the Landscape of Multiplayer Games
Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players
Theories of Coalitional Rationality
Are People Probabilistically Challenged?
Theories of Coalitional Rationality*