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- The Failure of the Paretian Criterion to Evaluate Efficiency
- A Theory of Tacit Collusion∗
- Strong Price of Anarchy∗
- Cesifo Working Paper No. 2937 Category 11: Industrial Organisation February 2010
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- Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy∗
- Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age
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- Discerning Solution Concepts
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- The Failure of the Paretian Criterion to Evaluate Efficiency
- Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games†
- Collusion in Markets with Syndication
- Price Caps As Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition∗
- Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics Maurice E
- Co-Evolutionary Learning
- Can Coopetition Be Source of Competitive Advantage for Strategic Networks?
- Perfect Or Bounded Rationality? Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals
- What's a Little Collusion Between Friends?
- A Theory of Collusion with Partial Mutual Understanding
- Lecture 5: Collusion and Cartels in Oligopoly
- Economics Review of Radical Political
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- Solution Methods for Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria of Continuousmtime, Finitemstate Stochastic Games
- Nuances in the Interplay of Competition and Cooperation: Towards a Theory of Coopetition Devi R
- Chapter 14 from Microeconomics
- The Limits of Smoothness: a Primal-Dual Framework for Price of Anarchy Bounds
- Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model
- Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: a Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing
- Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: an Experimental Investigation∗
- Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization1
- Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies
- Economics & Finance 2009
- Corporate Law and Legal Determinacy
- Algorithms for Test-Based Problems
- Monetary Policy, Determinacy, and the Natural Rate Hypothesis † Alexander Meyer-Gohde∗ This Version: July 27, 2011 Abstract
- Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting
- Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups$
- Rationalizable Bidding in First-Price Auctions1
- Coopetition (Contemporaneous Cooperation and Competition) Among Nonprofit Arts Organizations: the Ac Se of Symphony Orchestras Theresa A
- Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model
- Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy
- Neomi Rao George Mason University School of Law
- Articles Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress
- Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the Political Economy of Capitalism
- The Political Limits of Economics
- Optimal Collusion with Private Information Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell First Draft: May, 1998
- Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Market Sharing Games Applied to Content Distribution in Ad Hoc Networks Michel X
- Beyond Discoverydiscovery®
- The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust
- Arxiv:1808.06750V4 [Econ.TH] 22 Feb 2021 the Strategy of Conflict And
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- A Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy
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- Here Is a Fast Dimension to the Mind As Well As a Slow, Calculating One
- Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics;
- Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms
- Interim Correlated Rationalizability1
- Strategic Behavior Setting Quotas at OPEC
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles Author(S): Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole Source: Econometrica, Vol