Collusion
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- The Failure of the Paretian Criterion to Evaluate Efficiency
- A Theory of Tacit Collusion∗
- Strong Price of Anarchy∗
- Cesifo Working Paper No. 2937 Category 11: Industrial Organisation February 2010
- Advanced Information on the Prize in Economic Sciences 2002, 17 December 2002
- Constraint Games: Modeling and Solving Games with Constraints Thi-Van-Anh Nguyen
- Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory ALDINE TREATISES in MODERN ECONOMICS Edited by Harry G
- Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy∗
- Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age
- Essays on Bounded Rationality in Applied Game Theory
- Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For
- Discerning Solution Concepts
- Question 1: (15 Points, 3 Each) (A) Principle of Complementary Slackness (B) Utility Function
- The Failure of the Paretian Criterion to Evaluate Efficiency
- Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games†
- Collusion in Markets with Syndication
- Price Caps As Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition∗
- Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics Maurice E