A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

Readings With Commentary

NOTICE This material may be Peter A. Morton protected by ropyright Jaw (llUe 17 U.S. Code.)

broadview press CHAPTER 7 164 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy uf Mind CHAPTER 7 r Cart G. Hempel 165 ' which makes use of rigorous logical tools, and marter of psychology by means of physical which has made possible decisive advances to­ methods. The subject matter of physics includes Carl G. Hempel ward the solution of the above problem. 1 This such concepts as mass, wave length, tempera­ 1'rhe Logical Analysis of Psychology" analysis was carried our by the "Vienna Circle" ture, field intensity, etc. In dealing with these, (Wiener Kreis), the members of which (M. physics employs its distinctive method which Author's prefatory note, 1977. The original Dr. Block's plea that it offers a concise account Schlick, R. Carnap, P. Frank, 0. Neurath, F. makes a co.mbined use of description and causal French version of this article was published in of an early version of logical behaviorism and Waismann, H. Feigl, etc.) have, during the past explanation. Psychology, on the other hand, has 1935. By the time it appeared in English, I had would thus be a useful contribution to this an­ ten years, developed an extremely fruitful fur its subject matter notions which are, in a abandoned the narrow translationist form of thology. method fur the epistemological examination and broad sense, mental. They are toto gmere dif­ physicalism here set forth for a more liberal In an effort to enhance the closeness of critique of the various sciences, based in part on ferent from the concepts of physics, and the 2 reductionist one, referred to in note 1, which translation and the simplicity of formulation, I the work ofL. Wittgenstein. We shall limit our­ appropriate method fur dealing with them sci­ presents psychological properties and states as have made a number of small changes in the selves essentially to the examination of psychol­ entifically is that of empathetic insight, called partially characterized, but not defined, by bun­ text of the original English version; none of ogy as carried out by Carnap and Neurath. "introspection," a method which is peculiar to dles of behavioral dispositions. Since then, I these affects the substance of the article. The method characteristic of the studies of psychology. have come to think that this conception re­ the Vienna Circle can be briefly defined as a One of the principal differences between logical ttnaf)>sis of the language of siimct. This quires still further broadening, and that the in­ I the two kinds of subject matter is generally be­ troduction and application of psychological method became possible only with the devel­ lieved to consist in the fact that the objects in­ terms and hypotheses is logically and methodo­ One of the most important and most discussed opment of a subtle logical apparatus which vestigated by psychology-in contradistinction logically analogous to the introduction and ap­ problems of contemporary philosophy is that of makes usc, in particular, of all the formal pro­ to those of physics-are specifically endowed plication of the terms and hypotheses of a determining how psychology should be charac­ cedures of modern symbolic logic.3 However, in with meaning. Indeed, several proponents of physical theory.* The considerations that terized in the theory of science. This problem, the following account, which does not pretend this idea state that the distinctive method of prompted those changes also led me long ago which reaches beyond the limits of epistemo­ ro give mqre than a broad orientation, we shall psychology consists in "understanding the sense to abandon as untenable the verificationist logical analysis and has engendered heated con­ limit ourselves to setting out the general prin­ of meaningful structures" (sinnvolk Gebilde construal of the "empirical meaning" of a sen­ troversy in metaphysics itself, is brought to a ciples of this new method, without making use verstehmd zu eifassm). Take, for example, the tence-a construal which plays such a central focus by the familiar alternative, "Is psychology of strictly formal procedures. case of a man who speaks. Within the frame­ tole in the arguments set forth in this article. a natural science, or is it one of the sciences of work of physics, this process is considered to Since the atricle is so far from representing mind and culture ( Geisteswissmschaftm) ?" II be completely explained once the movements my present views, I was disinclined to consent The present article attempts to sketch the which make up the utterance have been traced to yet another republication, but I yielded to general lines of a new analysis of psychology, one Perhaps the best way to characterize the posi­ to their causes, that is to say, to certain physi­ tion of the Vienna Circle as it relates to psy­ ological processes in the organism, and, in par­ chology, is to say that it is the exact antithesis ticular, in the central nervous system. But, it is An earlier version of this paper appeared in and S.F. Barker, eds., The Legacy ofLegal Posi­ of the eutrent epistemological thesis that there said, this does not even broach the psychologi­ Ausonio Marras, ed., Intentionality, Mind. and tivism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University is a fundamental difference between experimen­ cal problem. The latter begins with understand­ lAnguage (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, Press, 1969); "Reduction: Ontological and tal psychology, a natural science, and introspec­ ing the sense of what was said, and proceeds to · 1972), pp. 115-131, and in Herbert Feigl and Lingustic Facets," in S. Morgenbesser, P. tive psychology; and in general, berween the integrate it into a wider context of meaning. Wilfrid Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Suppes, and M. White, eds., Philosophy. Scien«, natural sciences on the one hand, and the sci­ It is usually this latter idea which serves as a Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, and Mtthod: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel ences of mind and culture on the other.4 The principle for the fundamental dichotomy that is 1949), pp. 373-384, translated from the (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); common content of the widely different fOrmu­ introduced into the classification of the sciences. French by W. Sellars. Reprinted, with revisions "Dispositional Explanation and the Covering· lations used to express this contention, which There is taken to be an absolutely impassable gulf by the author, with permission of the author, Law Model: Response to Laird Addis," in A. C. we reject, can be set down as follows. Apart between the natural sciences which have a sub­ Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, and the editors Michalos and R.S. Cohen, eds., PSA 1974: Pro­ from certain aspects clearly related to physiol­ ject matter devoid of meaning and the sciences of of &vut de Synthtst. ceedingrofthe 1974 Bimnia/MeetingofthePhi­ ogy, psychology is radically different, both in mind and culture, which have an intrinsically *My reasons are suggested in some of my losophy ofScimu Association (Dordrecht: Reidel, subject matter and in method, from physics in meaningful subject matter, the appropriate more recent articles, among them "Logical Posi­ 1976), pp. 369-376. the broad sense of the term. In particular, it is methodological instrument for the scientific tivism and the Social Sciences," in P. Achinstein impossible to deal adequately with the subject study of which is "comprehension of meaning." l66 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind CHAf'TfR 7 CHAPTER 7 r Carl G. Hempel 167 III subject matter of a science. The theoretical con­ "retranslated" without change of meaning into a. Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and tent of a science is to be found in statements. another statement-doubtless longer-in such kinds. The position in the theory of science which we It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether which the word "temperature" no longer ap­ b. At the question "What is the matter?," have just sketched has been attacked from sev­ there is a fundamental difference betWeen the pears. That term functions solely as an abbre­ Paul utters the words "I have a toothache." 5 eral different points ofview. As far as psychol­ statements of psychology and those of physics. viation, making pnssible the concise and c. Ooser examination reveals a decayed tooth ogy is concerned, one of the principal Let us therefore ask what it is that determines complete description of a state of affairs the ex­ with exposed pulp. countertheses is that formulated by behavior­ the content--<>ne can equally well say the pression of which would otherwise be very d. Paul's blood pressure, digestive processes, ism, a theory born in America shortly before "meaning"--<>f a statement. When, for exam­ complicated. the speed of his reactions, show such and the war. (In Russia, Pavlov has developed simi­ ple, do we know the meaning of the following 2. The example equally shows that two such changes. lar ideas.) Its principal methodological postu­ statement: "Today at one o'clock, the tempera­ statements which diffir in formulation can nev­ e. Such and such processes occur in Paul's late is that a scientific psychology should limit ture of such and such a place in the physics ertheless have the same meaning. A trivial ex­ central nervous system. itself to the study of the bodily behavior with laboratory was 23.4° centigrade"? Oearly when, ample of a statement having the same meaning This list could be expanded considerably, but which man and the animals respond to changes and only when, we know under what condi­ as the above would be: "Today at one o'clock, it is already sufficient to bring out the funda­ in their physical environment, and should pro­ tions we would call the statement true, and at such and such a location in the laboratory, mental and essential point, namely, that all the scribe as nonscientific any descriptive or ex­ under what circumstances we would call it false. the temperature was 19.44° R.eaumur." circumstances which verifY this psychological planatory step which makes use of terms from Needless to say, it is not necessary to know As a matter of fact, the preceding consid­ statement are expressed by physical test sen­ inttospecrive or "understanding~ psychology, whether or not the statement is true.) Thus, we erations show--and let us set it down as an­ tences. [This is ttue even of test condition b, such as 'feeling', 'lived experience', 'idea', Will', understand the meaning of the above statement other result-that the meaning ofa !fllfement is which merely expresses the fact that in speci­ 6 'intention', 'goal', 'disposition', 'repression'. We since we know that it is true when a tube of a established by the ctmdititms ofits verification. In fied physical circumstances (the propagation of find in behaviorism, consequendy, an attempt cettain kind filled with mercury (in shott, a particular, two differently formulated state­ vibrations produced in the air by the enuncia­ to construct a scientific psychology which thermometer with a centigrade scale), placed at ments have the same meaning or the same ef­ tion of the words, "What is the matter?") there would show by its success that even in psychol­ the indicated time at the location in question, fective content when, and only when, they are occurs in the body of the subject a certain ogy we have to do with purely physical proc­ exhibits a coincidence betWeen the level of the < both true or both false in the same conditions. physical process (speech behavior of such and esses, and that therefore there can be no mercury and the mark of the scale numbered Furthermore, a statement for which one can such a kind).] impassable barrier betWeen psychology and 23.4. It is also true if in the same circumstances indicate absolutely no conditions which would The statement in question, which is about physics. However, this manner of undertaking one can observe certain coincidences on an­ verifY it, which is in principle incapable of con­ someone's "pain," is therefore, just like that con­ the critique of a scientific thesis is not com­ other instrument called an "alcohol thermom­ frontation with test conditions, is wholly devoid cerning the temperature, simply an abbreviated pletely satisfiu:tory. It seems, indeed, that the eter~; and, again, if a galvanometer connected of content and without meaning. In such a case expression of the fact that all its test sentences soundness of the behavioristic thesis expounded with a thermopile shows a cettain deviation we have to do, not with a statement properly are verified. 8 (Here, too, one verifies only some above depends on the possibility of ful1illing the when the thermopile is placed there at the in­ speaking, but with a "pseudo-statement," that of the test sentences and then infers by way of program of behavioristic psychology. But one dicated time. Further, there is a long series of is to say, a sequence of words correcrly con­ induction that the others obtain as well.) It can cannot expect the question as to the scientific other possibilities which make the statement structed from the point of view of grammar, be retranslated without loss of content into a status of psychology to be setded by empirical rrue, each of which is described by a "physical but without content? statement which no longer contains the term research in psychology itsel£ To achieve this is test sentence," as we will call it. The statement In view of these considerations, our prob­ "pain,» but only physical concepts. Our analysis rather an undertaking in epistemology. We itself clearly afftrms nothing other than this: all lem reduces to one concerning the difference has consequently established that a cettain state­ tum, therefore, to the considerations advanced these physical test sentences obtain. (However, berween the circumstances which verifY psycho­ ment belonging to psychology has the same con­ by members of the Vienna Circle concerning one verifies only some of these physical rest sen­ logical statements and those which verifY the tent as a starement belonging to physics; a result this problem. tences, and then "concludes by induction" that statements of physics. Let us therefore examine which is in direct conttadiccion to the thesis that the others obtain as well.) The starement, there­ a statement which involves a psychological con­ there is an impassable gulf between the state­ IV fore, is nothing but an abbreviated formulation cept, for example: "Paul has a toothache." What ments of psychology and those of physics. of all those test sentences. is the specific content of this statement, that is The above reasoning can be applied to any Before addressing the question whether the sub­ Before continuing the discussion, let us sum to say, what are the circumstances in which it psychological statement, even to those which con­ ject matters of physics and psychology are es­ up this result as follows: would be verified? It will be sufficient to indi­ cern, as is said, "deeper psychological strata" sentially the same or different in nature, it is 1. A statement that specifies the tempera­ cate some test sentences which describe these than that of our example. Thus, the assertion necessary first to clarify the very concept of the ture at a selected point in space-time can be circumstances. that Mr. Jones suffers from intense inferiority 168 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind CHAPTER 7 r CHAPTER 7 Cart G. Hempel 169 ! feelings of such and such kinds can be con­ sis, the result of which shows a certain affinity "real" or only simulated. One mnst note that hands is only a ~physical symptom" which re­ firmed or falsified only by observing Mr. Jones' with the fundamenral ideas of behaviorism, l in the case of the simulator, only some of the veals the presence of a running which is intrin­ behavior in various circumstances. To this constitutes the physicalistic conception of psy­ I conditions are fulfilled which verifY the state­ sically incapable of being grasped by physical behavior belong all the bodily processes of Mr. chology. I ment "This man is mentally unbalanced," means, or to ask, if the watch should stop, what Jones, and, in particular, his gestures, the flush­ those, namely, which are most accessible to di­ has become of the running of the watch.-.,..,..__....,....--1 ing and paling of his skin, his utterances, his v I rect observation. A more penetrating examina­ It is in exactly the same way that abbrevi- blood pressure, the events that occur in his cen­ tion-which should in principle take into ating symbols are introduced into the language tral nervous system, etc. In practice, when one It is customary to raise the following fundarnen­ i account events occurring in the central nervous of physics, the concept of temperature discussed wishes to test statements concerning what ate ral objection against the above conception. The system--would give a decisive answer; and this above being an example. The system of physi­ called the deeper layers of the psyche, one lim­ physical test sentences of which you speak are answer would in turn clearly rest on a physical­ cal test sentences exhausts the meaning of the its oneself to the observation of external bodily absolutely incapable of formulating the intrin­ istic basis. If, at this point, one wished to push statement concerning the temperature at a behavior, and, particularly, to speech move­ sic nature of a mental process: they merely de­ the objection to the point of admitting that a place, and one should not say that these sen­ ments evoked by certain physical stimuli (the scribe the physical symptoms from which one man could show aa the 'Symptoms» of a mental tences merely have to do with "symptoms" of asking of questions). But it is well known that infers, by pu.rely psychological methods-nota­ disease without being "really" ill, we reply that the existence of a certain temperature. experimental psychology has also developed bly that of understanding-the presence of a it would be absurd to characterize such a man Our argument has shown that it is neces­ techniques for making use of the subder bod­ certain mental process. as "really normal"; for it is obvious that by the sary to attribute to the characteristic concepts ily stares referred to above in order to confirm But it is not difficult to see that the use of vety nature of the hypothesis we should pos­ of psychology the same logical function as that the psychological discoveries made by cruder the method of understanding or of other psy­ sess no criterion in terms of which to distin­ performed by the concepts of"running" and of methods. The statement concerning the inferi­ chological procedures is bound up with the ex­ guish this man from another who, while "temperature." They do nothing more than ority feelings of Mr. Jones-whether true or istence of certain observable physical data exhibiting the same bodily behavior down to make possible the succinct formulation of false-means only this: such and such happen­ concerning the subject undergoing examina­ the last detail, would "in addition" he "really propositions concerning the states or processes ings take place in Mr. Jones' body in such and tion. There is no psychological understanding ill." (To put the point more precisely, one can of animal or human bodies. such circumstances. that is not tied up physically in one way or an­ say that this hypothesis contains a logical con­ The introduction of new psychological con­ We shall call a statement which can be other with the person to be understood. Let us tradiction, since it amounts to saying, "It is pos­ cepts can contribute greatly to the progress of translated without change of meaning into the add that, for example, in the case of the state­ sible that a statement should be false even when scientific knowledge. But it is accompanied by language of physics, a ~physicalistic statement," ' ment about the inferiority complex, even the the necessary and sufficient conditions of its a danger, that, namely, of making an excessive whereas we shall reserve the expression "state­ "introspective" psychologist, the psychologist truth are fulfilled.") and, consequendy, improper use of new con­ ment of physics" to those which ate already for­ who "understands," can confirm his conjecture Once again we see clearly that the meaning cepts, which may result in questions and an­ mulated in the terminology of physical science. only if the body of Mr. Jones, when placed in of a psychological statement consists solely in swers devoid of sense. This is frequently the case (Since every statement is in respect of content certain circumstances (most frequently, sub­ the function of abbreviating the deScription of in metaphysics, notably with respect to the no­ equivalent to itself, every statement of physics jected to questioning), reacts in a specified certain modes of physical response characteris­ tions which we formulated in section II. Terms is also a physicalistic statement.) The result of manner (usually, by giving certain answers). tic of the bodies of men or animals. An anal­ which are abbreviating symbols are imagined to the preceding considerations can now be Consequently, even if the statement in question ogy suggested by 0. Neurath may be of further designate a special class of "psychological ob­ summed up as follows: AO psychological state­ had to be arrived at, discovered, by "empathetic assistance in clarifYing the lo ·cal function of jects," and thus one is led to ask questions ments which are meaningfo4 that is to sa)l which understanding, • the only information it gives us psychological statements. 9 he comp 1cated about the "essence" of these objects, and how are in principle verifiable, are translatabk into is nothing more nor less than the following: statements that would describe the movements they differ from "physical objects." The time­ statements which do not involve psychological con­ under certain circumstances, certain specific of the hands of a watch in relation to one an­ worn problem concerning the relation between cepts, but only the concepts ofphysics. The state­ events take place in the body of Mr. Jones. It is other, and relatively to the starS, are ordinarily mental and physical events is also based on this ments ofpsychology are consequently physicalistic this which constitutes the meaning of the psy­ summed up in an assertion of the following confusion concerning the logical function of statemmts. Psychology is an integral part ofphys­ chological statement. form: "This watch runs well (tuns badly, etc.)." psychological. concepts. Our argument, there­ ics. If a distinction is drawn between psychol­ The further objection will perhaps be raised The term "runs" is introduced here as an auxil­ fore, enables us to see that the psycho-physical ogy and the other areas of physics, it is only that men can feign. Thus, though a criminal at iary defined expression which maltes it possi­ problem is a pseudo-problem, the formulation of from the point of view of the practical aspects the bar may show physical symptoms of men­ ble to formulate briefly a relatively complicated which is based on an inadmissible use of scien­ of tesearch and the direction of interest, rather tal disorder, one would nevertheless be justified system of statements. It would thus be absurd tific concepts; it is of the same logical natuse than a matter of principle. This logical analy- in wondering whether his mental confusion was to say, for example, that the movement of the as the question, suggested by the example CHAPTER 7 170 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind CHAPTER 7 Carl G. Hempel 171 above, concerning the relation of the running methodologically to the study of the responses their responses to one another and to their en­ has the methodological attitude we have char­ 10 12 of the watch to the movement of the hands. organisms make to certain stimuli. It by no vironment," and consequendy thar every so­ acterized than the making of decisions, on its means offers a theory belonging to the domain r ciological statement is a physicalistic starement. own authority, concerning the truth or f.tlsity VI of psychology, but rather a logical theory about I This view is cha.racrerized by Neurath as the the­ of particular scientific starements, or the desire the. statements of scientific psychology. Its po­ sis of"social behaviorism," which he adds to that to eliminate any matters of fact whatsoever. The In order to bring out the exact status of the sition is that the latter are without exception ! of "individual behaviorism" which we have ex­ subject matter ofthis philosophy is limited tQ the fundamental idea of the physicalistic concep­ physicalistic statements, by whatever means I pounded above. Furthermore, it can be shown 13 ! form of scientific statmtmts, and the deductive tion of psychology (or logical behaviorism), we they may have been obtained. Consequendy, it that every statement of what are called the "sci­ relationships obtaining between them. It is led by shall conttaSt it with certain theses of psycho­ seeks to show that if in psychology only ences of mind and culture" is a sociological state­ its analyses to the thesis of physicalism, and es­ logical behaviorism and of classical materialism, physicalistic statements are made, this is not a ment in the above sense, provided it has genuine tablishes on purely logical grounds thar a cer­ which give the appearance of being closely re­ limitation because it is logically impossibk to do content. Thus one arrives at the "thesis of the tain dass of venerable philosophical "problems" 11 lated to it. otherwise. unity of science": consists of pseudo-problems. It is certainly to 1. Logical behaviorism claims neither that 3. In order for logical behaviorism to be The division of science into different areas the advantage of the progress of scientific minds, feelings, inferiority complexes, voluntaty valid, it is not necessary that we be able to de­ rests exclusively on differences in research pro­ knowledge that these imitation jewels in the actions, etc., do not exist, nor that their exist· scribe the physical state of a human body which cedures and direction of interest; one must not coffer of scientific problems be known for what ence is in the least doubtful. It insists that the is referred to by a certain psychological state­ regMd it 1/.S a matter ofprincipk. On the contrary, they are, and that the intellectual powers which very question as to whether these psychologi­ ment-for example, one dealing with someone's aJt the branches ofscinu:e are in principk ofone have till now been devoted to a class of mean­ cal constructs really exist is already a pseudo­ feeling of pain-down to the most minute de­ and the same nature; they are branches ofthe uni­ ingless questions which are by their very nature problem, since these notions in their "legitimate tails of the phenomena of the central nervous tfl.rJ science, physics. insoluble, become available for the formulation use" appear only as abbreviations in physicalistic system. No more does it presuppose a knowl­ and study of new and fruirful problems. That statements. Above all, one should not interpret edge of all the physical laws governing human VIII the method of logical analysis stimulates re­ the position sketched in this paper as amount· or animal bodily processes; nor a fortiori is the search along these lines is shown by the numer­ ing to the view that we can know only the existence of rigorously detcrminisric laws relat­ The method of logical analysis which we have ous publlcarions of the Vienna Circle and those "physical side" of psychological processes, and ing to these processes a necessary condition of attempted to explicate by clarifYing, as an ex­ who sympathize with its genetal point of view that the question whether there are mental phe­ the truth of the behavioristic thesis. At no point ample, the starements of psychology, leads, as (H. Reichenbach, W. Dubislav, and others). nomena behind the physical processes falls be­ does the above argument rest on such a con­ we have been able to show only too briefly for In the attitude of those who are so bitterly yond the scope of science and must be left crete presupposition. the sciences of mind and culture, to a "physical­ opposed to physicalism, an essential role is either to faith or to the conviction of each in· ism" based on logic (Neurath): Every statement played by certain psychological facrors relatiog dividual. On the contrary, the logical analyses VII of the abovementioned disciplines, and, in general, to individuals and groups. Thus the contrast originating in the Vienna Circle, one of whose of tnnpirical science as a whole, which is not between the constructs (Gehilde) developed by consequences is the physicalistic conception of In concluding, I should like to indicate briefly merely a meaningless sequence of words, is the psychologist, and those developed by the psychology, teach us that every meaningful the clarification brought to the problem of the transl.tztable, without change of content, into a physicist, or, again, the question as to the nature question is, in principle, capable of a scientific division of the sciences into rotally different ar­ statement containing only physicalistic urms, and of the specific subjecr matter of psychology and answer. Furthermore, these analyses show that eas, by the method of the logical analysis of sci­ consequently is a physicalistic statement. the cultural sciences (which present the appear­ what, in the case of the mind-body problem, is entific starements, applied above to the special This thesis frequendy encounters strong ance of a search for the essence and unique laws considered as an object of belief, is absolutely case of the place of psychology among the sci­ opposition arising from the idea that such of "objective spirit") is usually accompanied by incapable of being expressed by a factual propo­ ences. The considerations we have advanced can analyses violendy and considerably reduce the a strong emotional coloring which has come sition. In other words, there can be no ques­ be extended ro the domain of sociology; talten in richness of the life of mind or spirit, as though into being during the long historical develop­ tion here of an "article of faith." Nothing can the broad sense as the science of historical, cul­ the aim of the discussion were purely and sim­ ment of a "philosophical conception of the be an objecr of faith which cannot, in princi­ tural, and economic processes. In this way one ply to eliminate vasr and important areas of ex­ world," which was considerably less scientific ple, be an objecr of knowledge. arrives ar the result thar every sociological asser­ perience. Such a conception comes &om a false than normative and intuitive. These emotional 2. The thesis here developed, though rdared tion which is meaningful, that is to say, in prin­ interpretation of physicalism, the main ele­ factors are still deeply rooted in the picture by in certain ways to the fundamental idea of ciple verifiable, "has as its subjecr rnarrer nothing ments of which we have already examined in which our epoch represents the world to itself behaviorism, does not demand, as does the lat­ else than the states, processes and behavior of section VII above. As a matter of fact, nothing They are protected by certain affective disposi­ ter, that psychological research restrict itself groups or of individuals (human or animal), and ean be more remote from a philosophy which tions which surround them like a rampart, and 172 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind CHAPTER 7 r CHAPTER 7 Carl G. Hempel 173 for all these reasons appear to us to have genu­ 3. A recent presentation of symbolic logic, 6. For further details see the statement of one pain or other psychological characteristics ine content-something which a more pen­ based on the fundamental work of White­ of the founders of behaviorism: J.B. to an individual might be "translatable," in etrating analysis shows to be impossible. head and Russell, Principia Mathnnatica, I Watson, Behaviorism (New York: Norton, a suitable sense, into physical sentences as­ A psychological and sociological study of is to be found in R. Carnap, Abriss der ! 1930); also A.A. Roback, Behaviorism and cribing associated physical micro-States or the causes for the appearance of mese "concomi­ Logistik (Vienna: Springer, 1929; vol. 2 of Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Univ. Book­ micro-events to the nervous system or to tant factors" of the metaphysical type would the series Schriftm zur W'tssmschaftlichm store, 1923); and A.P. Weiss, A Theoretical the entire body of the individual in ques- take us beyond the limits of this study, 14 but We!tauffiumng). It includes an extensive I Bmis of Human Behavior, 2nd ed. rev. tion. without tracing it back to its origins, it is possi­ bibliography, as well as references to other (Columbus, Ohio: Adams, 1929); see also 9. "Soriologie im Physikalismus," Erkmntnis, ble to say that if the logical analyses sketched logistic systems. the work by Koehler cited in note 11 be­ 2 (1931-32), 393-431, particularly p. 411 above are correct, the fact that they necessitare 4. The following are some of the principal low. [English trans.: "Sociology and Physical­ at least a partial break with traditional philo­ publications of the Vienna Circle on the 7. Space is lacking for further discussion of ism, "in A.J. Ayer, ed,, Logical Positivism]. sophical ideas which are deeply dyed wim emo­ nature of psychology as a science: R. the logical form of test sentences (recently 10. Carnap, Der Logische Aufoau der Welt; pp. tion can certainly not jusrify an opposition to Carnap, Scheinprobkme in der Philosophie: called "protocol sentences" by Neurath and 231-236; id. Scheinprobleme in der PhibJs­ physicalism-at least if one acknowledges that Dm Fremdpsychische und des &alismusstreit Carnap). On this question see Wittgen­ ophie. See also note 4 above. philosophy is to be something more than the (Leipzig: Meiner, 1928); Der Logische stein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as well 11. A careful discussion of the ideas of so­ expression of an individual vision of the world, Aufoau der Welt (Leipzig: Meiner, 1928) as the articles by Neurath and Carnap called "internal" behaviorism is to be that it aims at being a science. [English trans.: Logical Structure of the which have appeared in Erkmntnis (above, found in Psychologische Probkme by W. World (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, note 4). Koehler (Berlin: Springer, 1933). See par­ 8. Two critical comments, 1977: (a) This ref­ NOTES 1967)]; "Die Physikalische Sprache als ticularly the fust two chapters. Universalsprache der Wissenschaft," Er­ erence to verification involves a conceptual 12. R. Carnap, "Die Physikalische Sprache als 1. I now consider the type of physicalism out­ kmntnis, 2 (1931-32), 432-465 [English confusion. The thesis which the preceding Universalsprache," p. 451. See also: 0. lined in this paper as too restrictive; the trans.: The Unity of Science (London: considerations were intended to establish Neurath, Empirische Soziologie (Vienna: thesis that all statements of empirical sci­ Kegan Paul, 1934)]; "Psychologic in was clearly that the statement "Paul has a Springer,. 1931; the fourth monograph in ence are translatabk, without loss of theo­ physikalischer Sprache," Erkenntnis, 3 toothache" is, in effect, an abbreviated ex­ the series Schriftm zur wissenschaftlichen retical content, into the language of (1932-33), 107-142 [English trans.: "Psy­ pression of all its test sentences; not that it Weltauffmsung). physics, should be replaced by the weaker chology in Physical Language/ in A.J. expresses the claim (let alone the "fact") 13. See R. Carnap, Der Logische Aufoau der assertion that all starements of empirical Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: that all those test sentences have actually Welt; pp. 22-34 and 185-211, as well as science are reducihk to sentences in me lan­ Free Press, 1959)]; "Ueber Protokoll­ been tested and verified. (b) Strictly speak­ the works cited in the preceding note. guage of physics, in the sense that for every saetze," Erkmntnis, 3 (1932-33), 215-228; ing, none of the test sentences just men­ 14. 0. Neurath has made imeresting contribu­ empirical hypothesis, including, of course, 0. Neurath, "ProtokoUsaette," Erkenntnis, tioned is implied by the statement "Paul tions along these lines in Empirische those of psychology, it is possible to for­ 3 (1932-33), 204-214 [English trans.: has a toothache": the latter may be true Soziologie and in "Soziologie im Physikal­ mulate certain test conditions in terms of "Protocol Sentences," in Logical Positivism]; and yet any or all of those test sentences ismus" (see above, note 9), as has R. physical concepts which refer to more or Einheitswissmschaft und Psychologie (Vi­ may be false. Hence, the preceding consid­ Carnap in his article "Ueberwindung der less directly observable physical attributes. enna: Springer, 1933; vol. I of the series erations fail to show that the given psycho­ Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der But those test conditions are not asserted Einhritswissmschafo. See also the publica­ logical statement can be "translated" inca Sprache," Erkenntnis, 2 (1931-32), 219- to exhaust the theoretical content of the tions mentioned in the notes below. sentences which, in purely physical terms, 241 [English trans.: "The Elimination of given hypothesis in all cases. For a more 5. P. Oppenheim, for example, in his book describe macro-behavioral manifestations Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of detailed development of this thesis, cf. R. Die Natuerlkhe Ordnung der Wwmschaften of pain. This failure of the arguments out­ Language," in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Posi­ Carnap, "Logical Foundations of the Unity Oena: Fischer, 1926), opposes the view that lined in the text does not preclude the pos­ tivism]. of Science," reprinted in A. Marras, ed.,ln­ there are fundamental differences between sibility, however, that sentences ascribing tmtionality. Mind, and Language (Urbana: any of the different areas of science. On Univ. of Illinois Press, 1972). the analysis of "understanding," cf. M. 2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, Schlick, "Erleben, Erkennen, Metaphysik," 1922). Kantseudim, 31 {1926), 146.