A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Readings With Commentary NOTICE This material may be Peter A. Morton protected by ropyright Jaw (llUe 17 U.S. Code.) broadview press CHAPTER 7 164 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy uf Mind CHAPTER 7 r Cart G. Hempel 165 ' which makes use of rigorous logical tools, and marter of psychology by means of physical which has made possible decisive advances to­ methods. The subject matter of physics includes Carl G. Hempel ward the solution of the above problem. 1 This such concepts as mass, wave length, tempera­ 1'rhe Logical Analysis of Psychology" analysis was carried our by the "Vienna Circle" ture, field intensity, etc. In dealing with these, (Wiener Kreis), the members of which (M. physics employs its distinctive method which Author's prefatory note, 1977. The original Dr. Block's plea that it offers a concise account Schlick, R. Carnap, P. Frank, 0. Neurath, F. makes a co.mbined use of description and causal French version of this article was published in of an early version of logical behaviorism and Waismann, H. Feigl, etc.) have, during the past explanation. Psychology, on the other hand, has 1935. By the time it appeared in English, I had would thus be a useful contribution to this an­ ten years, developed an extremely fruitful fur its subject matter notions which are, in a abandoned the narrow translationist form of thology. method fur the epistemological examination and broad sense, mental. They are toto gmere dif­ physicalism here set forth for a more liberal In an effort to enhance the closeness of critique of the various sciences, based in part on ferent from the concepts of physics, and the 2 reductionist one, referred to in note 1, which translation and the simplicity of formulation, I the work ofL. Wittgenstein. We shall limit our­ appropriate method fur dealing with them sci­ presents psychological properties and states as have made a number of small changes in the selves essentially to the examination of psychol­ entifically is that of empathetic insight, called partially characterized, but not defined, by bun­ text of the original English version; none of ogy as carried out by Carnap and Neurath. "introspection," a method which is peculiar to dles of behavioral dispositions. Since then, I these affects the substance of the article. The method characteristic of the studies of psychology. have come to think that this conception re­ the Vienna Circle can be briefly defined as a One of the principal differences between logical ttnaf)>sis of the language of siimct. This quires still further broadening, and that the in­ I the two kinds of subject matter is generally be­ troduction and application of psychological method became possible only with the devel­ lieved to consist in the fact that the objects in­ terms and hypotheses is logically and methodo­ One of the most important and most discussed opment of a subtle logical apparatus which vestigated by psychology-in contradistinction logically analogous to the introduction and ap­ problems of contemporary philosophy is that of makes usc, in particular, of all the formal pro­ to those of physics-are specifically endowed plication of the terms and hypotheses of a determining how psychology should be charac­ cedures of modern symbolic logic.3 However, in with meaning. Indeed, several proponents of physical theory.* The considerations that terized in the theory of science. This problem, the following account, which does not pretend this idea state that the distinctive method of prompted those changes also led me long ago which reaches beyond the limits of epistemo­ ro give mqre than a broad orientation, we shall psychology consists in "understanding the sense to abandon as untenable the verificationist logical analysis and has engendered heated con­ limit ourselves to setting out the general prin­ of meaningful structures" (sinnvolk Gebilde construal of the "empirical meaning" of a sen­ troversy in metaphysics itself, is brought to a ciples of this new method, without making use verstehmd zu eifassm). Take, for example, the tence-a construal which plays such a central focus by the familiar alternative, "Is psychology of strictly formal procedures. case of a man who speaks. Within the frame­ tole in the arguments set forth in this article. a natural science, or is it one of the sciences of work of physics, this process is considered to Since the atricle is so far from representing mind and culture ( Geisteswissmschaftm) ?" II be completely explained once the movements my present views, I was disinclined to consent The present article attempts to sketch the which make up the utterance have been traced to yet another republication, but I yielded to general lines of a new analysis of psychology, one Perhaps the best way to characterize the posi­ to their causes, that is to say, to certain physi­ tion of the Vienna Circle as it relates to psy­ ological processes in the organism, and, in par­ chology, is to say that it is the exact antithesis ticular, in the central nervous system. But, it is An earlier version of this paper appeared in and S.F. Barker, eds., The Legacy ofLegal Posi­ of the eutrent epistemological thesis that there said, this does not even broach the psychologi­ Ausonio Marras, ed., Intentionality, Mind. and tivism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University is a fundamental difference between experimen­ cal problem. The latter begins with understand­ lAnguage (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, Press, 1969); "Reduction: Ontological and tal psychology, a natural science, and introspec­ ing the sense of what was said, and proceeds to · 1972), pp. 115-131, and in Herbert Feigl and Lingustic Facets," in S. Morgenbesser, P. tive psychology; and in general, berween the integrate it into a wider context of meaning. Wilfrid Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Suppes, and M. White, eds., Philosophy. Scien«, natural sciences on the one hand, and the sci­ It is usually this latter idea which serves as a Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, and Mtthod: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel ences of mind and culture on the other.4 The principle for the fundamental dichotomy that is 1949), pp. 373-384, translated from the (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); common content of the widely different fOrmu­ introduced into the classification of the sciences. French by W. Sellars. Reprinted, with revisions "Dispositional Explanation and the Covering· lations used to express this contention, which There is taken to be an absolutely impassable gulf by the author, with permission of the author, Law Model: Response to Laird Addis," in A. C. we reject, can be set down as follows. Apart between the natural sciences which have a sub­ Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, and the editors Michalos and R.S. Cohen, eds., PSA 1974: Pro­ from certain aspects clearly related to physiol­ ject matter devoid of meaning and the sciences of of &vut de Synthtst. ceedingrofthe 1974 Bimnia/MeetingofthePhi­ ogy, psychology is radically different, both in mind and culture, which have an intrinsically *My reasons are suggested in some of my losophy ofScimu Association (Dordrecht: Reidel, subject matter and in method, from physics in meaningful subject matter, the appropriate more recent articles, among them "Logical Posi­ 1976), pp. 369-376. the broad sense of the term. In particular, it is methodological instrument for the scientific tivism and the Social Sciences," in P. Achinstein impossible to deal adequately with the subject study of which is "comprehension of meaning." l66 A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind CHAf'TfR 7 CHAPTER 7 r Carl G. Hempel 167 III subject matter of a science. The theoretical con­ "retranslated" without change of meaning into a. Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and tent of a science is to be found in statements. another statement-doubtless longer-in such kinds. The position in the theory of science which we It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether which the word "temperature" no longer ap­ b. At the question "What is the matter?," have just sketched has been attacked from sev­ there is a fundamental difference betWeen the pears. That term functions solely as an abbre­ Paul utters the words "I have a toothache." 5 eral different points ofview. As far as psychol­ statements of psychology and those of physics. viation, making pnssible the concise and c. Ooser examination reveals a decayed tooth ogy is concerned, one of the principal Let us therefore ask what it is that determines complete description of a state of affairs the ex­ with exposed pulp. countertheses is that formulated by behavior­ the content--<>ne can equally well say the pression of which would otherwise be very d. Paul's blood pressure, digestive processes, ism, a theory born in America shortly before "meaning"--<>f a statement. When, for exam­ complicated. the speed of his reactions, show such and the war. (In Russia, Pavlov has developed simi­ ple, do we know the meaning of the following 2. The example equally shows that two such changes. lar ideas.) Its principal methodological postu­ statement: "Today at one o'clock, the tempera­ statements which diffir in formulation can nev­ e. Such and such processes occur in Paul's late is that a scientific psychology should limit ture of such and such a place in the physics ertheless have the same meaning. A trivial ex­ central nervous system. itself to the study of the bodily behavior with laboratory was 23.4° centigrade"? Oearly when, ample of a statement having the same meaning This list could be expanded considerably, but which man and the animals respond to changes and only when, we know under what condi­ as the above would be: "Today at one o'clock, it is already sufficient to bring out the funda­ in their physical environment, and should pro­ tions we would call the statement true, and at such and such a location in the laboratory, mental and essential point, namely, that all the scribe as nonscientific any descriptive or ex­ under what circumstances we would call it false.