1. Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior

FACTS: Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.

HELD: Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude“.

The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.

2. Planas vs. Gil

FACTS: In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.

HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended. Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.

3. Myers vs. United States

Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of the first class in Oregon was forced to resign.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution “grants to the President the executive power of the government- i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that article 2 excludes the exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate’s consent; that the provisions of the second section of article 2, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication; that the President’s power of removal is further established as an incident to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication extend to removals the Senate’s power of checking appointments.” ContentBox-Law

Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senate’s permission to remove the postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent. The President asked for the individual’s resignation without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate refused the President permission to do so.

Issue. “[W]hether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative history of executive appointments, including Marbury v. Madison. It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, “in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.” Dissent. Justice McReynolds found that “it is impossible for me to accept the view that the President may dismiss, as caprice may suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review of precedent. Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was “May the President, having acted under the statute in so far as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take place?” Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the office was created by Congress. ContentBox-Law

Discussion. “To hold [an opposite rule] would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

4. Lacson vs. Roque

FACTS: The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.

HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the President “shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments,” but supervision does not contemplate control. The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done “conformably to law;” and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines.” Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.

5. Mondano vs. Silvosa

FACTS: The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,toSilvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING: Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.

6. Steel Seizure Case Brief Fact Summary. During the Korean War, President Truman in order to avoid a strike that would impede the war effort, issued an executive order seizing the mills and operating them under federal direction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President has limited inherent authority. He may have a legislative power in “theaters of war”. The President can act without Congress when it is an emergency and Congress has not negated such action that the President wishes to undertake.

Facts. During the Korean War, President Truman seized the steel mills so that a strike would not impede the Korean War effort. The United Steel Workers were upset that they were not getting paid enough and wanted a raise. President Truman was afraid that a strike would cause the United States to run out of steel. Congress had allowed the strike with the Taft Hartley Act passed in 1947 over President Truman’s veto. The Act gave the president the power to get an injunction against such strikes but Congress had rejected an amendment to permit government seizures to avoid serious shutdowns.

Issue. Can President Truman acting under the aggregate of his powers, exercise a law making power independent of Congress in order to protect serious national interests? Held. Justice Black opinion. No. Although Article II Section: 1 grants executive power to the President to execute the laws. His general executive power is inapplicable since there was no relevant law here to execute. Under Section 2, the Commander in Chief power does not warrant the seizure here either, since it was lawmaking and too far removed from the “theater of war”. That power did not include the President being able to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. That is the job for the Nation’s lawmakers and not for its military authorities. The Founders of the Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in good and bad times.

Dissent. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Minton dissenting. There was legislation authorizing the supplying of the forces engaged in the Korean War. The President had a duty to execute the foregoing legislative programs and successful execution depended upon continued production of steel and stabilized prices for steel. Work stoppage would have resulted in a serious curtailment of production of essential weapons and munitions of all kinds. The President was acting to save the legislative programs and in that sense he was there to take care that the laws were faithfully executed. He had to execute a defense program which Congress had enacted and strike would have had a disastrous effect on those programs. The President acted to preserve those programs by seizing the steel mills. It was temporary and subject to congressional direction. Presidents in the past have acted in the same way.

Concurrence. All of the Justices who joined Justice Black’s opinion for the Court also wrote individual concurring opinions. Justice Frankfurter stated that questions concerning the extent of the Presidential power in the absence of legislation were not before the Court. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was an explicit Congressional negation of the authority asserted by the seizure Justice Burton stated that the controlling fact was that Congress had prescribed specific procedures and they did include seizure for this emergency.

Justice Douglas emphasized the Fifth Amendment’s requirement for compensation for takings of property.

Justice Jackson said that the President had inherent legislative powers to act in preserving the nation, but only when there was an absence of any provision passed by Congress purporting to deal with the situation.

Justice Clark stated that the President must follow the procedures laid down by Congress in the Act. If Congress had not acted, then in the absence of Congressional action, the President’s independent power to act depends on the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.

Discussion. The majority described this as inherent power, while the dissent argued this was implied power. If there had been an emergency and Congress had declined or neglected to act, then the President would have had the narrow sliver of authority to seize the steel mills. This is inherent power. The dissent argued that the President exercised his implied powers to take care that the laws were faithfully executed. Since the list in the United States Constitution of the President’s powers is not exclusive, then as long as the President’s act seems reasonably related to carrying out the laws made by Congress, the Court will not strike the act merely because it does not fall within any narrow enumerated presidential power.

7. Marcos vs. Manglapus

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING: Yes, according to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).

The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

8. Laurel vs. Garcia

Facts: Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lexsitus applies. Issues and Held: 1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated. The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar. The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lexsitus does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lexsitus rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

9. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. vs. Republic

10. Ople vs. Torres

Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz : (1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and (2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 Ruling: YES Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308.The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper seand as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early asJanuary 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait fortheformality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right

11. David vs Arroyo

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional. The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

12. Banda vs. Ermita

FACTS: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.

HELD: YES J. Leonardo-de Castro. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. J. Carpio: RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities of the government including the acquisition of “items, supplies, materials, and general support services x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit of any government x x x activity” save for limited transactions. By opening government’s procurement of standard and accountable forms to competitive bidding (except for documents crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely by government), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184’s principle of promoting “competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding.

13. Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division

14. Galicto vs. Aquino

Facts:President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial management of the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National Power Corporation and the National Food Authority. Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries on the matter of activities of GOCC and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCC’s and government financial institutions (GFIs). President Aquino issued E.O 7 strengthening the supervision of compensation levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances and other benefits. However, petitioner JelbertGalicto allegedly questions the constitutionality of E.O 7 in his capacity as a lawyer and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office. As he allegedly stands to be prejudiced by E.O 7 because it suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant of salary increase and other benefits granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making sure that laws and orders by government officials are legally issued and implemented.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in bringing the petition before the Court.

Ruling:No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because petitioner is simply concerned about his entitlement to future salary increases. A public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or accrued. Salary increases are a mere expectancy volatile and dependent on various variables in nature. His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any future increase in petitioner’s compensation will only depend on usual factors considered by proper authorities was misleading and incorrect due to the concept of injury as an element of Locus standi.He only points out the denial of a reasonable expectation which is not a subject of harm to go against the law. His membership of Philippine Bar and a PhilHealth official does not suffice to clothe his legal standing. Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy irreducible minimum condition to trigger the exercise of judicial power.

STAT CON PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI

Locus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or action in question, and the harm suffered will continue unless the court grants relief in the form of damages or a finding that the law either does not apply to the party or that the law is void or can be nullified. This is called the "something to lose" doctrine, in which the party has standing because they directly will be harmed by the conditions for which they are asking the court for relief. A person cannot bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be harmed by the law. Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to bring the suit, and will dismiss the case without considering the merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law unconstitutional, there must be a valid reason for the lawsuit. The party suing must have something to lose in order to sue unless it has automatic standing by action of law.

15. Quarto vs. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo

16. General vs. Urro FACTS: When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.

Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P.de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escuetaas permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quo warranto petition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."

The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular" appointment, and as such, he cannot be removed from office except for cause. Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban on appointments,was officially released (perthe congratulatory letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively made. The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same grounds.

Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lismota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro.

The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.

Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary (acting) appointments,unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive Department.Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was appointed until apprised of the appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on his appointment. He cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for cause.

DENIED

17. Ramon P. Binamira vs. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr. FACTS: Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986. Pursuant thereto, petitioner assumed office on the same date. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains that his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum stating that petitioner's designation is invalid since it was designated not by the President but only by the Secretary of Tourism. Garrucho is then designated as General Manager until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity. Garrucho took over as the General Manager of the PTA and thereafter Pres. Aquino appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of PTA.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had been removed without just cause in violation of security of tenure

HELD: No, the designation is considered only on an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure.

Section 23-A of the P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority provides that “The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of sixyears unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, that upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve assuch until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.” It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official as in this case where the Secretary of Tourism s designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PTA. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that the shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acing or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure of the person named.

The decree also provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the PTA shall be made by thepresident, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the eexercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.

In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, the doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as also happened in the case at bar. With this ruling, it can be said that petitioner's designation is an unlawful encroachment on a presidential mprerogative, he did not acquire valid title to the position in question.

18. Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista

19. Binamira vs. Garrucho 20. Pimentel vs. Ermita While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else. On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith. It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity 21. 22. Sarmiento vs. Mison 23. Quintos-Delos vs. Commission on Appointments Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA. Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution: Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution. 24.

25. Guevara vs. Inocentes

FACTS: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25 th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution.which states that: The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioner’s ad interim appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution which states that: “until the next adjournment of Congress” means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely ‘suspended’ its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous session without interruption since January 17. ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only. 2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention that Congress is still in continuous session? HELD: 1. NO. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not make any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that ‘when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word “adjournment” had in mind either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended. 2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the petitioner’s ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate. 26. Matibag vs. Benipayo 27. Luego vs. Civil Service Commission

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.” The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

28. Lacson vs. Romero 29. Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines

FACTS: On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.ButonJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.

Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.

OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three- reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: • Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

• Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987 Constitution

HELD: Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992. It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholdingsimultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605). That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.] Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.

Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise. 30. Aytona vs. Castillo

FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner DominadorAytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments. 31. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

32. Alajar vs. Alba

FACTS: RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant t the law, Alba was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alba telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Alajar. Alajar was then declared as the acting mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed his case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then complained. Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides: “ Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .”, has been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure. HELD: The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. “Admittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the “term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the “tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the pleasure of the resident and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.

33. Manubay vs. Garilao

FACTS: Petitioners owned a 124-hectare land in Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not protest the notice and filed an application at the DAR for conversion of the property from agricultural to residential. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution approving the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use. Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the November 1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the land had been reclassified and the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was denied, on the ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which must have been lifted first either because of retention or exemption. Respondent denied petitioners’ application for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the CARP. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their application

ISSUE: WON the act of a department secretary may be directly challenged in a petition for certiorari.

HELD: Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or hostility.

34. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines vs. Manalang-Demigillo

FACTS: The Board of Directors of Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP), a wholly owned government corporation, formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. TIDCORP alleged that Demigillo engaged in a verbal tussle with Mr. Joel Valdes (Valdes), President and CEO of TIDCORP. Allegedly, Demigillo also sent a memorandum addressed to Valdes which contained discourteous and arrogant words.

Pending the investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive suspension for 90 days.

Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ruled that her suspension was not proper because under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil service officer like Demigillo might be preventively suspended by the disciplining authority only if any of the two grounds were present, to wit: (1) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might unduly influence or intimidate potential witnesses against him; or (2) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the CSC .

ISSUE: Whether or not Demigillos 90-day preventive suspension is proper?

HELD: The 90-day preventive suspension order issued against Demigillo was valid.

POLITICAL LAW: preventive suspension

Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code, the imposition of preventive suspension by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue there must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office.

Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August 31, 1999. It is clear from Section 19,supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service.Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites.

In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that preventive suspension pending investigation "is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him." As such, preventing the subordinate officer or employee from intimidating the witnesses during investigation or from tampering the documentary evidence in her office is a purpose, not a condition, for imposing preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word "intended."

Petition is GRANTED. The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

35. Angeles vs. Gaite

FACTS: It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution dated June 20, 1999, respondent Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary who, in a Resolution dated April 4, 2000, ordered the withdrawal of the Information against petitioner. On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently dismissed. On reconsideration, Velasco submitted a comment which contained statements pertaining to Judge Velasco's sexuality.

On the basis of the above statements which petitioner claimed to be a direct attack on her character and reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaint for four counts of libel against respondent Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. It was dismissed. Petitioner Judge was clearly undaunted, as she filed a petition for review with the DOJ of the dismissal. The petition was, again, dismissed, even upon reconsideration.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review Before the OP questioning the DOJ Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the Petition for Review, stating that under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated 29 May 2003, no appeal from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

Petitioner thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing the OP order. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political agency. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or overturn the DOJ Secretary's resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego.

The CA also held that the OP's outright dismissal of petitioner's Petition for Review was valid and binding, and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It found that the DOJ resolutions dismissing petitioner's petition for review became final and executory after petitioner failed to elevate the said DOJ resolutions directly with the CA in a petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period provided for under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA was erroneous in applying the doctrine of qualified political agency

2. Whether or not the petition before the CA was filed on time

HELD: The petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW: Qualified political agency.

First issue: The Court referred to Angeles v. Gaite, and explained that: "The President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second-guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary - his own alter ego.

REMEDIAL LAW: Prohibited petitions before the OP. Second issue: Filing an action with the OP was fatal to the petitioners case, since MC No. 58 prohibits the filing of such petition with the OP. Petitioner's filing of the petition for review with the OP, which is prohibited, did not toll the running of the reglementaryperiod for filing a petition with the CA.Accordingly, the DOJ resolutions became final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the same in the CA.

Petition is DENIED.

36. Araneta vs. Gatmaitan Facts: The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue: W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held: VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.

Distinction bet: Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall be Execution of Law – authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of law.

37. Gacson vs. Arroyo

38. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pano

Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.

HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.

39. Ang-Angco vs. Castillo 40. Noblejas vs. Salas 41. Jacob vs. Puno 42. De Leon vs. Carpio

FACTS: Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission.

The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement.

However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: • Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice

HELD: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.

The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.

Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regularcourse of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)

In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.

43. Orosa vs.Roa 44. Kulayan vs. Tan 45. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

FACT: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

• It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation; • The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission; • The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. • It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

46. Department of Health vs. Camposano 47. PCGG Chairman vs. Jacobi

FACTS: There were several letters showing that there exists agreement between PCGG and respondent Jacobi entitling the latter of incentive percentage for efforts in recovering ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Respondent Jacobi filed before the Sandiganbayan thru his counsel Atty. Reyes a petition for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari (with prayer for injunction) against PCGG for allegedly re-hiring two “trojan horse” consultants preventing the enforcement of claims against the Marcoses. Another similar thrust was filed before the Ombudsman against PCGG in violation of R.A. No. 3019, with a later manifestation of withdrawing a letter because Jacobi is allegedly part of said letter. PCGG claimed that said that the letter is a falsified document there being nothing on their records that such ever existed. PCGG through Chairman Elma filed before the DOJ criminal complaint under Art.171 par.2 and Art. 172 pars.1 and 3 of RPC against respondents. No summons were issued to respondents. DOJ found no probable cause on the complaint and the case was dismissed.

ISSUES: Remedial Law 1. Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the DOJ’s determination of probable cause. a) If it is, where should the petition be filed. 2. Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion. a) In (i) effectively allowing Jacobi to simultaneously avail of the remedy of a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration, and (ii) file a second motion for reconsideration. b) In finding that no probable cause for falsification and use of falsified document exists against the respondents

RULINGS: Remedial Law (1) (a) No. The respondents are mistaken in their claim that petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties in a preliminary investigation and by making an independent assessment thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions of a quasi-judicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, since he does not make a determination of the rights of any party in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondent’s guilt or innocence (thus limiting his action to the determination of probable cause to file an information in court), an investigating prosecutor’s function still lacks the element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule 43. As an extraordinary remedy, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not require that summons be issued to the respondent; the service upon him of an order to file its Comment or Memorandum is sufficient. But it is required that this be filed before the Court of Appeals and not directly to SC under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. SC’s original jurisdiction may be allowed only if there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. (2) (a) No. The ruling on Jacobi’s second MR and on Atty. Reyes’ first MR cannot be appreciated as grave abuse of discretion. While it seemingly violated established rules of procedure, it provided ample justification therefor – the avoidance of possibility of two conflicting rulings on two motions treating of the same inseparable subject matter. (b) No. The existence of several letters and reports made by the respondents to the PCGG, shows that the PCGG was at least aware of the respondents’ efforts to assist in the recovery efforts of the government, in general, and of the PCGG, in particular. Therefore, forging a letter that would simply be evidence of an implied agreement for those services hardly makes any sense. Considering the inapplicability of the presumption of authorship and the dearth of evidence to support the allegation of conspiracy, much less of evidence directly imputing the forgery of the De Guzman letter to Jacobi, SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in absolving respondent Jacobi.

48. Ramos Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.

49. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional

Held: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."

50. Marcos vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

51. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a LieutenantGeneral of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 68 is Constitutional

HELD: Yes. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68

52. Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 FACTS:In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.

ISSUE:Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.

HELD:Yes. The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the “open court’ theory observed in the USA

53. Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be considered null and void. Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case – Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.

ISSUE:Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so far as the case at bar is concerned?

HELD: Yes. First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is still pending, military tibunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of some justices in AQUINO V. MILCOMM, stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil of enses under general law are entitled o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process…xxx.. Judicial power exist only in courts’. Moreover, the Court emphasized that “Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine, which should be abandoned or modified, should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right.

54. Toth vs. Quarks FACTS: ISSUE: HELD:

55. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora FACTS: Invoking his powers as CommanderinChief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. ISSUE:Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

HELD: No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

56. Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo FACTS:Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of AlyansaDagitiMannalonIti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with KilusangMagbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the OplanBantayLaya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party- respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

ISSUE:Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit

HELD:No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunityfrom suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor uponthe presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.(The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

57. Gonzales vs. Abaya FACTS:On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an Information for coup d’etat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not service connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup d’etat.

ISSUE:Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts.

HELD:Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "serviceconnected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

58. Balao vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men earlier. Named respondents in the petition were then President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others. James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio. In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region. According to witnesses’ testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men, saying they were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van. petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3) a witness protection order. the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows: ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person; and DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” It was formulated in the exercise of this Court’s expanded rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations. “Extralegal killings” refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law. ** The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as “enemies of the state. We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military’s counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups. ** The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by the respondents. The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, “is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.” Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings]. x x x x As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[ Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are “very limited, superficial and one-sided.” Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are borne by the evidence on record. ** An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production order was predicated on petitioners’ bare allegation that it obtained confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned any “fishing expedition” by precipitate issuance of inspection and production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.

59. Montenegro vs. Castañeda FACTS:In October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his son’s body and explain his detention. Castaňeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker

ISSUE:Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.

HELD: No. As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegro’s petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt. The determination by the President of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. 60. Barcelon vs. Baker FACTS:This case was an application for a writ ofhabeas corpus which it alleged that Barcelon isdetained and restrained of his liberty at the town of Batangas, in the Province of Batangas, and that the detention and restraint of the said applicant is wholly without legal authority and not under or by virtue of any process issued by any court. Respondents admit that they are detaining the body of the said Felix Barcelon, but deny the right of the court to inquire into the reasons therefor by virtue of the resolution issued by the Philippine Commission and the executive order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas.

The Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the Governor-General is hereby authorized to suspend writ of habeas corpus in the said provinces because of the fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said provinces were in open insurrection against the constituted authorities; and the said bands, or parts of them, and some of their leaders, were still in open resistance to the constituted authorities.

ISSUE:Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the facts upon which the legislative and executive branches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Cavite and Batangas

HELD: NO. It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the Government, or any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the Governor-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with such orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until the very object of the rebels or insurrectos or invaders has been accomplished.

IN THIS CASE, Congress had authority to provide that the President, or the Governor-General, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

In cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety might require it.the conclusion set forth in the said resolution and the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion off the legislative and executive branches of the Government, after an investigation of the facts. That one branch of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands has no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the discretionary acts of another independent department of the Government. The doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts has been recognized in this case. The authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the legislative and executive branches of the government and their decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial Department and upon all persons.

Therefore, the application for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

61. Lansang vs. Garcia

FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional. HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

62. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile FACTS:The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid

HELD:The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or the by the Review Committee created for the purpose

63. Aquino vs. Enrile FACTS: The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES: 1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? 2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law?

HELD:5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.

64. People vs. Salle FACTS:Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. La’o further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardonis valid

HELD:No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. –“WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall bedeemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with thisResolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into hiscustody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.”

65. Culanag vs. Director of Prisons FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: 66. Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol FACTS: ISSUE: HELD:

67. Sumulong vs. Gonzales FACTS: ISSUE: HELD:

68. Pelobello vs. Palatino FACTS:Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.

ISSUE:Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office

HELD:Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question.

69. Monsanto vs. Factoran FACTS: • In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. • She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted. • Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension. • Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment • The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite. • In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. • Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. • The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same

ISSUE: WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment

HELD: No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

70. Garcia vs. Chairman, Commission on Audit FACTS:Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. ISSUE:Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency

HELD: Yes. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages. If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner

71. Vera vs. People of the Philippines FACTS: Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

HELD: Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office." The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

72. Bayan Muna vs. Romulo FACTS:In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a nonsurrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect. ISSUE:Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate

HELD: Yes. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

73. Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary FACTS: The Rome Statute established the ICC which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The Philippines, through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute on Dec. 28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners now file this petition to compel the Office of the President to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate for its concurrence.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute

HELD:No. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treatymaking, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The participation of the legislative branch in the treatymaking process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.