1. Villena Vs. Secretary of the Interior FACTS
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1. Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior FACTS: Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation. HELD: Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude“. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation. 2. Planas vs. Gil FACTS: In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President. HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended. Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth. 3. Myers vs. United States Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of the first class in Oregon was forced to resign. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution “grants to the President the executive power of the government- i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that article 2 excludes the exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate’s consent; that the provisions of the second section of article 2, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication; that the President’s power of removal is further established as an incident to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication extend to removals the Senate’s power of checking appointments.” ContentBox-Law Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get the Senate’s permission to remove the postmaster of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent. The President asked for the individual’s resignation without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate refused the President permission to do so. Issue. “[W]hether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative history of executive appointments, including Marbury v. Madison. It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, “in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.” Dissent. Justice McReynolds found that “it is impossible for me to accept the view that the President may dismiss, as caprice may suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review of precedent. Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was “May the President, having acted under the statute in so far as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take place?” Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the office was created by Congress. ContentBox-Law Discussion. “To hold [an opposite rule] would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 4.