Conceptualizing Japanese Whiteness

______

A Thesis

Presented to

The Honors Tutorial College

Ohio University

______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for Graduation

from the Honors Tutorial College

with the degree of

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

______

by

Jason Akbar

June 2010 Table of Contents

Introduction 3

Theoretical Framework 7

Part I: Historical Background 18 Chapter I: The Birth of Japanese Whiteness 18

Part II: The Implications of Japanese Whiteness 38 Chapter II: Korean and Chinese Immigrants in Japan 39 Chapter III: Brazilians in Japan 54

Conclusions 65

References 69

2 Introduction

Assimilation is often a key issue in the study of how ethnic minorities relate to the domestic people of their host country. When we think of immigrants, we often picture people from distant lands who move to a new place in search of a better future full of ripe opportunities. Every year, millions of people migrate across the world and find themselves in completely new environments. Little by little they adapt to the language, culture, and society of their new homes. Over time, these people adopt a new identity and eventually may even be naturalized as citizens in the country where they now reside.

While this image of immigration may seem overly simplified, it is hard to deny that many Americans may share this view. In fact, is this not the ‘American

Dream’ speech that is indoctrinated into our minds from an early age? Countless stories of penny‐less European immigrants who made rags‐to‐riches success in the early 20th century are reminders of this maxim. These stories serve as a

testament to the American ideology that regardless of your religion, gender, class,

or the color of your skin, you shall be welcomed into society and be given

citizenship and with it a voice.

As benevolent as this creed may sound, it operates on one small, yet highly

intrinsic principle: assimilation. The trade‐off for being allowed to reap the

benefits of citizenship is that immigrants must be willing to assimilate. Without

the assimilation of language, culture, and identity, it becomes difficult for

3 domestic Americans to accept newly initiated Americans. This seems like a

relatively small price to pay considering the benefits of becoming a citizen.

However, this widely accepted notion presupposes that the host country

welcomes immigrants with open arms.

But what happens when a nation does not welcome immigrants with such

hospitality? What about nations that place preference on the racial majority

rather than the minority? Do some nations have institutionalized barriers that

prevent ethnic minorities from assimilating?

* * *

Ware­ware nihonjin, “We Japanese,” is an expression often used by

Japanese people to preface statements related to their culture and identity. But

just who are these nihonjin? As a concept, what it means to be Japanese has been

refined over centuries of tradition. Words like washiki, “Japanese‐style” and

yamato­damashi, “Japanese‐spirit,” conjure images of a collective cultural identity.

In previous centuries of Japanese history, understanding the Japanese

identity may have been easier. Due to self‐imposed policies of isolation, known

as sakoku, Japan was able to keep its borders closed for over two hundred years.

As a result, international influence on Japanese society was minimal, and a

homogenous Japanese society was kept intact.

Japanese isolation could very well have continued throughout the 19th and

20th centuries if not for the forcing open of its borders by the U.S. Navy in the

early 1850s. Due to this foreign pressure, Japanese isolationism ended, and Japan

4 found itself on the path to internationalization. Over the next fifty years Japan’s

interactions with the rest of the world continued to increase. By the end of the

19th century, Japan was a fully industrialized nation that even rivaled some

Western powers.

During the first few decades of the 20th century, Japan put its industrial

power to use as it evolved into a dominant imperial power in Asia. Japanese

imperialism resulted in cultural influence throughout East and South‐East Asia.

Conversely, Japan itself was also influenced by the hundreds of thousands of

laborers who were pressed into service in Japan during the war.

After World War II, Japan found itself under the influence of a foreign

occupier. For seven years, the U.S. occupation forces were in charge of

reconstructing and reshaping Japan. The first step was the promulgation of a

completely new, U.S. authored, Japanese Constitution. The document, presented

to the people in 1947, was a symbol of a new, democratic, and peaceful Japan.

For the first time in Japan’s history, all Japanese citizens were given rights and

freedoms.

Japanese internationalization brought changes to Japan on several levels.

On one hand, the implementation of a democratic constitution deconstructed

Japan’s former monarchic system. Furthermore, internationalization brought

many new peoples, cultures, and ideologies into a place that was traditionally

homogenous.

5 Currently, there are approximately 2.1 million foreign residents in Japan.

Out of a population of about 127 million, foreigners account for roughly 1.5 percent. The three largest ethnic groups in Japan are Koreans (North and South),

Chinese (mainland and Taiwanese), and Brazilians. According to a census conducted by the Japanese government in 2007, they represent around twenty‐ eight, twenty‐seven, and fourteen percent, respectively, of the total foreign resident population.

Despite all the foreign influence that Japan has experienced over the past century and half, Japanese identity still remains highly protected. Phrases like ware­ware nihonjin and washiki are still commonly used in reference to characteristics about Japanese identity.

What is important to understand here is that Japanese people use these phrases to distinguish a clear divide between what is Japanese and what is not, or moreover, who is Japanese and who is not; or as will be elaborated below, who is

‘white’ and who is not. This divide has created friction between those who are nationals and those who are foreigners, and a system of exclusion and discrimination has become institutionalized.

* * *

6 Theoretical Framework

Critical Race Theory (CRT) will serve as the primary basis for my analysis for understanding racial discrimination and its source in Japanese society.

Through its application, I will be not only proposing, but also supporting the notion that relations with ethnic minorities are based on a racial contract with the ‘white’ signatories being Japanese nationals. In addition to my analysis, I will also be researching the implications of the Japanese system and its effect on minorities groups.

Moreover, through my research I will show that Japanese society, like

Western societies, is founded on a racial contract, which in turn governs relations between the majority race and minority races. From this assessment, I will be going as far as to say that Japanese people themselves are whites, and that the imposition of their whiteness has relegated the non‐whites of their society to the periphery; ignoring their voice and their needs.

From a theoretical standpoint, approaching the system of institutionalized discrimination in Japan is difficult. While numerous texts that describe the social status of different ethnic minorities exist, these works are primarily descriptive of a system that is already in play. However, deconstructing the system to analyze and understand how such a relationship developed proves more difficult.

7 Due to a lack of theoretical analysis on this subject and the increase in friction between the majority and minority, it seems that it has become necessary to fundamentally break down this system and identify its source.

In the context of Japan, the application of CRT is insightful because it can be applied to illustrate how racial discrimination has become fused into the social, political, and economic systems. Discrimination is no longer solely the disdain that different races feel towards each other; rather, it is the implementation of a hierarchical power structure that differentiates between the insiders and outsiders in a society based on race.

In Western societies, CRT refers to the subjugation of one racial group by another as Whiteness. Charles Mills’, The Racial Contract addresses whiteness in

the context of American society. According to Mills, a racial contract is

“that set of formal or informal agreements or meta‐agreements between the members of one subset of humans…designated by (shifting) “racial” (phenotypical/ genealogical/ cultural) criteria C1, C2, C3…as “white” and coextensive with the class of full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans as “nonwhite” and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white‐ruled polities the whites either already inhabit or establish or in transactions as aliens with these polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behavior of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form,”(Mills, 1997,11).

Here, Mills’ terminology is key because he uses the word ‘contract’ to underscore

the fact that racial discrimination is not a natural occurrence, rather, it is

intentionally institutionalized by the people of the majority class. Furthermore,

white privilege is further protected through the concept of the epistemology of

8 ignorance. Mills states that racism in our society is able to survive due to

widespread “white misunderstanding, misperceptions, evasion, and self‐

deception on matters related to race.” These elements are pivotal in the Racial

Contract, “which requires a certain schedule of structured blindnesses and

opacities in order to establish and maintain the white polity,” (Mills, 1997,19).

Additionally, the Racial Contract system privileges the white class above

other racial classes, which naturally promotes racism through ideas of

superiority and the organization of power. Furthermore, the white members of

society hold this system together through strong denouncement and denial of the

existence of white privilege. To enable this,

“The racial contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, and epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made,” (Mills, 1997,18).

The epistemology of ignorance is essential because it allows whites to reign

superior because they rationalize that they are not superior. Under the influence

of the epistemology of ignorance whites are able to ignore racism and are able to deny the existence white privilege.

Whites, who are the privileged, power holding members of society, are the major propagators of racism, and the majority of whites fall into two categories of the Racial Contract. The two categories are the signatories and the non‐ signatories. The signatories are those who consciously engage in promoting the hierarchy of white privilege. Non‐signatories fall into two groups: those who

9 resist the hierarchy of the contract, such as white abolitionists during the Civil

War, but moreover, those who are completely oblivious to the structures of white privilege and racism. Without noticing the prevalence of racism in society, these oblivious propagators contribute tremendously to the survival of racism. The reason that some white people are oblivious is because they live without ever experiencing racial discrimination. Since they have never been directly affected by racism they believe that it is not a problem. Finally, whether signatory or non‐ signatory, “all whites are beneficiaries of the contract,” (Mills, 1997,11). The benefits of the racial contract are clear and simple: “the bottom line is material advantage,” (Mills, 1997,33), considering that “The whole point of establishing a moral hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of those individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons,” (Mills, 1997,32).

The Racial Contract is upheld by white power and privilege, and is maintained through the actions of both the signatories and oblivious non‐ signatories. Furthermore, all racial classes beneath the white class are subjected to the Racial Contract. As a result, in a system founded on a racial contract, racism flourishes while simultaneously it is denounced, denied, and ignored by the white members of society; thusly the system is perpetuated.

While the racial contract is often invisible to whites, it is always apparent to nonwhites. Instances of racial differentialization, white advantage, and

10 nonwhite disadvantage, and interest convergence within a society are proof of an

institutionalized racial contract. The first refers to “the ways the dominant

society racializes different minority groups at different times, in response to

shifting needs such as the labor market,” (Delgado, 2001,8). For example, during

World War II, Japanese Americans were placed in internment camps, while

blacks were deemed only capable as serving as cooks in the military; illustrating

how at times, certain minorities can be more desirable than others.

A major factor of racial differentialization is often the visibility of race.

Furthermore, race is far more difficult to conceal than other aspects of identity;

“Age can be surgically masked, homosexuality can be rendered invisible on the street, and class can be hidden behind a cultivated accent or clothing style,”

(Alcoff, 2006,6). As a result, visible racial characteristics are often the first

characteristics noticeable when seeing other people.

The importance of the visibility of race is that it can determine the manner

in which different races will be racialized. If whiteness is the acceptable standard,

then races that are most visibly similar to this category will be less racialized.

Take for example European immigration to the United States in the early 20th

century. Immigrants from the northern parts of Europe, England, Germany,

Holland, etc, were visibly whiter than southern Europeans from Spain, Italy, and

Greece, who had darker complexions. It was easier for northern Europeans to

blend in with other white Americans than it was for southern Europeans. As a

11 result, the experience of racism for these groups differs greatly on the account that their race is more or less visible in different circumstances.

White advantage and nonwhite disadvantage refers to the tangible positive and negative consequences of being white or nonwhite in a society.

Access to higher education, high‐paying employment, safe residential areas, are all examples of socio‐economic advantages taken for granted by whites.

Conversely, for nonwhites, “employment discrimination, wage discrimination, and promotion discrimination” are the reality for subpersons. (Mills, 1997,38)

Finally, interest convergence is one of the most salient aspects of a racial contract, as well as the most deceiving. Interest convergence operates on the principle that “civil rights gains for communities of color coincide with the dictates of white self‐interest,” (Delgado, 2001,18). Take for instance the Civil

Rights movement and the Cold War. While the United States was fighting for freedom in Asia, minorities within the US still faced bitter discrimination. Some

CRT scholars assert that the passing of civil rights laws was done for the sake of improving the image of the US and legitimizing its position in the Cold War, rather than for the sake of minority groups. The danger of interest convergence is that is creates the illusion of progress in a society, making it easier for whites to deny the existence of racism or a racial contract. (Delgado, 2001,18)

Operating on the most basic social level, the racial contract subsequently infects all aspects of a society, seeping its way into cultural, social, and political channels. Once this occurs, a society then has legal precedents to defend (and

12 further perpetuate) discrimination. In essence, it is here (political level) where

discrimination becomes institutionalized.

Ian Haney Lopez’s, White By Law discusses the way in which the court

system of the United States created a legal definition for whiteness in America,

and thus established a clear outline for the initial requirement for citizenship in

the United States. The cases of Ozawa and Thind, as described by Lopez’s underscore this point.

Ozawa and Thind were both immigrants to the United States. After living in the United States for an extended period of time, both men applied for citizenship. Both men embraced American culture and the American creed;

Ozawa even cut all ties to Japan. When Ozawa applied for citizenship, the basis of his argument was that he was white because he had white skin. Since whiteness was a requirement for citizenship and he satisfied it, then he should be granted citizenship. However, the courts decided that being white was not solely about skin color, it was about being of the Caucasian race and assimilating to American culture. Even though Ozawa had assimilated as much as white society would allow, he was still denied citizenship; he failed to assimilate into looking

‘American.’ (Lopez, 1996,85)

The Thind case in tandem with the Ozawa case shows the great lengths at which white society was willing to go to in order to marginalize minority groups.

After it was established that one had to be Caucasian to be a citizen, Thind, an

Indian, used this argument in his favor. Once again the courts altered the

13 stipulations for citizenship stating that while Thind was in fact a Caucasian, he was non‐white by the popular understanding of white.

The Thind verdict obviously contradicts the Ozawa verdict, but together these examples demonstrate how race was a concept that was socially created and then defined in legal terms in order to protect white privilege. Moreover, through the legal system, the notion of white superiority was established by determining that certain ethnicities were not capable of assimilating into white culture. The definition of whiteness was determined to be what is popularly understood as being white, and the cases of Ozawa and Thind created the legal precedents of enforcing who is white and who is not. Since nonwhite races were of different stock, they inherently were not capable of successfully partaking in a white society as whites. (Lopez, 1996,95)

While these cases pertain to the case of the United States, the understanding of the legal aspect of constructing and maintaining whiteness is pertinent to the case of Japan; where citizenship is highly regulated.

Traditionally, CRT is a theory that is primarily applied to the American context. Citing a history of slavery, discrimination, and racism, CRT scholars such as Mills and Lopez prove that locally (domestically), the United States is founded in a structured hierarchy of power based on and legitimized by the claimed superiority of the white race. In essence, white superiority, or “whiteness,” by way of the Racial Contract, is the determining factor of who gets what in

American society by determining whose voices count and whose voices do not

14 count. However, the power of the Racial Contract and “whiteness” is not

restricted only to the local aspects of a nation.

Internationally, “whiteness” has created a hierarchical power structure

between all nations. As Mills notes, “Globally, the Racial Contract creates Europe

as the continent that dominates the world…within Europe and other continents,

it designates Europeans as the privileged race,” (Mills, 1997,33). The obvious

proof of this assertion is imperialism and colonialism. Two examples of this are

the settling of the American continent through the removal and extermination of

Native Americans and British colonial imperialism throughout Asia, Africa, and

the West.

Through the establishment of white superiority, all non‐whites were determined to be subpersons. Following this logic, since subpersons were not considered fully human, they therefore “have a different and inferior schedule of rights and liberties applying to them,” and as a result, “ it is possible to get away with doing things to subpersons that one could not do to persons, because they do not have the same rights as persons,” (Mills, 1997,56). To sum it up concisely, whites (persons) have an innate license over non‐whites (subpersons) because they are the only real people. Therefore, colonialism, enslavement, and discrimination, etc. are not only acceptable, they are just, so long as those colonized, enslaved, and discriminated against are non‐whites. Through this historical justification we now live, “in a world which has been foundationally

15 shaped for the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination

and the gradual consolidation of global white supremacy,” (Mills, 1997,20).

Understanding the global reach of whiteness leads to the conclusion that

in other parts of the world and at different times there may be other racial

contracts at work. In first hearing the term “Japanese whiteness” I undoubtedly

imagine that there will be some pressing questions. How can the Japanese be

white? From a classical understanding of the racial definition of white, the

Japanese are not whites. The Japanese are not white in terms of their skin color,

rather, they are white in terms of their position of power on the hierarchy of the

Racial Contract.

To better illustrate this point, it is necessary to turn to one of Mills’

assertions in his work. To Mills, whiteness and white power is not about skin

color; it is about power. By understanding the Racial Contract as a global

occurrence it becomes evident that white racism is not unique and that there are

other Racial Contracts that exist between peoples of different races. Mills states,

“the Racial Contract decolorizes Whiteness by detaching it from whiteness…we

could have had a yellow, red, brown, or black Whiteness: Whiteness is not really

about color at all, but a set of power relations,” (Mills, 1997, 127).

In this sense, the Racial Contract becomes a universal concept about

power relations between dominant and subordinate races; therefore the concept of whiteness is readily applicable to the case of Japan, because the focus is on power structures and not on skin color; “In Asia the Japanese have long

16 considered themselves the superior race, oppressing the Ainu in their own

country and proclaiming during the 1930s Pan‐Asiatic mission to “united the

yellow races” under their leadership against white Western domination,” (Mills,

1997,127). This understanding of whiteness is the basis for Japanese whiteness;

and I will employ historical and contemporary evidence of Japanese whiteness

throughout the social, political, and economic sectors of Japanese society to

illustrate this point.

Understanding the global nature of the Racial Contract is perhaps the first

step towards understanding the concept of Japanese whiteness. While Japanese

whiteness exists both locally and globally, examining Japanese whiteness globally

will later allow it to be better understood locally. To first understand

international Japanese whiteness it is pertinent to examine Japanese history from the 19th and 20th centuries.

17 Part I: Historical Background

It is nearly impossible to comprehend the situation of race relations in contemporary Japan without first addressing some important questions related to Japanese history: “What led to the birth of Japanese whiteness?” “How has it developed since its creation?” “Is whiteness a new concept in Japan or is it rooted

in its own history?” Of these questions, the creation of Japanese whiteness is the

most pertinent, and will be the focus of this next section.

* * *

Chapter I: The Birth of Japanese Whiteness

It is often the common view that, as an island nation, Japan kept itself isolated from the outside world. While this notion holds some truth in more modern times, a large portion of Japan’s history is marked by its relation to other countries in Asia, primarily China and Korea. In fact, the earliest records of Japan come from Chinese records dated as early as the first century A.D. Over the course of the next several centuries, Japan, like other countries throughout Asia, was part of a tributary system with China. Regions outside of the mainland were deemed to have cultures inferior to the Chinese empire and were therefore

subjected to a hierarchy of nations. Nations could maintain their own rulers, but

emissaries were required to “visit the Chinese capital, bow their heads, present

gifts, and praise the glory of the Chinese emperor,” (Gordon, 2003,4). In return

for this compliance, outside nations were given access to trade routes throughout

18 Asia and were guaranteed protection from invasion. Under the tributary system, the Chinese empire maintained a degree of hegemonic authority throughout Asia, but simultaneously, other nations were able to develop their own independent culture.

In the case of Japan, the nation’s history was heavily influenced by its tributary relationship with China. The earliest records of Japan were accounted by the Chinese, due to a lack of a writing system in Japan. However, through cultural exchange, Japan came to adopt the Chinese writing system in the 6th and

7th centuries. This period, known as the Asuka period (538‐ 710 A.D.), is also characterized by the import of all sorts of ideas related to politics, religion, and philosophy. One of the most substantial influences from mainland Asia was the importation of Buddhism from Korea. Another great import from mainland Asia was the adoption of Confucian philosophical thought and political processes from

China. Together, these two ideologies “provided the foundation for the achievements of classical Japanese civilization” from the 8th through 12th centuries (Gordon, 2003, 4).

Japanese history for the next several centuries is characterized by domestic affairs more so than international affairs. While relations with mainland Asia were maintained, it is during these next centuries that Japan began developing into a centralized state. However, this process did not occur quickly.

In contrast, the time period between the 12th and 19th centuries is marked by a long internal struggle for power between various regional leaders throughout

19 Japan. These leaders, known as daimyo, controlled large portions of land,

regulated by their own private armies. During this time period, war between

neighboring regions was frequent.

Eventually, Japan became a unified state once power was consolidated under one clan, the Tokugawa. The Tokugawa period lasted from 1603‐1867.

This era, unlike the centuries before, was relatively peaceful and government control was rigid. In addition, the Tokugawa rulers maintained a policy of seclusion from international affairs. From as early as the 1540s, Westerners

(mainly Dutch and Portuguese) had been engaging in missionary work as well as trade. However, the Tokugawa came to see the spread of Christianity as a threat to their authority. As a result, in 1633, Tokugawa banned the teaching of

Christianity. When some Japanese Christians in Nagasaki rebelled, the Tokugawa military responded by killing more than thirty thousand people and forcing all

Portuguese out of Japan. By this time, the only westerners permitted to remain were the Dutch, who were forbidden to travel beyond the small island of Dejima.

Further interaction with the outside world was reduced with the ban on Japanese people to travel outside the country. (Gordon, 2003, 17)

It was not only the West with which the Tokugawa government cut international ties. Perhaps more surprising was the dissolution of ties with China.

The Tokugawa government denounced its subordinate position as a tribute to

China, as well as the superiority of the Chinese empire. The logic of the

Tokugawa was simple, they wanted to legitimize their own power by “attempting

20 to develop a vision and a reality of a different regional order…” that did not recognize “the premises of a China‐centered order emblematized by the tribute system to which other Asian rulers submitted,” (Gordon, 2003, 18).

It is here that glimpse into the beginnings of Japanese superiority becomes evident. The changes in policy towards relations with the outside world during the Tokugawa era signify the first steps towards creating a sense of cultural superiority and nationalism among the Japanese. The two most significant changes involve relations with the Chinese empire and with the kingdom of

Korea.

For thousands of years, the regional hierarchy of Asia positioned the

Chinese empire at the center, and all other Asian states in the periphery. The breaking of ties to the tribute system signified that Japan was no longer willing to submit to this regional order. This act was a huge step for Japan in terms of creating its own regional order since it essentially turned its back on the system that had governed international relations in the region for thousands of years.

Furthermore, while Japan no longer bowed to Chinese authority, it still maintained international ties with Korea; who sent emissaries to visit Japan about once every decade. These missions were conducted primarily to keep ties between the countries active, and the ambassadors from Korea often came only for “occasions of congratulations, such as the birth of an heir or the accession of a new [leader],” (Gordon, 2003, 18).

21 The most significant part of Japan’s relationship with Korea during this time was that the Japanese never sent emissaries to visit Korea. Here is where another sign of Japanese superiority begins to develop. While the relationship between the two countries was not officially structured into superior and inferior roles, the one‐sided relationship of only Korean emissaries visiting Japan seems to depict otherwise. In fact, this relationship arguably resembles the tribute system in which inferior states sent emissaries to the superior Chinese empire without the Chinese reciprocating on such visits. While such a hierarchy between the two states was never officiated during this era, it is perhaps a foreshadowing of future relations among them. At the very least, this change is significant because it marks a shift in how Japan began to see itself and the rest of the world; no longer an inconsequent member of the periphery, Japan was looking to establish its own order.

Under these new regulations, Japan was able to maintain relative isolation from the outside world. This policy was successful for more than two hundred years. However, while the Tokugawa government was able to control the affairs domestically, it was unable to do so beyond its borders. Outside of the country, international order was undergoing significant changes. During the 19th century,

European imperialism was in full swing. With European nations vying for

resources, influence, and dominance throughout African and Asia, it was only a matter of time before the isolated island of Japan would be of interest.

22 Time for Japan’s isolation ran out in 1853. It was in this year that

Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States arrived with naval warships in

Edo bay. The US offered Japan the ultimatum of opening its borders for trade willingly or be subject to have them opened forcefully. The US gave Japan one year to deliberate an answer, and Japan had found itself at a crossroad. (Gordon,

2003,)

Concerning Japan’s reply to the demands of the United States, the government found itself divided. However, there were few options. Militarily speaking, Japanese did not have sufficient resources to defend itself against modern Western weaponry. Furthermore, Western colonization throughout mainland Asia served as a warning sign for what was to come for Japan. The

Opium Wars, which occurred a decade earlier, had shown the superior force of the British military over the Chinese empire. The conflict was a result of the

Chinese attempt to ban the sale of opium due to its widespread negative impact on their society. When the British met this action with force, China lost its sovereign control to the West. All sorts of new laws were imposed on the Chinese by the British, such as the creation of new trading ports, the control of tariffs, and the right of British law to be used in cases involving British citizens. This detriment to Chinese authority, the prior regional empire for thousands of years, was alarming to the Japanese. (Gordon, 2003, 48)

When Commodore Perry returned the following year, Japan had no choice but to acquiesce to their demands; they permitted the creation of two ports and

23 one consul. In the following years, Japan would sign treaty after treaty, slowly

giving up portions of its own sovereignty to the West. By 1858, eight ports had

been opened, tariff rights were controlled by foreign powers, and foreign laws

were instituted to represent foreign nationals. (Gordon, 2003, 50)

To the Japanese, these treaties were “humiliating in theory and in practice,” and “Politically and economically, Japan became legally subordinate to foreign governments,” (Gordon, 2003, 50). This bottom‐of‐the‐barrel position in the global order was a disgrace to Japanese sovereignty and pride. As a result, anger grew among many Japanese who saw their country crumbling to the West.

Over time, tension grew among rival daimyo clans who saw the reigning

Tokugawa government as a contributor to Japan’s increasing weakness against foreign powers. This anger culminated in the disposal of the Tokugawa government and the reinstitution of the Meiji emperor as the leader of Japan in

1868. (Gordon, 2003, 58)

The initial interactions between Japan and the West began to set the stage for the creation Japanese whiteness. From the beginning, the Western nations

sought to subject Japan (and the rest of Asia) to their globalized racial contract.

At this time, white superiority was the justification for colonialism and

imperialism. Ironically, Japan’s subservient status in this global system would

fuel Japan’s desire to rise quickly as an international power and the development

of Japanese whiteness as the country became an empire.

24 The reinstitution of the emperor as the supreme ruler of Japan started the beginning of the Meiji era. This era, unlike all other previous times in Japanese history, was a period of intense interaction with the outside world. Just a few years before the reinstitution of the emperor, Japan had opened its borders to the

West, and was making efforts to actively partake in international relations.

Relations with the West also allowed for the rapid industrialization of Japan and its transition into modernity. Thusly, the Meiji period was a revolutionary era in

Japan.

After the reinstatement of Japan’s emperor as the head of the Japanese government in 1868, Meiji leaders began to further revolutionize Japan’s political order by breaking down the more than two hundred autonomous domains and their daimyo leaders. After three years of reorganizing, the emperor announced that all the domains had been dismantled and that Japan would now be divided into seventy‐two prefectures. Governors, who were appointed by the central government in Tokyo, headed prefectures. With the newly created prefectures and centralized governmental control in Tokyo, the Meiji leaders were able to set up a new system of tax collection. The system was a major change because now the central government collected taxes, as apposed to previous years when the daimyo leaders collected taxes for their domains. (Gordon, 2003, 62‐64)

The economic side of the Meiji revolution began with tax reforms in the

early 1870s. The new tax system implemented a national tax on land. Tax

revenues went to the federal government in Tokyo, and were used for public

25 works, such as the national railroad system. The rapid industrialization of the country was financed through these new tax revenues. (Gordon, 2003, 71‐72)

Some of the most significant, or most revolutionary, reforms in the government were those caused by international influence. Modernization in

Japan meant the understanding and adoption of all things Western. To gain the knowledge necessary for modernizing Japan, many Japanese traveled abroad to learn the secrets of the West; for the first time in over two hundred years,

Japanese were not only allowed to travel abroad, they were encouraged to.

(Gordon, 2003, 72)

The most famous expedition was the Iwakura Mission from 1871 to 1873.

The purpose of the mission was to bring back information to Japan regarding political institutions and practices, as well as information regarding economics, education, and science, etc. The members of the Iwakura Mission were astonished by the social systems and industrial power of the West. The knowledge they gained would be put to use in reforming Japan’s government and strengthening Japan with improvements in technology and industry. This progress towards modernization was conducted under the phrase fukoku kyouhei, meaning “rich country, strong army.” In some sense, this mantra became the framework for Japanese whiteness. In order to become a dominant power, the

Japanese would need military and economic strength to demonstrate their transition from being non‐white to white.(Gordon, 2003,70)

26 At first, this reverse in stance of attitude towards the West seems surprising. Roughly two decades earlier, Japan was a closed country that prohibited foreigners from entering the country. Furthermore, when Westerners started coming in after Japan opened up in 1854, there was a widespread call for their expulsion. Why now was there such enthusiasm towards the West? The answer is simple: the Japanese wanted to know their enemy. The Japanese never forgot the exploitative treaties they were coerced into signing with the West.

With warning signs of colonization coming from China and other parts of Asia,

Japan knew its only option was to submit, and the subordinate role they were forced into was a source of great shame and anger. However, the Japanese were well aware that they lacked the military strength required to assert their sovereignty. Instead of resisting, the Japanese cooperated with western countries and in exchange they were given access to all sorts of information and technology, which would allow for the country’s industrialization. All of these efforts were focused on a single goal: to become an international power on par with the West.

From borrowed Western technology, industrialization in Japan quickly modernized Japan’s cities. Railroads and other infrastructure emerged to meet the economic demands of transportation of people and goods. Furthermore,

Japan’s light industries, such as textiles, boomed. All of these advancements helped push Japan towards levels of modernization similar to Western powers, and “by the end of the nineteenth century, Japan had shifted from a relatively marginal position to a dominant place in Asia,” (Gordon, 2003,115). It is in this

27 time that feelings of Japanese superiority and nationalism begin to manifest in the birth of imperial Japan.

From the example set by the western powers, Japan quickly learned that international order was organized on the principle of “colonize or be colonized,” and industrialization had given Japan the strength and resources to achieve this goal. What subsequently occurred between Japan and its Asian neighbors over the next several decades directly mirrors the way it had been initially treated by the West.

The first country to experience the new power of Japan was Korea.

Historically, Japan’s relationship with Korea involved tremendous inter‐cultural exchange. However, beginning in the Tokugawa era, a sense of Japanese superiority over Korea began to emerge when relations became more one‐sided.

In the final decades of the nineteenth century, Japan was ready to exercise its superiority.

Japan’s first act was to use its new navy to forcefully open trading ports in

Korea. In addition, the Treaty of Kanghwa gave the right for Japanese law to be used for the Japanese. Furthermore, in the 1880s, Japan began to send military advisors to Korea. However, the action put pressure on China, who in turn sent advisors. As a result tension was quickly rising in the region. By 1894, the build up of tension led to war. When China increased its military presence, at the request of Korea, Japan saw a pretext for war. Up against a force of eight thousand Japanese troops, China continued to refuse to back down. In response,

28 Japan took control over the Korean royal palace and declared war on China. The

conflict lasted until April of 1895, and resulted in victory for the Japanese.

(Gordon, 2003,118)

Japan’s victory over China in Korea came as a surprise throughout the

world. Western powers were shocked to see how rapidly Japan had turned into

an international power. The victory also marked the beginning of Japanese

imperialism. The conflict had demonstrated Japan’s newfound military power

and ability to assert itself internationally. Furthermore, the victory yielded

Japan’s first colony, Taiwan, which Japan would continue to regulate with a force

of sixty thousand troops. (Gordon, 2003, 118)

More importantly, Japan’s victory in the Sino‐Japanese War was a huge

boost for Japanese nationalism and the notion of Japanese superiority. Defeating

the region’s thousand‐year‐old hegemonic power was extremely significant;

more so because Japan had once been subordinate to China. While Japan had

established itself as the region’s new power, international respect from the West

remained elusive. The clearest indicator of this was the forced cessation, by a coalition of Russia, France, and Germany, of the Liaodong peninsula, which it had also acquired at the end of the Sino‐Japanese War. This action reminded Japan of its position in the international sphere. As journalist Tokutomi Soho stated,

“What it came down to was that sincerity and justice did not amount to a thing if you were not strong enough…Japan’s progress…would ultimately depend upon military strength,” (Gordon, 2003,119).

29 With China removed from the picture, Japan continued to increase its influence in Korea. As a result of Japan’s dominance in the region increasing,

Russia began to sense that its own interests in the region were being compromised. They responded with an increased military presence in

Manchuria and captured the Liaodong peninsula in 1898. Unwilling to lose its foothold in the region, Japan responded by sending ten thousand troops to assist the British in winning the Boxer Rebellion. The victory resulted in an alliance in

1902 between Britain and Japan that guaranteed support against the Russians if they encroached on Japan’s interests in Korea. (Gordon, 2003, 120)

While Russia never attacked, its continued presence in the region was extremely irritating to the Japanese. Back in Japan, the press, as well as other groups of elite politicians and intellectuals began calling for war against Russia to finally put an end to the tension and secure Japan’s international power. Their call was answered with the declaration of war against Russia in 1904. (Gordon,

2003, 121)

The Russo‐Japanese War was a grueling conflict for the Japanese. Victory was anything but assured, and the Japanese military sustained heavy losses in personnel and resources. After a year and a half of fighting, both sides were running short on supplies and funds. In September 1905, a peace agreement was reached, and Russia gave up railway control in Manchuria and recognized Japan’s authority in Korea. (Gordon, 2003, 121)

30 The military victory over Russia was a great success for Japan and fueled an increase in Japanese nationalism as news of Japan’s international power dominated newsprint. While the victory did not yield as much gain as the Sino‐

Japanese War, Japan’s defeat of the Russians, a western power, was a good signal that Japan was becoming an international power. In addition, feelings of

Japanese superiority, at least over other Asians, began to solidify with complete control of Taiwan and Korea. These feelings only increased after Japan formally annexed Korea. (Gordon, 2003,123)

With the control over new colonies in Asia and the defeat of a western power, Japan had finally attained its goal of creating a new regional order in Asia and having power that rivaled the West. These victories would give Japan the confidence to expand its empire throughout Asia over the next several decades.

To ensure the success of the empire, the Japanese government sought to boost nationalism and patriotic pride amongst the Japanese. To do this, the government founded the Imperial Military Reserve Association, which “wished to raise the military preparedness among men who might be called to active duty in an emergency,” and instituted two more years of compulsory education to

“promote nationalism and respect for authority…[and] emphasize nationalism and the emperor,” (Gordon, 2003,136). These actions were designed to indoctrinate the Japanese in the notion of Japanese superiority; a state‐controlled dissemination of Japanese whiteness.

31 By the end of the 1920s, nationalism was booming in Japan, especially among military leaders who were vying for political power through military control. These leaders wanted Japan to assert aggressive control and expand the empire throughout Asia. However, convincing the government to act was difficult. The solution was to sabotage some railway in Manchuria and frame the

Chinese military for the attack. This attack in 1931, known as the Manchurian

Incident, gave the imperial army in Manchuria the excuse for war. The resulting victory led to the creation of a puppet‐state known as Manchukuo. While it was not an official colony of Japan, it maintained total control of the region and picked its leaders. (Gordon, 2003,188)

Japan’s military presence in Manchuria increased and expanded into China over the next several years. By 1935, the Japanese military had forced Chinese troops to withdraw from Beijing and Tianjin. Furthermore, the leadership of

China was now under direct influence from Japan. (Gordon, 2003,190)

By 1937, the Japanese military had expanded its occupation into the

Shandong peninsula and south to the city of Nanjing. During the occupation of

Nanjing, Japanese soldiers captured tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers and civilians to be executed. In addition, soldiers raped thousands of women, even young girls. The massacre at Nanjing also offers an insight to the mindset of

Japanese soldiers, as well as the military leaders in China and back in Japan who allowed the massacre to continue for weeks; “Taught to hate a dehumanized

32 enemy,” Japanese soldiers vented their rage against the Chinese, who they

deemed subordinate to the superior Japanese (Gordon, 2003,206).

The attitude of Japanese soldiers towards the Chinese people is indicative

of flourishing Japanese whiteness. The dehumanized view of the Chinese is a

clear differentialization between persons and subpersons. This is one of the most

crucial tenants of the racial contract. In order for the Japanese to justify the

inhumane treatment of the Chinese, they had to establish that they were not

human. By placing the Chinese in a sub‐people category, the Japanese could

rationalize their cruel treatment as acceptable since the Chinese did not count as

people.

Outside of China, Japan sought to expand its empire into Southeast Asia in

order to secure natural resources to fuel its imperial campaign. With permission from the French government, Japan expanded into Indochina in July 1941. In response to this action, the United States put an export embargo on the Japanese empire. After a failed attempt to negotiate with the U.S., Japan carried out an attack on Pearl Harbor; sending the two countries to war. (Gordon, 2003, 209)

Japan’s war against the West in the Pacific was quite popular among the

Japanese. The series of victories against the U.S. at Pearl Harbor, the British in

Singapore and Burma, and in the Philippines and Indonesia sent a feeling

throughout Japan “to return Asia to Asian control,” (Gordon, 2003,210); a goal

that seems to fall in line with creating a Japan‐centric global racial contract in

Asia. Despite the benevolence of this assertion, the war in the Pacific had harsh

33 consequences for those people under Japanese control. In Korea, thousands of people were pressed into labor in Japanese mines or at construction sites in

China. In Taiwan, men were pressed into military service and others were forced to work in factories. Finally, thousands of women throughout these Japanese occupied regions were pressed into forced prostitution for the military.

Furthermore, as the war endured, Japan began confiscating food supplies from the locals of their newly controlled territory in order to feed the military. One instance of this led to a famine that resulted in the death of nearly one million

Vietnamese. (Gordon, 2003,210‐211)

The war in the Pacific dragged on for years until the atomic bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced Japan’s surrender in August 1945. In the aftermath of the war, Japan’s major cities were left burned to the ground and the

Japanese people starving. Moreover, Japan’s imperial occupation throughout

Asia left countless people dead or starving. In the end, the attempt to reorganize regional order under the authority of the Japanese empire, fueled by sentiments of nationalistic fervor and feelings of superiority, ultimately failed. After the

Allied victory in Asia, Japan was forced to return to its own original borders, and its military was dissolved. For the next seven years, between 1945 and 1952, the

U.S. led occupation would seek to reconstruct Japan and bring it out of the despair caused by the war.

It goes without saying the war era of Japanese imperialism was a time marked by tremendous conflict and hardship. Whatever brief account I have

34 provided on this tragic period in history does not do justice whatsoever in illustrating the devastation that occurred in those years. In response to this, I must reiterate that the aim of this section was not to serve as an in‐depth account of historical events; rather it was organized to provide a background for the birth of Japanese whiteness and the source of its creation.

From this brief historical account, it should be clear that Japanese whiteness came into existence in the 20th century from the resulting combination of Japan’s historical relationship to the Asian region and the increase of nationalist pride and imperialist fervor during the late 19th and 20th centuries.

However, these two sources alone do not provide the complete catalyst for

Japanese whiteness. In fact, the primary part for the creation of Japanese whiteness rests in the hands of the Western powers that entered Japan in the middle of the 19th century. While it had been previously established that the

Japanese were interested in a new Japan‐centric regional order during the

Tokugawa era, it was truly the interactions with the West that would allow for

Japan to pursue this mission, ultimately resulting in the birth of Japanese whiteness.

From their interactions with the West, Japan learned the truly valuable lesson that in the international world of the 19th century, there were only two groups of states: the ones colonized and the ones doing the colonizing. When

Japan saw its neighbors in Asia fall to the control of Western powers, it knew that the only chance for the survival of its sovereignty was to become like the West.

35 What did this entail exactly? Well, it required Japan to industrialize and modernize itself to Western standards. This process was not easy, and Japan had to endure several hardships such as the exploitative nature of their initial treaties with the West, as well as domestic disputes over the best course of action for

Japan’s future.

Japan quickly picked up on the examples of colonial practice and interaction between “superior” (westernized) and “inferior” (non‐westernized) set by the West. The same policies of gunboat diplomacy and unfair treaties employed by the West on Japan, that had ashamed the Japanese and inspired a necessity for the creation of a Japanese empire that would assert international superiority, would serve as models for Japanese relationship with countries throughout Asia.

In essence, the West taught Japan how to become a colonial power and gave it the means to do so by assisting in its industrialization. Moreover, given the fact that Japan was left with few options for its place in the international order, one could argue that the West basically forced Japan down its path towards imperialism and constructing its superiority. The reason for this is because, at the time, the only way to avoid being colonized was to prove that

Japan was a “white” (westernized) country; since it was whites, the superior powers, who were capable of colonizing the inferior, non‐white regions of the world.

36 From this rise to power, Japan had gained its feeling of superiority in Asia, and thus Japanese whiteness was born. While Japan eventually lost its empire,

Japanese whiteness would prove an enduring sentiment within Japan. It persists to this day with established lines between who is white and who is not in

Japanese society. Furthermore, Japanese whiteness has led to the subordination of racial minorities to second‐class status, denying them access to the advantages common to the white Japanese class. In the following sections, I will be analyzing the political, social, and economic implications that Japanese whiteness has created for the hundreds of thousands of immigrants currently living in Japan.

37 Part II: The Implications of Japanese Whiteness

While the war was finally over, its legacies and memory would carry on for decades to come. Tension between Japan and its formerly colonized territories continues to this day, especially with Korea and China; and Japan’s refusal to admit to war atrocities, let alone apologize for them, committed in

Nanjing and other campaigns only serves to reopen the wounds of the war’s survivors and hampers contemporary international relations in the region. The war has also left a significant mark within Japan.

The next part of this research seeks to explore the affects of Japanese whiteness on the ethnic minority groups currently residing in Japan. The next chapters are devoted to the three largest ethnic minorities in Japan; Korean,

Chinese, and Brazilian. Collectively, these groups account for about seventy percent of Japan’s total foreign residents. Individually, the lives of these groups offer their own unique insight to the experience of living under the Japanese

Racial Contract. Through identifying and understanding how racial lines affect their lives, proof of a functioning and perpetuating Japanese Racial Contract will become evident.

* * *

38 Chapter II: Korean and Chinese Immigrants in Japan

Presently, according to the Japanese Immigration Bureau, there are roughly half a million Koreans living in Japan. These people are registered as foreign residents and are mostly the descendants of Koreans brought to Japan during the imperial era. Now, more than sixty years since the end of the Second

World War, Korean residents find themselves as the largest ethnic minority group in Japan.

When discussing Korean residents in Japan, the term zainichi is frequently used. This term, literally meaning “in Japan,” refers only to the Koreans who migrated to Japanese during the colonial‐era and their descendants living in

Japan today. Other Koreans that have since come to Japan or long‐term visitors, such as students, are not considered to be zainichi. Moreover, while the term could essentially be applied to any group of foreigners in Japan, the large number of Korean immigrants has resulted in the term almost exclusively being used to refer to them. (Lie, 2008, x)

Currently, Chinese immigrants represent the second largest ethnic minority group in Japan. Similar to Korean immigrants, the presence of Chinese immigrants in Japan dates back to the colonial era. However, having never been annexed as a part of Japan, immigrants from China were not regarded in the same light as Koreans and did not have the same rights.

39 As a foreign ethnic minority, Koreans and Chinese have had a profoundly different experience living in Japan from that of Japanese nationals. As a result, it is not surprising that they have had to forge a cultural and racial identity separate from mainstream Japan. This differentiated identity in combination with their minority status has forced these minorities to experience the brunt of Japanese whiteness. Today, they find themselves relegated to a marginal status in a country that they have had to make their new home. This next section contends with the case of these Korean and Chinese immigrants and discusses how

Japanese whiteness has impacted the social, political, and economic aspects of their lives in Japan.

* * *

During the imperial era, the view of Chinese immigrants from the Japanese perspective was similar to Koreans. To the Japanese, Chinese and Koreans represented a cheap and accessible labor market to fuel Japanese industrialization and imperialism; they were viewed as a commodity rather than a group of people. To the Japanese government, when the demand for labor was high, workers could be imported, and when the demand was low, workers could be deported; “the colonial worker was initially perceived as a flexible and inexpensive source of labor whose entry and length of residence in Japan could be controlled by labor market forces,” (Douglass, 2000,54). This was especially true in the case of Chinese workers, who were frequently laid‐off from work and often returned to China.

40 At the end of the war, around six hundred thousand Koreans remained to reside in Japan. This was little more than a fourth of the over two million

Koreans that came to Japan during the colonial period between the 1920s and end of the war. During this period, a labor shortage throughout Japan created a necessity for importing foreign labor from Japan’s colonies. To solve this problem, the Japanese government brought in hundreds of thousands of Koreans, mostly peasants and farmers, to work in Japan. Most of these workers were involved in agriculture or other manual labor such as construction and mining; others were conscripted to serve in the Japanese military. The lives of these workers were extremely harsh; many

“were subjected to slave labor, and many were injured, and in some cases killed, in the work place by accident, malnutrition, and maltreatment. Many Korean women were forced into prostitution for the army as ‘comfort women’ and taken as far away as Southeast Asia and the Pacific fronts, where many died or were killed in the final months of the war,” (Ryang, 2000,3).

The Japanese government also began conscripting laborers from China (in addition to Korea). Approximately forty thousand Chinese were forced to work in mines or factories between 1943 and 1945. The lives of these workers were harsh; the men were “put into wired camps, given below‐subsistence‐level provisions, and treated as slaves…17 percent, died from malnutrition, diseases, injuries,” (Weiner, 2009,118).

At this time, discrimination against Koreans was clearly visible, signified by comparatively lower wages and the habitation of slum‐like living conditions

41 (Lie, 2008,4‐5). In addition, “landlord‐tenant conflicts, cultural misunderstandings, and employment competition,” were all sources of tension between Koreans and Japanese (Lie, 2008, 6). At times, some Koreans began to resist Japanese dominance and responded, with violence, which often increased discrimination towards them.

Despite some of their harsh treatment, many Koreans tried to assimilate into Japanese society and form a Japanese identity. In fact, after annexation in

1910, Korea was officially part of Japan, and Koreans “were classified as Japanese citizens and enjoyed certain citizenship rights. Korean males in Japan…could vote and be elected to public office,” (Ryang, 2000,4). Many Koreans embraced

Japanese culture, learned Japanese, and adopted a new Japanese identity.

Furthermore, interaction between ethnic Koreans and native Japanese was far from rare. By the 1940s, “over a third of Korean men married Japanese women…well over 90 percent of Korean women married co‐ethnics,” (Lie, 2008,

11)

It is important to note, however, that this sentiment of becoming Japanese was most commonly held by the educated Koreans, who had the advantage of education to assist in the process of assimilation; for the impoverished class, illiteracy and a lack of education would make becoming Japanese exceedingly difficult. (Lie, 2008, 10)

At the end of the war, many of the two million Koreans in Japan were able to return home. However, those who stayed would soon find their lives

42 drastically changed from the imperial era, and they (as well as their children)

would live on to face further social, political, and economic discrimination.

Political Implications

The first political implication of Japanese whiteness becomes visible right after the end of the war. Up until 1945, Koreans had been considered Japanese subjects and were given rights, such as voting. This all changed when the war

ended. After the Japanese surrender, the U.S. occupation forces came into Japan

with the aim of rebuilding Japan as a peaceful democracy. The war had left most

of Japan’s infrastructure in ruins, along with millions of Japanese starving and homeless. The occupation forces set to work right away on coordinating a reconstruction of Japan. However seemingly noble the act, the occupation and reconstruction of Japan focused entirely on the needs of the Japanese; the needs

(and rights) of ethnic Koreans, and other minorities, in Japan were completely ignored, as well as restricted.

At first, in 1945, Koreans lost the right to vote, then, in 1947 they were subjected to the Alien Registration Law and required to register as foreign residents, and in 1950 they were ultimately denied eligibility for citizenship when the Japanese government instituted patrilineal parentage under the

Japanese Nationality Law in 1950. The full extent of Korean exclusion came into affect in 1952 with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which returned sovereignty to Korea but also revoked Japanese citizenship from Koreans in

Japan. Resultantly,

43 “Koreans lost the rights of political participation as well as occupational and educational opportunities which were dependent on Japanese citizenship, including the licensing of certain businesses, national health insurance, and social security. They also lost war veterans’ pensions and war bereavement pensions, and the right to overseas travel (owing to their lack of Japanese or any other passports),” (Ryang, 2000,4).

In just a few short years, this group of ethnic Koreans went from citizens with rights to outcasts on the social periphery.

Why would the Japanese government, after spending decades trying to convince Koreans to embrace Japan as imperial subjects, suddenly reverse course and revoke their status? One simple answer to this would be that under colonial

rule, since Koreans were Japanese subjects, the Japanese had an obligation to

provide authority and protection over them considering that they were the

“emperor’s children” as well. To some degree this may have been true, but it is

far more likely that whatever treatment Koreans experienced before and after

the war was conducted by the Japanese for their own interests. If one assumes

that encouraging assimilation was in the interests of the Japanese empire during

the war, then one can infer that the exclusion of Koreans in the post‐war period

was also in Japan’s interest. Consequently, what seems to be a reverse course in

Japanese policy towards Koreans is actually the propagation of Japanese interests.

More succinctly, the change in political policy towards Koreans is an example of

interest convergence, a part of Japanese white privilege.

When Japan was experiencing a labor shortage, it actively sought to bring

Korean laborers to work in the fields, construction, and mining. Similarly, when

44 faced with a military personnel shortage, the empire wanted to do the same.

However, in accordance with the military obligation law of 1927, only “those to whom the household registration law is applicable were subject to conscription,”

(Ryang, 2000,18). At the time, Koreans were not included in the Japanese household registry. Originally, this law was implemented for security reasons because the government did not want to risk having disloyal subjects entering the military. By the 1940s, the shortage in military personnel created a need for more conscripted soldiers, forcing the government to revise the guidelines, allowing for some Koreans to enter the registry.

This action exemplifies interest convergence because it was the need for soldiers that prompted the Japanese to allow for Koreans to change their registry; whatever benefits Koreans received as a result was only a side effect of Japan’s overall interest of winning the Pacific War. The Japanese government’s shift in policy towards Koreans in the early post‐war period further confirms this notion.

Right after the war, millions of people in Japan were left homeless and starving.

With the country essentially broken, the government needed to start rebuilding.

With little to go around, it makes sense that Japanese interests would have to supersede all others. By revoking the citizenship of the Koreans, the Japanese government rid itself of any civil obligation to their needs and (more importantly) took away their political voice by denying their right to vote; effectively ensuring that this minority population would go unrepresented.

45 Beyond interest conversion, other signs of Japanese white privilege became evident quickly in the post‐war period. Three provisions under the Alien

Registration Act in 1947 are examples of Japanese white privilege and non‐white disadvantage. First, the law “stipulated that the Koreans should be regarded as aliens…[and] required non‐Japanese residing in Japan to register as aliens,”

(Ryang, 2000,21). Due to their new status as aliens, Koreans living in Japan could be forced to repatriate to Korea at the discretion of the Japanese government. At this point, the Japanese government completely disregarded the fact that many of these Koreans had been living in Japan for decades.

A second provision of the law required all non‐Japanese be fingerprinted every three years, which went into effect in 1955 and was applicable to all aliens sixteen and above. As if fingerprinting was not enough, the law further required that registered aliens carry their alien registration card, which could randomly be requested by police, at all times. (Weiner, 2009,177)

The provisions of the Alien Registration Law served the interests of the

Japanese by firmly differentiating between who is Japanese and who is not. This allowed for Japanese white privilege to remain exclusive by denying the benefits of citizenship to non‐Japanese. Furthermore, the institution of registration cards, fingerprinting, and fear of forced repatriation all helped to keep the Korean minority in check. The Japanese government knew whom these Koreans were, where they were, and could subsequently keep them under their control with the threat of deportation. Finally, registration cards and fingerprinting served as

46 constant reminders to Koreans of their unwelcome and second‐class status; the only other group of people fingerprinted in Japan was prisoners.

Economic Implications

The economic displacement of Koreans went hand‐in‐hand with their political exclusion. As a result of their legally established second‐class status,

Koreans would face a wide variety of economic disadvantages. Beginning from the early post‐war period, Japanese white privilege would take precedent over the economic needs of ethnic Koreans.

The labor shortage during the war created a dire need for laborers from throughout the Japanese empire. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans came to

Japan to work in agriculture, mining, and construction. However, with the loss of citizenship and the institution of alien resident status, Koreans were prohibited from obtaining public and private sector jobs, and “therefore pursued informal‐ sector employment and, in so doing, created a new ethnic economy. In the immediate post‐war years, many engaged in illegal or marginal economic activities, ranging from illegal alcohol production to scrap recycling,” (Lie, 2008,

38).

The formal exclusion of Koreans from attaining employment forced many to hide their identity and family lineage. The level of concealment varies, from simply not bringing up the topic of Korean lineage to complete denial. Denying lineage is difficult, however, due to the Japanese family registry that details the family history of all registered Japanese citizens. Institutions, such as schools and

47 employers, have access to the family registry, making it easy to screen an individual’s history and verify if he or she is truly Japanese. (Lie, 2008, 20)

For Koreans, “job discrimination was an unquestioned fact of life in the post‐war period,” (Lie, 2008, 73). The degree of institutionalized discrimination in the decades after the war is best described in a survey of Japanese employers from in 1971; “Forty‐two percent of large employers responded categorically that they would not hire ethnic Koreans, and a further thirty‐eight percent said that they would find it ‘problematic’ to do so,” (Lie, 2008, 74). In 1976, Sakura Bank proclaimed, “We have no intention of hiring…Korean men,” (Lie, 2008, 74).

Ineligible to work in the public and corporate sectors of the Japanese economy, Koreans turned to self‐employment in the service sector. Jobs in this area were primarily in restaurants and entertainment, such as pinball parlors and clubs. However, it is important to note that many Koreans were able to have some success. In fact, yakiniku (a type of barbeque) restaurants began to be synonymous with Koreans, who “owned ninety percent of the roughly 20,000 yakiniku restaurants in Japan in the 1990s,” (Lie, 2008, 73).

When examining the economic aspects of Koreans’ lives in Japan, the implications of Japanese whiteness are once again evident. The revoking of employment eligibility served the benefit of Japanese white privilege and provides another instance interest convergence. The latter can be seen in the reverse course in employment of Koreans during and after the war. As previously stated, labor shortages during the war created a need for the

48 importation of colonial laborers. At the end of the war, these laborers were no longer needed because other Japanese could fill the labor needs for Japan’s reconstruction. If Japanese people were in need of employment, it was natural that they should have preference since they are Japanese. The continued denial of access to employment proved that that Japanese were unwilling to accept

Koreans on equal terms. As summed up in the assessment by Asahi glass in 1976,

“if we employ Koreans the workplace harmony would be destroyed,” (Lie,

2008,74).

Social Implications

At the source of ethnic Korean’s political and economic exclusion is their social status, deemed as ‘second‐class’ by the Japanese majority. Beyond being ineligible for attaining employment in public or professional sectors due to restrictions in their alien resident status, Koreans often find themselves excluded simply because Japanese people do not like them because of preconceived prejudices that have existed since the colonial era. These prejudices form a stereotype of a low‐class Korean identity that is rationalized by the Japanese through social practices, allowing for Japanese whiteness to be justified and perpetuated.

During the colonial era, the common view of the Japanese “regarded

Koreans as racially inferior…[that] laziness ranked with backwardness, poverty, and filth among the most salient characteristic of Korean life,” (Lie, 2001,106).

However, politically they still were regarded as Japanese subjects and maintained

49 a degree of rights and representation. In the post‐war period, new legislation may have changed the legal status of Koreans to non‐Japanese, but colonial attitudes towards them persisted. Coupled with the harsh times of reconstruction and scarcity, a very vocalized disdain for ethnic Koreans in Japan began to develop. Stereotypes of Koreans as violent criminals began to emerge as more and more turned to illegal black markets activities because they could not attain work elsewhere. Additionally, the rise of communism back in Korea led to the association of communism with ethnic Koreans in Japan. These two stereotypes led to the Japanese feeling that “Korean identity in Japan was at once polluted and taboo; Koreans were to be excluded and quarantined,” (Lie, 2008,

38).

The general regard of Koreans as a nuisance to Japanese society forced

Koreans to attempt to hide their identity and assimilate as Japanese. For the first generation of Koreans, assimilation was difficult due to “ethno‐national differences…perhaps most viscerally in speech and food…[that] manifested themselves in everyday life,” (Lie, 2008,17). However, second generation

Koreans, who were born in Japan, grew up speaking Japanese and attended

Japanese schools were more capable of blending in.

In order for Koreans to be a part of society, they had to pretend to be

Japanese. While it is difficult to differentiate Koreans from Japanese based solely on physical appearance, other factors such as language, family names, food, and cultural practices were all signs of difference. While language and other barriers

50 could be broken down slowly between first and second generation Koreans, names would always be a clear indicator of lineage.

Adopting Japanese names was not a new concept to first and second generation Koreans; under imperial rule, the Japanese government began requiring Koreans to convert their names into Japanese since 1940. At the time, the motive for name conversion, as stated by the Home Ministry was that “it would have been unbearable had the emperor’s army included persons named

‘Kim’ or ‘Li.’ The retention of Korean names was equated with the retention of

Korean identity and hence, evidence of insufficient identification with, and loyalty to, the Japanese empire,” (Ryang, 2000,20). After the war, many Koreans continued to use their Japanese names to avoid discrimination. However, discrimination persists due to profiling certain Japanese family names as being typical translations of Korean names. Ironically, these speculations can often lead to the assumption that a native Japanese person is of Korean descent even if he or she has no Korean lineage. (Lie, 2008, 21)

Nevertheless, it is important to understand that even though many

Koreans are able to pass themselves off as Japanese, it in no way proves that (1)

Japanese people are more open to and less discriminatory towards assimilated

Koreans, or (2) that assimilated Koreans in Japan have attained equality with native Japanese people. Many Japanese still remain steadfast to the notion that

“they can identify a Zainichi person, whether by their presentation of self (for example, as a loner or ‘lone‐wolf’), facial type of phrenology, the register of voice

51 (some say high, others say low), faint aroma, or some sixth sense,” demonstrating that the desire to distinguish even assimilated Korean‐Japanese from real

Japanese (Lie, 2008, 20).

Furthermore, discrimination against Koreans did not stop even if they were able to assimilate. For these assimilated Koreans, “the fear of exposure envelops everyday life,” and the necessity for maintaining secrecy about lineage was important not only for avoiding social discrimination, but also for survival; the knowledge of lineage could result in the termination of a person’s employment, the deportation of a person if he or she did not have proper documentation or was ‘acting out in society,’ (Lie, 2008, 20).

The social status of ethnic Koreans in Japan is a reflection of institutionalized racism and evidence of a functioning Japanese Racial Contract.

The prevalence of discrimination in the political, economic, and social aspects of

Korean lives serves as proof that Japanese society viewed them as second‐class citizens. Evidence for the existence of a Japanese Racial Contract is further compounded when we see the degree to which the Japanese went to exclude this ethnic minority. During the early post‐war period, Koreans were stripped of their legal rights to representation, and throughout the 1960s to 1980s, Japanese companies felt that Koreans could not function in their work environments; all actions that were conducted for the goal of preserving the Japanese identity and way of life. There was no space allotted for Koreans in post‐war Japan; in the pre‐war period, Japanese were willing to accept Koreans in a subservient

52 capacity as colonial subjects, but since the war was over and Korean sovereignty was restored, the only choices for the Japanese were to allow Koreans access to

Japanese society or to systematically marginalized them for the sake of maintaining their superior Japanese identity.

The final proof of a Japanese Racial Contract can be seen in the efforts the

Japanese have made to perpetuate their system of Japanese white privilege. The first aspect is fear. By maintaining a constant sense of fear among Koreans, through fingerprinting, alien registration cards, and the potential for ‘unruly’ aliens to be deported, Japanese society ensures that it will not have to worry about Koreans acting out against their marginalized societal status. Additionally, under the Alien Registration Act, the establishment of ‘who is Japanese’ and ‘who is not,’ the Japanese were able to keep their job market Japanese‐only by setting the legal precedent to deny public and private sector jobs from alien residents.

The contract is further perpetuated by the necessity for Koreans to assimilate.

Not only did the Japanese not want to see Koreans play a role in their society, they did not want to even hear their foreign sounding names; forcing Koreans to give up any and all attachments to their Korean identity. The priority of maintaining superior Japanese interests and identity over all others is proof of the Japanese Racial Contract.

53 Chapter III: Brazilians in Japan

The third largest ethnic minority in Japan is made up of Brazilian immigrants. At first, as non‐Japanese, it may seem that this group is similar to other ethnic minorities in the sense that they are another group of foreign residents. However, the Brazilian immigrant experience in Japan differs greatly from the experience of Korean and Chinese immigrants. This difference is generated by two main factors. First, whereas Korean and Chinese immigrants have been living in Japan since the late 1800s, Brazilians only started coming to

Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, new racial identity issues become more apparent with the case of Brazilians as factors of visible character traits allow for easy differentiation between Japanese and non‐Japanese.

What ultimately makes the case of Brazilian immigrants in Japan so fascinating is that a large portion claims to be nikkeijin, meaning “people of

Japanese lineage.” As first, second, and third generation Japanese living in Brazil, these Brazilians are in some ways returnees to Japan, but are unable to integrate into their ancestral culture due to visible racial differences, language barriers, and their culturally Brazilian identity. Due to these factors, Brazilian immigrants in Japan represent a unique case for racial discrimination in Japan because even though they are from Brazil, their experience in Japan varies depending on the degree to which domestic Japanese can perceive them as Japanese or as foreigners.

54 Despite their Brazilian nationality, ethnic Brazilians living in Japan can racially fall into three categories: Brazilian nationals of full Japanese descent, partial Japanese descent, or completely Brazilian descent. Regardless of their degree of Japanese ancestry, almost all Brazilian immigrants in Japan face some degree of discrimination. In terms of understanding Japanese whiteness, the case of Brazilians in Japan offers insights into the role of visibility of race and how it affects the manner in which different ethnic minorities are racialized. Moreover, this case helps to establish a clear line of difference between who is and is not considered Japanese by the Japanese majority. Finally, these insights further demonstrate the degree to which the exclusivity of Japanese whiteness is protected and maintained.

* * *

Between the early 1900s to the 1940s, roughly one hundred and fifty thousand Japanese immigrated to Brazil in search of economic opportunity and an escape from poverty they faced in Japan. At first, these Japanese immigrants served as plantation workers. Initially, most of these workers viewed themselves as temporary migrants who would eventually return to Japan. However, the loss of World War II and the resulting weak economy and poverty made it unreasonable for these workers to return to Japan. These initial temporary workers went on to become Brazilian nationals and many integrated into

Brazilian society and intermarried. (Douglass, 2000,128)

55 By the late 1980s, the population of Japanese descendents living in Brazil reached over one million. Many of these people were of mixed ancestry, having only one relative who was of Japanese lineage. Around this time Brazil was facing economic hardships and many Brazilians saw Japan, which conversely was in

need of unskilled labor, as an opportunity for employment. At this time,

immigration of unskilled laborers to Japan was still prohibited by Immigration

Control and Refugee Recognition Law from 1951. This law, initially intended to

prevent Asian immigrants from illegally working and residing in Japan, applied to

Brazilians even if they had some Japanese lineage because they were not

Japanese citizens. (Douglass, 2000,132)

Facing the labor shortage, the Japanese government sought to balance the

need for laborers and the desire to keep unskilled foreign laborers from flocking

to Japan. Many politicians and employers saw the Japanese Brazilians as a

solution for this dilemma. In 1989, legislators began to revise the immigration

control law by creating a provision that allowed for “a new long‐term visa

exclusively for descendants (up to the third generation) of Japanese emigrants.

This visa, designed to attract cheap ‘Japanese’ (nikkeijin) labor, granted up to

three years’ residence without restriction on socio‐economic activities,”(Douglass,

2000,133). The law allowed nikkeijin to relocate to Japan with their family and seek employment anywhere.

By 1996, the number of Brazilian immigrants in Japan reached over two hundred thousand. The new immigration law, effective in 1990, permitted these

56 Brazilians to work in Japan in the unskilled labor market. The majority of

Brazilians relocated to cities where manufacturing and industrial jobs were available. By 1995, sixty‐five and fifty percent of Brazilian men and women, respectively, were working as machine operators in factories; only seven and six percent, respectively, held clerical positions. (Douglass, 2000,138)

As the third largest ethnic minority in Japan, Brazilian immigrants represent fourteen percent of Japan’s total foreign immigrant population.

Population alone warrants a study of Brazilian immigrant life and identity in

Japan. Moreover, their varying racial identities as Brazilian and Japanese make for a unique case study. Being of Japanese ancestry, many Brazilian immigrants anticipated a feeling of acceptance upon their arrival in Japan. Similarly, many domestic Japanese were open to the idea of an influx of immigrant labor from

Brazil because they perceived Nikkei Brazilians as not fully foreign. However, pre‐arrival and post‐arrival perceptions rapidly changed on both sides, and

Brazilians immigrants from Japan quickly became aware of their marginal status in the social, political, and economic levels of Japanese society.

The social status of Brazilian immigrants in Japan is undeniably second‐ class. In fact, the Japanese government arguably preordained this second‐class status when they sought to allow Nikkei Brazilians to come work in Japan. The revision to the immigration control law allowed for unskilled laborers enter

Japan and fill the labor shortage in many industries. The law was not designed to welcome the Japanese diaspora back to Japan, rather “the legal admission of

57 nikkeijin was a political compromise on the part of the Japanese government taken, on the one hand, to accommodate labor‐starved small‐scale employers and, on the other, as an attempt to maintain racial, ethnic and social homogeneity in the face of progressive internationalization,”(Douglass, 2000,133). However,

“it did not take the Japanese long to realize that most nikkeijin are not the Japanese they had expected but ‘foreigners’ who neither spoke Japanese nor conformed to the Japanese practices and customs. When expectations of their ‘Japaneseness’ were overtly contradicted, the Japanese often verbally abused them, calling them stupid, secondary Japanese and uncivilized people from a backward country,” (Douglass, 2000,141).

As noted above, the language barrier between nikkeijin and the Japanese is a significant problem to their assimilation and social acceptance and it is one of the primary factors in their exclusion. A 1992 survey of Brazilians conveyed that

Japanese language courses were one of the most desired administrative services, yet this need is rarely addressed (Noguchi, 2001,166). For average unskilled

Brazilian laborers, Japanese language proficiency is usually not a requirement for their jobs. In addition, the tendency for these workers to live in immigrant communities makes it possible for them to function by speaking Portuguese.

When Brazilians have a chance to study Japanese, they seek lessons that are occasionally offered by volunteer teachers; language study offered through employment is rare. (Noguchi, 2001,174)

The lack of language training and employer’s low priority for offering language study to their employees is the first sign of discrimination against the

Brazilian minority. Moreover, it is a clear example of Japanese white privilege

58 and non‐Japanese disadvantage. First, by ignoring the language needs of this

immigrant minority, Japanese employers are denying Brazilians the opportunity to integrate into Japanese society. Without language ability, Brazilians are easily excluded and, in turn, unable to speak out against this exclusion. More importantly, the lack of language ability essentially condemns Brazilians to only be able to work in industrial environments, making upward socio‐economic mobility unattainable. This exclusion is evidence that the Japanese majority is focused on protecting its educated, middle‐class from being infiltrated by an ethnic minority and preventing this minority from being able to achieve a degree of social or political power through assimilation.

This institutionalized exclusion through denied language study is further evident in the Japanese education system. Along with Brazilian immigrant workers came their children. In Japan, education is compulsory for Japanese children between ages six and fourteen. This law applies only to Japanese citizens; non‐citizens are not required to attend school. For Brazilian children who wish to attend schools are permitted entrance to Japanese public schools.

Public schooling is conducted only in Japanese, so Portuguese‐speaking Brazilian children realistically only have two other options: attend expensive, private

Brazilian or international schools, or to not attend any school. The latter has become sadly common and causes many Brazilian teens to, “work in factories while others roam the streets, giving local citizens the impression that Brazilian teenagers are truants and delinquents,” (Tsuda, 2006,102).

59 Beyond exclusion due to language barriers, Brazilians also face blatant discrimination in their everyday lives due to visible racial differences. Such discrimination includes denied housing in certain areas, employment discrimination, and even open discrimination in public (Human Rights Report

2008). Additionally, Brazilians are sometimes denied entry to stores, restaurants,

and bars that have “Japanese only” signs hanging in windows. One instance in

1998 involved the removal of a Brazilian woman from a locally owned jewelry

store. The woman, a Brazilian television reporter, sued for racial discrimination

and surprisingly won her case (French, 1999). While the woman received

damages for discrimination, the refusal of foreigners into private establishments

still occurs in some places.

Another reflection of the day to day discrimination can be seen in the

journal of a Brazilian junior high student: “When I speak to clerks in Portuguese

at the Japanese department store, they just ignore me. But when an American

speaks to them in English, they will attend to him very quickly. The Japanese hate,

avoid, and discriminate against the Brazilians,” (Donahue, 2002,199).

Furthermore, an American resident in Japan noted that he was once apologized

to for receiving poor service from a store clerk because the clerk thought he was

Brazilian. (Donahue, 2002,199)

The poor treatment of Brazilian immigrants in Japan exemplifies the

degree to which Japanese society has gone to protect its white privilege.

Brazilians are regarded as an ignorant people from a backwards cultural.

60 Moreover, they are often stereotyped as criminals and miscreants. This overall negative view associated with being Brazilian has not only spread fiercely among domestic Japanese, but among many Brazilians as well, as seen in the account of another Brazilian student: “I feel a bit ashamed of being Nikkei Brazilian…Having a Brazilian background is perceived as slightly negative, at least here in Japan. I wish I could become a Japanese. Or. I wish I could have stayed in Brazil in the first place, so I wouldn’t have to feel this way,” (Donahue, 2002,206).

Throughout the early 2000s, the population of Brazilian immigrants in

Japan continued to grow. By 2008, the population had reached over three hundred thousand. In this time, issues of language assistance, the lack of employment opportunities outside of factory work, and social discrimination have remained problematic. The attempt of Japanese society to exclude Brazilian immigrants from entering mainstream society continues to be successful and is proof that overall, Brazilian immigrants appear to be largely undesirable to domestic Japanese.

A final testament to the undesirability of Brazilians in Japan came through

Japanese legislation early in 2009. In the face of Japan’s worst economic slow down in twenty‐five years the government began seeking ways to alleviate an increase in unemployment. The general consensus was to promote the repatriation of Brazilians back to Japan. Under this proclaimed ‘emergency strategy,’ “the country’s Brazilian and other Latin American guest workers are offered $3,000 toward air fare, plus $2,000 for each dependent…Workers who

61 leave have been told they can pocket any amount left over,” (Tabuchi, 2009).

However, there is also a condition that “those who travel home on Japan’s dime will not be allowed to reapply for a work visa. Stripped of that status, most would find it all but impossible to return. They could come back on three‐month tourist visas,” (Tabuchi, 2009).

Thousands of Brazilian immigrants quickly took advantage of the offer, especially those unemployed. However, the decision was not easy. Many of these immigrants had made new lives for themselves, as well as their children, in Japan.

But without opportunity for employment, many feel they have no choice but to leave. Either way, this act by the Japanese government is demonstrating the ill regard towards Brazilians. Since the Japanese government will not allow these individuals to reapply for visas to Japan, they are essentially submitting them for deportation. While Brazilians have the choice to stay, choosing to stay could result in unemployment and even homeless; thus the choice becomes somewhat involuntary.

The promotion of Brazilian repatriation is concrete proof of a functioning

Japanese Racial Contract. Under this contract, jobs and reliable employment are the privileges of the mainstream Japanese white majority. When unemployment began to rise, the government needed to protect the privileges of the Japanese majority. Moreover, former health minister Jiro Kawasaki viewed the economic decline was an opportunity to “overhaul Japan’s immigration policy as a whole,” stating, “We should stop letting unskilled laborers into Japan. We should make

62 sure that even the three‐K [industrial] jobs are paid well, and that they are filled

by Japanese…I do not think that Japan should ever become a multiethnic society,”

(Tabuchi)

The experience of Brazilians in Japan differs greatly from that of Korean

and Chinese immigrants. The primary source of this is racial differentialization

through the visibility of race. Whereas many Korean and Chinese immigrants

have been able to assimilate, or keep their identity a secret, by appearing to look

Japanese and speak Japanese, Brazilians in Japan are easily recognized from their

appearance and language. As a result, it is important to note how the Japanese

racial contract is constructed in a manner that treats races differently. Being able

to assimilate allows many Koreans and Chinese to access the upper echelons of

Japanese society by attaining higher education. In contrast, Brazilians, barred by

appearance and language, are unable to access Japanese education, practically

guaranteeing that they will stay in lower economic conditions. By visibly

appearing to be non‐Japanese, Brazilians are immediately racialized to a second‐

class status since only true Japanese can function properly in Japanese society.

This disparity in visibility has created a notably different experience for

Brazilians because they are racialized differently from Koreans and Chinese on

account of their visible race.

As an ethnic minority, Brazilians faced racism along similar lines as

Koreans and Chinese. Just like the Koreans and Chinese who were brought to

Japan to meet a labor demand during the war, Brazilians were encouraged to

63 come to Japan to work during the labor shortage in the late 1980s and early

1990s. However, in the face of an economic downturn, the Japanese government sought to repatriate these immigrants back to Brazil. This is a prime example of interest conversion, and coupled with racial differentialization, makes the case of

Brazilian immigrants in Japan evidence of a Japanese racial contract.

64 Conclusions

The Japanese Racial Contract, like any racial contract, is not finite. At any time, the terms of a racial contract can be set, reevaluated, and changed by the white majority. As a result, a racial contract is in some ways a living, breathing social implementation that conforms to the needs laid out by the ruling majority.

In the context of Japan, the Japanese Racial Contract has been in the

making perhaps since Japan opened its borders in the mid‐19th century (though

signs of Japanese feelings of superiority were evident earlier). However, over the

last 150 years, the details of the contract have changed. Changes in the social,

political, and economic status of ethnic minorities signify that the racial contract

is constantly be adapted and rewritten.

The first example of this is the change in the legal status of colonial

subjects before and after the war. In the post‐war period, the Japanese

Nationality law determined that Japanese citizenship could only be obtained

through paternal bloodlines. Furthermore, colonial subjects who had previously

been granted citizenship, such as Koreans, were stripped of their rights and had

their citizenship revoked.

Here, the presence of the Japanese Racial Contract is evident through the

concept of interest convergence. During imperialism, it was in the interests of the

Japanese to foster loyalty to the empire. By giving Koreans citizenship rights, the

Japanese created some assimilation that would strengthen the empire.

65 Additionally, in order to boost military forces, the consolidation of some Koreans into being Japanese allowed for easier conscription. However, after the war,

Japan was reduced to its own borders. In the wake of the war, preserving

Japanese identity and “keeping Japan for the Japanese” was the priority. To do this, the threat of cultural intermingling had to be removed. So, previous colonial subjects were no longer allowed citizenship. No citizenship meant no voice, meaning that Japan would be for the Japanese.

To protect their identity, the Japanese also introduced another reform in the early postwar period: the Alien Registration law. This law further protected

Japanese white privilege by requiring non‐Japanese to be registered as foreign residents. Residents were required to submit to fingerprinting and carry registration cards at all times. These requirements serve the interests of the

Japanese by labeling foreigners and keeping their whereabouts known to the government. Additionally, they serve as a constant reminder to foreign residents that they are not Japanese.

While the provisions of a racial contract can change, one factor is always constant: the needs, wants, and privileges of the white majority will always have priority over those of the non‐white minority. Moreover, it is important to understand that change does not signify progress. A racial contract can be modified to appear as though the laws of that society are becoming more open and less discriminatory of ethnic minorities. In 1993, after much protest from

Zainichi Koreans throughout the 1980s, the Japanese government finally

66 repealed the fingerprinting requirement of permanent residents during alien registration. (Lie, 2008,152)

At first glance, the change in fingerprinting requirements appears to be progress for the civil rights of immigrants. However, it is far closer to interest convergence than it is to altruism. For Japan, the benefit of the measure was to increase its international image. In 1979 and 1981, Japan ratified the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and the International Refugee Convention and

Protocol, respectively. In the face of these agreements, the treatment of immigrants domestically generated an image of hypocrisy. To combat the negative image, Japan relaxed some of its regulations on foreigners. (Lie,

2008,152)

However, a racial contract is not solely maintained through legal parameters. While a law can be relaxed, modified, or even repealed, so long as the social sentiments of racial discrimination are officially and unofficially upheld, the racial contract will always endure. Words can do more harm than laws, for legislation only offers the theory, whereas socialization is the practice. Ethnic minorities will never be able to assimilate if the natives of a society constantly single them out, marginalize, and degrade them. Finally, over time, these minorities may begin to accept their second‐class status and resent their identity, as seen from the journal entry of the Brazilian junior high student.

The aim of this research was twofold: first, to bring attention to racial discrimination in Japan, and second, to demonstrate that case of Japan is evidence

67 of the universality of the Racial Contract. It was not my intention to single out

Japan or Japanese society and denigrate it for its practices of racial discrimination.

Racial discrimination is not unique to Japan; it exists in every corner of our world.

However, this does not justify racism as an acceptable “the‐way‐things‐are” reality. On the contrary, as a socially constructed concept, we all share a certain degree of responsibility for the way we treat one another. If, at some point in time, humanity decides to pursue a more equal approach to human relations

(domestic and international), it will require an understanding of how we currently and historically have treated (and mistreated) each other along racial lines. Using Japan as the focus of this study conveys the applicability of critical race theory to various societies. The Japanese Racial Contract is only one of numerous racial contracts that exist and operate on local and global levels.

Ultimately, this research is only one part of an overall study of various societies needed to fully understand the extent to which racial discrimination and racial contracts govern all peoples’ lives.

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