An Economic and Institutional Analysis of Multi-Port Gateway Regions in the Black Sea Basin
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Domestic Train Reservation Fees
Domestic Train Reservation Fees Updated: 17/11/2016 Please note that the fees listed are applicable for rail travel agents. Prices may differ when trains are booked at the station. Not all trains are bookable online or via a rail travel agent, therefore, reservations may need to be booked locally at the station. Prices given are indicative only and are subject to change, please double-check prices at the time of booking. Reservation Fees Country Train Type Reservation Type Additional Information 1st Class 2nd Class Austria ÖBB Railjet Trains Optional € 3,60 € 3,60 Bosnia-Herzegovina Regional Trains Mandatory € 1,50 € 1,50 ICN Zagreb - Split Mandatory € 3,60 € 3,60 The currency of Croatia is the Croatian kuna (HRK). Croatia IC Zagreb - Rijeka/Osijek/Cakovec Optional € 3,60 € 3,60 The currency of Croatia is the Croatian kuna (HRK). IC/EC (domestic journeys) Recommended € 3,60 € 3,60 The currency of the Czech Republic is the Czech koruna (CZK). Czech Republic The currency of the Czech Republic is the Czech koruna (CZK). Reservations can be made SC SuperCity Mandatory approx. € 8 approx. € 8 at https://www.cd.cz/eshop, select “supplementary services, reservation”. Denmark InterCity/InterCity Lyn Recommended € 3,00 € 3,00 The currency of Denmark is the Danish krone (DKK). InterCity Recommended € 27,00 € 21,00 Prices depend on distance. Finland Pendolino Recommended € 11,00 € 9,00 Prices depend on distance. InterCités Mandatory € 9,00 - € 18,00 € 9,00 - € 18,00 Reservation types depend on train. InterCités Recommended € 3,60 € 3,60 Reservation types depend on train. France InterCités de Nuit Mandatory € 9,00 - € 25,00 € 9,00 - € 25,01 Prices can be seasonal and vary according to the type of accommodation. -
Ukrainian and Russian Waterways and the Development of European Transport Corridors
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei n. 30 (2005): 14-36 Ukrainian and Russian waterways and the development of European transport corridors Michael Doubrovsky1∗ 1Odessa National Maritime University, Odessa, Ukraine Abstract Four of the nine international transport corridors pass through the territory of Ukraine: №3, №5, №7, and №9. In recent years Ukraine conducted an active policy supporting the European initiatives on the international transport corridors and offered variants of corridors to the European community. In the field of a water transport it is planned to carry out the construction of new and reconstruction of existing infrastructure (regarding corridors № 9; TRACECA; Baltic - Black Sea) in the main Ukrainian ports. The paper considers the situation in the Ukrainian waterways as a part of the international transport corridors. It presents an analysis of the existing situation and some planning measures. In order to optimize and rationally development the inland waterways and seaports of the Black Sea – Azov Sea region it is necessary to speed up the working out and official approval of the regional transport ways network. Regarding Ukrainian seaports this task is carried out within the framework of program TRACECA, and also by Steering Committee of Black Sea PETRA and working group on transport of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. To connect the new members countries of EU two approaches are considered: (1) the use of the Danube River due to restoration of navigation in its Ukrainian part, providing an exit to the Black Sea; (2) the creation of new inland water-transport links providing a more rational and uniform distribution of freight traffics from the Central and Northern Europe (using the third largest river in Europe - Dnepr River running into the Black Sea). -
BEX – Bosphorus Express Loss of Goods During Transit
Book Serenity to get full compensation for damaged or BEX – Bosphorus Express loss of goods during transit. THE APL ADVANTAGE • Direct service connecting major ports and hubs in Far East Asia to Lebanon, Turkey and Black Sea • Fast and reliable connections to and from North Egypt • Direct and fast service from Black Sea and East Mediterranean to Far East Asia UKRAINE Odessa ROMANIA Constanta Istanbul Ambarli (Avcilar) GREECE Istanbul Evyap (Izmit) Piraeus TURKEY SOUTH KOREA LEBANON Busan Beirut CHINA Port Said West Shanghai Ningbo EGYPT Eastbound SAUDI ARABIA Xiamen Westbound Shekou Jeddah Transit Times Westbound Eastbound Port Said West Beirut Izmit Istanbul Constanta Odessa Jeddah Port Klang Busan Shanghai Ningbo Xiamen MALAYSIA Busan 25 27 33 34 36 38 Izmit 16 28 37 39 41 45 Port Shanghai 23 25 31 32 34 36 Istanbul 14 26 35 37 39 43 Klang Ningbo 21 23 29 30 32 34 Constanta 12 24 33 35 37 41 Singapore Xiamen 18 20 26 27 29 31 Odessa 9 21 30 32 34 38 Shekou 16 18 24 25 27 29 Piraeus 6 18 27 29 31 35 Singapore 12 14 20 21 23 25 Port Said West 3 15 24 26 28 32 Port Rotation Westbound Eastbound Port Terminal (Tml) Transit Arrive Transit Depart Port Terminal (Tml) Transit Arrive Transit Depart Day Day Day Day Busan Busan New Container Tml 00 Sun 01 Mon Port Said West Port Said Container and Cargo Handling 26 Fri 28 Sun Shanghai Yangshan Deep Water Port 02 Tue 03 Wed Beirut Beirut Container Tml Consortium 28 Sun 29 Mon Ningbo Ningbo Beilun 4-5 Container Tml 04 Thu 05 Fri Izmit Evyap Shipping Tml 33 Fri 33 Fri Xiamen Xiamen Ocean Gate Container -
Crimea: Anatomy of a Decision
Crimea: Anatomy of a decision Daniel Treisman President Vladimir Putin’s decision to seize the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia was the most consequential of his first 15 years in power.1 It had profound implications for both foreign and domestic policy as well as for how Russia was viewed around the world. The intervention also took most observers—both in Russia and in the West—by surprise. For these reasons, it is a promising case from which to seek insight into the concerns and processes that drive Kremlin decision-making on high-stakes issues. One can distinguish two key questions: why Putin chose to do what he did, and how the decision was made. In fact, as will become clear, the answer to the second question helps one choose among different possible answers to the first. Why did Putin order his military intelligence commandos to take control of the peninsula? In the immediate aftermath, four explanations dominated discussion in the Western media and academic circles. A first image—call this “Putin the defender”—saw the Russian intervention as a desperate response to the perceived threat of NATO enlargement. Fearing that with President Viktor Yanukovych gone Ukraine’s new government would quickly join the Western military alliance, so the argument goes, Putin struck preemptively to prevent such a major strategic loss and to break the momentum of NATO’s eastward drive (see, e.g., Mearsheimer 2014). 1 This chapter draws heavily on “Why Putin Took Crimea,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2016. A second image—“Putin the imperialist”—cast Crimea as the climax of a gradually unfolding, systematic project on the part of the Kremlin to recapture the lost lands of the Soviet Union. -
Black Sea Container Market and Georgia's Positioning
European Scientific Journal November 2018 edition Vol.14, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 Black Sea Container Market and Georgia’s Positioning Irakli Danelia, (PhD student) Tbilisi State University, Georgia Doi:10.19044/esj.2018.v14n31p100 URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2018.v14n31p100 Abstract Due to the strategically important geographical location, Black Sea region has a key transit function throughout between Europe and Asia. Georgia, which is a part of Black sea area, has a vital transit function for Caucasus Region, as well as for whole New Silk Road area. Nevertheless, still there is no evidence what kind of role and place Georgia has in The Black Sea container market. As the country has ambition to be transit hub for containerizes cargo flows between west and east and is actively involved in the process of formation “One Belt One Road” project, it is very important to identify Country’s current circumstances, capacities and future potential. Because of this, the purpose of the study is to investigate cargo flows and opportunities of the Black Sea container market, level of competitiveness in the area and define Georgia’s positioning in the regional Container market. Keywords: Geostrategic Location, New Silk Road, Transit Corridor, Cargo flow, Container market, Georgia, Black Sea Methodology Based on practical and theoretical significance of the research the following paper provides systemic, historical and logical generalization methods of research in the performance of the work, scientific abstraction, analysis and synthesis methods are also used. Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region has no longer been a static border between the West and the East. -
Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) Is a Quarterly Peer-Reviewed Free, Non-Profit and Only-Online Academic Journal Based in Germany
CCCAUCASIAN REVIEW OF IIINTERNATIONAL AAAFFAIRS Vol. 4 (((2(222)))) spring 2020201020 101010 RUSSIAN ENERGY POLITICS AND THE EU: HOW TO CHANGE THE PARADIGM VLADIMER PAPAVA & MICHAEL TOKMAZISHVILI AUTHORITARIANISM AND FOREIGN POLICY : THE TWIN PILLARS OF RESURGENT RUSSIA LUKE CHAMBERS THE GEORGIA CRISIS : A NEW COLD WAR ON THE HORIZON ? HOUMAN A. SADRI & NATHAN L. BURNS ENFORCEABILITY OF A COMMON ENERGY SUPPLY SECURITY POLICY IN THE EU EDA KUSKU “A SSEMBLING ” A CIVIC NATION IN KAZAKHSTAN : THE NATION -BUILDING ROLE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLES OF KAZAKHSTAN NATHAN PAUL JONES NEW GEOPOLITICS OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS FAREED SHAFEE CLIMBING THE MOUNTAIN OF LANGUAGES : LANGUAGE LEARNING IN GEORGIA HANS GUTBROD AND MALTE VIEFHUES , CRRC “DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ORDER ARE TYPICALLY NOT THE PROVINCE OF DEMOCRACIES ” INTERVIEW WITH DR. JULIE A. GEORGE , CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK ISSN: 1865-6773 www.cria -online.org EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Nasimi Aghayev EDITORIAL BOARD: Dr. Tracey German (King’s College Dr. Robin van der Hout (Europa-Institute, London, United Kingdom) University of Saarland, Germany) Dr. Andrew Liaropoulos (Institute for Dr. Jason Strakes (Analyst, Research European and American Studies, Greece) Reachback Center East, USA) Dr. Martin Malek (National Defence Dr. Cory Welt (Georgetown University, Academy, Austria) USA) INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD: Prof. Hüseyin Bagci , Middle East Prof. Werner Münch , former Prime Technical University, Ankara, Turkey Minister of Saxony-Anhalt, former Member of the European Parliament, Germany Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich, University of Vienna, Austria Prof. Elkhan Nuriyev , Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies under the Prof. Edmund Herzig , Oxford University, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan UK Dr. -
The Changing Strategic Situation in the Black Sea Region
DUYGU BAZOGLU SEZER The Changing Strategic Situation in the Black Sea Region Introduction The wider Black Sea region, which includes almost a dozen countries stretching from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea,1 has become one of the world’s most dynamic and fluid areas in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet era. The Black Sea region is bordered on the west by the Balkans; on the east, by the Caucasus, two of the most conflict-ridden sub-regions in the 1990s on the periphery of Europe. Spanning thus the southern belt of the easternmost periphery of Europe, the newly evolving strategic situation in the Black Sea proper has important implications for European security. This paper will address the following questions: What essentially has changed in the Black Sea region? Second, what are the main issues that are on the agenda of Black Sea politics? Clearly, these two questions are interrelated. The discussion is intended to throw light on how the Black Sea region has slowly been acquiring a new significance in and of itself, and how developments in this region relate to and impinge upon European security. What has changed? From Rivalry to Cooperation The end of the Cold War has terminated the Black Sea’s position as one of the immediate zones of global ideological and military confrontation between two power blocs. Only eight years ago the Black Sea, surrounded by three Warsaw Pact countries (the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria) and one NATO country (Turkey), was considered the microcosm of the Cold War. Today that divide of adversity is history. -
Argus Nefte Transport
Argus Nefte Transport Oil transportation logistics in the former Soviet Union Volume XVI, 5, May 2017 Primorsk loads first 100,000t diesel cargo Russia’s main outlet for 10ppm diesel exports, the Baltic port of Primorsk, shipped a 100,000t cargo for the first time this month. The diesel was loaded on 4 May on the 113,300t Dong-A Thetis, owned by the South Korean shipping company Dong-A Tanker. The 100,000t cargo of Rosneft product was sold to trading company Vitol for delivery to the Amsterdam-Rotter- dam-Antwerp region, a market participant says. The Dong-A Thetis was loaded at Russian pipeline crude exports berth 3 or 4 — which can handle crude and diesel following a recent upgrade, and mn b/d can accommodate 90,000-150,000t vessels with 15.5m draught. 6.0 Transit crude Russian crude It remains unclear whether larger loadings at Primorsk will become a regular 5.0 occurrence. “Smaller 50,000-60,000t cargoes are more popular and the terminal 4.0 does not always have the opportunity to stockpile larger quantities of diesel for 3.0 export,” a source familiar with operations at the outlet says. But the loading is significant considering the planned 10mn t/yr capacity 2.0 addition to the 15mn t/yr Sever diesel pipeline by 2018. Expansion to 25mn t/yr 1.0 will enable Transneft to divert more diesel to its pipeline system from ports in 0.0 Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr the Baltic states, in particular from the pipeline to the Latvian port of Ventspils. -
Reference Projects
REFERENCE PROJECTS Project Locations around the World © HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GmbH On the following pages, you will find a comprehensive list of the projects HPC has conducted ever since our foundation in 1976. 22/07/2021 HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GmbH 1/94 REFERENCE PROJECTS Project Title Client, Location Start Date Construction Supervision for Six Automated Victoria International Container Terminal 2021 Container Carriers in Melbourne, Australia Ltd. PR-3241/336003 Melbourne; Australia Application for Funding of 5G Campus HHLA Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG 2021 Network Hamburg; Germany PR-3240/331014 Simulation Analysis Study for CTA with Fully HHLA Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG 2021 Automated Truck Handover Hamburg; Germany PR-3238/331013 Initial Market Study for a New "Condition EMG Automation GmbH 2021 Monitoring & Predictive Maintenance" Wenden; Germany PR-3239/332005 Business Model Support with Funding Applications for the B- HHLA Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG 2021 AGV System at Container Terminal Hamburg; Germany PR-3233/331011 Burchardkai HPC Secondment BHP Safe Mooring IPS Aurecon Australasia Pty Ltd 2021 Melbourne; Australia PR-3236/336002 Brazil, Sagres Implementation of OHS Sagres Operacoes Portuarias Ltda 2021 Recommendations Cidade Nova Rio Grande RS; Brazil PR-3234/334002 IT Management Support for a German CHI Deutschland Cargo Handling GmbH 2021 Cargo Handling Company Frankfurt/Main; Germany PR-3235/332004 PANG Study on the Ability of Ports on the Puerto Angamos 2021 Western Coast of Latin America to Handle -
Information Memorandum Olvia Port Concession Project
Information Memorandum Olvia Port Concession Project September 2018 1 Table of Contents Chapter 1. General information and a brief summary of the Project 6 1.1 Introduction 6 1.1.1 Outline of the Information Memorandum 8 Chapter 2. Overview of the market environment 9 2.1 Summary 9 2.2 Part A: Ukrainian Port Sector Analysis 9 2.2.1 Historical analysis of the cargo flow of the port industry in Ukraine 9 2.2.2 National Demand and Capacity Projections Most Promising Cargo Commodities 21 2.2.3 Supply Chain Cost Analysis 40 2.3 Part B: SE SC Olvia Projections 54 2.3.1 Introduction 55 2.3.2 Grain Projections 55 2.3.3 Ferrous Metals Projections 61 2.3.4 “Other” Cargoes Projections 66 2.3.5 Conclusions Demand Projections Port of Olvia 71 2.4 Part C: Market Sounding - Potential Investors 73 2.4.1 Introduction 73 2.4.2 Context 73 2.4.3 Main outcomes of the market sounding meetings 75 Chapter 3. Legal aspects of the Project 76 3.1 Overview of laws, decrees, regulations and other legal instruments that are related to the Project 76 3.1.1 Seaport industry laws and regulations 76 3.1.1 PPP/concession laws and regulations 78 3.1.3 Dedicated laws/regulations governing specific aspects/relations under the Projects 81 3.1.4 Overview of concession project flow 83 3.2 The selection of the PPP model, its effectiveness from the legal standpoint 87 3.2.1 Concession 87 3.3 Concession object 90 3.3.1 Concession object under Ukrainian law 90 3.3.2 Comments on land issues 93 3.4 Comments on permit documents and approvals that may be required to implement the Projects 97 3.4.1 Permit documents and approvals that may need to be "transferred" to investors 98 3.4.2 Permit documents and approvals that may need to be received by private partners due to their investment activities and other Project-specific operations 107 3.5 Comments on insurance terms for the Projects 110 3.5.1 Key types of insurance relevant for implementation of the Projects 110 Chapter 4. -
Transport for Sustainable Development in the UNECE Region
NITED ATIONS CONOMIC OMMISSION FOR UROPE U N E C E TRANSPORT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECE REGION UNITED NATIONS Copyright © UNECE Transport Division 2011. All rights reserved. All photos in this publication © Fotolia, unless otherwise stated. UNITED NATIONS United Nations Economic Commission for Europe The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is one of the five United Nations regional commissions administered by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It was established in 1947 with the mandate to help rebuild post‐war Europe, develop economic activity and strengthen economic relations among European countries, and between Europe and the rest of the world. During the Cold War, UNECE served as a unique forum for economic dialogue and cooperation between East and West. Despite the complexity of this period, significant achievements were made, with consensus reached on numerous harmonization and standardization agreements. In the post Cold War era, UNECE acquired not only many new Member States, but also new functions. Since the early 1990s the organization has focused on analyses of the transition process, using its harmonization experience to facilitate the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the global markets. UNECE is the forum where the countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North America, 56 countries in all, come together to forge the tools of their economic cooperation. That cooperation concerns economics, statistics, environment, transport, trade, sustainable energy, timber and habitat. The Commission offers a regional framework for the elaboration and harmonization of conventions, norms and standards. The Commission's experts provide technical assistance to the countries of South‐East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. -
Hellenic Chamber of Shipping
Hellenic Chamber of Shipping MARITIME LAW REGULATIONS IN UKRAINE EVGENIY SUKACHEV Board Member Ukrainian Maritime Bar Association 24/10/2019 SHIPPING CAPITAL OF UKRAINE ODESSA IS THE THIRD-LARGEST CITY IN UKRAINE SHIPPING CAPITAL OF UKRAINE 8 INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT CORRIDORS TOTAL CAPACITY - 313, 3 MILLION TONS CARGOES 2/28 KEY FACTS ABOUT ODESSA REGION ODESSA REGION - 2ND LARGEST PORT POTENTIAL AMONG THE BLACK AND AZOV SEAS 7 FROM 13 TRADE PORTS - IN ODESSA REGION 11 RIVER PORTS TO HANDLE UP TO 100 MT OF CARGO ANNUALLY IN 2018 UKRAINE REGISTERED THE HIGHEST GROWTH IN THE CONTAINER TURNOVER VOLUMES AMONG THE BLACK AND AZOV SEAS 3/28 TOTAL CAPACITY - 313, 3 MT CARGOES Sea Port of Chornomorsk 17% Sea Trade Port Yuzhny 37.8% Nikolaev sea port 23.2% Port of Odessa 22% 4/28 CARGO STATISTICS & TRENDS IN 2019 Transit 6.9% EXPORT: 55.464 MT Import IMPORT: 10.961 MT 15.4% TRANSIT: 4.941 MT Export 77.7% 5/28 CARGO STATISTICS & TRENDS IN 2019 COAL OIL OIL: 3.167 MT 4.3% 6.6% CHEMICAL PETROLEUM: 538.78 THOUSAND TONS 3% CHEMICAL CARGO: 1.422 MT GRAIN LOADS: 24.5 MT ORE CARGO: 16.491 MT ORE COAL: 2.076 MT 34.2% GRAIN 50.8% 6/28 PORTS OF UKRAINE SEA - 13 RIVER - 11 7/28 OPERATORS IN UKRAINE PORTS 8/28 STATE AND PRIVATE STEVEDORES 103 PRIVATE PORT OPERATORS 13 STATE PORT OPERATORS 9/28 UKRAINIAN INLAND WATERWAYS 3 NAVIGABLE RIVERS, TWO OF WHICH ARE IN TOP-5 LARGEST RIVERS OF EUROPE 16 RIVER PORTS AND TERMINALS 60 MT OF CAPACITY PER YEAR THE LAW “ON INLAND WATERWAYS OF UKRAINE” MUST BE ADOPTED NO LATER THAN NOVEMBER 1 OF THIS YEAR 10/28 MARITIME AUTHORITY MINISTRY OF INFRASTRUCTURE OF UKRAINE UKRAINIAN SEA PORTS AUTHORITY (USPA) STATE SERVICE FOR MARITIME AND RIVER TRANSPORT 11/28 PSC THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATION IS AN EXECUTIVE BODY WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED AND COORDINATED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE MINISTER OF INFRASTRUCTURE.