Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2)
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.p/ NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration June 1990 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2) NgO-221&2 (_ASA-TM-]01104) FINAL _NVIRONM_NTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE ULYSSFS MISSION (TIfR 2) (NASA) 34L _ CSCL 13_ G3/_s Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2) Office of Space Science and Applications Solar System Exploration Division Washington, DC 20546 June 1990 ABSTRACT LEAD AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546 COOPERATING AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 FOR INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Dudley G. McConnell NASA Headquarters Code SL Washington, DC 20546 (202) 453-1587 DATE: June 1990 This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by the implementation of the Ulysses mission, a space flight mission to observe the polar regions of the Sun. The proposed action is completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft, including its planned launch at the earliest available launch opportunity on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1990 or in the backup opportunity in November 1991. The alternative is canceling further work on the mission. The Tier I EIS (NASA 1988a) included a delay alternative which considered the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. This alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from consideration when, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan IV, notified the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that it could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. Subsequently, NASA was notified that a Titan IV could not be available until 1995. Consequently, NASA terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV as a backup launch vehicle for the Ulysses mission. Even if a Titan IV were available, a minimum of 3 years is required to implement mission-specific modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration after a decision is made to use the Titan IV. Therefore, insufficient time would be available to use a Titan IV vehicle in November 1991. Thus, the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) for the November 1991 launch opportunity. Because the only launch configuration available for a launch in 1990 or 1991 is the STS/IUS/PAM-S and the environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S launch are the same whenever the launch occurs, a delay alternative would have the same environmental impacts as the planned launch in 1990. Hence, the delay alternative would provide no new environmental information and is eliminated from further consideration. The Iggl backup launch date is a contingency opportunity due to the short launch period available in IggO. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation and are treated in published National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle (NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC Environmental Resources Document (NASA 1986), the Galtleo and Ulysses Mission Tier 1EIS (NASA 1988a), and the Galileo Tier 2 EIS (NASA 1989a). The environmental impacts of normal Shuttle launches have been addressed in existing NEPA documentation and are briefly summarized in Chapter 4. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects have been judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. There could also be environmental impacts associated with the accidental release of radiological material during launch, deployment, or interplanetary trajectory injection of the Ulysses spacecraft. Intensive analysis indicates that the probability of release is small. The most probable release occurs during Mission Phase 4, interplanetary trajectory injection, with a total probability of release of 1 in 4,670 (2.14 x 10"4). Even in the rare event of a release, comprehensive analysis indicates that the chances of adverse health or environmental consequences are remote No accident scenario in a_y phase of this mission, to a probability level of 1 in one million (] x IO" ), would lead to a fatality. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative; however, the U.S. Government and the European Space Agency would suffer adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts if this alternative were adopted. The scientific benefits of the mission would be delayed and possibly lost. There could be significant impacts on the ability of the U.S. to negotiate international agreements for cooperative space activities. ti EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION The Ulysses mission is a joint effort conducted by the European Space Agency (ESA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ESA is responsible for developing and operating the spacecraft and for about half of the experiments installed on the spacecraft. NASA is responsible for providing the launch on the Space Transportation System (STS)/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) vehicles, the remaining experiments, and the mission support using the communications and spacecraft tracking facilities of NASA's Deep Space Network. The Ulysses mission supports NASA's Solar System Exploration and Space Physics Programs. The scientific objectives for the Ulysses mission are to conduct studies of the Sun and the heliosphere (i.e., the regions of space for which the Sun provides the primary influence) over a wide and unexplored range of heliographic latitudes. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED The proposed action addressed by this (Tier 2) Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) is the completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses mission, including its launch at the earliest available launch opportunity on the Space Shuttle in October 19g0 or in the backup opportunity in November 1991. The launch configuration will use the STS/IUS/PAM-S combination. To achieve an orbit over the poles of the Sun, the spacecraft must travel to Jupiter and use that planet's huge gravitational pull to propel the spacecraft out of the Earth's orbital plane and into a polar orbit about the Sun. The alternative to the proposed action is no-action; that is, canceling further work on the mission. The Tier 1EIS (NASA 1988a) included a delay alternative which considered the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in November 1991 or later. The Titan IV is not a commercially available launch vehicle; the U.S. Air Force procures that vehicle for NASA. The Titan IV alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from consideration when, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force notified NASA that it could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 backup launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. Subsequently, NASA was notified that a Titan IV could not be available until 1995. Consequently, NASA terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV as a backup launch vehicle. Even if the Titan IV were available, a minimum of 3 years is required from the decision to launch on a Titan IV in order to implement mission-specific modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore, insufficient time is available to use a Titan IV vehicle in November 1991, even if it were available. Thus, the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/IUS for the November 1991 backup launch opportunity. iii Because the only launch configuration available is the STS/IUS/PAM-S and the environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S launch are the same whenever the launch occurs, a delay alternative involving the STS/IUS/PAH-S would have the same environmental impacts as the planned launch in 1990. The 1991 backup launch date is a contingency opportunity due to the short launch period available in 1990. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation. These effects have been considered in the previously published EISs on the Space Shuttle Program (NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA Iglg) and in the Final (Tier I) EIS for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions (NASA Ig88a), the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), and the Final (Tier 2) EIS for the Galileo Mission (NASA IgBga). The environmental consequences of normal Shuttle launches are small and temporary, and have been judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations. In the event of (I) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the spacecraft from Earth orbit, there are possible adverse health and environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium dioxide from the spacecraft's Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). The potential effects considered in preparing this EIS include risks of air and water quality impacts, local land area contamination by plutonium dioxide, adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, the occurrence of adverse impacts on wetland areas or in areas containing historical sites, and socioeconomic impacts. An extensive analysis of the safety and environmental consequences of launch or mission accidents indicates very small risks to human health or the environment. The results of the detailed analyses are summarized for each mission phase. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an extensive data base on the behavior of space nuclear power systems, and their components and materials, under a wide variety of environmental conditions over some 30 years of research, development, test, and evaluation. This data base was used to develop models and simulation techniques to conduct a detailed, in-depth safety analysis.