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Transformation of Stereotypical Perception of „The Image of Poles” in the Russian Empire Society During the World War I
The Person and the Challenges Volume 7 (2017) Number 2, p. 151–164 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/pch.2188 Olga Bilobrovets Zhytomyr Ivan Franko State University, Ukraine Transformation of stereotypical perception of „the image of Poles” in the Russian Empire society during the World War I Abstract The cohabitation of different nations in the border of one state creates certain ethnic, social, mental collective nation’s image which changes very slowly. These processes are enhanced during the global historical processes with significant devastating effects which lead to an alteration in public consciousness. During World War І, under the influence of the external crisis circumstances, the necessity to take into account the strategic interests and fundamental values of the nations involved in the war, led to a change in perception of the image of the Pole. The image of a Pole as a disloyal person to Russian statehood had changed into the image of a true confederate in the mutual striving with the enemy. Perception of the Poles as partners in state‑building and international cohabitation became possible only due to global geopolitical changes, the policy of powerful nations, including the Polish territory and the ability of Polish political powers to consolidate their efforts around the idea of statehood restoration. Keywords Russian Empire, the image of the Pole, loyalty, World War І. The Person and the Challenges 152 Volume 7 (2017) Number 2, p. 151–164 1. Introduction The cohabitation of different nations in the border of one state always has its own features caused, among other things, by their status, historical circumstances and conditions of development. -
Venäjän Pitkä Vuosisata 1900–2008 Sitran Raportteja 78
Venäjä on aina ajankohtainen – hyvässä ja näkökulman naapurin monipolviseen ja Muodonmuutoksia pahassa. Krimin sodan jälkeen Aleksanteri II ristiriitaiseen kehitykseen. Tämän risti- avasi tien uudistuksille ja suuriruhtinas- riitaisen historian rakenteisiin Torvalds kunnan enemmistön kielellisille oikeuksille. pureutuu ja yrittää löytää sen järjen, jonka Seuraava hallitsija ryhtyi venäläistämään olemassaolon runoilija ja ulkoministeriön imperiumin alusmaita. Sitä seuraava johti virkamies Fjedor Tjutšev kielsi. maansa sotaan Japania vastaan. Onneton sota oli kuitenkin Suomelle onnellinen – Kaukasuksen elokuinen sota 2008 nosti sekä taloudellisesti että poliittisesti. taas nämä ristiriitaisuudet esille. Tätä samaa kaavaa tapahtumat ovat noudattaneet senkin jälkeen. Onneton vallankumous 1917 avasi mahdollisuuksien ikkunan suuriruhtinaskunnalle, jolla ei enää ollut suuriruhtinasta. Venäjän/Neuvostoliiton heikkoudet ovat muuttuneet Suomen mahdollisuuksiksi niin kaupassa ja teollisuudessa kuin kansainvälisessä politiikassakin. Samalla naapurin ratkaisut ovat muodostuneet Suomen politiikan haasteiksi. Venäjä/Neuvostoliitto on myös jakanut mielipiteitä eikä tämä jako mitenkään ole Muodonmuutoksia noudattanut tavallisia poliittisia rajoja. Venäjän pitkä vuosisata 1900–2008 Nils Torvalds on toiminut Yleisradion ruotsinkielisen toiminnan kirjeenvaihta- jana sekä Moskovassa että Washingto- nissa. Laaja kokemus sekä intohimoinen Nils Torvalds historianharrastus on antanut hyvän Sitran raportteja 78 Sitran raportteja Suomen itsenäisyyden juhlarahasto -
On Stalin's Team
© Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION When Stalin wanted to temporize in dealing with foreigners, he sometimes indicated that the problem would be getting it past his Polit- buro. This was taken as a fiction, since the diplomats assumed, correctly, that the final decision was his. But that doesn’t mean that there wasn’t a Polit buro that he consulted or a team of colleagues he worked with. That team—about a dozen persons at any given time, all men—came into ex- istence in the 1920s, fought the Opposition teams headed by Lev Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev after Lenin’s death, and stayed together, remark- ably, for three decades, showing a phoenixlike capacity to survive team- threatening situations like the Great Purges, the paranoia of Stalin’s last years, and the perils of the post- Stalin transition. Thirty years is a long time to stay together in politics, even in a less lethal political climate than that of the Soviet Union under Stalin. The team finally disbanded in 1957, when one member (Nikita Khrushchev) made himself the new top boss and got rid of the rest of them. I’ve used the term “team” (in Russian, komanda) for the leadership group around Stalin. At least one other scholar has also used this term, but alternatives are available. You could call it a “gang” (shaika) if you wanted to claim that its activities—ruling the country—had an illegiti- mate quality that made them essentially criminal rather than govern- mental. -
University Microfilms, a XEROX Company, Ann Arbor. Michigan
1 1 71-27,1+89 JANUS, Glenn Alfred, 1940- THE POLISH KOLO, THE RUSSIAN DUMA, AND THE QUESTION OF POLISH AUTONOMY. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 History, m o d e m , University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor. Michigan THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN'MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE POLISH KO&O, THE RUSSIAN DUT.Ll, AND THE QUESTION OF POLISH AUTONOMY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for .the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Glenn Alfred Janus, B.A., I*'i.A. The Ohio State University 1971 Approved by Advisor Department of History PLEASE NOTE: Some pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS. TABLE OF CONTENTS " INTRODUCTION Chapter I. THE RISE OF THE E N D E C J A ................... 9 II. CONGRESS POLAND AND THE I9O5 REVOLUTION . 35 III. THE POLISH KOLO IN THE FIRST DUMA: THE TACTICS OF A "FREE HAND" ........ 55 The Elections to the First Duma The Organization and Tactics of the Polish ‘ Kolo The Polish Kolo and the Autonomy Question The Polish Kolo and the Agrarian Ques üion Summary IV. THE POLISH KOLO IN THE SECOND DUMA: THE "THIRD A G E N T " ......................... Ill The Elections to the Second Duma The Tactics of the Polish Kolo The Polish Kolo and the Agrarian Question The Polish Kolo and the Autonomy Question The School Bill, the Budget, and the Dissolution of the Duma Summary V. THE POLISH KOLO IN THE THIRD DUMA; THE TACTICS OF C O N C I L I A T I O N ............. -
Cahiers Du Monde Russe, 56\/2-3 | 2015
Cahiers du monde russe Russie - Empire russe - Union soviétique et États indépendants 56/2-3 | 2015 Communiquer en URSS et en Europe socialiste Stenography and the public sphere in modern Russia La sténographie et le domaine public dans la Russie moderne Stephen Lovell Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/monderusse/8184 DOI: 10.4000/monderusse.8184 ISSN: 1777-5388 Publisher Éditions de l’EHESS Printed version Date of publication: 17 April 2015 Number of pages: 291-325 ISBN: 978-2-7132-2476-8 ISSN: 1252-6576 Electronic reference Stephen Lovell, « Stenography and the public sphere in modern Russia », Cahiers du monde russe [Online], 56/2-3 | 2015, Online since 17 November 2019, Connection on 20 April 2019. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/monderusse/8184 ; DOI : 10.4000/monderusse.8184 This text was automatically generated on 20 April 2019. © École des hautes études en sciences sociales Stenography and the public sphere in modern Russia 1 Stenography and the public sphere in modern Russia La sténographie et le domaine public dans la Russie moderne Stephen Lovell 1 Stenography brought about an unsung communications revolution in the modern world. For the first time ever human beings had a technology that allowed the written word to keep pace with speech and accurately record it. In the words of one of stenography’s Russian pioneers, “how many works of genius, eloquent sermons, happy improvisations, clever and lively discussions have remained unknown, lost to posterity, due to the incapacity of ordinary writing to transfer them to paper.”1 No wonder enthusiasts could promote stenography as a sign of human genius and progress. -
What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II
A Thesis entitled “Uncle Joe”: What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II by Kimberly Hupp A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of The Masters of Liberal Studies ______________________________ Advisor: Dr. Michael Jakobson ______________________________ College of Graduate Studies University of Toledo May 2009 1 2 An Abstract of “Uncle Joe”: What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II by Kimberly Hupp A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of The Master of Liberal Studies University of Toledo May 2009 A thesis presented on the American public opinion of Josef Stalin before and after World War II beginning with how Russia and Stalin was portrayed in the media before the war began, covering how opinions shifted with major events such as the famine, collectivization, the Great Terror, wartime conferences, the Cold War and McCarthyism. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents................................................................................................iii Acknowledgements .............................................................................................v List of Figures……………………………………………………………….vii List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………… .viii Introduction......................................................................................................... -
THE RISE and FALL of the BLACK HUNDRED by Jacob Langer Department of History Duke Univers
CORRUPTION AND THE COUNTERREVOLUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLACK HUNDRED by Jacob Langer Department of History Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Marty Miller, Supervisor ___________________________ Donald Raleigh ___________________________ Warren Lerner ___________________________ Alex Roland Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University 2007 ABSTRACT CORRUPTION AND THE COUNTERREVOLUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLACK HUNDRED by Jacob Langer Department of History Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Marty Miller, Supervisor ___________________________ Donald Raleigh ___________________________ Warren Lerner ___________________________ Alex Roland An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University 2007 Copyright by Jacob Langer 2007 Abstract This dissertation analyzes the ideology and activities of the Black Hundred movement at the end of the Imperial period in Russia (1905-1917). It seeks to explain the reasons for the sudden, rapid expansion of Black Hundred organizations in 1905, as well as the causes of their decline, which began just two years after their appearance. It further attempts to elucidate the complex relationship between the Black Hundred and Russian authorities, including the central government and local officials. The problem is approached by offering two distinct perspectives on the Black Hundred. First, a broad overview of the movement is presented. The focus here is on the headquarter branches of Black Hundred organizations in St. Petersburg, but these chapters also look at the activities of many different provincial branches, relating trends in the provinces to events in the center in order to draw conclusions about the nature of the overall movement. -
Memory of Stalinist Purges in Modern Ukraine
The Gordian Knot of Past and Present: Memory of Stalinist Purges in Modern Ukraine HALYNA MOKRUSHYNA Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the PdD in Sociology School of Sociological and Anthropological Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Halyna Mokrushyna, Ottawa, Canada, 2018 ii Table of Contents Table of Contents Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... iv Preface ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Methodology ....................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Research question ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10 Conceptual framework ................................................................................................................................................................... 15 Chapter 2: Social memory framework ......................................................................................................................................... -
Kronstadt NEP Kulaks USSR Korenizatsiia
Useful Information #9 From NEP to Stalinism The USSR from 1921 to 1939 Terms and People: Kronstadt NEP kulaks USSR korenizatsiia (indigenization) socialism in one country Nikolai Bukharin Joseph Stalin Leon Trotsky Stalin Revolution "Great Retreat" soft line on culture Cultural Revolution "bourgeois experts" Shakhty trial Magnitogorsk Dneprstroi Mikhail Tomskii Nikolai Bukharin Aleksei Rykov "Right Opposition" First Five-Year Plan (1928-32) Stakhanovite movement Ural-Siberian method Kolkhoz "Dizzy with Success" article Cheka GPU / OGPU / NKVD Sergei Kirov Nikolai Ezhov Great Terror (Ezhovshchina) "show trials" Gulag Important moments (1917-39) 1917 Dec Finland & Lithuania declare independence from Russian empire 1918 Jan-Feb Latvia & Estonia proclaim independence March Bolsheviks sign peace treaty with Germans at Brest-Litovsk May Recently formed Transcaucasian Federation dissolves Georgians declare independence with German encouragement Azerbaijan & Armenia declare independence more or less by default Nov End of World War I; Bolsheviks repudiate treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1919 Feb Signing of Soviet-Bashkir agreement (to make Bashkir Autonomous Republic) 1920 April Outbreak of Soviet-Polish War May Establishment of Tatar Socialist Soviet Republic (within RSFSR) Begins the process of creation of many autonomous regions (1920-22) 1921 March Treaty of Riga ends Russo-Polish war Revolt of sailors at Kronstadt fortress against communist rule Passing of resolution against factions within Communist Party Introduction of New Economic Policy summer Famine begins to spread in Russia, lasting until 1922 1922 March Lenin suffers first stroke Stalin becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party 1923 March Lenin suffers another stroke, removing him from political life July Formation of USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1924 Jan Lenin dies. -
V. the Rise of Stalin All Is Going Well Until Lenin Suffers a Stroke in May 1923
V. The Rise of Stalin All is going well until Lenin suffers a stroke in May 1923. There is a vacuum of leadership in the Communist Party. 5 members of the Politburo: *Leon Trotsky – foreign minister, chief of the Red Army, intellectual, Jewish. Not liked for Anti-Semitic reasons and he joined the party later than the rest. Seems to be the heir apparent. Gregory Zinoviev – leader of the ComIntern whose job is foster communist revolutions to other countries. Les Kamenev – chief of staff. Nikolai Bukharin – propaganda chief and supporter/originator of NEP *Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) – real name Joseph Dzhugashvili. Georgian not Russian. Lies about origin (Stalin Russian word for steel). Rises through the Bolshevik’s leadership rather quickly as a thug. Sent to Siberia multiple times, always escapes. Not considered a great thinker nor a great speaker. Didn’t do anything during Revolution other than hang around Lenin (yes man/occasional idea) and run the Communist newspaper Pravda. Very good at politics. Appointed Secretary to the Communist Party – not much power other than to confirm Lenin’s ideas and appoint commissars/anti-Semites (important later). After Lenin is incapacitated, Stalin, Kamenov, Zinoviev work together to discredit Trotsky. They start issuing propaganda trying to turn Lenin into a God-like figure of Communism (Cult of Personality). Petrograd renamed Leningrad. Trotsky was known to speak his mind and would argue with Lenin. When the 3 believed Trotsky was wrong on something they would denounce him publically as going against the will of Lenin. Stalin begins appoint loyal cronies to commissar positions. -
Final+Russia+Dossier.Pdf
Dossier Count Vladimir Kokovtsov1 -- was a Russian politician who served as the Prime Minister of Russia from 1911. Staunch and conservative, he is one of the most powerful figures in Russia and deals with matters with a trusted iron hand. He is extremely intolerant of the left or any of his opponents--political or otherwise, and often deals with them fatally. As prime minister, he has significant influence over the Duma, the lawmaking body in the Russian empire. He also has significant influence over Tsar Nicholas II, serving as one of his closest advisors. Prince Georgy Lvov2-- a Russian statesman and a supporter of reform, Lvov joined the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party. In 1906 he won election to the Duma. A serial playboy, Georgy touts liberal values loud and proud much to the annoyance of powerful conservatives who see him as an enemy to the future of Russia. He organized work relief efforts during the Russo-Japanese war in 1893, thus he has a fair amount of influence over veterans from this war. He believes in progressive ideals, and thinks that Russia needs to move forward. He believes that Tsar Nicholas might be incompetent and may need replacement. Vasily Shulgin3-- a Russian conservative monarchist, in 1907 Shulgin became a member of the Duma. He advocated right-wing views, supported the government of Pyotr Stolypin, including introduction of courts-martial, and other controversial changes. A strict, powerful political presence in Russia, he is a staunch believer in Machiavellian ethics and is willing to do whatever it takes to bring a highly conservative future to Russia. -
Better Now Than Later Jack Snyder the Paradox of 1914 As Everyone’S Favored Year for War
Better Now Than Later Better Now Than Later Jack Snyder The Paradox of 1914 as Everyone’s Favored Year for War One reason why Europe went to war in 1914 is that all of the continental great powers judged it a favorable moment for a ªght, and all were pessimistic about postponing the ªght until later. On its face, this explanation constitutes a paradox. Still, each power had a superªcially plausible reason for thinking this was true. Germany wanted to ªght to forestall the planned future growth of Russian military might. France wanted to ªght because the Balkan casus belli would bring Russia into the war, guaranteeing that France would not be left to face the German army alone. Austria wanted to ªght because Germany had given it a blank check to help solve its endemic, existential security problems in the Balkans. Russia wanted to ªght because, unlike in some previous Balkan crises, its army was reasonably prepared and France was already committed to ªght. All of these reasons, however, especially Russia’s, prompt crucial questions in ways that merely deepen the paradox. The basic facts about the military and economic capabilities of the powers, their likely war plans, and their domestic political constraints were more or less common knowledge. What would hap- pen in the event of war was fraught with great uncertainty, but this largely shared unknown did not include huge asymmetries of private knowledge. Moreover, key statesmen in each of the powers considered defeat and social upheaval to lie within the scope of possibility. In a dark moment, German Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke said that he expected “a war which will annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for de- cades to come” and bring pressures for revolution.1 German Chancellor Jack Snyder is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.